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SECTIO II.

*Utrum causalitas finis in voluntate nostra sit tantum respectu
mediorum, vel etiam respectu ipsius finis.*

1. Explicata motione causæ finalis in voluntate nostra, super-
est explicandum, quotuplex sit hæc motio, et circa quos actus
versetur: nam inde constabit qui sint effectus finis: supponimus
autem in genere quosdam actus voluntatis versari circa finem
ipsum <col. b> amando vel intendendo illum, vel fruendo illo;
alios vero circa media, quæ propter finem eliguntur. Est ergo
quorundam sententia, causalitatem finis solum exerceri circa
media, quæ propter finem appetuntur atque adeo motionem
voluntatis ad appetendum finem propter se ipsum non esse, nec
pertinere ad causalitatem finis, sed solum eam motionem, qua
eligit media, vel eis utitur propter finem. Ita Gabriel, in 2, d. 1,
q. 5, a. 1, et Gregorius, in 1, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, et Medina, 1, 2,
q. 8, in principio, et idem sentit Hervæus, quodlibet 1, q. 8, et
quodlibet 2, quæst. 1, quatenus dicit rationem finis consistere
in hoc, quod facit media esse amabilia propter ipsum: in quo
magis explicat aptitudinem quam actum. Potest autem hæc sen-
tentia probari ex Aristotele 2, Physic., cap. 3, et 5 Metaphysicæ,
cap. 2, dicente finem esse *cujus gratia aliquid fit*: nam in hac def-
initione aperte explicat habitudinem medii ad finem. Unde 3,
Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, inquit: *Omne, quod, per se et propter nat-
uram ipsius, bonum est, finis est, atque ita causat*, quoniam *illius
gratia cætera fiunt*: in quibus verbis significat, illam rem esse
finem, quæ per se bona est et amabilis: et hanc conditionem

1. Sententia
Gabrielis, &
aliorum.

Arguitur pro illa
ex Arist.

SECTION II.

*Whether the causality of an end in our will is only with respect to means or
also with respect to the end itself.*

1. Having explained the motion of the final cause in our will, it remains
to explain how many kinds of this motion there are and with which acts
it is concerned. For by doing so it will become clear what the effects
of the end are. We assume in general that certain acts of the will are
concerned with the end itself by loving, intending, or enjoying it, but
others are concerned with means that are elected for the sake of the end.
There is, therefore, the view of some that the causality of the end is
exercised only concerning means that are desired for the sake of the end,
for which reason the motion of the will in desiring the end for its own
sake is not nor does it pertain to the causality of the end. Rather, only
that motion by which it elects means or uses them is for the sake of the
end. Gabriel in II, dist. 1, q. 5, a. 1, Gregory in I, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2,
and Medina in IaIIæ.8, in the beginning, [say] this. Hervæus thinks the
same thing in *Quodlibet* 1, q. 8, and 2, q. 1, insofar as he says that the
nature of the end consists in its making means lovable for its sake, by
which he explains the aptitude more than the act. Moreover, this view
can be proven from Aristotle, *Phys.* II, cap. 3, and *Metaph.* V, cap. 2,
saying that the end is ‘that for the sake of which something happens’.
For in this definition he obviously explains the relation of means to an
end. Hence, in *Metaph.* III, cap. 2, he says: ‘Everything which is good in
itself and on account of its own nature is an end and causes in that way’,
because, ‘the other things come about for its sake’. He indicates with
these words that that thing is an end which is in itself good and lovable.

The first view of
Gabriel and
others.

