

© Sydney Penner 2010

<1><sup>2</sup>

DISPUTATIO I.

*De causalitate finis, respectu humanæ voluntatis.*

Universa hæc doctrina maxima ex parte versatur in explican-  
dis humanis actionibus, quatenus humanæ sunt, ac bonitatis,  
5 ac malitiæ moralis capaces: in quo potissimum a fine pendent,  
qui est principium moralium actionum, et ideo prius hanc Dis-  
putationem præmittendam duxi, in qua munus, varios modos,  
rationem, seu distinctionem finis explicabo: hæc enim Dispu-  
tatio necessario præmittenda videtur, ad explicanda nonnulla  
10 principia, et varium titulum, quibus, in sequentibus utendum  
nobis est, ne cogamur eadem semper repetere: curabimus autem  
a quæstionibus philosophicis, quoad fieri potest, abstinere, aut  
eas tantum breviter attingere, quantum ad rem Theologicam  
fuerit necessarium.

15 SECTIO I.

*In quo consistat causalitas finis respectu humanæ voluntatis.*

Causalitatem  
finis esse proprie  
erga humanam  
voluntatem  
ostenditur.

1. Primum omnium statuendum est, finem et causalitatem ejus,  
qualiscumque illa sit, proprie suum locum habere in voluntate  
humana, et in actibus, seu effectibus ejus, quod est certissimum.  
20 Primo ex modo loquendi Scripturæ sacræ, ubique enim tribuit

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>Suárez also discusses this subject in *DM* XXIII.4.

DISPUTATION I.

*On the causality of the end with respect to human will.*

This entire doctrine chiefly stems from its part in explaining human ac-  
tions insofar as humans are capable of both moral goodness and badness.  
5R They above all depend in this on the end, which is the principle of moral  
actions. For this reason, I start first with this disputation that should  
come first, in which I explain the function, different modes, nature, or  
distinctions of the end. For it seems necessary to set this disputation  
at the beginning in order to explain some principles and different la-  
10R bels which we will make use of in the following [sections] so that we  
are not compelled always to repeat the same thing. Moreover, we will  
take care, insofar as possible, to stay away from philosophical questions  
or to touch on them only briefly insofar as they are necessary for the  
theological matter.

15R SECTION I.

*In what the causality of the end consists with respect to human will.*<sup>3</sup>

1. First of all, it should be established that the end and its causality,  
whatever that is, properly has its place in the human will and in its acts  
or effects. This is most certain. First, [it is certain] because of the way  
20R of speaking in Holy Scripture, for it everywhere attributes to human

It is shown that  
the causality of  
the end is  
properly towards  
human will.

25 homini modum operandi propter finem, quod maxime illi con-  
venit ratione voluntatis, ad Romanos 8: *Propter te mortifica-*  
*mur tota die*, etc. *Sed in his omnibus superamus propter eum,*  
*qui dilexit nos*, et Psalmo 118: *Inclinavi cor meum ad facien-*  
30 *das justificationes tuas, propter retributionem*. Secundo experi-  
entia constat, hominem non casu, <col. b> nec fortuito in in-  
certum ferri, sed in definitum finem dirigere operationes suas.  
Tertio, constat etiam ratione, quia motio finis præcipue habet  
locum in agentibus per intellectum: nam finis movet agens ad  
35 operandum, movet autem per cognitionem; agens autem intel-  
lectuale maxime cognoscere potest rationem finis, et ordinem  
ejus ad media: ergo voluntas, quæ ratione ducitur, maxime  
potest moveri a fine.

Suppositio pro  
sensu quæstionis. 35 2. Secundo, ut intelligatur proprius quæstionis sensus, sup-  
ponendum est ex Cajetano, 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 4, et clarius 2,  
2, quæst. 17, a. 5, sicut in causa efficienti quatuor distinguuntur  
ita etiam posse in causa finali distingui, scilicet, res quæ causat,  
ratio, seu forma, quæ est principium causandi, causalitas ejus  
40 actualis et effectus causatus: in hac sectione præcipue agimus  
de tertio, scilicet de causalitate actuali finis, qua intellecta, facile  
constabit, quis sit, et quotuplex effectus finis in humana volun-  
tate: de ratione autem seu principio causandi, dicemus postea in  
sectione tertia: et inde constabit, quænam res possit esse causa  
45 finalis. Quare in universum, et in omni genere causæ illa res  
potest rationem causæ participare, cui potest convenire forma  
illa, quæ est ratio causandi.

