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Utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem

QUAESTIUNCULA 1

[Qc. 1 arg. 1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem. Nullus enim vult quod ignorat, ut patet
5 per Augustinum in Lib. de Trinit., et per philosophum, qui dicit in 3 de anima, quod objectum voluntatis est appetibile apprehensum. Sed non omnes cognoscunt beatitudinem, cum multi circa beatitudinem erraverint. Ergo non omnes appetunt beatitudinem.

10 [Qc. 1 arg. 2] Praeterea, quicumque appetit beatitudinem, appetit illud quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo. Sed ipsa beatitudo est Dei visio, quam non omnes appetunt. Ergo non omnes appetunt beatitudinem.

15 [Qc. 1 arg. 3] Praeterea, illud quod non potest apprehendi, non potest desiderari. Sed duo contraria esse simul, non cadit in apprehensione, ut patet 4 Metaph. Ergo contraria simul non possunt appeti. Sed aliqui appetunt ea quae sunt beatitudini contraria, sicut illi qui appetunt peccata. Ergo non omnes appetunt beatitudinem.

20 [Qc. 1 arg. 4] Praeterea, peccatum est, spreto incommutabili bono, rebus mutabilibus adhaerere. Sed beatitudo est incommutabile bonum. Ergo qui peccat, eam spernit; et sic non omnes eam appetunt.

25 [Qc. 1 s. c. 1] Sed contra est quod Boetius in 3 de Consol., probat, quod mentibus omnium hominum veri boni cupiditas inserta est. Verum autem bonum dicit beatitudinem. Ergo beatitudo ab omnibus appetitur.

30 [Qc. 1 s. c. 2] Praeterea, unicuique appetibilis est suus finis. Sed beatitudo est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Ergo omnes homines beatitudinem appetunt.

Whether everyone desires happiness

QUAESTIUNCULA 1

We thus proceed to the third article. It seems that not everyone desires happiness. For no one wishes for that of which he is ignorant, as is clear from Augustine, *De Trin.*, and from the Philosopher, who says in *DA* III that the object of the will is a desirable apprehended thing. But not everyone is aware of happiness since many people have been in error concerning it. Therefore, not everyone desires happiness.

Furthermore, whoever desires happiness, desires that which is essentially happiness itself. But happiness itself is the vision of God, which not everyone desires. Therefore, not everyone desires happiness.

Furthermore, that which cannot be apprehended cannot be desired. But that two contraries are at the same time cannot come into apprehension, as is clear from *Metaph.* IV. Therefore, two contraries at the same time cannot be desired. But some people desire those things which are contrary to happiness, as do those who desire sins. Therefore, not everyone desires happiness.

Furthermore, it is a sin to cling to changeable things, scorning unchangeable good. But happiness is an unchangeable good. Therefore, he who sins, scorns it. And so not everyone desires happiness.

On the contrary: Boethius in *De consol.* III shows that a desire (*cupiditas*) for true good is implanted in the minds of all human beings. But happiness is called 'true good'. Therefore, happiness is desired by everyone.

Furthermore, one's end is desirable to each person. But happiness is the ultimate end of human life. Therefore, every human being desires happiness.

¹Latin text is from: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/snp40491.html>.

QUAESTIUNCULA 2

[Qc. 2 arg. 1] Ulterius. Videtur quod aliquis possit miseriam appetere. Omnis enim rationalis potentia ad opposita se habet. Sed voluntas est potentia rationalis. Ergo se habet ad opposita. Beatitudini autem opponitur miseria. Ergo si potest aliquis appetere beatitudinem, potest etiam appetere miseriam.

[Qc. 2 arg. 2] Praeterea, si non potest aliquis velle miseriam, impossibile est eum velle. Ergo necesse est eum non velle. Sed necessitas coactionem vel prohibitionem importat, ut Anselmus dicit. Ergo voluntas cogi poterit; quod ejus repugnat libertati.

[Qc. 2 arg. 3] Praeterea, sicut beatitudo est ab omnibus appetibilis, ita et esse. Sed quidam volunt non esse, ut patet de his qui seipsos interficiunt. Ergo et quidam possunt velle miseriam.

[Qc. 2 arg. 4] Praeterea, voluntas est de fine, ut dicitur 3 Ethic. Sed finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum, ut dicitur 2 Phys. Ergo tam bonum quam apparens bonum potest desiderari. Sed illud quod est malum, potest esse apparens bonum. Ergo miseria quantumcumque sit mala, aliquis eam velle poterit.

[Qc. 2 s. c. 1] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in *Lib. de Lib. Arb.*, ostendit quod nullus homo potest velle esse miser.

[Qc. 2 s. c. 2] Praeterea, sicut se habet intellectus ad primum intelligibile, ita se habet voluntas ad primum appetibile. Sed intellectus non potest assentire contrario primi intelligibilis, quod est affirmationem et negationem non esse simul veram, ut probatur 4 *Metaph.* Ergo voluntas non potest assentire miseriae, quae est contrarium sui primi appetibilis.

QUAESTIUNCULA 3

[Qc. 3 arg. 1] Ulterius. Videtur quod nullus appetendo beatitudinem mereatur. Naturalibus enim non meremur. Sed appetitus beatitudinis est homini naturalis; alias non esset omnibus communis. Ergo nullus appetendo beatitudinem meretur.

