|Quotuplex sit causa.||How many kinds of causes there are.|
|1. Celebris est illa divisio causae in quatuor causarum genera, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficientis, et finalis, quam tradit Arist., V Metaph., c. 2, et lib. II Phys., c. 3 et sequent., cuius divisionis expositio omnino pendet ex singulorum membrorum exacta intelligentia, quam in toto hoc tractatu late prosequemur; et ideo nunc in communi solum proponemus ea quae circa hanc divisionem dubitari possunt et ea breviter expediemus. Primum est an omnia illa membra vere ac proprie sub diviso contineantur. Secundum an inter se distinguantur et opponantur. Tertium an sufficienter comprehendant totum divisum. Quartum an proxime et immediate causa in illa membra dividatur, vel possit aliqua divisio media excogitari. Quintum an illa divisio sit infima seu atoma, an possunt singula membra in alia dividi. Sextum, an sit univoca vel analoga.||1. The division of causes into four genera of causes---namely: material, formal, efficient, and final---which Aristotle teaches in Metaph. V, c. 2 and Phys. II, c. 3 and following, is renowned. The exposition of this division depends entirely on an accurate understanding of each individual member, which we will pursue in more depth in this treatise as a whole. And now, therefore, we will put forward in general only those things which can be doubted concerning this division and we will briefly resolve them. The first is whether all these members truly and properly belong to this division. The second is whether they are distinguished from each other and mutually opposed. The third is whether they sufficiently cover the whole division. The fourth is whether causes are proximately and immediately divided into these members or whether some mediate division can be contrived. The fifth is whether this division is basic or atomic or whether each member can be divided into others. The sixth is whether it is univocal or analogical.|
|Quatuor propria causarum genera||The four proper genera of causes|
2. Ad primam dubitationem dicendum est omnia illa vere ac proprie rationem causae participare; et ideo merito causam in illa quatuor membra dividi. Haec assertio, praeter communem omnium consensum post Aristotelem, sic probatur. Nam quod illa quatuor in rebus seu effectibus quos experimur inveniantur, facile declarari potest supponendo aliquid novum in rerum natura fieri; quod est tam evidens ex perpetua rerum vicissitudine, alteratione, generatione ac corruptione, ut illud argumentis probare supervacaneum sit. Si ergo fit aliquid de novo, necessaria est aliqua alia res a qua fiat, quia non potest idem facere seipsum, et hanc vocamus efficientem causam. Quae vel producit suum effectum ex nihilo, vel ex aliqua re quam ad suam actionem praesupponat; primum non potest in universum dici, nam experimento constat neque artificem facere statuam nisi ex ligno aut aere, neque ignem calefacere nisi aliquid ei supponatur quod calorem suscipiat, neque efficere ignem nisi ex ligno, stupa aut alia re simili. Immo hic modus agendi tam est proprius naturalium causarum, ut philosophi qui ad illas tantum attenderunt inde sumpserint axioma illud: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Illud ergo subiectum, quod ad actionem efficientis causae supponitur, materialem causam vocamus. Necesse est autem ut causa efficiens tale subiectum aliquam rem introducat; alias nihil novum efficeret contra positam hypothesim. Illud ergo vocamus formam, qualiscumque illa sit, de quo postea videbimus. Tandem, cum causae per se agentes non temere et casu agant, ut ipso rerum experimento constat, et praecipue in actionibus humanis, ut res sit extra controversiam, necesse est ut praeter illa tria detur etiam finis propter quem causa efficiens operatur. Reperiuntur ergo haec quatuor membra in rebus, sive omnia illa in singulis effectibus inveniantur, sive non, hoc enim postea erit inquirendum nam ad praesens sat est quod in rerum universitate haec inveniantur.
3. Quod autem quaelibet ex his vera sit causa, de materiali quidem, formali et efficiente, facile probari potest, nam quaelibet ex his manifeste influit aliquod esse; materia enim ab Aristotele definitur esse id ex quo insito fit aliquid. Ubi per particulam ex cum proprietate sumptam distinguitur materia ab aliis causis; per particulam autem insito separatur a privatione et declaratur proprius influxus, quo materia et in universum subiectum exhibet se, ut ex eo consurgat esse totius. Similiter forma seipsam exhibet ut illa tamquam actu compositum constituatur; immo frequenter definiri solet forma, quod sit causa intrinseca quae dat esse rei; materia enim est quasi inchoatio quaedam vel fundamentum ipsius esse; forma vero illud consummat et complet; propter quod ratio quidditatis appellatur ab Aristotele citatis locis. Item haec numerantur inter principia intrinseca rei naturalis, vel potius illa duo tantum sunt principia constituentia rem naturalem; sunt autem principia per se, cum sint maxime necessaria et essentialia, et dant esse eo modo quo explicatum est; sunt ergo propriae causae. De efficienti etiam patet, quia sua actione efficit ut res habeat esse quod antea non habebat; et ad hoc per se ac directe tendit actio eius; ergo efficiens est quasi fons et principium per se influens esse in effectum; quod esse effectus distinctum est ab esse efficientis; ergo tota definitio causae propriissime convenit efficienti. De fine vero potest esse nonnulla dubitandi ratio, quia nullum esse reale in eo praesupponitur, quo causare possit; sed, quia de hoc latius in propria disputatione dicendum est, nunc breviter declaratur, quia licet finis sit postremum in executione, tamen est primum in intentione et sub ea ratione veram habet rationem principii; nam est primum quod excitat seu movet agens ad agendum; est autem principium non fictum, sed verum et reale, quia vere excitat et movet. Unde sicut habet sufficiens esse quo possit talem rationem principii exercere, ita etiam rationem causae; illud autem esse, quamvis in mente sit, non est extra latitudinem entis realis, et ideo sufficiens esse potest ad talem rationem causae. Rursus huiusmodi principium non est per accidens sed per se; immo ab illo habet causalitas agentis quod per se et ordinate tendat in effectum; atque hac ratione per se influit esse in illum; ergo etiam fini vere ac proprie convenit definitio causae.
4. Contra hanc vero sententiam obiicere quis potest Augustin., lib. LXXXIII Quaestionum, in 28 dicentem: Omnis causa efficiens est. Quam sententiam videtur sumpsisse ex Platone, in dialogo de Pulchro, seu qui inscribitur Hyppias maior, ubi significat causam et efficientem idem esse et finem non posse dici causam; quod confirmat, tum quia est effectus, tum quia ipsius causae efficientis non potest esse causa. Eamdem fuisse communem sententiam Stoicorum, scilicet, quod sola causa efficiens sit vera causa, refert Seneca, lib. VIII, epist. 66, ubi etiam ipse eam probat: Quoniam si omnia (inquit) sine quibus effectus fieri non potest, ponenda sunt in causarum numero, plures essent numerandae, nimirum tempus, locus, motus, etc., sine quibus nullus fit effectus; in una ergo causa efficienti sistendum est, reliqua vero sunt veluti adiumenta huius causae, aut conditiones necessariae. Aliter obiici posset in alio extremo ex Socrate apud Platonem, in Phaed., quod solus finis nomen causae mereatur, nam tota causa rei est id propter quod fit; reliqua vero omnia solum sunt conditiones requisitae ut res fiat; unde interrogationi propter quid res est aut fit, sola responsio per finalem causam satisfacit.