1. Opinio in  
præsenti quæst. 50 3. Tertio, his positis, duæ possunt esse extremæ senten-  
tiæ in præsentis sectione. Prima est, causalitatem finis non  
consistere in motione aliqua respectu humanæ voluntatis, sed  
in hoc solum, quod effectus, qui a voluntate progreditur, in  
aliquid ut in finem ordinetur, ita ut esse finem nihil aliud sit,  
quam esse id, cujus gratia aliud sit: nam hoc modo rationem  
finis Aristoteles ubique describit, præsertim 2, Physicor. et 5  
Metaphysicæ. Unde Cajetanus supra dicit, causalitatem finis  
55 esse innominatam, significari vero per hanc vocem esse propter  
quod, seu id esse, cujus gratia. Et potest suaderi hæc sen- <2>  
tentia, quia in operibus Dei est propria causalitas finis, Deus

Suadetur  
exemplis.

25R beings the way of acting for the sake of an end which is especially suitable  
for them by reason of the will. For example, Romans 8[:36–37]: ‘For  
your sake we are put to death all the day long . . . But in all these things  
we overcome for the sake of him who loved us.’ And Psalm 119[:112]:  
30R ‘I have inclined my heart to doing your right things for the sake of the  
reward.’ Secondly, it is clear from experience that a human being is  
not brought to an indefinite thing by chance or by fortune; rather, he  
directs his actions to a definite end. Thirdly, it is also clear by reason,  
because the motion of an end especially has a place in agents through  
the intellect. For the end moves an agent to acting, but it moves through  
35R cognition. But intellectual agents especially can cognize the *ratio* of the  
end and its relation to means. Therefore, the will, which is led by reason,  
can especially be moved by the end.

35R 2. Secondly, in order that the proper sense of the question is un-  
derstood, one should suppose according to Cajetan in Ia.5.4 and more  
clearly in IIaIIæ.17.5 that just as four things are distinguished in an ef-  
ficient cause, so also [four things] can be distinguished in a final cause.  
Namely, the thing which causes, the nature or form that is the principle  
of causing, its actual causality, and the caused effect. In this section we  
40R will deal especially with the third, namely, with the actual causality of  
the end. Once this is understood it will easily be clear what the effect  
of the end in a human will is and how many kinds of effects there are.  
Moreover, concerning the nature or principle of causing, we will speak  
later in the third section. And thereupon it will be clear what then can  
45R be a final cause. Wherefore in general and in every genus of cause that  
thing can participate in the nature of cause with which that form which  
is the nature of causing can agree.

50R 3. Thirdly, these things having been posited, there can be two ex-  
treme views in the present section. The first is that the causality of the  
end does not consist in some motion with respect to the human will but  
in this alone, namely, that the effect which is advanced by the will is or-  
dered to something in such a way that to be the end is nothing other than  
to be that for the sake of which something exists. For Aristotle describes  
the nature of the end in this way everywhere, especially in *Phys.* II and  
55R *Metaph.* V. Hence Cajetan says earlier that the causality of the end is in-  
nominate, but is signified through this expression: ‘to be for the sake  
of which’ or ‘to be that for the sake of which’. And this view can be  
urged because there is a proper causality of the end in God’s actions, for

An assumption  
for the sense of  
the question.

The first opinion  
in the present  
question.

It is urged by  
examples.

enim vere ac perfecte operatur propter finem: sed respectu Dei non potest hæc causalitas consistere in motione voluntatis ejus, ut videtur per se notum, quia id esset maxima imperfectio in Deo. Similiter in inferioribus agentibus naturalibus est propria causalitas finis, quæ non potest consistere in motione agentis, cum non cognoscat finem: ergo similiter in voluntate humana, quæ est quasi media inter Deum et res inferiores, philosophandum est. Secundo, quia vix potest intelligi, quæ vel qualis illa motio, quia vel est aliquid antecedens actum voluntatis, et hoc non, quia nihil est in voluntate: vel est ipsemet actus voluntatis, et hoc non, quia talis actus potius est effectus finis, quam causalitas ejus: movet enim finis ad talem actum trahendo, et alliciendo voluntatem: ergo, etc.

