

<388><sup>2</sup>

*Quotuplex sit causa.*

Aristot.

1. Celebris est illa divisio causae in quatuor causarum genera, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficientis, et finalis, quam tradit Arist., V *Metaph.*, c. 2, et lib. II *Phys.*, c. 3 et sequent., cuius divisionis expositio omnino pendet ex singulorum membrorum exacta intelligentia, quam in toto hoc tractatu late prosequemur; et ideo nunc in communi solum proponemus ea quae circa hanc divisionem dubitari possunt et ea breviter expediemus. Primum est an omnia illa membra vere ac proprie sub divisio contineantur. Secundum an inter se distinguantur et opponantur. Tertium an sufficienter comprehendant totum divisum. Quartum an proxime et immediate causa in illa membra dividatur, vel possit aliqua divisio media excogitari. Quintum an illa divisio sit infima seu atoma, an possunt singula membra in alia dividi. Sextum, an sit univoca vel analoga.

*Quatuor propria causarum genera*

2. *Ab experimento probatur assertio.*—Ad primam

*How many kinds of causes there are.*

5R

10R

15R

1. The division of causes into four genera of causes—namely: material, formal, efficient, and final—which Aristotle teaches in *Metaph.* V, c. 2 and *Phys.* II, c. 3 and following, is renowned. The exposition of this division depends entirely on an accurate understanding of each individual member, which we will pursue in more depth in this treatise as a whole. And now, therefore, we will put forward in general only those things which can be doubted concerning this division and we will briefly resolve them. The first is whether all these members truly and properly belong to this division. The second is whether they are distinguished from each other and mutually opposed. The third is whether they sufficiently cover the whole division. The fourth is whether causes are proximately and immediately divided into these members or whether some mediate division can be contrived. The fifth is whether this division is basic or atomic or whether each member can be divided into others. The sixth is whether it is univocal or analogical.

Aristotle.

*The four proper genera of causes*

2. In response to the first doubt, it should be said that

<sup>1</sup>The Latin text from <http://www.telefonica.net/web2/salcasu/d12.htm>. Retrieved March 3, 2009. Spelling errors corrected without note. I checked the text against the 1597 edition (generally the most reliable text) for significant textual variations. Marginal notes are as found in the 1597 edition. Many of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition, D = digital source, and V = Vivès edition.

The translation is certainly better than it would have been had I not had the welcome occasion to discuss the text with Kara Richardson. The remaining errors, infelicities, etc. should be attributed to me.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Ab  
experimento  
probatur  
assertio.

5 dubitationem dicendum est omnia illa vere ac proprie rationem causae participare; et ideo merito causam in illa quatuor membra dividi. Haec assertio, praeter communem omnium consensum post Aristotelem, sic probatur. Nam quod illa quatuor in rebus seu effectibus quos experimur inveniuntur, facile declarari potest supponendo aliquid novum in rerum natura fieri; quod est tam evidens ex perpetua rerum vicissitudine, alteratione, generatione ac corruptione, ut illud argumentis probare supervacaneum sit. Si ergo fit aliquid de novo, necessaria est aliqua alia res a qua fiat, quia non potest idem facere seipsum, et hanc vocamus efficientem causam. Quae vel producit suum effectum ex nihilo, vel ex aliqua re quam ad suam actionem praesupponat; primum non potest in universum dici, nam experimento constat neque artificem facere statuum nisi ex ligno aut aere, neque ignem calefacere nisi aliquid ei supponatur quod calorem suscipiat, neque efficere ignem nisi ex ligno, stupa aut alia re simili. Immo hic modus agendi tam est proprius naturalium causarum, ut philosophi qui ad illas tantum attenderunt inde sumpserint axioma illud: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. Illud ergo subiectum, quod ad actionem efficientis causae supponitur, materialem causam vocamus. Necessesse est autem ut causa efficiens tale subiectum aliquam rem introducat; alias nihil novum efficeret contra positam hypothesim. Illud ergo vocamus formam, qualiscumque illa sit, de quo postea videbimus. Tandem, cum causae per se agentes non temere et casu agant, ut ipso rerum experimento constat, et praecipue in actionibus humanis, ut res sit extra controversiam, necesse est ut praeter illa tria detur etiam finis propter quem causa efficiens operatur. Reperiuntur ergo haec quatuor membra in rebus, sive omnia illa in singulis effectibus inveniuntur, sive non, hoc enim

5R all these truly and properly participate in the nature of cause and for that reason cause is rightly divided into these four members. This assertion, besides the general consensus of everyone after Aristotle, is proven as follows. For that these four are found in the things or effects which we experience can be shown easily by supposing something new to happen in the nature of things, which is so evident from the perpetual vicissitude, alteration, generation, and corruption of things that to prove it by argument is superfluous. If, therefore, something happens anew, it is necessary that there is some other thing by which it happens, since the same thing cannot make itself. And this we call 'efficient cause'. It either produces its effect *ex nihilo* or from some thing which is presupposed for its action. The first cannot be said in general, for it is clear from experience that an artist does not make a statue except from wood or brass, that fire does not heat except something is placed next to it which takes up heat, that fire is not brought about except by means of wood, tow, or some other similar matter. Indeed, this way of acting is so proper to natural causes that philosophers who paid attention only to these assumed this axiom: 'Nothing comes from nothing.' Therefore, we call this subject which is supposed for the action of the efficient cause 'material cause'. Moreover, it is necessary that the efficient cause introduce some thing to such a subject. Otherwise, nothing new would be effected, contrary to the posited hypothesis. That thing, therefore, we call 'form', whatever kind of thing it may be. We will consider it afterwards. Lastly, since causes acting *per se* do not act blindly and by chance—as is clear from experience itself of things and especially in the case of human actions, so that the matter is beyond controversy—it is necessary that beyond these three an end is also given for the sake of which the efficient cause acts. These four members, therefore, are discovered in things. Either all of them are found in each effect or not. For an inquiry needs to be made into this later, but for the present it suffices that these are found

The assertion  
is proven from  
experience.

	40	postea erit inquirendum nam ad praesens sat est quod in rerum universitate haec inveniantur.	40R	in the universe of things.	
Materia vera causa.		3. Quod autem quaelibet ex his vera sit causa, de materiali quidem, formali et efficiente, facile probari potest, nam quaelibet ex his manifeste influit aliquod esse; materia enim ab Aristotele definitur esse <i>id ex quo insito fit aliquid</i> . Ubi per particulam <i>ex</i> cum proprietate sumptam distinguitur materia ab aliis causis; per particulam autem <i>insito</i> separatur a privatione et declaratur proprius influxus, quo materia et in universum subiectum exhibet se, ut ex eo consurgat esse totius. Similiter forma seipsam exhibet ut illa tamquam actu compositum constituatur; immo frequenter definiri solet forma, quod sit <i>causa intrinseca quae dat esse rei</i> ; materia enim est quasi inchoatio quaedam vel fundamentum ipsius esse; forma vero illud consummat et complet; propter quod <i>ratio quidditatis</i> appellatur ab Aristotele citatis locis. Item haec numerantur inter principia intrinseca rei naturalis, vel potius illa duo tantum sunt principia constituentia rem naturalem; sunt autem principia per se, cum sint maxime necessaria et essentialia, et dant esse eo modo quo explicatum est; sunt ergo propriae causae. De efficiente etiam patet, quia sua actione efficit ut res habeat esse quod antea non habebat; et ad hoc per se ac directe tendit actio eius; ergo efficiens est quasi fons et principium per se influens esse in effectum; quod esse effectus distinctum est ab esse efficientis; ergo tota definitio causae propriissime convenit efficienti. De fine vero potest esse nonnulla dubitandi ratio, quia nullum esse reale in eo praesupponitur, quo causare possit; sed, quia de hoc latius in propria disputatione dicendum est, nunc breviter declaratur, quia licet finis sit postremum in executione, tamen est primum in intentione et sub ea ratione veram habet rationem principii; nam est	45R	3. But that any whichever of these is a true cause can easily be proven indeed in the case of material, formal, and efficient causes, for any whatever of these manifestly inflows some being. For matter is defined by Aristotle as being ‘that from which having been incorporated something is made’, where matter is distinguished from the other causes through the particle ‘from’ taken in its proper sense. But through the expression ‘having been incorporated’ it is separated from privation and a proper influx is revealed, by which matter and, in general, the subject presents itself so that the being of the whole arises from it. Similarly, form presents itself so that it is constituted as actually a composite. Indeed, form is usually defined as being the ‘intrinsic cause that gives being to the thing’. For matter is as if a certain beginning or foundation of being itself, but form consummates and completes it. This is why it is called the ‘account of the essence’ by Aristotle in the cited places. Also, these are numbered among the intrinsic principles of a natural thing or, rather, these two alone are the principles constituting a natural thing. Moreover, they are principles <i>per se</i> , since they are very much necessary and essential and they give being in the way in which it was explained. Therefore, they are proper causes. Concerning the efficient cause it is also clear, because it effects by its action so that a thing has being which it did not have before. And its action tends <i>per se</i> and directly to this. Therefore, the efficient cause is as it were the source and principle <i>per se</i> inflowing being into the effect. This being of the effect is distinct from the being of the efficient cause. Therefore, the whole definition of cause is very properly suited to the efficient cause. But concerning the end there can be some reason for doubting, since no real being is presupposed in it by which it could cause. But, since it remains to be discussed more thoroughly in the proper disputation, it is briefly revealed now, because, although the end is last in	Matter truly a cause.
Forma est proprie causa.			50R		Form properly a cause.
Efficiens vere causa.	65		65R		The efficient truly a cause.
Finis an vera causa.	75		75R		Whether the end is a true cause.