[Qc. 3 arg. 2] Praeterea, cum meritum et demeritum sint circa idem, nullus meretur in eo quod vitare non potest, sicut nec peccat, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed homo non potest non appetere beatitudinem. Ergo nullus appetendo meretur.

[Qc. 3 arg. 3] Praeterea, nullus potest ex propriis viribus

QUAESTIUNCULA 2

Next. It seems that someone can desire misery. For every rational power holds itself to opposites. But the will is a rational power. Therefore, it holds itself to opposites. Misery, moreover, is opposed to happiness. Therefore, if someone can desire happiness, he can also desire misery.

Furthermore, if someone cannot will misery, it is impossible that he will it. Therefore, it is necessary that he not will it. But necessity brings in compulsion or prohibition, as Anselm says. Therefore, the will would be compelled, which is incompatible with its freedom.

Furthermore, just as happiness is desirable for everyone, so also is being. But certain people do not want to be, as is obvious of those who kill themselves. Therefore, they also can will misery.

Furthermore, willing is of the end, as is said in *EN* III. But the end is good or apparent good, as is said in *Phys.* II. Therefore, something can be desired as good or as apparent good. But that which is bad can be apparent good. Therefore, however bad misery may be, someone could will it.

On the contrary: Augustine shows in *De lib. arb.* that no human being can will to be miserable.

Furthermore, just as the intellect is related to the first intelligible, so also the will is related to the first desirable. But the intellect cannot assent to the contrary of the first intelligible, which is that an affirmation and a negation cannot be true at the same time, as was proven in *Metaph.* IV. Therefore, the will cannot assent to misery, which is the contrary of its first desirable.

QUAESTIUNCULA 3

Next. It seems that no one earns merit by desiring happiness. For we do not earn merit from natural things. But the desire for happiness is natural to a human being; otherwise, it would not be common to everyone. Therefore, no one earns merit by desiring happiness.

Furthermore, since merit and demerit concern the same thing, no one earns merit in that which he cannot avoid, just as he does not sin, as Augustine says. But a human being cannot not desire happiness. Therefore, he does not earn merit by desiring it.

Furthermore, no one can merit eternal life by his own power as

mereri vitam aeternam, sicut Pelagius dicebat. Sed homo ex propriis viribus beatitudinem appetere potest. Ergo appetendo beatitudinem non meretur.

[Qc. 3 s. c. 1] Sed contra, eodem modo aliquis desiderat beatitudinem et Deum. Si ergo nullus desiderando beatitudinem meretur, nullus desiderando Deum merebitur; quod est absurdum. 15R

[Qc. 3 s. c. 2] Praeterea, caritas est principium merendi. Sed caritas principaliter respicit finem. Ergo ex motu voluntatis in ultimum finem maxime meremur; et ita in appetendo beatitudinem. 20

QUAESTIUNCULA 4

[Qc. 4 arg. 1] Ulterius. Videtur quod non omne quod aliquis vult, propter beatitudinem velit. Nullus enim delectationem propter aliquid vult, ut dicitur 7 Ethic. Delectatio autem non est ipsa beatitudo, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo non quicquid aliquis vult, propter beatitudinem vult. 5R

[Qc. 4 arg. 2] Praeterea, id quod potest propter beatitudinem desiderari, est ad beatitudinem ordinabile. Sed multi volunt aliqua quae non sunt ordinabilia in beatitudinem, sed magis ab ea avertunt, sicut est de peccatoribus. Non ergo omne quod aliquis vult, propter beatitudinem vult. 10R

[Qc. 4 arg. 3] Praeterea, illud quod in se nullam speciem boni habet, non potest ad beatitudinem desiderari. Sed quandoque desideratur aliquid quod nullam speciem boni habet, sicut patet per Augustinum in Lib. Confess., ubi dicit: id furatus sum quod mihi abundabat, et multo melius; nec ea re volebam frui quam furto appetebam; sed ipso furto et peccato (...) et ita quaero quid me in furto delectaverit; et ecce species nulla est. Ergo aliquid desideratur non propter beatitudinem. 15R

[Qc. 4 arg. 4] Praeterea, mors nullo modo ad beatitudinem potest ordinari, nisi forte sub spe vitae consequendae post mortem: quia beatitudo non nisi viventis est. Sed quidam seipsos mortem pati voluerunt vel a seipsis, vel ab aliis, sub nulla spe futurae vi-

Pelagius said. But a human being can desire happiness by his own power. Therefore, he does not earn merit by desiring happiness.

On the contrary: someone desires happiness and God in the same way. Therefore, if no one earns merit by desiring happiness, then no one will earn merit by desiring God—which is absurd.

Furthermore, charity is the principle of earning merit. But charity principally respects the end. Therefore, we especially earn merit from the motion of the will to the ultimate end; and thus [we especially earn merit] in desiring happiness.

QUAESTIUNCULA 4

Next. It seems that one does not will everything for the sake of happiness that one wills. For no one wills delight for the sake of something else, as is said in *EN VII*. Moreover, delight is not happiness itself, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, one does not will everything for the sake of happiness that one wills.

