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DE FINE HOMINIS, DISP. 7, SECT. 1¹

DE SPECIFICA OPERATIONE, ET PROXIMA POTENTIA, IN
QUA SUPERNATURALIS BEATITUDO CONSTITUENDA EST.

<69, col. b> Quæ hactenus diximus, generalia sunt, et com-
munia supernaturali, et naturali beatitudini; jam vero agendum
5 est specialiter de singulis, quia hæ beatitudines, et in specie ope-
<70> rationis, et in proprietatibus et perfectionibus, quæ il-
lam consequuntur, valde differunt: hic ergo proprie agendum
de beatitudine supernaturali vitæ futuræ, nam imperfecta hu-
jus vitæ potius est via ad beatitudinem quam beatitudo; et ideo
10 pauca de illa attingemus in fine hujus disputationis, sectione
secunda.

SECTIO I.

*Utrum beatitudo formalis essentialiter sit actus intellectus, vel
voluntatis.*

1. opinio stat pro
actu voluntatis
qui est amor
charitatis.

15 1. Prima opinio constituit essentiam beatitudinis in actu vol-
untatis, qui est amor Dei. Est autem considerandum duplicem
esse Dei amorem, unum concupiscentiæ, alterum charitatis,
quo amamus Deum super omnia propter se ipsum: nullus
ergo auctorum constituit beatitudinem in priori amore solum:
20 tum quia ille amor imperfectus est: tum etiam quia non tam
propter se, quam propter habendum id, quod concupiscit-
ur, et ita non potest habere rationem ultimi termini, seu
20R

CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITY AND PROXIMATE POWER
IN WHICH SUPERNATURAL HAPPINESS IS TO BE SET UP.

The things we have said so far are general and common to supernatural
and natural happiness. But now each remains to be discussed individu-
5R ally, since these happinesses differ greatly, both in the kind of working
and in the kind of properties and perfections which follow it. Here,
therefore, the supernatural happiness of the future life should properly
be discussed, for the imperfect [happiness] of this life is more a way to
happiness than happiness and for that reason we will touch on it a little
10R at the end of this disputation in the second section.

SECTION I.

Whether formal happiness is essentially an act of the intellect or of the will.

1. The first opinion places the essence of happiness in an act of the
will that is love for God. Moreover, there should be considered to be
two kinds of love for God by which we love God more than anything
else for his own sake: one of concupiscence, the other of charity. There-
fore, none of the authors places happiness in the former love alone, in
part because such a love is imperfect and in part also because it is not so
much for its own sake as for the sake of having that which is desired and
thus it cannot have the nature of an ultimate *terminus* or of attainment.

The first opinion
stands for an act
of the will that is
the love of
charity.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text.