80 primum quod excitat seu movet agens ad agen-  
 dum; est autem principium non fictum, sed verum  
 et reale, quia vere excitat et movet. Unde sicut  
 85 habet sufficiens esse quo possit talem rationem  
 principii exercere, ita etiam rationem causae; il-  
 lud autem esse, quamvis in mente sit, non est ex-  
 tra latitudinem entis realis, et ideo sufficiens esse  
 90 potest ad talem rationem causae. Rursus huius-  
 modi principium non est per accidens sed per se;  
 immo ab illo habet causalitas agentis quod per se  
 et ordinate tendat in effectum; atque hac ratione  
 per se influit esse in illum; ergo etiam fini vere ac  
 proprie convenit definitio causae.

80R

85R

90R

Prima obiectio.  
 August.

4. Contra hanc vero sententiam obiicere quis  
 potest Augustin., lib. LXXXIII Quaestionum, in 28  
 dicentem: *Omnis causa efficiens est*. Quam sen-  
 tentiam videtur sumpsisse ex Platone, in dialogo  
 95 de Pulchro, seu qui inscribitur Hyppias maior,  
 ubi significat causam et efficientem idem esse et  
 finem non posse dici causam; quod confirmat,  
 tum quia est effectus, tum quia ipsius causae ef-  
 ficientis non potest esse causa. Eamdem fuisse  
 100 communem sententiam Stoicorum, scilicet, quod  
 sola causa efficiens sit vera causa, refert Seneca,  
 lib. VIII, epist. 66, ubi etiam ipse eam probat: *Quo-  
 niam si omnia (inquit) sine quibus effectus fieri non  
 potest, ponenda sunt in causarum numero, plures  
 105 essent numerandae, nimirum tempus, locus, mo-  
 tus, etc., sine quibus nullus fit effectus; in una ergo  
 causa efficienti sistendum est, reliqua vero sunt ve-  
 luti adiumenta huius causae, aut conditiones nec-  
 110 essariae*. Aliter obiici posset in alio extremo ex  
 Socrate apud Platonem, in Phaed., quod solus finis  
 nomen causae mereatur, nam tota causa rei est id  
 propter quod fit; reliqua vero omnia solum sunt

95R

100R

105R

110R

Stoici solum  
 efficiens  
 veram causam  
 agnovere.  
 Seneca.

Secunda  
 obiectio.

execution, nevertheless it is first in intention and under  
 that aspect has the true nature of a principle. Moreover,  
 the principle is not a *fictum* but is true and real, since it  
 truly excites and moves. Hence, just as it has sufficient  
 being by which it can exercise such a nature of a princi-  
 ple, so also the nature of a cause. Moreover, that being,  
 although it is in the mind, is not beyond the latitude of  
 real being and for that reason can be sufficient being for  
 such a nature of a cause. On the other hand, a principle  
 of this kind is not *per accidens* but *per se*. Indeed, it is  
 by this that the causality of an agent tends to an effect  
*per se* and in an orderly way. And by this reason it *per se*  
 inflows being into the [effect]. Therefore, the definition of  
 a cause is also truly and properly suited to the end.

4. But against this true view someone can object that  
 Augustine says in *Eighty-three Questions* 28 that ‘every  
 cause is efficient’. This view seems to have been taken  
 from Plato in the dialogue *On Beauty*—which is also en-  
 titled *Hippias Major*—where he indicates that cause and  
 efficient are the same and that an end cannot be called  
 a cause, which he confirms partly because it is an effect  
 and partly because there can be no cause of the efficient  
 cause itself [(296e–297d)]. The common view of the Sto-  
 ics was the same, namely, that the efficient cause alone  
 is a true cause. Seneca refers [to this] in book VIII, let-  
 100 ter 66 [i.e., 65], where he also proves it: ‘Because if ev-  
 erything without which an effect could not happen were  
 placed among the number of causes, many more should  
 be numbered, namely, time, place, motion, etc. No ef-  
 105 fect happens without these. Therefore, one should stop  
 with one cause: the efficient. But the rest are as if aids  
 or necessary conditions for this cause.’ Alternatively, one  
 could object in the other extreme according to Socrates in  
 Plato’s *Phaedo* [96–99] that only an end merits the name  
 of cause, for the entire cause of a thing is that for the sake  
 of which it happens. But all the rest are only conditions

The first  
 objection.  
 Augustine.

The Stoics  
 only  
 recognized the  
 efficient cause  
 as a true  
 cause. Seneca.

The second  
 objection.

condiciones requisitae ut res fiat; unde interrogationi propter quid res est aut fit, sola responsio per finalem causam satisfacit.

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115R

Prima obiectio cum August. loco difficili enodatur.

5. Ad priorem objectionem locus Augustini difficilis est; negat enim ibi quaerendum esse quare Deus voluerit creare mundum, quia hoc est quaerere causam voluntatis Dei; omnis autem causa efficiens est, quae in divina voluntate locum habere

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120R

non potest; ubi videtur plane Augustinus confundere causam finalem cum efficienti; nam qui quaerit quare Deus voluerit creare mundum non quaerit causam efficientem, sed finalem. Dicendum vero est sensum Augustini esse, non esse

125

125R

quaerendam causam cur voluerit creare mundum, ita ut ipsius voluntatis Dei propria aliqua causa esse putetur, quia si divina voluntas aliquam causam huiusmodi haberet, haberet causam efficientem;

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130R

non quia finis et efficiens formaliter sint idem, sed quia nihil potest habere propriam causam extrinsecam finalem quin habeat efficientem, vel quia finis ipse non causat sine efficientia, ut multa volunt; vel quia finis proxime movet efficiens ad efficiendum. Cum ergo dicit Augustinus; omnem

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135R

causam esse efficientem, loquitur de causalitate extrinseca, quae nunquam est sine interventu efficientis causae; non tamen intendit Augustinus excludere quin cum illa causa possit coniungi aliud causandi genus. Alii brevius respondent Augustinum locutum esse stricte de causa, prout dicit relationem ad effectum stricte etiam sumptum et denominatum a verbo efficiendi. Sed hoc

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140R

vix potest accommodari discursui Augustini, nam qui quaerit quare Deus voluit, etc., non quaerit causam ita stricte sumptam.

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145R

6. Ad Platonem, certum est illum posuisse omnia genera causarum quae Aristoteles posuit et

required for the thing to happen. Hence, to the question asking for the sake of what a thing is or happens, only a response in terms of a final cause is satisfactory.

5. In response to the former objection, the place in Augustine is difficult. For he denies here that one should inquire why God wished to create the world, since this is to inquire the cause for the will of God. Moreover, every cause is efficient which cannot have a place in the divine will. Augustine here seems plainly to confuse the final cause with the efficient. For one who inquires why God wished to create the world is not inquiring about the efficient cause but about the final. But it should be said that the sense of Augustine is that the cause for why he wished to create the world should not be asked, so as to think that there is some proper cause of the willing itself of God. Because if the divine will were to have some cause of this kind, it would be an efficient cause, not because the end and the efficient cause are formally the same, but because nothing can have a proper extrinsic final cause without having an efficient cause. [This is] either because the end itself does not cause without efficiency, as many prefer, or because the end proximately moves the efficient cause to effecting. Therefore, when Augustine says that every cause is efficient, he speaks of extrinsic causality which never exists without the intervention of an efficient cause. Nevertheless, Augustine does not intend to exclude the possibility that another genus of causing be conjoined with that cause. Others briefly respond that Augustine was speaking strictly about cause just as it expresses a relation to the effect which is also taken and denominated strictly from the expression 'to effect'. But this can hardly be fitted to Augustine's discussion, for one who inquires why God wished [to create the world] does not inquire about the cause taken in such a strict way.