4. Nihilominus hæc sententia nec rem ipsam, nec communem modum loquendi theologorum et philosophorum explicat. Primo enim auctores omnes ponunt causalitatem finis in motione metaphorica respectu nostræ voluntatis. Ita sentit D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, et in quæst. de Veritate, quæst. 22, art. 2, ubi notanda sunt illa verba: *Sicut influere causæ efficientis est agere, ita influere causæ finalis est appeti seu desiderari*: et in quæstionibus de Pœnitentia, quæst. 5, art. 1, inquit: *Finis non est causa, nisi quatenus movet efficientem ad agendum: unde ubi non est actus, non est causa finalis* 3, Metaphysicæ, text. 12. Et videtur hæc doctrina sumpta ex Aristotele 1, de Generat., cap. 7. Secundo, quod finis dicatur esse id, cujus gratia aliquid fit, solum est denominatio quædam extrinseca in ipso fine; ex eo quod aliquid aliud ordinatur ad ipsum: ergo non satis est hoc ad causalitatem propriam finis. Patet consequentia, tum quia hæc denominatio non dicit emanationem aliquam realem, nec influxum: tum etiam, quia alias quilibet terminus motus, et quodlibet objectum cujuscumque actus, quatenus est terminus, ad quem tendit operatio agentis, habebit propriam causalitatem finis. Item, cessante actione agentis hoc solo quod res esset propensa, seu inclinata natura sua in finem, duraret semper causalitas finis, quia semper durat illa denominatio, quod hæc res est propter illam, quæ emanare potest ex sola actione præterita, et ordinata ipsius agentis: hoc ergo solum non satis est ad explicandam hanc causalitatem finis. <col. b>

God truly and perfectly acts for the sake of an end. But with respect to God this causality cannot consist in the motion of his will, as seems *per se notum* since that would be a great imperfection in God. Similarly, in lower natural agents there is a proper causality of the end, which cannot consist in the motion of the agent, since the agent does not cognize the end. Therefore, one should philosophize likewise in the case of the human will, which is, as it were, the middle between God and lower things. Secondly, because it can scarcely be understood what that motion is or what sort of thing it is, since either it is something antecedent to the act of will (and this cannot be the case since there is nothing in the will) or it is the very act of will itself (and this cannot be the case since such an act is more an effect of the end than its causality). For the end moves to such an act by drawing and enticing the will. Therefore, etc.

4. Nevertheless, this view explains neither the matter itself nor the common way of speaking of theologians and philosophers. For first, all the authors place the causality of the end in a metaphorical motion with respect to our will. St. Thomas thinks in this way in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 and in *De Veritate*, q. 22, art. 2, where these words should be noted: ‘Just as to inflow in the way of an efficient cause is to act, so to inflow in the way of a final cause is to be sought (*appeti*) or to be desired.’ An in *De Pœnitentia*, q. 5, art. 1, [co.], he says: ‘The is not a cause except insofar as it moves the efficient cause to acting. Hence, where there is no act, there is no final cause, [as is clear from] *Metaph.* III, text. 12.’ And it seems that this doctrine is taken from Aristotle *De gen.* I, cap. 7. Secondly, that the end is said to be that for the sake of which something happens is only a certain extrinsic denomination on the end itself from the fact that something else is ordered to it. Therefore, this is not enough for a proper causality of the end. The consequence is clear, both because this denomination does not express some real emanation or influx and also because otherwise any *terminus* whatever of motion and any object of any act (insofar as it is a *terminus* to which the action of the agent tends) will have the proper causality of an end. Likewise—in a case where an agent rests from action—by the mere fact that the thing disposed or inclined by its nature to the end, the causality of the end would always remain, because that denomination that his thing is for the sake of that—which can emanate merely from an action of the agent that is past and ordered—always remains. Therefore, this alone is not sufficient to explain this causality of the end.

The same by reason.

The preceding view is attacked.

Item ratione.

Impugnatur proxima opinio.

