

Francisco Suárez, S. J.
DE BONITATE ET MALITIA HUMANORUM ACTUUM, DISP. 6, SECT. 1¹

<354>

DISPUTATIO VI.

DE BONITATE ACTUS INTERIORIS VOLUNTATIS EX FINE.

5 Finis quatenus voluntatem movet et excitat, ad objectum voluntatis pertinet: quatenus vero interdum esse solet extra substantiam actus, inter circumstantias numeratur, et ideo postquam de bonitate ex objecte, et circumstantiis dictum est, commode explicanda sequitur bonitas ex fine sumpta, de qua re tractavit D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 18, per varios articulos, et quæst. 19, art. 7 et 8, quos omnes in hac disputatione exponemus.

10 SECTIO I.

Utrum bonus finis sit necessarius ut actus voluntatis sit bonus.

Notatio 1 pro resolutione.

15 1. Primo supponendum est duobus modis versari voluntatem circa finem: uno modo propter se: alio modo circa alia propter ipsum: et hoc modo distingui solet in genere duplex motus voluntatis in finem, scilicet intentio et electio, comprehendendo tamen sub intentione simplicem voluntatem et amorem, seu desiderium finis propter se ipsum, et sub electione comprehendendo usum, et quemcumque alium actum, qui versatur circa

DISPUTATION VI.

ON THE GOODNESS RESULTING FROM THE END OF AN INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL.

5R The end pertains to the object of the will insofar as it moves and excites the will. But insofar as it sometimes is accustomed to being beyond the substance of the act, it is numbered among the circumstances. And for that reason after the goodness resulting from the object and circumstances has been discussed, the goodness taken up from the end follows in a helpful explanation. St. Thomas treated this matter in [ST] IaIIæ.18, various articles, and IaIIæ.19.7–8, all of which we will explain in this disputation.

SECTION I.

Whether a good end is necessary in order for an act of the will to be good.

15R 1. First, it should be supposed that the will can turn in two ways concerning the end. In one way, for its own sake; in another way, concerning something else for its sake. And in this way two motions in kind of the will towards the end are usually distinguished, namely, intention and election. Still, simple will and love or desire for the end for its own sake should be included under intention and use and any other acts that turn concerning some object for the sake of an extrinsic end should be

A first note on behalf of a resolution.

¹The Latin text is from the Vivès edition. Marginal notes—some of which, but not all, are reproduced in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the beginning of paragraphs—are from the 1628 edition.

Notatio 2. 20 aliquod objectum propter extrinsecum finem.
 2. In quo est secundo advertendum duobus modis posse
 actum voluntatis versari circa aliquid propter finem extrinse-
 cum. Uno modo in intentione diligendo, seu eligendo medium
 propter finem, ita ut tota ratio, et proximum motivum talis
 actus sit ipse finis. Secundo modo fieri potest, ut ipse finis
 25 solum remote terminet actum, qui refertur in ipsum: ita ut
 voluntas proxime velit aliquod objectum propter bonitatem in-
 trinsecam illius: et præterea referat illum actum in ulteriorem
 finem: inter quos actus est differentia: nam in priori licet finis
 videatur extrinsecus respectu materiæ volitæ, seu medii electi,
 30 tamen respectu ipsius voluntatis se habet, ut objectum formale
 proxime movens ad talem actum: at vero in posteriori actu,
 finis non est objec- <col. b> tum formale, nam supponit ali-
 iud motivum formale proximum, sed solum est veluti causa
 extrinseca movens remote, et applicans voluntatem, et ut bre-
 35 vibus terminis utamur, priorem actum vocabimus semper pu-
 ram electionem: posteriorem vero vocabimus actum ordina-
 tum ad finem extrinsecum, nam sub hac ratione se habet, ut
 electio, vel usus, quamvis participet etiam rationem intentio-
 nis, quatenus versatur circa aliquod objectum bonum propter
 40 se ipsum.