2. In response to the first doubt, it should be said that all these truly and properly participate in the nature of cause and for that reason cause is rightly divided into these four members. This assertion, besides the general consensus of everyone after Aristotle, is proven as follows. For that these four are found in the things or effects which we experience can be shown easily by supposing something new to happen in the nature of things, which is so evident from the perpetual vicissitude, alteration, generation, and corruption of things that to prove it by argument is superfluous. If, therefore, something happens anew, it is necessary that there is some other thing by which it happens, since the same thing cannot make itself. And this we call `efficient cause'. It either produces its effect ex nihilo or from some thing which is presupposed for its action. The first cannot be said in general, for it is clear from experience that an artist does not make a statue except from wood or brass, that fire does not heat except something is placed next to it which takes up heat, that fire is not brought about except by means of wood, tow, or some other similar matter. Indeed, this way of acting is so proper to natural causes that philosophers who paid attention only to these assumed this axiom: `Nothing comes from nothing.' Therefore, we call this subject which is supposed for the action of the efficient cause `material cause'. Moreover, it is necessary that an efficient cause introduce some thing to such a subject. Otherwise, nothing new would be effected, contrary to the posited hypothesis. That thing, therefore, we call `form', whatever kind of thing it may be. We will consider it afterwards. Lastly, since causes acting per se do not act blindly and by chance---as is clear from experience itself of things and especially in the case of human actions, so that the matter is beyond controversy---it is necessary that beyond these three an end is also given for the sake of which the efficient cause acts. These four members, therefore, are discovered in things. Either all of them are found in each effect or not. For an inquiry needs to be made into this later, but for the present it suffices that these are found in the universe of things.|
3. But that any whichever of these is a true cause can easily be proven indeed in the case of material, formal, and efficient [causes], for any whatever of these manifestly inflows some being. For matter is defined by Aristotle as being `that from whose incorporation something is made', where matter is distinguished from the other causes through the particle `out of' taken with propriety. But through the particle `having been attached' it is separated from privation and a proper influx is revealed, by which matter and, in general, the subject presents itself so that the being of the whole arises from it. Similarly, form presents itself so that it is constituted as actually a composite. Indeed, form is usually defined as being the `intrinsic cause which gives being to the thing'. For matter is as if a certain beginning or foundation of being itself, but form consummates and completes it. This is why it is called the `account of the essence' by Aristotle in the cited places. Also, these are numbered among the intrinsic principles of a natural thing or, rather, these two alone are the principles constituting a natural thing. Moreover, they are principles per se, since they are very much necessary and essential and given being in the way in which it was explained. Therefore, they are proper causes. Concerning the efficient it is also clear, because it effects by its action so that a thing has being which it did not have before. And its action tends per se and directly to this. Therefore, the efficient [cause] is as it were the source and principle per se inflowing being into the effect. This being of the effect is distinct from the being of the efficient [cause]. Therefore, the whole definition of cause is very properly suited to the efficient [cause]. But concerning the end there can be some reason for doubting, since no real being is presupposed in it by which it could cause. But, since it remains to be discussed more thoroughly in the proper disputation, it is briefly revealed now, because, although the end is last in execution, nevertheless it is first in intention and under that aspect has the true nature of a principle. Moreover, the principle is not a fictum but is true and real, since it truly excites and moves. Hence, just as it has sufficient being by which it can exercise such a nature of a principle, so also the nature of a cause. Moreover, that being, although it is in the mind, is not beyond the latitude of real being and for that reason can be sufficient being for such a nature of a cause. On the other hand, a principle of this kind is not per accidens but per se. Indeed, it is by this that the causality of an agent tends to an effect per se and in an orderly way. And by this reason it per se inflows being into the [effect]. Therefore, the definition of a cause is also truly and properly suited to the end.
4. But against this true view someone can object that Augustine says in Quaestiones LXXXIII.28 that `every cause is efficient'. This view seems to have been taken from Plato in the dialogue On Beauty---which is also entitled Hippias Major---where he indicates that cause and efficient are the same and that an end cannot be called a cause, which he confirms partly because it is an effect and partly because there can be no cause of the efficient cause itself [(296e--297d)]. The common view of the Stoics was the same, namely, that the efficient cause alone is a true cause. Seneca refers [to this] in book VIII, letter 66 [i.e., 65], where he also proves it: `Because if everything without which an effect could not happen were placed among the number of causes, many more should be numbered, namely, time, place, motion, etc. No effect happens without these. Therefore, one should stop with one cause: the efficient. But the rest are as if aids or necessary conditions for this cause.' Alternatively, one could object in the other extreme according to Socrates in Plato's Phaedo [96--99] that only an end merits the name of cause, for the entire cause of a thing is that for the sake of which it happens. But all the rest are only conditions required for the thing to happen. Hence, to the question asking for the sake of what a thing is or happens, only a response in terms of a final cause is satisfactory.
5. Ad priorem obiectionem locus Augustini difficilis est; negat enim ibi quaerendum esse quare Deus voluerit creare mundum, quia hoc est quaerere causam voluntatis Dei; omnis autem causa efficiens est, quae in divina voluntate locum habere non potest; ubi videtur plane Augustinus confundere causam finalem cum efficienti; nam qui quaerit quare Deus voluerit creare mundum non quaerit causam efficientem, sed finalem. Dicendum vero est sensum Augustini esse, non esse quaerendam causam cur voluerit creare mundum, ita ut ipsius voluntatis Dei propria aliqua causa esse putetur, quia si divina voluntas aliquam causam huiusmodi haberet, haberet causam efficientem; non quia finis et efficiens formaliter sint idem, sed quia nihil potest habere propriam causam extrinsecam finalem quin habeat efficientem, vel quia finis ipse non causat sine efficientia, ut multa volunt; vel quia finis proxime movet efficiens ad efficiendum. Cum ergo dicit Augustinus; omnem causam esse efficientem, loquitur de causalitate extrinseca, quae nunquam est sine interventu efficientis causae; non tamen intendit Augustinus excludere quin cum illa causa possit coniungi aliud causandi genus. Alii brevius respondent Augustinum locutum esse stricte de causa, prout dicit relationem ad effectum stricte etiam sumptum et denominatum a verbo efficiendi. Sed hoc vix potest accommodari discursui Augustini, nam qui quaerit quare Deus voluit, etc., non quaerit causam ita stricte sumptam.
6. Ad Platonem, certum est illum posuisse omnia genera causarum quae Aristoteles posuit et fortasse plura, ut postea videbimus. Et in citato loco non dicit causam et efficiens idem esse, ut ei tribuitur, sed e contrario ait: Efficiens nihil aliud est quam causa. Quae propositio non potest simpliciter converti, ut per se constat. Inde autem non infert finem non esse causam, sed infert id quod fit ab efficienti causa esse distinctum ab ipsa, quia non potest causa efficere seipsam. De aliis vero philosophis existimo verbis potius quam re ab Aristotele dissentire. Nam ipsi non negant necessitatem et concausam materiae, aut formae, vel finis; sed in nominibus differunt, raro materiam vocant quid praerequisitum; formam vero potius appellandam censent effectum quam causam, quia ad ipsam tota causalitas terminatur, vel ad summum vocant partem causae, ut loquitur Seneca supra; finem vero appellant aliquo modo causam seu potius concausam cum efficienti seu esse quid superveniens efficienti medio proposito, seu intentioni finis, ut causare possit. Praeterea causa efficiens habet influentiam et magis realem et quodammodo immediatiorem ipsi effectui quam finis; et notiorem et quodammodo magis proprium quam materia et forma et priorem etiam illis; et ideo causae nomen interdum per antonomasiam vel etiam ratione primae impositionis pro causa efficienti sumi solet. Nihilominus tamen rem ipsam physice considerando non est dubium quin singulae ex dictis causis veram et proprium rationem causae habeant, et in suo genere totalem ac plane diversam ut in secundo puncto dicemus, et ideo multo melius Aristoteles haec distincte numeravit sub communi notione causae.
