De malitia.

Praeter alias differentias inter bonitatem, et malitia, una est, quod voluntas humana non potest fieri actualiter bona sine operatione a se elicita, ut supra dictum est; potest autem fieri mala sineullo actu per voluntarium carentiam actus debiti; huiusmodi enim voluntarium dari potest, ut supra tract. 2. disp. 1. sect. 5. dictum est, et ad malitiam sufficit propter imperfectionem eius, ut latius tradi solet 1. 2. q. 71. art. 5. et q. 72. art. 6. Unde fit duplicum esse malitiam, una est quae proxime denominat actum malum, et per illum, voluntatem; altera, quae voluntati proxime inest, et illam malam denominat. Quoniam igitur hic de actibus agimus, prior malitia est propria praesentis disputationis, et ideo prius de illa disputabimus, et potest illa generali nomine vocari malitia commissionis; in fine tamen aliquid de posteriore addemus, quando carentia actus ex ipso actu facile cognoscatur; de malitia autem actu disputari possunt omnia quae de bonitate dicta sunt; tamen quia suppositis dic-

On evil.

In addition to other differences between goodness and evil,\(^3\) one is that a human will cannot become actually good without an operation elicited by it, as was said above, but it can become evil without any act by the voluntary lack of an act that one ought to perform.\(^4\) For something voluntary of this sort can be given, as was said above in De voluntario et involuntario disp. 1. sect. 5. and it suffices for evil on account of its imperfection, as is usually discussed more widely with respect to Summa theologiae (henceforth: \textit{ST}) IaIIae.71.5 and 72.6. Hence, there are two kinds of evil: one where the act is proximately denominated evil and the will through it and the other where evil is proximately in the will and denominates it evil. Therefore, since in this treatise we are discussing acts, the former kind is proper to the present disputation and so we will discuss it first. It can be called by that general name, ‘evil of commission’. Nevertheless, at the end we will add something about the latter kind of evil, since the lack of an act is easily understood according to that act itself. Moreover, everything that was said about goodness can also be discussed concerning the evil of acts. Nevertheless, since...
The discussions will be briefer by assuming what has already been said. I will include everything in this one disputation, first explaining the ratio of evil without qualification, and then afterwards discussing its object, circumstances, and end in brief.

**SECTION 1.**

**Utrum sit aliquis actus voluntatis ex se, et natura sua malus etiam seclusa extrinseca prohibitione.**

1. Primo, quod in voluntate humana sint actus mali, per se notum est, et D. Thomas satit hoc disputat 1. 2. q. [74] art. 2. <372> Quod autem omnes actus mali sint prohibiti aliquia lege, saltem divina, est certum, quia hoc ad perfectionem spectat divinae providentiae. Rursus certum est apud omnes Theologos aliquos actus esse malos solum, quia prohibiti sunt, tamen ad explicandum exacte rationem malitiae oportet in universum explicare quomodo se habeat ad prohibitionem quantum a lege pendeat; et consequenter, quantum possit esse intrinseca humanis actibus, quia in hoc potissimum apparat tota difficiatas tractanda. Est autem ratio dubii, quia nullus actus voluntatis potest ex vi suae entitatis positivae habere malitiam, sicut bonitatem; ergo tantum post tubit illam habere, in quantum deficit a regula voluntatis, quae est lex; ergo non potest intelligi actus malus sine lege extrinseca prohibente. Antecedens supponitur, quia malum, ut malum, non potest esse differentia specifica, et positivum...
ens. Confirmatur, quia non potest intelligi malitia actus sine obligatione non faciendi; sicut neque e contrario intelligi potest malitia in carentia actus, nisi sit obligatio operandi; sed omnis obligatio oritur ex lege extrinsecus praecipientur, vel prohibente; ergo sine hac nulla est malitia; ergo sicut talis lex non est extrinsecus actui, ita neque illa malitia. Antecedens videtur ex terminis notum, quia nemo peccat nisi omittendo, quod tenetur facere, neque e contrario, et potest etiam explicari, quia nemo peccat nisi volendo malitiam; non autem vult illam directe, quia nemo intendens ad malum operatur; ergo indirecte; ergo oportet ut intercedat obligation cavendi illam, quia hoc voluntarium indirectum, moraliter loquendo, non est nisi ubi intercedit aliqua obligation.