It is argued for
this view from
Aristotle.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Confirmatur 1.	30	supponit requiri ante causalitatem finis, hanc vero causalitatem in hoc consistere, quod hujus rei gratia aliquid fiat ratione prædicta. Confirmari hoc potest, quia finis dicit essentialiter habitudinem ad media, ut ex ipsa vocis proprietate constat; nam finis idem est quod extremum; ubi autem non est medium, nec extremum esse potest: ergo causalitas finis proprie non exercetur nisi circa media. Et confirmatur, nam Deus licet se ipso sit beatus, et se propter se amet, et in se ipso quiescat, non est proprie finis sui ipsius, quia non tendit per aliquod medium ad consecutionem sui, vel suæ beatitudinis: ergo signum est causalitatem finis solum exerceri in ordinatione mediorum ad finem.	30R	And he supposes that this condition is required prior to the causality of the end. But that causality consists in something coming about for the sake of that thing for the aforementioned reason. This can be confirmed because the end essentially expresses a relation to means as is clear from the very meaning (<i>proprietate</i>) of the word, for the end is the same thing as that extreme. But where there is no mediate thing, there can be no extreme. Therefore, the causality of the end is not, strictly speaking, exercised except concerning means. And this is confirmed, for God, although he himself is happy and loves himself for his own sake and rests in himself, is not, strictly speaking, his own end, because he does not tend through some means to the attainment of himself or his own happiness. This, therefore, is a sign that the causality of the end is only exercised in the ordering of means to an end.	It is confirmed, first.
Confirmatio altera.	35		35R		It is confirmed, secondly.
2. Sententia vera.	40	2. Nihilominus dicendum est, finem exercere causalitatem suam circa voluntatem nostram, non solum ut eligentem, vel utentem mediis, sed etiam ut amantem, vel intendentem finem ipsum. Quam sententiam late tradidi, in disp. 23, <i>Metaphysicæ</i> , sect. 3, et imprimis existimo esse doctrinam divi Thomæ 1, 2, q. 1, artic. 1, ad 2, dicentis, voluntatem nostram operari propter finem, <i>etiam agenda actionem quæ est ultimus finis</i> ; non potest autem operatio esse propter finem in nostra voluntate, nisi interveniente causalitate finis. Idem constat ex loco supra citato, de <5> <i>Veritate</i> , q. 22, art. 2, ubi dicitur, influxum finis esse amari et desiderari. Idem 3, contra Gentes, c. 2, dicit finem esse id, in quo tendit impetus agentis: ergo sive tendat per electionem, sive per intentionem, ibi exercetur ratio, sive causalitas finis. Præterea Aristoteles 2, <i>Metaphysicæ</i> , c. 2, sic inquit: <i>ipsum cujus causa finis, tale autem est id, quod non est alterius gratia, sed ejus causa cætera</i> : ubi per negationem illam explicat positivam quamdam motionem, aut conditionem finis proprie ac simpliciter dictam, in qua illa negatio fundatur, scilicet ut propter se ametur seu intendatur: ergo utraque illarum actionum, seu motionum pertinet ad causalitatem finis, et quodammodo integrat rationem ejus, quinimo quod finis habeat vim ad movendum et trahendum voluntatem ad se, habet et vir-	40R	2. Nevertheless, it should be said that the end exercises its causality concerning our will not only in electing or using means but also in loving or intending the end itself. I have discussed this view more thoroughly in <i>DM XXIII</i> , sect. 3, ³ and, in particular, I think this is the teaching of St. Thomas in <i>IaIIæ</i> .1.1 ad 2 when he says that our will acts for the sake of the end ‘even when dealing with the action which is the ultimate end’. But an activity cannot be for the sake of the end in our will except by the causality of the end intervening. The same is clear from the previously cited place from <i>De Veritate</i> , q. 22, art. 2, where it is said that the influx of the end is to be loved and to be desired. Likewise, he says in <i>SCG III</i> , c. 2, that the end is that to which the impetus of the agent tends. Therefore, whether it tends through election or through intention, the nature or causality of the end is exercised there. Furthermore, Aristotle in <i>Metaph.</i> II, c. 2, says it is this way: ‘The end of which is a cause and of such a kind that it is not for the sake of another thing but is of itself the cause of the remaining things’. ⁴ Here he explains through that negation a certain positive motion or condition of the end, speaking properly and strictly, in which that negation is grounded, namely, as it is loved or intended for its own sake. Therefore, each of those actions or motions pertains to the causality of the end and in a certain way integrates its nature. Indeed, should the end have the power for moving and drawing the will to itself, it also has the power for drawing it for the	The second, true view.
Probatum primo ex D. Thom.	45		45R		It is proved, first, from St. Thomas.
2. Ex Aristot.	55		50R		Secondly, from Aristotle.
	55		55R		
	60		60R		

³That is, Alvarez has cut some text here.⁴994a9–11: ‘Further, the *final cause* is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is’ (Ross).