6. With respect to Plato, it is certain that he posited all the genera of causes which Aristotle posited and per-

The first objection with Augustine is made clear by appeal to the difficulty of the text.

Quot Aristoteles, causarum genera admisit Plato.

Plato admits as many genera of causes as Aristotle.

150 fortasse plura, ut postea videbimus. Et in citato  
 loco non dicit causam et efficiens idem esse, ut  
 ei tribuitur, sed e contrario ait: *Efficiens nihil al-*  
*155 iud est quam causa.* Quae propositio non potest  
 simpliciter converti, ut per se constat. Inde autem  
 non infert finem non esse causam, sed infert id  
 quod fit ab efficiente causa esse distinctum ab ipsa,  
 155R quia non potest causa efficere seipsam. De aliis  
 vero philosophis existimo verbis potius quam re ab  
 Aristotele dissentire. Nam ipsi non negant neces-  
 sitatem et concausam materiae, aut formae, vel fi-  
 nis; sed in nominibus differunt, raro materiam vo-  
 160 cant quid praerequisitum; formam vero potius ap-  
 pellandam censent effectum quam causam, quia  
 ad ipsam tota causalitas terminatur, vel ad sum-  
 mum vocant partem causae, ut loquitur Seneca  
 165 supra; finem vero appellant aliquo modo causam  
 seu potius concausam cum efficiente seu esse quid  
 superveniens efficienti medio proposito, seu inten-  
 tionem finis, ut causare possit. Praeterea causa ef-  
 170 ficiens habet influentiam et magis realem et quo-  
 dammodo immediatiorem ipsi effectui quam finis;  
 et notioem et quodammodo magis proprium quam  
 materia et forma et priorem etiam illis; et ideo  
 causae nomen interdum per antonomasiam vel  
 etiam ratione primae impositionis pro causa effi-  
 175 cienti sumi solet. Nihilominus tamen rem ipsam  
 physice considerando non est dubium quin singu-  
 lae ex dictis causis veram et proprium rationem  
 causae habeant, et in suo genere totalem ac plane  
 diversam ut in secundo puncto dicemus, et ideo

haps more, as we will see later.<sup>3</sup> And in the cited place he does not say that cause and efficient are the same, as is attributed to him, but he says the converse: ‘The efficient is nothing other than a cause’ [(296e)]. This proposition cannot simply be turned around, as is *per se* clear. Therefore, moreover, it does not imply that an end is not a cause but implies that that which is made by an efficient cause is distinct from it since a cause cannot effect itself. But with regard to the other philosophers, I think they dissent from Aristotle more in words than in actuality. For they do not deny the necessity and concausality of matter or of form or of the end, but they use different names.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes they call matter that which is a prerequisite, but they think that form should be called an effect rather than a cause, because the entire causality is terminated in it. Or, at most, they call it a part of the cause, as Seneca said above. But an end they call a cause in some way or rather a concause with the efficient or that which supervenes on the efficient by the proposed means or the intention of the end so that it can cause. In addition, the efficient cause has an influence on the effect that is both more real and in a certain way more immediate than what the end has. Also, it is better-known and in a certain way more proper than matter and form; it is also prior to them. And therefore, the name ‘cause’ sometimes becomes customarily taken for the efficient cause through antonomasia or also by reason of first imposition. Nevertheless, however, there is no doubt in considering the matter itself physically<sup>5</sup> that each single member of the mentioned causes has the true and proper nature of a cause and is complete and clearly different in its genus, as we will say in

Of the ancient philosophers in this sense.

Why the efficient cause usurped the name ‘cause’ through antonomasia.

<sup>3</sup>See n. 18.

<sup>4</sup>On ‘concausa’, cf. Poliziano: ‘Principia sunt aut causae, aut concausae. Causae aut efficientes aut finales. Concausae uel formales uel materiales’ (*Panep.*, p. 463). Citation from Johann Ramminger, Neulateinische Wortliste, Lemma ‘concausa’, URL: [www.neulatein.de/words/1/004505.htm](http://www.neulatein.de/words/1/004505.htm) (accessed March 24, 2009). In commenting on Plato’s *Philebus*, Iamblichus says that only productive causes are *aitiai*, strictly speaking, while matter and form are only *sunaitiai* (Simplicius, *Categories* 327, 6 ff). Also, cf. Suárez, *DM XIII.8.11*: ‘Omitto etiam necessariam habitudinem seu relationem ad formam, et (ut ita dicam) concausalitatem formae; nam hoc potius est quid necessario consequens quam requisita conditio ad causandum.’

<sup>5</sup>Is the contrast between physics and metaphysics (cf. the introduction to *DM XII*) or between physical and moral (cf. n. 8)?

180 multo melius Aristoteles haec distincte numeravit 180R  
sub communi notione causae.

Locus, tempus  
et similia, cur  
non causae.

185 7. Nec ratio ex Seneca adducta quidquam ob-  
stat, non enim in causis numerantur omnia sine  
185 quibus effectus non fit, sed ea tantum quae per se 185R  
influunt in effectum. Quod non habet locus, quia  
est quid extrinsecum; vel si sit sermo de Ubi intrin-  
seco, illud non praesupponitur sed consequitur in  
effectu ut quoddam accidens eius. Et idem est  
de tempore; nam prout est communis mensura, 190R  
190 extrinsecum est; prout vero esse potest intrinse-  
cum, solum est duratio ipsius motus quo fit res,  
quando successive fit; ille autem motus non est  
causa, sed est potius ipse actualis influxus causae  
efficientis successive, ut infra declarabitur. At vero 195R  
195 materia, quamvis sit quid praerequisitum ad ac-  
tionem agentis, tamen in ipso instanti vel tem-  
pore quo agens agit, etiam materia per se influit  
in effectum, immo et in ipsam actionem agentis,  
si ex illa operetur, ut postea videbimus. Forma 200R  
200 vero, licet sit effectus agentis vel etiam materiae,  
est tamen causa totius compositi, complens es-  
sentiam eius. Et quamvis sit pars compositi, est  
tamen in suo genere totalis causa eius, nec est  
cur pars causae appelletur, quia neque est pars 205R  
205 agentis neque materiae. Quod si appelletur pars  
causae respectu totius causalitatis necessariae in  
omni genere ad effectum, hoc modo etiam materia  
et efficiens dici potest pars causae; est tamen im-  
propria locutio, quia omnes illae non componunt 210R  
210 unam causam, sed aggregatum vel requisitum nu-  
merum causarum. Atque idem est proportionaliter  
de fine, nam, licet requiratur ex parte agentis ut  
actio eius non temere fiat sed ex instituto, habet  
tamen influxum proprium ac per se et diversum 215R  
215 ab influxu agentis; qualis vero ille sit et an semper  
sit necessarius, infra dicemus.

the second point. And for that reason, Aristotle numbered these distinctly under the common notion of a cause, as is much to be preferred.

7. Nor does the argument gathered from Seneca pose any obstacle, for not all things without which an effect would not happen are numbered among the causes but only those which *per se* inflow into the effect. Place (*locus*) does not do this because it is something extrinsic. Or, if the discussion is about the intrinsic where (*Ubi*), it is not presupposed but follows in the effect as a certain accident of a it. And likewise in the case of time, for insofar as it is a common measure, it is extrinsic. But insofar as it can be intrinsic, it is only the duration of the motion itself by which the thing happens when it happens successively. But this motion is not a cause but rather is the actual influx itself of the efficient cause successively, as will be shown below. But matter, on the other hand, although it is a prerequisite for the action of the agent, nevertheless in the very instant or time in which the agent acts, the matter also *per se* inflows into the effect, or, more correctly, into the very action of the agent, if it is done by it, as we will see later. But the form, although it is an effect of the agent or even of matter, is, nevertheless, a cause of the whole composite, completing its essence. And, although it is a part of the composite, it is for all that in its genus a complete cause of the composite, nor is there reason why it should be called a part of a cause since it is a part of neither the agent nor the matter. If it should be called a part of the cause with respect to the entire causality necessary in every genus for the effect, then in this way matter and the efficient can also be called a part of the cause. It is, nevertheless, an improper locution, since all these do not compose one cause but an aggregate or requisite number of causes. And likewise proportionately in the case of the end, for, although it is required on the part of the agent so that its action does not happen blindly but by institution, it has, nevertheless, a proper and *per se* influx and is distinct from the influx of the agent. But what that is and

Why place,  
time, and  
other similar  
things are not  
causes.