2. Opinio, eiusque explicatio.	<p>5. Secunda sententia est, hanc causalitalem consistere in motione metaphorica voluntatis, quæ ex se antecedit tempore, et distinguitur ab omni actu elicito ab ipsa voluntate. Quæ opinio in hunc modum explicari potest, quia finis non movet voluntatem, nisi præcognitus sit: hoc autem ipso quod finis est cognitus, et bonitas ejus, etiamsi voluntas per proprium suum actum in illum non tendat (est enim libera, et potest suum actum suspendere) intelligitur excitari et moveri a fine cognito, ut ipsum amet et intendat: hæc enim excitatio et motio antecedit consensum voluntatis, et intelligitur oriri ex conjunctione et sympathia potentiarum intellectus et voluntatis, quatenus in eadem animæ essentia radicanur: ergo in hac motione consistit causalitas finis, quia hæc motio metaphorica non videtur posse alio modo explicari. Et hoc confirmat secunda ratio facta in præcedenti sententia: quia quidquid post hanc motionem sequitur, non est nisi amor, vel intentio finis, qui sunt actus voluntatis, qui non sunt causalitas: sed potius effectus causalitatis finis. Secundo, quia, seclusa prædicta motione, postea finis solum se habet ut terminus specificans actum tendentem in ipsum: at vero sub hac ratione finis non exercet causalitatem finis, sed potius participat causalitatem formæ specificantis, ut significat D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 6, ad. 1, et in omnibus objectis, actus specificativus est eadem ratio et modus causalitatis: ergo.</p>	<p>5. The second view is that this causality consists in metaphorical motion of the will, which from itself temporally precedes and is distinguished from every act elicited by the will itself. This opinion can be explicated in this way, [namely,] because the end does not move the will unless it was first cognized. But by this very fact that the end and its goodness is cognized—even if the will does not tend to it, for the will is free and can suspend its act—the will is excited and moved by the cognized end so that it loves and intends the end. For this excitation and motion precedes the consent of the will and is understood to arise from the union and sympathy of the powers of intellect and will, insofar as the essences are rooted in the same soul. Therefore, the causality of the end consists in this motion, since this metaphorical motion does not seem to be able to be explained in another way. And a second argument made in the preceding section confirms this. For whatever follows after this motion is nothing other than love or intention for the end, which are acts of the will. These are not causality but rather the effect of the causality of the end. Secondly, because, apart from the aforementioned motion, afterwards the the end only holds itself as the <i>terminus</i> specifying the act tending to it. But, to be sure, the end does not exercise the causality of the end under this aspect, but rather participates in the causality of the specifying form, as St. Thomas indicates in IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1. And in all object the specificative act is the same nature and mode of causality. Therefore.</p>	The second opinion and its explication.
Confirmatur 1.	<p>110 præcedenti sententia: quia quidquid post hanc motionem sequitur, non est nisi amor, vel intentio finis, qui sunt actus voluntatis, qui non sunt causalitas: sed potius effectus causalitatis finis. Secundo, quia, seclusa prædicta motione, postea finis solum se habet ut terminus specificans actum tendentem in ipsum: at vero sub hac ratione finis non exercet causalitatem finis, sed potius participat causalitatem formæ specificantis, ut significat D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 6, ad. 1, et in omnibus objectis, actus specificativus est eadem ratio et modus causalitatis: ergo.</p>	<p>110R the preceding section confirms this. For whatever follows after this motion is nothing other than love or intention for the end, which are acts of the will. These are not causality but rather the effect of the causality of the end. Secondly, because, apart from the aforementioned motion, afterwards the the end only holds itself as the <i>terminus</i> specifying the act tending to it. But, to be sure, the end does not exercise the causality of the end under this aspect, but rather participates in the causality of the specifying form, as St. Thomas indicates in IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1. And in all object the specificative act is the same nature and mode of causality. Therefore.</p>	It is confirmed, first.
Secundo.	<p>115 vero sub hac ratione finis non exercet causalitatem finis, sed potius participat causalitatem formæ specificantis, ut significat D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 6, ad. 1, et in omnibus objectis, actus specificativus est eadem ratio et modus causalitatis: ergo.</p>	<p>115R afterwards the the end only holds itself as the <i>terminus</i> specifying the act tending to it. But, to be sure, the end does not exercise the causality of the end under this aspect, but rather participates in the causality of the specifying form, as St. Thomas indicates in IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1. And in all object the specificative act is the same nature and mode of causality. Therefore.</p>	Secondly.
Refellitur prædicta opinio tanquam insufficiens.	<p>120 6. Hæc vero nec intelligi possunt, nec satisfacere: quia hic non agimus de causalitate finis in actu primo, ut sic dicam, seu de proxima applicatione ejus ad causandum, sed de causalitate, et influxu ejus in actu secundo, hic autem intelligi non potest priusquam in voluntate aliquid causatum sit, quia realis causalitas debet ad aliquid reale haberi, alias nihil esset: sed si in voluntate nulla est res nova, nec operatio aliqua, vel affectio, nihil intelligi potest, quod a fine causatum sit: ergo nec intelligi potest causalitas finis in actu secundo. Confirmatur ac declaratur, quia illa excitatio, quæ dicitur esse in homine cognoscente finem et bonitatem ejus, antequam voluntas proprio motu moveatur, nihil aliud est revera, quam cognitio et iudicium intellectus, nam in voluntate nihil de novo positum est, quod ante non esset: sed iudicium intellectus non est causalitas finis, ut per se constat, sed potius est approximatio finis, ut &lt;3&gt; causare possit: ergo</p>	<p>120R 6. But this cannot be understood and does not satisfy. For we are not dealing here with the causality of the end in the first act—if I may speak that way—or with the proximate application of it to causing, but with its causality and influx into the second act. But this cannot be understood before something is caused in the will, because real causality must be had towards something real. Otherwise, it is nothing. But if there is no new thing in the will, neither any action or affection, then nothing can be understood as having been caused by the end. Therefore, no causality of the end can be understood in the second act. It is confirmed and shown because that excitation which is said to be in the human who is cognizing the end and its goodness before the will is moved by a proper motion, is really nothing other than the cognition and judgement of the intellect, of nothing new was posited in the will that was not there before. But the judgement of the intellect is not the causality of the end, as is clear <i>per se</i>, but rather is an approach of the</p>	It is refuted more broadly.

