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DE ELECTIONE, ET CONSENSU, DEQUE COGNITIONE
PRÆVIA AD TALEM ACTUM.¹

<256> Diximus de actibus circa finem, dicendum sequitur de actibus circa media, qui ad ordinem intentionis pertinent, de quibus ego simul disputo, quia easdem difficultates continent: et, ut dicemus, hi actus nullo fere modo distinguuntur, licet D. Thomas, in 1, 2, quæst. 13 et seq., hanc doctrinam separaverit.

SECTIO I.

Quod sit electio, quod ejus objectum, et cujus potentia sit actus.

1. *Prima assertio.*—*Eligere*, si vim nominis consideremus, est unum e multis separare: idque cæteris præferendo, quod intellectu nonnunquam fieri potest, cum e duabus sententiis alterum alteri præfert, non tam propter libertatem, quam quia rationibus, vel alio modo verisimilior demonstratur: proprie tamen *eligere* actus est voluntatis. Et hæc sit prima conclusio: quæ probatur primo ex communi consensu hominum: nam licet quis judicet hoc esse melius, vel utilius donec illud velit, non censetur elegerit. Secundo *eligere* est actus existens in potestate eligentis, solum autem velle, et ea, quæ voluntati subsunt, sunt in potestate hominis: nullus vero eligit, quæ necessario illi insunt: et in ipsis indiciis eatenus est aliquis modus electionis, quatenus ab intellectus et voluntatis consensu pendet. Dices, Aristoteles quasi dubitans 6, Ethic., c. 3, concludit electionem esse vel appetitum intellectivum, vel intellectum appetitivum. Respondetur, illis verbis solum indicasse, electionem

CONCERNING ELECTION,² CONSENT, AND THE COGNITION GO-
ING BEFORE SUCH AN ACT.

We have spoken about the acts concerning the end. It follows that we should speak about the acts concerning means, which belong to the order of intention. I discuss them at the same time, since they sustain the same difficulties, and, as we will say, these acts are distinguished in almost no way, although St. Thomas divided this teaching in qq. 13 and following of [ST] IaIIæ.

SECTION I.

What election is, what its object is, and of what power it is an act.

The first assertion.—‘To elect’, if we were to consider the meaning of the word, is to separate one from the many. And preferring one to the others can sometimes be done by the intellect, when it prefers one to another of two views, not so much on account of freedom as because the view is demonstrated more likely by reasons or in some other way. Still, ‘to elect’ is properly an act of the will. And let this be the first conclusion. It is proved first by the common consensus of men. For although someone may judge this to be better or more useful, he is not thought to have elected it until he wills it. Secondly, ‘to elect’ is an act existing in the power of the one electing. Moreover, only [i] to will and [ii] those things which are underneath the will are in the power of a human being. But no one elects what necessarily belongs to him. And in the evidence indicated so far there is some mode of election, to the extent that it depends on the consensus of the intellect and will. You may say that Aristotle, doubting, as it were, in EN VI, c. 3 [i.e., 2], concludes that election is either an intellective appetite

pertinere aliquo modo ad intellectum, non tanquam ad elicentem, sed tanquam ad dirigentem et ordinantem: et ideo ibidem appellat electionem potentiam consulatricem. Dices, hoc commune esse omnibus actibus voluntatis: qua ratione ergo tanquam proprium electioni tribuitur. Respondet D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 13, articulo 1, electionem materialiter esse in voluntate, quia ab illa habet substantiam suam: formaliter vero esse ab intellectu, quia ab illo habet quemdam ordinem, qui est tanquam forma istius actus, quod obscurum valde est: sed exponam statim.

2. *Secunda assertio.*—Nota tamen *electionem*, si consideremus vim dictam vocis, neces- <col. b> sario fieri inter multa, quomodo fieri sæpe contingit in voluntate, tamen in philosophia morali generalius sumitur, omnis volitio efficax alicujus rei particularis, quæ non propter se amatur, sed propter aliud, electio dicitur: quamvis contingat non fieri inter plura, sed illud medium esse unum tantum. Et hæc sit secunda conclusio, quæ etiam est communis: et ratio est, quia ratio volentis a fine speciem sumit: quare actus humanus per ordinem ad eundem finem eandem speciem et essentiam retinet: sive sit unicum medium, sive conferatur cum aliis: nam hoc accidentarium est actui morali, et per se illi non confert bonitatem, neque malitiam, et ideo si servatur species, servatur etiam nomen.

3. *Tertia assertio.*—Dico tertio. Objectum electionis est medium particulare ut medium, seu ut bonum utile. Est communis, et probatur ex dictis, quia electio a voluntate et intentione distinguitur, ut suppono, et ex illis oritur. Omnis autem volitio boni, quod per se amatur, ad voluntatem, vel intentionem pertinet: ergo electio non potest esse nisi de bono propter aliud. Similiter quod sequitur ei intentione finis, ut sic, est volitio medii propter finem: ergo illud est materia electionis: solum nota circa hoc medium versari, et intellectum et voluntatem: intellectus confert tam medium cum fine, quam media inter se, et de illis judicat, et voluntati proponit: voluntatis vero est eligere unum illorum.

4. Ex quo intelligitur quod dixit D. Thomas *formaliter electionem esse ab intellectu*, non intellexit (ut impugnavit Aureolus, apud Capreolum, in 1, d. 1, quæst. 2, ad argumenta contra 3 conclusionem) aliquid vere esse in actu electionis, quod ab intellectu

or an appetitive intellect.³ It is responded: those words only indicate that election belongs in some way to the intellect, no as to the thing electing but as to the thing directing and ordering. And for this reason at the same time he calls election the consulting power. You may say: this is common to all acts of the will. For this reason, therefore, it is attributed as if proper to election. St. Thomas responds in [ST] IaIIæ.13.1 that election is materially in the will, since it receives its substance from it. But formally it is from the intellect, since it receives a certain order from it, which is as the form of that act. This is very obscure, but I will explain it at once.

2. *The second assertion.*—Nevertheless, note that an *election*, if we were to consider the spoken meaning of the word, necessarily takes place among multiple [options], just as it often happens to take place in the will. Still, in moral philosophy it is taken more generally [so that] every effective volition of some particular thing that is not loved for its own sake but for the sake of something else is called an election, even though it may happen that it does not take place among more [means] but that that means is the only one. And this is the second conclusion, which also is common. And the reason is that the nature of the willing takes its species from the end. wherefore a human act retains the same species and essence by means of order to the same end, whether there is a single means or it is compared to others. For this is accidental to the moral act and does not *per se* confer goodness or badness to it. And therefore if the species is kept, the name is also kept.

3. *The third assertion.*—I say, thirdly, that the object of election is a particular means as a means or as a useful good. This is the common [view] and is proved from what was said, since election is distinguished from will and intention, as I assume, and arises from these. Moreover, every volition for a good that is loved *per se* belongs to the will or intention. Therefore, there cannot be an election except for some good for the sake of another [good]. Similarly, what follows on that intention of the end, as such, is a volition of means for the sake of the end. Therefore, that is the matter of election. Only note that it turns concerning this means, both the intellect and the will. As the intellect compares a means with the end, so the means with each other. And it judges concerning them and proposes [them] to the will. But it belongs to the will to elect one of them.

4. From this one can understand what St. Thomas said: ‘election is formally from the intellect’. He did not understand (as Aureolus attacks in view of Capreolus in I, d. 1, q. 2, in response to the arguments against the third conclusion) that there truly is something in the act of election that is

fiat, quia intelligi nullo modo potest substantiam electionis fieri a voluntate, quin tota ratio illius actus usque ad ultimam differentiam ab eadem potentia ejiciatur: et patet, nam elicitur ut est voluntas medii propter finem: hæc autem est ipsa ratio formalis electionis: tamen hæc ipsa ratio formalis peculiari quadam ratione tribuitur intellectui: quia conferre unum ad alterum est proprium opus rationis, et in tantum reperitur in voluntate, in quantum præcedit in intellectu, a quo illam vim participat: et ita explicuit D. Thomas, quæst. 22, de Veritate, art. 15. Alio modo electio dicitur pendere a ratione tanquam forma, non simpliciter ut existat, sed ut sit prudens a vel imprudens, et hoc aperte voluit Aristoteles, loco cit. sexto Ethic., cap. 3. <257>

5. Sed arguitur contra conclusionem: nam eligere contingit non solum inter media, sed etiam inter fines: nam inter bona plura per se appetibilia unum sæpe eligimus, aliis relictis: et inter fines ultimos contingit electio: nam licet verus ultimus finis unus tantum sit, tamen homo potest ponere ultimum finem errando in multis rebus, et ideo potest eligere inter creaturam et creatorem, quod Scriptura sæpe indicat. Et confirmatur, nam eorum est electio, quorum est consultatio, sed consilium potest esse inter bona per se amabilia: ergo. Respondetur primo: si electio solum significet amorem unius rei præ multis, et inter multa, concedo, hujusmodi electionem posse versari circa fines, et bona per se amabilia: tamen, ut dixi, non est hæc essentia electionis, sed amare unum propter aliud: et hoc tantum convenit medio ut sic, et hoc sufficiebat quoad ipsam rem: tamen Aristoteles et D. Thomas, et fere theologi indicant, electionem inter multa solum esse de mediis. Dico præterea secundo hujusmodi electionem inter multa vel formaliter, vel virtute esse ex intentione alicujus finis præcedentis, et hoc modo vel formaliter, vel virtute esse de mediis. Quod sic patet primo. Omnis motus procedit ex intentione alicujus termini: consultatio autem, et electio est quasi motus quidam rationis, et ex intentione alicujus finis procedit: ergo. Probatur illa minor: nam consultatio est collatio quædam inter multa bona, et ideo necessario supponit voluntatem jam affectam circa bonum in communi.

6. *Quarta assertio.*—Dico quarto. Objectum electionis debet esse aliquid quod a nobis fieri potest. Duo continet conclusio: alterum objectum debere esse possibile: et hoc certum est, quia

made by the intellect, since there is no way of understanding that the substance of election comes about by the will but that the whole nature of that act all the way to the last difference is thrown up by the same power. And it is clear for it is elected so that it is a will for the means for the sake of the end. Moreover, this is the formal nature itself of election. Nevertheless, this formal nature itself is attributed by a certain peculiar reason to the intellect. For to compare one thing to another is the proper work of reason and it is only found in the will insofar as it precedes in the intellect by which it shares in that power. And St. Thomas in *De Ver.*, q. 22, art. 15, explained it in this way. In another way, election is said to depend on reason as on a form, not strictly-speaking as it exists but as it is prudent or imprudent by. And Aristotle clearly meant this in the cited passage from *EN VI*, cap. 3.

5. But it is argued against the conclusion. For electing happens not only between means but also between ends. For we often elect one among multiple goods desirable *per se*, forsaking the remaining goods. And election happens between ultimate ends. For although the true ultimate end is only one, nevertheless, a human being can, by erring, place his ultimate end in many things and for that reason can elect between creature and Creator. Scripture often indicates this. And it is confirmed, for election is of those things concerning which there is consideration, but there can be deliberation between goods that are *per se* lovable. Therefore. It is responded, first: if election only signifies a love of one thing in preference to others and between multiple things, I concede that election of this sort can turn concerning ends and goods that are *per se* lovable. Still, as I said, this is not the essence of election, but rather to love one thing for another thing. And only this is suitable to a means as such. And this suffices with respect to the matter itself. Still, Aristotle and St. Thomas and almost [all] theologians indicate that election among multiple things is only of means. I say in addition, secondly, that election of this sort between multiple things is either formally or virtually a result of a preceding intention for some end and, in this way, is either formally or virtually of means. This is clear, first, thus: every motion proceeds from an intention for some *terminus*. Moreover, consideration is a certain consideration between multiple goods and therefore necessarily supposes a will already affected concerning good in general.