Finis in  
moralibus  
causa  
praestantior.

220 8. Unde ad alteram partem obiectionis re-  
spondetur Platonem et Socratem illo loco moraliter  
potius quam physice loqui. In moralibus enim  
225 finis est quodammodo tota causa actionum seu  
effectuum, non quod aliae causae excludantur  
quatenus physice necessariae sunt, sed quod omnes  
aliae ex fine sumant quasi primam rationem cau-  
sandi. Unde finis potest quodammodo dici sola  
230 causa, quia ita est causa ut non habeat priorem  
causam vel rationem; omnes autem aliae ita sunt  
causae ut habeant aliquam priorem causam vel  
saltem priorem rationem causandi; quod dico propter  
235 primam efficientem causam quae est Deus, quod  
inferius declarabimus. Si autem vis fiat in voce  
*propter quid*, dicendum est stricte sumptam solum  
accommodari fini, latius vero solere etiam ad omnes  
causas extendi. Immo Aristoteles supra inde pro-  
bat praedicta causarum genera, quia per omnia  
240 illa satisfieri solet quaestioni propter quid; dicimus  
enim hominem esse mortalem propter materiam,  
et vivere propter animam, etc.

#### *Quatuor causarum mutua distinctio*

5 9. Ex his facile est expedire punctum secundum  
de distinctione harum causarum. Potest autem  
esse sermo de distinctione formaliter ac praecise  
in ratione causae vel de distinctione quasi materi-  
ali seu reali in esse entis. Prior distinctio est quae  
5R ad praesens spectat, quam certum est inter haec  
membra reperiri. Primo ex Aristotelis testimonio,  
quia alias esset vitiosa divisio. Secundo ratione,  
quia causa, ut causa in actu, formaliter consti-

whether it is always necessary, we will talk about below.

8. Hence, to the other part of the objection it is  
responded that Plato and Socrates are talking morally  
rather than physically in that place. For in moral mat-  
ters, the end is in a certain way the complete cause of  
actions or effects. Not that other causes are excluded in-  
sofar as they are physically necessary, but all the others  
are taken from the end as if it were the first nature of  
causing. Hence, the end can in a certain way be called  
the only cause, because it is a cause in such a way that it  
does not have a prior cause or reason. But all the others  
are causes in such a way that they have some prior cause  
or at least a prior nature of causing, which is what I say  
on account of the first efficient cause which is God, which  
I will discuss later. If, however, the meaning in the phrase  
'on account of what' (*propter quid*) is at issue, it should be  
said that, taken strictly, it is only applied to the end; usu-  
ally, however, it is extended more broadly to apply also  
to all the causes.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Aristotle above establishes the  
mentioned genera of causes on this basis, since the ques-  
tion 'on account of what' is usually satisfied through all  
of these. For we say that a human being is mortal on  
account of matter, lives on account of the soul, and so on.

The end is the  
more excellent  
cause in moral  
matters.

#### *The mutual distinction of the four causes*

9. From here, the second point concerning the distinction  
of these causes can easily be resolved. But the discussion  
can be either concerning the distinction formally and pre-  
cisely in the nature of cause or concerning the, as it were,  
material or real distinction in the existence of beings. The  
former distinction is what is relevant at present. It is cer-  
tain to be found between these members. First, by the  
testimony of Aristotle, since otherwise the division would  
be vicious. Secondly, by argument, since cause as cause

<sup>6</sup>Cf. *DM* 12.2.2. Also the Latin translation of *Phys.* II.3 and 7 included with the Coimbra commentary.



10 tuitur per actualem influxum in effectum; sed in  
 quatuor illis membris sunt influxus diversarum  
 rationum; ergo. Probatum minor, quia influxus  
 causae materialis et formalis est intrinsecus per  
 15 internam compositionem, influxus autem causae  
 efficientis et finalis est extrinsecus. Rursus in-  
 fluxus materiae est per modum potentiae, formae  
 autem per modum actus. Influxus item efficientis  
 est per actionem seu mutationem realem; influxus  
 20 autem finis est per mutationem intentionalem aut  
 metaphoricam; sunt ergo omnes hae causalitates  
 formaliter distinctae; constituunt igitur causas in  
 actu formaliter distinctas. Unde etiam rationes  
 seu virtutes causandi harum causarum distinctae  
 25 sunt, nam materia causat quatenus est passiva  
 potentia; efficiens vero quatenus habet potentiam  
 activam in aliud; forma vero quatenus vim ha-  
 bet actuandi per seipsam; finis tamen, quatenus  
 bonus est et per bonitatem habet vim alliciendi  
 effectum, quae omnia in sequentibus exponentur  
 30 latius, neque hic occurrit specialis difficultas circa  
 hanc partem.

Eadem res  
 diversarum  
 munera  
 causarum  
 potest  
 exercere  
 respectu  
 effectuum  
 diversorum.

10. Circa distinctionem autem realem seu ma-  
 35 terialem harum causarum dubitari potest an sem-  
 per intercedat, vel fieri possit ut eadem omnino  
 res habeat plures rationes causandi ex numeratis.  
 Potest autem hoc quaeri, vel in ordine ad diversos  
 effectus, vel ad eundem. Priori modo dicendum  
 est non esse necessariam distinctionem realem  
 seu materialem inter dictas causas, quia non re-  
 40 pugnat eadem omnino rem in ordine ad diversos  
 effectus habere plures causalitates diversarum ra-  
 tionum. Eadem enim forma est finis respectu ge-  
 nerationis seu alterationis per quam fit, et est forma  
 respectu materiae et compositi, et est principium  
 45 efficiens respectu actionis in aliud, et potest esse  
 materialis causa suarum proprietatum, ut est ani-  
 ma rationalis quatenus est subiectum intellectus

10R in act is formally constituted through actual influx into  
 effect. But in these four members are influxes of diverse  
 natures. Therefore. The minor is proven: the influx of  
 the material and formal causes is intrinsic through inter-  
 15R nal composition, but the influx of the efficient and final  
 causes is extrinsic. In turn, the influx of matter is by the  
 mode of potency, but of form by the mode of act. Similarly,  
 the influx of the efficient cause is through real action or  
 change, but the influx of the end is through intentional  
 or metaphorical change. Therefore, all these causalities  
 20R are formally distinct. Therefore, they constitute causes  
 formally distinct in act. Hence, the natures or powers  
 of causing of these causes are also distinct, for matter  
 causes insofar as it is passive potency, but the efficient  
 insofar as it has an active potency to another thing. But  
 25R form insofar as it has the strength of actuating *per seip-*  
*sam*, while the end insofar as it is good and through good-  
 ness has the the strength of enticing an effect. All of these  
 are explained more broadly in the following disputations,  
 nor does any special difficulty occur here concering this  
 30R part.

10. But regarding the real or material distinction of  
 these causes one can doubt whether it always it always  
 intervenes or whether it could happen that the very same  
 thing have more than one nature of causing of the ones  
 35R numbered. Moreover, this can be asked either in relation  
 to different effects or in relation to the same effects. In the  
 former way, it should be said that there is not a real or  
 material necessary distinction between the stated causes,  
 since it is not repugnant for the very same thing to have  
 40R multiple causalities of different natures in relation to dif-  
 ferent effects. For the same form is the end with respect  
 to the generation or alteration through which it comes  
 about, is the form with respect to the matter and com-  
 position, is the efficient principle with respect to action to  
 45R another, and can be the material cause of its properties as  
 the rational soul is insofar as it is the subject of the intel-

The same  
 thing can  
 exercise the  
 roles of  
 different  
 causes with  
 respect to  
 different  
 effects.

50 vel voluntatis. Hi namque influxus seu causalitates, quantumvis diversae rationis sint respectu diversorum effectuum non habent inter se repugnantiam, neque etiam repugnat quod ab eadem re prodeant; quia, sicut eadem res est capax diversorum respectuum in ordine ad diversa, est enim 55 uni similis et alteri dissimilis, principium unius et finis alterius, ita potest in ordine ad diversos effectus participare diversos respectus causandi. Ratio denique a priori est, quia eadem res creata potest in sua entitate includere actum potentiae admixtum, et ideo potest ad unam rem comparari per 60 modum actus formalis, ad aliam vero per modum subiecti; actus autem formalis cum det esse rei, simul esse solet principium agendi aliud, quia operatio consequitur esse; ac denique quia talis actus aliquod bonum est, etiam potest esse principium 65 metaphoricae motionis. Sic igitur non repugnat omnia haec genera causarum in eadem rem convenire respectu diversorum.