Evasio.	non potest in hoc solo consistere causalitas finis. Dices fortasse	135R	end so that it can cause. Therefore, the causality of the end cannot consist	
	ex hoc iudicio statim resultare in voluntate affectionem vel motionem aliquam saltem per simplicem complacentiam, ratione		in this alone. You may perhaps say that from this judgement there	Evasion.
Præcluditur.	cujus est actualiter, et universaliter propensa in finem, ut illum		at once results in the will some affection of motion, at least through a	
	intendat, et efficaciter amet. Sed hoc nihil refert ad rem de qua		simple taking of pleasure, by reason of which it is actually and generally	
	agimus, explicandam: primo quidem, quia, si hæc affectio est	140R	it. But this has no bearing on the matter that needs to be explained and	It is blocked off.
	libera, potest voluntas illam suspendere: si autem est naturalis,		with which we are dealing. First, indeed, because if this affection is free,	
	non est per se ac semper necessaria ad causalitatem finis: huiusmodi enim imperfecti motus ex imperfecto modo operandi		the will can suspend it. But if it is natural, it is not <i>per se</i> and always	
	insurgunt in nobis, vel ex conjunctione appetitus, vel ex imperfecta deliberatione. At vero, seclusis his imperfectionibus, non	145R	necessary for the causality of the end. For motions of this imperfect	
	sunt necessarii illi imperfecti actus, ut voluntas ex perfecto iudicio ac libertate a fine moveatur, ut videre licet in Angelis, in		sort rise up in us from an imperfect way of acting or from a union of desire	
	Beatis, in Christo et Virgine, et nonnunquam etiam contingit in		or from imperfect deliberation. But, on the other hand, apart from	
Refellitur ultimo.	nobis. Deinde de illomet affectu simplici redit eadem difficultas: nam ille etiam est quidam actus voluntatis, unde est quidam effectus ipsius finis, de quo inquirendum superest, quæ sit causalitas finis circa talem actum: et quod de illo dictum fuerit, dici etiam poterit de perfecto actu intentionis, seu electionis.	150R	these imperfections, these imperfect acts are not necessary in order for	It is refuted lastly.
			the will to be moved by the end from freedom and perfect judgement, as	
			may be seen in the case of angels, the blessed, Christ, and the Virgin, and	
			sometimes even in us. Next, the same difficulty returns concerning the	
			simple affect itself. For it is also a certain act of the will. Hence it is a certain	
			effect of the end itself, concerning which it remains to be inquired	
			what the causality of the end is with respect to such an act. And what	
			has been said about that, will also be able to be said about the perfect act	
			of intention or election.	
1. Assertio veræ sententiæ, de qua videndus Author disp. 23 <i>Metaph.</i> sect. 4.	7. Dico ergo causalitatem finis circa voluntatem nostram non esse in actu secundo, donec ipsa voluntas actu moveatur, et tendat in ipsum finem. Hæc assertio probatur sufficienter argumentis factis contra secundam sententiam, et videtur mihi expresse divi Thomæ, locis nuper citatis, ex cuius verbis potest ratione nova confirmari: quia donec causa efficiens sit in actu, non potest intelligi causa finalis actu causare: nam finis, ut definit Aristoteles, est, <i>cujus gratia aliquid fit</i> : si ergo nihil actu fit, non est actu finis; si autem efficiens actu non efficit actu, nihil fit: et consequenter nihil fit propter finem: ergo, de primo ad ultimum, ante actum agentis non est causalitas finis: ergo pari ratione in voluntate ante actionem voluntatis non est causalitas finis circa ipsam in actu secundo. Quod tandem declaratur, quia vel hæc causalitas esset circa ipsam potentiam voluntatis, et hoc non, quia, secluso actu, illa non aliter se habet, nec immutatur aliquo modo: vel est circa actum ipsius voluntatis, et hoc esse non potest sine ipso actu.	155R	7. I say, therefore, that the causality of the end concerning our will is not in the second act until the will itself is actually moved and tends to the end itself. This assertion is sufficiently proved by the arguments made against the second view and it seems to me explicit in St. Thomas in the places just cited, from whose words it can be confirmed anew by reason. Because until the efficient cause actually is, the final cause cannot be understood to actually cause. For the end, as Aristotle defines it, is that ‘for the sake of which something happens’. If, therefore, nothing actually happens, the end is not actually. But if the efficient cause actually does not actually effect [anything], nothing happens. And consequently nothing happens for the sake of the end. Therefore, from the first to the last, there is no causality of the end before an act of the agent. Therefore, by a like argument, before an action of the will there is no causality of the end in the second act concerning it in the will. This is shown, finally, because this causality would concern either the power itself of the will (and this is not the case, because, apart from an act, it could not hold itself otherwise nor is it changed in some way) or an act of the will itself (and this cannot be without the very act).	The first assertion of the true view; see the author’s <i>DM</i> XXIII.4.
Eius ratio ex D. Thom.		160R		An argument for it from St. Thomas.
		165R		
Confirmatur.				It is confirmed.
		170R		

