

Francisco Suárez, S. J.
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<241, col. b>

CONCERNING THE WILL, INTENTION, AND PRIOR ACTS OF THE INTELLECT (De voluntate, et intentione, actibusque intellectus præviis)

From the beginning of this second treatise we so far examined two general differentia of human acts which are indicated by ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’. It remains for us to deal with the species of the acts of the will in this second part of the same treatise. We will, nevertheless, mix in a discussion about the acts of the intellect because they are conducive for clearly explaining the acts of the will. It should also be noted that the name ‘will’ in the present title does not convey a power but an act, although in the discussion of the doctrine we will sometimes digress also to the power.

Every action of the will, then, turns either concerning an end or concerning a means. That comes to happen two-fold: either in desiring or in attaining. From this a two-fold order arises of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. Prior to all those it contains the acts which are necessary all the way to the next election of a means, which are will, intention, deliberation, consent, and election. The first three concern the end and the last concern the means, respectively. As a result of the election having been established, moreover, the will progresses to a free execution. And thus is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use. To those two acts is added enjoyment, which is not an action in desiring or pursuing an appointed end, but rather it soon follows an end having been attained. In addition, all those acts directly tend to some object. Still, often they are as if reflexive so that when the will elects a means it elects to elect and it uses itself and the intellect, etc. Yet this as if reflection of the acts does not happen through acts distinct from those having been directed, although Cajetan thinks the opposite in [ST] IaIIæ.16.4. Therefore, we will talk in passing about directed and reflexive acts, which will be necessary. But we will talk about acts before the achievement of the end in this disputation.

A principio hujus secundi tractatus, hucusque disseruimus de duabus differentiis generalibus actuum humanorum, quæ per *voluntarium*, et *involuntarium* declarantur. Restat in hac secunda parte ejusdem tractatus, ut in specie de actibus voluntatis agamus. Miscibimus tamen sermonem de actibus intellectus, quia ad explicandos voluntatis actus plane conducunt. Illud etiam attendendum, *voluntatis* nomen in præsentis titulo non potentiam, sed actum importare: licet in discursu doctrinæ, ad ipsam quoque potentiam aliquando digrediamur. Omnis igitur voluntatis actio aut circa finem, aut circa medium versatur: quod dupliciter contingit fieri: aut appetendo, aut exequendo: ex quo duplex oritur ordo actuum voluntatis, et intellectus practici, qui voluntatem gubernat in moribus. Prior omnes illos actus continet, qui necessarii sunt, usque ad postremam medii electionem, qui sunt, voluntas, intentio, consilium, consensus, electio. Tres priores circa finem: posteriores circa medium (eo quo nu-

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition.

merati sunt ordine) versantur. Stabilita autem electione, progreditur voluntas ad liberam executionem : et sic est secundus ordo, in quo duo tantum actus numerantur : imperium et usus : quibus actibus fruitio additur, quæ non est operatio ad finem vel appetendum, vel assequendum ordinata, sed fine potius comparato, ipsa subsequitur. Omnes præterea actus isti directe tendunt in aliqua objecta, sæpe tamen sunt quasi reflexi, ut dum voluntas eligit medium, eligit eligere, et utitur seipsa, et <242> intellectu, etc., tamen hæc actuum quasi reflexio non fit per actus ab ipsis rectis distinctos, licet Cajetanus 1, 2, quæst. 16, art. 4, oppositum censeat. Dicemus igitur de actibus directis et de reflexis obiter, quæ erunt necessaria. In hac autem disputatione de actibus ante consecutionem finis agemus.

SECTION I

CONCERNING THE OBJECTS, NATURES, AND DIFFERENCES OF WILL AND INTENTION (De objectis, rationibus, et differentiis voluntatis et intentionis.)

1. *First, what the act of willing is.*—These are all bound up with each other to such an extent that it is not possible helpfully to explain one without the other. In the first place, then, ‘will’ signifies a certain simple act of the will, which is as if a first inclination of the will to a proposed object as it is lovable *per se*, of which the formal effect cannot be other than to will that object for its own sake without order to another. This act is called simple because it presupposes no other act [and] it does not include another either formally or virtually. From which it is clear that this act is properly concerned with an end. For only an end is good [and] lovable *per se* and because the principle of all motion of the will is an end. Moreover, this is the first motion of the will, as Aristotle teaches in *EN* III, c. 2.

