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DE FINE HOMINIS, PROÆMIUM¹

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<[xiii]>²

PROÆMIUM.

De objecto seu
materia huius
operis.

1. Divus Thomas in præfatione ad hanc theologiæ partem proponit in materiam et objectum, seu subjectum ejus, hominem, ut ad imaginem Dei conditum, id est, ratione et libertate utentem, 5
secundum hoc enim maxime relucet in homine Dei imago: alibi vero (hoc est, prima parte in fronte quæstionis 2, inter tradendam generalem theologiæ divisionem) ait finem potius illius esse tractare de reditu creaturæ rationalis in Deum: unde et subjectum non hominem esse, sed Deum, ut finem ultimum, multi collegerunt. Neque id videtur rationi dissentaneum, totius namque 10
theologiæ objectum Deus est; quare ut pars cum toto proportionem servet, oportet, ut omnes theologiæ partes, præsertim majores, magisque præcipuæ, de Deo disputent, eo vel maxime quod ad perfectionem theologiæ spectat Deum sub omni ratione, atque habitudine considerare: cumque in priore parte theologiæ disputatum sit de Deo; tum sub ratione absoluta a creaturis, quatenus unus et trinus est, tum etiam secundum habitudinem primæ causæ, seu principii creaturarum, necesse est ut in parte alia theologiæ nimirum quam aggredimur, de ipso, ut 20
de ultimo fine disseratur, eoque pacto sit ejus objectum. Neque vero hæc inter se sunt contraria, sed eodem revolvuntur, si enim loquamur de materia proxima, in qua versatur hæc doctrina, non est dubium eam esse hominem ut libere operantem, et per actionem liberam in suam beatitudinem tendentem, quod nunc alia probatione non eget, sed ipso usu constabit, et ex proxime dicendis declarabitur. Si autem de primaria ratione materiam hanc tractandi sit sermo, rectissime dicitur Deus, ut fi-

PREFACE.

1. In the preface to this part of the *Summa Theologiæ*, St. Thomas says that its matter and object or subject is humanity as made in the image of God, that is, as using reason and freedom, for the image of God shines forth most in following these. But elsewhere (that is, the preface to question 2 in the first part, while giving the general division of theology) he says that its goal is rather to discuss the return of rational creatures to God. Hence, many gathered that the subject is also not humanity, but God as ultimate end. Nor does that seem unsuitable to reason, inasmuch as God is the object of all of theology. In the way that a part preserves proportion with the whole, it is necessary that all parts of theology, especially the major parts and even more the primary parts, discuss God, given the fact that it belongs to the perfection of theology to consider God in every aspect and relation. And since there was a discussion of God in the first part of the *Summa Theologiæ*, both in absolute aspect apart from creatures insofar as he is one and three and also according to the relation of first cause or principle of creatures, it is necessary that in another part of the *Summa Theologiæ*—namely, the one we are approaching—he is discussed as ultimate end, in which case God is its object.

But neither are these contrary to each other; rather, they concern the same thing. For if we speak about the proximate matter to which this doctrine is directed, there is no doubt that it is human beings as acting freely and tending through free action to their happiness. Another proof is not now needed, but it will be clear from use itself and it will be shown by the things that are to be said shortly. If, however, the discussion is about the primary reason for discussing this matter, God as ultimate end is most rightly said to the subject of this very work, which the several

Concerning the
object or matter
of this work.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

nis ultimus, subjectum hujusce operis, quod plus rationes factæ probant.

Cur theologi rationem finis ultimi per ordinem solum ad hominem pertractant.

30 2. Quæret vero aliquis: cum Deus non sit solum finis hominis, sed terminus etiam omnium creaturarum, cur theologi ad explicandum in Deo rationem finis ultimi, in homine tantum illum declarent, considerando videlicet, quo modo beatitudo hominis consistat in Deo, et quibus actibus illum assequatur potius quam in aliis creaturis.

Respondetur varias posse reddi hujus rei causas, quas breviter attingam, quoniam amplitudinem, dignitatem et difficultatem hujus doctrinæ manifestant.

Ratio 1.