6. *The fourth assertion.*—I say, fourthly, that the object of election ought to be something which can be accomplished by us. The conclusion contains two [parts]. One is that the object ought to be possible. And this is certain

electio procedit ex intentione efficaci finis: voluntas autem efficaci non inclinatur ad impossibilia. Item quia electionis objectum est bonum utile ut sic: id autem quod est impossibile, non est utile. Altera pars conclusionis est, objectum electionis esse factibile ab eligente: ita Aristoteles 3, *Ethic.*, cap. 2, et patet inductione, nam ea, quæ non possumus facere, possumus quidem amare: eligimus autem operari hoc, vel illud, ut rem amatam consequamur. Dices: etiam eligimus res, quas non facimus, ut cibum, hunc potius quam illum: vitam potius, quam mortem et personas ad hoc vel illud munus. Respondetur: hæc ipsa exempla explicant rem: nunquam enim quis eligit rem nisi prout ab ipsius opere vel omnino, vel ex parte pendet, vel ad <col. b> illud ordinatur, sin minus tantum potest desiderare, vel amare: ut qui diligit pecunias, tunc dicitur eligere, quando vel diligit illas inquirere, vel quando actione sua potest efficere illas suas: idem est de reliquis; et ratio esse potest, quia nos in tantum intendimus finem, in quantum actionibus nostris possumus eum consequi: et ideo electio, quæ ex hac intentione sequitur, versatur vel in actionibus nostris, vel in rebus prout actionibus nostris subjectæ sunt. Dices: idem igitur erit de intentione. Respondetur: intentio quatenus versatur circa ipsum finem objectivum, sæpe est de re, quam nos non possumus facere, sed tamen possumus actionibus nostris consequi, et hac ratione, et prout aliquo modo includit voluntatem mediorum, dicit etiam respectum aliquem ad actiones nostras: quod D. Thomas 1, quæst. 13, art. 4, adnotavit.

SECTIO II.

Utrum consensus sit actus voluntatis ab electione distinctus.

1. *Prima notatio.*—Consensus propria significatione animorum, aut iudiciorum concordiam significat: et hoc modo non unum actum, sed plures, ut sibi similes significat, ut habetur 1, ad Corinth. 7: *Nisi ex consensu ad tempus*, tamen hinc translatum est hoc nomen ad significandum voluntatem concordem cum iudicio rationis in eodem homine. Propter quod Bonaventura, in 2, dist. 39, quæst. ult., dicit, istum actum non esse voluntatis, neque intellectus, sed utrique mutuo convenire. Verum ex communi usu

because election proceeds from an effective intention for the end. But an effective will does not incline to impossibles. Likewise, because the object of election is a useful good as such, but that which is impossible is not useful. The other part of the conclusion is that the object of election is doable by the one electing. Aristotle says this in *EN* III, cap. 2, and it is clear by induction. For those things which we cannot do, we can indeed love. But we can elect to do this or that in order to pursue the loved thing. You may say: we also elect things which we cannot do, like this food rather than that, life rather than death, and persons for this or that office. It is responded: these very examples explain the matter. For it is never the case that someone elects a thing unless it depends either wholly or in part on his action or is ordered to it. But if it can only be desired or loved less, as in the case of he who loves money, then he is said to elect [it] either when he seeks it or when he can make it his by his action. Likewise concerning the remaining [cases]. And the reason can be that we only intend an end inasmuch as we can pursue it by our actions. And therefore election, which follows from this intention, is turned either to our actions or to things that are subject to our actions. You may say: therefore the same will be the case concerning intention. It is responded: intention, to the extent that it is turned concerning the objective end itself, is often about a thing which we cannot make. But, nevertheless, we can pursue it by our actions and, both for this reason and as in some way it includes the will for means, it is also called a certain respect to our actions. St. Thomas noted this in [*ST*] Ia.13.4.

SECTION II.

Whether consent is an act of the will distinct from election.

1. *The first note.*—‘Consent’, in its proper signification, signifies a concord of souls or judgements. And in this way it signifies not one act but several, as it signifies those similar to itself. This is the way 1 Cor. 7[:5] is taken: ‘except by consent for a time’. Nevertheless, this name was transferred from here to signifying a will in concord with a judgement of reason in the same human being. On account of this Bonaventure in II, dist. 39, last question, says that this act is not of the will nor of the intellect but agrees with both mutually. Certainly, by common use by other theologians, ‘con-

aliorum theologorum consensus proprie significat actum voluntatis: cujus rationem tradit D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 15, art. 2. Et alia esse potest, quia iudicium intellectus antecedit voluntatis actum, et est quasi naturalis. In potestate autem voluntatis est, illi assentiri, vel non: et ideo illa dum libere operatur, est quæ perficit consensum, licet interdum etiam apud Aristotelem 6, *Ethic.*, c. 12, consensus referatur ad intellectum.

2. *Secunda notatio.*—Nota tamen secundo, hoc nomen hac ratione posse tribui cuicumque actui libero voluntatis acceptantis bonum intellectu propositum, quomodo dicitur peccatum perfici consensu: et sic non est specialis actus: et non solum circa media, sed etiam circa finem versatur: quia tamen consensus proprie videtur fieri post perfectam deliberationem et consultationem: ideo peculiariter <258> usurpatur ad significandum quemdam peculiarem voluntatis actum circa media jam ratione proposita et iudicata convenientia. Et hæc propria est difficultas, an talis consensus possit esse actus alius ab electione.

3. Ratio dubitandi est: nam D. Thomas videtur distinguere istos actus 1, 2, quæst. 19 et 13, quorum distinctionem sic possumus intelligere, ut consensus et electio ita versentur circa media, sicut voluntas, et intentio circa finem: nam intellectus primo proponit medium ut bonum et utile: et voluntas simpliciter amat illud ut bonum quoddam est, et conveniens, et hic amor ut sic est consensus: nam est prima concordia voluntatis cum iudicio circa medium: postmodum vult illud medium ut exequendum: et hæc erit proprie electio. Et confirmatur iste modus, nam in fine illæ duæ rationes formales boni ut absolute amati, vel ut cum ordine ad executionem, distinguunt duos actus: ergo idem erit in ipso medio.

4. Sed mihi non satisfacit hic modus, quia medium ut medium non habet bonitatem nisi in ordine ad finem: ergo non potest amari nisi cum eodem ordine: ergo si amor sit efficax circa medium, necessario dicet ordinem ad executionem circa medium ipsum: non enim apprehenditur ut utile, nisi ut exequendum: et revera nihil aliud est velle efficaciter medium, nisi velle exequi illud. Confirmatur, quia si aliqua possit esse distinctio inter medium volitum secundum se, et in executione, potius esset talis distinctio inter electionem et usum, ut magis patebit infra. Et tamen ipse D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 15, art. 3, ad 3, dicit ubi solum invenitur

sent' properly signifies an act of will. St. Thomas relates the reason for this in [ST] IaIIæ.15.2. And another reason can be that the judgement of the intellect precedes the act of the will and it is, as it were, natural. But it is in the power of the will either to assent to it or not. And therefore as long as it freely acts, it is what completes consent, although sometimes 'consent' is also referred to the intellect in the writing of Aristotle in *EN VI*, cap. 12.

2. *The second note.*—Still, note, secondly, that this name can by this reason be attributed to any free act whatever of the will accepting the good proposed by the intellect. In this way sin is said to be perfected by consent. And thus it is not a specific act. It not only turns concerning means but also concerning the end. Nevertheless, since consent seems properly to take place after deliberation and consideration has been completed, for that reason it is peculiarly usurped for signifying a certain peculiar act of the will concerning means already proposed and judged agreeable by reason. And herein lies the difficulty: whether such a consent can be an act different from election.

3. The reason for doubting: for St. Thomas seems to distinguish these acts in [ST] IaIIæ.19 and 13. We can understand the distinction of them so that consent and election turn concerning means just as the will and intention concern the end. For the intellect first proposes a means as good and useful and the will simply loves it as it is a certain good and agreeable thing. And this love as such is consent. For it is the first concordance of the will with the judgement concerning the means. Afterwards it wills that means as something to be carried out and this will properly be the election. And this way is confirmed, for these two formal natures in the end of good as absolutely loved or as something ordered to execution distinguish two acts. Therefore, the same will be the case for the means.

4. But this way is not satisfactory to me, since the means as means does not have goodness except in an order to the end. Therefore, it cannot be loved except in the same order. Therefore, if the love is effective concerning the means, it necessarily expresses order to execution concerning the means itself. For it is not apprehended as useful except as something to be carried out. And, in reality, effectively to will a means is nothing other except to will to carry it out. It is confirmed, for if something can be a distinction between a means willed according to itself and with regard to execution, even more can there be such a distinction between election and use, as will be more clear below. And, still, St. Thomas himself says in [ST] IaIIæ.15.3 ad

unum medium quod placeat, non differre consensum ab electione, nisi per diversos respectus rationis: cum tamen in unico etiam medio essent distinguendi actus, si distinguerentur illo modo. Ad-dit vero Thomas, loco citato, ubi sunt plura media, distingui prædicto modo, quia oblata media voluntati prius placent, et tunc consentit, postmodum unum præfert cæteris, et eligit; sed revera illa prior complacentia non satis intelligitur, nam vel est judicare omnia hæc media esse utilia, et convenientia; et hoc est intellectus, vel est amare, et velle illa omnia, et hic actus non reperitur; quia voluntas unum vult, cætera omittit. Cujus signum manifestum est, quia si contingat omnia illa media esse peccatum; voluntas si judicat, non peccat in omnibus, sed in uno tantum; ergo unum tantum vult, uni et tantum consentit. <col. b>

5. Posset tamen exponi D. Thomas, ut, præsentatis omnibus mediis, voluntas acceptet omnia, et singula non actu absoluto, sed conditionato, isto modo; si non esset aliud medium, isto uteretur; qui quidem actus potest aliquando contingere; id tamen non est necessarium; quod etiam ipse D. Thomas indicavit, cum dixit: *Potest autem contingere*, etc. Et ille actus conditionis magis potest dici consensus, quam electio; quia electio cum dicat unum simpliciter præferri aliis, denotat actum absolutum. Quapropter loquendo de actu absoluto circa medium, arbitror, consensum et electionem non esse actus distinctos, sed a diversis respectibus rationis recipere has denominationes. Nam quatenus voluntas vult, quod intellectus judicat esse utile, dicitur consensus; quatenus vero illud præfert, vel aliis mediis utilibus, vel certe aliis rebus inutilibus non conducentibus ad finem, dicitur electio.

6. Dicet aliquis. In hoc actu circa medium potest distingui amor medii, et desiderium: ergo isto modo possunt distingui illi actus. Respondetur, proprie electionem esse ad modum desiderii, quia est de medio ut exequendo; et ut dicam infra, electio antecedit executionem: et ideo est de re absente: tamen non supponit alium actum, qui sit veluti amor ipsius medii: sed immediate oritur ex amore finis: nam revera voluntas non amat medium ut medium illi peculiari actu amoris, quem supra explicui, quia non proprie unitur illi ut sic, neque bonitati ejus: sed late dicitur illud: quatenus omne velle est amare: et ipsum desiderium est

3 that in a case where only one means is found that pleases, consent does not differ from election except through different respects of reason. Nevertheless, the acts would also be distinguished in a single means, if they were distinguished in that way. But Thomas adds in the cited place that in a case where there are multiple means, they are distinguished in the mentioned way, since the means offered to the will please first, then it consent, and afterwards it prefers one to the others and elects. But, really, that former taking pleasure in is not sufficiently understood, for either it is to judge all these means to useful and agreeable (and this belongs to the intellect) or it is to love and will all these (and this act is not found, since the will wills one thing and disregards the rest). A sign of this is manifest: for if it were to happen that each of these means is a sin, the will, if it judges, does not sin in all of them but in only one. Therefore, it wills only one and consents to one and only one.