3. Probatio ex ratione.	<p>60 tutem trahendi illam propter finem.</p> <p>3. Unde ratione argumentor hoc modo; quia finis trahendo voluntatem ad eligenda media propter ipsum, exercet causalitatem suam: ergo et trahendo voluntatem ad volendum eundem finem propter se. Probatur consequentia: nam in electione medii propter finem duo possunt considerari: unum est quod ex intentione, quæ est actus voluntatis, oritur electio, et hoc non pertinet ad voluntatem finis, sed efficientis, ut postea videbimus. Alterum est quod finis propositus, et intentus movet in suo genere ad electionem mediorum, tanquam forma dans illis appetibilitatem; sed in hoc eadem, vel major ratio est de ipso fine trahente voluntatem ad appetitionem suam: ergo pertinet hoc ad causalitatem finis non minus, quam illud.</p>	<p>sake of the end.</p> <p>3. Hence, I argue from reason in this way: because the end in drawing the will to electing means for the sake of the end exercises its causality, therefore, [it also exercises its causality] in drawing the will to willing the very end itself for its own sake. The consequence is proven: for in the election of a means for the sake of the end two things can be considered. One is that an election arises from intention, which is an act of the will. And this does not pertain to the willing of the end, but of the efficient [cause], as we will see later. The second is that proposed and intended end moves in its own genus to the election of the means as a form giving desirability to it. But in this case there is the same or an even stronger argument concerning the end itself drawing the will to desiring it. Therefore, this pertains no less to the causality of the end than the former. Secondly, our will tends to the end through its true action, which acts in a perfect and reasonable way. Therefore, just as a true efficient cause is given of that action, so also a true final cause, which is the first of them. Thirdly, the love of God beyond everything else really is love of the ultimate end as such. Therefore, that love is caused by the goodness of God in the genus of final cause. Hence, the will of the blessed, which necessarily loves God by the goodness of God having been clearly seen, is determined and necessitated in this genus of cause to this love. And if <i>per possibile</i> or <i>per impossibile</i> a human being had that happiness without other means, he would nevertheless attain God and enjoy him as his ultimate end and God would exercise the causality of the ultimate end in relation to the will with respect to these acts. Just as an angel, although by nature he immediately has his natural happiness in God as in the end of nature without other means, nevertheless respects him as his end and for that reason as the final cause of all his actions by which he tends to God. Finally, it cannot be denied that the end determines and moves the will to these acts. But that aspect cannot pertain to another genus of cause. Therefore.</p>	The third proof, from reason.
4. Probatio.	<p>75 illius actionis datur vera causa efficiens, ita etiam vera finalis causa, quæ est prima earum. Tertio, amor Dei super omnia revera est amor ultimi finis ut sic; ergo ille amor causatur a bonitate Dei in genere causæ finalis. Unde in beatis voluntas, quæ necessario amat Deum, ab ipsa Dei bonitate clare visa, in hoc genere causæ determinatur, et necessitatur ad hunc amorem, et si per possibile, vel impossibile homo haberet illam beatitudinem sine aliis mediis, nihilominus consequeretur Deum, et frueretur illo ut ultimo fine suo, et Deus exerceret quoad hos actus, circa voluntatem causalitatem finis ultimi, sicut Angelus, licet natura sua absque aliis mediis, statim habeat beatitudinem naturalem in Deo ut in fine naturæ, nihilominus illum respicit ut finem <col. b> suum, atque adeo ut causam finalem omnium actionum, quibus tendit in ipsum. Denique negari non potest quin finis determinet, et moveat voluntatem ad hos actus; sed illa ratio non potest ad aliud genus causæ pertinere: ergo.