70 11. Quod si interdum in aliqua re non coniunguntur, non est ex formali repugnantia talium causalitatum in ordine ad diversa, sed ex peculiari conditione. Et interdum provenit ex perfectione, interdum vero ex imperfectione; verbi gratia, Deus potest esse causa efficiens et finalis, non tamen materialis respectu alicuius, quia est purus 75 actus et nullam habet potentiam passivam; neque etiam exercere potest causalitatem formalem, quia haec requirit entitatem incompletam et imperfectam. Et ob eamdem rationem angelicae substantiae non possunt exercere causalitatem formalem; 80 quia vero non sunt puri actus, possunt aliqua ex parte exercere materialem, saltem respectu aliquorum accidentium; et quia non sunt pura potentia, possunt habere rationem aliquam efficiendi et multo magis finalizandi. E contrario vero materia prima, cum causalitatem materialem exercere

50R lect or will. In fact, these influxes or causalities, however different the natures are with respect to different effects, have no repugnance to each other nor is it repugnant that they come out of the same thing; because, just as the same thing is capable of different respects in relation to different things (for it is similar to one and dissimilar to another, the principle of one and the end of another), so also it can participate in different in different respects of causing in relation to different effects. Finally, an a priori argument is that the same created thing can include in its entity an act mixed with a potency and therefore can be compared to one thing through the mode of formal act but to another through the mode of subject. But a formal act, since it gives being to a thing, usually is at the same time a principle of doing something else, since action follows being. And, finally, since such an act is some good, it can also be the principle of metaphorical motion. Thus, for that reason, it is not repugnant that all these genera of causes come together in the same thing with respect to different [effects].

55R 60R 65R 70R 75R 80R 11. If sometimes in some thing they are not conjoined is not a result of a formal repugnance of such causalities in relation to diverse [effects] but a result of a special condition. Sometimes it comes into being from perfection, but sometimes from imperfection. For example, God can be the efficient cause and the final cause with respect to something, yet not be the material cause, since God is pure act and has no passive potency. Nor can he exercise formal causality, since this requires incomplete and imperfect entity. And for the same reason angelic substances cannot exercise formal causality. But since they are not pure acts they can by some part exercise material causality, at least with respect to some accidents. And since they are not pure potencies they can have some nature of efficient-causing and much more of final-causing. But, conversely, first matter, while it can exercise material causality, nevertheless, because it is pure potency, participates neither in formal causality nor properly in effective

possit, tamen, quia est pura potentia, nec causalitatem formalem nec proprie effectivam participat; tamen, quia non est ita pura potentia quin aliquam entitatem et actualitatem habeat, aliquam causalitatem finalem habere potest, ratione cuius anima appetit corpus suum et quaelibet forma materiam. At vero forma substantialis, cum causalitatem formalem, efficientem et finalem exercere possit, non tamen materialem substantialem (ut sic dicam), quia non est potentia passiva in genere substantiae. Respectu vero accidentium potest interdum exercere hanc causalitatem, quod proprie convenit formae subsistenti, nam illa forma quae ob imperfectionem suam ex se subsistere non potest, neque etiam est potens per seipsam ad sustinenda accidentia. Et ad hunc modum facile discursi potest per entitates accidentales, quatenus praedictas causandi rationes participare possunt.

12. At vero, si hae causae comparentur ad unum et eundem effectum, nonnulla maior difficultas est. Et quidem in quibusdam est clara repugnantia, in aliis vero e contrario est manifesta possibilitas, in quibusdam autem res est controversa et dubia. Itaque eandem rem in ordine ad idem simul esse causam materialem et formalem plane repugnat, quia hae causalitates requirunt conditiones formaliter oppositas, quales sunt esse in potentia et in actu formali; unde si sit sermo de propria forma substantiali, semper requirit distinctionem realem a sua causa materiali, et idem est in forma accidentali quae suam propriam habeat entitatem. Quia vero sunt aliquae accidentales quae tantum sunt modi substantiae, ut praesentia localis, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi, in illis, sicut ratio formae est imperfecta, ita sufficit distinctio modalis. Semper tamen necesse est ut formalis et materialis causa respectu eiusdem compositi distinguantur realiter

causality. Still, since it is not so pure a potency that it does not have some entity and actuality, it can have some final causality, for which reason the soul desires its body and any form its matter. But substantial form, on the other hand, while it can exercise formal, efficient, and final causality, nevertheless [cannot exercise] substantial material causality—if I may speak in this way—since it is not a passive potency in the genus of substance. But it can sometimes exercise this causality with respect to accidents, which properly is appropriate to a subsistent form, for this form which cannot subsist by itself on account of its imperfection also is not able *per seipsam* to sustain accidents. And in this way one can easily run through the accidental entities to the extent that the mentioned natures of causing can participate.

12. But on the other hand, if these causes are compared to one and the same effect, there is a considerably greater difficulty. And indeed in some things there is a clear repugnance, but in others it is, conversely, an obvious possibility, while in certain things the matter is controversial and doubtful. And so the same thing being at the same time the material and formal cause in relation to the same thing is plainly repugnant, since these causalities require formally opposite conditions, which are to be in formal potency and in formal act. Hence, if the discussion is about the proper substantial form, it always requires a real distinction from its material cause. The same is true in the case of an accidental form that has its own entity. But since there are some accidental [forms] which are only modes of substance (present place, for example), or if something else is of this sort, in these things a modal distinction suffices just as the nature of the form is imperfect. Nevertheless, it is always necessary that the formal and material causes with respect to the same composite be really or by the nature of the thing distinguished. Fur-

Respectu  
eiusdem  
eadem res  
formae et  
materiae  
munera subire  
nequit.

The same  
thing cannot  
be placed into  
the roles of  
form and  
matter with  
respect to the  
same [effects].

Forma et  
efficiens  
respectu  
eiusdem in  
idem  
coincidere non  
possunt.

125 vel ex natura rei. Deinde etiam constat formalem  
et efficientem causam non posse in eadem re con-  
iungi respectu eiusdem effectus; quia forma ex-  
ercet causalitatem formalem in eo in quo est, ef-  
ficientem vero respectu alterius formae, vel com-  
positi, et ideo forma ut informans, vel supponitur  
130 ad actionem ut principium agendi, vel consequitur  
ut effectus seu terminus formalis actionis; et ideo  
fieri non potest ut causalitas formalis et efectiva  
eidem formae conveniant respectu eiusdem, nam  
includunt habitudines repugnantes. 120R 125R

Forma cum  
fine an possit  
in eadem  
entitatem  
confluere.

135 13. Rursus etiam est clarum finalem et for-  
malem causalitatem quodammodo convenire posse  
in eadem formam respectu eiusdem, quodammodo  
autem non posse. Si enim comparentur ad idem  
subiectum vel suppositum, optime possunt in eam-  
dem rem convenire; eadem enim forma et est finis  
140 materiae et eam informat, eademque visio beata  
est forma intellectus et finis ac beatitudo eius. Et  
ratio est quia ipsamet forma, ut informans, et in-  
formatio eius est bonum ac perfectio subiecti quod  
145 informat; et ideo potest ad illud comparari simul  
in ratione formae et finis. At vero, si comparatio  
fiat ad ipsum compositum quod per formam con-  
stituitur, sic non potest eadem esse forma et finis  
respectu eiusdem, quia non est forma finis com-  
150 positi, sed potius forma est propter compositum ut  
propter finem suum. Quod si comparentur ad ac-  
tionem seu generationem, etiam respectu illius ea-  
dem est forma et finis. Quo sensu videtur dixisse  
155 Aristoteles, infra citandus, finem et formam coin-  
cidere in eadem rem numero; sub eo tamen re-  
spectu, licet forma proprie sit finis generationis,  
non tamen proprie est causa formalis eius, sed  
tantum principium, ut sectione praecedenti dice-  
bam. 130R 135R 140R 145R 150R 155R

An  
coniungantur  
in eodem  
efficiens et  
finis.

160 14. Praeterea eadem fere proportionem loquen-

thermore, it is also evident that the formal and efficient  
causes cannot be conjoined in the same thing with re-  
spect to the same effect, since the form exercises formal  
causality in that in which it is, but the efficient cause with  
respect to another form or composite. And therefore the  
form as informing either is supposed for the action as a  
principle of acting or follows as the formal effect or *ter-  
minus* of the action. And therefore it cannot happen that  
the formal and effective causalities of the same form come  
together with respect to the same [effect] for they include  
repugnant habitudes.