Furthermore, that which can be desired for the sake of happiness is directed (*ordinabile*) to happiness. But many people will something that is not directed to happiness, but which rather turns away from it, as is the case with sins. Therefore, one does not will everything for the sake of happiness that one wills.

Furthermore, that which has no appearance of good in itself cannot be desired for the sake of happiness. But whenever something is desired that has no appearance of the good, as is clear from Augustine in *Conf.*, where he says: ‘For I stole something of which I already had more than enough and of and of much better quality. I did not want to enjoy what I desired by theft, but only the theft and the sin itself . . . and thus I ask what in the theft I delighted in. And, behold, nothing appears in it.’² Therefore, something is desired but not for the sake of happiness. 20R

Furthermore, death in no way can be directed to happiness, except perhaps by way of hope of attaining life after death, because there is no happiness except while living. But certain people wanted themselves to suffer death either at their own hands or the hands of

² *Confessions* 2.4.9 and 2.6.12.

tae. Ergo non omne quod quis vult, propter beatitudinem vult. 25R

25 [Qc. 4 arg. 5] Praeterea, ex hoc hominis voluntas recta indicatur quod in rectum finem ordinatur. Si ergo quidquid desideratur, propter beatitudinem desideratur, omnis voluntas hominis est recta: quod falsum est. 30R

30 [Qc. 4 arg. 6] Praeterea, propter quod aliquis vult aliquid actu, oportet actu esse cogitatum. Si ergo quidquid vult propter beatitudinem vult, in omni desiderio oportebit beatitudinem actu esse cogitam; quod apparet esse falsum. Ergo idem quod prius. 35R

35 [Qc. 4 s. c. 1] Sed contra, in eo quod propter se desideratur, et nunquam propter aliud, stat motus desiderii. Sed illud in quo stat motus desiderii, est ultimus finis. Si ergo aliud quam beatitudo sit desideratum propter se, et nunquam propter aliquid aliud; aliud quam beatitudo erit ultimus finis; quod esse non potest. Ergo omne aliud desideratum, vel mediate vel immediate ad beatitudinis desiderium refertur. 40R

40 [Qc. 4 s. c. 2] Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, quod pacem omnia desiderant, et quod propter eam agunt quaecumque agunt. Sed pax ordinatur in beatitudinem, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo quidquid desideratur, propter beatitudinem desideratur. 45R

QUAESTIUNCULA 1

[Qc. 1 co.] Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod in omni ordine mobilium et motorum oportet secundos motores ordinari in finem primi motoris per dispositionem impressam in eis a primo motore; sicut patet cum anima movet manum et 5 manus baculum, et baculus percutit, quod est finis intentus ab anima; baculus et manus tendunt ad finem ab anima intentum per hoc quod anima in eis imprimit mediate vel immediate. Sed hoc distat in motibus naturalibus et violentis; quod in motibus violentis impressio relicta a primo motore in secundis motoribus 10 est praeter naturam eorum; et ideo operatio consequens ex tali impressione est eis difficilis et laboriosa: sed in motibus naturalibus impressio relicta a primo motore in secundis motoribus, est eis causa naturalis; et ideo operatio hanc impressionem conse-

others, but without any hope of future life. Therefore, one does not will everything for the sake of happiness that one wills.

Furthermore, a human will is revealed to be right by it being directed to the right end. Therefore, if whatever is desired is desired for the sake of happiness, then every human will is right. But this is false.

Furthermore, that for the sake of which someone actually wills something must be actually cognized. Therefore, if whatever one wills one wills for the sake of happiness, then happiness will have to be actually cognized in every desire. But this is obviously false. Therefore, the same conclusion as before.

On the contrary: the motion of desire stops in that which is desired for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. But that in which the motion of desire stops is the ultimate end. Therefore, if something other than happiness is desired for its own sake and never for the sake of something else, then something other than happiness will be the ultimate end. But this cannot be. Therefore, everything else that is desired is referred either mediate or immediately to a desire for happiness.

Furthermore, Dionysius says that everyone desires peace and that they do whatever they do for its sake. But peace is directed to happiness, as is clear from what was said. Therefore, whatever is desired is desired for the sake of happiness.

QUAESTIUNCULA 1

I respond to the first question that in every order of movable things and movers second movers must be directed to the end of the first mover through a disposition impressed on them by the first mover, as is clear when the soul moves a hand and the hand a stick and the stick strikes that which is the end intended by the soul. The stick and the hand tend to the end intended by the soul through that which the soul impressed on them mediate or immediately. But this differs in natural motions and violent motions. In the case of violent motions the impression remaining from the first mover in the second movers is beyond their nature. And for that reason the action following from such an impression is difficult and laborious for them. But in the case of natural motions the impression remaining from the first mover in the second movers is a natural cause for them. And for that rea-

