

Christoph Scheibler
METAPHYSICA II, CAP. 9, TITUL. 1¹

<p. 780>

COMMENTARY (Commentarius)

Since our intellect is of a certain perfect mean, it happens as a result that something is not easily understood by us or on account of an excess of cause the objects become unproportionate to the intellect. Consequently, just as our intellect is blind to the recognition of God as of the most perfect being, so also it clings to the cognition of relations as of the most feeble beings.

Yet they are to be thoroughly discussed by us in the following chapters: (1) the word 'relation' is to be discussed by, where also the divisions of the name are to be explained, (2) it is to be inquired: whether all those genera of relations are understood under a categorical relation, (3) the general essence of categorical relations is to be explained and from this (4) a definition of them is to be built up, and then (5) the requisites for a categorical relation are to be explained, and (6) the divisions of them, and, finally what the attributed variety, what kinds they are, which Aristotle enumerated in *Categ.* c. 7, where he deals with this matter, as also in *Metaph.* V, c. 15.

Cum intellectus noster sit perfectionis cujusdam mediæ, hinc fit, ut aliqua non facilè intelligantur à nobis, vel propter excessum causa objecta fiunt improporcionata intellectui. Sicut igitur intellectus noster cæcutit ad agnitionem Dei, tanquam Entis perfectissimi: ita etiam hæret in cognitione relationum, tanquam Entium debilissimorum.

Sunt tamen de iis nobis sequentia capita pertractanda. I. Dicendum est nobis de voce *relationis*, ubi etiam divisiones nominis explicandæ sunt. II. Inquirendum est: an omnia illa relationum genera sub relatione prædicamentali intelligantur? III. Explicanda est generalis essentia prædicamentalis relationis. <781> Atque hinc IIII. extruenda ejus definitio. Tum V. explicanda sunt requisita relationis prædicamentalis. VI. Ejusdem distributiones. Et *denique*, ejusdem attributa varia, qualia sunt, quæ Aristoteles *l. Categ. c. 7.* recensuit. Ubi hac de materia agit, sicut & *lib. 5. Met. c. 15.*

¹Latin text is from: *Christophori Scheibleri, antehac in academia Giessena professoris, Metaphysica duobus libris ...* (Oxonis, excudebat Hen. Hall ... impensis Jos. Godwin, 1665). I have made no attempt to capture all variants, but occasionally I have noted variants found in the 1637 edition published by William Turner in Oxford.

HEADING I (Titulus I)

Concerning the word 'relation' and its named distinctions (De voce Relationis ejusdemque distinctionibus nominalibus)

Accordingly, what holds to that word, Albert thinks in *Categ.* c. 2, is that is better to say '*relatum*' than '*relation*'. But this is not a satisfying view. For compositions of accidents are beings *per accidens*, because they are observed both as form and subject. But *per accidens* beings are not in the categories. Hence, the abstractive word '*relation*' is better than '*relatum*'.

A relation is called by another name '*respect*' and by '*to something*'. Nevertheless, this term '*to something*' can be said ambiguously, so that it signifies either the relation itself or also the *relatum*. Therefore, the father is thus to something and the paternity is also to something. Where by the latter genus of speaking, relation and to something are equivalent in meaning. Hence again I rather use the word '*relation*' for the sake of shunning that equivocation which the term '*to something*' has. Even if respect is more clear signified through the term '*to something*' than through the term '*relation*'. For the little word '*to*' suggest respect. Moreover, the little word '*something*' terminates the same. As is well explained by Armandus de Bellovisu, *De declaratione difficultum terminorum tam theologiæ quam philosophiæ ac logice* l. 2, c. 171.

Further on, the word '*relation*' is also ambiguous. For it can be taken efficiently and formally. In the first way, a relation is nothing other than the action by which one from something to another thing is referred (as in the case where one thing is compared with another thing). And the discussion at present is not concerning that. Consequently, the word '*relation*' should be taken formally, insofar, namely, as that is an intrinsic nature, whence such a thing is intrinsically so that it is called a *relatum*.

