

<22, col. a><sup>2</sup>

*Utrum homo operetur propter finem in actionibus, quæ a voluntate non procedunt.*

*Whether a human being acts for the sake of an end in actions that do not proceed from the will.*

1. Diximus hactenus de actionibus voluntatis, tam elicitis, quam imperatis, et tam liberis, quam necessariis: ut ergo si  
5 completa disputatio de actibus hominis dicendum est brevis-  
sime de reliquis operationibus ejus, quæ a voluntate non pro-  
cedunt: latius enim id agimus in disp. 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 3,  
art. 18. Et primo potest esse difficultas de actibus intellectus,  
qui præveniunt voluntatem, nam illi videntur maxime proprii  
10 hominis, et valde perfecti: ergo ut sunt ab homine debent  
habere hanc perfectionem. Quod maxime urgeri solet de vi-  
sione beata: nam illa est operatio, in qua est ultimus finis: ergo  
etiam est propter finem ex D. Thoma 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1,  
ad 1. Secundo idem inquiri potest de actionibus mere natu-  
15 ralibus facultatis vegetativæ, seu animalis, ut sunt nutritio,  
motus cordis, etc., nam si alia agentia naturalia agunt propter  
finem, cur non etiam homo in his actionibus, præsertim quia  
etiam passiones involuntariæ possunt ab homine recipi propter  
finem; ergo magis actus naturalis.

2. Tertio est major difficultas de actibus appetitus tam ex  
20 ratione communi hominis quam cæterorum animalium, quia  
hic appetitus movetur ex cognitione boni; ergo ex metapho-  
rica cognitione objecti boni, in qua diximus, disp. 1, consistere  
causalitatem finis: ergo in hoc appetitu præcise, et vi sua habet  
25 locum actio propter finem, præsertim cum D. Thoma sæpe di-  
cat, bruta apprehendere rationem boni, utilis, et ab ea moveri,  
ut patet ex 1 p., quæst. 28 [sic], art. 4, ubi autem est bonum

1. We have spoken so far about actions of the will: elicited and com-  
5R manded, free and necessary. Therefore, in order for the disputation  
about the acts of a human being to be complete, something should  
be said very briefly about the remaining acts of a human, which do  
not proceed from the will (for we discuss this more widely in *DM*  
*XXIII.3.18*). And, first, there can be a difficulty about acts of the in-  
10R tellect which come before the will, for these seem to be most properly  
of a human and very perfect. Therefore, as they are from a human,  
they ought to have this perfection. This is usually especially urged in  
the case of the beatific vision. For that is the activity in which the ul-  
timate end is. Therefore, it is also for the sake of the end, according to  
St. Thomas [*ST IaIIæ.1.1 ad 1*. Secondly, the same can be asked about  
15R merely natural actions of the vegetative faculty or soul, like nutrition,  
the motion of the heart, etc. For if other natural agents act for the sake  
of an end, why not also a human being in these actions, especially since  
the involuntary passions can be accepted for the sake of an end by a  
human? Therefore, natural acts even more.

2. Thirdly, there is a greater difficulty with acts of the appetite  
20R coming from the general nature of a human being than with [acts] of  
the rest of the animals, because this appetite is moved as a result of a  
cognition of good. Therefore, as a result of metaphorical cognition of  
the good object, in which the causality of the end consists, as we said  
25R in disp. 1. Therefore, with regards to this appetite, considered apart  
from other things, and its strength, action has a place for the sake of  
the end, especially since St. Thomas often says that brute animals ap-

It is argued for  
acts of the  
intellect  
preceding will.

Likewise for acts  
of the vegetative  
soul.

It is argued,  
thirdly, for acts of  
the animal  
appetite.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Et speciatim de  
hominis appetitu.