2. Propter haec quidam dixerunt nullum esse actum voluntatis ita malum, quin possit esse non malus, quamvis libere, et humano modo fiat, quia putant omnem mali tantum pendere ex prohibitione extrinsecus saltem divina, quam putant esse libera, quia pendet ex voluntate Dei, quae libera est in omnibus effectibus ad extra, quorum unus est prohibitio, seu praecipient, ita Nominales fere sentiunt, Ochamus in 2. q. 19. ad 3. et 4. Gerson Alphabeto 6. litt. E. et Tractatu de vita spirituali, lect. 1. et aliis refert Almainus tract. 3. Moralia cap. 15. et fere consentit Scotus in 4. dist. 26. q. 1. qui tamen excepit odium Dei; videtur etiam favere D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 71. art. 6. ad 4. Ubi explicans illam distinctionem Theologorum de actibus malis, quod quidam sunt mali, quia prohibiti; alii vero prohibiti, quia mali, dicit esse intelligendum respectu legis positivae, significans respectu aeternae, et divinae legis omnes esse mali, quia prohibitos; quod etiam sentit D. Bonaventura in 2. dist. 35. dub. 4. circa litteram. Favet Augustinus 2. De peccatorum merti-

The first opinion, denying.

29 peccat nisi omittendo A peccat omittendo V
Suárez, DBM VII, sect. 1

Tis et remissione cap. 16. dicens, neque praeceptum erit, si quid erit nisi iubeatur, ut non sit. Et infra. Quomodo per divinam misericordiam dimittitur, si peccatum non est, aut quomodo per divinam justitiam non prohibetur, si peccatum est. Denique lib. 22. Contra Faustum cap. 27. [peccatum] definit per hoc, quod sit contra legem; idem Ambrosius lib. De paradiso cap. 6. dicens. Quid est peccatum nisi divinae legis praevericatio, imo videtur id docere Paulus ad Romanos 4. Ubi non est lex, neque praevericatio; et cap. 5. Peccatum non imputabatur; cum lex non esset; et ideo 1. ad Corinth. 15. Virtus, inquit, peccati lex.

2. Opinio extreme contraria.

3. Allii vero absursum existimant, negare aliquos actus ita esse malos, quin habeant inseparabilem malitiam etiam de potentia absoluta, si libere, et humano modo fiant, et nihilominus propter argumenta facta concedunt non posse esse malos sine prohibitione saltem divina; unde claudit hanc prohibitionem non esse Deo liberam, sed necessariam, quia licet Deus ad extra se nihil simpliciter necessario velit; tamen supposita libera voluntate circa unum non est inconveniens, ut sit necessarium velle allud, quia haec non est necessitas simpliciter, sed ex libera suppositione; sic ergo inquit hoc ipsa, quod Deus vult creare hominem, et illum liberre vult, et per rationem operari, et cum illo ad hoc concurrere, necessarium est, ut illi prohibeat hos actus habentes ita coniunctam malitiam, tum quia facta dicta suppositione necesse est, ut habeat Deus providentiam hominis, cuius haec est pars potissima, tum etiam, quia absolute necessarium est, ut huissusmodi actus Deo displiceat; ergo necesse est, ut repugnet voluntati favours it in De peccatorum meritis et remissione II, cap. 16, [§23,] saying: ‘nor would that be sin, if, whatever it may be, it were not decreed that it should not be’. And further down: ‘How is it forgiven through divine mercy if there is no sin, or how is it not prohibited through divine justice if it is sin?’ Finally, in Contra Faustum XXII, ch. 27, he defines sin thus: it is contrary to law. Ambrose says the same thing in De paradiso ch. 6, [§30,] saying: ‘what is sin except a transgression of divine law?’ Indeed, Paul seems to teach the same thing in Romans 4[15]: ‘where there is no law, neither is there transgression’. And in Romans 5[13]: ‘sin is not imputed where there is no law’. And for that reason he says in 1 Corinthians 15[56]: ‘the power of sin is the law’.

3. But others think it is absurd to deny that some acts—if they were done freely and in a human way—are evil in such a way that they have an evilness that is inseparable even by absolute power. Nevertheless, on account of the arguments just made, they concede that they cannot be evil without at least a divine prohibition. Hence they conclude that this prohibition is not free for God but necessary. For, although God wills nothing beyond himself with strict necessity, it is, nevertheless, not disagreeable that God will something necessarily on the supposition of freely willing something else. This is not necessity strictly speaking but a necessity resulting from a free supposition. In this way, therefore, they think that from this, that God willed to create human beings and willed them to act freely and through reason and willed to concur with them in this, it is necessary that he prohibit for them those acts that have evil conjoined to them in the way in question. For once the stated supposition has been made, it is necessary that God have providence over human beings, of which this prohibition is the greatest part. Also, because it is absolutely necessary that acts of this sort displease God. Therefore, it is necessary that they are repugnant to his will.