Eius autores.	25	consecutionis. Prima igitur sententia de amore charitatis perfecto intelligenda est, et ita illam docuit Scotus, in 4, dist. 49, q. 5, quam sequuntur Scotistæ omnes, et Ægidius, quodl. 3, quæst. 19, illique favent auctores qui licet plures operationes requirant ad essentiam beatitudinis, præcipuam tamen earum dicunt esse hunc amorem, ut Hugo Victorinus, supra, capite septimo, de Cœlesti hierarch., et Bonaventura, in 1, distinct. 38, quæst. 1, et in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 5, ubi idem sentit Albertus Magnus et Supplementum Gabrielis, quæst. 1, art. 1, conductione 3, et Henricus, quodlib. 1, quæstion. 14, et quodlib. 13, quæst. 2, Corduba, qui alios referi, libro primo, quæst. 42; videtur præterea huic favere Augustinus, sermon. 53, de Tempore, dicens charitatem omnium esse arcem virtutum, promissionem regni, et præmium sanctorum in cœlo, quia in perenni gaudio nihil gratius, et nihil dulcius habent sancti perfecto amore Dei. Item epistola 52: <i>Una, inquit, ibi virtus erit, et id ipsum erit virtus, præmiumque virtutis, quod dicit in sanctis colloquiis homo qui amat: mihi autem adhærere Deo bonum est. Hoc illi erit plena perfectaque sapientia, eademque beatitudinis vita beata.</i> Præterea 1, de Doctrina Christ., capite 32: <i>Tota, inquit, merces nostra erit ut Deo fruamur: frui autem, ut ibidem definierat, capite primo, est adhærere alicui rei propter se <col. b> ipsam.</i> Nonnulla etiam in favorem hujus sententiæ sumi possunt ex Chrysostomo, homil. 64, ad Populum, quæ brevitatis causa omitto.	25R 30R 35R 40R 45R	Therefore, the first view should be understood as about the perfect love of charity. And that is what Scotus taught in IV, dist. 49, q. 5, which all the other Scotists follow, as well as Ægidius in <i>Quodl.</i> III, q. 19. And the authors who say that, although they require many workings for the essence of happiness, nevertheless, the principal one of them is this love favour [this view]. For example: Hugh of St. Victor, above, c. 7 in <i>Commentariorum in Hierarchiam Cælestem S. Dionysii Areopagitæ</i> and Bonaventure in I, dist. 38, q. 1, and in IV, dist. 49, q. 5, where Albertus Magnus thinks the same thing. Also: Gabriel Biel, <i>Supplementum</i> q. 1, art. 1, concl. 3; Henry of Ghent, <i>Quodl.</i> I, q. 14, and XIII, q. 2; and ? of Cordoba, who refers to the others, in I, q. 42. In addition, it seems that Augustine favours this view in sermon. 53 of <i>De tempore</i> , saying that charity for all is the refuge of virtue, the promise of the kingdom, and the reward of the saints in heaven, because the saints in everlasting joy have nothing more pleasing and nothing sweeter than the perfect love for God. Likewise, he says in letter 52: ‘one will be a virtue there and that which a human being who loves says in holy conversations will itself be virtue and the reward of virtue. But for me to adhere to God is good. This will be to him full and perfect wisdom and the same happy life of happiness.’ In addition, in <i>De doctrina Christ.</i> I, c. 32, he says: ‘Our entire recompense will be that we enjoy God.’ But to enjoy, as he had defined it in c. 1 of that place, is to adhere to some thing for its own sake. Something in favour of this view can also be taken from Chrysostom, <i>Ad populum</i> , homil. 64, which I omit for the sake of brevity.	The authors of the view.
Favet illi Augustinus.	35			Augustine favours it.	
Item Chrysostom.	45			Chrysostom also.	
Accedit una ratio.	50	2. Argumenta pro hac sententia afferuntur multa, sed ad duo capita revocanda sunt. Primum est, quia nobilissimus actus voluntatis, qui est hic Dei amor, est perfectior quocumque actu intellectus, dicente Paulo 1, Corinth. 13, cap. <i>Horum major est charitas: ad quod vulgaris responsio est, illud esse verum in statu viæ, comparando charitatem cum fide, secus vero esse in statu patriæ, comparando charitatem cum clara visione.</i> Sed contra hoc instatur primo auctoritate divi Thomæ, 1 part., quæstione 108, articulo sexto, ad tertium, et in 3, distinct. 27, quæst. 1, articulo 4, quibus locis videtur etiam in patria antepone charitatem. Secundo auctoritate Anselmi, libro secundo, <i>Cur Deus homo</i> , capite primo, dicentis, esse perversum ordinem, amare ut intelligas: ergo etiam in patria	50R 55R	2. Many arguments are brought forward for this view, but they should be restrained to two heads. The first is, because the most noble act of the will, which is this love of God is more perfect than any act of the intellect, as Paul says in I Cor. 13: ‘Of these the greater is charity’. The common response to this is that that is true in the state on the way when comparing charity with faith but it is otherwise in the state of the homeland when comparing charity with clear vision. But against this is pressed, first, the authority of St. Thomas in [<i>ST</i>] Ia.108.6 ad 3 and in III, dist. 27, q. 1, art. 4. In these places he seems to place charity higher in the homeland as well. Secondly, the authority of Anselm, who says in <i>Cur Deus homo</i> II, c. 1 that to love in order that you understand is a perverse order. Therefore, in the homeland also seeing is for the sake of loving and not the other way around. Therefore, [loving]	One argument comes up.
Evasio proximæ rationis.	55			An evasion of the last argument.	
Instatur primo contra ipsam Evasionem.	55			The first response to this evasion.	
Secundo.	60			The second.	