Notatio 3. 3. Ex quo potest tertio adverti interiorem actum volun-
 tatis, de quo solum nunc agimus, interdum esse tantum elic-
 itum ab illa, ut est, verbi gratia, prima intentio, seu primus
 amor finis: interdum vero est simul elicitus et imperatus, nam
 45 imperatus tantum nullus esse potest in actibus internis, de
 quibus agimus, sed illud est proprium externorum, nam actus
 interior voluntatis debet esse elicitus ab illa: quia vero sicut vol-
 untas potest velle actus aliarum potentiæ, ita etiam potest
 velle suos per alios actus distinctos, ideo sicut potest imperare
 50 actus eliciendos per alias potentias, ita etiam et eliciendos per
 se ipsam, et hoc modo potest dari in ipso actus simul elicitus et
 imperatus, qui necessario supponit alium pure elicitem.

Notatio 4. 4. Unde etiam fit dupliciter posse esse actum voluntatis
 imperatum ab ipsa scilicet, vel virtualiter tantum, vel etiam for-
 55 maliter. *Formaliter* voco eum quando actus est directe, et for-
 maliter volitus per alium actum, ut cum volo dolere de pecca-

included under election.

25R 2. Secondly, in this it should be noted that an act of the will can
 turn concerning something for the sake of an extrinsic end in two ways.
 In one way, in intention by loving or electing a means for the sake of
 the end so that the end itself is the entire reason and proximate motive
 for such an act. In the second way, it can happen that the end itself
 30R terminates the act which is referred to it only remotely, so that the will
 proximately wills some object for the sake of its intrinsic goodness and
 in addition refers that act to a further end. There is a difference between
 these acts. For in the former act, although the end seems extrinsic with
 respect to the willed matter or elected means, still, with respect to the
 will itself, it holds itself as a formal object proximately moving [the
 will] to such an act. But, on the other hand, in the latter act, the end is
 35R not the formal object, for it supposes another proximate formal motive,
 but is only as if an extrinsic cause remotely moving and applying the
 will. And, in order to use short terms, we will always call the former
 act 'pure election', but the latter act we will call an 'act ordered to an
 extrinsic end'. For under this nature it holds itself as election or use,
 although it also participates in the nature of intention to the extent
 40R that it turns concerning some good object for its own sake.

3.

4.

The second note.

tis, aut volo amare Deum: *virtualiter* autem cum actus unus excitatur ex vi alterius, quia includit virtualementem voluntatem illius, et hoc modo omnis electio dici valet imperata ab intentione efficaci, quia posita tali intentione ex vi illius applicatur voluntas ad electionem, etiamsi non habeat formaliter hunc actum, volo eligere, quia satis est quod hic actus virtute in intentione efficaci includatur: nam qui intendit finem, vult illum consequi, et consequenter virtute vult applicare media, atque adeo eligere illa, atque hoc modo omnes actus circa finem revocabimus ad elicitos et imperatos: et elicitos proprie sunt, qui versantur circa ipsum finem propter se, imperati vero sunt omnes qui versantur circa alia propter finem.

1. Pronuntiatum
certum in
præsenti quæst.

5. His positis nonnulla sunt certa in hac quæstione. Primum erit intentionem finis, ut bona sit, requirere bonum finem eo modo, quo ipsa est propter finem. Hoc constat ex dictis, disput. 4, nam respectu actus, talis finis et objectum coincidunt: sicut ergo, ut actus sit bonus requirit honestum objectum, ita intentio honesta requirit finem honestum, et hoc est habere bonum finem, et esse propter illum, et hanc conclusionem posuit D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 19, art. 7.

2. Pronuntiatum.

6. Secundo est certum, actum puræ electionis, ut bonus sit requirere honestum finem, ut sic, quod etiam sumitur ex D. Thoma, eo loco, et constat eadem ratione, quia respecta talis actus, finis se habet, ut motivum et objectum formale: ergo, ut actus sit bonus ex illo, oportet, ut motivum sit honestum. Confirmatur: quia ille actus ex materiali objecto non habet honestatem, quia supponimus non tendere in illud propter bonitatem, quæ in ipso est, ideo enim est pura electio. Dictum est autem supra, actum non accipere bonitatem ab objecto honesto, nisi tendat in illud propter honestatem ejus: ergo ut talis actus sit bonus, oportet ut saltem ex fine habeat honestatem. Unde confirmatur tandem, quia si finis ille sit malus, actus est malus, si indifferens, saltem ex illo fine non est bonus: ergo ut ipse sit bonus, necesse est habere finem bonum.