7. Nec ratio ex Seneca adducta quidquam obstat, non enim in causis numerantur omnia sine quibus effectus non fit, sed ea tantum quae per se influunt in effectum. Quod non habet locus, quia est quid extrinsecum; vel si sit sermo de Ubi intrinseco, illud non praesupponitur sed consequitur in effectu ut quoddam accidens eius. Et idem est de tempore; nam prout est communis mensura, extrinsecum est; prout vero esse potest intrinsecum, solum est duratio ipsius motus quo fit res, quando successive fit; ille autem motus non est causa, sed est potius ipse actualis influxus causae efficientis successive, ut infra declarabitur. At vero materia, quamvis sit quid praerequisitum ad actionem agentis, tamen in ipso instanti vel tempore quo agens agit, etiam materia per se influit in effectum, immo et in ipsam actionem agentis, si ex illa operetur, ut postea videbimus. Forma vero, licet sit effectus agentis vel etiam materiae, est tamen causa totius compositi, complens essentiam eius. Et quamvis sit pars compositi, est tamen in suo genere totalis causa eius, nec est cur pars causae appelletur, quia neque est pars agentis neque materiae. Quod si appelletur pars causae respectu totius causalitatis necessariae in omni genere ad effectum, hoc modo etiam materia et efficiens dici potest pars causae; est tamen impropria locutio, quia omnes illae non componunt unam causam, sed aggregatum vel requisitum numerum causarum. Atque idem est proportionaliter de fine, nam, licet requiratur ex parte agentis ut actio eius non temere fiat sed ex instituto, habet tamen influxum proprium ac per se et diversum ab influxu agentis; qualis vero ille sit et an semper sit necessarius, infra dicemus.
8. Unde ad alteram partem obiectionis respondetur Platonem et Socratem illo loco moraliter potius quam physice loqui. In moralibus enim finis est quodammodo tota causa actionum seu effectuum, non quod aliae causae excludantur quatenus physice necesariae sunt, sed quod omnes aliae ex fine sumant quasi primam rationem causandi. Unde finis potest quodammodo dici sola causa, quia ita est causa ut non habeat priorem causam vel rationem; omnes autem aliae ita sunt causae ut habeant aliquam priorem causam vel saltem priorem rationem causandi; quod dico propter primam efficientem causam quae est Deus, quod inferius declarabimus. Si autem vis fiat in voce propter quid, dicendum est stricte sumptam solum accommodari fini, latius vero solere etiam ad omnes causas extendi. Immo Aristoteles supra inde probat praedicta causarum genera, quia per omnia illa satisfieri solet quaestioni propter quid; dicimus enim hominem esse mortalem propter materiam, et vivere propter animam, etc.
5. In response to the former objection, the place in Augustine is difficult. For he denies here that one should inquire why God wished to create the world, since this is to inquire the cause for the will of God. Moreover, every cause is efficient which cannot have a place in the divine will. Augustine here seems plainly to confuse the final cause with the efficient. For one who inquires why God wished to create the world is not inquiring about the efficient cause but about the final. But it should be said that the sense of Augustine is that the cause for why he wished to create the world should not be asked, so as to think that there is some proper cause of the willing itself of God. Because if the divine will were to have some cause of this kind, it would be an efficient cause, not because the end and the efficient [cause] are formally the same, but because nothing can have a proper extrinsic final cause without having an efficient [cause]. [This is] either because the end itself does not cause without efficiency, as many prefer, or because the end proximately moves the efficient [cause] to effecting. Therefore, when Augustine says that every cause is efficient, he speaks of extrinsic causality which never exists without the intervention of an efficient cause. Nevertheless, Augustine does not intend to exclude the possibility that another genus of causing be conjoined with that cause. Others briefly respond that Augustine was speaking strictly about cause just as it expresses a relation to the effect which is also taken and denominated strictly from the word `to effect'. But this can hardly be fitted to Augustine's discussion, for one who inquires why God wished [to create the world] does not inquire about the cause taken in such a strict way.|
6. With respect to Plato, it is certain that he posited all the genera of causes which Aristotle posited and perhaps more, as we will see later. And in the cited place he does not say that cause and efficient are the same, as is attributed to him, but he says the converse: `The efficient is nothing other than a cause' [(296e)]. This proposition cannot simply be turned around, as it is per se clear. Therefore, moreover, it does not imply that an end is not a cause but implies that that which is made by an efficient cause is distinct from it since a cause cannot effect itself. But with regard to the other philosophers, I think they dissent from Aristotle more in words than in actuality. For they do not deny the necessity and concausality of matter or of form or of the end, but they use different names. Sometimes they call matter that which is a prerequisite, but they think that form should be called an effect rather than a cause, because the entire causality is terminated in it. Or, at most, they call it a part of the cause, as Seneca said above. But an end they call a cause in some way or rather a concause with the efficient or that which supervenes on the efficient by the proposed means or the intention of the end so that it can cause. In addition, the efficient cause has an influence on the effect that is both more real and in a certain way more immediate than what the end has. Also, it is better-known and in a certain way more propter than matter and form; it is also prior to them. And therefore, the name `cause' sometimes becomes customarily taken for the efficient cause through antonomasia or also by reason of first imposition. Nevertheless, however, there is no doubt in considering the matter itself physically that each single member of the mentioned causes has the true and proper nature of a cause and [is] complete and distinctly diverse in its genus, as we will say in the second point. And for that reason, Aristotle numbered these distinctly under the common notion of a cause, as is much to be preferred.
7. Nor does the argument gathered from Seneca pose any obstacle, not all things without which an effect would not happen are numbered among the causes but only those which per se inflow into the effect. Place (locus) does not do this because it is something extrinsic. Or, if the discussion is about the intrinsic where (Ubi), it is not presupposed but follows in the effect as a certain accident of a it. And likewise in the case of time, for insofar as it is a common measure, it is extrinsic. But insofar as it can be intrinsic, it is only the duration of the motion itself by which the thing happens when it happens successively. But this motion is not a cause but rather is the actual influx itself of the efficient cause successively, as will be shown below. But matter, on the other hand, although it is a prerequisite for the action of the agent, nevertheless in the very instant or time in which the agent acts, the matter also per se inflows into the effect, or, more correctly, into the very action of the agent, if it is done by it, as we will see later. But the form, although it is an effect of the agent or even of matter, it is, nevertheless, a cause of the whole composite, completing its essence. And, although it is a part of the composite, it is for all that in its genus a complete cause of the composite, nor is there reason why it should be called a part of a cause since it is a part of neither the agent nor the matter. If it should be called a part of the cause with respect to the entire causality necessary in every genus for the effect, then in this way matter and the efficient can also be called a part of the cause. It is, nevertheless, an improper locution, since all these do not compose one cause but an aggregate or requisite number of causes. And likewise proportionately in the case of the end, for, although it is required on the part of the agent so that its action does not happen blindly but by institution, it has, nevertheless, a proper and per se influx and is distinct from the influx of the agent. But what that is and whether it is always necessary, we will talk about below.