Tertio.	videre est propter amare, et non e contrario: est ergo perfectius. Tertio ex auctoritate Dionysii, Gregorii, et theologorum dicentium inter Angelos Seraphinorum ordinem esse supremum, et excellere ordini Cherubinorum, quoniam ille ordo	60R	is more perfect. Thirdly, by the authority of pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory, and of the theologians who say that among the angels the order of Seraphim is the highest and excels the order of Cherubim, because that order exceeds in love even though the Cherubim are called the knowing ones after [their] excellence. Therefore, this is a sign that in	The third.
Quarto.	65 excedit in amore, quamvis Cherubim dicatur ab excellentia sciens: ergo signum est etiam in patria ab amore scientiam superari. Quarto, quia illud est simpliciter melius, quod secundum	65R	the homeland knowledge is surpassed by love. Fourthly, because that is strictly speaking better which should be preferred to another according to right reason. But love is more choiceworthy than vision according to right reason, if precisely compared, as is clear from the contrary. For	The fourth.
Confirm. 1.	70 rectam rationem alteri præferendum est, sed amor eligibilior est visione, secundum rationem rectam, si præcise comparetur, ut patet a contrario, nam majus malum est carere amore Dei quam carere visione. Unde hoc confirmat Scotus primo, quia illud est melius, cujus oppositum est pejus: sed pejus est	70R	it is a greater evil to lack love for God than to lack vision. Hence, Scotus confirms this, first, because that is better whose opposite is worse. But hatred for God is worse than heresy or error concerning the divine. Therefore, love is more eminent than vision. It is confirmed, secondly,	The first confirmation.
Confirm. 2.	75 actus amoris est perfectior actu fidei: ergo voluntas est simpliciter perfectior intellectu: ergo in optimo statu utriusque potentiæ optimus actus voluntatis est perfectior optimo actu intellectus. Prima consequentia probatur, quia potentia minus	75R	because if on the way an act of love is more perfect than an act of faith, then will is strictly speaking more perfect than intellect. Therefore, in the best state of either power the best act of the will is more perfect than the best act of the intellect. The first consequence is proven because a less perfect power cannot elicit a more perfect act than the act of a better power. And here other arguments are collected, by which	The second confirmation.
Altera ratio principalis eiusdem 1. opinionis.	80 perfecta non potest elicere actum perfectiorem actu melioris potentiæ. Et hic congeruntur alia argumenta, quibus Scotistæ probare solent, voluntatem esse perfectiorem intellectu, scilicet quia est formaliter libera, et ideo est quasi domina aliarum potentiarum, et ipsemet intellectus illi obedit, habet denique pro objecte bonum, et attingere potest summum ut tale est.	80R	the Scotists usually prove that the will is more perfect than the intellect, namely, because [i] it is formally free and for that reason is, as it were, master of the other powers, [ii] the intellect itself obeys it, and finally [iii] it has good for its object and can attain the highest [good] as it is so great.	The other principal argument of the same first opinion.
	85 3. Secundum fundamentum proprium hujus sententiæ est, quia perfectus amor Dei habet <71> rationem consecutionis ultimi finis, in qua diximus beatitudinem consistere. Assumptum probatur primo, quia ratio consecutionis non consistit in	85R	3. The second proper foundation of this view is that perfect love for God has the nature of an attainment of the ultimate end in which we say happiness consists. The assumption is proven, first: the nature of attainment does not consist in a discussion of the object nor in a likeness and representation of it. For he who loves money does not	
	90 tractione objecti, nec in assimilatione et repræsentatione illius, nam, qui amat pecunias, etiam si videat illas, et consequenter si faciat illas sibi præsentis, vel intentionaliter ad se trahat, non consequitur propterea illas: ergo consecutio consistit in perfecta unione ad finem, qui propter se maxime desideratur, et	90R	pursue it just in virtue of the fact that he sees it and consequently makes present to himself or draws it to himself in intention. Therefore, attainment consists in a perfect union with the end which is most desired and loved for its own sake. But perfect love for God is perfect union with him, according to the testimony of Augustine in <i>De Trin.</i> X, c. 4, and St. Thomas in <i>SCG</i> c. 116. And it is gathered from [Pseudo-]Dionysius:	
	95 teste Augustino, lib. 10, de Trinit., cap. 4, et divo Thoma, contr. Gent., cap. 116, et colligitur ex illo Dionysii, quod <i>amor</i>		‘love transforms the beloved into the lover’, both carrying the former	

100 *transformat amatum in amantem*, et quodammodo extra se fert
illud, et transfert in amantem: unde est illud vulgatum quod
et amor intrat ubi cognitio foris stat, et quod cognitio sit ad
modum cognoscentis, amor vero fertur in amatum, ut in se
est. Rursus hæc unio est maxime propter se, et quasi se ipsa
obtinetur, quia nihil magis propter se potest expeti, quam con-
105 jungi Deo perfecto vinculo amicitia, hoc autem formaliter fit,
et comparatur per ipsum actum amoris: unde sicut Augustinus
1, de libero Arbitrio, cap. 13, et lib. 1 Retract., cap. 9, dixit,
in rebus honestis velle, esse habere ipsum ita multo magis re-
spectu Dei amare illum est habere, et consequi illum.

Confirm. 1.

110 4. Confirmatur primo, quia finis ut finis, et bonum ut
bonum, ad voluntatem pertinent: ergo consecutio finis, et boni
pertinent etiam ad voluntatem: sed beatitudo est consecutio
summi boni, ut tale est, et consistit in consecutione ultimi fi-
nis, ita ut ratione talis consecutionis homo se, et omnia sua
115 referat ad talem finem, quod totum sit per amorem; ergo. Con-
firmatur secundo, nam propter hanc rationem, voluntas in via
est principium totius meriti, quia est primum movens in ulti-
mum finem: ergo eadem ratione in patria ipsa est, quæ con-
sequitur talem finem, nam quod in finem tendit, debet in illo
quiescere, et quod maxime desiderat, debet maxime satiari; de-
cet etiam ut ibi detur præmium, ubi præcessit meritum.

Confirm. 2.