Primus actus volendi quid.—Hæc omnia adeo inter se nexa sunt, ut non possit unum sine altero commode explicari. Imprimis igitur *voluntas* significat simplicem quemdam actum voluntatis, qui est quasi prima inclinatio voluntatis in objectum propositum tanquam per se amabile, cuius effectus formalis non potest esse alius, quam velle illud objectum propter se, sine ordine ad aliud, qui actus dicitur simplex, quia nullum alium supponit neque formaliter, neque virtute alterum includit : ex quo patet hunc actum proprie versari circa finem : solus enim finis est bonum per se amabile, et quoniam principium omnis motus voluntatis est finis : hic autem est primus voluntatis motus, ut docet Aristoteles 3, *Ethic.* 2.

2. *A different signification of ‘intention’.* *What intention properly is.*—‘To intend’ by a certain general signification is to tend to something else, [i.e., to aim at something else]. From this etymology the name ‘intention’ has various significations. For it customarily signifies both the attention of the mind and the application of the senses. And sometimes inanimate things are said to intend their ends. But in the proposition it signifies a certain free or perfectly voluntary tendency to some end, which is proper to things having use of reason. From which it is clear that intention here signifies something pertaining to the intellect or to the will. But what it is, others explain otherwise. St. Bonaventure in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 38, q. 2 says that ‘intention’ pertains equally to will and to intellect [and] he says that it is not one act but as if having been mixed from two. Because ‘intention’ expresses a desire for that which it intends and a bringing together of one to another. But it first pertains to the will and second to the intellect, which are conjoined. Aureolus, in view of Capreolus, [*Sent.*] I, dist. 1, q. 1 says that ‘intention’ is not an act but the circumstance of election, because to intend is only to do here for the sake of something. But here conveys the circumstance of the end in the election.

Intentionis varia significatio.—*Intentio proprie quid.*—*Intendere* significatione quadam

generali est in aliud tendere : ex qua etymologia nomen *intentionis* varias habet significationes : nam et mentis attentionem, et sensuum applicationem significare solet, et interdum res inanimas dicuntur intendere suos fines. In proposito vero significat quamdam liberam, vel perfecte voluntariam tendentiam in aliquem finem : quæ propria est rei utentis ratione : ex quo constat, intentionem hic aliquid significare ad intellectum, vel voluntatem pertinens. Quid vero sit, alii aliter explicant. D. Bonaventura 2, dist. 38, 2 part., quæst. 2, dicit *intentionem* ad voluntatem, et intellectum æque pertinere, quam ait, non esse unum actum, sed quasi mixtum ex duobus : quia *intentione* dicit appetitionem ejus, qui intendit, et collationem unius ad alterum. Primum vero pertinet ad voluntatem, secundum ad intellectum, quæ conjunguntur. Aureolus, apud Capreolum, 1, dist. 1, quæst. 1, ait, *intentionem* non esse actum, sed circumstantiam electionis, quia intendere solum est alicujus gratia hoc facere, hoc vero importat circumstantiam finis in electione. <col. b>

3. *Assertion: intention is a proper act of the will.—The object of intention is the end itself.*—It should be said, nevertheless, that by this name is conveyed a certain proper act of the will. This is the view of St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.8 and of the teachers in [Sent.] II, dist. 38, where Augustine says that ‘intention’ expresses love, Psalms 7 and 9. And the reason is because to intend in this case is to voluntarily tend to something. Moreover, the principle of motion and of tendency is the will, whence it is confirmed. For whether human behaviour is good or bad depends chiefly on intention. But it depends on the will. But from St. Bonaventure’s argument is only concluded that that intention of the will presupposes a judgement and a rule of reason, just as progressive motion, which example he uses, requires direction from some power of the cognizer. But to Aureolus is responded that the end is sometimes the circumstance of election. Still, the very intention of the end is an act of the will. From which we further gather that the object of this act is the end itself, which is the common view. Indeed for that reason the goodness or badness of an act is weighed by intention, especially because it itself is on account of the end and the end is the principle of human acts, as is clear in virtue of the name. For ‘to intend’ is to tend to something else. But we tend to a *terminus* and the *terminus* of the will is the end.

Assertio. Intentio est proprius actus voluntatis.—Objectum intentionis est ipse finis.—Dicendum tamen est, hoc nomine importari proprium quemdam actum voluntatis quæ sententia est D. Thomæ 1, 2, quæst. 8, et doctorum 2, dist. 38, unde Augustinus *intentionem* vocat amorem, Psalm. 7 et 9. Et ratio est, quia *intendere* hic est in aliquid voluntarie tendere : principium autem motionis, et tendentiæ est voluntas, unde confirmatur : nam ex intentione potissimum pendent mores hominum, ut boni, vel mali sint : pendent vero ex voluntate. Ex ratione vero D. Bonaventuræ solum concluditur, istam intentionem voluntatis supponere judicium, et ordinem rationis, sicut motus progressivus, quo exemplo ipse utitur, directionem alicujus potentiæ cognoscentis requirit. Ad Aureolum vero respondetur, finem esse interdum circumstantiam electionis : tamen ipsam intentionem finis esse actum voluntatis. Ex quo ulterius colligimus hujus actus objectum esse finem ipsum ; quæ est sententia communis : ideo enim bonitas, vel malitia actus ab intentione pensatur, maxime quia ipse est circa finem, et finis est principium humanorum actuum, ut patet ex vi nominis : nam *intendere* est in aliud tendere : tendimus vero in terminum, et terminus voluntatis est finis.