Tertium.

7. Tertio colligitur hinc, ut certum, quoties actus voluntatis versatur circa objectum indifferens, et ordinat illud in ulteriorem finem, requirere bonum finem, ut bonus sit. Hoc

5. These things being in place, some things are certain regarding this question. The first will be that in order for an intention for the end to be good, it requires a good end in the way in which it is for the sake of the end. This is clear from what was said in disp. 4, for with respect to an act such an end and object coincide. Therefore, just as an act requires an honest object in order to be good, so also an honest intention requires an honest end. And this is to have a good end and to be for its sake. And St. Thomas put this conclusion down in [ST] IaIIæ.19.7.

6. Secondly, it is certain that in order for an act of pure election to be good, it requires an honest end . . .

7. Thirdly, it is gathered from this as certain how often an act of the will that concerns an indifferent object and orders it to a further end requires a good end in order to be good. This is clear, since it does

The first certain pronouncement regarding this question.

The second pronouncement.

The third.

patet, quia non habet aliud caput unde sumat bonitatem: an
95 vero illud sufficiat, postea dicam.

Quartum.

8. Quarto est certum, quando actus voluntatis versatur
circa objectum, ut honestum, ut simpliciter bonum sit, nec-
essarium esse ut non ordinetur ad malum finem. In hoc etiam
100 omnes conveniunt cum D. Thoma, loco citato, estque commu-
nis doctrina Sanctorum, ut videre licet apud Ambrosium, l. 2,
de Jacob, et Vita beata, c. 4, Augustinum, 2, de Moribus Eccle-
siae, c. 13, et praefatione in psal. 31, et lib. de Opere monacho-
rum, c. 26, ubi illa exponit illud Matth. 6: *Attendit ne justitiam*
vestram faciatis, etc., et *Lucerna corporis tui est oculus tuus*: ubi
105 nomine *oculi* intentionem finis intelligit, quod etiam Cassianus
praestat, collat. 1, c. 22, quamvis, collat. 2, cap. 2, per *oculum*
discretionem intelligat, sic etiam ad hoc propositum exponit
Gregorius 1, Moral., cap. 23 et seq., illud Eccles. 1: *Vae pecca-*
tori ingredienti terram duabus viis, et illud psal. 77: *Cor autem*
eorum non erat rectum cum eo, de quo videri potest Chrysos-
tomus, <col. b> hom. 23, ad Populum: consentit Aristoteles,
2, Ethicorum ad Eudemum, in fine: *Qualis unusquisque est, ex*
electione judicamus, non quid, sed cujus gratia, fiat expendentis:
idem late 7, Politicorum, cap. 13: *Et is curam appetitus suscipere*
oportet gratia mentis, et curam corporis gratia animae: ratio est
115 illa communis, quia *bonum ex integra causa*. Item quia motio
in finem est aliquo modo forma, et dans speciem aliquo modo,
et denominationem actui morali, ut infra dicam, omitto nunc
tractare, utrum intentio proprii honesti objecti, ut sic, neces-
sario excludat malum finem, nam de hoc occurrit proprius lo-
cus, disp. 8.

Quid sit dubium
in praesenti
quaestione.
1. Opinio.

9. His ergo stabilitis solum dubitari potest, utrum ac-
tus habens honestum objectum, ut sit bonus simpliciter, re-
quirat finem bonum extrinsecum. Quidem theologi existimant
125 esse necessarium, ut actus praeter objectum bonum referatur
ab operante ad ultimum finem bonum, sine qua relatione ne-
gant actum esse absolute bonum, et quidam ex eis dicunt esse
malum. Alii vero neque bonum, neque malum, sed indiffer-
entem: quae opinio, ut minimum limitanda est ad illos actus,
130 qui habent objectum distinctum ab ipso ultimo fine: nam illi
qui versantur circa ipsum ultimum finem, ut proximum ob-

not have any other head from which to take goodness. But whether
this suffices, I will say later.