120 5. Secunda opinio ponit beatitudinem in delectatione, et
gaudio de Deo ipso. Hanc tribuit Aureolo Medina 1, 2, q. 4,
art. 4, sed nescio unde sumpserit, nam Capreolus non refert.
Sed cujuscumque sit, oportet advertere: duplex gaudium posse
125 in beatitudine intelligi: unum est de bonis quæ Deus <col. b>
in se habet, et quia ipse habet, et hoc gaudium est charitatis:
unde si de hoc sit sermo, parum differt hæc sententia a præce-
denti, nam probabile est tale gaudium non esse actum distinc-
130 tum a perfecto amore, qui habetur in præsentia objecti: nam in
illo revera explicatur purissimus affectus diligentis ad Deum.
Et si fortasse est actus distinctus, videntur de illo magis urg-
ere motiva adducta pro Scoto, nam hic actus est quasi comple-

2. opinio stat pro
actu voluntatis
qui est delectatio.Unum genus
delectationis de
quo potest
intelligi dicta
opinio.

95R beyond himself in a certain way and bringing him to the lover.² From
here comes the common saying ‘and love enters where cognition stands
at the gate’ and that cognition belongs to the mode of cognizing but
love is brought to the beloved so that it is in him. On the other hand,
this union is especially for its own sake and it obtains, as it were, itself,
100R since nothing can be sought more for its own sake than to be joined to
God by a perfect bond of friendship. But this happens formally and is
composed through the very act of love. Hence, just as Augustine said
in *De lib. arb.* I, c. 13, and *Retr.* I, c. 9, that with respect to honest things
to wish is to have so also much more with respect to God to love him
105R is to have and to follow him.³

4. It is confirmed, first, since end as end and good as good pertain
to the will. Therefore, the attainment of the end and the good also
pertain to the will. But happiness is the attainment of the highest good
as such and consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, just as by
110R reason of such an attainment a human being refers himself and all his
[actions] to such an end, which whole is through love. Therefore. It is
confirmed, secondly, for on account of this reason the will on the way
is the principle of all merit, because it is the first mover to the ultimate
end. Therefore, for the same reason it is the very thing in the homeland
115R which follows such an end, for what tends to an end ought to rest in it
and what desires most ought to be satisfied the most. It is also fitting
that the prize is given here where merit preceded.

5. The second opinion places happiness in delight and joy in God
himself. [Bartolomé de] Medina in IaIIæ.4.4 attributes this view to
[Peter] Auriol, but I do not know from where he took it for [John]
120R Capreolus does not refer [to it].⁴ Be that as it may, it must be noted
that joy can be understood in two ways in happiness. One is about the
good which God has in himself, and because he has it. This joy be-
longs to charity. Hence, if the discussion concerns this [kind of joy],
this view differs very little from the preceding view, for it is likely that
125R such joy is not an act distinct from the perfect love which is had for
the present object. For the most pure affection of love for God is re-
vealed in it. And if perhaps it is a distinct act, the motives brought
up for Scotus seem to have more force concerning it. For this act is,

The first
confirmation.The second
confirmation.The second
opinion stands
for an act of the
will that is
delight.
One genus of
delight with
regard to which
the stated
opinion can be
understood.

²Isn't it supposed to be 'amor transformat amantem in amatum'? See Aquinas, *De malo* q. 6, arg. 13, and response.

³*De lib. arb.* I, c. 13, n. 28: 'Sed dic, quaeso, nonne bonam suam uoluntatem diligere et tam magni aestimare, quam dictum est, etiam ipsa bona uoluntas est?'

⁴Capreolus defended Aquinas against the objections of Auriol and others.

mentum reliquorum, quasi satiety ipsius amoris, de hoc actu potest intelligi quod sæpe Augustinus ait beatitudinem consistere in fruitione, ut supra citavi ex libro 1, de Doctrina Christi., cap. 32, cum quo jungi possunt verba ejusdem 8, de Civitate, cap. 9: *Nemo beatus est qui eo quod amat non fruitur, nam et hi qui res non amandas amant; non se beatos amando putant, sed fruendo: quisquis ergo fruitur eo quod amat, verumque et summum bonum amat, quis eum beatum nisi miserrimus negat?* Quinetiam D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 11, art. 3, ad 3, dicit, fruitionem esse adeptionem beatitudinis, et tamen, quæst. 34, art. 3, dicit fruitionem importare delectationem in ultimo fine, et hoc modo aliquam delectationem esse bonum optimum hominis. Atque de hoc gaudio posset etiam intelligi quod idem divus Thomas ait 2, 2, quæst. 27, art. 6, ad 3, ubi dicit, ultimum finem hominis esse inhærere Deo per charitatem, ultima enim adhæsiō charitatis fit per gaudium: de quo possunt etiam intelligi illa Scripturæ sacræ loca, in quibus beatitudo nomine gaudii promittitur, Matth. 25: *Intra in gaudium domini tui*, et Joan. 15: *Ut gaudium meum in vobis sit, et gaudium vestrum sit plenum*: de quo subjungit cap. 16: *Et gaudium vestrum nemo tollet a vobis*. Sic etiam Augustinus, in Confession., cap. 21, 22 et 23, dicit vitam beatam esse gaudere de Deo, ad Deum, et propter Deum. Alterum proprium gaudium beatorum est de beatitudine propria, quod potest oriri ex amore concupiscentiæ, et hoc gaudium etiam censeri potest aut essentia, aut de essentia beatitudinis, dicit enim Anselmus, lib. de casu Diaboli, cap. 4, beatitudinem ex commodis constare, atque adeo appetitum ejus pertinere ad appetitum commodi: ergo ad beatitudinem propriam magis spectat gaudium de proprio comodo, quam de alieno. Rursus hoc gaudium est ultima perfectio humanæ operationis, teste Aristotele, 1 et 10 Ethic., propter quod ut divus Thomas, refert 1, 2, quæst. 4, art. 2, ipse non audet definire, quod sit majus bonum contemplatio, aut delectatio, quæ illam <72> consequitur: cum ergo saltem excedat delectatio in ratione ultimæ perfectionis, ex hac parte vel

