

<10>²

CAPUT III.

Utrum recte describatur potestas libera esse, quae positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum potest agere, et non agere.

5 1. Punctum hoc tractavi in lib. 1. de Auxiliis, quia
illius resolutionem, et declarationem, ad intelligen-
dum usum libertatis, et concordiam eius cum gra-
tia censeo esse valde necessariam, et ob eandem
10 causam iterum hic praemittendum esse iudicavi,
quia nonnulli moderni, licet descriptionem, seu
propositionem illam simpliciter negare non audeant:
illam limitant variis modis, prout unicuique, ad
proprias sententias in aliis punctis defendendas
commodum videtur. Has ergo limitationes hic ex-
15 pendere necesse est, ut postea cum solido funda-
mento procedere valeamus. Ut autem intelligantur
limitationes, sciendum est, verbum illud, *potest*, in
descriptione positum, duobus modis accipi solere,
scilicet in <col. b> sensu composito, vel diviso, id
20 est, vel ut cum illis omnibus praerequisitis stare
simul possit, tam agere, quam non agere; vel ut

Verbum,
potest, in
sensu
composito et
diviso
accipitur.

CHAPTER III.

*Whether a power that after all the prerequisites for acting have been posited can both act and not act is rightly described as being free.*³

5R 1. I treated this point in Book I of *De concursu, motione et auxilio Dei*,⁴ since I think its resolution and explanation to be most necessary for understanding the use of freedom and its harmony with grace. For the same reason I judge that we should start here for a second time, since some
10R moderns, although they do not dare simply to deny that characterization or proposition, they restrict it in various ways as seems advantageous to each one in defending his own views in other points. It is necessary, therefore, to evaluate these restrictions here so that afterwards we can
15R proceed from a solid foundation.

But in order to understand these restrictions, one should know that it is usual to take that word ‘can’ in the posited characterization in two ways, namely, in a composed sense or in a divided sense. That is, either such that both acting and not acting are compatible with all those prerequisites,
20R or such that with those prerequisites standing the power

The word ‘can’ is taken in a composed sense and a divided sense.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1620 Lyon edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Coimbra, 1619). For recorded variants, B = 1620 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1620 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

My thanks to Shane Duarte, who generously commented on my translation and spared me from a number of errors and infelicities.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 7 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³Merely three years after the first publication of this work, the Spanish Franciscan Jeronimo Tamarit de Tavarria summarizes the present chapter in the identically titled chapter in his *Flores theologiae* (Valencia, 1622), tom. 1, pp. 495–96.

⁴The first of Suárez’s *Opuscula*, which can be found in vol 11 of the Vivès edition.

	stantibus illis praerequisitis potentia retineat integram libertatem suam, non tamen possit uti illa ad non agendum, nisi aliquod ex dictis praerequisitis auferatur.		retains its complete freedom yet cannot use it for not acting except with the removal of some one of the stated prerequisites.	
Prima limitatio aliquorum.	25 2. Primus ergo modus interpretandi, vel limitandi illam descriptionem est, ut si verbum, <i>potest</i> , accipiatur in sensu composito, limitanda sit ad praerequisita ex parte causarum secundarum, ut intellectus, obiecti, et phantasiae, et si quid est aliud simile, non tamen extendatur ad praerequisita ex parte Dei: tum quia praevius concursus est necessarius ex parte Dei, et tamen illo posito non potest voluntas agere, et non agere, sed tantum agere: tum etiam quia voluntas, qua Deus vult liberum arbitrium operari, est necessaria, ut arbitrium operetur, et est ex praerequisitis, quia praecedit ipsum actum, et determinationem voluntatis creatae: et posita illa Dei voluntate, non stat voluntatem creatam liberam non operari; ergo necessario ab illa descriptione excipienda sunt praerequisita ex parte primae causae. Ita opinatur Alvarez, disp. 115. Ledesma, art. 10. §. <i>Sed antequam</i> , post 7. concl. et alii.	25R 30R 35R 40R	2. The first way of interpreting or restricting that characterization, then, is (if the word ‘can’ is taken in the composed sense) that it should be restricted to the prerequisites on the part of secondary causes—such as the intellect, the object, the imagination, and anything else that is similar—and it should not be extended to the prerequisites on the part of God. This is both [i] because a previous concursus on the part of God is necessary, yet once it has been posited the will cannot both act and not act, but can only act, and also [ii] because the willing by which God wills freewill ⁵ to operate is necessary for freewill (<i>arbitrium</i>) to operate, and it is one of the prerequisites since it precedes the act itself and the determination of the created will. Once that willing by God has been posited, it does not remain possible for the created free will not to operate. It is necessary, therefore, to remove the prerequisites on the part of the first cause from that characterization. Alvarez thinks this in [<i>De auxiliis gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus</i>] disp. 115, and Pedro de Ledesma ⁶ in [<i>De divinae gratiae auxiliis</i>] art. 10, in the section starting ‘But before . . .’ after the 7th conclusion, as well as others.	The first restriction [proposed] by some.
Alvarez. Ledesma.				Alvarez. Ledesma.
Secunda limitatio.	3. Secundus modus limitandi descriptionem illam est, ut si intelligatur de omnibus praerequisitis, tam ex parte Dei, quam ex parte aliarum causarum, vel conditionum necessariarum, verbum, <i>potest</i> , accipiendum sit in sensu diviso, non in composito, respectu utriusque actus agendi, et non agendi,	45R 50R	3. The second way of restricting that characterization is so that if it is understood to include all prerequisites or necessary conditions, both on the part of God and on the part of the other causes, the word ‘can’ should be taken in the divided sense rather than the composed sense, with respect to each act of acting and not acting, which also are	The second restriction.

⁵I take ‘*liberum arbitrii*’ as a technical term naming the item under dispute. The equivalent term in contemporary philosophy might be ‘freedom of the will’, though it has the disadvantage of already suggesting a theory as to which faculty would provide us with this freedom. I will translate ‘*liberum arbitrii*’ with ‘freewill’ as a single word and reserve ‘freedom of the will’ for ‘*libertas voluntatis*’ where it is clear that it is the *will’s* freedom that is being considered. A benefit to using ‘freewill’ is that it is readily read as referring to a faculty rather than an act. A disadvantage, however, is that ‘*arbitrium*’ used by itself cannot be translated as ‘will’ because ‘will’ needs to be reserved for ‘*voluntas*’. I will translate ‘*arbitrium*’ with ‘choice’, even though that obscures the connection between ‘*arbitrium*’ and ‘*liberum arbitrium*’.

⁶There are at least two other scholastics with the name ‘Ledesma’, but Pedro de Ledesma seems the likeliest one for Suárez to have in mind here.

50 etiam divisim, seu sigillatim sumpti. Ita ut sensus
 sit, illam potentiam esse liberam, quae positis om-
 nibus requisitis, adhuc in se retinet potestatem non
 agendi, etiamsi stantibus illis omnibus praerequi-
 sitis, cum illis coniungi non possit, ut non agat, 55R
 55 sed oporteat aliquod ex illis praerequisitis auferri,
 ut potentia libera sua potestate non agendi utatur.
 Et simili modo quando talis potentia non agit, aut
 non vult, potestatem retinet agendi, et ideo libera
 est, non potest tamen coniungere actionem, vel voli-
 tionem cum solis illis praerequisitis, quae tunc con-
 currunt, quando non vult, nisi aliquid, quod deerat,
 addatur, et ordine naturae, seu causalitatis praece-
 dat. Et hunc etiam modum dicendi approbant dicti
 auctores: in quolibet autem alio sensu illam de-
 60 scriptionem reiciunt, quam etiam dicunt non esse
 ab Aristotele, D. Thoma, Magistro, vel aliquo gravi
 doctore traditam, sed ab Almaino, et quibus- <11>
 65 dam Nominalibus inventam. Et ita facile omnia
 contemnunt, quae de illa descriptione in lib. 1. de
 70 Auxiliis diximus.

Prima assertio,
 vera est
 definitio
 libertatis in
 titulo posita.
 Victoria.