Now some distinctions between relations which pertain to the nature of the name should also be explained.

Igitur quod ad vocem attinet, Albert. c. 2. *Categ.* existimat, melius dici *relatum*, quàm relationem. Sed non placet sententia. Nam concreta ex accidentibus sunt Entia per accidens, quia notant & formam & subjectum. At Entia per accidens non sunt in prædicamentis. Proinde melior est vox abstractiva *relatio*, quàm *relatum*.

Dicitur relatio alio nomine *respectus*, & *ad aliud*. Quanquam vox hæc *ad aliud*, potest ambiguè dici, ut significet vel ipsam relationem, vel etiam relatum. Sic igitur pater est ad aliquid, & etiam paternitas est ad aliquid. Ubi ex posteriori genere loquendi, relatio & ad aliquid æquipollent. Unde & vocem relationis potiùs usurpo, ad evitandam istam æquivocationem, quæ est ad vocem ad aliquid. Etsi aliàs clariùs significatur respectus, per vocem *ad aliquid*, quàm per vocem *relationis*. Vocula enim *ad respectum* insinuat. Vocula autem *aliquid* eundem terminat. Ut bene explicat Arman. de Bello Visu *lib. 2. termin. c. 171*.

Porro etiam vox relationis est ambigua. Potest enim efficienter sumi & for-

maliter. Primo modo relatio est nihil aliud quàm actio quâ unum ab aliquo, (veluti eo, qui unum cum alio comparat) ad aliud refertur. Et sic de ea non est sermo in præsentî. Sumenda igitur est vox relationis formaliter, quatenus scilicet ea est intrinseca ratio, unde intrinsecè tale est, ut relatum dicatur.

Nunc etiam explicandæ sunt aliquæ distinctiones relationis, quæ ad rationem nominis pertinent.

Concerning the distinction of relation into real and that which is conceptual (De distinctione Relationis in realem, & eam quæ est rationis)

Igitur nunc 2. distinguitur relatio in *relationem realem* & *rationis*. Quæ distinctio nominalis solùm est, sive vocis ambiguæ, qua de re & ipsius imagine, nihil univocè prædicatur, sive secundùm unum conceptum.

Per relationem igitur *realem* ea intelligitur, quæ verè est relatio. Relatio igitur *rationis* erit, quæ cùm non sit relatio, apprehenditur tamen & concipitur à nobis tanquam relatio. Ita Petrus cùm simpliciter sit quid absolutum,² apprehenditur tamen ut aliquid relativum: quatenus dicitur *idem sibi ipsi*. Quæ indentitas relatio realis non est. Sic & animal est simpliciter quid absolutum, apprehenditur tamen ut aliquid relativum, quatenus, (quæ relatio est generis) apprehenditur ut constituens speciem humanam. Hic relatio generis realis non est, quia non est nisi accedente mentis operâ, quæ purificat rem aliquam à conditionibus specificis, per præcisionem, & sic apprehendit eam tanquam genus, traduntque hanc distinctionem Dd. communiter. Vide imprimis Arman. de Bello Visu *lib. 2. term. cap. 177, seqq.* ubi ipse quatuor ad relationem realem conditiones requirit. Prima est, ut quod refertur relatione reali, sit aliquid reale. II. ut in eo quod sic refertur, sit aliquid positivum, per quod sic referatur. III. Ut terminus, ad quem est relatio, sit realis. Denique ut terminus, qui refertur, sit realiter distinctus à termino opposito. <782>

Concerning the distinction of relations secundum dici and secundum esse (De distinctione Relatorum secundum dici & secundum esse)

Hæc distinctio sumitur ex Aristotele, *l. Categ. c. 7*. Ex his igitur *relatio secundum dici* non est ea, quæ dicitur relatio. Nam & ea quæ realis est, dicitur relatio, sed ea solùm est relatio secundùm dici, quæ (ut evincit oppositio ad esse) non revera, sed nomine quatenus solùm relatio est. Talis est, cùm refertur ala ad alatum & caput ad capitatum. Relatio igitur secundùm esse est illa, quæ & est & dicitur relatio.