2. Assertio.	170	8. Dico secundo: Causalitas finis in voluntate non est res aliqua, nec modus distinctus ab actu et actione voluntatis: sed est ipsamet actio, quæ simul est et a voluntate in genere cau-	175R	8. I say secondly: the causality of the end in the will is not some thing or mode distinct from the act and action of the will. Rather, it is the very action itself which is at the same time both by the will in the genus of effecient cause and by the end in its genus, namely, by drawing and giving determinateness to the will to such an act. This conclusion	The second assertion.
Eius probatio.	175	hoc solo sufficienter probatur, quia non potest intelligi quid aliud sit hæc causalitas finis, nec aliud est necessarium ut voluntas moveatur in finem: ergo revera in hoc consistit. Deinde potest exemplis declarari, quia sicut in potentia cognoscitiva actio ejus natura sua pendet a potentia, et ab objecto ut movente	180R	is sufficiently proven by this alone that it cannot be understood what else this causality of the end would be nor is anything else necessary for the will to be moved to the end. Therefore, it really does consist in this. Finally, it can be shown by examples, since just as in the case of cognoscitive power an action depends by its nature on the power and on the object as moving the power, so also in its way an action of the will. But in the case of the cognoscitive power the same action insofar as it comes from the power is a concursus of it to such an act and insofar as it comes from the object is likewise its causality. Therefore, in the same way, in the case of the will its action, because it depends intrinsically and essentially on these two principles (namely, on the power and on the proposed end), is its concursus, insofar as it effectively comes from the will. But insofar as it comes from the end in its own genus of cause it is its actual motion. Nor is it necessary to distinguish in that action two aspects or modes, because it requires through it itself and essentially each habitude. The only difference is that in the case of the cognoscitive power the concursus of the power pertains to the effective cause, but in the case of the will to the final cause. This results from the proper modes of acting of such powers. Another example can be employed in the case of an exemplar cause, which also concurs with its effect by means of an apprehension. And its concursus consists only in this, namely, that the effect comes about by imitation of it. Hence, it is not distinguished in reality from the action of the agent, but the same action which flows forth effectively from the agent flows from the idea exemplarily, if I may speak in this way. And, as such, it is its concursus. Therefore, the same sort of thing should be said in the present case.	Its proof.
Declaratur exemplo uno.	180	potentiam, ita suo modo actio voluntatis, in potentia autem cognoscitiva eadem actio ut est a potentia est concursus ejus ad talem actum, et ut est ab objecto est similiter causalitas ejus: ergo eodem modo in voluntate actio ejus, quia intrinsece, et essentialiter pendet ab his duobus principiis, scilicet a potentia	185R	et a fine proposito, ut est effective a voluntate, est concursus ejus: ut vero est a fine in suo genere causæ, est motio actualis ejus, nec oportet in illa actione duas rationes, aut modos distinguere, quia per se ipsam et essentialiter postulat utramque habitudinem. Solum est differentia, quod in potentia cognoscitiva concursus potentiæ pertinet ad causam effectivam, in voluntate vero ad causam finalem, quod provenit ex propriis modis operandi talium potentiarum. Aliud exemplum adhiberi potest in causa exemplari, quæ media apprehensione concurrat etiam ad effectum suum, et concursus ejus solum in hoc consistit, quod fiat effectus ad imitationem ejus: unde in re non distinguitur ab actione agentis, sed eadem actio quæ profluit effective ab agente, manat ab idea exemplariter, ut sic dicam, et ut sic, est concursus ejus: sic ergo in præsentia dicendum est.	It is shown by one example.