as it were, a complement of the remaining ones, a satiety of the love itself. One can understand concerning this act what Augustine often says about happiness—that it consists in enjoyment—as I cited above from *De doct. Christ.* I, c. 32. The words from the same book VIII of *De Civ.* c. 9 [i.e., 8] can be joined to that passage: ‘No one is happy who does not enjoy that which he loves, for even those who love things that should not be loved do not think themselves happy in loving but in enjoying. Who, therefore, but the most miserable denies that someone who enjoys what he loves and who loves the true and highest good is happy?’ Indeed, St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.11.3 ad 3 says that enjoyment is the achievement of happiness and, nevertheless, in IaIIæ.34.3 says that enjoyment conveys delight in the ultimate end and in this way some delight is the best good of a human being. And one can also understand concerning this joy what the same St. Thomas says in IaIIæ.27.6 ad 3, where he says that the ultimate end of a human being is to inhere in God through charity, for the ultimate adhesion of charity comes about through joy. Those places in the holy Scriptures in which happiness is promised with the name ‘joy’ can also be understood as being about this joy. Matt. 25[:21]: ‘Enter into the joy of your lord.’ John 15[:11]: ‘so that my joy might be in you and that your joy might be full.’ To which is joined chapter 16[:22]: ‘and your joy no one shall take from you.’ Likewise, Augustine also in *Conf.* [X], c. 21, 22, and 23, says that the happy life is to rejoice concerning God, in God, and for the sake of God.⁵ The other proper joy of the happy concerns proper happiness which can arise from a concupiscent love. And this joy can also be thought of as the essence or concerning the essence of happiness. For Anselm says in *De casu diab.* c. 4 that happiness consists in advantageous things and for that reason an appetite for it pertains to the appetite for advantage. Therefore, joy concerning advantage that belongs to one pertains more to proper happiness than joy concerning alien advantage. On the other hand, this joy is the ultimate perfection of human activity, according to the testimony of Aristotle in *EN* I and X, for which reason (as St. Thomas reports in IaIIæ.4.2) he does not dare to determine which is the greater good, contemplation or the delight which follows it. Since, therefore, delight at least exceeds in the

Alterum genus
delectationis.

The other genus
of delight.

⁵X.22.32: ‘et ipsa est beata vita, gaudere ad te, de te, propter te’. Note the difference in order.

omnino, vel maxime erit beatitudo: nam illa est quies animæ, sine qua non potest satiari. 165R

3. Opinio stat pro actu intellectus. 170

Eius autores.