30 utile, est ordinatio in finem. Deinde ex speciali ratione homi-  
nis, quia in eo appetitus non movetur tantum ab aestimativa,  
sed etiam a cogitativa, quæ juxta multorum opinionem discursu- 30R  
rere potest circa <col. b> particularia: ergo poterit etiam con-  
ferre medium cum fine. Quin potius aliqui existimant, quando  
intellectus confert, et cognoscit proportionem mediæ cum fine,  
35 ut cogitatio comitetur intellectum et similem collationem faci-  
at: ergo appetitus sequens hanc potentiam et formaliter, et ex  
propria ordinatione appetit unum propter aliud, et præsertim  
quia ex motione rationis sæpe appetitus fertur in id, quod vide-  
tur sensui repugnare: propter quod D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 30,  
40 art. 3, ad 3, dixit in nostro appetitu esse concupiscentiam, quæ  
est cum ratione, et 1 p., q. 81, art. 3, ad. 2, dicit in homine  
moveri appetitum a ratione universali.

Notationes pro  
decisione.  
Prima.

45 3. Advertendum est breviter, aliud esse actum procedere a  
voluntate; aliud esse volitum a voluntate: nam primum dicit  
rationem effectus et causæ, secundum vero tantum dicit rati-  
onem objecti et actus, qui circa illud fertur. Atque simili rati-  
one illud est actum fieri propter finem, aliud vero extrinsece  
ordinari in finem aliquo modo: nam primum requirit quod 50R  
ipsa mutatio sit a voluntate ut a causa operante propter finem:  
secundum vero solum requirit: ut actus ametur, seu sit voli-  
tus propter aliquem finem, licet ab ipso amante non fiat ipsa  
actio propter talem finem ex propria et intrinseca ordinatione  
ejus. Supponimus enim ultimo, sermonem esse de operatione 55R  
propter finem formaliter ac proprie ex ordinatione ipsius oper-  
antis proxime, et non tantum ex extrinseca ordinatione ip-  
sius auctoris naturæ, prout naturalia agentia operantur propter  
finem.

Assertio  
bipartita.

60 4. Dicendum est ergo, actus seu actiones omnes quæ nullo  
modo cadunt sub humanam voluntatem, esse posse propter  
finem passive, seu extrinsece, eo videlicet modo, quo actiones  
naturalium agentium sunt propter finem, non tamen active et  
intrinsece, id est, ex propria ipsius hominis ordinatione et in-  
tentione. Prior pars per se clara est, quia non est in hac parte 65R

Suadet prior  
pars.

prehend the nature of useful good and are moved by it, as is clear from  
[ST Ia.78.4, where, moreover, the useful good is ordained to the end.  
Next, from the special nature of a human being, because in him the  
appetite is moved not only by the estimative but also by the cogitative  
[faculty], which according to the opinions of many can think through  
things from one thing to another concerning particulars. Therefore,  
it will also be able to associate a means with an end. In contrast, oth-  
ers think that when the intellect associates and cognizes the relation of  
the means to the end, if the object is sensible and proportionate, it is  
necessary that a cogitation attend the intellect and make a similar asso-  
ciation. Therefore, the appetite following this power both formally and  
from a proper ordination desires one thing for the sake of another, and  
especially because the appetite is often brought by a motion of reason  
to that which seems repugnant to the sense. For this reason St. Thomas  
says in [ST IaIIæ.30.3 ad 3 that there is rational concupiscence in our  
appetite and says in [ST] Ia.81.3 ad 2 that appetite in a human being is  
moved by universal reason.

45R 3. It should be noted briefly that something else is an act proceed-  
ing from the will, something else is wished by the will. For the first ex-  
presses the nature of an effect and cause, but the second only expresses  
the nature of an object and act, which is made for the sake of the for-  
mer. And for a similar reason the former is an act that happens for the  
sake of an end, but the other is extrinsically ordered to the end in some  
way. For the first requires that the change itself is from the will as from  
a cause acting for the sake of an end. But the second only requires that  
the act is loved or is willed for the sake of some end, although from  
the one loving himself the action itself does not happen for the sake of  
such an end from its proper and intrinsic ordering. For we suppose, 55R  
lastly, that the discussion is about acting for the same of end formally  
and properly from a proximate ordering of the one acting himself and  
not only from an extrinsic ordering by the author of nature, as natural  
agents act for the sake of an end.