4. Nihilominus iterum dicimus descriptionem
 illam optimam esse, et a gravissimis Auctoribus tra-
 ditam vel eisdem, vel aequivalentibus verbis. Imo
 existimo, ante nuperas controversias circa auxilium
 75 efficax gratiae exortas, descriptionem illam fuisse
 a Doctoribus, et in scholis communiter probatam,
 ut affirmat Victoria Relectiones de homine veniente
 ad usum rationis q. 1. propos. 3. ubi etiam ipse
 illam supponit, licet ad usum liberi arbitrii amplius
 requirat. Eamdem supponit tanquam communem
 80 Valentia 2. tom. disp. 8. q. 5. punct. 4. §. 4. ubi ait
 in hoc consistere essentialiter libertatem actionis.
 Eamdem ponit, ut receptam sententiam Corduba
 in lib. 1. Quaestionarum q. 55. dub. 9. et 10. et
 sumitur ex Nemesio lib. de Natura hominis cap.
 85 35. dicente, *Esse autem liberum, si eisdem positis
 causis in nobis esset aliquando appetere, aliquando*

taken separately or individually. Thus the sense is that that
 power is free which still retains in itself the power not to act
 once all the prerequisites are posited, even though it is not
 possible for it to not act when all those prerequisites obtain.
 Rather, some one of those prerequisites must be removed in
 order for the free power to use its capacity for not acting. In
 a similar way when such a power does not act or does not
 will, it retains the capacity to act, and for that reason it is
 free, although it cannot conjoin that action or volition with
 precisely those prerequisites that concur in the case where it
 does not will, unless something that is absent is added and
 surpasses the order of nature or of causality.

The mentioned authors also approve this way of speaking,
 but they reject any other sense of that characterization,
 which they also say is not handed down by Aristotle, St.
 Thomas, the Master, or any other important doctor, but was
 invented by Jacques Almain and other nominalists. And
 thus they easily scorn everything that we said about that
 characterization in Book I of *De concursu, motione et auxilio
 Dei*. 65R 70R

4. Nevertheless, we say again that that characterization
 is best and was handed down by the most important authors,
 either in the same words or in equivalent words. In fact, I
 think that before the appearance of the recent controversies
 about the efficacious help of grace that characterization
 was commonly proved by the doctors and in the schools,
 as Francisco de Vitoria affirms in *Relectiones theologicae*
 XIII ('On that to which one is held who is coming to the
 use of reason'), q. 1, propos. 3, where he also presupposes
 it, even though it is more required for the use of freewill.
 Gregory of Valencia supposes the same as the common view
 in *Commentariorum theologorum tomi quatuor* II, disp. 8. q.
 5, punct. 4, §4, where he says freedom of action consists
 essentially in this. Antonio de Córdoba takes this as the
 received view in *Quaestionarium theologicum libris quinque
 distinctum* I, q. 55, dub. 9 and 10, and it is taken from
 Nemesius, *On Human Nature*, ch. 35, where he says: 'but to

The first
 assertion: the
 definition of
 freedom
 posited in the
 title is true.

Vitoria.

Gregory of
 Valencia.

Córdoba.

Nemesius.

Scotus. Gabriel. Ockham. Marsilius. Dionysius. Henricus. Hervaeus. Soto. Curielus.

90 *refugere, etc.* Et ex Scoto 2. d. 25. q. unica in fine, et ibi Gabriel n. 3. dub. 3. et 4. et in 1. d. 48. cap. 3. et ibi Ockham et quodlibet 1. q. 16. et Marsilius 2. q. 16. art. 4. et Dionysius Cisterciensis 2. d. 25. art. 2. concl. 2. et art. 3. concl. 4. Henricus quodlibet 1. q. 16. Hervaeus quodlibet 1. q. 1. Soto lib. 1. de Natura et Gratia cap. 16. ubi ponit illam, ut

95 receptam definitionem liberi arbitrii. Et novissime consentit Curielus *Controversiae* 2. in Epistola 2. D. Petri n. 234. Denique ex Aristotele ac D. Thoma paulo post illam comprobabimus. Ratio autem potissima est, quia per illa verba optime declaratur

100 internum dominium voluntatis in actiones suas, et proxima potestas operandi, et non operandi, vel operandi contrarium, quae vix potest aliis verbis commodius explicari.

Pronuntiata liberi arbitrii.

105 5. Assumptum declaratur imprimis per varias definitiones liberi arbitrii ab aliis traditas breviter discurrendo. Quinque sumi possunt ex Illustrissimo Bellarmino lib. 3. de Gratia et libero arbitro et ipse addit sextam, quae tamen proprie definitiones non sunt, sed quaedam sunt simplices assertiones aliquarum proprietatum liberi arbitrii. Tale enim est, quod liberum arbitrium sit *rationalis voluntas*, vel quod sit *potestas servandi rectitudinem propter ipsam rectitudinem*. Aliae quodammodo involvunt definitum in definitione, ut cum dicitur arbitrium esse *liberum de ratione iudicium*, ut ex Philosophis refert D. Thomas <col. b> 1. 2. q. 17. art. 1. ad 2. cum Magistro in 2. d. 25. in principio, vel esse *habitum animi liberum sui*, vel esse *consensum ob inamissibilem animi libertatem*, vel *liberam potestatem eligendi, aut acceptandi, et respuendi*. Ut

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115

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D. Thomas. Magister.

be free is, if the same causes are posited in us, sometimes to seek, sometimes to flee . . .’ It is also taken from Scotus, II, d. 25, the end of the only question; Gabriel, II, d. 25, n. 3, dub. 3 and 4, and I, d. 48, ch. 3; Ockham, I, d. 48, ch. 3, and *Quodlibet* 1, q. 16; Marsilius of Inghen, II, q. 16, art. 4; Dionysius the Cistercian,⁷ II, d. 25, art. 2, concl. 2, and art. 3, concl. 4; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 1, q. 16; Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* 1, q. 1; and Domingo de Soto, *On Nature and Grace* I, ch. 16, where he assumes it as the received definition of freewill. And very recently Juan Alfonso Curiel agrees in *Controversiae in diversa loca Sacrae Scripturae* II, in n. 234 of the part on 2 Pet. Finally, we will confirm it a little later from Aristotle and St. Thomas. But by far the chief reason is that the internal control of the will over its actions and the proximate capacity to act and not to act or to act contrarily is best revealed through those words. It can hardly be explained more helpfully through other words.

5. The assumption is confirmed especially through briefly discussing the different definitions of freewill given by others. Five can be taken from the most illustrious Bellarmine, *On Grace and Freewill* III, and he himself adds a sixth, although they are not properly definitions but a kind of simple assertion of some properties of freewill. For it is of this sort [to assert] that freewill is a ‘rational willing’ or that it is a ‘capacity for serving rectitude for the sake of rectitude itself’. Others in a certain way include what is defined in the definition, as when it is said that choice (*arbitrium*) is a ‘free judgement of reason’, as St. Thomas reports some philosophers saying in *ST* IaIIae.17.1 ad 2, along with the Master in II, at the start of d. 25. Or it is said to be a ‘habit of the mind, free of itself’,⁸ or to be a ‘consent of the soul on account of a freedom that cannot be lost’, or a ‘free power to elect or accept and to reject’.

For even if I disregard the other defects that can be

Scotus. Gabriel. Ockham. Marsilius. Dionysius. Henry of Ghent. Hervaeus Natalis. Soto. Curiel.

Accounts of freewill.

St. Thomas. The Master.

⁷Is there a Cistercian Dionysius or does Suárez mean Denis the Carthusian, i.e., Dionysius Cartusienensis?

⁸Bernard of Clairvaux, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 1.