5. Nevertheless, St. Thomas might be explained as [saying that] once all the means have been presented, the will accepts all of them and each one not absolutely in act but conditionally in this way: if there were no other means, I would use this one. This act can indeed sometimes occur. Still, it is not necessary, which St. Thomas himself also indicated when he said: ‘But it can happen . . .’ And this act of condition can more be called consent than election, because election—since it expresses one preferred *simpliciter* to the others—denotes an absolute act. For this reason, when speaking about an absolute act concerning means, I judge that consent and election are not distinct acts, but receive these denominations according to different respects to reason. For insofar as the will wills what the intellect judges to be useful, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers one thing either to other useful means or at least to other things that are not useful for bringing about the end, it is called election.

6. Some may say: in this act concerning the means can be distinguished a love for the means and a desire. Therefore, these acts can be distinguished in this way. It is responded: election is properly according to the mode of desire, since it is concerning the means as something to be carried out. And, as I will say below, election precedes execution. And for this reason it is concerning something absent. Still, it does not suppose another act which is as if a love for the same means; rather, it arises immediately from the love for the end. For, in truth, the will does not love a means as means by that special act of love, which I explained above, since it is not properly united to it as such nor to its goodness. But more loosely it is called that

quidam amor. Et explicatur experientia ipsa, nam nullus habet affectionem illam amoris erga potionem amaram, quæ est medium ad sanitatem: tamen desiderat illam sumere. Sed dices, quia nonnunquam experimur eligere medium, et tunc non desiderare illud, et postea oriri ipsum desiderium. Respondetur, substantiam, et essentiam desiderii, quæ consistit in voluntate rei absentis, simul esse cum electione, quia est ipsamet: tamen affectus ille desiderii, qui est anxietas quædam, vel ærumna, ille non semper est conjunctus cum electione, et hoc est quod experimur postea oriri.

SECTIO III.

Quomodo distinguantur electio et consensus ab intentione finis, et simul quomodo versentur circa finem.

1. Et ex dictis colligi potest, electionem et <259> intentionem hoc differre, quod intentio, ut plurimum, descendit ad media in communi: electio vero est circa medium particulare ut sic. Ex quo duplex oritur dubitatio. Prima est, utrum hæc diversitas constituat distinctionem essentialem inter hos actus? Secunda, utrum etiam realiter illos distinguat? Ratio prioris dubii est, quia Aristoteles 3, Ethicor., cap. 2, et D. Thomas, citatis quæstion., videntur distinguere illos tanquam essentialiter differentes. Et ratione arguitur: nam actus distinguuntur specie ex objectis formalibus: sed finis, qui est primum objectum intentionis, et medium, sunt objecta formaliter distincta: quod patet, quia habent diversas rationes formalis boni: nam finis est per se, et intrinsece bonum: medium vero secundum quid, et denominatione extrinseca. Confirmatur ex Aristotele 6, Ethic., c. 8, et 2, Physic., text. 29, ita se habent intentio et electio in voluntate sicut in intellectu assensus primi principii et conclusionis: sed isti actus in intellectu differant essentialiter: ergo, etc. Ex quibus videtur consequenter concludi, istos actus esse realiter distinctos: quia unus actus secundum rem non potest habere differentias essentialiter distinctas. Confirmatur primo, quia intentio est causa effectiva electionis. Confirmatur secundo ex simili illo de assensu principiorum et conclusionis: et hanc sententiam secutus est Gregorius in 1, dist. 1, quæst. 2.

2. *Arguitur in contrarium pro formali identitate.—Arguitur*

to the extent that every willing is a loving. And the desire itself is a certain love. And the experience itself is explained, for no one has that affection of love towards a bitter potion that is a means to health, yet he still desires to take it. But you may say: since sometimes we experience electing a means, then not desiring it, and afterwards the very desire arises. It is responded: the substance and essence of desire, which consists in the will for an absent thing, is simultaneous with election, since it is the very thing. Still, that affect of desire, which is a certain anxiety or distress, that is not always conjoined with election and this is what we experience as arising afterwards.

SECTION III.

How election and consent are distinguished from the intention for an end and, at the same time, how they are concerned with the end.

1. And from what was said it can be gathered that election and intention differ in that intention as most descends to the means in general but election is about a particular means as such. Two doubts arise from this. The first is whether this difference constitutes an essential distinction between these acts. The second is whether it also really distinguishes them. The reason for the first doubt is because Aristotle in *EN* III, cap. 2, and St. Thomas in the cited question seem to distinguish them as essentially different. And it is argued by reason: for acts are distinguished into species according to their formal objects. But the end, which is the primary object of intention, and the means are formally distinct objects. This is clear because they have different aspects of formal good. For the end is good *per se* and intrinsically, but a means is good according to something [else] and by extrinsic denomination. It is confirmed from Aristotle in *EN* VI, cap. 8, and *Phys.* II, text. 29. Intention and election hold themselves in the will just as assent to first principles and to conclusions in the intellect. But those acts in the intellect differ essentially. Therefore, etc. From which it seems that it can consequently be concluded that these acts are really distinct, because an act that is one according to the thing cannot have essentially distinct differences. It is confirmed, first, because intention is an effective cause of election. It is confirmed, secondly, by its similarity to assent to principles and conclusions. And Gregory follows this view in I, dist. 1, q. 2.

2. *It is argued to the contrary for formal identity.—It is also argued for real*

etiam pro identitate reali.—In contrarium autem est primo, quia intentio et electio habent idem objectum formale: nam formale objectum voluntatis est, quod est motivum ejus: idem autem est quod movet ad intentionem et electionem. Et confirmatur: nam idem est habitus, qui inclinatur ad intentionem et electionem, sicut est idem habitus charitatis, qui inclinatur ad amandum Deum et proximum: et eadem religio qua inclinatur ad honorandum sanctum, et imaginem sancti propter sanctum. Confirmatur secundo, quia alius qui vult occidere, et evaginat gladium, peccata specie diversa committeret, quia habet actum intentionis et electionis. Consequens est aperte falsum, et contra illud Aristotelis: *Qui furatur propter mœchiam, magis est mœchus, quam fur.* Ex quibus videtur etiam concludi, intentionem et electionem posse coalescere in eodem actu realiter: quia non habent essentias distinctas, et objectum formale est unum revera, ex illo Aristotelis: *Ubi unum est propter aliud, ibi <col. b> est unum tantum.* Et confirmatur: nam ostensum est, habitum esse re unum: ergo actus etiam potest esse unus. Et in hanc partem videtur inclinare D. Thomas 1, 2, quæstion. 8, articulo. 3, et q. 12, et Cajetanus, his locis, et Thomistæ communiter, Ockham, et fere Nominales 1, dist. 1. Nota dupliciter posse intelligi eum, qui vult medium, velle simul finem: uno modo per se, et, ut aiunt, tanquam objectum *quod*: alio modo ut *quo*, seu ut ratione volendi: et hoc vel formaliter, vel tantum virtute, ut statim exponam.

3. *Prima assertio.*—Dico primo, per electionem, ut electio est, semper est aliquo modo volitus finis, quamvis interdum sit virtualiter amatus. Prima pars patet ex illa regula, *Propter quod unumquodque tale*, etc., sed finis est, propter quem est electio, volita igitur. Confirmatur, nam electio, ut sic, recipit bonitatem, et malitiam moralem ex fine: ergo tali actu amatur aliquo modo finis, et ejus bonitas vel malitia. Secunda pars, scilicet non esse necessariam istam bonitatem finis semper esse formaliter amatam, patet. Interdum enim contingit, voluntatem amare medium, et intellectum nihil actu cogitare de fine: non potest autem esse aliquid formaliter volitum, nisi sit etiam actu cognitum: ergo.

4. *Obiectio.*—*Quorumaam [sic] solutio.*—Sed dices, quomodo fieri potest, ut voluntas velit medium ut sic propter solam boni-

identity.—But for the contrary position is, first, the fact that intention and election have the same formal object. For the formal object of the will is what its motive is. But it is the same thing that moves it to intention and election. And it is confirmed: for it is the same habit which inclines to intention and to election, just as it is the same habit of charity which inclines one to loving God and to loving one's neighbour and the same religion which inclines one to honouring the holy and to honouring the image of the holy for the sake of the holy. It is confirmed, secondly: because otherwise he who wishes to kill and who unsheathes his sword would commit different species of sin, since he has an act of intention and an act of election. But the consequent is manifestly false and contrary to the passage from Aristotle: 'He who steals for the sake of adultery is more an adulterer than a thief'.⁴ From these things it seems that it could also be concluded that intention and election can really join together in the same act, since they do not have distinct essences and the formal object is one in reality, according to what Aristotle says: 'where one thing is for the sake of another, there only one thing is'.⁵ And it is confirmed: for, as was shown, a habit is one in reality. Therefore, an act can also be one. And St. Thomas seems to lean in this direction in [ST] IaIIæ.8.3 and 8.12, as well as Cajetan in these places, the Thomists generally, Ockham, and most of the nominalists in I, dist. 1. Note that saying that he who wills the means at the same time wills the end can be understood in two ways. In one way, *per se* and, as they say, as the *objectum quod*. In the other way as the *objectum quo* or as the reason for willing. And this is either formally or only virtually, as I will explain shortly.

3. *The first assertion.*—I say, first, that through election insofar as it is election there is always in some way a willed end (although sometimes it is virtually loved). The first part is clear from that rule: 'that because of which a thing is such-and-such [is itself such-and-such to a greater extent]'. But the end is that for the sake of which the election is. Therefore, it is willed. It is confirmed, for election as such receives moral goodness and badness from the end. Therefore, in such an act the end and its goodness or badness is loved in some way. The second part, namely that it is not necessary that this goodness of the end always be formally loved, is clear. For sometimes it happens that the will loves a means and the intellect by no act thinks about the end. But something cannot be formally willed unless it is also cognized in act. Therefore.

4. *An objection.*—*What, then, the solution for these is.*—But you may say: how can it happen that the will wills a means as such for the sake of the

tatem finis, intellectu nihil cogitante de ipso fine: nam ut voluntas moveatur, non satis est intellectum cogitare de re amanda, sed oportet etiam cogitare de illa ut bona est, et de ratione amandi, et hic est finis. Propterea dicunt aliqui, illam voluntatem, quam experimur circa medium sine actuali cogitatione finis, non esse medii, ut est, sed medii propter se: ita indicat Gregorius, loco citato, et alii Thomistæ. Sed mini non placet, nam experientia docet infirmum velle medicinam etiam amaram, etsi nihil cogitet de sanitate, tamen revera non vult illam propter se: nam sæpe in illa non est ratio ulla volendi illam. Et confirmatur, nam talis voluntas recipit bonitatem et malitiam ex fine. Confirmatur secundo, quia alias nunquam quis amaret proximum ex vera charitate, nisi actu cogitaret de Deo, propter quem debet eum diligere. Similiter nunquam quis crederet actu vero fidei, nisi actu cogitaret de prima veritate revelante, propter quam credit. Dico ergo, ut voluntas amet medium, non esse necessarium intellectum actu cogitare de fine: sed satis esse hic et nunc proponere hoc medium ut <260> conveniens et appetibile, confusa quadam ratione, ex habitu, id est, virtute actuum præcedentium in actu exercito ferri tanquam propter finem in medium, sicut in brutis contingit instinctu naturæ apprehendere media appetenda propter finem, et moveri in illa, non cognita ratione appetendi: quamvis in re nulla alia sit, nisi finis: ita in homine ex habita fit simile iudicium in intellectu, et voluntas ex eodem habita sine expressa motione finis movetur etiam in medium. Et simile quid est in illis exemplis adductis, et in scientia, et habitu principiorum.