7Ambrose repeats the claim in De paradiso ch. 8. §39, which is the passage that Suárez cites in De legibus II.6.7.
8Suárez provides a nearly identical list of citations with some more detail in De legibus II.6.7.

63 peccatum | praeceptum ACV
eius; ergo et prohiberi; nam haec duo idem sunt, hanc vero opinionem sic explicatam apud nullum scriptorem invenio.

4. Alli distinctione utuntur cum Gregorio in 2. dist. 34. q. 1. art. 2. Gabriel dist. 35. q. 1. art. 1. Almainus tract. 3. cap. 16. quos sequitur Corduba lib. 3. Quaestionum q. 10. ad 2. hi enim auctores concedunt aliquos esse actus intrinsece omnino malos ac necessario, etiam de potentia absoluta; distinguunt autem du- <373> plicem legem, aliam indicantem, aliam praecipientem. Prima explicatur tantum per verbum indicativi modi, hoc est facien- dum, vel non est faciendum; alia per verbum imperativi, fac hoc, vel non facies. Prima tota est in intellectu, et non pendet a voluntate; consistit enim in iudicio indicante rem ipsam prout est. Secunda vero pendet a voluntate quatenus vult imponere hanc, vel ilam obligationem. Unde prima non pendet ex iurisdictione, vel potestate superioris, sed ex re ipsa. Secunda vero requirit potestatem, et iurisdictionem; dicunt ergo omne actum malum requiere priorem legem, non autem posteriori.

5. Haec distinctio a nonnullis improbatur, quia impropie utitur Gregorius voce legis, proprie enim non significat nisi imperium; si tamen res vera est, non esset de voce multum contendendum, praeser- tim, quia dictamen rectae rationis non admodum impri- mope per sese dicitur habere rationem legis respectu voluntatis; praesertim in voluntate, quae non est sibi regula suorum actuum, neque est natura sua determinata ad honestum; nam revera tale dictamen est regula, et mensura talis voluntatis: non ergo deo impropie dici potest lex re- spectu illius, neque haec significatio huius vocis est admodum inusitata, Augustinus enim lib. 22. Contra Faustum resp. 27. sub disiunctione dixit.

Therefore, also that they are prohibited. For these two are the same thing. But I do not find this view explained in this way in any writer.

4. Others use a distinction following Gregory of Rimini in Sent. II, dist. 34. q. 1. art. 2. Gabriel in Sent. II, dist. 35. q. 1. art. 1. and Almain in [Moralia] tract. 3. cap. 16. Antonio de Córdoba follows them in Quaestionarium theologicum III, q. 10 ad 2. For these authors grant that there are some acts that are intrinsically entirely evil and necessarily so even with respect to absolute power. But they distinguish between two kinds of law, one indicative, the other prescriptive. The first kind is explained only through a verb in the indicative mode: ‘this is to be done’ or ‘this is not to be done’. The other kind is explained through an imperative verb: ‘do this’ or ‘you will not do this’. The first is wholly in the intellect and does not depend on a will, since it consists in a judgement indicating a thing as it is. But the second depends on a will insofar as it wishes to impose this or that obligation. Hence, the first does not depend on jurisdiction or on the power of a superior, but on the thing itself. The second requires power and jurisdiction. These authors say, then, that every evil act requires the former kind of law but not the latter.