6. Tertia opinio est beatitudinem consistere in solo actu intellectus, qui est clara visio Dei. Hæc est opinio divi Thomæ 1, 2, quæstione 3, articulo 4, etc., contra Gent., capite 25 et 26, et 1 part., quæstione 26, articulo 2, et in 4, distinct. 49, quæst. 1, articulo primo, quæstiunc. 2, ubi late Capreolus et Scotus, et inclinatur etiam Paludanus quatenus præfert actum speculativum intellectus activi practico et amoris; quamvis utrumque requirat. Item Cajetanus et Ferrariensis, dictis locis. Idem significat Magnus, in quarta, distinct. 49, ubi etiam Cajetanus, quæst. prima. Fundamenta hujus sententiæ sunt varia. Primum ex divina Scriptura, ex qua potissimum ponderari solent verba Christi Joan. 17: *Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum*. Respondet Scotus, in quæstione 4, ad 1, cognitionem dici vitam æternam, non quia sit beatitudo, sed quia est vita actualis et æterna. Sed est indigna expositio, illo enim modo etiam tristitia damnatorum esset vita æterna: negari ergo non potest, quin usitata phrasi Scripturæ illa voce quasi per antonomasiam significetur beatitudo, ut patet Matth. 26, Marc. 9, ad Rom. 16, et eodem loco Joan. 17, immediate ante dixerat Christus: *Pater, clarifica Filium tuum, ut Filius tuus clarificet te, ut omne quod dedisti ei, det eis vitam æternam*: clarum autem est ibi petere beatitudinem electorum, et statim additur, *hæc autem est vita æterna, etc.* Quod autem Christus ibi loquatur de cognitione Dei per visionem beatam, videtur etiam clarum: quia nulla alia esse potest vera et perfecta beatitudo. Atque ita exponit Augustinus, lib. de Spiritu et lit., cap. 37, et sermone 1, 2, de Tempore: et significat Origenes, lib. 2, in c. 2, Epist. ad Rom., et Innocentius III, lib. 5, de Mysterio altaris, cap. 8 et 27: Laurentius Justinianus, in Fasciculo amoris, c. 16. Sentiunt etiam Ambrosius 5, de Fide, cap. 1, et Rupertus, l. 12, ad Joan., quamvis hi duo ultimi videantur aliam etiam expositionem indicare, et videtur etiam expositio satis accommodata textui. 170R 175R 180R 185R 190R 195R 200

Aliter enervatur apparentius.

Nihilominus tamen hic locus non convincit propter duo: primo, quia satis commode exponitur de cognitione per <col.

nature of ultimate perfection on this side, either wholly or for the most part, it will be happiness. For it is the rest of the soul without which it cannot be satisfied.

6. The third opinion is that happiness consists in an act of intellect alone that is a clear vision of God. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in IaIIæ.3.4, etc., in SCG c. 25 and 26, in I, q. 26, art. 2, and in IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 1, q. 2 (where Capreolus and Scotus more broadly). Paludanus also inclines to it insofar as he prefers a speculative act of the active intellect to the practical and to love, although he requires both. Likewise, Cajetan and [Francis Sylvester] of Ferrara in the cited places. [Albertus] Magnus indicates the same [view] in IV, dist. 49, where Cajetan also does in q. 1. There are various foundations for this view. The first is from divine Scripture, of which the words of Christ in John 17[:3] are usually given the most weight: ‘This is eternal life, that they may know you, only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you sent.’ Scotus responds in q. 4, ad 1, that cognition is called eternal life not because it is happiness but because it is actual and eternal life. But the exposition is unworthy, for in that way the sorrow of the damned would also be eternal life. Therefore, it cannot be denied that in the usual phrase of Scripture happiness is signified by this word through, as it were, antonomasia, as is clear in Matt. 26, Mark 9, Rom. 16, and in the same place in John 17 where Christ had just said: ‘Father, glorify your Son so that your Son may glorify you, so that he may give eternal life to everyone that you have given him.’ But that Christ here speaks about the cognition of God through beatific vision also seems clear, since true and perfect happiness cannot be in any other way. And Augustine expounds it in this way in *De Spiritu et lit.* c. 37 and in *De tempore*, sermons 1 and 2. Origen also indicates it in *Epist. ad Rom.* II, c. 2. And Innocent III in *De myst. alt.* V, c. 8 and 27, and Lawrence Justinian in *Fasc. amoris*, c. 16. Ambrose in *De fide* V, c. 1, and Rupert in *Ad Ioan.* XII also think this, although these last two may seem to indicate another exposition and the exposition also seems fitting enough to the text. 165R 170R 175R 180R 185R 190R 195R

Nevertheless, this passage does not convince for two reasons. First, because the point about cognition is sufficiently well explained through

The third opinion stands for an act of intellect. Its authors.

It is proven first from Scripture. John 17.

Scotus does not rightly weaken this passage.

It is weakened otherwise in a more apparent way.