<p>125</p> <p>Idem.</p> <p>130</p> <p>135</p> <p>D. Thomas.</p> <p>140</p> <p>145</p> <p>Dominium quid sit.</p> <p>150</p> <p>Aristoteles. D. Thomas.</p> <p>155</p>	<p>enim omittam alios defectus, qui in his locutionibus, si ut propriae definitiones accipiantur, notari possunt; quoties nomen, <i>liberi</i>, vel <i>libertatis</i>, in definitione ponitur, definitio involvit definitum, et aeque obscura manet, quia cum liberum arbitrium definiendum proponitur, maxime declarari desideratur, quid significet illud, <i>liberum</i>, vel quid sit illa libertas, unde liberum denominatur, hoc autem in illis descriptionibus non declaratur, sed reperitur, et ideo dico in illis definitum involvi. E contrario vero cum Magister in 2. d. 24. dicit liberum arbitrium esse <i>facultatem voluntatis, et rationis, qua bonum, vel malum eligitur</i>, nec adaequate explicat facultatem illam; quia libertas non solum in electione, sed etiam in aliis actibus voluntatis, nec solum in electione inter bonum, et malum, sed in electione inter plura bona exerceri potest: neque etiam declarat quid sit electionem, aut consensum, vel volitionem esse liberam, quod maxime desideratur. Unde D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. non definiendo, sed asserendo dixit, <i>liberum arbitrium esse facultatem voluntatis, et rationis</i>, et quasi tacite complens descriptionem, addidit illam facultatem esse <i>per quam homo est dominus suorum actuum</i>. Per hoc insinuans, libertatem potentiae consistere in dominio sui actus. Dominium autem est facultas utendi, et non utendi, seu faciendi, et non faciendi, et ideo moderni aliqui liberum arbitrium dicunt esse <i>facultatem voluntatis, et rationis ad utrumlibet</i>, id est, agendum, vel non agendum, et agendum unum, vel alterum. Quod quidem vere dictum est, et ex Aristotele desumptum 9. Metaphysicorum cap. 3. alias text. 12. et ex D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 6. art. 2. ad 2. et q. 13. et 1. p. q. 83. ut autem illud sit proprium liberi arbitrii, debet intelligi de potentia proxima, alias non erit illud proprium potentiae formaliter liberae; ergo ad hoc explicandum necessarium est addere particulam in dicta descriptione positam,</p>	<p>125R</p> <p>130R</p> <p>135R</p> <p>140R</p> <p>145R</p> <p>150R</p> <p>155R</p> <p>found in these phrases if they are taken as proper definitions, every time the name ‘free’ or ‘freedom’ is placed in the definition, the definition includes what is defined and remains just as obscure. For when freewill is put forward to be defined, one especially desires to be shown what that word ‘free’ signifies or what that freedom is in reference to which it is denominated free. But this is not explained in those characterizations but rather is found in them. For this reason I say that what is being defined is found in the characterizations. But, conversely, when the Master says in II, d. 24, that freewill is the ‘faculty of the will and of reason by which good and bad are elected’, he neither adequately explains that faculty (for freedom can be exercised not only in election but also in other acts of the will and not only in electing between good and bad but also in electing between multiple goods) nor does he reveal what it is for an election, consent, or volition to be free, which is what was especially desired. Hence, St. Thomas said in <i>ST IaIIae.1.1</i>, not in defining but in asserting, that ‘freewill is a faculty of the will and of reason’, and as it were silently completing the characterization, he adds that that faculty is the one ‘through which a human being is in control of his acts’. He suggests through this that a power’s freedom consists in its control over its acts. Control, moreover, is the faculty of using and not using or doing and not doing. For this reason, some moderns say that freewill is the ‘faculty of the will and of reason for either’, that is, for doing and not doing and for doing one thing or another. This indeed was truly said, and it was selected from Aristotle, <i>Metaphysics IX</i>, ch. 3, text. 12, and elsewhere, and from St. Thomas, <i>ST IaIIae.6.2 ad 2</i>, <i>IaIIae.13</i>, and <i>Ia.83</i>. But as that is a proprium of freewill, it must be understood of a proximate power. Otherwise that would not be a proprium of a formally free power. Therefore, in order to explain this it is necessary to add the phrase posited in the given characterization: ‘after all prerequisites for acting have been posited’.</p>	<p>The Master.</p> <p>St. Thomas.</p> <p>What control is.</p> <p>Aristotle. St. Thomas.</p>
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positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum.

Ex 160 6. Utrumque declarare possumus intellectum
aequiparatione ad intellectum probatur. cum voluntate comparando: nam etiam intellectus
165 sicut voluntas: ergo necesse est hoc discrimen in
definitione liberi arbitrii explicare, quod sine illis
170 particulis non fit. Supponimus enim, liberum arbi-
trium non esse plures potentias divisim sumptas,
nec collectionem earum, sed unam solam, quae sit
175 domina suorum actuum; esse autem facultatem
agendi unum, et oppositum, vel agendi, et non
agendi, non uni tantum, sed multis potentiis con-
180 venit, ut dictum est de intellectu; et suo modo con-
venit etiam appetitui sensitivo, et multo magis vol-
untati: ergo per hanc facultatem ad utrumlibet gen-
185 eratim et indistincte sumptam non explicatur pro-
prietas illius unicae, ac simplicis potentiae, quae est
liberum arbitrium, nec propria ratio, per quam in ra-
tione potentiae formaliter liberae constituitur. Ergo
ad hoc explicandum merito additur, esse potentiam,
190 quae habet facultatem agendi, et non agendi positis
omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum. Per hanc enim
ultimam particulam optime explicatur vis intrinseca
liberae potentiae ad eliciendum, vel sustinendum
195 actum sola sua potestate, et non ex defectu alicuius
conditionis necessariae ad agendum, vel non agen-
dum.

Sola voluntas potest efficere, et suspendere actum positus omnibus requisitis. 190
195 7. Unde quia hic modus operandi soli voluntati
convenit, ideo illa est formaliter libera, et liberum
arbitrium. Intellectus autem non habet hanc facul-
tatem intrinsecam ita indifferentem, ut sese possit
determinare ad actum, vel suspendere illum, aut ad
oppositum se determinare. Nam si obiecti veritas
sit evidens, et sufficienter proponatur, ex neces-
sitate naturali praebet assensum; si vero non sit
190R 195R 185R 180R 175R 170R 165R 160R
evidens, sed probabilis, vel credibilis appareat, non

6. We can make both clear by comparing intellect and will. For intellect also has the capacity to act and not act, to believe and not believe, or to dissent and assent, and yet it is not formally free as the will is. It is necessary, then, to explain this difference in the definition of freewill. That cannot happen without the phrase in question. For we assume that freewill is neither multiple powers taken separately nor a collection of powers, but is one power alone that is the controller of its acts. But to be a capacity to do one thing and to do its opposite or to act and not to act applies not just to one power but to many, as was said about the intellect. It applies in its way even to the sensitive appetite, and much more to the will. Therefore, this capacity for either, taken in a general and imprecise way, does not explain the peculiar nature (*proprietas*) of this unique and simple power that is freewill, nor the proper *ratio* through which it is constituted in the *ratio* of a formally free power. In order to explain this [kind of power], therefore, one rightly adds that it is a power that has the capacity to act and not to act after all the prerequisites for acting have been posited. For it is through this last phrase that one best explains the intrinsic force of a free power to elicit or sustain an act through its power alone and not just as the result of the absence of some condition necessary for acting or for not acting.

7. Hence, since this way of operating applies only to the will, it for that reason is formally free and is freewill. The intellect, however, does not have this intrinsic faculty indifferent in such a way that it can determine itself to act or to suspend that act or to determine itself to an opposite act. For if the truth of the object is evident and it is sufficiently proposed, the intellect gives assent by a natural necessity. But if it is not evident but only appears probable or credible, the intellect cannot determine itself except by

It is proven from a comparison to the intellect.

The will alone can effect and suspend an act once all the prerequisites have been posited.

potest sese determinare, nisi intercedente voluntate
 (ut in fide Christiana certum est, et idem est cum
 200 proportione in humana). Et tunc nunquam intellec- 195R
 tus, positus omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest
 agere, et non agere, quia unum ex praerequisitis
 ad agendum est, ut moveatur a voluntate, et posita
 tali motione non potest non agere, illa autem non
 205 posita, necessario non agit, non tam ex potentia 200R
 non agendi, quam ex impotentia agendi. Voluntas
 autem positus omnibus requisitis ad agendum, sicut
 potest agere ex interna facultate se determinando,
 sine motione alterius potentiae, ita ex eadem interna
 210 facultate potest non agere, suspendendo suum in- 205R
 fluxum ex interna vi, et dominio, vel etiam ex eadem
 facultate aliud, seu contrarium agendo, si ex parte
 obiecti suffi- <col. b> ciens propositio ad utrumque
 facta sit. Per illam ergo particulam optime com-
 215 pletur descriptio liberi arbitrii, non excludendo, vel 210R
 reprobando alias, sed explicando, de qua potestate
 agendi intelligi debeant, ut bonae sint, utique de
 potestate proxima, quae per se ad utramque partem
 flecti possit sine mutatione status, ut sic dicam, per
 quam scilicet mutationem impotens ad agendum,
 220 vel non agendum fiat. 215R

Particula,
 positus
 omnibus
 requisitis,
 complet
 definitionem
 liberi arbitrii.

Secunda
 assertio.
 Descriptio
 libertatis in
 sensu
 composito est 225
 intelligenda.