4. *In what will and intention differ.*—But from this arises a question: in what way are will and intention distinguished, since they have the same object, namely, the end? It is responded: there are two aspects in the end. The first is a certain good lovable *per se*, and as such it is the object of the will. This is clear because will is first and foremost an act of the will which tends to the object

first and foremost under a certain aspect. This, moreover, is the aspect of good *per se* without any order to another thing.

The second aspect is of its good as it ought to be pursued through means, and in this way it is the object of intention. This is also clear by virtue of the name. For we properly tend to an end when consider how to achieve it. Whence it is gathered that ‘intention’ of an end is only found in the absence of that end. This is why God does not properly intend his felicity, yet wills and loves it. Hence, the will can remain even with the end having been achieved, which also makes manifest the distinction between these acts.

Voluntas et intentio in quo differant.—Sed ex his oritur quæstio, quo modo voluntas et intentio distinguantur, cum habeant idem objectum, scilicet finem? Respondetur : in fine duæ sunt rationes. Prima est quoddam bonum per se amabile, et ut sic est objectum voluntatis : quod patet, quia voluntas est primus et simplicissimus actus voluntatis, qui tendit in objectum sub prima quadam et simplicissima ratione : hæc autem est ratio boni per se, sine ullo ordine ad aliud. Secunda ratio est ejus boni investigandi per media, et hoc modo est objectum intentionis : quod patet etiam ex vi nominis : tunc enim proprie tendimus in finem, quando de illius consecutione tractamus. Unde colligitur, *intentionem* finis solum reperiri in absentia ipsius finis : quare Deus non intendit proprie suam felicitatem, tamen vult, et amat eam : unde voluntas manere potest etiam consecuto fine, quod etiam distinctionem istorum actuum manifestat.

5. *Will and love of the end are entirely the same act.*—From this difference is inferred, first, that will is not distinct from love. For the nature of love is to tend to absolute good, whether present or absent. This, however, is the same as the nature of that act which is called ‘will’. It only seems that it should be added that the name ‘love’ can be used more generally and can sometimes signify an affection of the will, either concerning a means or concerning an end. Yet in speaking about the love for an end or for a good for its own sake, it is not apparent how it can be distinguished from that act which is *will*. This is confirmed: for this act of love of itself is also most simple and presupposes nothing else, from which it happens that the act of *intention* is distinguished from *love* in the same way as from the act which is *will*.

Voluntas et amor finis prorsus idem actus.—Ex qua differentia infertur primo, voluntatem non esse distinctam ab amore : nam ratio amoris est tendere in bonum absolute sive præsens sit, sive absens : hæc autem eadem <243> est ratio istius actus, qui dicitur *Voluntas*. Solum videtur addendum, amoris nomen posse universalius usurpari, et significare aliquando affectionem voluntatis, sive circa medium, sive circa finem : tamen loquendo de amore finis, seu boni propter se, non apparet, quomodo possit distinguui ab illo actu, qui est *Voluntas*. Quod confirmatur : nam hic actus amoris de se etiam est simplicissimus, et nullum alium supponit : ex quo fit, ut actus *intentionis* eo modo distinguatur ab *amore*, quo ab actu, qui est *voluntas*.

6. *How some do not distinguish desire from intention.*—Secondly, many gather that the act of *intention* is not distinguished from the act of *desire*, because it seems to be compared to desire just as *will* is to *love*. For ‘desire’ by a general signification signifies any appetite for obtaining a good which someone lacks. And it extends not only to an appetite of the effective will but also to imperfect volitions or willings even of things impossible in themselves. But ‘intention’ only seems to signify an absolute and effective will for obtaining through appropriate means a loved end.

Hence, if we talk about *desire* not in that general signification, but insofar as it is an effective desire for an end, then in that way it does not seem to have a formal nature distinct from *intention*,

because it is the same formal object, namely, to obtain an absent good. For since usually it is said that the nature of *desire* is to be such that it is turned concerning an absent good, it should not be understood that the *desire* is turned concerning the very absence. For, rather, it flees that but is turned under a certain concept which necessarily presupposes an absence. This, however, is not the concepts of good as such alone. For thus it is indifferent to absence and presence. Therefore, it expresses the attainment of good not already had. But intention desires this very thing. Therefore, etc.

