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<51><sup>2</sup>

*Utrum Deus secundum totum, quod in se habet, vel secundum speciale attributum sit objectum humanæ beatitudinis.*

*Whether God is the object of human happiness according to everything that he is or according to a special attribute.*

Triplex dubium  
in præsentī  
quæst.

5 Tria sunt, de quibus potest in hoc dubio inquiri. Primo de divinis attributis et absolutis perfectionibus Dei. Secundo de divinis relationibus. Tertio de ideis seu actionibus liberis, qui in Deo existunt: de quibus sigillatim dicam pauca.

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There are three things into which we can inquire in this doubt. The first concerns the divine attributes and absolute perfections of God. The second the divine relations. The third the ideas or free actions that exist in God. I will say a little bit about each one.

The three doubts  
in the present  
question.

PUNCTUM I.

POINT I.

*An omnia, vel aliquod attributum Dei, pertineat ad objectum beatitudinis.*

*Whether all or some attribute of God pertain to the object of happiness.*

1. Sententia. 10

1. Circa primam partem duo possunt excogitari dicendi modi: primus est juxta opinionem Scoti dicentis, seu distinguentis attributa divina ab essentia Dei, quam ex parte sequuntur aliqui Thomistæ, qui licet non admittant distinctionem ex natura rei inter attributa et essentiam, nihilominus dicunt attributa esse extra rationem essentialem Dei, et unum attributum esse extra essentialem alterius priusquam secundum nostrum modum intelligendi in re ipsa fundatum concipi naturam divinam, ut constituentem essentialiter Deum, et ideo postulantes talia attributa, quæ re ipsa cum ipsa identificentur. Juxta hanc ergo  
15  
20 opinionem <col. b> in præsentī dici potest, Deum esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis præcise secundum eam rationem, quæ in eo intelligitur esse essentialis, quia secundum illam præcise constituitur in esse Dei: sicut, si homo ut homo esset objectum

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1. Concerning the first part, two ways of speaking can be imagined. The first follows the opinion of Scotus in speaking or in distinguishing the divine attributes from the essence of God. This is followed in part by some Thomists, who although they do not admit a distinction *ex natura rei* between attributes and essence, say, nevertheless, that the attributes are beyond the essential nature of God and that one attribute is beyond the essential [nature] of another before, according to our way of understanding which is founded in the thing itself, the divine nature is conceived as essentially constituting God and for that reason requiring attributes of the sort that are in reality identified with him. Therefore, according to this opinion one can say about the present case that God is the object of our happiness precisely according to that nature which is understood to be essential in him, because according to it happiness is constituted precisely in the being of God. Just as, if a

The first view.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

25	<p>beatitudinis humanæ, intelligeremus solam essentiam animæ et corporis pertinere proprie ad tale objectum; proprietates vero, sicut sequuntur essentiam, ita etiam pertinere ad quamdam beatitudinis perfectionem, seu objecti illius, non vero ad primariam rationem ejus. Quam sententiam attigit Scotus, in 1, distinctione 1, quæstione 1, et quamvis ibi eam non tractet, colligi tamen potest ex fundamento ejus.</p>		<p>human being as human being were the object of human happiness, we would understand the essence alone of the soul and of the body to pertain properly to such an object. But just as properties follow essence, they in that way also pertain to a kind of perfection of happiness or of its object, but do not pertain to its primary nature. Scotus touches on this view in I, dist. 1, q. 1, and, although he does not discuss it there, it can, nevertheless, be gathered from his foundation.</p>	
30	<p>2. Secundus modus dicendi est, Deum esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis secundum quoddam speciale attributum, vel secundum bonitatem suam. Hanc opinionem attigit Medina 1, 2, quæstione 3, art. 5, ubi inquit, cum beatus judicet Deum esse omnipotentem, esse trinum, et unum, in quo judicio consistat beatitudo. Respondet consistere in hoc <i>quam bonus Deus Israel his qui recto sunt corde</i>, cætera vero judicia, inquit, quæ habent beati, vel sunt præmia fidei, vel necessario conjuncta. Fundamentum esse potest, quia Deus est objectum beatitudinis nostræ ut est summum bonum, quia tale objectum ut est ultimus finis simpliciter ac perfectissimus: ultimus autem finis, et summum bonum idem sunt, ut Aristoteles dixit 1, Eth., cap. 7. Et ideo ex sententia omnium beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni: ergo Deus ratione suæ bonitatis, et non ratione aliorum attributorum, est objectum nostræ beatitudinis.</p>	30R	<p>2. According to the second way of speaking, God is the object of our happiness according to a certain special attribute or according to his goodness. Bartolomé de Medina touches on this opinion in Iallæ.3.5, where he asks in which judgement happiness consists, since the happy judge God to be omnipotent and to be three and one. He responds that it consists in this: ‘How good is God to Israel, to those who are of a right heart’. But the remaining judgements that the happy have, he says, are either gifts of faith or necessarily conjoined. The foundation can be that God is the object of our happiness insofar as he is the highest good, because such an object is the most perfect and unqualifiedly ultimate end. But the ultimate end and the highest good are the same thing, as Aristotle said in <i>EN</i> I, cap. 7. And for this reason from the view of everyone that happiness consists in the attainment of the highest good it follows that God is the object of our happiness by reason of his goodness and not by reason of other attributes.</p>	The second view.
40	<p>3. Utamque opinionem falsam existimo, et sic dicendum, Deum secundum omnia sua attributa, et absolutas perfectiones esse objectum proprium, ac primarium nostræ beatitudinis perfectæ, quam speramus in futura vita. Quæ sententia fundari potest in verbis illis 1, Joan. 3: <i>Similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est</i>. Sicut ergo Deus est per suam essentiam summe sapiens, omnipotens, etc., ita videbimus eum: ergo Deus quatenus in sua essentia complectitur omnia bona, erit objectum nos beatificans. Secundo præcipue argumentor ratione, quia Deus non est objectum nostræ beatitudinis, nisi ut supremum ens intelligibile, et supremum bonum, formaliter, aut eminenter, reliqua omnia continens, quia ut sic potest implere capacitatem nostri intellectus, et voluntatis, et non alio modo: sed Deus non est hujusmodi ens secundum aliquod</p>	40R	<p>3. I think each view is false. One should instead say that God according to all his attributes and absolute perfections is the proper and perfect object of our perfect happiness which we hope to have in our future life. This view can be founded in those words from 1 John 3[:2]: ‘We shall be like him and we shall see him as he is.’ Therefore, as God is through his essence most wise, omnipotent, and so forth, we will also see him as such. Therefore, God insofar as he in his essence encompasses all goods will be the object making us happy. Secondly and principally, I argue from reason, for God is not the object of our happiness except as he is the supreme intelligible being and the supreme good formally or eminently containing all other goods. For in that way—but in no other way—he can fulfill the capacity of our intellect and will. But God is not a being of this kind after some special attribute, but insofar as he is an immense ocean of all perfection. Therefore, insofar</p>	The true view.
45		45R		It is proven first from Scripture.
50		50R		The first argument is added.
55		55R		

Ratio 2.