8. Secundo hinc dicimus, descriptionem illam
 in sensu composito esse intelligendam, sicut ab om-
 nibus auctoribus, qui illam attigerunt, est intellecta.
 Et probatur facile, quia positus omnibus praerequisi-
 220 tis ad agendum, posse non agere in sensu diviso, id 220R
 est, retinere potestatem ad non agendum, ablata ali-
 qua conditione ex praerequisitis, non est proprium
 potentiae liberae, sed cuilibet naturaliter agenti con-
 venit. Nam sol etiam ita illuminat, cum omnia req-
 230 uisita concurrunt, ut possit non illuminare, si fen- 225R
 estrae claudantur, et oculus videt obiectum impri-
 mens speciem, et aptus est ad carendum visione, si
 auferatur species: et intellectus ipse dum credit a
 voluntate motus potens est ad non credendum, si

the intercession of will (as is certain in the case of Christian
 faith and the same is true with proportion in human cases).
 Even in that case no intellect, once all the prerequisites for
 acting have been posited, can both act and not act, since
 one of the prerequisites for acting is that it be moved by
 the will. By positing such a motion it cannot fail to act, but
 if it is not posited then it necessarily does not act, not so
 much from a power for not acting but from an inability to
 act. But the will, once all the prerequisites for acting have
 been posited, just as it can act from an internal capacity
 for determining itself without the motion of another power,
 so also from the same internal capacity it can not act, by
 suspending its influence with its internal power and control.
 By the same capacity, it can also do something else or do
 a contrary thing, if on the part of the object a sufficient
 proposal of each option was made. Therefore, through that
 phrase the characterization of freewill is best filled in, not
 by excluding or rejecting the other ones, but by explaining
 of what power of acting it should be understood so that it
 is good. It should certainly be understood of a proximate
 power that through itself can turn to either option without
 a change in its state (if I may call it that), through which
 change, namely, it is made unable to act or unable not to
 act.

8. Second, from this we say that that characterization
 should be understood in the composed sense, just as it is
 understood by all the authors who touch on it. This is easily
 proven, because that something is able not to act in the
 divided sense once all the prerequisites for acting have been
 posited—that is, that it retain the capacity for not acting with
 the removal of some condition among the prerequisites—is
 not the proprium of a free power but applies to anything
 acting naturally. For the sun also illuminates in that way
 with all the prerequisites concurring, so that it is able not
 to illuminate if the windows are closed, and the eye sees
 an object that is imprinting a species but is ready to lack
 that vision if the species is removed. And the intellect itself
 that believes as long as it is moved by the will is able not

The phrase
 'once all the
 prerequisites
 have been
 posited' fills in
 the definition
 of freewill.

The 2nd
 assertion: the
 characteriza-
 tion of freedom
 should be
 understood in
 the composed
 sense.

	235	voluntas aut non moveat, aut in contrarium actum inclinat: non enim suam potentiam in actu primo, quam innatam habet ad utrumque actum, amittit, quando ad credendum per voluntatem applicatur: ergo positis omnibus requisitis est potentia non cre-	230R	to believe if the will either ceases to move it or inclines it to some contrary act. For it does not lose its power in first act that it has innately for either act when it is applied to believing by the will. Therefore, once all the prerequisites have been posited, the power not to believe or to dissent still exists in the divided sense. That, then, is not enough	
	240	240 est satis ad potentiam formaliter liberam: vel di- cendum est, intellectum esse potentiam formaliter liberam, quod nec verum est, neque a dictis auc- toribus admittitur: ergo ut illis verbis formalis lib- ertas voluntatis explicetur, necesse est, ut in sensu	235R	for a power to be formally free. Or it must be said that the intellect is a formally free power. But that is not true and is not granted by the mentioned authors. Therefore, in order to explain the formal freedom of the will through those words, it is necessary that they be taken in the composed sense.	
	245	245 composito accipiantur.	240R		
Probatur ex voluntate beata.		9. Idem argumentum sumi potest ex ipsamet voluntate: nam in beatitudine non libere, sed neces- sario beatus amat Deum, quia positus praerequisitis ad illum amorem, non potest non amare in sensu		9. The same argument can be taken from the will itself. For in the blessed state, the blessed do not love God freely but love him necessarily, since once the prerequisites for that love have been posited, they cannot not love in the composed sense, yet here also they retain the power not to love in the divided sense. For if the vision that is a prerequisite for that love were removed, the will would be able to cease from that love (as happened in the case of Paul, if he saw God when he was taken up ⁹). Nor is it relevant that that necessity comes from a different source, namely, from the force of the object or of the vision, since, nevertheless, the power not to love remains in the divided sense under that necessity, and it is only about this that a comparison is being made. In addition, the will acts from necessity and without freedom in undeliberated acts of the kind to which the motions of <i>gratia excitans</i> belong. For once all the previous prerequisites for that act are posited, the will cannot restrain that act, yet it can cease from it in the divided sense, as is clear. In fact, the same kind of indifference can even be found in brute animals. For they can spontaneously both move and rest, and move to one option and to the opposite option. For this reason Aristotle said in <i>Physics</i> VIII, text. 40, that they have it in themselves to move and not to move. And so when all the prerequisites for desiring	It is proven with reference to the blessed will.
	250	250 composito, et nihilominus ibi etiam retinet potes- tatem non amandi in sensu diviso: nam si visio ad illum amorem requisita auferatur, poterit voluntas ab illo amore cessare; sicut in Paulo contigit, si in	245R		
Evasionis ventilatio.	255	255 raptu Deum vidit. Neque refert, quod illa necessitas aliunde proveniat, nimirum ex vi obiecti, et visio- nis, quia nihilominus sub illa manet potestas ad non amandum in sensu diviso, et in hoc tantum	250R		Airing an evasion.
	260	260 <13> fit aequiparatio. Deinde voluntas in actibus indeliberatis, quales sunt etiam motus gratiae ex- citantis, ex necessitate, et sine libertate operatur: quia positus praeviis requisitis ad illum actum, non potest actum continere, cum tamen in sensu di- viso possit ab illo cessare, ut constat. Quin potius	255R		
Idem in brutis probatur.	265	265 etiam in brutis idem genus indifferentiae invenire- tur, possunt enim sponte sua, et moveri, et qui- escere, et ad unam partem, et ad oppositum moveri.	260R		The same is proven in the case of brute animals. Aristotle.
Aristoteles.	270	270 Propter quod dixit Aristoteles 8. Physicorum text. 40. habere in seipsis moveri, et non moveri, et ideo quando positus omnibus requisitis aliquid appetunt,			

⁹See 1 Cor. 12:1-4.

potestatem retinent ad cessandum ab illo appetitu, 265R
 et ad contrarium appetendum in sensu diviso, id
 est, si aliquod ex illis praerequisitis auferatur, vel
 aliud diversum adhibeatur. Et nihilominus, quia
 275 positis praerequisitis ita ad unum determinantur,
 ut in sensu composito, id est, illis stantibus, nec 270R
 aliud appetere, nec ab illo appetitu cessare valeant,
 ideo sine libertate operantur. Unde D. Thomas q. 24.
 de Veritate art. 2. *In brutis (ait) est quaedam simil-*
 280 *itudo liberi arbitrii, in quantum possunt agere, vel*
non agere unum, et idem, secundum suum iudicium, 275R
[...] sed quia eorum iudicium est determinatum ad
unum, per consequens eorum appetitus, et actio ad
unum determinatur. Et in solutione ad 2. et 3. dicit
 285 *esse in brutis quamdam indifferentiam actionum,*
quia eorum potentia motiva non magis inclinatur ex 280R
se ad unum motum, quam ad alium, et idem suo
modo esse in appetitu eorum, et tamen non esse
 290 *libertatem, quia posita apprehensione, et iudicio*
phantasiae, ad unum determinantur. Ex quibus
verbis colligimus, necessarium esse ad libertatem, 285R
ut stante eodem iudicio cum talibus praerequisitis
 295 *tam actio, quam non actio sit in potestate agentis,*
nec satis esse, quod in eo sit potestas ad agendum,
et non agendum, variato iudicio: nam hanc etiam 290R
potestatem habent bruta: eadem autem ratio est de
caeteris praerequisitis, ut mox dicam.

something are posited, they retain the power in the divided
 sense (that is, if one of those prerequisites is removed or
 another different one is introduced) for ceasing from that
 desire and for desiring something contrary. Nevertheless,
 since once the prerequisites have been posited they are
 determined to one thing in such a way that in the composed
 sense (that is, with the prerequisites in place) they do not
 have the power to desire something else or to cease from
 that desire, they operate without freedom. Hence St. Thomas
 says in *On Truth*, q. 24, art. 2: ‘There is a certain semblance
 of freewill in brute animals, insofar as they can, according
 to their judgement, do or not do one and the same thing
 But because their judgement is determined to one thing,
 their appetite and action are consequently also determined
 to one thing.’ And in ad 2 and 3 he says that in brute animals
 there is a certain indifference in their actions, since their
 motive power is not of itself more inclined to one motion
 than another and the same is true in its way with their
 appetite. And yet they are not free, since they are determined
 to one course once the apprehension and the judgement of
 imagination are posited. From these words we gather that it
 is necessary for freedom that while standing with the same
 judgement along with such prerequisites both the action and
 non-action are in the power of the agent. It is not enough
 that the power for acting and not acting be in it with changed
 judgements. For brute animals also have this power. The
 argument is the same, moreover, for the other prerequisites,
 as I will say shortly.