15 quens est conveniens et suavis; et ideo dicitur Sap. 8, quia Deus 15R
omnia suaviter disponit: quia unaquaeque res ex natura sibi di-
vinitus indita tendit in id ad quod per divinam providentiam ordi-
natur secundum exigentiam impressionis receptae. Et quia om-
nia procedunt a Deo in quantum bonus est, ut dicit Augustinus, et
20 Dionysius; ideo omnia creata secundum impressionem a creatore 20R
receptam inclinatur in bonum appetendum secundum suum
modum; ut sic in rebus quaedam circulatio inveniatur; dum, a
bono egredientia, in bonum tendunt. Haec autem circulatio in
quibusdam perficitur creaturis, in quibusdam autem remanet im-
25 perfecta. Illae enim creaturae quae non ordinantur ut pertingant 25R
ad illud primum bonum a quo processerunt, sed solummodo ad
consequendam ejus similitudinem qualemcumque; non perfecte
habent hanc circulationem; sed solum illae creaturae quae ad ip-
sum primum principium aliquo modo pertingere possunt; quod
30 solum est rationabilium creaturarum, quae Deum ipsum assequi 30R
possunt per cognitionem et amorem: in qua assecutione beati-
tudo eorum consistit, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo sicut quaelibet
res alia naturaliter appetit suum bonum, ita quaelibet creatura
rationalis naturaliter suam beatitudinem appetit.

35 [Qc. 1 ad 1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut visibile
est duplex; scilicet per se, ut color, et per accidens, ut homo: ita
etiam appetibile, quod est objectum voluntatis, dupliciter accipi
potest; per se, et per accidens. Per se objectum voluntatis est 40R
bonum; sed per accidens est hoc vel illud bonum. Et sicut bonum,
40 communiter loquendo, est per se objectum voluntatis; ita et sum-
mum bonum est ultimus voluntatis finis, per se loquendo: sed
hoc vel illud bonum ponitur ut ultimus voluntatis finis et princi-
pale ejus objectum quasi per accidens. Beatitudo ergo quantum 45R
ad id quod in ipsa est per se voluntatis principale objectum, est
45 omnibus nota; sed quantum ad id quod accidit per se objecto, non
est nota. Omnes enim cognoscunt perfectum bonum, et hoc ap-
petunt, dum beatitudinem appetunt; sed hoc perfectum bonum
esse voluptatem vel divitias, virtutem, vel quidquid hujusmodi, 50R
50 est per accidens; et ideo circa hoc non est inconveniens multos
esse errores.

son the action following this impression is agreeable and pleasant.
And for that reason it is said in Wisdom 8[:1] that God ‘arranges all
things agreeably’. For each thing as a result of the nature divinely
introduced to it tends to that to which it is ordered through divine
providence according to the enforcement (*exigentiam*) of the received
impression. And because everything proceeds from God insofar as it
is good, as Augustine and Dionysius say, therefore all created things
according to the impression received from the Creator are inclined
to desiring the good according to the way of each.

And so a certain kind of circular movement is found in things as
long as, coming forth from the good, they tend to the good. More-
over, this circular movement is perfected in certain creatures, but re-
mains imperfect in certain creatures. For those creatures which are
not directed so that they extend to that first good from which they
proceeded but only to attaining some sort of similitude with it, do
not have this circular movement perfectly. But only those creatures
which can in some way extend to the first principle itself [have it
perfectly]. This only belongs to rational creatures, which can attain
God through cognition and love. Their happiness consists in this at-
tainment, as is clear from what was said. And for that reason just as
any other thing whatever naturally desires its good, so any rational
creature naturally desires its happiness.

To the first argument, therefore, I respond that just as the visible
is twofold, namely, *per se* (for example, colour) and *per accidens* (for
example, a human being), so also the desirable that is the object of
the will can be taken in two ways: *per se* and *per accidens*. The object
of the will *per se* is the good, but *per accidens* it is this or that good
thing. And just as the good, speaking generally, is *per se* the objec-
tion of the will, so also the highest good is the ultimate end of the
will, speaking *per se*. But this or that good thing is counted as an ul-
timate end of the will and its principal object *per accidens*, as it were.
Therefore, happiness with respect to that which in itself is *per se* the
principal object of the will is known by everyone. But with respect
to that which belongs to the *per se* object it is not so known. For ev-
eryone is aware of the perfect good and desires this when they desire
happiness. But that this perfect good is pleasure, wealth, virtue, or
something of this sort is *per accidens*. And for this reason it is not an
objection that many people are in error concerning this.

[Qc. 1 ad 2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis divina visio sit ipsa beatitudo, non tamen sequitur quod quicumque appetit beatitudinem, appetat divinam visionem: quia beatitudo, 55R
inquantum huiusmodi, importat per se objectum voluntatis, non
55 autem ipsa divina visio; sicut aliquis appetit dulce, qui tamen non appetit mel.

[Qc. 1 ad 3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis aliqui appetant ea quae sunt contraria beatitudini secundum rei veritatem; tamen secundum suam aestimationem non sunt contraria, 60R
60 sed perducentia ad eam.