8. Hence, to the other part of the objection it is responded that Plato and Socrates are talking morally rather than physically in that place. For in moral matters, the end is in a certain way the complete cause of actions or effects. Not that other causes are excluded insofar as they are physically necessary, but all the others are taken from the end as if it were the first nature of causing. Hence, the end can in a certain way be called the only cause, because it is a cause in such a way that it does not have a prior cause or reason. But all the others are causes in such a way that they have some prior cause or at least a prior nature of causing, which is what I say on account of the first efficient cause which is God, which I will discuss later. If, however, the meaning in the phrase `on account of what' (propter quid) is at issue, it should be said that, strictly taken, it is only applied to the end, but usually it is extended more broadly to apply also to all the causes. Indeed, Aristotle above establishes the mentioned genera of causes on this basis, since the question `on account of what' is usually satisfied through all of these. For we say that a human being is mortal on account of matter, lives on account of the soul, and so on.
|Quatuor causarum mutua distinctio||The mutual distinction of the four causes|
9. Ex his facile est expedire punctum secundum de distinctione harum causarum. Potest autem esse sermo de distinctione formaliter ac praecise in ratione causae vel de distinctione quasi materiali seu reali in esse entis. Prior distinctio est quae ad praesens spectat, quam certum est inter haec membra reperiri. Primo ex Aristotelis testimonio, quia alias esset vitiosa divisio. Secundo ratione, quia causa, ut causa in actu, formaliter constituitur per actualem influxum in effectum; sed in quatuor illis membris sunt influxus diversarum rationum; ergo. Probatur minor, quia influxus causae materialis et formalis est intrinsecus per internam compositionem, influxus autem causae efficientis et finalis est extrinsecus. Rursus influxus materiae est per modum potentiae, formae autem per modum actus. Influxus item efficientis est per actionem seu mutationem realem; influxus autem finis est per mutationem intentionalem aut metaphoricam; sunt ergo omnes hae causalitates formaliter distinctae; constituunt igitur causas in actu formaliter distinctas. Unde etiam rationes seu virtutes causandi harum causarum distinctae sunt, nam materia causat quatenus est passiva potentia; efficiens vero quatenus habet potentiam activam in aliud; forma vero quatenus vim habet actuandi per seipsam; finis tamen, quatenus bonus est et per bonitatem habet vim alliciendi effectum, quae omnia in sequentibus exponentur latius, neque hic occurrit specialis difficultas circa hanc partem.
10. Circa distinctionem autem realem seu materialem harum causarum dubitari potest an semper intercedat, vel fieri possit ut eadem omnino res habeat plures rationes causandi ex numeratis. Potest autem hoc quaeri, vel in ordine ad diversos effectus, vel ad eumdem. Priori modo dicendum est non esse necessariam distinctionem realem seu materialem inter dictas causas, quia non repugnat eamdem omnino rem in ordine ad diversos effectus habere plures causalitates diversarum rationum. Eadem enim forma est finis respectu generationis seu alterationis per quam fit, et est forma respectu materiae et compositi, et est principium efficiens respectu actionis in aliud, et potest esse materialis causa suarum proprietatum, ut est anima rationalis quatenus est subiectum intellectus vel voluntatis. Hi namque influxus seu causalitates, quantumvis diversae rationis sint respectu diversorum effectuum non habent inter se repugnantiam, neque etiam repugnat quod ab eadem re prodeant; quia, sicut eadem res est capax diversorum respectuum in ordine ad diversa, est enim uni similis et alteri dissimilis, principium unius et finis alterius, ita potest in ordine ad diversos effectus participare diversos respectus causandi. Ratio denique a priori est, quia eadem res creata potest in sua entitate includere actum potentiae admixtum, et ideo potest ad unam rem comparari per modum actus formalis, ad aliam vero per modum subiecti; actus autem formalis cum det esse rei, simul esse solet principium agendi aliud, quia operatio consequitur esse; ac denique quia talis actus aliquod bonum est, etiam potest esse principium metaphoricae motionis. Sic igitur non repugnat omnia haec genera causarum in eamdem rem convenire respectu diversorum.
11. Quod si interdum in aliqua re non coniunguntur, non est ex formali repugnantia talium causalitatum in ordine ad diversa, sed ex peculiari conditione. Et interdum provenit ex perfectione, interdum vero ex imperfectione; verbi gratia, Deus potest esse causa efficiens et finalis, non tamen materialis respectu alicuius, quia est purus actus et nullam habet potentiam passivam; neque etiam exercere potest causalitatem formalem, quia haec requirit entitatem incompletam et imperfectam. Et ob eamden rationem angelicae substantiae non possunt exercere causalitatem formalem; quia vero non sunt puri actus, possunt aliqua ex parte exercere materialem, saltem respectu aliquorum accidentium; et quia non sunt pura potentia, possunt habere rationem aliquam efficiendi et multo magis finalizandi. E contrario vero materia prima, cum causalitatem materialem exercere possit, tamen, quia est pura potentia, nec causalitatem formalem nec proprie effectivam participat; tamen, quia non est ita pura potentia quin aliquam entitatem et actualitatem habeat, aliquam causalitatem finalem habere potest, ratione cuius anima appetit corpus suum et quaelibet forma materiam. At vero forma substantialis, cum causalitatem formalem, efficientem et finalem exercere possit, non tamen materialem substantialem (ut sic dicam), quia non est potentia passiva in genere substantiae. Respectu vero accidentium potest interdum exercere hanc causalitatem, quod proprie convenit formae subsistenti, nam illa forma quae ob imperfectionem suam ex se subsistere non potest, neque etiam est potens per seipsam ad sustentanda accidentia. Et ad hunc modum facile discurri potest per entitates accidentales, quatenus praedictas causandi rationes participare possunt.
12. At vero, si hae causae comparentur ad unum et eumdem effectum, nonnulla maior difficultas est. Et quidem in quibusdam est clara repugnantia, in aliis vero e contrario est manifesta possibilitas, in quibusdam autem res est controversa et dubia. Itaque eamdem rem in ordine ad idem simul esse causam materialem et formalem plane repugnat, quia hae causalitates requirunt conditiones formaliter oppositas, quales sunt esse in potentia et in actu formali; unde si sit sermo de propria forma substantiali, semper requirit distinctionem realem a sua causa materiali, et idem est in forma accidentali quae suam propriam habeat entitatem. Quia vero sunt aliquae accidentales quae tantum sunt modi substantiae, ut praesentia localis, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi, in illis, sicut ratio formae est imperfecta, ita sufficit distinctio modalis. Semper tamen necesse est ut formalis et materialis causa respectu eiusdem compositi distinguantur realiter vel ex natura rei. Deinde etiam constat formalem et efficientem causam non posse in eadem re coniungi respectu eiusdem effectus; quia forma exercet causalitatem formalem in eo in quo est, efficientem vero respectu alterius formae, vel compositi, et ideo forma ut informans, vel supponitur ad actionem ut principium agendi, vel consequitur ut effectus seu terminus formalis actionis; et ideo fieri non potest ut causalitas formalis et effectiva eidem formae conveniant respectu eiusdem, nam includunt habitudines repugnantes.