St. Thomas.

Ratio
 convincens.

10. Ratio denique hanc partem convincit, quia
 non quaelibet potestas agendi, et non agendi ad
 300 libertatem sufficit, sed illa quae est ex interna potes-
 tate, et eminenti virtute, ac dominio (ut in praece-
 denti capite declaravi:) at vero ita operari positus
 omnibus requisitis ad agendum, ut solum possit fac-
 ultas ab operatione cessare in sensu diviso, id est,
 305 sublato aliquo ex requisitis, non est posse cessare 300R
 ex interna potestate, et dominio actionis: ergo non
 satis est ad libertatem. Minor <col. b> probatur,

10. Finally, reason establishes this part, since not just
 any power for acting and not acting suffices for freedom,
 but [only] that which results from an internal capacity and
 eminent power and control (as I showed in the previous
 chapter). On the other hand, to operate in such a way that
 once all the prerequisites for acting have been posited the
 faculty can only cease from operation in the divided sense—
 that is, by removing something from the prerequisites—is not
 to be able to cease by virtue of an internal power and control
 over the action. Therefore, it is not enough for freedom. The

Establishing
reason.

310 quia tunc non cessatur ex potestate non agendi, sed
 potius ex impotentia agendi, quia nimirum nulla
 Confirmatio. 310R causa agere valet, nisi positis omnibus requisitis ad
 315 agendum. Et confirmatur, quia alias postquam vol-
 untas positis omnibus praerequisitis velle incepit,
 non poterit sua sponte ab actuali voluntate ces-
 sare, stantibus iisdem praerequisitis, sed oportebit
 315R aliquod illorum auferri, ut ipsa cesset; hoc autem
 est, et contra experientiam, et contra usum liber-
 tatis: ergo. Sequela probatur: nam eadem est ratio
 de inceptioe actus, et de perseverantia in illo: imo
 320 aliqui existimant magis necessariam esse continua-
 tionem, quam inceptioem, saltem pro brevi morula,
 quod nec verum est, nec nostra nunc refert: satis
 315R enim est, quod aequalis ratio intercedat. Si ergo
 voluntas, stantibus omnibus praerequisitis ad per-
 severandum, potest sua sponte, et interna vi ab
 325 amando cessare, componendo simul illam cessa-
 tionem cum illis praerequisitis, eadem profecto, vel
 maiori ratione poterit non inchoare amorem, stan-
 tibus omnibus praerequisitis, negationem agendi
 cum eisdem praerequisitis simul componendo, vel
 330 si hoc posterius non potest, profecto nec illud prius
 potest. Unde ulterius confirmatur a contrario, quia
 si positis illis praerequisitis non relinquitur potestas
 non agendi in sensu composito, ergo ex potentia sic
 constituta cum omnibus praerequisitis necessario
 335 sequitur actio; ergo talis actio non est libera, cum
 ex necessitate sequatur ad potentiam antecedenter
 ad omnem usum libertatis ita dispositam, ut cum
 tali dispositione non possit actionem continere, et
 sine illa praeparatione non possit illam elicere.

335R

Ultima 340 11. Tandem confirmatur, quia ex altera senten-
 confirmatio ex absurdo oppositae sententiae. Capreolus. 340R
 332 si] sic B.

minor is proven: for in that case it would not cease in virtue
 of a power for not acting but in virtue of an inability to act,
 namely, because no cause has the strength to act without
 all the prerequisites for acting having been posited.

It is confirmed, for otherwise after the will begins to will
 once all the prerequisites have been posited, it could not
 spontaneously cease from the actual willing as long as the
 same prerequisites stand. It would be necessary that some-
 thing be removed from the prerequisites in order to cease
 from that willing. But this is both contrary to experience and
 contrary to the use of freedom. Therefore. The consequence
 is proven: for the reasoning is the same about the inception
 of the act as about persevering in it. In fact, some people
 think the continuation is more necessary than the inception,
 at least for brief delays. This is neither true nor relevant
 for us at present. For it is enough that there be an equal
 reason. If, therefore, the will once all the prerequisites for
 persevering have been posited can spontaneously and by
 an internal power cease from loving, by bringing together at
 the same time that cessation with those prerequisites, then
 surely there is just as much reason or more that it could
 not begin to love with all the prerequisites standing, but
 bringing together at the same time a negation of acting with
 the same prerequisites. Or, if the latter is not possible, then
 certainly the former is not possible either. Hence, it is further
 confirmed *a contrario*. For if with those prerequisites posited
 the power not to act does not remain in the composed sense,
 then the action necessarily follows from the power set up
 in that way with all the prerequisites. Therefore, such an
 action is not free, since it follows of necessity on the power
 in that condition antecedently to any use of freedom, so that
 when it is in such a condition the power cannot hold back
 the action and without that preparation cannot elicit it.

Confirmation.

11. Finally, it is confirmed by the fact that it follows from
 the other view that the will never has the proximate power to
 act and not to act. But the consequent is contrary to the use

The last
 confirmation
 from the
 absurdity of
 the opposite
 view.
 Capreolus.

Potentia in
sensu diviso
est potentia
remota.

est contra libertatis usum: ergo. Sequela probatur,
quia ut recte dixit Capreolus in 2. d. 28. q. 1. art. 3. 340R
345 ad 2. et 3. contra quartam conclusionem, potentia
in solo sensu diviso solum est potentia remota, et
potentia proxima includit omnia requisita ad actum,
ut supra ex Scoto retulimus. Et probatur clare,
quia illa, quae dicitur potestas solum in sensu di- 345R
350 viso, non potest immediate reduci ad actum, sed
oportet, ut praecedat aliqua dispositio, aut mutatio,
qua potentia reddatur proxima, acquirendo aliquid
necessarium ad actum, vel tollendo impedimentum
actus, ut homo carens lumine gloriae dicitur potens 350R
355 ad videndum Deum, non in <14> sensu composito,
sed diviso, id est, ablata illa carentia, et ideo illa
potentia est remota: idemque in universum inveni-
etur in omni actu possibili in sensu tantum diviso.
Si ergo voluntas positis omnibus praerequisitis ad 355R
360 agendum, potest non agere tantum in sensu diviso,
non est tunc potentia proxima ad non agendum, sed
tantum potentia remota. Et e contrario quando non
habet omnia praerequisita ad agendum, non est
potentia proxima ad agendum, sed tantum remota, 360R
365 nunquam ergo est potentia proxima ad agendum,
et non agendum, sed ad alterum tantum. Minor
autem, seu falsitas consequentis probatur, quia hoc
modo tollitur in effectu verus usus libertatis: quia
potestas remota revera non exercetur, nec reduci- 365R
370 tur in actum, nisi in statu proximo constituta, ut
potestas, quam habet album, ut sit nigrum, non re-
ducitur in actum, nisi ablata albedine, et quamdiu
illa potentia est sub albedine, non exercet actum al-
terius potestatis, et sic de aliis; ergo si voluntas nun- 370R
375 quam est in potentia proxima ad utrumque actum
agendi, et non agendi, vel agendi hoc, aut illud, nun-
quam exercet potestatem liberam, quia solum eam
partem exercet, ad quam proxime est praeparata.

of freedom. Therefore. The consequence is proven: as Capreolus rightly said in II, d. 28, q. 1, art. 3, ad 2 and 3, against the fourth conclusion, that a power in the divided sense alone is only a remote power and that a proximate power includes all the prerequisites for the act, as we reported from Scotus above. It is clearly proven, for that which is called a power only in the divided sense cannot be immediately reduced to act, but it is necessary that some condition or change precede by which the power is rendered proximate, by acquiring something necessary for the act or removing something impeding the act. For example, a human being lacking the light of glory is said to be able to see God, not in the composed sense but in the divided sense, that is, by the removal of that lack, and for this reason that power is remote. The same thing is universally found in every act that is possible only in the divided sense. If, therefore, once all the prerequisites for acting have been posited the will is able not to act only in the divided sense, it is not in this case a proximate power for not acting, but only a remote power. Conversely, when it does not have all the prerequisites for acting, it is not a proximate power for acting but only a remote power. Therefore, it is never a proximate power for both acting and not acting, but only for one or the other. But the minor or the falsity of the consequent is proven, for in this way the true use of freedom is removed in the effect. For a remote power is not really exercised or reduced to act except when constituted in a proximate state. For example, in order to be black a power that has white cannot be reduced to act except the whiteness be removed. As long as that power is under whiteness, it cannot exercise the act of the other capacity. And so on for the other cases. Therefore, if the will is never in proximate power to both the act of doing and the act of not doing, or to doing this or that, it never exercises a free power, since it only exercises that part to which it was proximately prepared. This is especially convincing if the matter is considered morally. For no use of freedom is given

A power in the
divided sense
is a remote
power.