Altero.	185	et a fine proposito, ut est effective a voluntate, est concursus ejus: ut vero est a fine in suo genere causæ, est motio actualis ejus, nec oportet in illa actione duas rationes, aut modos distinguere, quia per se ipsam et essentialiter postulat utramque habitudinem. Solum est differentia, quod in potentia cognoscitiva concursus potentiæ pertinet ad causam effectivam, in voluntate vero ad causam finalem, quod provenit ex propriis modis operandi talium potentiarum. Aliud exemplum adhiberi potest in causa exemplari, quæ media apprehensione concurrat etiam ad effectum suum, et concursus ejus solum in hoc consistit, quod fiat effectus ad imitationem ejus: unde in re non distinguitur ab actione agentis, sed eadem actio quæ profluit effective ab agente, manat ab idea exemplariter, ut sic dicam, et ut sic, est concursus ejus: sic ergo in præsentia dicendum est.	190R	But in the case of the cognoscitive power the same action insofar as it comes from the power is a concursus of it to such an act and insofar as it comes from the object is likewise its causality. Therefore, in the same way, in the case of the will its action, because it depends intrinsically and essentially on these two principles (namely, on the power and on the proposed end), is its concursus, insofar as it effectively comes from the will. But insofar as it comes from the end in its own genus of cause it is its actual motion. Nor is it necessary to distinguish in that action two aspects or modes, because it requires through it itself and essentially each habitude. The only difference is that in the case of the cognoscitive power the concursus of the power pertains to the effective cause, but in the case of the will to the final cause. This results from the proper modes of acting of such powers. Another example can be employed in the case of an exemplar cause, which also concurs with its effect by means of an apprehension. And its concursus consists only in this, namely, that the effect comes about by imitation of it. Hence, it is not distinguished in reality from the action of the agent, but the same action which flows forth effectively from the agent flows from the idea exemplarily, if I may speak in this way. And, as such, it is its concursus. Therefore, the same sort of thing should be said in the present case.	Another example.
1. Corollar. causalitatem finis proprie solum reperiri in agentibus intellectualibus.	200	9. Unde intelligitur primo hujusmodi modum causalitatis finis tantum habere locum in agentibus per cognitionem, nam alia agentia non possunt a fine moveri; et ideo est communis omnium sensus, apprehensionem finis esse illi vel rationem causandi, vel rationem necessariam ad causandum. Ut autem hæc causalitas propria ac formalis sit, necesse est ut hæc cognitio sit intellectualis: quia, ut infra dicemus, solum finis movet sub	205R	Hence, it is understood, first, that the mode of this sort of causality of the end only has a place in agents through cognition. For other agents cannot be moved by the end. And for this reason it is the common sense of everyone that for it the apprehension of the end is either the nature of causing or a nature necessary for causing. Moreover, for this causality to be proper and formal, it is necessary that this cognition be intellection, because, as we will say below, the end only moves under	The first corollary: the causality of the end is properly found only in intellectual agents.
	205	sit intellectualis: quia, ut infra dicemus, solum finis movet sub	210R	be intellection, because, as we will say below, the end only moves under	