</p>	<p>75R of the ultimate end as such. Therefore, that love is caused by the goodness of God in the genus of final cause. Hence, the will of the blessed, which necessarily loves God by the goodness of God having been clearly seen, is determined and necessitated in this genus of cause to this love. And if <i>per possibile</i> or <i>per impossibile</i> a human being had that happiness without other means, he would nevertheless attain God and enjoy him as his ultimate end and God would exercise the causality of the ultimate end in relation to the will with respect to these acts. Just as an angel, although by nature he immediately has his natural happiness in God as in the end of nature without other means, nevertheless respects him as his end and for that reason as the final cause of all his actions by which he tends to God. Finally, it cannot be denied that the end determines and moves the will to these acts. But that aspect cannot pertain to another genus of cause. Therefore.</p>	The fourth proof.
5. Probatio.	<p>80 et si per possibile, vel impossibile homo haberet illam beatitudinem sine aliis mediis, nihilominus consequeretur Deum, et frueretur illo ut ultimo fine suo, et Deus exerceret quoad hos actus, circa voluntatem causalitatem finis ultimi, sicut Angelus, licet natura sua absque aliis mediis, statim habeat beatitudinem naturalem in Deo ut in fine naturæ, nihilominus illum respicit ut finem <col. b> suum, atque adeo ut causam finalem omnium actionum, quibus tendit in ipsum. Denique negari non potest quin finis determinet, et moveat voluntatem ad hos actus; sed illa ratio non potest ad aliud genus causæ pertinere: ergo.</p>	<p>80R of the ultimate end as such. Therefore, that love is caused by the goodness of God in the genus of final cause. Hence, the will of the blessed, which necessarily loves God by the goodness of God having been clearly seen, is determined and necessitated in this genus of cause to this love. And if <i>per possibile</i> or <i>per impossibile</i> a human being had that happiness without other means, he would nevertheless attain God and enjoy him as his ultimate end and God would exercise the causality of the ultimate end in relation to the will with respect to these acts. Just as an angel, although by nature he immediately has his natural happiness in God as in the end of nature without other means, nevertheless respects him as his end and for that reason as the final cause of all his actions by which he tends to God. Finally, it cannot be denied that the end determines and moves the will to these acts. But that aspect cannot pertain to another genus of cause. Therefore.</p>	The fifth proof.
Qui sint effectus finis.	<p>95 4. Atque ex hac resolutione intelligitur primo quos effectus habeat causa finalis in voluntate nostra: omnes enim actus, quos voluntas exercet tam circa finem ut sic, quam circa media propter finem, sunt proprii et immediati effectus causæ finalis, in quibus ita est distinguenda ratio effectus a causalitate ipsa,</p>	<p>95R 4. And from this resolution it is understood in the first place what effects the final cause has in our will. For all the acts which the will exercises both concerning the end as such and concerning means for the sake of the end are proper and immediate effects of the final cause. The <i>ratio</i> of effect should be distinguished from the causality itself in these</p>	What the effects of the end are.