346 solo] *om.* V.

380 Quod maxime urget, rem moraliter considerando: 375R
 quia non datur usus libertatis, nisi quando oper-
 anti imputari potest carentia actionis, et e converso:
 at vero ad hoc non satis est potentia remota, quae
 non potest ad proximam reduci per ipsam volun-
 385 tatem, qualis est illa potestas in sensu diviso: quia 380R
 positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum, quae
 antecedunt libertatem, non est in potestate hominis
 cum illis componere carentiam actionis: ergo non
 potest illi imputari, quod tunc non absteineat a tali
 390 actione: ergo nec actio ipsa illi potest tribui, tan- 385R
 quam libera, id est, tanquam procedens ex dominio
 agendi, et non agendi, ut ergo per illam descrip-
 tionem vera libertas explicetur, oportet, ut in sensu
 composito intelligatur.

Tertia assertio
 subterfugia
 praeccludens.

395 12. Dico tertio, descriptionem intelligendam
 esse de omnibus praerequisitis sive ex parte Dei,
 sive ex parte aliarum causarum, et nisi ita intel- 390R
 ligatur, non satis definiri libertatem, ut in actum
 liberum in ipso usu prodire possit. Haec assertio
 solum ponitur propter priorem partem: nam de al-
 400 tera non est controversia. Est autem iuxta mentem
 antiquorum doctorum, qui descriptionem illam tra- 395R
 diderunt, vel ut certam supposuerunt; quia nec Dei
 concursum, aut voluntatem ab illa excipiunt, sed
 pu- <col. b> tant, vel non pertinere ad illa praereq-
 405 uisita, vel si aliquo modo pertinet, cum illa, et aliis,
 ut antecedunt, posse componi tam agere, quam 400R
 non agere divisim sumpta, ut videre licet in Cor-
 duba. duba supra, et aliis, quos ipse refert, et propterea
 410 dicere etiam solet non posse eundem effectum esse
 simul evitabilem in ordine ad causam secundam, et
 evitabilem in ordine ad primam, ut sentit Caietanus 405R
 1. p. q. 21. art. 4. et Waldensis lib. 1. *Doctrinale*
 fidei cap. 28. Occam in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Gregorius q.
 22. art. 3. Gabriel art. 2. Et propterea cum tota con-
 415 troversia versetur circa concursum, vel motionem
 divinam, in illa sola limitare generalem assertionem, 410R

unless when a lack of action can be imputed to the agent
 and conversely. But a remote power that cannot be reduced
 to a proximate power through the will itself (that power in
 the divided sense is of this sort) is not sufficient for this. For
 once all the prerequisites for acting that precede freedom
 have been posited, it is not in the power of a human being
 to bring those together with the lack of an action. Therefore,
 it cannot be imputed to him that in that case he did not
 abstain from such an action. Therefore, the action itself also
 cannot be attributed to him as free, that is, as proceeding
 from a control over acting and not acting. It is necessary,
 then, to understand that characterization in the composed
 sense in order for true freedom to be explained through it.

12. I say, third: that characterization should be under-
 stood to be about all the prerequisites, whether on the part
 of God or on the part of other causes. Unless understood in
 that way, it is not sufficient for defining freedom, so that it
 can advance to a free act from a use of that freedom. This
 assertion is only made on account of the first part, for the
 other part is not controversial. It is, moreover, according to
 the mind of the venerable doctors who handed down that
 characterization or assumed it as certain, since they do
 not remove either the will or the concursus of God from it.
 Rather, they either think that those do not belong to those
 prerequisites or, if they do belong in some way, both acting
 and not acting taken individually can be brought together
 with the concursus and the other prerequisites. This may
 be seen in Córdoba, cited above, and in others to whom he
 refers. For this reason it is also customary to say that the
 same effect cannot be avoidable in relation to the secondary
 cause and at the same time be avoidable in relation to the
 first cause. Cajetan thinks this in [ST] Ia.21.4, and Thomas
 Netter of Walden in *Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei ecclesiae*
 I, ch. 28, Ockham in I, d. 38, q. 1, Gregory in q.
 22, art. 3, and Gabriel in art. 2. For this reason, since the
 entire controversy turns around the divine concursus or mo-

3rd assertion,
 precluding a
 subterfuge.

Córdoba.

Cajetan.
 Netter of
 Walden.
 Ockham.
 Gregory.
 Gabriel.

videtur esse quaedam petitio principii, vel aperta destructio, ac negatio illius axiomatis. Ratione idem ostenditur, quia omnia, quae generaliter diximus de praerequisitis ad agendum, aequae procedunt de omnibus, et singulis praerequisitis, sive ex parte Dei, sive ex parte aliarum rerum, vel causarum necessariae sint, et sive dicantur esse aliquid requisitum in ipsa voluntate, sive in intellectu, sive in alia quacumque re, quae ipsam voluntatem moveat ad agendum, et sive talis motio dicatur esse propria causa, efficiens volitionem, sive sit necessaria conditio, sine qua non stet fieri talem actum, et, illa posita, non stet non fieri, dummodo sermo semper sit de solis, et propriis praerequisitis, id est, ita requisitis, ut omnino praecedant aliquo modo causalitate, et ordine naturae in causalitate fundato usum liberum voluntatis: nam de concomitantibus, quae involvunt liberum usum, non loquimur, ut capite sequenti declarabimus. Assumptum ergo sic declaratum probatur specialiter de illo requisito ex parte Dei, quod a generali descriptione excipitur, et vocatur motio Dei. Nam si illa motio est unum ex praerequisitis, et simpliciter necessaria, ut voluntas operetur, et illa posita non manet in voluntate potestas ad non operandum, nisi in sensu diviso: ergo, illo praerequisito posito, non est voluntas in potentia proxima ad non operandum, sed tantum in remota, quia oportet prius illam motionem auferri ab illo, qui illam posuit: nam ipsa voluntas non potest illam auferre, quia sicut non fuit facta ab illa, ita neque ab illa pendet, nisi ut a subiecto recipiente, in cuius potestate non est duratio passionis, sicut nec inceptio eius, ut cap. 2 probatum est: ergo illa potentia in sensu diviso non est potestas ad liberum usum sufficiens, quia liber usus non est nisi a potestate proxima, ut etiam probavi. <15> Ergo in voluntate sic mota non manet libertas non agendi, et consequenter neque ipsum operari

tion, to limit the general assertion to that alone seems to be a kind of begging of the question, or a manifest destruction or negation of that axiom. The same is shown by reason, since everything that we said generally about the prerequisites for acting apply equally to each and every prerequisite—whether on the part of God or on the part of other things or causes that are necessary, and whether they are said to be something prerequisite in the will itself or in the intellect or in any other thing whatsoever that moves the will to acting, or whether such a motion is said to be a proper cause effecting a volition or is a necessary condition without which such an act would not be in a position to come to be and with it having been posited the act would not be in a position not to come to be—as long as the discussion is always about the proper prerequisites alone, that is, prerequisites of such a kind that in some way in causality and in the order of nature founded in causality they wholly precede the free use of the will. For we are not talking about the concomitants that involve free use, as we will explain in the following chapter.

Thus explained, therefore, the assumption is proven specifically with respect to the prerequisite on the part of God that is taken out of the general characterization and is called the motion of God. For if that motion is one of the prerequisites and necessary without qualification for the will to operate and if once it is posited the power not to operate does not remain in the will except in the divided sense, then, once that prerequisite has been posited, the will is not in proximate potency for not acting but only in remote potency, since it is necessary that that motion first be removed by him who posited it. For the will itself cannot remove it, since just as it was not made by the will, so also it does not depend on the will except as on a receiving subject. The duration of a passion is not in the power of the receiving subject just as the passion's inception is not in its power, as was shown in ch. 2. Therefore, that power in the divided sense is not a power sufficient for free use, since there is no free use except by a proximate power, as I also proved. Therefore, the freedom not to act does not remain in a will moved in

Assumpti
probatio.

The proof of
the
assumption.