Videtur hæc distinctio cum præcedente coincidere, prout & Avicennæ *l. I.*³ *Metaph.*, & Henrico *quodl. 3. q. 4.* visum est: nihilominus hactenus eæ distinctiones differunt, quòd relatio rationis semper eo modo quo concipitur, est

²1637: absolutum

³1637: 3

relatio. Identitas enim & genus (quæ exempla erant relationis rationis) sunt istiusmodi. Indéque relationes rationes assimilantur relationibus realibus. Sed id secus est in relationibus secundùm dici, quæ non habent nisi nomen relationis, nihil autem relationi prædicamentali simile. Dicimus enim potentiam *referri* ad aliquid possibilie. Intellectum *referri* ad verum. Voluntatem *referri* ad bonum. Hîc usurpatur vox *referri*, sive relationis. Nihil autem hîc concipitur tanquam relatio, quod secus esset in relationibus rationis.

Concerning the distinction of relations into transcendental and categorical (De distinctione relationis in transcendentem & prædicamentalem)

The distinction of relations into transcendental and categorical is commonplace and is explained more thoroughly by Cajetan in *De ente et essentia*, c. 7, q. 15 and Suárez, *DM* XLVII.3.10 and all of section 4.

This division of relations is understood, speaking accurately, only concerning relations which are *secundum esse*. And it seems to have this sense that one is a relation which is counted among the categories, but another which is understood in the transcendental division of beings through absolute and respectice. But to this point the distinction is not good. For respective being there is said with indifference to transcendental respect and categorical respect, as we saw above in l. 1, c. 10, n. 13 and following. Consequently, the best distinction is the one that I made in that very place, n. 24, that a transcendent relation agrees with the thing by the power of its essence and without any addition. A categorical relation, however, adds something really distinct to the thing which is referred (not in this sense: as if the relation itself is something always really distinct, but) because it adds something external, co-existing, by which co-existence of the other thing a relation, as it were, results which would not be present otherwise. But a transcendent relation, inasmuch as it is intimately implicated in the essence, is always in it, whether the *terminus* co-exists or not. Just as paternity signifies a categorical relation, so that consequently in order for someone to be a father, something real is required in addition to the father, which thing, that is, the son, terminates the relation. A power, however, implies a respect to its act, just as the visual power to vision: a respect, I say, that is transcendental, which respect itself agrees, strictly speaking, by the potential of that essence, and not by something external having been applied somewhere, or, namely, whether vision co-exists or not.

The Coimbra College commentary on *Categ.* c. 7 distinguishes transcendental and categorical relations in a two-fold way. In one by a discrimination taken from the *terminus*; in the other, from the subject. The former way says that a categorical *relatum* respects something else, as a pure *terminus*, that is, not under an aspect of some cause or as some effect concerning which it exercises, just as similar and similar, equal and another equal, and so on. But a transcendent relation does not respect something else as a pure *terminus*, and, as it were, for nothing, but with regard to some service of bringing to bear or receiving, in which way affects are powers to acts and their objects, likewise matter to form, accident to substance, and so on. In the latter way the distinction is taken from the subject, that is, a transcendental relation does not suppose a subject to which it arrives, just as a form, and that refers, but is included essentially in that which is referred. But a categorical relation

is a certain accidental form of created things, adjacent by the subject that is denominated a *relatum*, as is proven by the previous examples.

And here are the chief distinctions among relations, which need to be put forward in order to fix this category of relation.