[Qc. 1 ad 4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ille qui peccat inhaerendo bonis mutabilibus sicut fini, accipit ipsas res mutabiles quasi principale appetibile et perfectum bonum; et ideo eis inhaerendo beatitudinem appetit. Sicut enim non sequitur 65R
65 quod aliquis appetendo beatitudinem appetat id quod secundum rei veritatem est beatitudo; ita etiam non sequitur quod aliquis spernendo id quod secundum rei veritatem est beatitudo, beatitudinem spernat: sicut non sequitur quod qui ignorat hominem, ignoret album, quamvis homo sit albus. 70R

QUAESTIUNCULA 2

[Qc. 2 co.] Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod operatio causae secundae semper fundatur super operatione causae primae, et praesupponit eam; et ideo oportet quod omnis operatio 5R
5 animae procedat ex suppositione ejus quod inditum est animae ex impressione primi agentis, Dei scilicet; et ideo videmus ex parte intellectus, quod ad nihil intelligendum anima potest procedere nisi ex suppositione illorum quorum cognitio est ei innata; et propter hoc non potest assentire alicui quod sit contrarium his 10R
10 principiis quae naturaliter cognoscit; et similiter oportet esse ex parte voluntatis. Unde cum ex impressione primae causae, scilicet Dei, hoc animae insit ut bonum velit; et perfectum bonum tamquam finem ultimum appetat; impossibile est quod contrarium ejus in appetitu illius cadat: et ideo nullus potest miseriam velle, vel malum, nisi per accidens; quod contingit dum appetit 15R
15 aliquod malum quod apprehendit ut bonum.

To the second argument, I reply that although vision of the divine is happiness itself, nevertheless it does not follow what anyone who desires happiness desires vision of the divine, because happiness, insofar as it is of this kind, introduces through itself the object of the will, but not the very vision of the divine, just as someone who desires something sweet yet does not desire honey.

To the third argument, I respond that although some people desire those things which are contrary to happiness according to the truth of the matter, nevertheless they are not contrary [to happiness] according to the estimation of these people but rather productive of it.

To the fourth argument, I respond that he who sins by clinging to changeable goods as to an end, grasps these changeable things as if they were the principal desirable thing and the perfect good. And for that reason he desires happiness by clinging to them. For just as it does not follow that someone desiring happiness desires that which is happiness according to the truth of the matter, so also it does not follow that someone who scorns that which is happiness according to the truth of the matter scorns happiness. Likewise, it does not follow that he who is ignorant of a human being is ignorant of white, although the human being is white.

QUAESTIUNCULA 2

I respond to the second question that the action of a second cause is always grounded in an action of a first causes and presupposes it. And for this reason every action of a soul must proceed from the supposition of it that was put into the soul by the impression of the first agent, namely, God. And for this reason we see on the part of the intellect that the soul cannot proceed to anything that is to be understood except from the supposition of those things of which cognition is innate to it. And on account of this it cannot assent to anything that is contrary to those principles which it cognizes naturally. And it must be likewise on the part of the will. Hence, since by impression of the first cause—namely, God—this is in the soul so that it wills the good and desires perfect good as the ultimate end, it is impossible that the contrary of it fall into its appetite. And for this reason no one can will misery or bad, except *per accidens*, which happens when it desires something bad that it apprehends as good.

[Qc. 2 ad 1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potentia rationalis se habet ad opposita in his quae ei subsunt; et haec sunt illa quae per ipsam determinantur: non autem potest in opposita illo-
 20 rum quae sunt ei ab alio determinata; et ideo voluntas non potest
 in oppositum ejus ad quod ex divina impressione determinatur,
 scilicet in oppositum finis ultimi; potest autem in oppositum eo-
 rum quae ipsa sibi determinat, sicut sunt ea quae ordinantur in
 finem ultimum, quorum electio ad ipsam pertinet.

[Qc. 2 ad 2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod coactio, cum vi-
 olentiam importet, et prohibitio similiter, non pertinent ad illam
 necessitatem quae naturam rei consequitur: quia omne violen-
 tum est contra naturam; et ideo cum naturaliter voluntas neces-
 sario feratur in beatitudinem, hoc coactionem in ipsa non ponit,
 30 nec aliquam libertatis diminutionem.

[Qc. 2 ad 3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet ali-
 quid quod secundum se est appetibile, aliquo adjuncto appetibile
 non esse. Unde etiam esse, quod per se ab omnibus desideratur,
 et secundum se est bonum, aliquo adjuncto redditur malum et
 35 odibile, sicut esse in tristitia vel miseria; unde et per accidens
 non esse appetitur, non quidem in quantum privat esse, sed in
 quantum tollit illud malum quod esse odiosum reddebat. Carere
 autem malo bonum est; unde et qui appetit non esse, appetit il-
 lud ut bonum. Sed miseria nunquam potest accipi ut bonum, quia
 40 dicit rationem perfecti mali; et ideo nullus potest velle esse miser.
 Non esse autem non dicit ipsam rationem mali, sed id quod est
 malum; et ideo aliquo adjuncto, quod habet rationem boni, potest
 esse appetibile; sicut patet per philosophum in 9 Ethic., et per Hi-
 eronymum in Glossa Hierem. 20. Quod autem Augustinus dicit,
 45 quod nullus appetit non esse, intelligendum est per se loquendo.