60 spe- <52> ciale attributum, sed ut est immensum pelagus om-  
nis perfectionis: ergo ut est objectum nostræ beatitudinis in-  
cludit formaliter omnia attributa absoluta, quæ dicunt perfec-  
tionem simpliciter simplicem, eminenter vero omnes alias perfec-  
65 tionem. Tertio hoc ipsum declaratur, quia sententiæ con-  
trariæ procedunt ex falsis fundamentis: nam imprimis falsum  
est attributa divina distingui ex natura rei ab essentia divina, ut  
ostenditur latius circa quæst. 3 primæ part. D. Thomas, falsum  
est etiam, hæc attributa, quæ dicunt perfectionem simpliciter,  
70 non includi in conceptu essentiali Dei adæquato, quia Deus ex  
præcisa essentia sua est ens infinitum intensive in perfectione  
essentiali, et ideo ex eadem præcisa essentia formaliter com-  
plectitur omnem perfectionem simpliciter, quia illud ens, quod  
formaliter afficitur his perfectionibus, quæ vocantur simplices  
75 simpliciter, perfectius est in genere entis intensive quam si illas  
formaliter excludat: et ideo tam essentialia sunt istæ proposi-  
tiones, Deus est sapiens, Deus est justus, sicut hæc, Homo est  
animal rationale. Unde retorquendo argumentum, cum Deus  
sit objectum beatitudinis nostræ ratione suæ perfectionis es-  
80 sentialis, necesse est ut in hoc objecto formaliter includantur  
omnia attributa.

Arguitur  
specialiter contra  
2. sententiam.

4. Præterea secunda opinio confingit summam Dei boni-  
tatem esse speciale attributum Dei ab aliis distinctum: nam  
80 revera non est nisi infinita perfectio ejus consurgens, nos-  
tro modo intelligendi, ex omnibus attributis; quod in hunc  
modum explicari potest: nam sicut in nobis, ita in Deo du-  
plex bonitas intelligi potest, vel physica, vel moralis, et neutra  
in nobis est specialis aliqua virtus ab aliis distincta; sed bonitas  
85 physica est ipsamet entitativa perfectio, quæ consurgit ex prin-  
cipiis naturæ; bonitas autem moralis integra, nihil aliud esse  
potest, quam collectio omnium virtutum, vel in habitu, vel in  
90 actu, et utraque bonitas suo modo reperitur in Deo; nam et  
est perfectissimum ens in genere entis, et est summum bonum  
in genere moris, quæ bonitas in ipso nihil aliud est, quam per-

60R as he is the object of our happiness he formally includes every absolute  
attribute which expresses a simple perfection strictly speaking and emi-  
nently includes all the other perfections. This is shown, thirdly, because  
the contrary views arise from false foundations. For in the first place it  
is false that the divine attributes are distinguished *ex natura rei* from  
the divine essence, as was shown more thoroughly when discussing  
65R St. Thomas's *ST* Ia.3. It is also false that these attributes which express  
perfection strictly speaking are not included in an adequate essential  
concept of God, because God according to his essence taken precisely  
is an being intensively infinite in essential perfection. And for that rea-  
son he encompasses every perfection strictly speaking according to the  
70R same essence taken precisely, since that being which is formally affected  
by these perfections (which are called simple strictly speaking) is more  
perfect in the genus of intensive being that if those were formally ex-  
cluded. And therefore these propositions—namely, that God is wise  
and that God is just—are just as essential as this one—namely, that hu-  
75R man beings are rational animals. Hence, by turning back the argument,  
since God is the object of our happiness by reason of his essential per-  
fection, it is necessary that all attributes are formally included in this  
object.

The second  
argument.

80R 4. Furthermore, the second opinion imagines the highest good-  
ness of God to be a special attribute of good distinct from his other  
attributes. For in reality it does not exist unless it is an infinite perfec-  
tion of him arising, in our way of understanding, from all the attributes.  
This can be explained as follows: just as in us, so also two kinds of good-  
85R ness can be understood in God, namely, physical goodness and moral  
goodness. Neither goodness is some special virtue distinct from others  
in us. Rather, physical goodness is the entitative perfection itself which  
arises from the principles of nature and complete *integra* moral good-  
ness cannot be anything other than the collection of all virtues, whether  
in habit or in act. Each goodness is found in its way in God. For he is  
90R both the most perfect being in the genus of being and the highest good  
in the genus of morality. This goodness is in him nothing other than

It is argued  
especially against  
the second view.60 est ] *om.* V.

67 part. ] part. 3 V.

67 Thomas ] Thomæ V.

68 est etiam ] etiam est V.

95fectio ejus essentialis, ratione cujus essentialiter est summe jus-  
 tus, summe misericors, etc.; ergo Deus, ut summum bonum,  
 formaliter includit has omnes perfectiones: ergo retorquendo  
 etiam argumentum, ex eo quod Deus est objectum beatitudinis  
 et summum bonum, non sequitur aliquod attributum esse ex-  
 tra rationem objecti illius, sed potius sequitur omnia includi in  
 100 ipso formaliter. <col. b>

Arguitur iterum  
 contra eandem.

5. Quocirca falsum etiam est, quod illa opinio secunda  
 fingebat, scilicet, esse in beatis varia judicia horum attributo-  
 rum quæ non pertinent ad ipsam beatitudinem, sed cum illa  
 105 conjuncta sunt: hæc, inquam, falsa fictio est, quia sicut in Deo  
 secundum se hæc attributa non sunt multa, sed una simpliciter  
 perfectio Dei, ita in beato ut sic, id est, ut intuentem Deum, non  
 sunt varia judicia de his attributis, sed unico, et simplicissimo,  
 105R quo intuetur Deum sicuti est, judicat Deum esse omnipoten-  
 tem, sapientem, etc., quia, ut infra dicemus, videre Deum, non  
 110 est videre unum vel aliquod attributum ejus, sed videre totam  
 Dei naturam formaliter includentem hæc attributa. Et per hæc  
 responsum est dictis opinionibus.

Eadem vera  
 sententia procedit  
 etiam de  
 beatitudine  
 supernaturali  
 huius vitæ.