13. Rursus etiam est clarum finalem et formalem causalitatem quodammodo convenire posse in eamdem formam respectu eiusdem, quodammodo autem non posse. Si enim comparentur ad idem subiectum vel suppositum, optime possunt in eamdem rem convenire; eadem enim forma et est finis materiae et eam informat, eademque visio beata est forma intellectus et finis ac beatitudo eius. Et ratio est quia ipsamet forma, ut informans, et informatio eius est bonum ac perfectio subiecti quod informat; et ideo potest ad illud comparari simul in ratione formae et finis. At vero, si comparatio fiat ad ipsum compositum quod per formam constituitur, sic non potest eadem esse forma et finis respectu eiusdem, quia non est forma finis compositi, sed potius forma est propter compositum ut propter finem suum. Quod si comparentur ad actionem seu generationem, etiam respectu illius eadem est forma et finis. Quo sensu videtur dixisse Aristoteles, infra citandus, finem et formam coincidere in eamdem rem numero; sub eo tamen respectu, licet forma proprie sit finis generationis, non tamen proprie est causa formalis eius, sed tantum principium, ut sectione praecedenti dicebam.
14. Praeterea eadem fere proportione loquendum est de fine et efficiente; nam secundum quamdam rationem finis convenire possunt eidem rei, non vero secundum aliam. Duplex enim finis, ut infra videbimus, distingui solet, scilicet, finis cuius gratia actio fit, vel cui seu in cuius gratiam et commodum fit; ut in curatione, finis cuius gratia est sanitas; cui vero, est ipse homo cui sanitas procuratur. Prior ergo finis non potest esse eadem res cum causa efficienti quia est effectus eius; posterior autem finis optime potest esse eadem res cum causa efficienti: nam saepe efficiens operatur propter seipsum; et hoc modo Deus est simul primum efficiens et ultimus finis suorum operum. Et iuxta haec intelligitur facile vulgare dictum Aristoteles, II Phys., c. 7: Finis et forma coincidunt in idem numero; finis autem et efficiens in idem non numero, sed specie; loquitur enim de fine cuius gratia, seu qui per actionem formaliter intenditur et fit; de quo iam diximus distingui ab agente tamquam effectum eius, et ideo non posse esse idem numero cum illo. Quod vero sit idem specie, contingit in agentibus univocis, non in omnibus, ut ipsemet Aristoteles indicavit. Quomodo autem causa formalis et finalis in eamdem rem numero coniungi possint, iam declaratum est. Addo vero etiam posse aliquam rationem finis in eamdem numero rem cum causa materiali coniungi; nam subiectum accidentium et est causa materialis eorum et finis; ut enim dicebam, finis proximus sanitatis procurandae est homo, et inter alios fines forma inducitur in materiam propter ipsam materiam conservandam; nam, quia ratio finis fundatur in bonitate, quae transcendentalis est et in omni entitate ex parte reperitur, ideo coniungi potest aliqua ratio finis cum qualibet alia causa.
15. Solum supererat comparanda causa efficiens cum materiali, an possit utraque ratio coniungi in eadem re respectu eiusdem effectus. Et quidem loquendo de causa materiali substantiarum naturalium, certum est non posse materialem et efficientem causam coniungi in eadem re in ordine ad talem effectum, quia materia non potest esse principium efficiens formae ex illa educendae, et consequenter nec totius compositi. At vero loquendo de causa materiali accidentium, maius dubium est an eadem causa materialis possit esse efficiens eorumdem. Potest autem haec efficientia intelligi duplex: una, per naturalem resultantiam, et de hac loquendo non est dubium quin possint illae causalitates coniungi, et ita dici solet passim, animam, verbi gratia, habere triplicem causalitatem in suas naturales potentias, nempe finalem, materialem et efficientem; et multi censent hoc genus activitatis nec materiae primae repugnare in suam propriam passionem, quae est quantitas. Altera efficientia est per se et per propriam actionem et de hac est maior difficultas; coincidit tamen cum illa quaestione, an omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, seu (quod idem est) an agens et patiens semper distinguantur, saltem secundum proxima principia agendi et recipiendi, quam postea tractabimus disputando de causa efficienti.
9. From here, the second point concerning the distinction of these causes can easily be resolved. But the discussion can be either concerning the distinction formally and precisely in the nature of cause or concerning the, as it were, material or real distinction in the existence of beings. The former distinction is what is relevant at present. It is certain to be found between these members. First, by the testimony of Aristotle, since otherwise the division would be vicious. Secondly, by argument, since cause as cause in act is formally constituted through actual influx into effect. But in these four members are influxes of diverse natures. Therefore. The minor is proven: the influx of the material and formal [causes] is intrinsic through internal composition, but the influx of the efficient and final causes is extrinsic. In turn, the influx of matter is by the mode of potency, but of form by the mode of act. Similarly, the influx of the efficient [cause] is through real action or change, but the influx of the end is through intentional or metaphorical change. Therefore, all these causalities are formally distinct. Therefore, they constitute causes formally distinct in act. Hence, the natures or powers of causing of these causes are also distinct, for matter causes insofar as it is passive potency, but the efficient insofar as it has an active potency to another thing. But form insofar as it has the strength of actuating per seipsam, while the end insofar as it is good and through goodness has the the strength of enticing an effect. All of these are explained more broadly in the following [discussions], nor does any special difficulty occur here concering this part.|
10. But regarding the real or material distinction of these causes one can doubt whether it always it always intervenes or whether it could happen that the very same thing have more than one nature of causing of the ones numbered. Moreover, this can be asked either in relation to different effects or in relation to the same effects. In the former way, it should be said that there is not a real or material necessary distinction between the stated causes, since it is not repugnant for the very same thing to have multiple causalities of different natures in relation to different effects. For the same form is the end with respect to the generation or alteration through which it comes about, is the form with respect to the matter and composition, is the efficient principle with respect to action to another, and can be the material cause of its properties as the rational soul is insofar as it is the subject of the intellect or will. In fact, these influxes or causalities, however different the natures are with respect to different effects, have no repugnance to each other nor is it repugnant that they come out of the same thing; because, just as the same thing is capable of different respects in relation to different things (for it is similar to one and dissimilar to another, the principle of one and the end of another), so also it can participate in different in different respects of causing in relation to different effects. Finally, an a priori argument is that the same created thing can include in its entity an act mixed with a potency and therefore can be compared to one thing through the mode of formal act but to another through the mode of subject. But a formal act, since it gives being to a thing, usually is at the same time a principle of doing something else, since action follows being. And, finally, since such an act is some good, it can also be the principle of metaphorical motion. Thus, for that reason, it is not repugnant that all these genera of causes come together in the same thing with respect to different [effects].