205 b> fidem, ut indicant Ambrosius et Rupertus supra, et Hilar- 200R
 ius 3, de Trinitat., circa medium, et lib. etiam 9, et Cyprianus
 ad Demetrium, et epistola 73, ad Jubajanum, Cyrillus, lib. 11,
 in Joan., cap. 16, et Augustinus, tractatu 105, in Joan., et est
 expositio accommodata textui: petierat enim Christus clarifi-
 210 id est, beatitudinem; *vita autem æterna*, inquit, *hæc est, ut*
cognoscant te, id est, hæc est unica via ad acquirendam vitam
 æternam, scilicet per fidem et veram cognitionem Dei, et Jesu
 Christi: ibi ergo non explicatur in quo consistat vita æterna,
 sed quomodo acquiratur. Cujus etiam signum est, quia cogni-
 215 tionis Dei adjungitur cognitio Jesu Christi Dei hominis, quæ
 non pertinet ad essentiam beatitudinis, sed est via ad acquiren-
 dam illam. Secundo, quia licet intelligamus de visione beata,
 non sequitur in ea consistere essentiam beatitudinis, sed illam
 esse quasi fundamentum, et primam operationem status beati-
 220 fici; sicut dici solet in Scriptura sacra nos *justificari per fidem*,
 non quia illa sola sit justitia nostra, sed quia est initium, et
 fundamentum justitiæ. Et ad hunc modum enervari possunt
 alia testimonia, quæ pro hac sententia adduci solent, quamvis
 225 non sint contemnenda, quia certe indicatur in illis visionem
 beatam esse id, quod est perfectissimum in operationibus beatorum,
 et quod est præmium laborum, ut 1, Joan. 3: *Similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est*, et Joan., decimo quarto:
Qui diligit me, diligitur a Patre meo, et manifestabo ei me ipsum:
 et capite decimo septimo: *Pater, volo ut ibi ego sum et*
 230 *illi sint mecum, ut videant claritatem meam*, 1 Corinthiorum,
 13, Paulus vocat statum viæ, statum pueritiæ, beatitudinem
 autem statum perfectæ ætatis, et subbit [sic] causam, *quia vide-*
mus nunc per speculum in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.
 Facit etiam illud psalmi 16: *Satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua*:
 235 et illud psalmi 90: *Longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam*
illi salutare meum. Denique ponderari potest illud Christi ver-
 bum Matthæi, c. 18: *Angeli enim eorum semper vident faciem*
Patris, indicans hanc esse summam dignitatem sanctorum An-
 gelorum, juxta quod dixit Basilius, in *Constit. monast.*, c. 16:
 240 *Summi boni contemplatio Angelorum thesaurus est*. Unde Hi-
 eronymus Isaiaë 5, dixit, homines per visionem Dei ex ho-

Iterum enervatur.

Sustinetur tamen pro habiliter dictus locus.

faith, as is shown by Ambrose and Rupert, above; Hilary in *De Trin.* III,
 around the middle, as well as in book 9; Cyprian in [his letter] to
 Demetrius and in letter 73 to Jubajanus; Cyrillus in *In Joan.* book 11,
 c. 16; and Augustine in *In Joan.* tract. 105. And the exposition is suit-
 205R able to the text. For Christ had asked to be glorified through faith and
 supplies the reason: ‘so that he may give to them eternal life’, i.e., hap-
 piness. ‘But eternal life’, he says, ‘is this, that they may know you’, i.e.,
 this is the one way to acquire eternal life, namely, through faith and the
 true cognition of God and Jesus Christ. Therefore, in what eternal life
 consists is not explained here, but rather in what way it is acquired. A
 210R sign of this is that the cognition of Jesus Christ, God-man, is joined to
 the cognition of God. The former does not belong to the essence of
 happiness, but is the way to acquire it. Secondly, because, although we
 understand according to the beatific vision, it does not follow that the
 essence of happiness consists in it. Rather, it is, as it were, the foun-
 215R dation and first action of the beatific state. Just as it usually says in
 the sacred Scriptures that we ‘are justified through faith’, not because
 that alone is our justification, but because it is the beginning and foun-
 dation of righteousness. And the other *testimonia* which are usually
 brought forward for this view can be weakened in this way, although
 220R they should not be neglected because it is certainly revealed in them
 that the blessed vision is that which is most perfect among the actions
 of the blessed and that which is the reward for labours. As 1 John 3[:2
 says]: ‘we shall be like him and we shall see him as he is’. And John
 14[:21]: ‘He who loves me shall be loved by my Father [...] and I will
 225R reveal myself to him’. John 17[:24]: ‘Father, I wish that they be with
 me where I am so that they may see my glory’. In 1 Cor. 13[:10–12],
 Paul calls the state of the way the state of a child, but happiness the
 state of the perfect age. And he supplies the grounds: ‘since now we see
 through a mirror, obscurely, but then [we will see] face to face’. He also
 makes the well-known Psalm 17[:15]: ‘I shall be satisfied when your
 230R glory shall have appeared’ and Psalm 91[:16]: ‘I shall satisfy him with
 a length of days and I shall show him my salvation’. Finally, the words
 of Christ in Matt. 18[:10] can be pondered: ‘For their angels always see
 the face of the Father’, indicating that this is the highest dignity of the
 holy angels, according to what Basilius said in *Constit. monast.*, c. 16:
 235R ‘contemplation of the highest good is the treasure of the angels’. Hence,
 Jerome said of Isaiah 5 that human from being humans become angels

It is weakened again.