6. Atque hinc facile intelligitur, quomodo Deus sit ob-  
 jectum illius imperfectæ beatitudinis supernaturalis, quam in  
 115 hac vita consequi possumus: nam idem Deus secundum to-  
 tam beatitudinem suæ perfectionis formalis et bonitatis, qui  
 beatificat in patria, est etiam objectum beatitudinis ejus, sed  
 ibi ut consecutus, hic ut speratus: ibi ut visus, hic ut amatus.  
 Solum est considerandum, si in hoc objecto consideretur ra-  
 tio sub qua attingitur a nostris potentiis, vel actibus, sic so-  
 lent assignari speciales, ac diversæ rationes, sub quibus attingitur,  
 120 scilicet, ratio veri respectu intellectus, et ratio boni seu  
 appetibilis respectu voluntatis. Quæ duæ rationes conveniunt  
 Deo secundum totam perfectionem essentialem, quam inclu-  
 dit, nam ratione illius et summe intelligibilis est, et summe ama-  
 125 bilis; tamen ratio, quæ nos beatificat, non est hæc ratio, sub  
 qua loquendo, ut loquimur, de beatitudine objectiva, sed est  
 ipsa infinita perfectio, quæ in objecto attingitur: illa enim est  
 quæ nos satiat, quia omne bonum continet: illa vero ratio, sub  
 130 qua, non addit objecto aliquam realem perfectionem, sed sum-

his essential perfection by reason of which he is essentially most just,  
 most merciful, and so forth. Therefore, God as highest good formally  
 includes all these perfections. Therefore, in also turning back the argu-  
 95R ment according to which God is the object of happiness and the highest  
 good, it does not follow that some attribute is beyond the nature of that  
 object but rather it follows that all the attributes are formally included  
 in it.

5. For this reason what that second opinion imagines—namely,  
 100R that there are in the happy various judgements about these attributes  
 which do not pertain to happiness itself but that are conjoined with  
 it—is also false. This is, I say, a false imagining, because just as these  
 attributes in God according to himself are not multiple but are, strictly  
 speaking, one perfection of God, so also in a happy person as such—that  
 is, as intellectually seeing God—there are not various judgements about  
 these attributes but he judges God to be omnipotent, wise, and so forth  
 105R by a singular and most simple judgement by which he intellectually  
 sees God as he is. For, as we will say below, to see God is not to see  
 one or another of his attributes but to see the whole nature of God that  
 formally includes these attributes. And through these things I respond  
 110R to the mentioned opinions.

It is argued again  
 against the same  
 view.

6. And from here it is easy to understand in what way God is the  
 object of that imperfect supernatural happiness which we can achieve  
 in this life. For the same God according to the whole happiness of his  
 formal perfection and goodness who makes one happy in the afterlife  
 is also the object of his happiness [in this life]: there as attained, here  
 as hoped for; there as seen, here as loved. We only need to consider  
 whether the aspect under which he is reached by our powers or acts is  
 considered in this object in the way that different and special aspects are  
 usually assigned under which he is reached: namely, the aspect of the  
 true with respect to the intellect and the aspect of the good or desirable  
 with respect to the will. These two aspects come together with God  
 according to his whole essential perfection, which he includes, for by  
 reason of it he is both the highest intelligible and the highest lovable.  
 115R Nevertheless, the aspect that makes us happy is not this aspect about  
 which we speak when speaking about objective happiness. Rather, it  
 is the infinite perfection itself which is attained in the object. For that  
 is what satisfies us, since it contains every good. But that aspect about  
 which does not add any real perfection to the object but is taken from

The same true  
 view proceeds  
 also in the cause  
 of the  
 supernatural  
 happiness of this  
 life.

Procedit item de naturali.	<p>itur ex ordine ad modum operandi nostrarum potentiarum. Quæ notanda sunt pro his, quæ dicemus de formali beatitudine. Denique quod attinet ad naturalem beatitudinem ex dictis colligi potest quid in hoc puncto dicendum sit, proportione servata: est enim Deus objectum illius secundum totam perfectionem, quæ de illo cognosci potest ex principiis naturæ, quod eisdem rationibus ostendi potest.</p>	<p>130R the order to our powers' way of acting. These points should be noted for those things that we will say about formal happiness. Finally, as far as natural happiness is concerned, what should be said can be gathered from what was said by respecting the analogy. For God is the object of natural happiness according to his whole perfection, which can be 135R cognized concerning him from the principles of nature. This can be shown by the same arguments.</p>	<p>It also proceeds in the case of natural happiness.</p>
	PUNCTUM II.	POINT II.	
	<i>An pertineant divinæ relationes.</i>	<i>Whether the divine relations pertain to the object of happiness.</i>	
Non procedit punctum quoad beatitudinem viæ.	<p>7. Circa secundum punctum de relationibus, quod est difficile, supponamus imprimis, illud non habere locum in beatitudine naturali, quia constat Deum, ut trinum, non posse naturaliter cognosci. Similiter beatitudo imperfecta huius vitæ, etiamsi supernaturalis sit, consistere potest sine cognitione divinarum relationum, quia potest Deus, ut finis supernaturalis, fide cognosci, et charitate infusa super omnia amari, etiamsi Trinitas personarum distincte non cognoscatur. Et ratio utriusque est, quia cognitione abstractiva potest Deus ut infinitum bonum cognosci, non cognitio relationibus: et ideo omnis beatitudo imperfecta, quæ in sola abstractiva cognitione fundatur, non necessario includit in objecto suo prædictas relationes.</p>	<p>5R 7. With respect to the second point about relations, which is a difficult point, we suppose in the first place that it has no place in natural happiness, because it is clear that God as being three cannot be naturally cognized. Likewise, the imperfect happiness of this life, even if it is supernatural, can come about without cognition of the divine relations, since God as the supernatural end can be cognized by means of faith and can be loved beyond all other things by means of infused charity 10R even if the Trinity of persons is not distinctly cognized. And the reason in both cases is that God can be cognized as infinite good by abstractive cognition even when the relations are not cognized. And for this reason every imperfect happiness which is founded in abstractive cognition alone does not necessarily include the aforementioned relations in its object. 15R</p>	<p>The point does not proceed with respect to the happiness of this life.</p>
Altera quæstio est, quid viso Deo, necessario videatur: altera quid visum pertineat ad objectum beatitudinis.	<p>8. Difficultas ergo est de beatitudine perfecta, quæ consistit in clara Dei visione. Quam difficultatem attigerunt Scotus, in 1, dist. 1, quæst. 2, et Cajetanus 2, 2, quæst. 2, art. 8, tractantes aliam quæstionem, an possit videri essentia non visis relationibus, quam fere confundunt cum præsentis quæstione: sunt tamen revera difficultates diversæ, nam etiamsi fateamur visionem essentialem habere necessariam connexionem cum visione relationum, non videtur inde sequi relationes pertinere ad objectum nos beatificans, quia etiam cognitio creaturarum habet necessariam connexionem cum comprehensione essentialis, qua Deus beatus est, et aliquo etiam modo cum visione intuitiva, qua nos speramus esse beatos, et nihilominus non pertinent creaturæ ad objectum nos beatificans: atque etiam e</p>	<p>20R 8. The difficulty, therefore, is in the case of perfect happiness which consists in a clear vision of God. Scotus in I, dist. 1, q. 2, and Cajetan in IIallæ.2.8 touch on this difficulty when treating another question—whether the essence can be seen without the relations being seen— which they conflate with the present question. They are in reality, however, different difficulties, for even if we grant that the essential vision has a necessary connection with the vision of the relations, it does not seem to follow from that that the relations pertain to the object that makes us happy. For the cognition of creatures also has a necessary connection with the comprehension of the essence by which God is happy and in another way also with the intuitive vision by which we hope to be happy; nevertheless, creatures do not pertain to the object that makes us happy. And also, conversely, although the essence were cog-</p>	<p>One question is what is necessarily seen in seeing God; the other is what seen thing pertains to the object of happiness.</p>

30 contrario quamvis essentia cognosceretur sine personis, adhuc  
maneret quæstio, an sic præcise visa sufficeret ad nos beatifican-  
dos. Omissa ergo altera quæstione, quam suo loco tractabimus,  
circa præsentem.