[Qc. 2 ad 4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod non potest aesti-
 mari quod albedo sit nigredo, quamvis possit aestimari quod id
 quod est album, ut homo, sit nigrum; et similiter potest aestimari
 ut id quod est bonum, sit malum: sed quod ipsa bonitas sit mali-
 50 tia, aut e converso, aestimari non potest. Et quia miseria implicat
 in se rationem mali, ideo non potest aestimari ut bona, et propter

To the first argument, I respond that a rational power holds itself
 to opposites in those things which are subject to it and these things
 are those which are determined through it. But it cannot hold itself
 to opposites in those things which are determined to it by something
 else. And for this reason the will cannot hold itself to the opposite of
 that to which it is determined by divine impression, namely, to the
 opposite of the ultimate end. But it can hold itself to the opposite of
 those things which it determines itself, such as those things which
 are directed to the ultimate end the choice of which belongs to it.

To the second argument, I respond that compulsion (since it in-
 troduces violence) and prohibition likewise do not belong to that ne-
 cessity which follow on the nature of a thing, because every violence
 is against nature. And for this reason since the will naturally is nec-
 essarily brought to happiness, this does not place compulsion in it
 nor any other diminishment of freedom.

To the third argument, I respond that nothing prohibits some-
 thing that is desirable in itself from not being desirable conjoined
 with something else. Hence, it can also be that something that is de-
 sired through itself by everyone and is good in itself is turned bad
 and hateful conjoined with something else, as in the case of being in
 sorrow and misery. Hence, also not being is desired *per accidens*, not
 indeed insofar it lacks being but insofar as it removes that bad which
 turned being into something hateful. Moreover, to be without a bad
 is good; hence also he who desire not to be desires that as a good. But
 misery can never be taken as a good, because it expresses the *ratio*
 of perfect bad. And for this reason no one can will to be miserable.
 Moreover, not being does not express the very *ratio* of bad, but that
 which is bad. And for this reason it can be desirable when conjoined
 with something else that has the *ratio* of good. This is clear through
 the Philosopher in *EN IX* and Jeremiah in *Glossa Hierem. 20*. More-
 over, that Augustine says that no one can desire not to be should be
 understood as speaking *per se*.

To the fourth argument, I respond that it cannot be estimated
 that whiteness is blackness, although it can be estimated that this
 thing (for example, a human being) is black when it is white. And
 likewise it can be estimated that this thing is bad which is good. But
 that goodness itself is badness or conversely cannot be estimated.
 And because misery implies in itself the *ratio* of bad, it for this reason

hoc non potest appeti.

55R cannot be estimated as good. And on account of this it cannot be desired.

QUAESTIUNCULA 3

[Qc. 3 co.] Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod bonum, quod est objectum voluntatis, est in rebus, ut dicit philosophus in 6 *Metaph.*; et ideo oportet quod motus voluntatis terminetur ad rem extra animam existentem. Quamvis autem res, prout
5 est in anima, possit considerari secundum rationem communem praetermissa ratione particulari; res tamen extra animam non potest esse secundum communem rationem nisi cum additione propriae rationis; et ideo oportet, quantumcumque voluntas feratur in bonum, quod feratur in aliquod bonum determinatum; et
10 similiter quantumcumque feratur in summum bonum, quod feratur in summum bonum hujus vel illius rationis. Quamvis autem ex naturali inclinatione voluntas habeat ut in beatitudinem feratur secundum communem rationem, tamen quod feratur in beatitudinem talem vel talem, hoc non est ex inclinatione nat-
15 urae, sed per discretionem rationis, quae advenit in hoc vel in illo summum bonum hominis constare; et ideo quandocumque aliquis beatitudinem appetit, actualiter conjungitur ibi appetitus naturalis, et appetitus rationalis; et ex parte appetitus naturalis semper est ibi rectitudo; sed ex parte appetitus rationalis
20 quandoque est ibi rectitudo, quando scilicet appetitur ibi beatitudo ubi vere est; quandoque autem perversitas, quando appetitur ubi vere non est; et sic in appetitu beatitudinis potest aliquis vel mereri adjuncta gratia, vel demereri, secundum quod ejus appetitus est rectus vel perversus.
25

55R
10R
15R
20R
25R

[Qc. 3 ad 1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in appetitu beatitudinis semper cum eo quod est naturale, conjungitur aliquod voluntarium non naturale, et sic potest ibi cadere ratio meriti vel demeriti.

[Qc. 3 ad 2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis nullus possit vitare quin beatitudinem aliquo modo appetat, potest tamen vitare quod non appetat eam hoc modo quo est appetenda; et sic potest mereri vel demereri.

30R

[Qc. 3 ad 3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad appetendam beatitudinem perfecto appetitu, qui sufficiat ad merendum, homo ex
35

QUAESTIUNCULA 3

I respond to the third question that the good that is the object of the will is in things, as the Philosopher says in *Metaph.* VI. And for this reason the motion of the will must be terminated in some thing existing beyond the soul. Moreover, although a thing as existing in the soul can be considered according to the its common *ratio* by passing over its particular *ratio*, nevertheless the thing beyond the soul cannot be according to a common *ratio* except with the addition of a proper *ratio*. And for this reason insofar as the will is brought to the good it must be brought to some determinate good. And likewise insofar as it is brought to the highest good it must be brought to the highest good of this or that *ratio*. Moreover, although by natural inclination the will is such that it is brought to happiness according to a common *ratio*, nevertheless, the fact that it is brought to such or such happiness is not by the inclination of nature but through the discrimination of reason, which devises to set up the highest good of a human being in this or that thing. And for this reason whenever someone desires happiness there are actually conjoined there a natural appetite and a rational appetite. And on the part of the natural appetite there is always rectitude there. But on the part of the rational appetite there is rectitude there when happiness is desired where it truly is, but there is perversity when it is desired where it not truly is. And thus someone can with a desire for happiness earn merit in conjunction with grace or demerit, in accordance with whether the desire is right or perverse.