13. On the other hand, it is also clear that final and  
formal causality can come together in the same form with  
respect to the same [effect] in some way but cannot in  
another way. For if they are compared according to the  
same subject or suppositum, they can best come together  
in the same thing. For the same form both is the end of  
the matter and informs it and the same beatific vision is  
the form of the intellect and its end and happiness. And  
the reason is that the very form itself, as informing, and  
its information is the good and perfection of the subject  
that it informs and therefore it can be compared in that  
at the same time in the nature of form and end. But, on  
the other hand, if the comparison happens according to  
the very composite that is constituted through the form,  
in this way the form and the end cannot be the same  
thing with respect to the same [effect], since the form is  
not the end of the composite but rather the form is for the  
sake of the composite as for the sake of its end. If they  
are compared according to action or generation, the form  
and the end are also the same with respect to these. This  
seems to be the sense in which Aristotle said, to be cited  
below, that the end and the form coincide in the same  
thing in number. Under that, nevertheless, with respect  
[to the same effect], although the form properly is the end  
of generation, it is not, nevertheless its formal cause but  
only its principle, as I said in the preceding section.

14. Furthermore, one should speak in almost the

The form and  
efficient cause  
cannot  
coincide in the  
same thing  
with respect to  
the same  
[effect].

Whether the  
form can come  
together with  
the end in the  
same entity.

Whether the  
efficient cause  
and end are  
conjoined in  
the same  
thing.

dum est de fine et efficiente; nam secundum quamdam rationem finis convenire possunt eidem rei, non vero secundum aliam. Duplex enim finis, ut infra videbimus, distingui solet, scilicet, finis cuius gratia actio fit, vel cui seu in cuius gratiam et commodum fit; ut in curatione, finis cuius gratia est sanitas; cui vero, est ipse homo cui sanitas procuratur. Prior ergo finis non potest esse eadem res cum causa efficienti quia est effectus eius; posterior autem finis optime potest esse eadem res cum causa efficienti: nam saepe efficiens operatur propter seipsum; et hoc modo Deus est simul primum efficiens et ultimus finis suorum operum. Et iuxta haec intelligitur facile vulgare dictum Aristoteles, II *Phys.*, c. 7: *Finis et forma coincidunt in idem numero; finis autem et efficiens in idem non numero, sed specie*; loquitur enim de fine cuius gratia, seu qui per actionem formaliter intenditur et fit; de quo iam diximus distingui ab agente tamquam effectum eius, et ideo non posse esse idem numero cum illo. Quod vero sit idem specie, contingit in agentibus univocis, non in omnibus, ut ipsemet Aristoteles indicavit. Quomodo autem causa formalis et finalis in eadem rem numero coniungi possint, iam declaratum est. Adde vero etiam posse aliquam rationem finis in eadem numero rem cum causa materiali coniungi; nam subiectum accidentium et est causa materialis eorum et finis; ut enim dicebam, finis proximus sanitatis procurandae est homo, et inter alios fines forma inducitur in materiam propter ipsam materiam conservandam; nam, quia ratio finis fundatur in bonitate, quae transcendentalis est et in omni entitate ex parte reperitur, ideo coniungi potest aliqua ratio finis cum qualibet alia causa.

same proportion about the end and the efficient cause. For with respect to a certain kind of end they can come together in the same thing but not with respect to another. For two kinds of ends are usually distinguished, as we will see below, namely, between a *finis cuius* for the sake of which an action is done and a *finis cui*, i.e., the end for whom or for whose sake and advantage it is done. For example, in healing the *finis cuius* is health but the *finis cui* is the very human being for whom the health is procured. Therefore, the former end cannot be the same thing with the efficient cause since it is the effect of the latter. But the latter end can best be the same thing with the efficient cause, for the efficient cause often acts for its own sake. And in this way God is simultaneously the first efficient cause and ultimate end of his actions. And the common statement of Aristotle in *Phys.* II, c. 7, is easily understood in accordance with this: ‘The end and form coincide in the same thing in number, but the end and efficient cause in the same thing not in number but in species’. For he is speaking about the *finis cuius* or the end which is formally intended and made through the action. We already said concerning it that it is distinguished from the agent as it is the effect of the latter and therefore cannot be the same in number with it. But the fact that it is the same in species happens in univocal species but not in all species, as Aristotle himself indicated. But in what way the formal cause and the final cause could be conjoined in the same thing in number was already shown. But I add also that some nature of the end can be conjoined in the same thing in number with the material cause, for the subject of accidents is both the material cause and end of them. For, as I was saying, the proximate end of health to be procured is the human being and among other ends the form is introduced in matter for the sake of the very matter to be conserved. For, since the nature of the end is founded in goodness, which is a transcendental property and which is found in part in every entity, therefore, some nature of the end can be conjoined with any other cause

Aristot.

Aristotle.

An materia  
rationem  
aliquam finis  
in sua entitate  
patiatur.

Whether  
matter allows  
some nature of  
an end in its  
entity.

Efficiens an  
idem esse  
possit cum  
materia.

15. Solum supererat comparanda causa efficiens cum materiali, an possit utraque ratio coniungi in eadem re respectu eiusdem effectus. Et quidem loquendo de causa materiali substantiarum naturalium, certum est non posse materialem et efficientem causam coniungi in eadem re in ordine ad talem effectum, quia materia non potest esse principium efficiens formae ex illa educendae, et consequenter nec totius compositi. At vero loquendo de causa materiali accidentium, maius dubium est an eadem causa materialis possit esse efficiens eorumdem. Potest autem haec efficientia intelligi duplex: una, per naturalem resultantiam, et de hac loquendo non est dubium quin possint illae causalitates coniungi, et ita dici solet passim, animam, verbi gratia, habere triplicem causalitatem in suas naturales potentias, nempe finalem, materialem et efficientem; et multi censent hoc genus activitatis nec materiae primae repugnare in suam propriam passionem, quae est quantitas. Altera efficientia est per se et per propriam actionem et de hac est maior difficultas; coincidit tamen cum illa quaestione, an omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, seu (quod idem est) an agens et patiens semper distinguantur, saltem secundum proxima principia agendi et recipiendi, quam postea tractabimus disputando de causa efficienti.

*Causae in quatuor genera divisio an adaequata*

Instrumenta  
sub efficienti,  
non materiali  
causa  
collocanda.

16. Circa tertium punctum, an haec quatuor genera sufficienter dividant causam, solent variae difficultates proponi de causis instrumentariis, positivis et obiectivis. Sed haec et similia difficultatem non habent, nam causa instrumentalis quaedam

whatever.

15. The only thing left is to compare the efficient cause with the material cause, whether each nature can be conjoined in the same thing with respect to the same effect. And indeed in speaking about the material cause of natural substances it is certain that the material and efficient causes cannot be conjoined in the same thing in relation to such an effect, since matter cannot be an efficient principle of form as a result of the latter being drawn out and consequently neither can the whole composite. But, on the other hand, when speaking about the material cause of accidents there is more of a doubt about whether the same material cause can be the efficient cause of the same [effects]. But this efficient cause can be understood in two ways. One, through the natural result and concerning this way of speaking there is no doubt but that these causalities can be conjoined. In this way it is customarily said everywhere that the soul, for example, has three causalities in its natural potencies, namely, final, material, and efficient. And many think that this genus of activity is not repugnant to prime matter in its proper property, which is quantity. The other kind of efficient cause is *per se* and through its own action. Concerning this there is greater difficulty. Nevertheless, it coincides with that question of whether everything that is moved is moved by something else, or (what is the same) whether the agent and patient are always distinguished, at least according to a proximate principle of acting and receiving. We will discuss this later when disputing about the efficient cause.

*Whether the division of causes into four genera is adequate*

16. Concerning the third point, whether these four genera sufficiently divide cause, various difficulties are usually put forward about instrumental, positive, and objective causes. But these and similar difficulties have no place for instrumental cause is a certain species of ef-

Whether the  
efficient cause  
can be the  
same with the  
material  
cause.