35 9. Est prima opinio Scoti, qui affirmat objectum nostræ  
beatitudinis esse essentiam præcise sumptam, non vero rela-  
tiones. Cujus sententiæ duplex potest excogitari fundamen-  
tum: primum est, quia Pater æternus est beatus ex vi visionis  
soliuss essentiæ, et non ex cognitione relationum: ergo essentia  
præcise sumpta est objectum divinæ beatitudinis: ergo multo  
magis nostræ, quæ est illius participatio. Antecedens probatur,  
40 primo quia Pater æternus ex se est sufficienter beatus, et non  
ab aliis personis, alias acciperet ab illis maximam perfectionem:  
<col. b> quod est inconueniens, cum ipse ex se sit infinite per-  
fectus. Secundo, quia objectum beatitudinis concurrat nostro  
modo intelligendi per modum principii et speciei intelligibilis  
45 ad formalem beatitudinem: sed relationes Filii et Spiritus sancti  
nullo modo concurrunt ad beatitudinem Patris, alias perfectio  
Patris aliquo modo esset ab illis personis ut a principio: ergo  
non pertinent illæ relationes ad objectum beatitudinis. Tertio,  
quia Pater prius origine quam generet Filium, est beatus, quia  
50 est Deus, et Deus essentialiter est beatus, et tamen in illo priori  
non intelligitur videre personas, quia antecedit illas. Dices, hæc  
argumenta non procedere saltem de relatione Patris. Respon-  
detur primo, etiam applicari posse ad hoc, quia relatio Patris  
non potest videri sine relatione Filii: ergo si una non pertinet  
55 ad objectum, nec etiam alia. Secundo possunt fieri eadem argu-  
menta de hoc Deo, ut subsistente absolute in divinitate prius  
ratione, quam intelligatur esse personæ, quia sic est perfecte  
beatus.

60 [10.] Alterum fundamentum præcipuum est, quia essen-  
tia potest videri sine personis, et illa, ut sic, sufficit ad bean-  
dum, quia est bonum simpliciter infinitum formaliter, et emi-  
nenter continens omnem perfectionem: relationes vero ut sic,

30R nized without the persons, the question would still remain whether the  
essence seen precisely in that way would suffice for making us happy.  
Setting aside the other question, therefore, which we will discuss in its  
place, [we turn] to the present question.

35R 9. The first opinion is Scotus's. He affirms that the object of our  
happiness is the essence taken precisely but not the relations. Two foun-  
dations can be thought of for this view. The first is that the eternal Fa-  
ther is happy by the force of the vision of the essence alone and not by  
a cognition of the relations. Therefore the essence taken precisely is the  
object of divine happiness. Therefore, much more for our happiness,  
which is a participation in that. The antecedent is proven, first, because  
40R the eternal Father is of himself sufficiently happy and not as a result of  
the other persons; otherwise he would receive maximal perfection from  
them, which is unfitting since he is infinitely perfect in and of himself.  
Secondly, because the object of happiness contributes to formal happi-  
ness in our way of understanding through the mode of principle and  
intelligible species. But the relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit in  
45R no way contribute to the happiness of the Father; otherwise the perfec-  
tion of the Father would in some way depend on those persons as on  
a principle. Therefore, these relations do not pertain to the object of  
happiness. Thirdly, because the Father is happy before the origin which  
generates the Son. For the Father is God and God is essentially happy  
and yet in the proposed case he is understood not to see the other per-  
sons because he precedes them. You will object that this argument fails  
to work at least in the case of the relation of the Father. I respond, first,  
that it can also be applied in this case because the relation of the Father  
cannot be seen without the relation of the Son. Therefore, if one does  
50R not pertain to the object, then neither does the other. Secondly, the  
same arguments can be made about this God as subsisting absolutely in  
divinity prior to the nature that is understood to belong to the person  
[of the Father] because even in this way he is perfectly happy.

60R [10.]<sup>3</sup> The other foundation is especially that the essence can be  
seen without the persons and that it, as such, suffices for making one  
happy, since it is a good that is without qualification formally infinite  
and that eminently contains every perfection. But the relations as such

The first opinion:  
divine relations  
do not pertain to  
the object of  
happiness.

The first  
foundation is  
established in  
three ways.  
First.

Second.

Third.

The other  
foundation.

<sup>3</sup>The Vivès edition starts n. 10 here and includes the next paragraph as part of n. 10. The 1628 includes this paragraph as part of n. 9, which is the more logical division.