455 liberum est. Et eadem ratione quamdiu illa motio
 non datur voluntati, solum est in potentia remota, 450R
 et ex parte receptiva ad agendum, quia oportet, ut
 prius recipiat illam motionem, quae non est in potes-
 460 tate eius activa, sed receptiva tantum: ergo tunc
 non est in potestate libera non agendi, sed in ne-
 cessitate, et impotentia agendi. Ergo ut salvetur 455R
 libertas, etiam respectu divinae motionis praevia
 requisitae, necessarium est, ut illa etiam posita
 cum aliis praerequisitis, maneat potentia in sensu
 465 composito ad agendum, et non agendum.

A simili
 confirmatio.

13. Confirmatur, et explicatur a simili de po- 460R
 tentia, verbi gratia, scribendi, quae est in manu;
 illa enim de se est etiam potentia non scribendi, et
 nihilominus libera non est, quia nec potest scribere
 470 sine actione voluntatis, nec posita motione volun-
 tatis, potest in sensu composito non scribere, licet
 in sensu diviso, et remote possit, utique si voluntas
 motionem auferat: ergo simili modo si voluntas non
 potest velle nisi mota a Deo, et posita motione non
 475 potest cum illa componere carentiam volitionis, licet
 in sensu diviso, id est, ablata motione, possit non
 velle, non magis est potentia libera, quam potentia
 motiva, quae est in manu. Simile est de intellectu
 quoad potentiam assentiendi, et dissentendi per
 480 fidem: nam in hoc non est formaliter liber, quia
 nec assentit nisi motus a voluntate, neque si ab illa
 moveatur, potest non assentire in sensu composito,
 sed in diviso: quae divisio (ut sic dicam) non est in
 eius activa potestate. Ergo si ita comparatur volun-
 485 tas hominis ad motionem Dei praeviam, ut sine illa
 non possit velle, et illa posita non possit non velle
 nisi in sensu diviso, qui non est in eius potestate
 activa, profecto non est magis libera voluntas, quam
 490 intellectus, quia non potest ipsa active tollere mo-
 tionem Dei, sicut non potest eam parere. Quid enim

455 motio] ratio B.

that way, and, consequently, neither is the acting itself free.
 For the same reason, as long as that motion is not given to
 the will, the will's power to act is only remote and on the
 receptive side. For it must first receive that motion, which
 is not in its active power but only in its receptive power.
 Therefore, then it is not in a free power to not act, but in
 necessity [to not act] and in an inability to act. Therefore,
 in order to save freedom even with respect to the previous
 prerequisite of divine motion, it is necessary (since it is also
 posited along with the other prerequisites) that the power for
 acting and not acting remain in the composed sense.

13. It is confirmed and explained by analogy to, for
 example, the power of writing that is in the hand. For it of
 itself is also the power not to write and yet is not free. For
 it can neither write without an action of the will nor can
 it in the composed sense not write when the motion of the
 will is posited, although remotely and in the divided sense it
 can (at least if the will removes its motion). Therefore, in a
 similar way if the will cannot will except when moved by God
 and with that motion posited cannot compose an absence
 of volition with that motion (although in the divided sense,
 that is, with that motion removed, it could not will), it is no
 more a free power than the moving power that is in the hand.
 It is similar with the intellect with respect to the power of
 assenting or dissenting through faith. For it is not formally
 free in this, since it can neither assent except when moved by
 the will nor can it in the composed sense fail to assent when
 it is moved by the will, but only in the divided sense, which
 division (if I may speak in this way) is not in its active power.
 Therefore, if the will of a human being is related to the prior
 motion of God in such a way that it cannot will without that
 motion and once that motion is posited it cannot not will
 except in the divided sense (which is not in its active power),
 then surely the will is no more free than the intellect. For
 it cannot itself actively remove the motion of God just as it
 cannot produce it. For what difference does it make that one

A confirmation
 by analogy.

interest, quod una motio sit a voluntate creata, et alia ab increata? profecto haec magis officit libertati; quia motio voluntatis increatae efficacior est, et intimior, magisque per se influens in effectum.

Adversantium 495
responsio.

14. Respondent constituendo discrimen, quia voluntas creata, licet sit mota a Deo, retinet intrinsicam potestatem non eliciendi talem actum, si velit, quod non habet intellectus, nec alia potentia naturaliter agens. Sed hoc <col. b> non potest satisfacere. Primo, quia illa potestas intrinseca ad non eliciendum actum, quae dicitur manere in voluntate mota a Deo, vel est ad non eliciendum actum in sensu composito, id est, sustinendo actum non obstante motione, et illa simul stante: et in hoc sensu optimum est discrimen, tamen per illum datur nobis, quod intendimus. Vel illa potentia est tantum in sensu diviso, et sic eadem profecto est in potentia motiva, et in intellectu, quia si motio voluntatis cesset, ex intrinseca natura talium potentiarum est, ut actum non eliciant, quia natura sua ita subordinantur voluntati quoad tales actus, ut si ab illa non applicentur, illos non eliciant, multo autem magis dicitur pendere voluntas hominis ab actuali applicatione, et praemotione Dei: ergo sub illa motione non magis habet potentiam intrinsicam non volendi, quam intellectus, vel manus sub motione voluntatis. Unde fit, ut sicut non posita motione voluntatis non solum potest intellectus non assentiri, vel manus non moveri, sed etiam necessario non assentit, nec movetur, ita iuxta illam sententiam non posita motione Dei, voluntas necessario non vult: ergo non vere dicitur in sensu diviso, id est, ablata motione, posse non operari, si velit, sed dicendum est ablata motione necessario non operari. Nam sicut non potest componi carentia operationis cum motione, ita non potest componi operatio

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motion is from a created will and another from an uncreated will? Surely the latter blocks freedom more, since the motion of an uncreated will is more efficacious, deeper, and has more of a *per se* influx into the effect.

14. They respond by setting up a distinction, since the created will although it is moved by God retains the intrinsic power not to elicit such an act if it wills, a power that the intellect and another naturally acting powers do not have. But this cannot be satisfactory. First, because that intrinsic power for not eliciting an act that is said to remain in the will moved by God is a power for not eliciting the act either [i] in the composed sense, that is, by holding back the act without hindering the motion and existing simultaneously with it—and the distinction is best in this sense, but then we are given everything that we intended—or [ii] that power exists in the divided sense only—and in that way it is surely the same in the moving power [of the hand] and in the intellect. For if the motion of the will ceases, it is in accordance with the intrinsic nature of such powers that they do not elicit the act, since by their nature they are subordinated to the will with respect to such acts in such a way that they do not elicit an act if they are not directed [to it] by the will. But much more is the will of a human being said to depend on the actual application and premotion of God. Therefore, the will no more has an intrinsic power not to will under that motion than the intellect or hand [has such an intrinsic power] under the motion of the will.

The result is that just as in the case where the motion of the will is not posited the intellect not only can not assent and the hand not move but also necessarily does not assent and not move, so also according to that view when the motion of God is not posited the will necessarily does not will. Therefore, it is not rightly said that in the divided sense, that is, with the motion removed, it can not operate if it wished. Rather, it should be said that with the motion removed it necessarily does not operate. For just as the

The
adversaries'
response.

It is rejected.

493 increatae] increata B.

Elucidatur
similitudine.

530 cum carentia motionis. Declaratur a simili, nam
ablata cognitione non recte dicitur voluntas posse
ab intrinseco carere volitione, si velit, sed dicen-
dum potius est, non posse velle, et necessario non
535 velle: sed non minus necessaria est (iuxta illam
sententiam) ad volendum motio Dei, quam motio
intellectus: ergo in illo sensu diviso, id est, si mo-
tio Dei desit, non habet voluntas potestatem non
operandi, si velit, sed est in potentia necessario non
540 volendi: quae (ut supra dicebam) est quaedam im-
potentia volendi. Quapropter illa particula, *si velit*,
nullo modo potest ibi locum habere, quia ablata mo-
tione Dei, non potest homo velle; ergo cum dicitur,
si velit, ponitur conditio impossibilis. Aut enim illud,
545 *si velit*, intelligitur de voluntate directe per actum
positivum volendi suspendere alium actum, et hoc
dici non potest, quia neque id est necessarium ad
non agendum libere, ut est probabile, nec illud est
550 possibile in illo sensu diviso, id est, ablata motione
Dei; vel intelligitur de voluntate indirecta, et tunc
supponi debet proxima potentia volendi, quae non
est sine motione <16> Dei, quia adhuc voluntas est
ex parte in potentia tantum receptiva: ergo tunc non
555 habet locum conditio, *si velit*, quia non voluntarie,
sed necessario caret voluntatis actu, quia a Deo non
movetur.