ratione boni et convenientis. Sub hac autem ratione proprie et formaliter solum cognosci potest per intellectum, quia necessarium est cognoscere habitudinem unius ad aliud, et proportionem quamdam inter appetibile et appetentem, seu inter medium et finem. Unde bruta, quamvis per cogitationem moveantur ad appetendum, et ideo fit in eis quaedam participatio hujus causalitatis finis, tamen non est perfecta in eis ac formalis ratio finis propter causam dictam.

2. Corollarium non tamen reperiri in intellectuali increato.

10. Secundo colligitur, hanc causalitatem finis, prout exercetur in voluntate, non reperiri proprie in Deo, nec in voluntate ejus: sed solum in voluntate creata, quæ per actionem propriam, et actum a se distinctum movetur in finem: quia, ut dixi, ubi non est actio agentis, non est actualis motio finis: sed in voluntate divina non est propria actio, quæ tendat in finem, quia actus, quo Deus vult quidquid vult, non distinguitur a voluntate ejus, nec est aliquid factum, seu causatum: nihil enim, quod sit ipsemet Deus, potest habere veram causam, voluntas autem Dei est ipsemet Deus. Dices, ergo Deus non vere ac proprie operatur propter verum finem. Respondeo, negando consequentiam simpliciter: quia, ut notavit Gabriel, in 2, dist. 1, quæst. 5, art. 1, aliud est loqui de fine, aliud de causa finali: finis autem tantum dicit terminum seu rationem extremi, ad quod aliud ordinatur; causa vero finalis, proprie dicit id, quod movet agens ad operandum: quamvis autem respectu Dei, et voluntatis ejus, finis non habeat hanc causalitatem, tamen Deus altiori, et perfectiori modo ordinat effectus suos, seu exteriores actiones ad determinatos fines: et ideo perfectissimo modo, et ablati omnibus imperfectionibus, operatur propter finem. Secundo, quia licet divinæ voluntatis non detur propria causa, dari tamen potest ratio ejus ex parte finis desumptæ, ut docet D. Thomas 1, cont. Gent., c. 86, et hoc modo sine causalitate finis circa divinam voluntatem Deus proprie operatur propter finem. Atque ex his satis responsum est ad fundamenta aliarum opinionum, in num. 3 et 5, et amplius patebit ex sequenti sectione.

Illatio contra hoc corollar. excluditur primo.

Excluditur 2.

the aspect of good and agreeability. But something can be properly and formally cognized under this aspect only through the intellect, since it is necessary to cognize the habitude of one thing to another and a certain proportion between the desirable things and the one desiring or between means and end. Hence, brute animals, although they are moved to desiring things through thought and therefore a certain participation in this causality of the end happens in them, still, it is not perfect in them and for that reason it is not called the formal nature of the end.

10. It is gathered, secondly, that this causality of the end, as it is exercised in the will, is not properly found in God nor in his will but only in a created will which through a proper action and act distinct from itself is moved to the end. For, as I said, where there is no action of the agent, there is no actual motion of the end. But in the divine will there is no proper action which tends to the end, because the act by which God wills whatever he wills is not distinguished from his will nor is something made or caused. For nothing that is God himself can have a true cause, but the will of God is God himself. You may say: therefore God does not truly and properly act for the sake of a true end. I respond by denying the consequence, strictly speaking. For, as Gabriel noted in II, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1, it is one thing to speak of the end, but another to speak of the final cause. The end, moreover, only expresses a *terminus* or the nature of an extreme to which something else is ordered. But the final cause properly expresses that which moves the agent to acting. Although with respect to God and his will, the end does not have this causality, nevertheless, God orders his effects and external actions to determinate ends in a higher and more perfect way. And, therefore, he acts for the sake of an end in a most perfect way that is free from all imperfections. Secondly, because, although a proper cause is not given to the divine will, a reason can nevertheless be given for it on the part of the chosen end, as St. Thomas teaches in *SCG I*, c. 86. And in this way God can properly act for the sake of an end without causality of the end around the divine will. And by these things there is a sufficient response to the foundations of the other opinions in nn. 3–5. And it will become even more clear in the following section.

An assumption against this corollary is excluded first.

A second [assumption] is excluded.