60R 4. It should be said, therefore, that all acts or actions which in no  
way fall under human will can be for the sake of an end passively or  
extrinsically, namely, in that way in which the actions of natural agents  
are for the sake of an end, but not actively and intrinsically, that is, from  
a proper ordering intention of the human being himself. The first part  
is clear *per se*, because a human being is in no worse of a condition with 65R

And especially  
for the appetite  
of a human.

Notes towards a  
decision.  
First.

Second.

Third.

A two-part  
assertion.

The first part is  
urged.

Suadet posterior.	<p>65 homo deterioris conditionis, quam alia naturalia agentia; nam in his actibus etiam operatur ex impetu naturæ, et tendit in scopum ab auctore naturæ destinatum; et hoc probant rationes dubitandi in num. 5, positæ, ut dicemus. Posterior autem pars facile probatur ex his dictis, quia motio finis propria est voluntatis, cujus finis est objectum, unde tendere in finem per proprium actum, atque alia ordinare in finem, ad voluntatem spectat: ergo, secluso omni actu voluntatis, non potest esse actus propter finem ex propria, et intrinseca ordinatione operantis. Ex quo fit, si actus sit a voluntate ut a causa eliciente, vel operante, tunc posse fieri, et esse proprie propter finem; sicut dictum est in præcedentibus. Si autem non sit a voluntate, ut a causa, sit tamen voluntarius saltem objective, tunc non fiet proprie propter finem, quia non fit ex motione voluntatis; potest tamen ordinari ad aliquem finem, quia hoc ipso quod voluntas vult aliquem actum, propter aliquem finem illum vult: et hoc est ordinare illum in aliquem finem, quæ ordinatio licet physice nihil ponat in ipso actu, potest tamen ad moralem valorem conferre: sic enim passiones, quæ non fiunt a voluntate, si per voluntatem acceptentur, et ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis referantur, possunt ad hunc effectum habere aliquem moralem valorem.</p>	70R	<p>respect to this than other natural agents. For in these actions he also acts from the impetus of nature and tends to the target having been destined by the author of nature. And the arguments for doubting posited in n. 5 show this, as we will say. The latter part, moreover, is easily shown from these statements, because the motion of an end is properly of the will, of which the end is the object. Hence, it tends to the end through a proper act and orders others to the end as it looks to the will. Therefore, excluding all acts of the will, there cannot be an act for the sake of an end from a proper and intrinsic ordering of the one acting.</p>	The latter part is urged.
Ad argum. de actibus intellectus in num. 1.	<p>75 5. Ex his facilis est responsio ad rationes dubitandi in principio positas. Ad primam enim respondetur, visionem Dei (et idem est de omni actu naturali intellectus, ut antecedit omnem actum voluntatis), non esse propter finem ut est ab ipso nomine: quia solum est quasi ex impetu naturæ, unde potius est finis, quam propter finem, licet ut est affectio sui objecti haberet illum pro fine, prout ex naturali sua inclinatione; at vero eo modo, quo illa actio potest esse voluntaria, potest ordinari in finem, sic enim potest beatus velle videre Deum in gloriam ipsius Dei; vel etiam in suum commodum, ut illa visione consequatur suum summum bonum.</p>	75R	<p>From which it happens that if the act is from the will as from an eliciting or acting cause, then it can happen and be properly for the sake of an end, just as was said in the preceding [passages]. But if it is not from the will as from a cause, yet is at least objectively voluntary, then it will not properly happen for the sake of an end, because it does not happen from a motion of the will. Nevertheless, it can be ordered to some end, because by the fact that the will wishes some act it wishes it for the sake of some end and this is to order that to some end. Although this ordination physically places nothing in that act, nevertheless it can confer moral value. For thus the passions, which are not made by the will, if they are accepted through the will and are directed to satisfaction for sins, can hold some moral value for this effect.</p>	To the argument about acts of the intellect in n. 1.
Ad argum. de actibus animæ vegetat. <i>ibid.</i>	<p>80 Ad secundum jam est responsum, quomodo inferiores naturales actiones, vel passiones sint propter finem, vel possint aliquo modo ordinari in finem.</p>	80R	<p>5. From these things a response to the arguments posited in the beginning is easy. For to the first is responded that the vision of God (and the same for all natural acts of the intellect as the precede every act of the will) is not for the sake of an end as it is from the name itself, because it is only as if from the impetus of nature. Hence it is more an end that for the sake of an end, although insofar as it is an affection for its object, it may have that for the end as from its natural inclination. But on the other had, by that way by which that action can be voluntary, it can be ordered to an end. For in that way the blessed person can wish to see God in the glory of God himself or also according to his advantage, as that vision attends his highest good.</p>	To the argument about acts of the vegetative soul in n. 1.
Ad 3. de actibus appetitus in num. 2.	<p>85 6. Ad tertium, quod ad bruta attinet, dicendum est, inveniri in illis quamdam imperfectam participationem causal-</p>	85R	<p>To the second argument was already responded how lower natural actions or passions are for the sake of an end or how in some way they are ordered to an end.</p> <p>6. To the third [argument] which concerns brute animals it should be said that there is found in these a certain imperfect participation in</p>	To the third argument concerning acts of the appetite in n. 2.