5. This distinction is rejected by some on grounds that Gregory improperly uses the word ‘law’, for it does not properly signify except where there is authority. Nevertheless, if the matter itself is true, there is no need to contend much about the word, especially since a dictate of right reason is said not at all that improperly to itself have the character of law with respect to the will, which is not the rule for itself of its acts and is not determined by its own nature to the fine (honestum). For such a dictate really is a rule and measure for such a will. To that extent, then, it can, not improperly, be called a law with respect to the will. Nor is this meaning of this word all that unusual, for Augustine says in Contra Faustum XXII, resp. 27. under the break that ‘the eternal law is divine reason or the will of God’

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9 For Suárez on the traditional division of good into honestum, utile, and delectabile, see DM 10.2.3–29. Roughly, goods that are good for their own sake apart from pleasure are honestum. Finding an English term with the same range is difficult.
Lex aeterna est ratio divina, aut voluntas Dei, et D. Thomas loco supra citato videtur certe hoc modo uti nomine legis, ut patet ex fine illius solutionis, dicit enim omne peccatum esse malum, quia prohibitum, et subdit: ex hoc enim ipso, quod est inordinatum, iuri naturali repugnat; ubi non dixit, ideo esse inordinatum, quia iuri naturali repugnat, sed et contrario, quia est inordinatum, iuri iuris naturalis repugnare, quod solum est verum sumendo ius naturale pro ipso dictamine rationis, sed quidquid sit de voce legis, nos loquamur de voluntate prohibente, et de iudicio dictante.

1. Assertio. 6. Dicendum primo, aliquos actus voluntatis ex se, et ex vi suorum objectorum esse malos ante omnem voluntatem prohibitam et independenter ab illa quod rationem malitiae. Haec conclusio sumitur ex D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 100. art. 1. et 8. hoc enim sensu definit quosdam actus ita esse malos, ut nulla Dei dispensatione fieri posset, ut non sint mali, et ita sequitur Cajetanus ibi, et Soto 2. De iustitia, q. 3. art. 10. Victoria Relectio de homicidio, Richardus in 3. dist. 37. art. 1. q. 5. et ibi Gabriel q. 1. art. 2. <col. b> et Scotus q. 1. absolute hoc admittit, licet in particulari iudicio de his actibus differat a sententia D. Thomae, quod non est huissimi loci; consentit etiam Durandus in 1. dist. 47. q. 4. Sumitur etiam ex Augustino 1. De libero arbitrio cap. 3. dicente adulterium non esse malum, quia prohibitum, sed e contrario, et idem dicit de mendacio, Glossa Levi. 19.

Probatur inductione. 7. Unde probatur primo inductione, quia odium Dei ita est malum, ut si libere, et humano modo absque ignorantia fiat, non possit non esse malum, quod videtur ita ex terminis notum, ut non indigeat probatione, nam rationi propositum statim repugnat, idem est de hoc actu, *volo agere contra consci-

and St. Thomas in the place cited above, [ST IaIae.71.6 ad 4.] certainly seems to use the name ‘law’ in this way, as is clear from the end of that solution, for he says that every sin is evil because it is prohibited, and he substitutes: ‘for precisely in that it is inordinate, it is repugnant to natural law’. He does not say here that because it is repugnant to natural law, therefore it is inordinate; rather, he says the contrary: because it is inordinate, therefore it is repugnant to the natural law. This is only true when taking natural law for the very dictate of reason. But whatever the case may be concerning the word ‘law’, we are talking about a prohibiting will and a dictating judgement.

6. It should be said, first, that some acts of the will are of themselves and their objects evil prior to any will prohibiting them; they are independent of that will with respect to the aspect of evil. This conclusion is taken from St. Thomas, ST IaIae.100.1 and 8. For in this sense he defines certain acts as evil in such a way that God cannot give dispensation so that they would not be evil. Cajetan follows this in the same place, as well as Soto in De iustitia II, q. 3. art. 10. Victoria in Relectio de homicidio, and Richard Middleton in Sent. III, dist. 37. art. 1. q. 5. It is also admitted in a strict sense by Gabriel in Sent. III, dist. 37. q. 1. art. 2. and Scotus in Sent. III, dist. 37. q. 1. although they disagree with St. Thomas in the case of a particular judgement about these acts. But that is not to the point here. Durandus also agrees in Sent. I, dist. 47. q. 4. It is also taken from Augustine in De libero arbitrio I, cap. 3, where he says that adultery is not evil because it is prohibited, but the other way around. He says the same thing about lying in Quaestitionum in Heptateuchum III.68.

7. Next it is proven, first, by induction, since hatred of God is an evil such that if it comes about freely, in a human way, and without ignorance, it cannot fail to be evil. This seems so well known from the terms that it does not require proof, for what is proposed is immediately repugnant to reason. It is the same with this act: ‘I wish to act against...
entiam, contra rectam rationem, contra praeceptum superioris. Nam huiusmodi actus non potest mente concepi, quin malus sit, quod argumentum late prosequitur Almainus supra. Potest etiam haec inductio extendi ad ipsam divinam voluntatem, respectu cuius quaedam sunt ita mala, ut non possit Deus ea velle, quae sunt velle mentiri, velle non implere promissum, etc. Quod non provenit respectu illius ex voluntate prohibente; ergo ex eo provenit quod tales voluntas per se mala est.