5. *Secunda assertio.*—Dico secundo, per electionem, ut electio est, potest appeti finis formaliter expresse, non ut objectum quod, sed tantum ut ratio volendi. Hanc conclusionem docet etiam D. Thomas, loco citato, et ratio est clara, quia generaliter semper potentia eodem actu fertur in objectum, et in rationem formalem objecti. Quapropter si intellectus actu cogitet de fine propter quem medium est amandum, et voluntas expresse illum appetat, illo actu formaliter appetit finem, saltem ut rationem volendi medium: non vero necessario appetit finem in se: tum quia in hoc distinguitur

goodness of the end alone when the intellect is not thinking at all about the end itself. For in order for the will to be moved it is not enough for the intellect to think about the thing to be loved but rather it must also think about it as a good and about the reason for loving it. And this is the end. For this reason others say that willing, which we experience as concerning a means without an actual thinking of the end, is not of the means as such but of the means for its own sake. Gregory indicates this in the cited place, as do other Thomists. But this does not please me for experience teaches that a sick person wills medicine, indeed bitter medicine, even if not thinking at all about health. Still, he does not really wish the medicine for its own sake. For often there is nothing at all in it that would be a reason for willing it. And it is confirmed: for such a will receives goodness and badness from the end. It is confirmed, secondly: since otherwise no one would love his neighbour from true charity unless he were actually thinking about God (for the sake of whom he ought to love his neighbour). Similarly, no one would believe by a true act of faith unless he were actually thinking about the first revealing truth for the sake of which he believes. I say, therefore, that it is not necessary for the intellect to actually think about the end in order for the will to love the means. But it is enough that it here and now proposes this means as agreeable and desirable by a certain obscure reason from habit. That is, by the strength of preceding acts actually exercised it is brought to the means just as if for the sake of the end just as in brute animals it happens that by the instinct of nature they apprehend the means to be desired for the sake of the end and are moved to them without cognizing the reason for desiring them. Although in reality the reason is nothing else but the end. Thus in the human case a similar judgement is made by habit in the intellect and the will by the same habit without an express motion of the end is also moved to the means. And similarly for what was adduced in these example, in science, and by the habit of principles.

5. *The second assertion.*—I say, secondly, that through election insofar as it is election the end can be desired formally and expressly not as an *objectum quod* but only as the reason for willing. St. Thomas also teaches this conclusion in the cited place. And the reason is clear, because generally a power is always brought to the object and to the formal aspect of the object by the same act. For this reason, if the intellect actually thinks about the end for the sake of which the means is to be loved and the will explicitly desires it, then it actually and formally desires the end at least as the reason for willing the means. But it does not necessarily desire the end in itself, since election

electio ab intentione: tum etiam, quia nihil est, quod tunc necessitet voluntatem ad amandum finem isto modo.

6. *Objection.*—*Diluitur.*—Sed dices. Quomodo fieri potest, ut finis ametur formaliter ut quo, uno actu, et non ut *quod*, quia finis non est ratio volendi medium, nisi ut est ipse volitus: hoc autem est esse objectum *quod*, et patet a simili; non enim potest quis videre colorem et lumen ut rationem videndi colorem,⁶ quin simul videat lumen, ut objectum *quod*. Respondetur sicut ad dubium positum in præcedenti conclusione, satis esse, ut in virtute actuum præcedentium voluntas feratur in medium formaliter propositum, ut ordinatur ad finem: nam tunc ratione illius ordinis formaliter amatur, et hoc est, finem, ut *quo*, amari. Et est simile in actu fidei, quando quis formaliter credit propter primam veritatem, quamvis non actu conficiat syllogismum: neque actu credat tunc Deum esse summum veritatem primam revelantem. Illud autem exemplum de lumine, et colore non est simile: quia lumen est quoddam visibile, quod necessario immutat potentiam: et ipsa immutata, et non impedita, necessario agit: non sic est de voluntate et intellectu. Nota tamen circa has duas conclusiones, istam qualemcumque voluntatem finis, quæ in electione continetur, vulgari sermone, et a Sanctis sæpe vocari intentionem: et hoc modo dicit Gregorius electionem manifestam, esse intentionem occultam, quia quod volumus per se patet: quare autem velimus, sæpe latet.

7. *Tertia assertio.*—Dico tamen tertio, actum proprium intentionis a proprio actu electionis aliquo modo secundum rationem formalem et interdum etiam reipsa distingui: et communis, et D. Thomas supra, et probatur: nam quando aliquis appetit finem in se nihil cogitando de medio particulari, habet verum actum intentionis et electionis nullo modo: et e contrario, qui appetit solum medium, maxime si nihil cogitat de fine, habet veram electionem et intentionem nullo modo: ergo illi actus habent aliquo modo rationes distinctas, quandoquidem diversas denominationes sortiuntur, et diversa munera. Et hoc etiam confirmant rationes in principio factæ: et hinc etiam constat, reipsa distingui, quandoquidem separantur ad invicem, et e contrario, quod nunquam contingit, nisi in rebus reipsa realiter distinctis. Et confirmatur exemplo amoris Dei et proximi: hos enim amores ratione formali

is distinguished from intention by this and also because there is nothing that then necessitates the will to loving the end in that way.

6. *An objection.*—*It is refuted.*—But you may say: how can it happen that the end is formally loved as the *objectum quo* by one act and not as the *objectum quod*, since the end is not the reason for willing the means except insofar as it is itself willed. But this is to be the *objectum quod* and it is clear by analogy. For no one can see colour and the light as the reason for seeing colour without at the same time seeing the light as the *objectum quod*. It is responded just as to the doubt expressed in the preceding conclusion: in order for the will to be brought to the means formally proposed with the strength of the preceding acts, it is enough that it be ordered to the end. For then by reason of that ordering it is formally loved and this is for the end, as *objectum quod*, to be loved. And it is similar in the act of faith in the case of someone who formally believes on account of the first truth, although he does not actually construct a syllogism nor does he then actually believe that God is the first revealer of highest truth. But that example concerning light and colour is not similar, since light is certain visible [thing] which necessarily alters the power. And the power itself having been altered and not impeded necessarily acts. But that is not true of the will and intellect. Note, nevertheless, concerning these two conclusions that any kind whatever of willing of the end which is contained in election is often called intention in common speech and by the saints. And in this way Gregory says that evident election is secret intention, because what we will it clear through itself but why we will is often hidden.

7. *The third assertion.*—Nevertheless, I say, thirdly, that a proper act of intention is in some way distinguished from a proper act of election according to a formal nature and sometimes also really. [This is held] both commonly and by St. Thomas above. And it is proven: for when someone desires an end in itself while not thinking at all about particular means, he has a true act of intention but in no way one of election. And, conversely, he who desires a means alone, especially if he does not think at all about the end, has [made] a true election and in no way [made] a [true] intention.⁷ Therefore, these acts have distinct natures in some way, seeing that are appointed different denominations and different functions. And the arguments made in the beginning also confirm this. And from this it is also clear that they are distinguished in reality, seeing that they are separated in turn and conversely, which never happens except in things really distinct in reality. And it is confirmed by the example of the love for God and neighbour. For it is

aliquo modo distingui patet: nam unus est amor super omnia, et non alius: unus est amor ultimi finis, et non alius, et reipsa aliquando separari experientia constat.

8. *Quarta assertio.*—Dico quarto. Contingit, voluntatem aliquando amare finem, et medium utrumque tanquam objectum *quod*, et tunc unum actum solum habet qui vere est intentio simul et electio. Colligitur ex D. Thoma 1, 2, quæst. 8, art. 3, et quæst. 12, art. 4. Et prior pars patet, quia voluntas potest simul multa appetere per modum unius: sed medium et finis conveniunt per modum unius: ergo, etc. Confirmatur, nam intellectus potest simul aliquando versari circa præmissas et conclusionem, quod experientia etiam videtur docere. Secunda pars, id est, tunc esse unum tantum actum, patet primo, quia procedit ab uno habitu, et inclinatione voluntatis: secundo, quia tendit in illa duo per modum unius objecti: nam licet utrumque appetat, ut objectum *quod*, tamen voluntas non sistit in utroque per se, sed unum ad alterum refert: ergo totus ille motus est una perfecta tendentia in finem et medium. Et confirmatur: nam supra diximus, per actum intentionis aliquem velle et finem, et media in communi: ergo si proponatur etiam particulare medium, potest etiam ille actus se extendere ad illud: nam <261> eadem est fere ratio. Tandem de actu charitatis theologi sentiunt eodem posse amari Deum in se, et proximum propter Deum. Ultima vero pars patet, quia in eo actu reperitur quidquid est de ratione electionis et intentionis.

9. Sed restat in hac conclusione difficultas, utrum res alioquin realiter, et formaliter diversæ in unam et eandem coalescant. Respondetur primo eo modo fieri posse, quod plures rationes formales possunt in eadem rem coalescere: ita Cajetanus, in 1, 2, quæst. 8, articul. 3, et favet D. Thomas, quæst. 12, art. 4, sed hoc non videtur satisfacere, quia nunquam contingit ut duæ rationes formales, vel res quæ aliquando possunt mutuo separari, aliquando in eadem re, et entitate conveniant. Præterea, quando duæ rationes finis eidem rei conveniunt, utraque quasi indivisibiliter inhæret toti entitati, hoc autem non ita est in proposito. Quare dicendum est, actum intentionis, cum extenditur ad medium particulare per modum electionis, in reipsa augeri per veram additionem entitatis eo modo, quo fit in augmento scientiæ: quare electio et intentio,

clear that these loves are distinguished in some way by formal nature. For one is a love beyond all else and the other is not. One is a love for the ultimate end but not the other. And experience agrees that they are sometimes separated in reality.

8. *The fourth assertion.*—I say, fourthly, that it can happen that the will sometimes loves both the end and the means as an *objectum quod* and then only have one act which actually is at the same time both intention and election. This is gathered from St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.8.3 and 12.4. And the former part is obvious, since the intellect can sometimes be concerned at the same time with premises and conclusion. Experience also seems to teach this. The second part, that is, that there then is one act alone, is obvious, first, because it proceeds from one habit and inclination of the will. Secondly, because it tends to those two in the mode of one object. For although it desires both as an *objectum quod*, nevertheless the will does not stop in both *per se* but refers one to the other. Therefore, that whole motion is one complete tendency to the end and means. And it is confirmed: for we said above that someone can will both an end and means in general through an act of intention. Therefore, if a particular means is also proposed, that act [of intention] can also extend itself to it. For the reason is almost the same. Finally, regarding the act of charity, theologians think that God can be loved in himself and the neighbour for the sake of God in the same [act]. But the last part is obvious, since whatever belongs to the nature of election and of intention is found in that act.