8. Fourthly, it is certain that when an act of the will concerns an
60R object as honest, it is necessary that it not be ordered to a bad end in
order to be good strictly speaking. . . .

The fourth.

9. These things having been established, therefore, it can only be
doubted whether an act having an honest object requires an extrinsic
good end in order to be good strictly speaking. Certain theologians
125 think that it is necessary that an act be referred beyond a good object
by the one acting to a good ultimate end. They deny that the act is
absolutely good without this relation and some of them say that it is
bad. But others say that it is neither good nor bad, but indifferent.
This opinion at a minimum should be limited to those act which have
130 an object that is distinct from the ultimate end itself. For those that are
directed to the ultimate end itself as proximate object (for example, love

What the doubt
with regard to
the present
question is.
The first opinion.

jectum, ut amor Dei propter se ipsum, non possunt referri
 in alium finem, quia nullum possunt habere meliorem, quam
 suum proprium objectum, et hoc modo tribuitur hæc opinio
 135 Scoto, in secundo, distinctione decima quarta, quæst. unica,
 et in 3, distinctione trigesima septima, quæstione prima, ubi
 docet nisi præcedat aliquod bonum velle circa ultimum finem,
 non posse esse bonum velle circa alia objecta: unde concludit
 si in pura lege naturæ non teneretur homo aliquando amare
 140 Deum absolute, etiam non posse teneri ad bene operandum.
 Eamdem opinionem tenet Gregorius, in 2, d. 18 et 38, Almainus,
 tractatu 1, Moraliū, cap. 2, inclinatur Bonaventura, in 2,
 d. 41, art. 1, q. 3. Fundamentum sumi potest vel ex illo 1, ad
 Corinth. 10: *Quæcumque facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite*: si-
 145 cut ergo tenetur homo eligere Deum super omnia: ita tenetur
 omnia opera sua in eum, ut in ultimum finem referre: ergo ac-
 tus carens hac relatione, caret circumstantia necessaria ad boni-
 tatem simpliciter. Confirmatur, nam ut actus circa creaturam
 sit bonus simpliciter, oportet, ut non sit per modum fruitionis,
 150 sed per modum usus, juxta doctrinam vulgarem Augustini, de
 qua <356> D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 10; ergo necesse est, ut ametur
 creatura per ordinem ad ultimum finem: nam hoc est illa uti.

Eius
fundamentum.

Confirm.

Dicta opinio
varie accipitur a
suis auctoribus.

10. Non conveniunt autem hi auctores in explicanda hac
 relatione, qualis scilicet esse debeat: Gregorius contentus est
 155 relatione habituali, quam in hoc ponit, quod ex præceden-
 tibus actibus circa ultimum finem, acquisitus, seu comparatus
 fit habitus, a quo dicit cæteros actus habitualiter referri; sed,
 ut recte notavit Almainus, hic habitus impertinens est ad sub-
 sequentes actus circa alia objecta, nisi ipse proprium suum ac-
 tum eliciat, quia alii actus non possunt esse elicit a tali habitu,
 160 cum non contineantur sub objecto illius: neque etiam pos-
 sunt esse imperati: quia habitus non imperat actum nisi medi-
 ante proprio actu. Scotus vero solum videtur requirere, quod
 præcesserit aliquis actus circa ultimum finem, ut patet ex locis
 165 citatis: sed, ut infra latius dicam, ex hoc præcise nihil boni-
 tatis communicatur sequentibus actibus, nisi ille prior actus
 per se, vel per virtutem aliquam influat in posteriores actus,
 quia alioqui nulla erit dependentia: neque causalitas unius ac-
 tus ab alio, sed sola temporis successio, quæ impertinens est ad

for God for his own sake) cannot be referred to another end because
 they can have nothing better than their own proper object. And in this
 way this opinion is attributed to Scotus . . .

