A Word of Warning

I created these files for my own purposes, i.e., without paying much attention to what would make them more or less useful to others. The import of that ranges, but, for example, it means that I sometimes translate terms with their cognates without a word of explanation, even though the cognate is clearly misleading if taken in its modern sense. Some of the translations are also hurried affairs, no doubt rife with errors. (That said, if someone notices an error likely to have philosophical consequence, I would be happy to hear about it. The error might, after all, have resulted from my intrinsic ignorance rather than from the external conditions of translating.) NB: I have started marking the more polished translations with an '*'.

Some of these texts, however, are relatively difficult to procure, so I thought there might be some point in making them available, despite the just-mentioned limitations. Many of them contain the Latin text (some of them contain only the Latin text and some mostly). Even where one has access to the books in question, it is sometimes useful to have texts that can be electronically searched. Also, in most of the Suárez files, the Latin text is more reliable than that in the standard Vivès edition.

Incidentally, I periodically add more texts or replace present ones with better translations, so it may be worth checking back.


De Angelis

  • Lib. VII, c. 6 - Whether every sin of the will presupposes some defect in the practical intellect
  • Lib. VII, c. 10 - Whether the first sin of pride in Lucifer was an excessive or inordinate appetite for his own natural happiness (html)

De anima

De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum

  • Disp. 6, sect. 1 - Whether a good end is necessary in order for an act of the will to be good
  • Disp. 6, sect. 4 - What the accidental goodness from the end in an interior act of the will is
  • *Disp. 6, sect. 5 - What kind of relation to the end is required for this goodness
  • *Disp. 7, sect. 1 - Whether there is some act of the will that is of itself and by its own nature evil even apart from an extrinsic prohibition
  • Disp. 11, sect. 2 - Whether the human will, in order to be right, must be conformed to the divine will that orders the actions of the human will itself

De Deo Uno et Trino

De Fine Hominis

  • *Introduction
  • *Disp. 1, sect. 1 - In what the causality of an end consists with respect to human will
  • *Disp. 1, sect. 2 - Whether the causality of an end in our will is only with respect to means or also with respect to the end itself
  • *Disp. 1, sect. 3 - Whether an end exercises causality under the aspect of cognized good
  • *Disp. 1, sect. 4 - Under what aspect of good an end moves and, consequently, whether means participate in the causality of an end
  • *Disp. 1, sect. 5 - How the end is related to the adequate object of the will
  • *Disp. 1, sect. 6 - What kinds of ends there are
  • Disp. 2, sect. 1 - Concerning actions of the will which are on account of an end
  • Disp. 2, sect. 2 - Whether acts of the will are necessarily for the sake of an end and consequently whether they are properly human acts
  • Disp. 2, sect. 3 - Whether a human being acts for the sake of an end in actions which do not proceed from the will
  • *Disp. 2, sect. 4 - In how many ways it happens that the will of a human acts for the sake of an end
  • *Disp. 3, sects. 1 - Whether it is necessary to set up some ultimate end for humans and their actions
  • *Disp. 3, sects. 2 - Whether one can intend in his actions two particular ultimate ends as such
  • *Disp. 3, sects. 3 - Whether someone can at the same time intend two ultimate ends, strictly speaking and positively, and act on account of these
  • *Disp. 3, sects. 4 - Whether someone can at the same time intend two ultimate ends, one unqualifiedly ultimate and the other qualifiedly ultimate
  • *Disp. 3, sects. 5 - Whether it is necessary that a human being always act for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that he himself intends
  • *Disp. 3, sects. 6 - Whether all human actions are on account of an ultimate end strictly speaking at least by inclination
  • *Disp. 4, sect. 1 - Concerning happiness in general: whether it exists and what it is
  • *Disp. 4, sect. 2 - Whether it can be shown that human happiness is possible or is going to be
  • Disp. 4, sect. 3 - What kinds of happiness there are
  • Disp. 5, sect. 1 - Whether all created things without God could be a sufficient object of human happiness
  • Disp. 5, sect. 2 - Whether God alone without the association of any creatures is a sufficient object of happiness
  • *Disp. 5, sect. 3 - Whether God is the object of human happiness according to everything that he is or according to a special attribute
  • Disp. 6, sect. 3 - Whether happiness is one simple activity of the intellective soul or a collection of multiple activities
  • Disp. 7, sect. 1 - Whether formal happiness is essentially an act of the intellect or of the will
  • Disp. 7, sect. 2 - In what act the essential imperfect happiness that can be had in this life consists
  • *Disp. 15, sect. 1-2 - In what this natural happiness properly consists; In what way a human being can acquire natural happiness
  • *Disp. 16, sect. 1 - Whether a human being desires with an innate desire natural happiness in particular and in general