11. If sometimes in some thing they are not conjoined is not a result of a formal repugnance of such causalities in relation to diverse [effects] but a result of a special condition. Sometimes it comes into being from perfection, but sometimes from imperfection. For example, God can be the efficient cause and the final cause with respect to something, yet not be the material cause, since God is pure act and has no passive potency. Nor can he exercise formal causality, since this requires incomplete and imperfect entity. And for the same reason angelic substances cannot exercise formal causality. But since they are not pure acts they can by some part exercise material [causality], at least with respect to some accidents. And since they are not pure potencies they can have some nature of efficient-causing and much more of final-causing. But, conversely, first matter, while it can exercise material causality, nevertheless, because it is pure potency, participates neither in formal causality nor properly in effective [causality]. Still, since it is not so pure a potency that it does not have some entity and actuality, it can have some final causality, for which reason the soul desires its body and any form its matter. But substantial form, on the other hand, while it can exercise formal, efficient, and final causality, nevertheless [cannot exercise] substantial material [causality]---if I may speak in this way---since it is not a passive potency in the genus of substance. But it can sometimes exercise this causality with respect to accidents, which properly is appropriate to a subsistent form, for this form which cannot subsist by itself on account of its imperfection also is not able per seipsam to sustain accidents. And in this way one can easily run through the accidental entities to the extent that the mentioned natures of causing can participate.
12. But on the other hand, if these causes are compared to one and the same effect, there is a considerably greater difficulty. And indeed in some things there is a clear repugnace, but in others it is, conversely, an obvious possiblity, while in certain things the matter is controversial and doubtful. And so the same thing being at the same time the material and formal [cause] in relation to the same thing is plainly repugnant, since these causalities require formally opposite conditions, which are to be in formal potency and in formal act. Hence, if the discussion is about the proper substantial form, it always requires a real distinction from its material cause. The same is true in the case of an accidental form that has its own entity. But since there are some accidental [forms] which are only modes of substance (present place, for example), or if something else is of this sort, in these things a modal distinction suffices just as the nature of the form is imperfect. Nevertheless, it is always necessary that the formal and material causes with respect to the same composite be really or by the nature of the thing distinguished. Furthermore, it is also evident that the formal and efficient causes cannot be conjoined in the same thing with respect to the same effect, since the form exercises formal causality in that in which it is, but the efficient [cause] with respect to another form or composite. And therefore the form as informing either is supposed for the action as a principle of acting or follows as the formal effect or terminus of the action. And therefore it cannot happen that the formal and effective causalities of the same form come together with respect to the same [effect] for they include repugnant habitudes.
13. On the other hand, it is also clear that final and formal causality can come together in the same form with respect to the same [effect] in some way but cannot in another way. For if they are compared according to the same subject or suppositum, they can best come together in the same thing. For the same form both is the end of the matter and informs it and the same beatific vision is the form of the intellect and its end and happiness. And the reason is that the very form itself, as informing, and its information is the good and perfection of the subject that it informs and therefore it can be compared in that at the same time in the nature of form and end. But, on the other hand, if the comparison happens according to the very composite that is constituted through the form, in this way the form and the end cannot be the same thing with respect to the same [effect], since the form is not the end of the composite but rather the form is for the sake of the composite as for the same of its end. If they are compared according to action or generation, the form and the end are also the same with respect to these. This seems to be the sense in which Aristotle said, to be cited below, that the end and the form coincide in the same thing in number. Under that, nevertheless, with respect [to the same effect], although the form properly is the end of generation, it is not, nevertheless its formal cause but only its principle, as I said in the preceding section.
14. Furthermore, one should speak in almost the same proportion about the end and the efficient cause. For with respect to a certain kind of end they can come together in the same thing but not with respect to another. For two kinds of ends are usually distinguished, as we will see below, namely, between a finis cuius for the sake of which an action is done and a finis cui, i.e., the end for whom or for whose sake and advantage it is done. For example, in healing the finis cuius is health but the finis cui is the very human being for whom the health is procured. Therefore, the former end cannot be the same thing with the efficient cause since it is the effect of the latter. But the latter end can best be the same thing with the efficient cause, for the efficient cause often acts for its own sake. And in this way God is simultaneously the first efficient cause and ultimate end of his actions. And the common statement of Aristotle in Phys. II, c. 7, is easily understood in accordance with this: `The end and form coincide in the same thing in number, but the end and efficient cause in the same thing not in number but not in species'. For he is speaking about the finis cuius or the end which is formally intended and made through the action. We already said concerning it that it is distinguished from the agent as it is the effect of the latter and therefore cannot be the same in number with it. But the fact that it is the same in species happens in univocal species but not in all species, as Aristotle himself indicated. But in what way the formal cause and the final cause could be conjoined in the same thing in number was already shown. But I add also that some nature of the end can be conjoined in the same thing in number with the material cause, for the subject of accidents is both the material cause and end of them. For, as I was saying, the proximate end of health to be procured is the human being and among other ends the form is introduced in matter for the sake of the very matter to be conserved. For, since the nature of the end is founded in goodness, which is a transcendental property and which is found in part in every entity. Therefore, some nature of the end can be conjoined with any other cause whatever.
15. It only remains to compare the efficient cause with the material cause, whether each nature can be conjoined in the same thing with respect to the same effect. And indeed in speaking about the material cause of natural substances it is certain that the material and efficient causes cannot be conjoined in the same thing in relation to such an effect, since matter cannot be an efficient principle of form as a result of the latter being drawn out and consequently neither can the whole composite. But, on the other hand, when speaking about the material cause of accidents there is more of a doubt about whether the same material cause can be the efficient cause of the same [effects]. But this efficient cause can be understood in two ways. One, through the natural result and concerning this way of speaking there is no doubt but that these causalities can be conjoined. In this way it is customarily said everywhere that the soul, for example, has three causalities in its natural potencies, namely, final, material, and efficient. And many think that this genus of activity is not repugnant to prime matter in its proper property, which is quantity. The other kind of efficient cause is per se and through its own action. Concerning this there is greater difficulty. Nevertheless, it coincides with that question of whether everything that is moved is moved by something else, or (what is the same) whether the agent and patient are always distinguished, at least according to a proximate principle of acting and receiving. We will discuss this later when disputing about the efficient cause.
|Causae in quatuor genera divisio an adaequata||Whether the division of causes into four genera is adequate|
16. Circa tertium punctum, an haec quatuor genera sufficienter dividant causam, solent variae difficultates proponi de causis instrumentariis, positivis et obiectivis. Sed haec et similia difficultatem non habent, nam causa instrumentalis quaedam species est causae efficientis, ut postea videbimus. Nec potest cum aliquo fundamento reduci ad materialem causam, ut falso excogitavit Philoponus, II Phys., text. 27, nisi fortasse loquamur de dispositionibus materiae, quae solent etiam instrumenta appellari; sed illae nisi efficientiam habeant, revera non sunt instrumenta; si vero efficientiam habent, ut sic non sunt dispositiones neque ad causam materialem ullo modo pertinent, sed ad efficientem, quam vel adiuvant vel eius vicem gerunt. Dispositiva autem causa communiter reducitur ad materialem, quia praeparat materiam ad formam. Sed haec denominatio solum esse videtur per quamdam attributionem; nam si loquamur cum proprietate, vera dispositio quaedam causa formalis est, non enim disponit nisi informando subiectum; calor enim qui est in ligno non disponit ad formam ignis nisi formaliter calefaciendo lignum; loquor autem de vera ac propria dispositione physica et positiva; nam vulgari modo solet dispositio vocari quaecumque remotio impedimenti, vel quaevis conditio necessaria, ut applicatio ad agendum vel quid simile; et in his nulla est vera causalitas; sed tantum per accidens.