	65	vel nullam perfectionem formaliter addunt, vel si addunt, illa eminenter continetur in sola essentia, quia non est perfectius ens tota Trinitas relationes includens, quam sit sola essentia ut a relationibus abstracta: ergo tota ratio objecti beatificantis in essentia. Unde Benedictus XI, in sua Extravagante, absolute docet sanctos esse beatos visione divinæ essentiæ.	65R	either add no perfection formally or, if they do, it is [already] contained eminently in the essence by itself. For the whole Trinity including the relations is not a more perfect being than the essence alone as abstracted from the relations. The whole <i>ratio</i> of the happy-making object, therefore, is in the essence. Hence, Benedict XI teaches unconditionally in his <i>Extravagans</i> that the saints are happy by vision of the divine essence.	
2. Opinio contraria præcedenti.	70	10. Secunda opinio est Cajetani, qui docet, relationes pertinere ad objectum primarium et essenziale nostræ beatitudinis, ita ut sine illis non intelligatur sufficiens divina essentia ad beandum. Probatur primo, quia Deus est objectum nostræ beatitudinis, ut in se est, juxta illud: <i>Videbimus eum sicuti est, sed Deus sicut est, dicit divinam naturam ut existentem in</i>	70R	10. The second opinion is Cajetan's. He teaches that the relations pertain to the primary and essential object of our happiness such that the divine essence cannot be understood to make one happy without them. It is proven, first, from the fact that God is the object of our happiness as he is in himself according to [1 John 3:2]: 'We will see him as he is'. But God 'as he is' expresses the divine nature as existing in three persons. Therefore, unless he is seen in that way, he is not seen as he is. Therefore, he is not seen in such a way that he can make one happy. I explain this example as follows: if happiness consisted in seeing the humanity of Christ as it now is in the nature of things, someone who saw the humanity but did not see its union would so far not see him as making one happy. Secondly, from the fact that with respect to divine happiness the relations are included in the happy-making object, since God cannot be comprehended unless he is cognized as including the relations. Therefore, the same will be true with respect to our happiness, which is a participation in the divine happiness. Thirdly, from the fact that if there were only one person in God, his nature itself without the person would not be the happy-making object. For just as God rather than deity is properly the first principle and the creator (if they are said of deity it is on account of highest identity with God), so also the ultimate end is properly God, as such, and not deity except on account of identity. God, moreover, expresses a person. Therefore, in the same way God without the persons is not now the object of happiness. The consequence is evident because the essence now is no less identical to the three persons than if it were only one person. Finally, there is Cajetan's argumentation from the fact that the human mind would not rest from seeing the divine nature without seeing the persons. This is both because someone who sees some nature but does not see in what it is supposed works disturbed until he sees in what way it is and also because the mystery of the Trinity is the greatest [mystery] and what	The second opinion is the contrary of the former one. It is proven, first.
Suadetur 1.					
Declaratur.	75	tribus personis: ergo nisi ita videatur, non videtur sicuti est: ergo non ita videtur ut possit beatificare. Quod exemplo ita declaro: nam si beatitudo consisteret in videnda Christi humanitate, sicut nunc est in rerum natura, qui videret illam, et non videret unionem ejus, adhuc illam non videret ut beatem. Secundo, quia respectu divinæ beatitudinis relationes includuntur in objecto beatificante, quia non <54> potest comprehendere Deum, quin cognoscatur ut includens relationes: ergo idem erit respectu nostræ beatitudinis, quæ est participatio divina. Tertio, quia, si in Deo tantum esset una persona, non esset	75R		It is explained.
Suadetur 2.	80	objectum beatificans natura ipsa sine persona, sicut enim proprie non est primum principium, et creator deitas, sed Deus (nam si hæc dicuntur de deitate, est propter summam identitatem cum Deo), ita proprie ultimus finis est Deus, ut sic, et non deitas, nisi propter identitatem: Deus autem dicit personam: ergo eodem modo nunc non est Deus beatitudinis objectum sine personis. Patet consequentia, quia non est minus idem nunc essentia cum tribus personis, quam si esset tantum una. Tandem est argumentatio Cajetani, quia visa divina natura, et non visis personis, non quiesceret mens hominis: tum quia, qui videt aliquam naturam, et non videt in quo supposito sit, inquietudine laborat, donec videat quomodo sit: tum etiam, quia mysterium Trinitatis est maximum, et quod potissimum declarat eminentiam divinæ naturæ: ergo non viso	80R		It is proven, secondly.
Suadetur 3.	85		85R		It is proven, thirdly.
Suadetur 4. ex Caiet.	90		90R		
	95		95R		It is proven, fourthly, from Cajetan.

96 inquietudine] in quietudine A.

		illo, non potest mens humana satiari.	100R	especially shows the eminence of the divine nature. As a result, the human mind cannot be satisfied without seeing it.	
1. Autoris assertio.	100	11. Inter has sententias media via tenenda est, et primo absolute et simpliciter dicendum, Deum trinum et unum esse primarium, et adæquatum objectum nostræ beatitudinis. Probat		11. A middle way between these views should be held. First, it should be said absolutely and strictly speaking that God as three and one is the primary and adequate object of our happiness. It is proven, first, from Cajetan's arguments, which at least convince one of this. And the saints' common way of speaking (to which we will return below when dealing with the beatific vision) favours it, especially when explaining the passage from [1] John 3 ('We will see him . . .'). The Council of Florence when tacitly explaining this passage in <i>Litt. union.</i> says that the fully purged souls of the saints intellectually see God three and one as he is with clarity. Secondly, from the fact that God as three and one is absolutely our first principle in whose image we were made. Therefore, he is also our ultimate end. Therefore, the object of our happiness. For happiness, as I said, consists in the attainment of the ultimate end and the greatest perfection of human nature is that it be directed to its first principle and that it rest in it. And it is confirmed: for the Trinity alone is worshiped by us with one supreme adoration and is loved beyond all other things with one love of infused charity. It is, therefore, the adequate object of our highest love. Therefore, also of our happiness. This will become more evident from the following [section].	The first assertion of the author.
Prima probatio.		batatur primo rationibus Cajetani, quæ hoc saltem persuadent, et favet communis modus loquendi Sanctorum, quos infra referemus agentes de visione beatifica: et præsertim exponentes illud Joannis 3: <i>Videbimus eum</i> , etc., quod tacite exponens Concilium Florentinum, in <i>Litt. union.</i> , dicit Sanctorum animas plene purgatas, intueri clare Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est. Secundo, quia Deus trinus et unus absolute est primum principium nostrum, ad cujus imaginem facti sumus: ergo est et ultimus finis noster: ergo objectum beatitudinis nostræ: nam beatitudo, ut dixi, consistit in consecutione ultimi finis, et magna perfectio humanæ naturæ est, quod ad suum primum principium convertatur, et in illo quiescat. Et confirmatur, nam sola Trinitas una suprema adoratione a nobis colitur, et uno amore charitatis infusæ super omnia diligitur. Est ergo adæquatum objectum nostræ supremæ dilectionis: ergo et beatitudinis nostræ, et hoc magis constabit ex sequenti.	105R 110R 115R 120R		The first proof.
Secunda.					The second.
Confirm.					It is confirmed.
2. Assertio.	120	12. Dico secundo: In hoc objecto essentia est propria ratio formalis essentialis, ac de se sufficiens ad nostram beatitudinem: relationes vero etiam concurrunt tanquam intrinsece <col. b> pertinentes ad substantialem quamdam, seu personalem constitutionem illius objecti. Declaratur in hunc modum: nam Deus est objectum nostræ beatitudinis: ergo eo modo pertinebit ad objectum nostræ beatitudinis, quo pertinuerit ad constitutionem ipsius Dei: relationes autem, ut sic, non sunt de conceptu essentiali Dei, sed sola divinitas; pertinent tamen intrinsece ad constitutionem personalem Dei, seu ut natura divina modo sibi connaturali eminentissimo subsistat: ergo eodem modo tam divinitas, quam relationes pertinebunt ad objectum beatitudinis nostræ. Unde in hoc est magna differentia inter relationes, et creaturas posibles, nam	125R 130R 135R	12. I say secondly: In this object essence is the proper formal essential <i>ratio</i> that is of itself sufficient for our happiness. But relations also concur as intrinsically belonging to a kind of substantial or personal constitution of that object. This is explained as follows: since God is the object of our happiness, something will pertain to the object of our happiness in that way in which it pertained to the constitution of God himself. Relations as such, however, are not part of the essential concept of God; only divinity is. Nevertheless, they do belong intrinsically to the personal constitution of God or as the divine nature subsists with it in a connatural and most eminent way. Therefore, relations will belong to the object of our happiness in the same way as divinity does. Hence, there is in this a great difference between relations and possible creatures, for although we grant that creatures are in some way necessarily seen once [God's] essence has been seen, they	The second assertion.
Declaratur seu probatur assertio.					The assertion is explained or proven.