8. Ratio autem a priori est, quia voluntas sumit bonitatem, vel malitiam suum ex obiecto; est autem aliquod obiectum ex se disconveniens naturae rationali, ut sic, absque voluntate superioris prohibenti, ut supra late dictum est; ergo tales voluntas per sese est mala ex vi voluntariae tendentiae in tale obiectum ante voluntatem prohibentem. Confirmatur, et declaratur primo, quia in caeteris rebus, et naturis, quaedam sunt natura sua disconveniencia naturis rerum ante omnem voluntatem, ut calor ex se est disconveniens aquae, similiter in alibus rationibus boni, et mali, verbi gratia, delectabilis, aut contristantis unumquodque est ex se tale natura sua sine respectu ad voluntatem extrinsecum; ergo idem esse poterit in natura rationali ut sic, et in ratione boni honesti, aut mali contrarii. Tandum, quia sicut in speculativis quaedam sunt principia per se nota, quae non pendent ab extrinsecu ut vera sint, ita etiam in practicis, qualia sunt, vel illa generalia, honestum est faciendum, turpe vitandum; vel particularia, non est mentiendum, nemeni est facienda iniuria, etc. Haec ergo judicia semper sunt vera independenter ab omni extrinsecu; ergo et voluntas ab illis discordans semper est mala independenter conscience, against right reason, against the precept of a superior'. For an act of this kind cannot be conceived by the mind as other than evil, which argument Almain pursues at length in the [text cited] above. This induction can also be extended to the divine will, with respect to which certain things are evil such that God cannot will them. Willing to deceive, willing not to keep a promise, and so on are such things. This does not result from the will prohibiting them. Therefore, it results from the fact that such willings are per se evil.

It is proven a priori.

The first confirmation.

The second confirmation.

10 DBM 2.1?
etiam ab omni extrinseco. Nam illa veritas sumitur suo modo ex [conformitate] <374> ad [appetitum] rectum, vel non rectum; unde si fingeremus hominem invinciblement ignorantem Deum et omnem superiorem voluntatem prohibentem mendacium, vel adulterium, recte autem utentem naturali iudicio in rebus agendis, intelligeremus illum posse bene, vel male agere; et a voluntate mentiendi, vel adulterandi in tali homine esse inseparabilem mali-tiam.

2. Assertio.

9. Dicendum secundo, nullum posse esse voluntatis actum malum, quin sit contra dictamen rationis iudicantis malitiam actus, vel objecti, qui est sensus auctorum tertiae sententiae, et per se constat, quia non potest actus voluntatis esse malus, quin sit illi voluntaria aliquo modo malitia, non erit autem voluntaria nisi sit aliquo modo ratione diuidicata, vel in actu ipso, vel in objecto, quod perinde est; nec disputo modo, an hoc dictamen debeat, et possit haber, nam de hoc satis dictum est supra in materia de voluntario, disp. 4. sect. 3.

10. Atque ex his sequitur primo quid sit iudicandum de hac conditionali, si Deus non prohiberet odium sui, non esset malum; quidam enim dicunt utrumque sequi, nam et esset malum, quia esset de turpi objecto, et non esset malum, quia non esset prohibitum a Deo, ita respondet Medina 1. 2. q. 81. art. 1, q. 19. in principio, et q. 100. art. 8. tamen si sit sermo de prohibitione non ut spectat ad naturale iudicium, sed ad voluntatem divinam, quia ut superior vult obligare hominem, ut hoc faciat, vel non faciat, dicendum est conditionalem hanc esse veram, licet Deus non prohiberet, actus esset malus, et aliam partem omnino esse falsam, neque sequi contradicetionem, quia objectum ip-

9. It should be said, second, that no act of the will can be evil without it being contrary to a dictate of reason judging the evil of an act or its object. This is the sense of the authors of the third view and it is obvious of itself. For an act of the will cannot be evil unless the evil is in some way voluntary for it. But it will not be voluntary unless it is in some way adjudicated by reason, either in the act itself or in the object that is equally [evil]. I will not discuss now whether this dictate must and can be had, for that was satisfactorily discussed above in *De voluntario et involuntario* 4.3.