Instruments  
should be  
classified as  
efficient and  
not material  
causes.

species est causae efficientis, ut postea videbimus. Nec potest cum aliquo fundamento reduci ad materialem causam, ut falso excogitavit Philoponus, II *Phys.*, text. 27, nisi fortasse loquamur de dispositionibus materiae, quae solent etiam instrumenta appellari; sed illae nisi efficientiam habeant, revera non sunt instrumenta; si vero efficientiam habent, ut sic non sunt dispositiones neque ad causam materialem ullo modo pertinent, sed ad efficientem, quam vel adjuvant vel eius vicem gerunt. Dispositiva autem causa communiter reducitur ad materialem, quia praeparat materiam ad formam. Sed haec denominatio solum esse videtur per quamdam attributionem; nam si loquamur cum proprietate, vera dispositio quaedam causa formalis est, non enim disponit nisi informando subiectum; calor enim qui est in ligno non disponit ad formam ignis nisi formaliter calefaciendo lignum; loquor autem de vera ac propria dispositione physica et positiva; nam vulgari modo solet dispositio vocari quaecumque remotio impedi-  
 20 menti, vel quaevis conditio necessaria, ut applicatio ad agendum vel quid simile; et in his nulla est vera causalitas; sed tantum per accidens.

Obiectum  
 cuius generis  
 circa  
 potentiam et  
 actum eius  
 exercent  
 causalitatem.

17. Causam obiectivam appello obiectum respectu potentiae vel actus. In quo obiecto duplex potest habitudo considerari: una est moventis, altera terminantis. Prior respectu potentiae cognoscitivae est causalitas efficiens, sive consideretur obiectum quatenus movet imprimendo speciem sive quatenus per speciem concurrat ad actum; respectu vero potentiae appetitivae est causalitas finalis vel propria et formalis, ut in appetitu rationali, vel materialis et imperfecta, ut in sensitivo, quod postea videbimus. Sub posteriori autem respectu, aliqui reducunt obiectum ad causam fi-

10R efficient cause, as we will see later. Nor can it with any foundation be reduced to the material cause, as Philoponus contrived in *Phys.* II, text. 27, unless perhaps we are speaking about material dispositions which are usually also called instruments. But these are not really instruments unless they have efficiency. But if they have efficiency, as such they are not dispositions nor pertain to the material cause in any way; instead they pertain to the efficient cause which they either aid or carry its change. 15R But a dispositive cause is commonly reduced to a material cause, since it prepares the matter for the form. But this denomination seems only to be through a certain attribution, for if we speak with propriety, a true disposition is a certain formal cause, for it does not dispose except by informing the subject. For the heat which is in wood does not dispose to the form of fire except by formally heating the wood. But I speak about a true and proper physical and positive disposition, for in a common way any removal of an impediment or any necessary condition is called a disposition (for example, an application to acting or something similar). And in these there is no true causality but only *per accidens*.

17. I call the objective cause the object with respect to the power or act. Two habitudes can be considered in this object: one is of the mover and the other of the terminating thing. The former with respect to the cognoscitive power is efficient causality. It may be considered the object either insofar as it moves by impressing the species or insofar as it concurs with the act through the species. But with respect to the appetitive power it is final causality either properly and formally, as in the case of the rational appetite, or materially and imperfectly, as in the case of the sensitive appetite, which we will see later. But with respect to the latter [habitudo], others reduce the object

The object of  
 any genus  
 exercises  
 causality with  
 regard to its  
 potency and  
 act.

45 nalem, quia potentia et actus in illud ut in finem tendunt. Neque obstat quod haec habitudo sit essentialis, quia non repugnat quod aliqua res essentialiter sit ordinata ad suum finem. Alii ad formalem causam revocant, quatenus obiectum dat speciem actui; quidquid enim dat speciem, habet rationem formae; dicunt autem esse non intrinsecam, sed extrinsecam formam. Ego vero libentius negarem obiectum sub hac ratione exercere aliquod verum genus causalitatis, sed puri termini specificantis, non per verum aliquem influxum qui causam constituat, sed per solam habitudinem alterius ad ipsum. Neque Aristoteles unquam illius causae formalis extrinsecae meminit, nec terminum motus appellavit causam motus, quamvis dixerit ab illo sumere speciem; et idem est de uno relativo respectu alterius seu de termino relationis ut sic. Nec D. Thomas aliter loquitur, ut videre licet I-II, q. 1, a. 3. Sed haec facilia sunt, ac fere de modo loquendi.

Exemplar an distinctum causae genus a numeratis. Plato.

65 18. Potissima difficultas est in hoc puncto de causa exemplari, quam Plato addit quatuor ab Aristotele numeratis, ut constat ex *Timaeo* et *Phaedone*, et refert Seneca, citata epistol. 66. Sed de hac materia propter gravitatem eius propriam disputationem instituemus. Nunc breviter concedimus Platoni exemplar veram causalitatem exercere, quod Aristoteles non ignoravit, nam hic numerando formam addit et exemplar, et ideo fortasse non est necesse propter eam causam augere numerum, quod dicto loco examinabimus.

*Divisio causae praedicta sitne immediata*

<sup>7</sup>DM 25.

<sup>8</sup>From *Phys.* II.3 from the translation in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesv in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritæ: Alia est forma, et exemplar, quæ essentiae quidem est ratio, atque eius genera, ut harmoniae diapason, duo ad unum, et omnino numerus, et partes, quæ insunt in ratione.*

40R to the final cause, since the power and act tend to it as to an end. Nor is it an obstacle that this habitudo is essential, since it is not repugnant that some thing be essentially ordered to its end. Others call it back to the formal cause, insofar as the object gives species to the act. For anything that gives species has the nature of a form. But they say that it is not an intrinsic form but an extrinsic form. But I would rather deny that the object under this aspect exercises any true genus of causality, but of a simple specifying *terminus*, not through some true influx which constitutes a cause, but through a habitudo alone of another thing to itself. Aristotle never had this extrinsic formal causes in mind nor did he call a *terminus* of motion a cause of motion, although he said that it takes it species from it. And the same is true of the one relative with respect to another or of the *terminus* of the relation as such. Nor does St. Thomas say otherwise, as may be seen in [ST] IaIIæ.1.3. But these are easier and generally about a manner of speaking.

60R 18. The greatest difficulty in this point is about the exemplar cause, which Plato adds to the four numbered by Aristotle, as is clear from the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedo* and to which Seneca refers in the cited letter 66 [i.e., 65]. But we will set up its own disputation about this matter on account of its gravity.<sup>7</sup> For now we will briefly concede to Plato that the exemplar exercises true causality. Aristotle did not ignore this, for here in his numbering he adds form and exemplar.<sup>8</sup> And therefore perhaps it is not necessary to increase the number for the sake of this cause. We will examine this in the stated place.

*Whether the division of the mentioned causes is immediate*

Whether exemplar is a distinct genus of cause from the ones numbered. Plato.



Causae in  
internam et  
externam  
divisio, altior  
quam  
praedicta.

19. Circa quartum videri potest divisio illa immediata, eo quod Aristoteles proxime diviserit causam in quatuor illa membra. Sed nihilominus dicendum illam divisionem non esse immediatam; posunt enim facile convenientiae inter quaedam ex his membris excogitari, ratione quarum aliae priores divisiones causae et in pauciora membra constituentur. Sic ergo potest primo causa dividi in internam et externam; interna rursus in materiam et formam; de quibus dubitari non potest quin peculiater convenient in modo causandi; dant enim esse effectui conferendo illi suamet numero entitatem et interne componendo illum; efficiens autem et finis longe aliter causant, et in hoc conveniunt, quod non componunt intrinsece effectum, et ideo causae extrinsecae communiter appellantur. Igitur in ratione causae abstrahi potest ratio communis materiae et formae quae non sit communis aliis causis, et e converso; ergo recte dividitur causa immediate in intrinsecam et extrinsecam, et deinde illa in materialem et formalem, haec vero in efficientem et finalem. Alio item modo posset alia divisio causae immediatior excogitari; nam tres aliae causae praeter finalem conveniunt in hoc quod conferunt ad esse effectus per realem influxum, ideoque requirunt existentiam realem ad suas causalitates, ut postea videbimus; causa autem finalis influit intentionaliter, ideoque causare potest antequam in se realiter existat. Recte igitur dividi potest causa immediate in realem et intentionalem, stricte sumendo in priori membro illum terminum realem; nam si sumatur in tota sua latitudine et transcendentia, etiam causae finali convenit. Et rursus causa realis dividitur in intrinsecam, quae in materiam et formam, et extrinsecam, quae est efficiens, et pecu-

Causae in  
realem rigide  
et  
intentionalem  
immediatissimam  
divisio.

4 divisionem] visionem D.