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125–126 pertinuerit] pertinebit V.



135	licet demus creaturas aliquo modo videri necessario visa essentia, tamen solum videntur ut effectus eminenter contenti in causa, seu ut objectum omnipotentiae divinae, atque adeo, ut quid extrinsecum Deo, terminans habitudinem quamdam transcendentalem divinae omnipotentiae, relationes vero ut intrinsecae ipsi Deo, et pertinentes aliquo modo ad constitutionem ipsius, saltem in esse personali; et ideo licet non sint de formali et essentiali conceptu hujus objecti, ut beatificantis, includuntur tamen in illo intrinsece, ac substantialiter. Et confirmatur illo argumento, quod finis ultimus respicit primum principium; quamvis autem Deus trinus et unus absolute sit primum principium nostrum, tamen formalis ratio, ac per se necessaria, ac sufficiens ut sit primum principium, est divinitas: relationes vero solum concurrunt, ut rationes subsistendi, quando de facto divinitas consistit in tribus, qui sunt primum principium: ergo eodem modo loquendum est de ultimo fine, et objecto beatitudinis. Et hanc sententiam sic expositam sumo ex D. Thoma 2, 2, quaest. 2, art. 8, argum. 3, cum solutione.	140R	are, nevertheless, only seen as effects eminently contained in cause or as an object of divine omnipotence and therefore as something extrinsic to God that terminates a kind of transcendental relation of divine omnipotence. But relations [are seen] as intrinsic to God himself and as belonging in some way to his constitution, at least to his constitution as a personal being. And, therefore, although they do not belong to the formal and essential concept of this object as a happy-making object, they are, nevertheless, intrinsically and substantially included in it. And it confirmed by the argument from the fact that the ultimate end looks back to the first principle. Moreover, although God three and one is absolutely our first principle, still, the formal <i>ratio</i> that is <i>per se</i> necessary and sufficient to be the first principle is divinity. Relations, however, only concur as subsisting <i>rationes</i> , since divinity in fact consists in three things which are the first principle. Therefore, we should speak in the same way about the ultimate end and the object of happiness. And I take this view explained in this way from St. Thomas IIaIIae.2.8 arg. 3 with its solution.	It is confirmed.
Confirm.		145R		
145		150R	13. In response, therefore, to the foundations of Scotus insofar as they can be contrary to the first conclusion, I respond to the first one that the eternal Father is happy by seeing himself and the divine persons and divinity in the sense that I just explained. Nor does it thereby follow that he receives happiness from the persons, since divinity is sufficient for him to be happy. Nevertheless, because this divinity as a result of its infinity is in fact also in the other persons, it belongs in its way to the happiness of the Father so that he sees them and his essence in them, which he does not receive from the other persons but also holds in himself. Hence, in response to the second proof, we deny that the relations concur through the mode of species to that cognition in our way of understanding. Rather, the essence alone is in itself a sufficient <i>ratio</i> for that vision, for the entire [essence] concurs in itself by reason of being even as terminated in the persons. But in response to the third proof, the assumption is denied. For in no sign, properly speaking, is the Father happy by vision of divinity without vision of the persons. For priority of origin in reality is not priority in which ( <i>in quo</i> ) but priority from which ( <i>a quo</i> ). Hence, that the Father is said	In response to the first foundation in n. 9, its first proof is refuted.
Ad 1. fundam. in n. 9. diluitur eius 1. probatio.	13. Ad fundamenta Scoti ergo quatenus fieri possunt contra primam conclusionem respondetur ad primum aeternum Patrem esse beatum videndo seipsum, et divinas personas, et divinitatem sensu a nobis explicato. Nec inde fit quod accipiat beatitudinem a personis, quia divinitas est illi sufficiens ad beatitudinem suam; tamen quia haec divinitas ex infinitate sua de facto est in aliis etiam personis, pertinet suo modo ad beatitudinem Patris ut illas videat, et suam essentiam in illis, quod non accipit ab aliis, sed ex se etiam hoc habet. Unde ad secundam probationem negamus relationes nostro modo intelligendi concurrere per modum speciei ad illam cognitionem, sed sola essentia est per se sufficiens ratio illius visionis, nam tota per se concurrat ratione entis etiam ut terminatur ad personas. Ad tertiam vero probationem negatur assumptum, quia Pater in nullo signo, proprie loquendo, est beatus visione divinitatis, et non personarum. Nam prioritas originis in re non est prioritas in quo, sed a quo. Unde quod Pater dicatur prius origine beatus, quam Filius, vel Spiritus sanctus non sig-	155R		The second proof is refuted.
Diluitur secunda.		160R		
Diluitur tertia.		165R		The third proof is refuted.
165		170R		