17. Causam obiectivam appello obiectum respectu potentiae vel actus. In quo obiecto duplex potest habitudo considerari: una est moventis, altera terminantis. Prior respectu potentiae cognoscitivae est causalitas efficiens, sive consideretur obiectum quatenus movet imprimendo speciem sive quatenus per speciem concurrit ad actum; respectu vero potentiae appetitivae est causalitas finalis vel propria et formalis, ut in appetitu rationali, vel materialis et imperfecta, ut in sensitivo, quod postea videbimus. Sub posteriori autem respectu, aliqui reducunt obiectum ad causam finalem, quia potentia et actus in illud ut in finem tendunt. Neque obstat quod haec habitudo sit essentialis, quia non repugnat quod aliqua res essentialiter sit ordinata ad suum finem. Alii ad formalem causam revocant, quatenus obiectum dat speciem actui; quidquid enim dat speciem, habet rationem formae; dicunt autem esse non intrinsecam, sed extrinsecam formam. Ego vero libentius negarem obiectum sub hac ratione exercere aliquod verum genus causalitatis, sed puri termini specificantis, non per verum aliquem influxum qui causam constituat, sed per solam habitudinem alterius ad ipsum. Neque Aristoteles unquam illius causae formalis extrinsecae meminit, nec terminum motus appellavit causam motus, quamvis dixerit ab illo sumere speciem; et idem est de uno relativo respectu alterius seu de termino relationis ut sic. Nec D. Thomas aliter loquitur, ut videre licet I-II, q. 1, a. 3. Sed haec facilia sunt, ac fere de modo loquendi.
18. Potissima difficultas est in hoc puncto de causa exemplari, quam Plato addit quatuor ab Aristotele numeratis, ut constat ex Timaeo et Phaedone, et refert Seneca, citata epistol. 66. Sed de hac materia propter gravitatem eius propriam disputationem instituemus. Nunc breviter concedimus Platoni exemplar veram causalitatem exercere, quod Aristoteles non ignoravit, nam hic numerando formam addit et exemplar, et ideo fortasse non est necesse propter eam causam augere numerum, quod dicto loco examinabimus.
16. Concerning the third point, whether these four genera sufficiently divide cause, various difficulties are usually put forward about instrumental, positive, and objective causes. But these and similar difficulties have no place for instrumental cause is a certain species of efficient cause, as we will see later. Nor can it with any foundation be reduced to the material cause, as Philoponus contrived in Phys. II, text. 27, unless perhaps we are speaking about material dispositions which are usually also called instruments. But these are not really instruments unless they have efficiency. But if they have efficiency, as such they are not dispositions nor pertain to the material cause in any way; instead they pertain to the efficient cause which they either aid or carry its change. But a dispositive cause is commonly reduced to a material cause, since it prepares the matter for the form. But this denomination seems only to be through a certain attribution, for if we speak with propriety, a true disposition is a certain formal cause, for it does not dispose except by informing the subject. For the heat which is in wood does not dispose to the form of fire except by formally heating the wood. But I speak about a true and proper physical and positive disposition, for in a common way any removal of an impediment or any necessary condition is called a disposition (for example, an application to acting or something similar). And in these there is no true causality but only per accidens.|
17. I call the objective cause the object with respect to the power or act. Two habitudes can be considered in this object: one is of the mover and the other of the terminating thing. The former with respect to the cognoscitive power is efficient causality. It may be considered the object either insofar as it moves by impressing the species or insofar as it concurs with the act through the species. But with respect to the appetitive power it is final causality either properly and formally, as in the case of the rational appetite, or materially and imperfectly, as in the case of the sensitive appetite, which we will see later. But with respect to the latter [habitude], others reduce the object to the final cause, since the power and act tend to it as to an end. Nor is it an obstacle that this habitude is essential, since it is not repugnant that some thing be essentially ordered to its end. Others call it back to the formal cause, insofar as the object gives species to the act. For anything that gives species has the nature of a form. But they say that it is not an intrinsic form but an extrinsic form. But I would rather deny that the object under this aspect exercises any true genus of causality, but of a simple specifying terminus, not through some true influx which constitutes a cause, but through a habitude alone of another thing to itself. Aristotle never had this extrinsic formal causes in mind nor did he call a terminus of motion a cause of motion, although he said that it takes it species from it. And the same is true of the one relative with respect to another or of the terminus of the relation as such. Nor does St. Thomas say otherwise, as may be seen in [ST] IaIIae.1.3. But these are easier and generally about a manner of speaking.
18. The greatest difficulty in this point is about the exemplar cause, which Plato adds to the four numbered by Aristotle, as is clear from the Timaeus and the Phaedo and to which Seneca refers in the cited letter 66 [i.e., 65]. But we will set up its own disputation about this matter on account of its gravity. For now we will briefly concede to Plato that the exemplar exercises true causality. Aristotle did not ignore this, for here in his numbering he adds form and exemplar. And therefore perhaps it is not necessary to increase the number for the sake of this cause. We will examine this in the stated place.