9. But the difficulty of whether things otherwise really and formally different are joined together in one and the same [thing] remains for this conclusion. It is responded, first, that it can happen in that way that multiple formal natures can be joined together in the same thing. Cajetan [says] this in IaIIæ.8.3 and St. Thomas favours it in IaIIæ.12.4. But this does not seem satisfactory, since it can never happen that two formal natures or things which can sometimes be mutually separated can sometimes come together in the same thing and entity. In addition, when two natures of an end come together in the same thing, both inhere indivisibly, as it were, to the whole entity. But this is not what was proposed. Just as it also needs to be asked in the case of a similar augmentation of habits, it needs to be asked why an act of intention that is extended to a particular means through the mode of election is increased in reality through a true addition of entity in the way

quando per se sumuntur separatim, res quidem sunt distinctæ, sed non integræ et perfectæ, sed absolute constituunt unam, si in eodem objecte simul, et debito modo conjungantur: sicut dicendum est, etiam in simili augmento habituum. Quapropter rationes formales intentionis et electionis ita sunt inter se differentes, sicut partes heterogeneæ totius dicuntur specie distinctæ, quamvis sint aptæ componere unum totum: et ad hunc modum dicendum de actu charitatis erga Deum et proximum.

10. Sed dices. Ergo simili modo quando actus intentionis se extendit ad media in communi formaliter amanda, illud erit per aliquod augmentum, quod non pertineat ad intentionem finis, sed potius ad electionem. Respondetur primo, non esse similem rationem, quia, ut dixi, ipsa intentio virtute et confuse continet media in communi, et postea idem ipsum magis explicat, sicuti si aliquis confuse cognosceret principia, et postea illa magis penetraret, non variaretur essentialiter modus conclusionis: secus vero est, quando ad conclusionem descendit. Secundo, si aliquid additur intentioni illa ratione, id non pertinet ad electionem, quia antecedit omnem consultationem, et per se habet intrinsecam connexionem cum intentione finis.

11. Ad argumenta primæ opinionis, si fiant contra istam conclusionem, Aristotelem esse <col. b> interpretandum juxta ea, quæ diximus, quamvis loquatur de voluntate et de intentione, de quo actu formaliter verum est, semper esse actum per se distinctum ab actibus subsequentibus, quia habet diversum modum tendendi in objectum, et est prima unio, quæ semper permanet eodem modo, quamvis cæteri actus varientur. Ad primam rationem negatur, objecta electionis et intentionis omnino distingui. Ad confirmationem respondetur non esse similem rationem in omnibus: et manifeste patet diversitas in habitibus: est ergo differentia, quia conclusiones, quæ eliciuntur ex principiis, habent in se propriam veritatem, quam principia manifestant: at vero medium, ut sic, nullam bonitatem habet: sed totam illam recipit ex ordine ad finem: et per hæc etiam patet ad reliquas rationes. Solum ad id de efficientia electionis circa intentionem, dico, forte non esse propriam efficientiam, sed dicitur intentio efficax, quia applicat efficaciter voluntatem ad electionem. Vel secundo, quanquam vere

in which that happens in the case of an increase in knowledge, [and] why election and intention are indeed distinct things—and not integrated and complete things—when they are taken *per se* and separately, but absolutely constitute one thing if they are joined in the same object at the same time and in the required way. For this reason, the formal natures of intention and election are different from each other in the same way as heterogenous parts of a whole are said to be distinct in species, although they are ready to compose one whole. And one should respond in this way concerning the act of charity towards God and neighbour.

10. But you may say: therefore, in an analogous way, when an act of intention extends itself to the means in general that are to be loved formally, it will be through some augmentation, which does not belong to the intention of the end but rather to election. It is responded, first, that it is not analogous argument, because, as I said, the very intention virtually and confusedly contains the means in general and afterwards it further disentangles the very same thing, just as the mode of the conclusion would not change essentially if someone were to cognize the principles confusedly and afterwards were to penetrate them further. But it is otherwise when it descends to the conclusion. Secondly, if something is added to the intention by that argument, it does not belong to election, because it precedes all deliberation and has a *per se* and intrinsic connection with the intention of the end.

11. In response to the arguments for the first opinion, if they are made against the conclusion that Aristotle is to be interpreted according to those things which we said, although it was said concerning will and intention concerning which act it is formally true that it is always an act *per se* distinct from subsequent acts, since it has a different way of tending to the object and is the first union which always remains in the same way even though the other acts are changed. In response to the first argument, it is denied that the objects of election and intention are entirely distinguished. It is responded to the confirmation that it is not an analogous argument in all respects. And difference is manifestly obvious in habits. There is therefore a difference, since conclusions which are drawn from principles have a proper truth in themselves which the principles reveal. But a means as such, on the other hand, has no goodness, but receives all its [goodness] from its ordering to the end. And through this [the response] to the remaining arguments is also obvious. I say only to the one about the efficiency of election concerning intention that perhaps it is not proper efficiency. Rather, it is called an efficacious intention because it efficaciously applies the will to election. Or,

efficiat potest esse per modum augmenti, ita ut eadem intentio finis ipsa se augeat, et extendatur ad voluntatem medii.

12. Sed hic sunt duo dubia. Primum est, quando medium est amatum per se, et propter finem, an ibi sint vera intentio et electio? et quomodo distinguantur? Respondetur, sine dubio esse ibi rationem intentionis et electionis; tamen de istorum actuum distinctione dicemus agendo de bonitate et malitia. Nunc dico breviter, frequenter et fere semper esse unum actum, qui secundum suam essentiam est intentio; tamen ex accidenti est electio: ut vero talis actus sit primario electio, necessarium est, ut voluntas proxime et immediate moveatur ad rationem boni intrinseca ratione medii et objectum illud referat in finem alium: tunc enim primaria species primario desumitur a medio, accidentaria a fine: si vero contingeret, potentiam ita allici a duabus illis rationibus boni, utrumque proxime et immediate intenderet, et unam ad alteram non referret, tunc revera essent duo actus distincti, eliciti, verbi gratia, a diversis virtutibus: quia differentiæ desumptæ ab illis objectis essent primariæ et essentielles, et ideo non possent convenire eidem actui.

13. Sed objicies: nam in intellectu tunc est unus actus, quo judicat hanc rem esse duplici ratione appetibilem, scilicet per se et propter aliud: ergo in voluntate erit unus actus. Respondetur negando consequentiam. Patet a simili, nam intellectus potest judicare unico ju- <262> dicio Deum esse in se bonum et nobis. Et tamen voluntas non amat uno actu sub utraque ratione: nam unus est actus amoris amicitiae, alius concupiscentiae: et ratio est, quia aliqua res possunt pertinere ad intellectum sub eadem ratione formali veri, quæ tamen diversa ratione appetibilis ad voluntatem pertineant; et habitus id manifeste declarant in illo exemplo: nam fides ostendit Deum sub utraque ratione, et tamen non eadem charitas amat sub utraque ratione.

14. Alterum dubium est, quando medium est volitum propter finem tantum, et tamen est id propter quod aliquid est volitum, quomodo se habent intentio et electio. Respondetur, in re esse unum actum, qui diversis rationibus potest dici intentio et electio, quando id refertur ad aliud, atque aliud ad aliud: tamen quia simpliciter tota ratio volendi illud medium sub utraque ratione est

secondly, although it truly effects, it can be in the mode of augmentation, so that the same intention of the end augments itself and is extended to the willing of the means.

12. But here there are two doubts. The first is whether there is true intention and election in the case where a means is loved *per se* and for the sake of an end. And how are they distinguished? It is responded that there is without doubt the nature of intention and election here. Nevertheless, we will talk about the distinction of these acts when discussing goodness and badness. For now I say briefly that frequently, even almost always, there is one act which is an intention according to its essence. Nevertheless, it is an election by accident. But in order for such an act to be primarily an election it is necessary that the will proximately and immediately be moved to the aspect of good by the intrinsic nature of the means and that it refer that object to another end. For then the primary species is primarily taken from the means and accidentally from the end. But if it were to happen that the power were thus drawn by those two aspects, each were proximately and immediately intended, and neither were referred to the other, then there really would be two distinct acts, elicited, for example, by different virtues. Since the differences taken from these objects would be primary and essential, they could not, therefore, come together in the same act.

13. But you will object: for there is then in the intellect one act by which it judges this thing to be desirable under two aspects, namely, *per se* and for the sake of another. Therefore, there will be one act in the will. It is responded by denying the consequence. It is obvious by analogy, for the intellect can judge by one judgement that God is good in himself and good for us. And yet the will does not love by one act under each aspect. For there is one act of friendship love and another of concupiscent love. And the reason is because any things can belong to the intellect under the same formal aspect of the true, which nevertheless belong to the will under different aspects of the desirable. And habits manifestly show this in that example. For faith reveals God under each aspect, and yet it is not the case that the same charity loves under each aspect.

14. The other doubt is in what way intention and election relate in a case where the means is willed for the sake of an end alone and yet is that for the sake of which something else is willed. It is responded that in reality there is one act which under different aspects can be called intention and election, since it is referred to another and another to another. Nevertheless, since strictly speaking the entire reason for willing that means under either aspect

finis extrinsecus a quo sumitur tota ratio appetibilitatis, quæ est in objecto, ideo simpliciter, et quasi secundum substantiam ille actus est electio: tamen secundum quid et veluti quodammodo est intentio.

SECTIO IV.

Utrum actus electionis sit liber.

Suppono post intentionem et facto consilio aliquando reperiri unum medium, interdum plura: et hæc vel æque, vel inæqualiter bona ad finem.

1. Est ergo prima sententia, quæ affirmat omnem electionem esse liberam, etiam posita intentione et unico medio. Ita tenent Nominales. Ratio est, quod nihil tunc occurrat, quod inferat necessitatem: nam deberet esse intentio ipsa: quæ tamen cum sit actus liber, non potest necessitare. Confirmatur primo exemplis, nam si quis voluntate absoluta velit facere eleemosynam, et non possit nisi per furtum, non necessario eligit tale medium. Similiter qui vult consequi felicitatem, non necessario servat mandata. Secundo confirmatur ab inconvenienti: alias posita intentione absoluta, nullum esset meritum in electione: sicut quando actus exterior necessario sequitur ex intentione: non habet meritum: ergo, etc.

2. *Secunda sententia.*—Secunda sententia affirmat existente unico medio electionem esse necessariam: tamen existentibus pluribus solum esse liberam, quatenus voluntas potest applicare intellectum, ut inquireat plures rationes convenientiæ et utilitatis in uno medio, quam in alio: quas intellectus si inveniatur, et iudicet esse in uno medio, voluntas necessario eligit illud. Quod si intellectus æque iudicet de utroque medio, voluntas in neutrum eorum poterit moveri. Hanc sententiam indicat divus Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 13, art. 6, ad 3, Cajetanus ibi. Fundamentum est, quia libertas voluntate oritur ex indifferentia intellectus: ergo facta determinatione intellectus, et posito iudicio demonstrante, hoc esse utilius, voluntas non potest non velle. Confirmatur quia

is the extrinsic end from which the entire aspect of desirability which is in the object is taken, therefore, strictly speaking and, as it were, according to substance, that act is election. Nevertheless, *secundum quid* and as if in a certain way, it is intention.

SECTION IV.

Whether an act of choice is free.

I suppose that after the intention and with the deliberation having been completed that sometimes one means is discovered and sometimes multiple means and that these are either equally or not equally good for attaining the end.

1. The first view, therefore, is the one which affirms that every choice is free, even with a posited intention and a single means. The nominalists think this. The reason is that nothing thereupon occurs that would impose necessity. For it ought to be the intention itself, which, nevertheless, when it is a free act, cannot be necessitated. It is confirmed first by examples. For if someone by an absolute will wishes to give alms and cannot do so except through theft, he does not by necessity choose such a means. Similarly, he who wills to pursue happiness does not by necessity keep the commandments. It is confirmed, second, from disagreeableness: otherwise, there would be no merit in choice once an absolute intention had been posited, just as an exterior act has no merit when it follows by necessity from an intention. Therefore, etc.