75R

10. These authors, however, do not agree in explaining this rela-
 tion, namely, in what sort of thing it is supposed to be. Gregory is
 content with a habitual relation, which he takes to be a habit acquired
 or built up from previous acts concerning the ultimate end by which
 [habit] he says the remaining acts are habitually referred [to the ulti-
 80R mate end]. . . .

The stated
opinion is taken
in different ways
by its authors.

170 bonitatem actus. Alii vero requirunt, ut saltem in principio cu-
jusque actionis actualiter referatur in ultimum finem, quamvis,
in progressu actionis possit tantum virtualiter manere in con-
175 tinuatione ipsius operis; sed quamvis, ut infra dicam, hoc pos-
sit sufficere ad virtuales relationem, tamen valde rigorosum
est hominibus hanc obligationem in cunctis operibus suis im-
ponere.

Autoris decisio.

11. Dicendum est ergo, ad bonitatem actus voluntatis suf-
ficere honestum objectum, esto ab orante non referatur in ul-
180 teriorem finem, ita sentiunt communiter discipuli D. Thomæ,
et sumitur ex ipso, in 1, 2, quæst. 19, art. 10, ad primum, di-
cente: *Quicumque vult aliquid sub ratione quacumque boni hon- 85R*
esti, habet voluntatem, conformem divinæ in ratione volendi,
et ideo bene operatur, et ita explicat doctrinam illius articuli
et præcedentis. Idem D. Bonaventura supra, solum enim re-
185 quirat relationem in ultimum finem intrinsecam et innatam
ipsi operi bono absque alia relatione operantis, nam hoc modo
diximus supra, tractatu 1, actus omnes honestos tendere in
Deum natura sua, ut in ultimum suum finem, quæ tendentia
190 non confert actui distinctam bonitatem præter illam, quam
sumit ex objecto, nisi forte distinctæ rationis secundum rati-
onem gene- <col. b> ricam et specificam, ut potest sumi ex
D. Thoma 1, 2, quæst. 18, art. 7, quem latius infra exponam:
hanc etiam sententiam late confirmat Scotus, l. 2, de Natura,
c. 20, et lib. 3, cap. 4.

Eius
fundamentum.

12. Fundamentum est, quod actus habens objectum bo-
num habet ex illo specificam bonitatem, ut supra probatum
est, sed ex carentia ulterioris finis non habet semper malitiam:
ergo sine illa relatione manebit actus bonus simpliciter. Pro-
195 batur consequentia, quia illa res est bona simpliciter, quæ ha-
bet omnia sibi debita secundum speciem, et individuum. Unde
Scotus non consequenter loquitur concedens actum ex caren-
tia hujus finis non habere malitiam, et negans esse bonum, cum
100R habeat bonum objectum, cum enim dicitur *bonum consurgere*
ex integra causa; non est intelligendum ad actum bonum sim-
105R pliciter necessarium esse omne id, quod conferre valet boni-

11. It should be said, therefore, that an honest object suffices for
the goodness of an act of the will (may it be one that is not referred
to a more ultimate end by one praying). The followers of St. Thomas
commonly think this and it is taken from him in IaIIæ.19.10 ad 1 where
he says: ‘Whoever will anything under some aspect of honest good has
a will that is conformed to the divine [will] in the reason for willing
and therefore he acts well.’³ In this way he explains the doctrine of this
article and the previous ones. Likewise St. Bonaventure above, for he
only requires a relation to the ultimate end that is intrinsic and innate
90R to the good action itself apart from any relation of the one acting. For
in this way we said above in treatise I that all honest acts tend to God as
to an ultimate end by their nature. This tendency does not confer on
the act a distinct goodness beyond that which is taken from the object,
except perhaps of a distinct nature according to generic and specific
195R nature, as can be gathered from St. Thomas in IaIIæ.18.7. I will explain
this in more detail below. Scotus also confirms this view more broadly
in *De natura* II, c. 20, and III, c. 4.

The decision of
the author.