15. Est igitur eadem ratio de quolibet requi-
555 sito ex parte Dei, quae est de aliis causis. Nam si
tale est requisitum ex parte Dei, ut cum illo non
sit potentia non agendi nisi in sensu diviso, revera
non est potentia suspendendi volitionem per intrin-
secum dominium in illam, sed per quamdam im-
560 potentiam, quia si auferatur illud requisitum, sine
illo non potest velle, sicut non potest operari sine
concursu Dei. Et similiter potentia illa in sensu di-
viso, etiamsi sit respectu praemotionis necessariae

absence of operation cannot be composed with the motion,
so also operation cannot be composed with the absence of
motion.

It is explained by analogy, for with the removal of cog-
535 nition the will is not rightly said to be able intrinsically to
lose volition if it wills. It should be said, rather, that it is un-
able to will and necessarily does not will. But (according to
that view) the motion of God is no less necessary for willing
than the motion of the intellect is. Therefore, in that divided
540 sense—that is, if the motion of God is missing—the will does
not have the power not to act if it wills, but it is in its power
necessarily not to will, which (as I said earlier) is a kind of
inability to will.

Therefore, that phrase ‘if it wills’ can in no way have
545 a place here, since with the motion of God removed, the
human being cannot will. Therefore, to say ‘if it wills’ is
to posit an impossible condition. For either [i] ‘if it wills’
is understood as the will directly through a positive act of
willing suspending another act—and this cannot be said,
because it is not the case that it is necessary for freely not
550 acting, as is probable, nor is that possible in that divided
sense, that is, with the motion of God removed—or [ii] it
is understood about the will indirectly and then one must
assume a proximate power for willing. Such a power does
not exist without the motion of God, since thus far the will is
in part only a receptive power. Therefore, then, the condition
‘if it wills’ has no place. For the act of will is absent not
voluntarily but necessarily, since it is not moved by God.

15. There is, therefore, the same argument concerning
555 any prerequisite on the part of God that there is concerning
any other cause. For if the prerequisite on the part of God
is such that when it is present there is no power for not
acting except in a divided sense, then there really is no
power for suspending volition through an intrinsic dominion
560 in it but only through a kind of impotency. For if that
prerequisite is removed the will cannot will without it, just
as it cannot operate without the concursus of God. Likewise,
that power in the divided sense, even if it is with respect to

It is elucidated
by similarity.

ex parte Dei, est tantum potentia remota, quia debet
 prius auferri motio Dei, ut talis potentia reducatur
 565 in actum non volendi, et auferre illam motionem
 non est in potestate ipsius voluntatis, quia ad il-
 lam solum passive se habet. Unde etiam hic habet
 locum illa ratio, quod nec possit imputari homini
 carentia volitionis, quando non recipit motionem
 570 Dei, quia ante motionem non est in potentia prox-
 ima, et non habet in sua potestate motionem, per
 quam in proxima potentia constituatur, sed solum
 est ad illam in potentia passiva, et ita non potest
 illi imputari, quod illam non habeat, et post mo-
 575 tionem non potest voluntati moraliter tribui, quod
 actum non suspendat, vel quod suum influxum non
 contineat, quia posita motione non potest, et illa
 motio ponitur sine influxu eius. Ergo ad veram lib-
 580 etatem salvandam sensus compositus universaliter,
 et sine exceptione necessarius est respectu omnium,
 quae proprie sunt praerequisita ad agendum, sive
 ex parte causarum secundarum, sive ipsius Dei.

Opposito
 fundamento fit
 satis.

16. Ad fundamentum contrariae sententiae,
 585 negamus priorem partem de concursu praevio, suf-
 ficat enim simultaneus, qui ut in re ipsa datus non
 est ex praerequisitis ad volendum, sed est con-
 comitans, et cum illo involvitur usus libertatis. Ut
 vero est tantum in actu primo, est ex praerequisi-
 585R tis: verumtamen cum illo in eo statu posito, seu
 oblato ex parte Dei, potest simul componi carentia
 actus, ad quem supponitur concursus in actu primo
 oblatus. Et eodem modo dicendum est ad alteram
 590 partem de voluntate Dei. Concedimus enim aliquam
 voluntatem Dei esse praeiviam ad volitionem homi-
 595 nis, et nihilominus dicimus cum illa posse simul
 componi, tam non agere, quam age- <col. b> re,
 quia non oportet, ut sit voluntas absoluta, quod
 talis actus fiat, et in rerum natura ponatur, ut recte
 595R dixit Soto 1. de Natura et gratia cap. 16. sed sufficit

Soto.

a necessary premotion on the part of God, is only a remote
 power, because the motion of God must first be removed so
 that such a power is reduced into the act of not willing, and
 to remove that motion is not in the power of the will itself
 since it is related to that only in a passive way.

Hence, here also is a place for that argument that the
 absence of a volition cannot be imputed to a human being
 when they did not receive the motion of God. For before the
 motion they are not in proximate potency and do not have
 in their power the motion through which to be placed in
 proximate potency but are only in passive potency to that
 motion. And thus what they do not have cannot be imputed
 to them. After the motion, not suspending the act or not
 containing its influx cannot be morally imputed to the will,
 since once the motion is posited the will cannot [suspend
 the act] and that motion is posited without its influx.

Therefore, in order to save true freedom the composed
 sense is universally and without exception necessary with
 respect to everything that is properly a prerequisite for acting,
 whether on the part of secondary causes or on the part of
 God.

16. In response to the foundation of the contrary view,
 we deny the first part concerning the previous concursus.
 For a simultaneous one suffices, which as it is given in the
 thing itself is not among the prerequisites for willing but is a
 concomitant. With that the use of freedom is involved. But
 insofar as it is only in first act, it is among the prerequisites.
 Nevertheless, when in that state it is posited or offered on
 the part of God, it can at the same time be composed with
 the absence of the act for which the offered concursus in the
 first act is presupposed.

The same thing should be said about the other part
 concerning the will of God. For we concede that some willing
 of God is prior to the human being's volition, and yet we say
 that at the same time not to act and to act can be composed
 with that willing, since it is not necessary for there to be
 an absolute willing that such an act occur and be posited
in rerum natura, as Soto rightly says in *De natura et gratia*

The
 foundation of
 the opposing
 view is
 satisfied.

600 voluntas includens aliquam conditionem, nimirum
 voluntas concurrendi cum libero arbitrio hominis
 ad hunc, vel illum actum, si ipse cooperari velit,
 quod semper relinquitur in manu, et potestate eius. 600R
 Unde merito graves Theologi dixerunt, licet volun-
 605 tas Dei ex aeternitate antecedit, nihilominus voli-
 tionem eius, ut determinatur ad volendum concur-
 rere cum voluntate creata ad talem actum, non esse
 voluntatem praecedentem sed concomitantem. Haec 605R
 autem concomitantia videtur consistere in obiecto
 610 illius voluntatis divinae, qua vult concurrere cum
 humana, quia per illam volitionem non vult actum
 voluntatis humanae simpliciter, et absolute, sed
 ut efficiendum ab eadem voluntate humana et 610R
 quasi sub conditione, si voluntas ipsa humana velit
 cooperari, et ideo talis voluntas Dei nihil operatur
 615 per se sola, neque prius, quam voluntas creata,
 simul efficiat, et ita facile intelligitur, quomodo illae
 duae voluntates simul coniungantur ad eandem 615R
 actionem, nam voluntas divina ex aeternitate est
 620 quasi praeparata, et habet applicatam potentiam
 suam ad coagendum cum voluntate humana. Unde
 quando in tempore voluntas humana pro libertate
 sua coniungitur divinae, simul efficiunt.

I, ch. 16. Rather, a willing that includes some condition—namely, a willing concurring with the freewill of a human being to this or that act if he himself wills to cooperate, which always remains in his hand and in his power—is sufficient. For this reason the important theologians rightly said that although the will of God precede from eternity, nevertheless, its volition as it is determined to willing to concur with a created will to such an act is not a preceding willing but a concomitant one. But this concomitance seems to consist in the object of that divine will, by which it wills to concur with a human will. For it does not will the act of the human will without qualification and absolutely through that volition, but wills it as coeffecting with the human will and, as it were, under the condition ‘if the human will itself wills to cooperate’. For this reason such a willing by God cannot perform anything through itself alone nor before the created will simultaneously brings about the effect. And thus it is easily understood how those two wills are simultaneously conjoined to the same action. For the divine will is prepared, as it were, from eternity and has its power applied to coacting with the human will. Hence, when in the temporal order the human will through its freedom is conjoined to the divine will, they together bring about the effect.

600–601 includens aliquam conditionem, nimirum voluntas] *om.* V.
 610 qua] quia B.