2. *The second view.*—The second view affirms that the choice is necessary if only a single means exists. Choice is free only with the existence of multiple means, to the extent that the will can apply the intellect so that it searches for more reasons of agreeability and utility in one means than in another. If the intellect finds this [greater agreeability and utility] and judges it to be in one means, then the will by necessity chooses that means. If the intellect judges the means to be equal, then the will would not be able to move to either of them. St. Thomas indicates this view in [ST IaIIæ.13.6 ad 3. Cajetan [also] here. The foundation is that freedom of the will arises from indifference of the intellect. Therefore, once the determination of the intellect has been made and the posited judgement that this is more useful has been demonstrated, the will cannot not will. It is confirmed because

cum voluntas sit potentia cæca, debet regi iudicio intellectus: alias iudicium et consilium essent inutilia, et nulla posset reddi ratio, cur voluntas hoc amaret et non illud. Hæc sententia est Durandi, in 2, 2, d. 24, quæst. 3, qui potius dicit, electionem prout est a voluntate, non esse liberam, sed totam libertatem esse in iudicio: nam intellectus, inquit, libere potest iudicare hoc esse eligendum, vel illud, cui iudicio necessario consentit voluntas.

3. *Prima assertio.*—Dico primo. Certum est de fide, hominem esse liberum in electionibus. Nam de fide est, hominem libere operari: præcipuæ autem operationes hominis, et maxime humanæ, sunt electiones, quia magis versantur circa contingentia et magis ex consilio et ratione hominis pendent: ergo, etc. Unde Eccles. 15, homo liber maxime dicitur, quia *relictus est in manu consilii sui*. Et statim adhibentur exempla de mediis, quibus potest homo libere uti. Hæreses vero, quæ ex hac conclusione evincuntur, omitto: vide in tr. 2, disp. 1, sect. 2, et libr. de Gratia.

4. *Secunda assertio.*—Dico secundo. Quando unum tantum est medium illius electio in tantum libera est, in quantum est in potestate voluntatis tollere intentionem, tamen si intentio est efficax, et illa perseveret, necessario sequitur electio. Est communis D. Thomas, supra ad primum, et quæst. 10, art. 2, ad 3, Aristotelis 3, de Anima, text. 47 et 48, et potest colligi ex Joanne, cap. 14: *Qui diligit me, mandata mea servabit*. Et ratio est, quia voluntas absoluta, si potest, facit quod vult: quia si potest et non facit, certe non propter aliud quam quia non vult, et quia efficaciter vult consequi finem: et potest: ergo facit: ergo si potest, unico medio, illo utitur: quod si non utitur, manifestum signum est, voluntatem non fuisse efficacem, etc.

Nota tamen debere medium necessarium iudicari et cognosci, et intellectum actu cogitare de illo: quoniam alias voluntas non movebitur. Itaque oportet ut voluntas necessario hic et nunc moveatur, medium hic et nunc iudicari necessarium: quoniam si iudicatur necessarium, sed pro alio tempore, potest voluntas differre electionem, etiamsi persistat in illa intentione. Et ratio est, quia voluntas non patitur necessitatem, nisi pro modo necessitate medii.

6. Neque contra hoc obstant fundamenta primæ sententiæ in numero primo. Ad rationem dico, hanc efficaciam, et necessi-

since the will is a blind power, it ought to be ruled by the judgement of the intellect. Otherwise, judgement and deliberation would be useless and no reason could be given for why the will loves this and not that. This is the view of Durandus in 2, 2, d. 24, q. 3, who says rather that choice insofar as it is from the will is not free, but all the freedom is in the judgement. For the intellect, he says, can be free to judge this to be choiceworthy or that, to which judgement the will consents by necessity.

3. *First assertion.*—I say, first: It is certain by faith that a human being is free in choices. For it is of the faith that a human being acts freely. Moreover, choices especially are human actions and maximally human, because they turn more on contingencies and depend more on the deliberation and reason of a human being. Therefore, etc. Hence, in Eccles. 15[14] is called especially free because ‘he was left in the hand of his deliberation’. And immediately the examples concerning means are brought in, which a human being can freely use. But I leave aside the heresies which are overcome by this conclusion: see disp. 1, sect. 2 and the book *De Gratia*.

4. *Second assertion.*—I say, secondly: when there is one means only to the end, the choice is free to the extent that it is in the power of the will to remove the intention. Nevertheless, if the intention is effective and it perseveres, the choice follows by necessity. [This view] is common to St. Thomas in the passage cited above ad 1 and 10.2 ad 3 and Aristotle in *DA* 3, text. 47 and 48, and it can also be gathered from John 14[21]: ‘He who loves me, will keep my commandments.’⁸ And the reason is that an absolute will, if it can, does what it wills. Because if it can and does not, it is certainly not on account of something other than that it does not wish to and because it wishes to follow some end to good effect. And it can. Therefore it does. Therefore, if it can by only one means, that one will be used. If it is not used, that is a manifest sign that the will was not effective, etc.

5. Note, however, that the necessary means ought to be judged and cognized and the intellect actually to think about it, because otherwise the will will not be moved. Accordingly, it is necessary that the means be judged necessary here and now for the will to be moved by necessity here and now. Because if it is judged necessary but only for another time, the will can postpone choice, even if it persists in that intention. And the reason is because the will does not undergo necessity except by way of the necessity of the means.

6. Nor do the foundations of the first view in n. 1 stand against this. To the argument I say that this efficacy and necessity comes from the intention.

tatem provenire ab intentione. Neque refert, actum intentionis esse liberum: quia cum actu libero potest alius actus necessario conjungi. Et tunc ab illo necessario manat. Ad primam confirmationem negatur inductio. Ad primum exemplum dic, illam voluntatem dandi eleemosynam non esse absolutam quæ explicatur hac voce *volo*, sed est *vellem*: qui tamen actus, quia procedit ex toto affectu ad bonum honestum, existimatur ac si esset absoluta voluntas. Ad secundum exemplum respondetur, peccatorem illum non judicare hic et nunc esse necessariam pœnitentiam, sed suo tempore. Ad secundam confirmationem aliqui concedunt electionem illam in se non esse meritoriam, sed in causa, id est, in intentione et in perseverantia: quia si illa intentio esset actus omnino necessarius, electio talis nullum haberet meritum: ergo signum est, totum meritum consistere in illa intentione. Sed verius dicitur, illam electionem esse in se meritoriam, quia necessitas ex suppositione non tollit voluntatem simpliciter, quia suppositio illa est in voluntate, neque est simile de actu exteriori: quia ille proxime procedit a potentia, quæ nullam habet libertatem: et ideo actus exterior est unus moraliter cum interiori, non sic autem electio. Et ad illud de perseverantia intentionis dico, hanc perseverantiam intentionis in hoc consistere quod hic potius vult eligere, quam omittere intentionem: et idcirco electio simpliciter est libera et in potestate eligentis, non vero esset simile, si intentio esset omnino et simpliciter necessaria: quia tunc non esset in potestate eligentis omittere illam: ne ad eligendum cogeretur, et ita nulla libertas maneret in electione.

7. Occurrebat hæc difficultas: nam sequitur, eos qui diligunt necessario Deum, cum vident illum, operari necessario omnia, sine quibus non potest conservari ille amor. Dico breviter, quoniam res est alterius loci, frequenter solum esse necessitatem quoad specificationem, quia non occurrunt objecta tanquam hic et nunc <col. b> necessaria. Secundo forte inconveniens non est, aliquando actum illum electionis esse necessarium: semper tamen potest manere aliqua libertas, quia potest voluntas ferri in illud medium, non ea ratione tantum, quæ necessaria est ad finem, sed propter alias rationes boni: et hoc liberum est. Quare, etc.

8. *Tertia assertio.*—Dico tertio. Quando sunt plura media omni ratione æque bona, potest voluntas sua libertate eligere quod

Nor does it imply that an act of intention is free, because with a free act another act can be conjoined by necessity. And then it flows from that necessity. With respect to the first confirmation, the induction is denied. To the first example, say that that will to give alms is not absolute which is explained by this word ‘I wish’ (*volo*) but is ‘I would wish’ (*vellem*). Yet this act, because it proceeds from the complete disposition to honest good, is esteemed as if it were an absolute will. To the second example is responded that those sinners do not judge here and now to be necessarily penitent but at their own time.

To the second confirmation some concede that that choice in itself is not merit but in its cause, that is, in intention and in perseverance. Because if that intention were an act entirely necessary, such a choice would have no merit. Therefore it is a sign that the entire merit consists in that intention. But it is more truly said that that choice is in itself meritorious, because necessity by supposition does not destroy will, strictly speaking, because that supposition is in the will nor is it similar to an external act. Because that proceeds proximately by a power which has no freedom. And therefore the external act is morally one with the internal act. But it is not like that with choice. And to that concerning the perseverance of the intention I say that this perseverance of the intention consists in this that in the present circumstances it wishes to choose rather than to disregard the intention. And on that account the choice, strictly speaking, is free and in the power of choosing, but it would not be similar if the intention were entirely and strictly speaking necessary. Because then it would not be in the power of choosing to disregard it, lest for choosing it were cognized and this no freedom would remain in the choice.

7. This difficulty has occurred: for it follows that those who love God by necessity, when they see him, do everything by necessity, without which that love cannot be conserved. I say briefly (because the matter is in another place) that frequently the necessity is only as long as the specification, because the objects do not occur as here and now necessary. Second, it is not strongly disagreeable that sometimes that act of choice is necessary. Some freedom can always still remain, because the will can be brought to that means not only by reason that it is necessary to the end but on account of other aspects of good. And this is free. Wherefore, etc.

8. *Third assertion.*—I say, thirdly: when multiple means are by every consideration equally good, the will can by its freedom choose the one it

voluerit. Conclusio hæc est communis, et probatur primo: quia propositis mediis intellectus indicat, nullum sigillatim esse necessarium: ergo habet voluntas unde amet quod illorum placuerit, quia bonum est, et propter quid omittat: scilicet, quia necessarium non est: ergo, etc. Secundo incredibile est dicere, quod tunc voluntas maneat suspensa: nam ipsa ratio ducit ad eligendum illo modo, nam advertere potest, esse irrationabile, medium utile non eligere, et fine amato privari, solum quia occurrit aliud medium seque bonum. Tertio in hoc maxime casu apparet libertas voluntatis: nam si tunc non potest eligere, semper determinaretur a iudicio intellectus: quo posito eligeret, sed hoc tollit libertatem voluntatis: nam peto, an illud iudicium sit liberum, an necessarium? si necessarium, tollitur libertas: si liberum, ergo ex præcedenti actu voluntatis libero, et redibit eadem quæstio. Neque vero probabile est, quod Durandus dicit, iudicium illud per se esse liberum, nam cum quis non necessarium præbet assensum, quando assentit, ideo facit, quia vult: sicut quia non necessario movetur, cum movetur, quia vult: et idcirco credit, quia vult, etc.