Desiderium quomodo aliqui ab intentione non distinguant.—Secundo colligunt multi, actum *intentionis* non distingui ab actu *desiderii*, quia ita videtur ad desiderium comparari, sicut *voluntas* ad *amorem*, *desiderium* enim generali significatione quamcumque appetitionem obtinendi boni, quo aliquis caret, significat : et non solum ad appetitionem efficacis voluntatis, sed etiam ad imperfectas volitiones, vel velleitates rerum etiam impossibilium sese extendit : *intentio* vero solum videtur significare absolutam et efficacem voluntatem obtinendi finem amatum per media consentanea. Quocirca si de *desiderio* non in illa generali significatione loquamur, sed prout est desiderium efficax finis, isto modo non videtur habere rationem formalem distinctam ab *intentione*, quia habet idem formale objectum, scilicet obtinere bonum absens : nam cum dici solet, de ratione *desiderii* esse, ut versetur circa bonum absens, non est intelligendum, *desiderium* versari circa ipsam absentiam : nam potius istam fugit, sed versatur sub quadam ratione, quæ necessario supponit absentiam, hæc autem non est sola ratio boni ut sic : nam sic indifferens est ad absentiam et præsentiam : ergo dicit consecutionem boni non habiti : sed hoc ipsum appetit intentio : ergo : etc.

7. *As others distinguish [them].*—Others, nevertheless, distinguish these acts in this way. *Desire*, they say, abstracts from the means concerning which *intention* in some way is turned. This is clear for this reason: when I love a good which I lack, I immediately desire it without any cognition of means. Indeed, it can happen that the means are not necessary and, nevertheless, there is a desire. And from this desire the consideration of means and the intention are born. But others say that the desire is not an act by a mode of volition but by a mode of a certain passion which is born from the love for a good and its absence, which is as a certain quasi-distress, which is opposed to the delight of a good that is present. And it is clear because desire and delight are opposed. But delight is the contrary of this distress. Therefore, etc.

Alii ut distinguant.—Alii nihilominus actus istos ita distinguunt. *Desiderium* (inquit) abstrahit a mediis, circa quæ *intentio* aliquo modo versatur : quod sic patet : cum amo bonum, quo careo, statim illud desidero sine ulla cognitione mediorum : imo contingit, media non esse necessaria, et nihilominus esse desiderium : et ex hoc desiderio nascitur consideratio mediorum, et intentio. Alii vero dicunt, desiderium non esse actum per modum volitionis : sed per modum cujusdam passionis quæ ex amore boni, et absentia ejus nascitur, quæ est quasi ærumna quædam, quæ opponitur delectationi de bono præsentis : et patet, quia desiderium et delectatio opponuntur : sed <col. b> delectatio contraria est huic ærumnæ : ergo, etc.

8. *The true view does not distinguish desire from intention.*—But the former way seems more proven to me, because desire ought not to be understood by a mode of volition. But that distress concerning which the last view speaks rather is a certain avoidance and a quasi-nolition of the way of sadness concerning the bad that is present. It is a sign of this that it arises not from the goodness of the object but from its absence, because the absences is apprehended under the aspect of bad. And therefore it is opposed not only to this perfect delight which arises from the good now hav-

ing been achieved, but also that imperfect [delight] which usually arises from the hope for a good already being pursued.

And therefore it is usually said that desire afflicts the soul not through itself but by reason of the lack and as the principle of this distress, concerning which it is rightly said that it is by the mode of passion. But desire is not opposed to delight in the way of a contrary, but in the way of a *terminus*. But that act which the second view was saying was desire can perhaps be a certain ineffective desire. Nevertheless, if it is effective and distinct from love, it cannot express order to the achievement of the object, as was sufficiently shown. But that which that view devises—that good can be absent and yet nothing be a necessary means—cannot happen. And all these things are confirmed by parallels from the sensible appetite. Someone, although he cannot perfectly intend the end, yet in his way can at least [intend] the material [end]. But his intention by the love having been supposed does not exist unless [there is] a desire. Therefore, the same perfect desire in the will will be his perfect intention.