Qui eorum proximi, qui remoti.	sicut distinguitur actio a termino, ut constat ex dictis in præcedenti sectione. Intelligitur secundo, omnem hanc finis causalitatem proxime et immediate versari circa actus elicitos ab ipsa voluntate, per illos autem extendi, et communicari aliis actibus humanis, qui ab hujusmodi voluntatis actibus imperantur: ab eis enim diriguntur, et ordinantur in finem, quod est notandum pro his, quæ postea, tractat. 3, dicemus de bonitate et malitia horum actuum, et in Disputatione sequenti amplius hoc explicabitur.	100R 105R	[acts] in the same way as an action is distinguished from the <i>terminus</i> , as is clear from what was said in the preceding section. Secondly, it is understood that this entire causality of the end proximately and immediately concerns the acts elicited from the will itself, but is extended and communicated to other human actions through those which are commanded by willed actions of this sort. For they are directed and ordered to the end by these, which should be noted according to these. We will discuss this later in <i>De Bonitate and Malitia</i> and it will be explained more thoroughly in the following disputation.	Which of these are proximate and which remote.
Ad argum. ex Aristo. in n. 1.	5. Ad fundamenta prioris sententiæ in numero 1, respondetur primo. Aristoteles in verbis illis, <i>finis est, cuius gratia aliquid fit</i> , virtute comprehendisse illa duo, scilicet quod finis propter se ametur, et alia propter ipsum. An vero utrumque eorum sit de ratione finis, dicam infra section. 4. Dico præterea quando finis intenditur, vel amatur, ibi aliquid fieri, scilicet, ipsam intentionem, vel affectionem circa finem, et illud ipsum fieri gratia finis: nam sicut propter bonitatem finis cogniti eligit homo media, ita propter eandem bonitatem finis cogniti eligit amorem, seu intentionem talis finis. Unde ad rationem, videlicet, quia finis dicit habitudinem ad media, primo respondetur, licet dicat habitudinem ad media, non tamen ad sola illa, sed ad omnem effectum, quem in suo genere causare potest: nam sicut efficiens dicit habitudinem ad factum, seu ad omne id, quod a virtute effectiva prodire potest: ita finis, ut est causa, dicit ad omne id habitudinem quod ex virtute finalisandi causari potest. Deinde etiam faciendo vim in nomine <i>finis</i> , quod significet terminum et extremum, respondetur, non solum esse terminum respectu mediorum, sed etiam respectu voluntatis intendentis in ipsum finem propter se amatum, sub qua ratione habet rationem cujusdam ultimi et extremi, quia ut <6> sic non ordinatur in aliud, et ipsemet actus voluntatis, qui quodammodo mediat inter ipsam et finem, in ipso fine consistit tanquam in ultimo termino. Ad confirmationem de Deo responsio est clara ex superius dictis, quæstione præcedenti, numero 11, nam in Deo ad intra quatenus se amat propter se, non est causalitas finis proprii, quia non intervenit aliquis actus, qui proprie fiat ex motione finis.	110R 115R	5. To the foundation of the former view in n. 1 I respond first: Aristotle in those words ‘the end is that for the sake of which something happens’ implicitly includes these two, namely, that the end is loved for its own sake and that other things are loved for its sake. But whether each of these is of the nature of the end, I will discuss below in sect. 4. I say, furthermore, since the end is intended or loved where anything happens, namely, the very intention or affection of the end, even that very thing happens for the sake of the end. For just as a human being elects means for the sake of the cognized end’s goodness, so also he elects love or intention for such an end for the sake of the same goodness of the cognized end. Hence, to the argument—namely, because the end expresses a relation to means—I respond, first, that, although it expresses a relation to means, [it expresses a relation] not only to those but to every effect that can be caused in its genus. For just as the efficient cause has a relation to what was made or to everything that can be produced by an effective power, so also the end, insofar as it is a cause, expresses a relation to everything that can be caused by the final-causing power. Next, also, by making the force of ‘end’ be that it signifies a <i>terminus</i> and extreme, I respond that it is not only a <i>terminus</i> with respect to means but also with respect to the will intending the end loved for its own sake, under which aspect it has the nature of a kind of ultimate and extreme, because as such it is not ordered to something else and the very act of the will which in a certain way mediates between itself and the end stands to the end itself as to an ultimate <i>terminus</i> . The response to the confirmation concerning God is obvious from what was said above in the preceding question, n. 11. For in the case of God insofar as he loves himself for his own sake within, there is no causality of a proper end, because there is no intervening act which properly comes about from the motion of the end.	Against the argument from Aristotle in n. 1.
Ad 1. confirm.	115 finis dicit habitudinem ad media, primo respondetur, licet dicat habitudinem ad media, non tamen ad sola illa, sed ad omnem effectum, quem in suo genere causare potest: nam sicut efficiens dicit habitudinem ad factum, seu ad omne id, quod a virtute effectiva prodire potest: ita finis, ut est causa, dicit ad omne id habitudinem quod ex virtute finalisandi causari potest. Deinde etiam faciendo vim in nomine <i>finis</i> , quod significet terminum et extremum, respondetur, non solum esse terminum respectu mediorum, sed etiam respectu voluntatis intendentis in ipsum finem propter se amatum, sub qua ratione habet rationem cujusdam ultimi et extremi, quia ut <6> sic non ordinatur in aliud, et ipsemet actus voluntatis, qui quodammodo mediat inter ipsam et finem, in ipso fine consistit tanquam in ultimo termino. Ad confirmationem de Deo responsio est clara ex superius dictis, quæstione præcedenti, numero 11, nam in Deo ad intra quatenus se amat propter se, non est causalitas finis proprii, quia non intervenit aliquis actus, qui proprie fiat ex motione finis.	120R 125R	120R 125R	Against the first confirmation.
Ad 2. confir.	130 Deo ad intra quatenus se amat propter se, non est causalitas finis proprii, quia non intervenit aliquis actus, qui proprie fiat ex motione finis.	130R	130R	Against the second confirmation.
		135R		