10. And from these assertions it follows, first, what should be judged regarding the conditional ‘if God did not prohibit hatred of himself, it would not be evil’.

For some authors say that both things follow, for it would both be evil because it would be about a base object and it would not be evil because it is not prohibited by God. Medina responds in that way in *ST IaIIae.* 81. 1, IaIIae.19 in the beginning, and IaIIae.100. 8. Nevertheless, if the discussion is about prohibition not as it relates to natural judgement but as it relates to the divine will by which God as superior wills to obligate human beings either to do this or not to do it, one should say that the conditional ‘the act would be evil, even though God did not prohibit it’ is true. The other part is entirely false and so no contradiction follows. For the object

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199 conformitate | confirmatione ACV (cf. DBM 12.2.2)
199–200 appetitum | oppositum ACV (cf. DBM 12.2.2)
219 Marginal note: etsi | esto ACV
sum per se sufficit ut actus sit malus; illud autem non mutatur etiamsi tollatur prohibitio. Deinde illud antecedens non est ideo impossibile, ut implicet contradic tionem; non est ergo impossibile, ut ex illo sequantur contradictoria. Antecedens imprimit patet; si intercedat ignorantia talis prohibiti onis, ut supra in exemplo positum est, nam respectu ignorantiae perinde est, ac si in re non esset prohibitio. Deinde patet ex re ipsa, qua voluntas, qua Deus hoc prohibit, vel intelligitur esse naturalis quaedam displicentia talis objecti, vel actus; et haec in primis supponit malitiam iam in actu, vel objecto; ergo si per possibile, vel impossibile praescindamus hanc displicentiam, ut non sit, erit in tali actu malitia, et deinde non constat Deum ex necessitate habere naturalem displicentiam, saltem quoad exercitium, quia nihil est, quod necessit pret ad hoc divinam voluntatem. Denique ille simplex affectus, ut sic, per se non sufficient ad rationem legis prohibentis, sicut neque e contrario simplex affectus complacentiae in bonum non sufficient ad rationem legis praecipientis, ut patet in actibus consiliorum; est ergo necessaria aliqua voluntas efficax, non qua Deus velit talem actum non fieri, sed qua velit teneri inferiori ad talem actum non faciendum; haec autem voluntas nulla ratione probari potest convenire Deo necessario etiam supposita voluntate creandi hominem, nam licet sit consentaneum divinae sapientiae et provid entiae gubernare creaturam rationalem, leges, et praeccepta ei imponendo per voluntatem suam; tamen non est ita hoc necessarium, ut contrarium implicet contradictionem; sicut etiam est consentaneum, ut retribuat præmia pro bonis actibus, et poenas pro malis, et tamen sine contradic tione po-

Next, that antecedent is not impossible on grounds that it implies a contradiction. It is not, therefore, impossible, because contradic tories interven e, as in the example posited above, for it is the same with respect to ignorance as if it were not prohibited in reality. Next, it is obvious from the matter itself, since the willing by which God prohibits this is either understood to be a certain natural displeasure with such an object or with such an act.11 But this, in the first place, already presupposes evil in the act or object, so that, if we *per possibile* or *impossibile* cut out this displeasure so that it doesn't exist, there will be evil in such an act. Furthermore, it is not obvious that God has such a natural displeasure of necessity, at least with respect to exercise, since there is nothing that necessitates the divine will to this [displeasure].

Finally, that simple affect as such does not of itself suffice for the character of a prohibiting law, just as conversely a simple affect of pleasure for a good does not suffice for a prescribing law, as is clear in the case of acts of giving counsel. Some efficacious willing is, therefore, necessary, not one by which God wishes a certain act not to be but one by which he wishes to bind an inferior to not performing such an act. But this willing cannot by any argument be proven necessarily to accompany God even if willing to create human beings is assumed. For, although it is fitting for divine wisdom and providence to govern rational creatures by imposing laws and precepts through his will, this is not, nevertheless, necessary such that the contrary implies a contradiction. Just as it is also fitting that he render rewards for good acts and penalties for evil acts, and yet God could without contradiction refuse to punish such evil acts. In the same way, therefore, he could also leave human beings

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11 The structure in this section is not entirely perspicuous, especially with respect to the occurrences of ‘vel’ in this sentence.
tuisset Deus nolle punire talem actum malum; sic ergo posset etiam hominem relinquere, ut sua ratione regeretur nullam speciale obligationem per voluntatem suam illi imponendo, nam hic etiam est quidam moralis effectus ad extra, qui non habet necessariam connexionem cum alicio effectu, neque cum voluntate divina. In hoc ergo sensu nullam involuit contradictionem illa conditionalis; sed vera est pars affirmativa, quod licet nulla esset externa prohibito talis actus esset malus.