9. *Quarta assertio.*—Dico quarto: quando media sunt inæqualia sive materialiter, sive formaliter, sive utroque modo, liberum est voluntati eligere etiam minus bonum: semper tamen electio est iuxta mensuram intentionis, et frequentius, et fere semper eligit voluntas sub aliqua ratione majoris convenientiæ. Notandum in mediis, duo posse præcipue considerari. Primum utilitas ad finem, quod est quasi formale. Secundum aliqua propria bonitas, quod est quasi materiale: possunt ergo media esse æque bona priori ratione, non vero posteriori: et hæc voco materialiter inæqualia: et tunc constat intentionem finis de se non magis inclinare ad unum, quam ad aliud. Quare ex hac parte libera est electio: verum aliunde ex naturali propensione voluntatis ad alia bona, fit ut voluntas magis inclinetur ad aliud bonum, quod est quacumque ratione melius. Verum, cum hæc inclinatio etiam non imponat necessitatem, poterit tunc voluntas non amplecti illam majorem rationem boni, atque adeo eligere medium materialiter minus bonum. Et ita patet prima pars conclusionis, quæ confirmatur: nam illud majus bonum, ut sic, non est amatum electione, sed intentione: atqui omnis hujusmodi intentio est libera; ut supra dixi: ergo.

wishes. This conclusion is common and is proved first: because in proposing the means the intellect indicates that none of them separately is necessary. Therefore, it happens that the will for that reason may love whichever one of them it pleases, because it is good and on account of what it disregards, namely, because it is not necessary. Therefore, etc. Secondly, it is incredible to say that then the will remains in suspense. For reason itself leads to choosing in that way. For it can be noticed that it is irrational not to choose a useful means and be deprived of the end that is loved merely because there happens to be another means which is good. Thirdly, freedom of the will is especially apparent in this case. For I ask whether that judgement is free or necessary. If necessary, freedom is removed. If free, [it is] because of the preceding free act of will and the same question will return. But neither is what Durandus says probable, that that judgement is *per se* free, for since someone not necessarily provides assent when he assents, therefore he does, because he wills. Just as because he is not moved by necessity, when he moves because he wills. And therefore, he believes, because he wills, etc.

9. *Fourth assertion.*—I say, fourthly: when the means are unequal, either materially or formally or in both ways, there is freedom of the will to choose even the lesser good. Nevertheless, the choice is always according to the measure of intention and more frequently, even almost always, the will chooses under some aspect of greater agreeability. It should be noted that with means two things can be especially considered. The first is utility with respect to the end that is as if formal. The second is some proper goodness that is as if material. Therefore, means can be equally good with respect to the former, but not with respect to the latter. And these I call materially unequal. And in that case it is clear that the intention of the end by itself does not incline more to one than to another means. Wherefore, from this part the choice is free. From elsewhere, however, by a natural propensity of the will to other goods it happens that that will is more inclined to another good which is better for whatever reason. Indeed, when this inclination also does not impose necessity, then the will will be able not to grasp that greater aspect of good and therefore to choose the means that is materially less good. And thus the first part of the conclusion is clear, which is confirmed: for that greater good, as such, was not loved by choice but by intention, and yet every intention of this sort is free, as I said above. Therefore.

10. Notandum secundo: contingere posse, media, ut media formalia esse inæqualia, quia scilicet uno medio, vel breviori tempore vel majori perfectione, et certitudine comparabitur finis, et tunc constat liberum esse voluntati eligere quod voluerit, quia liberum ei est intendere finem aut pro tali tempore, aut cum tanta perfectione: et ratio est, quia intentio est causa electionis, et ideo electio commensuratur illi tanquam suæ causæ. Et confirmatur etiam experientia conclusio: nam si quis intenderet consequi finem aut brevissimo tempore, aut summa perfectione, respectu hujus intentionis medium utilius esset simpliciter necessarium: ergo necessario eligitur. Et per hæc patent aliæ duæ partes conclusionis. Patet etiam alia pars, nempe simpliciter esse liberum voluntati eligere medium, quod omnibus pensatis absolute judicatur minus bonum, quia ad nullum determinate necessatur cum nullum sit necessarium, et semper potest remittere intentionem prout voluerit. Confirmatur experientia: nam quamvis simpliciter quis judicet honestum esse melius delectabili, eligit delectabile si vult.

11. Ad fundamentum secundæ sententiæ dico libertatem oriri ex ratione, non solum quia potest judicare hoc esse melius illo, sed maxime quia potest perpendere uniuscujusque boni pondus: propterea potest voluntas illo perfecto modo amare, id est, eo gradu, et modo, quo ipsum est amabile: et exemplum hujus evidens est in libertate divinæ voluntatis: quod confirmat omnia quæ diximus: quoniam ex duobus æqualibus eligit quod vult non alia ratione, nisi quia vult, et sæpe eligit, quod minus utile est: nostra autem libertas est participatio illius et eandem radicem habet servata proportione. Ad confirmationem illius sententiæ nego, voluntatem ita determinari ab intellectu, ut ipsa non se etiam determinet, imo ab intellectu determinatur, quasi quoad sufficientiam: ipsa vero se determinat quoad efficaciam: neque oportet aliam rationem hujus determinationis reddere, præter libertatem, et quia vult supposita sufficienti ratione ex parte ob- <col. b>jecti. Atque hactenus de priori parte tituli præsentis disputationis.

10. It should be noted, secondly, that it can happen that means as formal means are unequal, because, of course, the end will be compared to one means, either for nearness in time or for greater perfection and certainty, and then it is clear that there is freedom for the will to choose the one it wishes, because there is freedom for it to intend the end either on behalf of such nearness or with such perfection. And the reason is because the intention is the cause of the choice and therefore the choice is measured to that as its cause. And the conclusion is also confirmed by experience: for if someone were to intend to pursue an end either for the greatest nearness in time or for the greatest perfection, with respect to this intention the more useful means would be, strictly speaking, necessary. Therefore, it will be chosen by necessity. And through this the other two parts of the conclusion are clear.

The other part is also clear, for certainly, strictly speaking, there is freedom for the will to choose the means that by every weighing is judged less good overall, because it is necessitated to nothing determinate since none is necessary and it can always throw back the intention just as it wishes. It is confirmed by experience: for although, strictly speaking, someone may judge honest good to be better than pleasure, yet he chooses pleasure if he wants to.

11. Regarding the foundation of the second view, I say that freedom arises from reason, not only because it can judge this to be better than that, but especially because it can carefully assess the weight of each good. For this reason the will can love in that perfect way, that is, in that position and way in which the thing itself is lovable. And an example of this is evident in the freedom of the divine will, which confirms everything which we have said. Because from two equals it chooses what it will not by another reason, unless because it wants to, and often it chooses what is less useful. Our freedom, moreover is a participation of that and has the same root with the proportion being kept.

Regarding the confirmation of that view, I deny that the will is determined by the intellect so that it itself does not also determine itself. Indeed, by the intellect it is determined as if until sufficiency. But it determines itself until efficacy. Nor is it necessary that another reason of this determination be given beyond freedom, and because it wills by a sufficient supposition by a reason on the part of the object. And as far as this concerning the former part of the title of the present disputation.

SECTIO V.

De cognitione necessaria ad electionem.

1. In hanc secundam partem disputationis incidunt, quæ D. Thomas scribit 1, 2, q. 14. Possumus vero etiam ex dictis sumere quædam certa. Primum est, electionem debere præcedere iudicium aliquod intellectus. Secundum, oportere ut illud iudicium sit aliquo modo practicum. Tertium, non esse necessarium aliquod aliud imperium ab isto iudicio distinctum: quod eisdem rationibus confirmari potest, quibus in materia de intentione uti fuimus, disp. 6, sect. 4. Jam solum restat quærendum, utrum electionem necessario debeat præcedere consilium.

2. Et dico breviter ad electionem frequenter præcedere formale consilium, non tamen semper. Nota nomine *consilii* hic non significari collationem mediorum factam inter plura quamvis ea forte fuerit etymologia vocis: sed significat proprium actum intellectus hominis eligentis, in quo duo præcipue requiruntur: nempe inventio mediorum, et iudicium. Unde constat consilium non unum, sed plures actus includere: quoniam electionem præcedit inquisitio, quæ non fit sine discursu, et consideratione circumstantiarum et difficultatum, et omnium rerum quæ ad recte ferendum iudicium necessario considerando sunt: unde consilium nonnunquam solum inquisitionem ipsam significat, Psal. 12, *Quamdiu ponam consilium in anima mea?* Et hoc modo videtur loqui D. Thomas, fere tota quæst. illa 14, cum Aristotele 3, Ethic., cap. 3. Aliquando vero *consilium* significat solum iudicium, quamvis ex discursu non procedat. Et hoc præcipue tribuitur Deo, de quo Damascenus, lib. 2, cap. 22, interdum utrumque complectitur, Psal. 32, *Dissipat consilia gentium*, Gen., 49, *In consilium eorum non veniat anima mea*. Et hoc modo intelligenda est conclusio, quæ ex superioribus satis patet. Nam quando electio fit inter multa (quod sæpius accidit) oportet omnia illa esse iudicata, et proposita per intellectum, et communiter esse inventa et considerata. Tamen certum præterea est, hunc modum consilii neque semper, neque in omnibus æque procedere, vel esse necessarium: nam de rebus minimis, vel de per se motis non est consilium. Ex quibus constat, etiam materiam consilii et elec-

SECTION V.

Concerning the cognition necessary for election.

1. In this second part of the disputation come those things which St. Thomas wrote in [ST] IaIIæ.14. But from what was said we can also assume certain resolved things. The first is that some judgement of the intellect must precede election. The second is that it is required that that judgement is practical in some way. The third that some other command distinct from that judgement is not necessary. This can be confirmed by the same arguments which were used in the material about intention, disp. 6, sect. 4. It only remains now to inquire whether deliberation must necessarily precede election.

2. And I say briefly that formal deliberation frequently precedes election, but not always. Note that by the name ‘deliberation’ here is not signified a comparison that has been made of means between multiple [options], although this was perhaps the etymology of the word. Rather, it signifies a proper act of the intellect of the human being who is electing, in which two things in particular are required: namely, a discovery of means and a judgement. From this it is clear that deliberation includes not only one but multiple acts, because a search which does not happen without a discursus and consideration of circumstances, difficulties, and all those things which must necessarily be considered in order rightly to make a judgement. Hence, deliberation sometimes signifies this very search itself, [as in] Psalm 12[:2]: ‘how long shall I place deliberation in my soul?’ And St. Thomas seems to speak in this way in almost all of that q. 14, along with Aristotle EN III, cap. 3. But sometimes ‘deliberation’ signifies the judgement alone even though it not follow from the discursus. And this especially is attributed to God, concerning which [John] Damascene [speaks] in lib. II, cap. 22. Sometimes both are included [as in] Psalm 32[:10] (‘[The Lord] brings to nought the deliberations of the nations’) and Gen. 49[:6] (‘Let not my soul go into their deliberation’). And the conclusion should be understood in this way, which is sufficiently clear from the preceding. For when election occurs between multiple [means] (which happens more often), all those must be judged and proposed through the intellect and must generally be discovered and considered. Still, it is in addition certain that this mode of deliberation neither appears equally nor is necessary always and in all [cases]. For there is no deliberation concerning unimportant things or

nempe actiones nostras, vel quæ his actionibus subjiciuntur, vel ad illas conferunt. Solum addendum est, materiam consilii esse graviorem, quia ratione inquisitionis multa in consilio considerantur, quæ postmodum non cadunt: licet eorum notitia ad bene eligendum conducatur: et per hæc satis videtur exposita doctrina D. Thomæ, quæst. 14.