Ad 2. fundam. in eodem n. 9.	<p>170 nificat in aliquo priori esse beatum, sed solum quod Pater habet ex se sine origine quod sit beatus, Filius autem habet a Patre: et ideo sicut Pater non prius est quam Filius, juxta illud Athanasii: <i>In hac Trinitate nihil prius, aut posterius</i>, ita nec prius est beatus visione sui, quam visione Filii. Ad secundum fundamentum 175 negatur assumptum, non enim potest videri essentia sine per- sonis: deinde licet demus videri essentiam sine personis, con- cedo esse sufficientem ad beatificandum, quia revera est ens infinite simpliciter, et ex vi sui conceptus essentialis, non solum est deitas, sed Deus, ut alias probatum est in materia de 180 Incarnatione: Deus autem est sufficiens objectum beatificans. Nihilominus tamen de facto, quia hic Deus existit in tribus personis, quæ pertinent ad intrinsecam, et personalem con- stitutionem ejus, ideo quælibet illarum personarum, et omnes simul, pertinent ad objectum, quod de facto beatificat.</p>	175R 180R 185R	<p>to be happy before the Son or the Holy Spirit by priority of origin does not indicate that he is happy in something prior but only that the Father has from himself without origin the fact that he is happy. The Son, however, has it from the Father. And for this reason just as the Father is not prior to the Son—according to Athanasius’s statment: ‘nothing is prior or posterior in this Trinity’—so also his being happy by vision of himself is not prior to his being happy by vision of the Son. In response to the second foundation, the assumption is denied, for the essence cannot be seen without the persons. Furthermore, although I grant that the essence be seen without the persons, I concede that it is sufficient for making one happy, since it is in really infinite being strictly speaking and by the force of its essential concept it is only deity but also God, as is proven elsewhere in the material on the Incarnation. God, however, is the sufficient happy-making object. But, nevertheless, in fact, because this God exists in three persons which belong to his intrinsic and personal constitution, it follows that whichever of these persons you please and all simultaneously belong to the object that in fact makes one happy.</p>	In response to the second foundation in the same n. 9.
Ad 1. arg. in num. 10.	<p>185 14. Ad argumenta vero Cajetani quatenus fieri possunt ex parte contra secundam conclusionem, respondetur ad pri- mum solum probare quod de facto erimus beati videndo Deum trinum et unum, non tamen quod essentia, et relationes æque pertineant ad rationem illius objecti. Secundum etiam argu- mentum ad summum idem probat, quanquam in rigore non sit efficax, tum quia idem argumentum fieri potest de crea- 190 turis, quas Deus necessario cognoscit comprehendendo seip- sum: tum etiam quia nostra beatitudo non est comprehen- sio Dei. Ad tertium respondetur, non esse similem rationem; nam quidquid sit de identitate, tamen si intelligeremus in Deo 195 tantum esse unam personam, subsistentia personalis illius per- sonæ esset de essentiali conceptu Dei, nam esset perfectio ab- soluta: at vero nunc relationes personales quamvis sint unum cum essentia, non sunt tamen de conceptu essentiali ejus, ut ex materia de Trinitate suppono. Ad ultimum de appetitu respon- 200 detur, si per impossibile aliquis videret hunc Deum, non vi- dendo personas, illum debere manere quietum, et satiatum tam in intellectu, quia videret objectum formaliter, vel eminenter continens &lt;col. b&gt; illam perfectionem, et omnem veritatem:</p>	190R 195R 200R 205R	<p>14. But with respect to the arguments of Cajetan insofar as they can be contrary in part to the second conclusion, I respond to the first argument that it only shows that we will in fact be happy by seeing God three and one but, for all that, it does not show that the essence and the relations equally belong to the <i>ratio</i> of that object. The second argument also at most proves the same thing, although technically it does not work, both because the same argumnet can be made about creatures which God necessarily cognizes in comprehending himself and also because our happiness is not a comprehension of God. To the third, I respond that it is not an analogous argument, for whatever may be the case concerning identity, even if we were to understand there to be only one person in God, the personal subsistence of that person would be part of the essential concept of God. For it would be absolute perfection. But now, on the other hand, the personal relations are not part of his essential concept, although they are one with the essence, as I assume from the material on the Trinity. To the last arugment, concerning desire, I respond that if, <i>per impossibile</i>, someone were to see this God without seeing the persons, he ought to remain at rest and satisfied both in intellect (since he sees the object that formally or eminently contains that perfection and every truth) and in will (since</p>	Against the first argument in n. 10. Against the second. Against the third. Against the fourth

205 tam in voluntate, quia frueretur simpliciter summo bono; unde  
solum differret ab alio, qui videret Trinitatem, sicut minus beatus, a magis beato. Unde sicut nunc ille qui minus beatus est, 210R  
satiatus est, quamvis alius melius videat, ita dicendum esset in  
illo casu, qui tamen propter alias causas impossibilis est.

## PUNCTUM III.

*An pertineant ideæ, vel actus liberi Dei.*

Circa 3. punctum  
notatio 1.

5 15. In tertio puncto in principio hujus quæstionis proposito  
multa dici poterant, tamen quia attingunt materiam de modo,  
quo videntur creaturæ in Verbo per visionem beatam, ea nunc 5R  
prætermitto: solum sunt breviter adnotanda duo. Primum est,  
in rationibus, seu ideis creaturarum, quæ sunt in divina essen-  
tia, aliud esse considerare id, quod est in ipso Deo formaliter,  
sive illud sit eminentissima illa perfectio, in qua eminenter  
10 continentur omnes perfectiones creaturarum, sive sit infinita  
scientia, in qua intelliguntur esse exemplaria rerum omnium.  
Aliud vero esse considerare creaturas ipsas, quæ in Deo con-  
tinentur tanquam in causa prima efficienti et exemplari: nam  
15 primum horum pertinet ad intrinsecam et essentialem perfec-  
tionem Dei: secundum vero est extrinsecum ipsi Deo. Unde fit  
ut ad objectum beatitudinis pertineat omnis illa perfectio divi-  
na, in qua continentur rationes creaturarum, et perfectiones  
earum, quia tota illa perfectio est formaliter in Deo, et est  
20 essentialis illis; dictum est autem Deum secundum totam es-  
sentiam suam esse objectum beatitudinis nostræ. Nihilominus  
tamen creaturæ ipsæ, quæ continentur eminenter in Deo, vel  
in ideis divinis repræsentantur, per se non pertinent ad objec-  
tum beatitudinis secundum suam propriam, et formalem per-  
fectionem, ac rationem: quia ut sic, sunt simpliciter objecta  
25 creata. An vero, et quomodo cognosci possit illa perfectio, et  
videri clare et infinita scientia ejus et potentia, non visis crea-  
turis, dictum est disputando de perfectione visionis beatæ.

16. Secundo notandum est fere simili modo dicendum esse

7 ideis] in eis V.

Notatio 2.

he enjoys strictly speaking the highest good). Hence, he only differs  
from someone else who sees the Trinity as someone who is less happy  
from someone who is more happy. Hence, just as now one who is less  
happy is satisfied even though someone else sees something better, so  
one should say the same thing in the former case (which, however, is an  
impossible case for other reasons).

## POINT III.

*Whether ideas or the free acts of God pertain to the object of happiness.*

15. Many things could be said about the third point raised at the begin-  
ning of this question. But since they touch on the subject about the way  
in which creatures seem [to be] in the Word through the happy vision, 5R  
I pass over them for now. Only two things should be noted briefly.  
The first is that when it comes to the notions or ideas of creatures that  
are in the divine essence, it is one thing to consider that which is in  
God himself formally, which is either that most eminent perfection in  
10 which all the perfections of creatures are contained eminently or the  
infinite knowledge in which the exemplars of all things are understood  
to be. But it is another thing to consider the creatures themselves that  
are contained in God as in a first efficient cause and exemplar. For the  
15 first of these pertains to the intrinsic and essential perfection of God,  
but the second is extrinsic to God himself. As a result, it is the case that  
all those divine perfections in which the natures of creatures and their  
perfections are contained pertains to the object of happiness, because  
that whole perfection is formally in God and is essential to him. It was  
20 said, moreover, that God is the object of our happiness according to  
his whole essence. But, nevertheless, the creatures themselves that are  
contained eminently in God or that are represented in the divine ideas  
do not in themselves pertain the object of happiness according to its  
proper and formal perfection and *ratio*. For, as such, there are, strictly  
speaking, created objects. But whether and in what way that perfection  
25 can be cognized and both its infinite knowledge and power be clearly  
seen without seeing the creatures was stated when disputing about the  
perfection of the happy vision.

16. Secondly, it should be noted that one should say almost the

The first note  
about the third  
point.