Vera sententia desiderium ab intentione non distingui.—Sed prior modus mihi magis probatur, quia desiderium intelligi debet per modum volitionis, illa vero ærumna de qua ultima sententia loquitur, potius est fuga quædam, et quasi nolitio ad modum tristitiæ de malo præsentis : cuius signum est, quia non ex objecti bonitate, sed ex absentia oritur, quæ absentia apprehenditur sub ratione mali, et ideo opponitur delectationi non solum illi perfectæ, quæ oritur, bono jam consecuto, sed etiam illi imperfectæ, quæ ab spe boni jamjam consequendi oriri solet : et ideo dici solet desiderium affligere animam, non per se, sed ratione carentiæ, et ut illius ærumnæ principium, de qua vere dicitur, esse per modum passionis : desiderium vero non isto modo opponitur delectationi tanquam contrario, sed tanquam via termino : ille vero actus, quem secunda sententia aiebat esse desiderium, forte esse potest desiderium quoddam inefficax : tamen si sit efficax, et ab amore distinctum, non potest non dicere ordinem ad consecutionem objecti, ut satis ostensum est. Quod vero illa sententia fingit, bonum esse posse absens, et tamen nullum esse necessarium medium, fieri non potest. Et confirmantur hæc omnia a simili ex appetitu sensibili : qui licet non possit perfecte intendere finem, suo tamen modo potest saltem materialem. Ejus vero intentio supposito amore, non est nisi desiderium : ergo idem desiderium perfectum in voluntate erit perfecta ejus intentio.

9. *Imperfect enjoyment does not appear per se in the order of intention.*—*Neither the act of hope.*—*Although it is sometimes reduced.*—By these the view of Aureolus and Gregory—who do not distinguish these acts of love and desire with respect to an end not having been achieved and therefore also not will and intention—is proven to be false. Besides what has been said, we will speak against them when the discussion will be about enjoyment. Secondly, concerning an end not yet having been achieved the will can have only two perfect acts, which are necessary for its achievement, namely, will and intention. Or love and desire can have other imperfect [acts], but which are reduced to those.

But Cajetan in [ST] IaIIæ.16.4 adds another act which he says pertains to the order of intention, namely, imperfect enjoyment. But still this act, even imperfect, is in its genus and does not properly appear *per se* in the order of intention. One, because it is concerning the end as it has been achieved in some way. Also, because it is not an act ordered *per se* to the achievement of the intention of the end. But it is a quasi-passion resulting from hope of the propinquity of the end. This act was instituted by the author of nature so that one would persevere more easily and constantly in the intention of an end.

The major difficulty would be concerning the act itself of hope, which is also concerning an end

not already had. And it is necessary *per se* and directly ordained to the achievement of the end. But it should be said that acts of hope are not *per se* necessary in this quasi-line of human acts but by accident concerning some arduous and excellent object, so that the appetite is strengthened, and it is common to acts about the end and about the means. And, finally, since it is necessary, it is turned concerning the end and is reduced to intention. For it is a certain quasi-volition for obtaining an end that seems as arduous and excellent as you like.

*Fruitio imperfecta non spectat per se ad ordinem intentionis.—Neque etiam actus spei.—Quamvis aliquando reducatur.—*Ex his efficitur falsam esse sententiam Aureoli et Gregorii, qui respectu finis non consecuti non distinguunt hos actus amoris et desiderii, atque adeo neque voluntatem et intentionem : contra quos præter dicta agemus, cum de fruitione erit sermo. Secundo circa finem nondum acquisitum solum duos actus perfectos posse habere voluntatem, qui ad illius consecutionem sint necessarii, scilicet voluntatem et intentionem : sive amorem, et desiderium imperfectos vero posse habere alios, qui tamen ad istos reducantur. Cajetanus vero 1, 2, q. 16, art. 4, addidit alium actum, quem dicit pertinere ad ordinem intentionis, scilicet fruitionem imperfectam : sed tamen hic actus et imperfectus est in suo genere, et per se proprie ad ordinem intentionis non spectat : tum quia <244> est de fine ut aliquo modo consecuto : tum quia non est actus per se ordinatus ad consecutionem intentionis finis : sed est quasi passio resultans ex spe, vel propinquitate finis : qui actus ab auctore naturæ fuit institutus, ut in intentione finis quis facilius, et constantius perseveret. Major difficultas esset de ipso actu spei, qui etiam est circa finem non habitum : et per se est necessarius, et directe ordinatus ad consecutionem finis. Sed dicendum est, spei actuum per se non esse necessarium in hac quasi linea actuum humanorum, sed ex accidenti circa aliquod objectum quod arduum est, et excellens, ut appetitus confirmetur, et communis est actibus circa finem, et circa medium : et tandem cum necessarius est, versatur circa finem, et ad intentionem reducitur : est enim quasi volitio quædam obtinendi finem, quantumvis arduus, et excellens videatur.