tatis finis, quatenus ab objecte apprehenso excitantur, ut per appetitum elicited in illum tendant, et illum prosequantur, aut ab illo fugiant: nam cum causalitas finis consistat in motione voluntatis, quæ est appetitus elicited, quantum participant de hoc appetitu et motione, tantum necesse est participant de causalitate finis. Nihilominus, absolute loquendo, non operantur formaliter propter finem, quia solum moventur a fine materialiter, ut docet D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 2, et melius quæst. 6, <col. b> art. 2, et potest in hunc modum explicari. Nam quoad actiones, quæ versantur circa media, quibus acquiritur finis, bruta non agnoscunt proportionem mediorum cum fine, nec unum cum alio conferre possunt, atque adeo hoc modo operantur propter finem; quoad eas vero actiones, quæ versantur circa finem, non cognoscunt in ipso fine propriam convenientiam sub qua movet, et propter quam est per se appetibilis, quia hoc etiam requirit collationem talis objecti cum natura, et perfectam cognitionem illius; et ita quamvis materialiter tendant in rem sibi propositam, tamen non proprie operantur circa illam propter finem. Unde quando D. Thomas significat bruta apprehendere utilitatem, vel convenientiam, aut disconvenientiam cum propria natura, non est intelligendus, quia formaliter cognoscatur a brutis, sed tantum materialiter ex instinctu naturæ, quia videlicet apprehenso objecto statim ex instinctu naturæ apprehendant esse prosequendum vel fugiendum. Et hoc significat D. Thomas, loco citato, cum ait: *Apprehendere has intentiones naturæ quodam instinctu*. Cujus signum est, quia eodem impetu, et modo tendunt in id, quod est medium, et in id, quod est finis, quia utrumque apprehendunt ut prosequendum, et in neutro apprehendunt distincte rationem, propter quam prosequendum sit, qua de re latius in disputatione 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 10.

7. Ad aliam partem de appetitu hominis respondetur, longam esse disputationem quid possit cogitativa hominis cognoscere, et operari, quæ non est hoc loco tractanda. Ego vero probabilius existimo non posse hanc potentiam tam proprie

Ad aliud de speciali appetitu hominis, in eod. *num.* 2.