Distinctio relationis in transcendentalem & prædicamentalem vulgaris est, & latè explicatur à Cajetano in *lib. de Ente & essentia, cap. 7. qu. 15.* et Suarez *Disp. 47. Metaph. s. 3. n. 10 & seq. 4. tota.*

Intelligitur autem illa relationum divisio, accuratè loquendo, solùm de relatione, quæ est secundùm esse. Et videtur habere hunc sensum, quòd alia sit relatio, quæ inter prædicamenta recensetur: Alia verò quæ intelligitur in transcendentali Entium divisione per absolutum & respectivum. Sed huc discrimen bonum non est. Nam Ens respectivum ibi dicitur cum indifferentia ad respectum transcendentem & prædicamentalem, ut vidimus suprà *lib. 1. c. 10.⁴ n. 13. seqq.* Optimum igitur discrimen est, quod ibidem notavi *n. 24.* quod relatio transcendens, convenit rei ex vi essentiæ suæ, & sine ullo addito. Relatio autem prædicamentalis addit aliquid realiter distinctum, ad rem, quæ refertur (non hoc sensu, quasi ipsa relatio sit aliquid realiter distinctum semper sed) quia addit aliquid extraneum, coëxistens, ex qua alterius coëxistentia resultat quasi relatio, quæ secus non adesset. At relatio transcendens, utpote intimè implicata in essentia, semper est in ea, seu terminus sit coëxistens, seu non. Veluti paternitas significat relationem prædicamentalem. Ut igitur pater aliquis sit, requiritur aliquid reale extra patrem, quod hanc relationem terminet, hoc est, filius. Potentia autem implicat respectum ad actum suum, veluti potentia visiva ad visionem: respectum, inquam, transcendentem, qui respectus ipsi simpliciter convenit ex vi essentiæ istius potentialis, & non attento quoquam extraneo, seu scilicet sit visio coëxistens, seu non sit.

Colleg. Conimbr. *lib. Categ. c. 7.* Transcendentem & prædicamentalem relationem distinguit bifariam. *Altero* discrimine sumpto ex termino: *altero* ex subjecto. *Prius* est: quod relatum prædicamentale respicit aliud, ut purum terminum, hoc est, non sub ratione alicujus causæ, vel ut aliquem effectum circa illum exercent, veluti est simile & simile, æquale & aliud æquale, &c. Transcendens verò relatio, non respicit aliud, ut purum terminum, & quasi gratis, sed intuitu alicujus muneris præstandi vel recipiendi, quomodo affectæ sunt potentiæ, ad actus & objecta sua, item materia ad formam, accidens ad substantiam, &c. *Posterius* discrimen, quod à subjecto sumitur, hoc est, quod relatio transcendens non supponit <783> subjectum cui adveniat, tanquam forma, quòdque referat, sed includitur essentialiter in eo quod refertur. Prædicamentalis autem relatio est rerum creaturarum accidentaria quædam forma, adjacens subjectu quod relatum denominat, ut ex prioribus exemplis liquet.

Atque hac potissimum sunt distinctiones relationis, quæ ad constituendum

⁴1637: 2

hoc prædicamentum relationis necessariò proponendæ sunt. Nunc igitur quæritur.

HEADING 2 (Titulus II)

Whether all relations pertain to the category of relation (An omnes relationes pertineant ad prædicamentum relationis?)

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IV. *Transcendental relations do not pertain to the category of relation.* Thus it follows then by the opposition (for transcendental [relations] are opposed to categorical [relations]), then by the nature and condition of transcendentals. For transcendentals are called that from transcending, because, namely, they transcend, [i.e., run through], the steps of the categories, and by their community surpass them, as was seen above, l. 1, c. 3. Consequently, just as it is absurd to call transcendental good a quality or to call a transcendent multitude a quantity, so similarly it is absurd to call a transcendent respect categorical.

Relationes transcendentales non pertinent ad prædicamentum relationis. Ita sequitur tùm ex oppositione (transcendentales enim prædicamentalis opponuntur,) tùm ex natura & conditione transcendentium. Transcendentia enim dicuntur à transcendendo, quia scilicet scalas prædicamentales transcendant, & communitate suà superent, ut visum est suprâ *lib. 1. c. 3.* Sicut igitur absurdum est bonitatem transcendentem vocare qualitatem, aut multitudinem transcendentem dicere quantitatem. Ita similiter absurdum est, respectum transcendentem vocare prædicamentalem.

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