11. Alio vero sensu potest intelligi de dictamine rationis divinæ, vel humanæ, et hoc modo per locum intrinsecum sequitur, si talis actus non iudicaretur malus recta ratione non futurum malum, quia non potest esse malum aliquod in actu, nisi sit voluntarium: non potest autem esse voluntarium, nisi aliquo modo sit recta ratione iudicatum, et quia nostra ratio est quaedam participatio rectae rationis, quae in Deo est, ideo etiam recte sequitur, si in Deo non esset aeterna lex indicans malitiam actu, cui voluntas nostra repugnaret, non posse in actibus nostris esse malitiam, quia ablata divina ratione, necesse est nostram auferri: Si autem sub conditionali fingamus manere in nobis dictamen rectae rationis indicans malum, et per impossibile non esse in Deo, illud sufficeret ad malitiam, quia illud sufficit ut voluntas volitari te tendat in turpe objectum.

12. Secundo intelligitur ex dictis, quid dicendum sit de hac causali locutione, Omnis actus voluntatis est malus, quia prohibitus saltem lege aeterna; nam si intelligatur de lege proprie imponente obligationem per voluntatem legislorum, non est simpliciter necessaria de potentia absoluta, ut ex dictis patet, nec de facto etiam est vera, si intelligatur de prima radice, et causa malitiae, ut to be ruled by their reason without imposing any special obligation on them through his will. For the latter is also a certain moral effect beyond himself which does not have a necessary connection with the other effect nor with the divine will. In this sense, therefore, that conditional involves no contradiction. Rather, the affirmative part is true, namely, 'such an act would be evil even though there were no external prohibition'.

11. But the prohibition can be understood in another sense as a dictate of divine or human reason, and in this way the prohibition follows per locum intrinsecum. If such an act were not judged evil by right reason it would not be evil, since it cannot be something evil in act unless it is voluntary but it cannot be voluntary unless it was in some way judged by right reason. And since our reason is a kind of participation in right reason, which is in God, for that reason it also rightly follows that if in God there were no eternal law indicating the evil of acts to which our will was repugnant, there could not be any evil in our acts, since our reason is necessarily removed by the removing of divine reason. But if along with the conditional we imagine that a dictate of right reason indicating the evil remains in us even though, per impossibile, it is not in God, that would suffice for evil because that suffices for the will to tend voluntarily to a base object.

12. From what was said, it is understood, second, what should be said about the causal statement 'every act of the will is evil because it is prohibited at least by eternal law'. For if it is understood of a law properly imposing an obligation through the will of a legislator, it is not strictly necessary with respect to absolute power, as is clear from what was said. Nor is it even true in fact, if it is understood to be about the first root and cause of evil, as is also clear from
etiam patet ex dictis; potest autem de facto ver-
ificari intellecta de causa sufficienti ad malitiam,
nempe dictamine intellectus, seu lege aeterna, nam
licet, nulla alia esset, haec satis esset, ut volun-
tas nostra agens contra illam legem esset mala,
et hoc modo possent intelligi quaedam testimonia
Augustini, Ambrosii, et D. Thomae supra adducta
in n. 2. nam de facto ita est, quod omnis actus
malus est contra legem Dei, et per illam tanquam
per sufficientem rationem, et clariorem notificatur;
si vero intelligatur solum de lege dictante prout est
in ratione, facilius verificaretur propositio de inesse,
quam causalis, est enim voluntas mala agens con-
tra dictamen rationis; tamen non ita proprie dici
mala videtur, quia agat contra dictamen rationis,
neque ergo est malus, quia discordat ab obiecto,
per sufficientem rationem proponitur.