40 3. Prima est, quoniam si homo cum inferioribus creaturis conferatur, solus ipse Deum in se ipso proxime et immediate attingit, et consequitur præcognitionem et amorem: atque ita singulari modo est Deus finis ultimus humanæ naturæ: aliæ vero res solum remote, et secundum quamdam imitationem dicuntur in Deum tendere. Si autem comparetur superioribus creaturis, habet quidem Deus respectu illarum eandem rationem ultimi finis, tamen quia in hoc fere ejusdem rationis est, respectu Angelorum et hominum; ideo quæ in hac parte de homine dicuntur, per similitudinem ad beatitudinem Angelorum extendi possunt. Quod si in modo consequendi beatitudinem aliquid proprium aut singulare habent Angeli, <xiv> illud et minus notum est hominibus, et tractando de natura Angelorum brevissime a theologis expenditur, quoniam etiam ad utilitatem humanam minus est necessaria.

Ratio 2.

55 4. Secunda causa est, quia doctrina hæc non tantum est speculativa, sed etiam practica et moralis; quod enim Aristoteles 1 Ethicorum, cap. 7, et lib. 2, cap. 2, de Philosophia morali dixit, in hac etiam parte cum theologia convenit, scilicet non esse tantum propter cognitionem, sed propter actionem etiam, atque ut boni efficiamur; ad doctrinam autem moralem maxime fuit necessaria homini cognitio sui ipsius, et actionum suarum, non autem aliarum creaturarum, nisi quatenus huic morali doctrinæ deservire potest.

Ratio 3.

65 5. Tertia et optima causa addi potest, quia in homine, ut dixit S. Gregorius, hom. 29, in Evang., quodammodo omnes creaturæ continentur, et in eo omnes assequuntur suam felici-

56 2] 7 V.

reasons given show.

30R 2. But someone will ask: since God is not only the end for human beings but also the *terminus* for all creatures, why do theologians when explaining the nature of the ultimate end in God show this only in the case of human beings—namely, by considering in what way human happiness consists in God and by what acts it is pursued in man—rather than in the case of other creatures?

35R I respond that various reasons can be given for this. I will touch on them briefly, since the breadth, worth, and difficulty of this teaching are obvious.

40R 3. The first reason is that if human beings are compared to lower creatures, only humans attain God himself proximately and immediately in himself and pursue precognition and love. And so God is the ultimate end of human nature in a singular way. But other creatures are said to tend to God only remotely and according to a kind of imitation. If, however, human beings are compared to higher creatures, God indeed has the same nature of an ultimate end with respect to the higher creatures. Yet because there is in this almost the same nature with respect to both angels and men, therefore what is said in this part concerning human beings can be extended by analogy to the happiness of angels. But if angels have something singular or that only belongs to them in their way of following happiness, that thing both is less known to human beings and is briefly explained by theologians when discussing the nature of angels, since it is also less necessary for human utility.

55R 4. The second second reasons is that this doctrine is not only speculative but also practical and moral. For Aristotle said this about moral philosophy in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 1, Chapter 7, and Book 2, Chapter 2, (in which part he also agrees with theology), namely, that it is not only for the sake of cognition but also for the sake of action and so that we may bring about good. Moreover, cognition of human beings themselves and of their actions was most necessary to human beings for moral doctrine, but cognition of other creatures was not except insofar as they can be subject to this moral doctrine.

60R 5. The third and best reason can be added, because in humanity, as St. Gregory said in the 29th sermon on the Gospels, all creatures are contained in a certain way and in humanity they all attain their felicity

Why theologians discuss the nature of the ultimate only in relation to humanity.

The 1st reason.

The 2nd reason.