30 circa actus liberos voluntatis divinæ: aliud est enim considerare  
 in Deo actum voluntatis quo vult se, et alia a se: aliud est con-  
 siderare illum eundem actum prout libere terminatum ad hoc, 30R  
 vel illud objectum creatum. Primum necessario convenit ipsi  
 Deo, nam sicut est suum esse, et suum <56> intelligere, ita  
 est suum amare: unde perfectio illius actus, absoluta est et es-  
 35 sentialis Deo, et ideo per se pertinet ad objectum beatitudinis  
 nostræ, ut patet ex principio supra posito: at vero secundum  
 omnino est extra rationem, et perfectionem divinæ essentiæ:  
 quamvis enim Deus nihil extra se libere vellet, æque perfectus  
 essentialiter maneret, et in se summe beatus, et sufficiens ad be-  
 40 atificandum alios: unde illa libera determinatio actus divini ad  
 objecta creata, si aliquid ei addit, non pertinet ad necessariam,  
 et essentialem perfectionem ejus: vel quod verius est, nullam  
 rationem, aut perfectionem realem illi addit, sed solum connotat  
 extrinsecum objectum, et relationem rationis ad illud, ut  
 45 tractatur 1 p., quæstion. 19, et late exposui in disp. 30 Meta-  
 physicæ, sect. 9. Unde fit quod licet ad objectum beatitudinis  
 pertineat videre illum actum divinæ voluntatis prout in se nec-  
 essario est, ac de se sufficiens, ut sine sui mutatione terminetur  
 libere ad extrinseca objecta: tamen videre in illo actualem de-  
 50 terminationem liberam non pertinet per se ad objectum beati-  
 ficum, quandoquidem hoc est extra essentiam, et perfectionem  
 Dei.

17. Ultimo posset in hac disputatione inquiri, sub qua  
 ratione Deus sit objectum beatitudinis, hactenus enim solum  
 55 explicuimus objectivam rationem, quæ nos beatificat: dicen-  
 dum ergo videbatur de ratione sub qua: quia tamen, ut supra  
 dixi, hoc involvit habitudinem ad nostras potentias, et actus,  
 quibus attingimus illud objectum, ideo melius id explicabitur  
 tractando de formali beatitudine. Tandem inquiri poterat, an  
 60 Deus sit objectum beatificum prout in se est summum bonum,  
 propter se amabile amore amicitiae, an vero ut est summum  
 bonum ipsius beati amabile amore concupiscentiae: sed hoc  
 etiam omitto, quia involvit multa, quæ postea dicenda sunt  
 de modo appetendi beatitudinem: solumque breviter suppono  
 65 ex dictis, Deum ut simpliciter est summum bonum, summe  
 amabile, omni ratione esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis: nam

Quæstiuncula de  
 ratione sub qua  
 objecti beatifici  
 remittitur.

Altera  
 quæstuncula  
 breviter  
 expeditur.

30R same thing about the free acts of the divine will: for it is one thing to  
 consider the act of will in God by which he wills himself and other  
 things after himself, but another thing to consider that same act as it  
 is freely terminated in this or that created object. The first is necessarily  
 fitting to God himself, for just as it is to be himself and to understand  
 himself, so is it to love himself. Hence, the perfection of that act is ab-  
 35 solute and essential to God and for that reason pertains in itself to the  
 object of our happiness, as is evident from the principle posited above.  
 But, on the other hand, the second is entirely outside the *ratio* and per-  
 fection of the divine essence. For even if God freely willed nothing  
 beyond himself, he would remain equally perfect in essence, happy to  
 40 the highest degree in himself, and sufficient for making others happy.  
 Hence that free determination of the divine act to a created object, if it  
 adds anything to the act, does not pertain to its necessary and essential  
 perfection. Or, what is more true, it adds no real nature or perfection to  
 it, but only connotes an extrinsic object and relation of reason to it, as  
 45 is discussed in Ia.19 and as I discussed more thoroughly in *DM XXX.9*.  
 From this it follows that although it pertains to the object of happiness  
 to see that act of the divine will insofar as it is in itself necessary and  
 of itself sufficient to be freely terminated in an extrinsic object without  
 change in itself, nevertheless, to see in it the actual free determination  
 50R does not pertain in itself to the object of happiness, since this is beyond  
 the essence and perfection of God.

17. Lastly, one can ask in this disputation under which *ratio* God  
 is the object of happiness. For so far we have only explained the objec-  
 tive *ratio* that makes us happy. It seems, therefore, that we should talk  
 55R about the *ratio* under which. Nevertheless, because, as I said above, this  
 involves a relation to our powers and acts, by which we attain that ob-  
 ject, it will therefore be better to explain this when discussing formal  
 happiness. Finally, one could ask whether God is the beatific object in-  
 sofar as he is in himself the highest good, lovable with friendship love  
 60R for his own sake, but whether as the highest good of the happy person  
 he is lovable with concupiscent love. But I also set aside this question,  
 since it involves many things about the way of desiring happiness that  
 are to be discussed later. I only suppose, briefly, from what was said that  
 God as strictly speaking being the highest good, lovable in the highest  
 65R degree, is the object of our happiness under every *ratio*. For the fact

A little question  
 about the *ratio*  
 under which of  
 the beatific object  
 is passed over.

Another little  
 question is  
 briefly explained.

quod illud objectum sit maxime amabile ipsi beato tanquam summum bonum ejus, per se notum videtur, quia nihil est amabilius homini ipsa beatitudine. Propter quod dixit Anselmus, libro de Casu diabol, cap. 4, ex commodis constare beatitudinem: et D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 7, ad 2, dicit, beatitudinem amari tanquam bonum concupitum. Quod vero Deus etiam ut objectum beatificum, sit summum bonum propter se maxime diligendum, docuit idem D. Thomas, *ibid.*, quæst. 4. Ratio etiam est <col. b> clara, quia Deus sub hac ratione etiam est finis ultimus hominis, in quem ipsa etiam hominis beatitudo referri debet. Denique, quia beatitudo est satietas amoris, et ideo satiari debet, non solum amorem concupiscentiæ, sed etiam amorem amicitiae perfectum: oportet ergo ut objectum illius sit tale bonum quod utrumque amorem satiari possit. Quomodo autem hoc faciat Deus, quando a beatis perfecte possidetur, explicabitur tractando de consecutione hujus objecti, quæ est nostra beatitudo.

that the object that is the highest good for the happy person himself is the object that is most lovable for him seems *per se notum*, since nothing is more lovable to a human being than happiness itself. For this reason Anselm said in *De casu diaboli*, cap. 4, that happiness consists of advantages. And St. Thomas in IaIIæ.1.7 ad 2 says that happiness is loved as an ardently desired good. But that God as the beatific object is also the highest good maximally lovable for his own sake the same St. Thomas teaches in the same place in question 4. And the reason is clear: because God under this *ratio* is also the ultimate end for a human being, to which the very happiness of the human being ought to be referred. Finally, because happiness is the satisfaction of love and therefore it ought to satisfy not only concupiscent love but also perfect friendship love. It must, therefore, be the case that its object be such a good that it can satisfy either kind of love. But how God does this when perfectly possessed by the happy will be explained when discussing the attainment of this object. This attainment is our happiness.