3. Corollarium
quod sensu
dicantur aliqui
actus
intrinsec.

13. Tertio intelligitur ex dictis, quomodo di-
cantur aliqui actus intrinsec malis, non enim tales
sunt, quia malitia sit intrinsec, et physica entitas
eorum de quo postea in sect. 3. neque etiam for-
tasse, quia non possit entitas physica actus pon
in rerum natura, sine illa malitia, sed dicuntur
tales, quia non possunt libere, et humano modo
fieri circa tale obiectum moraliter, et abs- <col. b>
que ignorantia propositum, quin habeant coniunc-
what was said. Moreover, what was understood about the
sufficient cause for evil—namely, a dictate of the intellect or
the eternal law—can be verified as being the case in fact. For
even though there were nothing else, this would be enough so
that our will would be evil in acting contrary to that law. And
the kind of testimony of Augustine, Ambrose, and St. Thomas
that was brought up in n. 2 can be understood in this way.
For it is in fact the case that every evil act is contrary to the
law of God, and [is evil] through that as through a sufficient
reason and it is made more clearly known.

But if it is understood as only about a law that dictates
insofar as it is in reason, the proposition can be more easily
verified as assertoric rather than causal, for it is an evil
will acting against the dictate of reason. Nevertheless, it
does not thus seem properly to be called evil because it acts
against a dictate of reason but because it voluntarily tends
to an evil object, and the object is not evil because it is
[so] shown by reason, but rather it is [so] shown by reason
because it is itself evil, as I was saying in the beginning of
this discussion. That causality, however, can be verified in
another way. First, by speaking about divine reason insofar
as it is the first measure and first exemplar of all things, but
about our reason insofar as it is a necessary condition and
consequently in some sense a cause of every act of our wills.
But in each case [the causality] is properly on the part of the
object and not on the part of the acts of the intellect. For
a will is evil because it is in discord with the object as the
object is proposed through right reason.

13. Third, it is understood from what was said in what
way some acts are called intrinsically evil. For the acts are
not such because evil is a physical entity intrinsic to them
(about this later in sect. 3), nor perhaps because the physical
entity of the act could not be placed in rerum natura without
that evil. Rather, they are called such because they cannot
be freely and in a human way performed morally directed
at such an object and without ignorance of the proposed
object without having a conjoined and innate evil. And so it

314 dictante} distante V
Suárez, DBM VII, sect. 1

335 R | is repugnant for such acts performed in that way to be good or to remain indifferent. For that reason they are deservedly called intrinsically evil.

345 R | But a certain difference and latitude should be noticed among these acts, for some of them have evil conjoined to them by the force of a direct and physical tendency to the object, which happens either when the object has that condition entirely unchangeably from which the wickedness arises (this is the case with hatred of God) or when in the object itself directly willed that condition from which that wickedness arises is proposed (as in the case of willing to lie, to steal, and so on). But sometimes the evil is not conjoined by the force of a direct and physical tendency but only from an indirect tendency, as when someone wishes to accept this thing or to come near to this woman but does not place either his condition or that of another in the willed object. There is a difference between these two types, for this latter act can be entirely preserved without evil if the condition in the object were to change. From that change in the object no change in the act follows, since it did not tend directly to that condition. But a moral change can follow, since the object is morally changed. But in the former kind of act the object cannot be changed without the act being changed on account of the direct tendency. And for this reason the evil cannot be removed as long as the tendency remains, except perhaps by the intervention of ignorance. Nevertheless, if the evil is so obvious that one cannot be ignorant of it, as is perhaps the case with the hatred of God, that act could not be a human act without being evil. Perhaps it is for that reason that Scotus said that this act is especially intrinsically evil (some more about this in sect. 3).

365 R | The response to the reason for doubting in the beginning is clear from what has been said. For when it is said that every evil must be contrary to a prohibition or contrary to a duty, if this is understood as being about the duty intrinsic to a rational nature as such, what is assumed is true. From that duty arises a judgement of right reason that prohibits by judging agreeability to nature...
rae, et malitiam contrariam, non imponendo novam obligationem; et hoc satis est ad omnia, quae ibi assumuntur, neque est necessaria alia maior prohibitio exterior, ut dictum est, quamvis de facto semper haec concurrat ex perfectione divinae providentiae. Ad testimonia iam responsum est in n. 4. et possunt etiam non male exponi de lege indicante. and the contrary evil. It does not prohibit by imposing a new obligation. And this is sufficient for everything assumed here nor is any greater external prohibition necessary, as was said, although as a matter of fact this external prohibition always concurs as a result of the perfection of divine providence. There was already a response in n. 4 to the cited texts and they can also be not badly explained as being about indicative law.