The 3rd reason.

	tatem et beatitudinem, quatenus illius possunt esse capaces.		and happiness, to the extent that they are capable of it.	
Ratio 4.	6. Quarta denique, quia ex divina institutione et ordinatione omnes creaturæ ad salutem hominum ordinatæ sunt, et tota ratio divinæ providentiæ quodam modo in gubernando ac dirigendo hominem ad suum finem posita est. Unde fit, ut omnia divina opera et mysteria, præsertim supernaturalia, propter salutem humanam, maxime electorum, facta sint, atque ita considerando de homine, et de mediis, quibus ad finem suum perducitur, tota ratio divinæ providentiæ quodammodo exhauritur, quantum ab hominibus cognosci potest. Atque hinc satis constat, quid sit objectum hujus partis.	65R 70R	6. The fourth reason, finally, is that all creatures are ordered to the prosperity of humanity by divine institution and ordering, and the whole nature of divine providence is placed in a certain way in the governing and directing of human beings to their end. Hence, it happens that all divine works and mysteries, especially supernatural [ones], are made for the sake of the prosperity of humanity, especially for the sake of the prosperity of the elect. And so in considering human beings and the means by which they are led to their end, the whole nature of divine providence is exhausted in a certain way, insofar as it can be known by human s. And hence it is clear enough what the object of this part is.	The 4th reason.
1. Corollar. ex dictis.	7. Ex quo colligitur primo, qua ratione theologia, quamvis scientia divina sit, de humanis rebus disputet: duplici enim titulo hoc præstat; primo, quia hoc necessarium fuit ad explicandam in Deo rationem finis ultimi. Secundo, quia non considerat hæc moralia ut naturali lumine manifestantur, sed ut virtute continentur in principiis a Deo revelatis, atque ideo eadem est ratio totius theologiæ, et hujus partis, scilicet divinum lumen, et revelatio, aut prima veritas, quatenus mediate, aut per discursum applicatur conclusionibus in principiis fidei virtualiter contentis: in quo maxime differt hæc doctrina a morali philosophia humana, seu pure acquisita.	75R 80R	7. From here is gathered, first, for what reason theology, although it is the divine science, debates human matters. For this label may be read in two ways. First, because this was necessary for explaining the nature of the ultimate end in God. Second, because it does not consider these morals as manifested by the natural light, but as they are virtually contained in the principles revealed by God. And for this reason the whole of theology and this part are of the same nature, namely, divine light and revelation or first truth, insofar as by means of or through discursive reasoning it is applied to conclusions virtually contained in the principles of the faith. These doctrines differ especially in this respect from a human or purely acquired moral philosophy.	The first corollary of what has been said.
2. Corollar.	8. Secundo colligitur ratio methodi, et ordinis hujus tractationis: doctrina enim moralis et practica, ut perfecte, ac per modum scientiæ tradi potest, supponit speculativam scientiam. Item cognitio de Deo sub aliqua habitudine ad creaturas supponit cognitionem ipsius Dei in se: et ad cognoscendum reditum creaturarum in Deum, oportet prius emanationem earumdem ab ipso explicare, et ideo postquam de Deo, et de operibus creatis diximus, in hoc consequenti opere reditum creaturarum in Deum, atque adeo moralem doctrinam, qua pervenitur ad Deum trademus generaliter, principia scilicet et fundamenta virtutum omnium et actionum moralium. In specie vero, hoc est, de singulis virtutibus, eam tantum doctrinam in lucem damus, quæ ad tres virtutes theologicas, aut eis affinem religionem exponendas opportuna est. Quoniam vero, ut Aristoteles testatur, principium rerum omnium moralium est finis, ideo ab ultimo fine disputare incipimus.	85R 90R 95R 100R	8. Second, a reason for the method and ordering of this treatise is gathered. For moral and practical doctrine, so that it can be propounded perfectly and in the manner of science, presupposes speculative science. Likewise, cognition of God under some relation to creatures presupposes a cognition of God himself as he is in himself. And in order to learn about the return of creatures to God, it is necessary first to explain their emanation from God. For this reason, after we have spoken about God and his created works, in this subsequent work we discuss generally the return of creatures to God and even the moral doctrine—namely, the principles and foundations of all the virtues and moral actions—by which they are brought to God. But in the species, that is concerning individual virtues, we bring to light only that teaching which is useful for explaining the three theological virtues or connected religious matters. But because, as Aristotle bears witness, the beginning of all moral things is the end, we, therefore, begin the discussion by talking about the ultimate end.	The second corollary.