12. The foundation of this view is that an act which has a good
object thereby has specific goodness, as was proven above, but it does
not always have badness as a result of lacking a further end. There-
fore, it will remain a good act strictly speaking apart from that relation.
The consequence is proven: because that thing is good strictly speaking
which has everything that it ought to have according to species and in-
dividual. Hence, Scotus does not consequently say that he is conceding
that an act does not have badness as a result of lacking this end and deny-
ing that it is good when it has a good object. For when it is said that
‘goodness arises from a complete cause’, one should not understand that
for an act to be good strictly speaking everything is necessary that has

Its foundation.

³Suárez’s quotation is not exact: *quicumque vult aliquid sub quacumque ratione boni, habet voluntatem conformem voluntati divinæ, quantum ad rationem voliti.*

tatem, alioqui non est bonus actus, nisi optimus: requiritur ergo, et sufficit integra causa perfectionis, et bonitatis debita speciei, vel in individuo: ergo. Probatum minor propositione, quia nullum extat præceptum obligans hominem ad huiusmodi relationem, vel actualem, vel virtuales ex proprio ipsius hominis actu circa ultimum finem faciendum, nam hoc præceptum non est naturale, nulla enim sufficienti ratione convinci potest. Item satis est homini operari semper juxta rationem rectam circa objecta, quæ illi proponuntur, et plus ab ipso exigere ex præcepto, præsertim naturali, superat humanas vires. Item infidelis, qui verum Deum² ignorat, potest aliquando bene operari juxta sanam doctrinam. Item puer veniens ad usum rationis non tenetur statim in primo usu rationis Deum in se ipso diligere, sed in his, quæ ipsi occurrunt bene moraliter se gerere, et hoc ipso virtualiter censetur converti in Deum: nullum ergo est tale præceptum naturale, neque etiam est positivum humanum, aut divinum; neutrum enim ostendi potest, et humanum quidem superaret potestatem humanam, tum quia esset de re difficillima, tum quia esset de re interna, divina autem præcepta positiva nulla sunt, præsertim in lege gratiæ, nisi fidei, et sacramentorum: in citatis autem, n. 9, verbis Pauli, *Omnia in gloriam Dei facite*, vel non habetur præceptum, sed consilium, vel solum præcipitur, ita semper operari, ut omnia opera nata sint cedere in gloriam Dei, et apta, ut referantur in ipsum, atque adeo quod ex se in illum tendant, quod habent cuncta honesta hoc ipso, quod honesta sunt; et eodem modo tenemur cuncta referre in ultimum finem, et præterea nihil facere, quod non tendat aliquo modo in ipsum.

Satisfit contrario
fundam. in n. 9.

the power to confer goodness. Otherwise, no act would be good except the best. Therefore, a cause completed of the perfection and goodness owed to the species or to the individual is what is required and what suffices. Therefore. The minor proposition is proven, because there is no precept on record that obligates a human being to making a relation of this sort, whether actual or virtual, by a proper act of the human being himself concerning the ultimate end. For this precept is not natural. For no one can be convinced with sufficient reason. Also, it is enough for a human being always to act according to right reason concerning the objects which are proposed to him and to compel more from him by precept, especially by natural [precept], surpasses human strength. Also, the infidel who does not know the true God can sometimes act well according to sound doctrine. Likewise, a child approaching the use of reason is not bound at once to love God in himself in the first use of reason, but to conduct himself in a morally good way in those things which come up for him. And in doing that he is thought to turn virtually to God. Therefore, there is no such natural precept, nor is there even [such a] human or divine positive precept, for neither can be revealed. And, indeed, a human [precept like this] would surpass human power, both because it would be a most difficult matter and because it would be an internal matter. But there are no divine positive precepts, especially in the law of grace other than [precepts] of faith and of the sacraments. Moreover, in the cited words from Paul in n. 9 ('Do all things for the glory of God'), either no precept is held but rather counsel or it is only commanded to always act in such a way that all one's actions were produced to make way for the glory of God and to be suitable to be referred to him and for this reason that they tend to him out of themselves. All honest actions have this by the fact that they are honest. And in that way we are bound to refer everything to the ultimate end and, furthermore, to do nothing that does not tend to it in some way.

²Vivès omits 'Deum'.