|Divisio causae praedicta sitne immediata||Whether the division of the mentioned causes is immediate|
|19. Circa quartum videri potest divisio illa immediata, eo quod Aristoteles proxime diviserit causam in quatuor illa membra. Sed nihilominus dicendum illam divisionem non esse immediatam; possunt enim facile convenientiae inter quaedam ex his membris excogitari, ratione quarum aliae priores divisiones causae et in pauciora membra constituantur. Sic ergo potest primo causa dividi in internam et externam; interna rursus in materiam et formam; de quibus dubitari non potest quin peculiater conveniant in modo causandi; dant enim esse effectui conferendo illi suammet numero entitatem et interne componendo illum; efficiens autem et finis longe aliter causant, et in hoc conveniunt, quod non componunt intrinsece effectum, et ideo causae extrinsecae communiter appellantur. Igitur in ratione causae abstrahi potest ratio communis materiae et formae quae non sit communis aliis causis, et e converso; ergo recte dividitur causa immediate in intrinsecam et extrinsecam, et deinde illa in materialem et formalem, haec vero in efficientem et finalem. Alio item modo posset alia divisio causae immediatior excogitari; nam tres aliae causae praeter finalem conveniunt in hoc quod conferunt ad esse effectus per realem influxum, ideoque requirunt existentiam realem ad suas causalitates, ut postea videbimus; causa autem finalis influit intentionaliter, ideoque causare potest antequam in se realiter existat. Recte igitur dividi potest causa immediate in realem et intentionalem, stricte sumendo in priori membro illum terminum realem; nam si sumatur in tota sua latitudine et transcendentia, etiam causae finali convenit. Et rursus causa realis dividitur in intrinsecam, quae in materiam et formam, et extrinsecam, quae est efficiens, et peculiari ratione et quasi per antonomasiam dici potest extrinseca; nam, licet finalis causa comparata ad formalem et materialem extrinseca etiam sit, comparata tamen ad efficientem, est quodammodo intrinseca; nam habitudo ad finem est magis intrinseca unicuique rei et in quibusdam est etiam essentialis.||19. Concerning the fourth [point], this division can seem immediate by the fact that Aristotle divided cause into these four members. But, nevertheless, it should be said that this division is not immediate, for agreements between certain of these members can easily be thought up, by reason of which other prior divisions of cause into fewer members are set up. In this way, therefore, cause can first be divided into internal and external [causes]. The internal in turn [can be divided] into matter and form, concerning which it cannot be doubted by that they distinctively agree in their way of causing. For they give being to the effect by bestowing on it their very own entity in number and internally composing it. But the efficient cause and end cause in a very differet way and they agree in that they do not intrinsically compose the effect. Therefore, they are commonly called extrinsic causes. For this reason the nature common to matter and form which is not common to the other causes can be abstracted from the nature of cause, and conversely. Therefore, cause it is right to immediately divide cause into intrinsic and extrinsic and then to divide the former into material and formal but the latter into efficient and final. Likewise, in another way another more immediate division of cause can be thought up, for the three causes other than the final cause agree in that they contribute to the being of the effect through a real influx and therefore they require real existence for their causalities, as we will see later. But the final cause inflows intentionally and for this reason can cause before it really exists in itself. Therefore, cause can rightly be immediately divided into real and intentional, taking strictly in the former member that the terminus [be] real. For if it is taken in its whole latitude and transcendence, the final cause also agrees [with it]. And real cause, in turn, is divided into intrinsic, which [is divided] into matter and form, and extrinsic, which is the efficient cause. [The efficient cause] can be called extrinsic through its distinctive nature and, as it were, through antonomasia. For, although the final cause as compared to the formal and material is also extrinsic, nevertheless, as compared to the efficient, it is intrinsic in a certain way. For a habitude to the end is more intrinsic to each thing and in certain things it is also essential.|
|Quatuor causae membra, an atoma||Whether the four members of cause are atomic|
20. De quinto puncto pauca hoc loco dici possunt donec de singulis causis tractemus, et ideo breviter dicendum est hanc non esse divisionem in ultimas rationes causae; nam sub quocumque illorum membrorum dari possunt variae divisiones. Causa enim materialis quaedam est pura potentia, alia vero est tantum potentia secundum quid. Quae non est divisio tantum materialis (ut ita dicam) secundum entitatem quae est causa, sed etiam est formalis in ratione causae materialis. Nam de ratione formali illius est ut sit potentia, et ideo secundum diversam rationem potentiae receptivae erit diversa ratio causae materialis; quae diversitas attendi etiam potest ex effectibus; nam illa prior est causa materialis substantiae, posterior vero accidentium. Unde prior dici potest causa materialis simpliciter, posterior vero secundum quid, sumendo has voces non ex entitatibus talium causarum, sed ex habitudine ad effectus; nam quoad entitatem materialis causa accidentium esse potest ens simpliciter seu substantia integra; materialis autem causa substantiae tantum esse potest ens secundum quid; tamen quoad causationem seu habitudinem causae, haec causat ens simpliciter, illa secundum quid. Rursus materialis causa substantiae dividitur in materiam corruptibilium vel incorruptibilium substantiarum; causa vero materialis accidentium dividi potest vel in corporalem et spiritualem, vel in proximam aut remotam, vel in eam quae in se sit accidens, vel quae sit substantia, aut partialis aut integra, de quibus omnibus in proximis disputationibus dicam. Atque proportionali modo dividi potest forma in substantialem et accidentalem et utrumque membrum subdividitur in varias formas, iuxta varietatem substantiarum compositarum et accidentium. Causae item efficientis et finalis quamplures sunt divisiones, quae non possunt hic breviter recenseri sed in propriis disputationibus.
21. Dices: si causa potest immediate dividi in pauciora membra et remote in plura, cur Aristoteles potius quadrimembrem illam divisionem quam alias tradidit? Respondetur hoc ipso quod illa divisio est media inter illa extrema, fuisse aptiorem ad doctrinalem divisionem tradendam. Maxime quia membra illa habent rationes et modos causandi magis distinctos et notiores. Adde Aristotelem non omnino omisisse, sed insinuasse satis, tam convenientias harum causarum inter se, quam divisiones earum, ut ex citatis locis constat.
20. Concerning the fifth point there is little to be said in this place until we discuss each cause individually. Therefore, it should be said briefly that this is not a division into the ultimate natures of cause, for under various divisions can be given for any of these members. For a certain material cause is pure potency, but another is a potency only secundum quid. This division is not only material (if I may speak in this way) according to the entity that is the cause, but is also formal in the nature of the material cause. For with regard to its formal nature it is such that it is potency and therefore there will be different natures of material causes according to the different natures of receptive potencies. This diversity can also be applied by the effects, for the former is the material cause of substance but the latter of accidents. Hence, the former can also be called the material cause simpliciter but the latter secundum quid, taking these terms not from the entities of such causes but from their habitudes to their effects. For with respect to entity the material cause of accidents can be being simpliciter or an integral substance. But the material cause of a substance can only be being secundum quid. Still, with respect to the causation or habitude of a cause, the latter causes being simpliciter, the former secundum quid. The material cause of substance, in turn, is divided into the matter of corruptible and incorruptible substances. But the material cause of accidents can be divided either into corporeal or spiritual, into proximate or remote, into that which is an accident in itself or that which is a substance, or into partial or integral. I will talk about all of these in the next disputations. And form can be divided in a proportional way into substantial and accidental and each member is subdivided into various forms, according to the variety of composite substances and accidents. Likewise, there are as many divisions of efficient and final causes, which cannot briefly be reviewed here but in their proper disputations.|
21. Why cause is not divided into higher or lower members in the principal division.---You may ask: if cause can be divided immediately into fewer members and remotely into more, why does Aristotle hand down this division into four members rather than another? It is responded that by the very fact that this division is mediate between those extremes it was more suitable for handing down the doctrinal division, especially since these members have natures and modes of causing that are more distinct and better-known. Add that Aristotle did not wholly disregard but sufficiently suggested the agreements among these causes as much as their divisions, as is clear from the cited places.
|Qualis sit data divisio||What kind of division is given|
|22. In sexto puncto auctores omnes supponendo potius quam probando vel disputando, docent illam divisionem causae esse analogam et propter eam causam dicunt non fuisse causam in communi ab Aristotele definitam. Non tamen declarant satis modum aut rationem huius analogiae, neque a nobis declarari potest donec rationes singularum causarum exacte tractentur. Et ideo nunc supponamus sententiam illam veram esse ex communis sententiae auctoritate et ex hac generali ratione, quod illi modi causarum communes sunt causis accidentium et substantiarum, quae non possunt esse univoce causae, quia non dant univoce esse, unde nec ratio effectus univoca esse potest in accidente et substantia; exactiorem vero huius analogiae declarationem in praedictum locum remitto.||22. In the sixth point, all the authors---more by assuming it than by proving or disputing it---teach that this division of cause is analogous and as a result of this say that cause was not defined in general by Aristotle. Nevertheless, they do not satisfactorily show the mode or nature of this analogy. Nor can it be shown by us until the nature of each cause has been accurately discussed. And therefore we assume now that this view is true by the general authority of the view and for the general reason that these modes of causes are common to causes of accidents and substances. Since they do not give univocal being, they cannot be univocal causes. Hence, the nature of effect can be univocal in accident and in substance. But I refer to a more exact disclosure of this analogy in the mentioned place.|