To the first argument, I respond that in a desire for happiness there is always conjoined something voluntary that is not natural to that which is natural. And thus the *ratio* of merit or demerit can fall there.

To the second argument, I respond that although no one can avoid desiring happiness in some way, still, one can avoid desiring it in the way in which it should be desired. And thus he can earn merit or demerit.

To the third argument, I respond that for desiring happiness with a perfect desire that is enough for earning merit, a human being can-

propriis viribus non est sufficiens; sed habet hoc ex munere divinae gratiae, ut patet 2 Corinth. 5, 5: qui efficit nos in hoc ipsum Deus, idest, qui facit nos veram gloriam appetere, secundum Glossam.

QUAESTIUNCULA 4

[Qc. 4 co.] Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in 7 Ethic., in ordine appetibilium hoc modo se habet finis sicut principium in ordine intelligibilium. Quia
5 autem illud quod est primum in quolibet genere et maximum, 5R
est causa eorum quae sunt post; ideo cognitio principii in speculativis est causa cognitionis omnium aliorum; et similiter appetitus finis est causa appetendi omnia alia quae sunt ad finem. Unde cum beatitudo sit finis humanae vitae; quidquid voluntas
10 appetit facere, ad beatitudinem ordinat: quod etiam experimento 10R
patet. Quicumque enim appetit aliquid, appetit illud in quantum est aestimatum bonum. Per hoc autem quod aliquis habet aliquid quod aestimat bonum, reputat se ut beatitudini propinquorem: quia additio boni super bonum facit magis appropinquare bono
15 perfecto, quod est ipsa beatitudo. Et ideo quilibet appetitus in 15R
beatitudinem ordinatur.

[Qc. 4 ad 1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod delectatio est aliquid eorum quae ad beatitudinem exiguntur, cum sit in beatitudine; et ideo appetitus ipse quo quis delectationem appetit, in beatitudinem ordinatur, in quantum ipsa delectatio est
20 aliqua similitudo vel propinqua vel remota illius delectationis quae beatitudinem perficit. 20R

[Qc. 4 ad 2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid ordinari ad beatitudinem per desiderium, dupliciter contingit. Uno modo sicut quod quaeritur ut per hoc homo ad beatitudinem perveniat; 25R
sicut aliquis vult operari opera virtutis, ut per hoc beatitudinem mereatur. Alio modo cum quis appetit aliquid ex hoc ipso quod habet aliquam similitudinem beatitudinis. Cum enim voluntas appetit aliquid, ex hoc ipso efficitur ut desideret illud in quo
30 ejus aliqua similitudo invenitur, quamvis principale desideratum 30R
habere non possit; et hoc modo omnes qui peccata appetunt, ad beatitudinem tendunt, et ad Dei imitationem, ut dicit Augustinus 2 Confession., sic dicens: superbia celsitudinem imitatur, cum

not do enough by his own power. But he has this by the gift of divine grace, as is clear from 2 Cor. 5:5, ‘he who made us for this is God himself’, that is, who made us to desire true glory, according to the gloss.

QUAESTIUNCULA 4

I respond to the fourth question that according to the Philosopher in *EN VII* the end stands to the order of desirables in the same way as the principle in the order of intelligibles. Moreover, because that which is first in any genus and greatest is the cause of those things which come after it. For this reason cognition of the principle in speculative things is the cause of the cognition of all the others. And likewise the desire for the end is the cause of desiring all other things which are for the end. Hence, since happiness is the end of human life, whatever the will desires to do is directed to happiness. This is also clear from experience. For whoever desires something desires it insofar as it is estimated good. Through this, moreover, that someone has something that he estimates good he considers himself nearer to happiness, because the addition of a good to another good makes come closer to perfect good, which is happiness itself. And for this reason any desire whatever is directed to happiness.

To the first argument, therefore, I respond that delight is one of those things which fill out happiness, since it is in happiness. And for this reason the desire itself by which someone desires delight is directed to happiness, insofar as the delight itself is some similitude—either closer or more distant—of that delight which perfects happiness.

To the second argument, I respond that something being directed to happiness through desire can happen in two ways: in one way as what is sought so that the human being comes closer to happiness through it and in the other way when someone desire something as a result of the fact that it has some similitude with happiness. For when the will desires something, from this very thing it is brought about that it would desire something in which is found some similitude of the thing principally desired although it cannot have the principally desired thing. And in this way all who desire sins aim at happiness and to an imitation of God, as Augustine says in *Conf. II*, saying it in this way: ‘pride imitates high-spiritedness, although you alone, O

35 tu sis unus super omnia Deus excelsus: ambitio quid nisi hon-
orem quaerit, et gloriam, cum tu sis prae cunctis honorandus; et 35R
similiter inducit in aliis vitiis.