De generatione et corruptione

  • Disp. 1, q. 1 - Whether there is substantial generation and corruption and what it is

De gratia, pars I

  • *Prol. 1, cap. 1 - On the names 'nature' and 'freewill'
  • Prol. 1, cap. 2 - What things are necessary for a power to be free and to operate freely?
  • *Prol. 1, cap. 3 - Whether a power that after all the prerequisites for acting have been posited can both act and not act is rightly described as being free

De legibus

  • Lib. 1, cap. 13 - Whether the effect intended by law is to make subordinates good

De libertate divinae voluntatis

  • *Disp. 1 - 'On the true sense of Paul's statement that God works all things according to the counsel of his will'

De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium

  • Lib. 1, cap. 8 - In what way, finally, God cognizes future contingents

De voluntario et involuntario

  • Disp. 6, sect. 1 - Concerning the objects, natures, and differences of will and intention
  • Disp. 8 - What election is, what its object is, and of what power it is an act; Whether consent is an act of the will distinct from election; How election and consent are distinguished from the intention for an end and, at the same time, how they turn concerning the end; Whether an act of choice is free; Concerning the cognition necessary for election
  • Disp. 8, sect. 4 - Whether an act of choice is free
  • Disp. 9 - What use is and what its object is; Whether use is an act distinct from election; What act of the intellect precedes use and, at the same time, what command is and how it is distinguished from use

9. Disputationes Metaphysicae

  • II.1.1 - Formal and objective concepts
  • II.4 - In what the nature of being insofar as [it is] being consists and how it agrees with lower beings
  • III.2 - How many attributes of being there are and what order they preserve between themselves
  • *VIII.2 - What the truth of cognition is
  • VIII.7 - Whether truth is something in things which is an attribute of beings
  • *X.1 - What good or goodness is
  • XII.1 - Whether cause and principle are entirely the same
  • XII.2 - Whether there is some common ratio of cause, and what it is and of what kind it is
  • *XII.3 - How many kinds of causes there are (html)
  • *XIII.1 - Whether it is evident to natural reason that there is given in beings a material cause of substances, which we name prime matter
  • *XIII.2 - Whether the material cause of generable and corruptible substances is single or multiple
  • XIII.3 - Whether the single first material cause of generable substances is some simple body or a whole substance
  • *XIII.5 - Whether matter is pure potentiality and in what sense that should be accepted
  • *XIII.9 - What the causality of matter is
  • *XXIII - On the final cause in general
  • *XXIV - On the ultimate final cause or ultimate end
  • XXVI.1 - Whether every cause is more noble than its effect
  • XXVII - On the comparison of the causes to each other
  • *XXX.1 - Whether it belongs to God to be a wholly perfect being (includes bit about eminent containment)
  • *XXXII.1 - Whether being is proximately and sufficiently divided into substance and accident
  • XXXIX - Concerning the division of accidents into the nine highest genera (Whether accident in general is immediately divided into quantity, quality, and the other highest genera of accidents; Whether the division of accidents into nine genera is sufficient; Whether the stated division is univocal or analogical)
  • *XLVIII.1 - Whether action essentially expresses a respect to the principle of acting

8. Quaestiones de legibus (1582)


Commentary on the Sentences

  • *IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3 - Whether everyone desires happiness (for what it's worth, Suárez thinks that Aquinas does a better job explaining his position on this matter here than he does in ST IaIIae)

Rodrigo de Arriaga

Cursus philosophicus


Commentary on Aquinas's Summa Theologiae

Melchor Cano

De locis theologis

Richard Crakanthorpe

Logicae libri quinque

Duns Scotus




Pierre Gassendi

Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza

Universa Philosophia

Christoph Scheibler (aka, the "Protestant Suarez")


Domingo de Soto

De Iure et Iustitia