19. Concerning the fourth point, this division can seem immediate by the fact that Aristotle divided cause into these four members. But, nevertheless, it should be said that this division is not immediate, for agreements between certain of these members can easily be thought up, by reason of which other prior divisions of cause into fewer members are set up. In this way, therefore, cause can first be divided into internal and external causes. The internal in turn [can be divided] into matter and form, concerning which it cannot be doubted by that they distinctively agree in their way of causing. For they give being to the effect by bestowing on it their very own entity in number and internally composing it. But the efficient cause and end cause in a very different way and they agree in that they do not intrinsically compose the effect. Therefore, they are commonly called extrinsic causes. For this reason the nature common to matter and form which is not common to the other causes can be abstracted from the nature of cause, and conversely. Therefore, cause it is right to immediately divide cause into intrinsic and extrinsic and then to divide the former into material and formal but the latter into efficient and final. Likewise, in another way another more immediate division of cause can be thought up, for the three causes other than the final cause agree in that they contribute to the being of the effect through a real influx and therefore they require real existence for their causalities, as we will see later. But the final cause inflows intentionally and for this reason can cause before it really exists in itself. Therefore, cause can rightly be immediately divided into real and intentional, taking strictly in the former member that the *terminus* be real. For if it is taken in its whole latitude and transcendence, the final cause also agrees [with it]. And real cause, in turn, is divided into intrinsic, which [is divided] into matter and form, and extrinsic, which is the efficient cause. [The efficient cause] can be called extrin-

A division of  
cause into  
internal and  
external that  
is higher than  
the one  
mentioned.

The most  
immediate  
division of  
cause into the  
rigidly real  
and the  
intentional.

liari ratione et quasi per antonomasiam dici potest extrinseca; nam, licet finalis causa comparata ad formalem et materialem extrinseca etiam sit, comparata tamen ad efficientem, est quodammodo intrinseca; nam habitudo ad finem est magis intrinseca unicuique rei et in quibusdam est etiam essentialis.

*Quatuor causae membra, an atoma*

20. De quinto puncto pauca hoc loco dici possunt donec de singulis causis tractemus, et ideo breviter dicendum est hanc non esse divisionem in ultimas rationes causae; nam sub quocumque illorum membrorum dari possunt variae divisiones. Causa enim materialis quaedam est pura potentia, alia vero est tantum potentia secundum quid. Quae non est divisio tantum materialis (ut ita dicam) secundum entitatem quae est causa, sed etiam est formalis in ratione causae materialis. Nam de ratione formali illius est ut sit potentia, et ideo secundum diversam rationem potentiae receptivae erit diversa ratio causae materialis; quae diversitas attendi etiam potest ex effectibus; nam illa prior est causa materialis substantiae, posterior vero accidentium. Unde prior dici potest causa materialis simpliciter, posterior vero secundum quid, sumendo has voces non ex entitatibus talium causarum, sed ex habitudine ad effectus; nam quoad entitatem materialis causa accidentium esse potest ens simpliciter seu substantia integra; materialis autem causa substantiae tantum esse potest ens secundum quid; tamen quoad causationem seu habitudinem causae, haec causat ens simpliciter, illa secundum quid. Rursus materialis causa substantiae dividitur in materiam corruptibilem vel incorruptibilem substantiarum; causa vero materialis accidentium di-

sic through its distinctive nature and, as it were, through antonomasia. For, although the final cause as compared to the formal and material is also extrinsic, nevertheless, as compared to the efficient, it is intrinsic in a certain way. For a habitudo to the end is more intrinsic to each thing and in certain things it is also essential.

*Whether the four members of cause are atomic*

20. Concerning the fifth point there is little to be said in this place until we discuss each cause individually. Therefore, it should be said briefly that this is not a division into the ultimate natures of cause, for various divisions can be given for each of these members. For a certain material cause is pure potency, but another is a potency only *secundum quid*. This division is not only material (if I may speak in this way) according to the entity that is the cause, but is also formal in the nature of the material cause. For with regard to its formal nature it is such that it is potency and therefore there will be different natures of material causes according to the different natures of receptive potencies. This diversity can also be applied by the effects, for the former is the material cause of substance but the latter of accidents. Hence, the former can also be called the material cause *simpliciter* but the latter *secundum quid*, taking these terms not from the entities of such causes but from their habitudes to their effects. For with respect to entity the material cause of accidents can be being *simpliciter* or an integral substance. But the material cause of a substance can only be being *secundum quid*. Still, with respect to the causation or habitudo of a cause, the latter causes being *simpliciter*, the former *secundum quid*. The material cause of substance, in turn, is divided into the matter of corruptible and incorruptible substances. But the material cause of accidents can be divided either into corporeal or spiritual, into proximate or remote, into that which is an accident in

30 vidi potest vel in corporalem et spiritualem, vel  
 in proximam aut remotam, vel in eam quae in  
 se sit accidens, vel quae sit substantia, aut par-  
 tialis aut integra, de quibus omnibus in prox-  
 35 imis disputationibus dicam. Atque proportionali  
 modo dividi potest forma in substantialem et ac-  
 cidentalem et utrumque membrum subdividitur  
 in varias formas, iuxta varietatem substantiarum  
 compositarum et accidentium. Causae item effi-  
 cientis et finalis quamplures sunt divisiones, quae  
 non possunt hic breviter recenseri sed in propriis  
 40 disputationibus.

Cur nec in  
 summa  
 membra, nec  
 infima sit  
 causa  
 principali  
 divisione  
 partita.

21. Dices: si causa potest immediate dividi in  
 pauciora membra et remote in plura, cur Aristote-  
 les potius quadrimembrem illam divisionem quam  
 45 alias tradidit? Respondetur hoc ipso quod illa divi-  
 sio est media inter illa extrema, fuisse aptiorem ad  
 doctrinalem divisionem tradendam. Maxime quia  
 membra illa habent rationes et modos causandi  
 magis distinctos et notiores. Adde Aristotelem non  
 omnino omisisse, sed insinuasse satis, tam con-  
 45R venientias harum causarum inter se, quam divi-  
 siones earum, ut ex citatis locis constat.  
 50

#### *Qualis sit data divisio*

22. In sexto puncto auctores omnes supponendo  
 potius quam probando vel disputando, docent il-  
 lam divisionem causae esse analogam et propter  
 eam causam dicunt non fuisse causam in com-  
 5 muni ab Aristotele definitam. Non tamen declarant  
 satis modum aut rationem huius analogiae, neque  
 a nobis declarari potest donec rationes singularum  
 causarum exacte tractentur. Et ideo nunc suppon-  
 amus sententiam illam veram esse ex communis  
 10 sententiae auctoritate et ex hac generali ratione,  
 quod illi modi causarum communes sunt causis

30R itself or that which is a substance, or into partial or inte-  
 gral. I will talk about all of these in the next disputations.  
 And form can be divided in a proportional way into sub-  
 stantial and accidental and each member is subdivided  
 into various forms, according to the variety of composite  
 substances and accidents. Likewise, there are as many  
 35R divisions of efficient and final causes, which cannot briefly  
 be reviewed here but in their proper disputations.

21. You may ask: if cause can be divided immedi-  
 ately into fewer members and remotely into more, why  
 does Aristotle hand down this division into four mem-  
 40R bers rather than another? It is responded that by the  
 very fact that this division is mediate between those ex-  
 tremes it was more suitable for handing down the doc-  
 trinal division, especially since these members have na-  
 tures and modes of causing that are more distinct and  
 45R better-known. Add that Aristotle did not wholly disregard  
 but sufficiently suggested the agreements among these  
 causes as much as their divisions, as is clear from the  
 cited places.

#### *What kind of division is given*

22. In the sixth point, all the authors—more by assuming  
 it than by proving or disputing it—teach that this divi-  
 sion of cause is analogous and as a result of this say that  
 cause was not defined in general by Aristotle. Neverthe-  
 5R less, they do not satisfactorily show the mode or nature of  
 this analogy. Nor can it be shown by us until the nature  
 of each cause has been accurately discussed. And there-  
 fore we assume now that this view is true by the general  
 authority of the view and for the general reason that these  
 10R modes of causes are common to causes of accidents and  
 substances. Since they do not give univocal being, they

Why cause is  
 not divided  
 into higher or  
 lower  
 members in  
 the principal  
 division.

15 accidentium et substantiarum, quae non possunt  
esse univoce causae, quia non dant univoce esse,  
unde nec ratio effectus univoca esse potest in acci-  
dente et substantia; exactiorem vero huius analo-  
giae declarationem in praedictum locum remitto.

15R cannot be univocal causes. Hence, neither can the na-  
ture of effect be univocal in accident and in substance.  
But I refer to a more exact disclosure of this analogy in  
the mentioned place.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>*DM* 27.1.9–11.