[Qc. 4 ad 3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in illo furto, ut Au-
gustinus, ibidem, dicit, erat aliquid speciem boni habens, hoc
scilicet, facere aliquid contra legem, in quo quaedam libertatis
40 umbra apparet; unde dicit: quid ergo in illo furto ego dilexi, et in 40R
quo Deum meum vitiose atque perverse imitatus sum? Et solvit
dicens: an libuit facere contra legem saltem fallacia, quia poten-
tatu non poteram, ut libertatem captivus imitarer, faciendo im-
pune quod non liceret, tenebrosa omnipotentiae similitudine?

45R

45 [Qc. 4 ad 4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliqui sine spe
futurae vitae morti se exponunt dupliciter. Uno modo propter
operationem virtutis; sicut illi qui ut salvarent patriam, vel ali-
qua inhonesta vitarent, mortem sustinere praelegerunt; et hoc 50R
quidem in beatitudinem ordinabant secundum eorum aestima-
tionem, non consequendam post mortem, sed in ipso opere tunc
consequendam: quia facere perfectum opus virtutis, quod erat in
sustinendo mortem, erat ab eis desideratum maxime, in quo beat-
itudinem ponebant. Alio modo propter taedium miseriae quod 55R
sustinebant, quam se per mortem vitare aestimabant. Vitare
autem miseriam et appetere beatitudinem in idem coincidunt.
55 Et ideo constat quod desiderium eorum qui mortem sustinere
vulnerunt, ad beatitudinem ordinabatur.

[Qc. 4 ad 5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod vol- 60R
untas sit recta, duo requiruntur. Unum est quod sit finis deb-
60 itus; aliud, ut id quod ordinatur in finem, sit proportionatum
fini. Quamvis autem omnia desideria ad beatitudinem referantur,
tamen contingit utrolibet modo desiderium esse perversum; quia
et ipse appetitus beatitudinis potest esse perversus, cum quaer- 65R
itur ubi non est, ut ex dictis patet; et si quaeratur ubi est, potest
65 contingere quod id quod propter hunc finem appetitur, non est
finitum proportionatum; sicut cum quis vult furari, ut det eleemosy-

God, are exalted above all. What does ambition seek but honour and
glory, although you alone should be honoured before all other else
...³ And he introduces the other vices in a similar way.

To the third argument, I respond that in that theft, as Augus-
tine says in the same place, there was something having the appear-
ance of good: this, namely, to do something against the law, in which
the shadow of a certain kind of freedom appeared. Hence, he says:
'What, then, was it that I loved in that theft and in what was I imi-
tating my God in a vicious and perverse way?'⁴ And he resolves it,
saying: 'Was it pleasing to me to do something against the law—at
least in a deceptive way, because I could not do so actually by rule—
so that as a captive I might imitate freedom, by doing with impunity
what was not licit, a dark similitude of omnipotence?'⁵

To the fourth argument, I respond that those who want death for
themselves without hope of future life are explained in two ways. In
one way on account of the activity of virtue, as those who preferred
death in order to save the fatherland or in order to avoid something
shameful. And they certainly direct this to happiness according to
their estimation, not in pursuing death but in that very action upon
which it follows. For to perform the perfect work of virtue which was
in sustaining death was the thing most desired by them in which they
placed happiness. In the other way on account of a weariness of the
misery that they sustain which they estimate to avoid through death.
Moreover, to avoid misery and to desire happiness come to the same
thing. And for this reason it is clear that the desire of those who
willed to sustain death was directed to happiness.

To the fifth argument, I respond that two things are required for
the will to be right. One is that the end is due. The other is that what
is directed to the end is proportionate to the end. Moreover, although
every desire is referred to happiness, it yet happens that a desire is
perverse in either way, because even the very desire for happiness
can be perverse when it is sought where it is not, as is clear from
what was said. And if it is sought where it is it can still happen that
that which is desired for the sake of this end is not proportionate to
the end, as when someone wants to steal so that he may give alms

³ *Conf.* 2.6.13.⁴ *Conf.* 2.6.14.⁵ *Conf.* 2.6.14.

nam, per quam mereatur beatitudinem.

[Qc. 4 ad 6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod sic in intelligi-
bilibus non oportet ut in omnibus consequentibus demonstra-
tionibus prima principia essentialiter ingrediantur quasi actu-
aliter cogitata, sed virtute tantum, dum demonstratio conficitur
ex his quae per prima principia fidem habent; ita etiam quamvis
omne desiderium ad beatitudinem referatur, non tamen oportet
quod in omni desiderio de beatitudine actualiter cogitetur: sed
desiderium beatitudinis est virtute in omnibus aliis desideriis, si-
cut causa in effectu.

through which he may earn happiness.

To the sixth argument, I respond that just as in intelligible things it is not necessary that in every consequent demonstration the first principles that are essentially advanced are, as it were, actually thought about, but virtually only, while the demonstration is completed from those which have faith through the first principles; so also even though every desire is referred to happiness, it is, nevertheless, not necessary that in every desire one actually think about happiness. Rather, the desire for happiness is virtually in every other desire, as cause in effect.