3. Solum in quod, art. 5, dicit, consilium fieri modo resolutorio, quoniam a Cajetano obscure exponitur, breviter dicam. Resolutio ergo et compositio proprie ad totum, partesque dicitur ordinem: nam componitur totum ex partibus, et in illas resolvitur: tamen quia sunt causa totius, ideo processus a causa ad effectum dicitur compositivus ab effectu ad causam resolutorius: in consilio ergo inquisitio proprie procedit ordine resolutorio, et de hac loquitur D. Thomas, et ratio est, quia in inquisitione consideramus res secundum ordinem causæ ad effectum, quem in se ipsis habent non prout sunt in intentione: id est, finis prout est aptus fieri per hoc medium, et hoc medium, per aliud, et sic usque ad ultimum medium in hac resolutione sit posterius quod postea primum est in executione. Nam quia in hoc discursu consideratur finis ut est effectus a parte rei: ideo dicitur resolutorius discursus: tamen in iudicio ferendo in ordine ad intentionem, et electionem versatur ordo compositivus, quia procedit a causa finali ad suum actum.

4. Ex dictis facile solvitur aliud dubium, quod, citata quæst., art. 5, etiam tangit D. Thomas, an scilicet in appetitu possit esse electio, et in sensu, consilium? Respondetur ex dictis non posse, quia sensus non potest vi sentiendi, media inter se, aut cum fine conferre. Et ideo in sensu semper est aliquod materiale iudicium de objecto appetendo sine vera collatione cum aliis: et hoc vocat D. Thomas animalia bruta esse determinata ad unum, quia iudicium est determinatum ad unum, licet possit postea variari: est casus vulgaris, si bruto proponerentur duo objecta æque appetibilia. Dices, utrumque appeteret per modum unius; quod quidem verum esset si posset illa per modum unius apprehendere, ita ut in utrumque simul posset moveri. Sed casus est, quando unum repugnat alteri: et dico breviter durante illa æqualitate bru-

concerning those things moved *per se*. From which it is also clear that the matter of deliberation and election is almost the same, namely, our actions or those things which are subjected to these actions or directed at them. It only needs to be added that the matter of deliberation is more important, since by reason of the search many things are considered in deliberation which end up not happening to one, although knowledge of them is advantageous for electing well. And the doctrine of St. Thomas in q. 14 seems sufficiently explained through these things.

3. I will just briefly discuss what he says in art. 5 (that deliberation happens in an analytic mode), because it is explained obscurely by Cajetan. The analysis and composition, therefore, properly express order to the whole and parts. For the whole is composed from parts and it is analysed into those. Nevertheless, since they are the cause of the whole, the progression from cause to effect is called compositive [and] from effect to cause more analytic. In deliberation, therefore, the search properly proceeds by an analytic order and St. Thomas speaks about this. And the reason is because in the searching we consider things according to the order of cause to effect, which are related to themselves not as they are in intention, that is, the end as it is apt to happen through this means and this means through another and thus all the way to the last means in this analysis is after that which later is first in execution. For since in this discursus the end is considered as it is an effect on the part of the thing. Therefore, it is called a more analytic discursus. Nevertheless, in making a judgement a compositive order is concerned with the order to intention and election, since it proceeds from the final cause to its act.

4. From what has been said one can easily resolve the other doubt which was cited in q. 5 and which St. Thomas also mentions: namely, whether there can be election in appetite and, in a sense, deliberation. It is responded that it cannot be from what was said, because sense cannot compare the means with each other or with the end by the power of sensing. And for this reason there is in sense always some material judgement about the object to be desired without a true comparison with other [objects]. And St. Thomas says with this that brute animals are determined to one [judgement] because judgement is determined to one, although it can be changed afterwards. There is the common case: if two equally desirable objects were proposed to a brute [animal]. You will say: it would desire each through the mode of one. This indeed would be true if it could apprehend them through the mode of one, so that thus it could be moved at the same time to

tum in neutrum moveri, quia non potest habere principium motus, quod est determinatum iudicium, et efficax appetitio: determinatur enim ab objecto: et tunc objecta se semper impediunt, quia æqualiter agunt et resistunt. Dico, *durante æqualitate*, quia facillime posset fieri inæqualitas, et quacumque circumstantia mutata mutaretur iudicium, ut sic caput moveret, verbi gratia, quod casu et contingenter evenit.

5. Aliud dubium etiam resolvitur de homine non habente vim rationis, an in illo sit electio proprie? Dico primo esse quemdam modum electionis multo magis proprium quam in brutis, quia potest media cum fine, et inter se conferre: unde interrogatus amens rationem reddit, propter quam hoc potius, quam illud eligat: et ratio a priori est, quia in hoc non est omnino impedita operatio rationis, ut suo loco vidimus. Tamen adverte secundo, illam electionem non esse proprie humanam, seu moralem, quia in illa amens, vel puer non habet dominium, neque fit ex perfecto consilio: et potestate operantis: et ratio sumi potest ex dictis supra de voluntario, quia tunc ratio sequitur iudicium sensus, et non per se, et propria virtute iudicat; voluntas autem comitatur tunc intellectum. Vide Cajetanum 2, 2, quæst. 88, art. 1 et 1, 2, q. 6, art. 2, ap. 2, et 1 p., q. 82, art. 1, ad 3, Aristotelem 1 Mag. Mor., cap. 16, et Victorem, in Relect., de perveniente ad usum rationis.

6. *Utrum detur usus rationis ex parte tantum.*—Qui peculiariter circa hoc interrogat, an possit quis in aliquo medio carere usu rationis ad eligendum, et habere in omnibus aliis. Dico breviter, et nota primum, usum rationis dupliciter posse perturbari: uno modo permanenter, et quasi in habitu, ut quando læsio, et indispositio sensuum provenit ex ægitudine permanente, et ita sentio de amente, vel ebrio: alio modo quasi in transitu solum ut in illo, qui ira, vel furore agitur. Priori modo non credo posse contingere aliquem in una materia posse uti ratione, et non in aliis: et ratio est, quia facultas ratiocinandi potius pendet ex effectu, quam ex modo, et ex intelligentia principiorum. Principia autem, et modus ratiocinandi ejusdem rationis, et ordinis sunt, præcipue in materia morali. Et ideo quod propter impedimentum sensuum non potest, vel recta ratione iudicare de aliquo principio, vel convenienter ex

each. But the case is one where one [object] is opposed to another. And I say briefly that a brute [animal] is moved to neither as long as that equality persists, because it cannot have a principle of motion which is a determinate judgement and efficacious desire. For it is determined by an object and there the objects always obstruct themselves because they equally act and resist. I say ‘as long as that equality persists’ because an inequality could easily happen and whatever circumstances changed would change the judgement, for example, the head were moved, which happens contingently and by chance.

5. The other doubt concerning whether there is properly election in a human being who does not have the appearance of reason is also resolved. I say, first, that there is a certain mode of election much more proper than in brute [animals] since it can compare means with the end and with each other. Hence, an insane person having been asked gives a reason why he elects this rather than that. And the argument is *a priori* because the operation of reason is not wholly impeded in this, as we saw in its place. Still, note, secondly, that that election is not properly human or moral, because an insane person or a child does not have control of that nor does it result from perfect deliberation and the power of the one acting. And the reason can be taken from what was said above concerning the voluntary, since then the reason follows the judgement of sense and it does not judge *per se* and from proper virtue. But the will is then connected with the intellect. See Cajetan, IIaIIæ.88.1, IaIIæ.6.2 ap. 2, and Ia.82.1 ad 3; and Aristotle, *Mag. Mor.* III. cap. 16; and [Francisco de] Vitoria, in Relectio ‘De perveniente ad usum rationis’.

6. *Whether there is given use of reason is part only.*—Some people ask especially concerning this whether someone can lack the use of reason for electing with respect to some means and have it for all the rest. I respond briefly and note first that the use of reason can be disturbed in two ways. In one way, permanently and, as it were, in habit, as when an injury or a lack of aptitude of the senses results from an enduring sickness. And this is what I think of the insane or intoxicated. In another way, in passing alone, as it were, as in one who is agitated by anger or wrath. I do not believe that it can happen in the former way that someone can use reason in one matter and not in others. And the reason is because the faculty of ratiocination depends more on the effect than on the mode and on the understanding of principles. But the principles and mode of ratiocinating belong to the same reason and order, especially in moral matters. And therefore that which on account of the impediment of the senses cannot either judge about some principle with

illo colligere, eadem ratione non poterit in reliquis, quia eadem virtus rationis requiritur: neque indispositio sensus potest esse talis, ut de se magis impediatur in una materia, quam in alia. Quod si aliquando videantur isti homines ut cordati loqui, id vel casu, vel ex consuetudine, <266> aliqua præterita accidit: contingere autem potest hominem alias recte dispositum ad utendum ratione ita esse affectum in aliquo negotio, vel materia, ut illa proposita statim vehementer commoveatur, et organum phantasie alteretur: et ideo eo tempore non potest uti ratione: tamen pro tunc indispositus vere est in quacumque materia.

7. Aliam difficultatem huc pertinentem tractat D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 15, art. 4, an electio requirat directionem superioris rationis, vel sufficiat inferioris: sed quia, quod hic est difficile, pertinet ad materiam de peccatis dico breviter, electionem, vel consensum, quatenus actus humanus est, et liber, per se dirigi posse non solum a ratione superiori, sed etiam ab inferiori, quia ratio inferior vere ratiocinatur, et iudicat, licet per principia inferioris ordinis: tamen prout is actus habet rationem culpæ, interdum inferiori rationi, interdum superiori tribuitur, ut eo loco latius dicam.

right reason or agreeably gather from it, for the same reason will not be possible in the remaining [cases], since the same power of reason is required. Nor can a lack of aptitude of a sense be such that of itself it impedes more in one case than in the others. If sometimes these human beings seem to speak judiciously, this happens either by chance or from some past custom. But it can happen that human beings otherwise rightly disposed to using reason are affected in such a way in some business or matter that what has been proposed is at once vehemently disturbed and the organ of imagination will be altered. And therefore at that time it cannot use reason. Nevertheless, until then he truly is lacking in aptitude in any matter.⁹

7. St. Thomas discusses the other difficulty belonging here in [ST] IaIIæ.15.4: whether election requires the direction of superior reason or whether inferior [reason] suffices. But since what here is difficult belongs to the material concerning sins, I say briefly that election or consent, insofar as it is a human act and free can be *per se* directed not only by superior reason but also by inferior, because the inferior reason does truly ratiocinate and judge, although through principles of an inferior order. Still, as this act has the nature of guilt, it is sometimes attributed to inferior reason and sometimes to superior reason, as I will talk about in more detail in its place.

1 Latin text is from Vivès edition. My thanks to Tobias Schaffner for drawing my attention to a number of errors in an earlier version.

2 On 'election' rather than 'choice' as a translation of *electio*, cf. Terence Irwin, *The Development of Ethics*, vol. 1, §66, fn. 6 and §235, fn. 3.

3 1139b4–6.

4 Cf. *EN* V, cap. 2, 1130a24–27. Also, cf. Aquinas, *ST* IaIIæ.18.6 co.

5 Cf. *Topics* III, cap. 2, 117a18–19.

6 Deleted 'quin simul videat lumen ut rationem videndi colorem' in accordance with 1628 edition.

7 Or: 'And it is proven: for when someone desires an end in itself while not thinking at all about particular means, he in no way has a true act of intention and of election. And, conversely, he who desires a means alone, especially if he does not think at all about the end, has in no way [made] a true election and intention.'

8 'He who holds my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me' (*Qui habet mandata mea, et servat ea: ille est qui diligit me*). Cf. v. 15.

9 Should 'indispositus' be 'dispositus'? In that case the sentence would read: 'Nevertheless, until then he truly has aptitude in any matter.'