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the causality of the end, to the extent that they are excited by the object having been apprehended, so that they tend to it through an elicited desire and either pursue it or flee from it. For since the causality of the end consists in a motion of the will, which is the elicited appetite, insofar as they participate in this appetite and motion, it is also necessary that they participate in the causality of the end.

Nevertheless, absolutely speaking, they do not formally act for the sake of an end, because they are only moved by the material end, as St. Thomas teaches in [ST] IaIIæ.1.2 and better in 6.2. And it can be explained in this way. For regarding actions which turn concerning the means by which the end is acquired, brute animals do not recognize the relation of means to an end nor can they compare one with another and therefore they act for the sake of an end in this way. But regarding those actions which turn concerning the end, they do not cognize in the end itself a proper agreeability under which it moves and for the sake of which it is desirable *per se*, because this also requires a comparison of such an object with nature and its perfect cognition. And so although they tend materially to the thing having been placed before them, nevertheless, they do not properly act concerning it for the sake of an end. Hence, when St. Thomas indicates that brute animals apprehend utility or agreeability or disagreeability with proper nature, it should not be understood as being formally cognized by brute animals but only materially by an instinct of nature, because, namely, by the object having been apprehended they apprehend immediately by an instinct of nature that it is to be pursued or avoided. And St. Thomas indicates this in the cited place when he says: ‘to apprehend these intentions of nature by a certain instinct’.<sup>3</sup> It is a sign of this that by the same impetus and in the same way they tend to that which is the means as to that which is the end, because they apprehend both as something to be pursued and they apprehend in neither a distinct reason for the sake of which it should be pursued. We say more about this in *DM XXIII.10*.

7. To the other part about the appetite of a human being, I respond that it would be a long disputation about what a the cogitative [faculty] of a human being can cognize and do. It should not be discussed in this place. But I do consider it more probable that this power cannot

To the other part about a special appetite of a human being in the same n. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Ia.78.4 co.? It reads: ‘Sed quantum ad intentiones prædictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem’.

discurrere, nec etiam componere, aut dividere: et multo certius est non posse res universales cognoscere. Certum item est, appetitum sensitivum hominis non posse immediate moveri a ratione, sed solum mediante cogitativa, seu imaginatione particulari, ut D. Thomas explicuit, loco citato: et ideo etiam censeo hunc appetitum per se sumptum, et quatenus se movet, non vero ut movetur a voluntate, non posse proprie operari propter finem, quia sensus non potest conferre inter media, quæ posset hic appetitus eligere, et ita aliquam propriam libertatem habere, præsertim circa objecta posita ut æqualia, quod falsum est, ut infra suo loco latius dicemus. Solum ergo superat hic appetitus appetitum brutorum, quia potest interdum moveri ex motione appetitus superioris, et ideo non tantum movetur instinctu naturæ, sed aliquo etiam modo ex directione rationis, in qua magis se habet ut motus, quam se moveat, et ideo sub hac ratione non dicitur proprie operari propter finem ex præcisa virtute sua, sed præcedente aliqua ratione voluntatis.

properly go from one thing to another in thought in such a way, nor even compose and divide. And it is much more certain that it cannot cognize universal things. It is likewise certain that the sensitive appetite of a human being cannot immediately be moved by reason, but only by means of the cogitative [faculty] or a particular image, as St. Thomas explained in the cited place. And therefore I also think that this appetite considered *per se* and to the extent that it moves itself (but not as it is moved by the will) cannot properly act for the sake of an end, because sense cannot compare the means which this appetite can elect and so it has some proper freedom, particularly concerning objects presented as equal, which is false, as we will discuss more widely in its place.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, only this appetite surpasses the appetite of brute animals, because it can sometimes be moved by the motion of a superior appetite and therefore is not moved only by the instinct of nature, but also in some way by the direction of reason, in which case it holds itself more as one moved than as moving itself. And therefore under this reason it cannot properly act for the sake of an end by its power apart from others but from some preceding reason of the will.

<sup>4</sup>Which part does Suárez take to be false?