Still, it is sustained through an easily stated passage.

	minibus Angelos fieri, et Gregorius Nazianzenus, orat. 19, quæ est funebris in patrem: <i>Nunc, inquit, magis appropinquat nudus, quia cum nuda principe <73> illa, et purissima mente</i> 240R	through the vision of God. And Gregory Nazianzenus in <i>Orat.</i> 19, which is from a funeral for a father, says: ‘Now he approaches more naked, since when that original naked and most pure mind is turned, he has achieved the dignity of the order of angels’. Gregory also speaks in this way in <i>Dialogorum</i> I, c. 35: ‘A human being becomes higher in the world through the vision of God’.	
2. Ex Patribus. <i>August.</i>	7. Secundo ergo principaliter probatur hæc sententia ex Patribus præter citatos: Augustinus, 1 de Trinit., c. 8, 9, 10 et 17, sæpe repetit visionem Dei esse ultimum terminum vita nostræ, et totam mercedem nostris meritis promissam, et summum bonum, cujus adipiscendi causa præcipitur quidquid præcipitur: idem, lib. 22, de Civit., cap. 29, et concione 2, in Psalm. 90: <i>visio est tota merces</i> : et libro de Quantitate animæ, cap. 33, beatitudinem ponit in contemplatione primæ veritatis, quam vocat summum aspectum animæ, quo meliorem et perfectiorem non habet: idem late, libro secundo, de libero Arbit., capite 14, et 1 Retractat., c. 14: <i>Illud, inquit, beatissimos facit, quod scriptum est, tunc autem facie ad faciem, et tunc cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum: qui hoc, enim invenerunt, illi sunt in beatitudinis possessione.</i> Eadem sententiam docet late Cyrillus, libr. 3, contra Julian., circa principium, <i>Hæc, inquit, vera Dei contemplatio est pretiosior, quandoquidem nos summæ beatitudinis hæc facit participes.</i> Et citat locum Joan. 17, supra tractatum, et illud Exodi, 33: <i>Ostende mihi faciem tuam</i> : qua voce dicit explicari affectum beatitudinis. Præterea Eusebius 7, de Præparatione, c. 3, expresse dicit ultimam beatitudinem in visione Dei consistere: indicat etiam Irenæus, lib. 4, cap. 75, dicens: <i>Deus est, qui habet videri: visio autem Dei efficax est incorruptelæ, incorruptelæ vero proximum facit esse Deo.</i> Ac multa similia habet eodem lib., cap. 37, inter alia: <i>Vita æterna unicuique evenit ex eo, quod videat Deum</i> et infra, <i>Participatio Dei est videre Deum, et frui benignitate ejus.</i> Præterea Hieronymus in id Psalm. 89: <i>Ibunt de virtute in virtutem, videbitur Deus Deorum in Sion. Deum videre, inquit, infinita corona est, et magna felicitas.</i> Optime Nazianzenus, orat. 10, in Cæsar	7. Secondly, therefore, this view is principally proven from Fathers in addition to the ones cited. Augustine in <i>De Trin.</i> I, c. 8, 9, 10, and 17, often repeats that the vision of God is the ultimate <i>terminus</i> of our life, the whole promised reward for our merits, and the highest good for the sake of whose attaining all that is taught is taught. Likewise, in <i>De civ. Dei</i> XXII, c. 29, and in <i>Enarrationes in Psalmos</i> , in the second sermon on Psalm 90: ‘vision is the whole reward’. And in <i>De quant. an.</i> , c. 33, he places happiness in the contemplation of first truth, which he calls the highest aspect of the soul where it does not have [anything] better and more perfect. Likewise, more broadly, in <i>De lib. arb.</i> II, c. 14, and in <i>Retract.</i> I, c. 14, he says: ‘That makes [them] most happy, which was written: “but then face to face” and “then I shall know just as I was known”’. For those who have found this are in possession of happiness.’ Cyril teaches the same view extensively in <i>Contra Julian.</i> III, around the beginning: ‘This true contemplation of God is more valuable, since this makes us participants in the highest happiness’. And he cites the passage from John 17 discussed above and the one from Exodus 33[:18]: ‘show your face to me’. He says that the condition (<i>affectum</i>) of happiness is explained by these words. In addition, Eusebius in <i>De præparatione</i> VII, c. 3, explicitly says that ultimate happiness consists in the vision of God. Irenæus also indicates this in [<i>Adversus hæreses</i>] IV, c. 75, saying: ‘God is he who is yet to be seen. Moreover, the vision of God effects incorruptibility, but incorruptibility makes one close to being as God.’ ⁶ And he has many similar [statements] in the same book, c. 37. Among others: ‘eternal life comes to each one as a result of this, that he sees God’. ⁷ And later: ‘the participation of God is to see God and to enjoy is kindness’. ⁸ Furthermore, Jerome says about Psalm 89, [i.e., 90]: ‘They will go from virtue to virtue; the God of Gods will appear in Zion. To see God is an infinite crown and great	It is proven secondly from the Fathers. Augustine.
<i>Cyrrill.</i>	260		Cyrrill.
<i>Euseb.</i>	265		Eusebius.
<i>Iren.</i>	270		Irenæus.
<i>Hieron.</i>	275		Jerome.
<i>Nazian.</i>			

⁶According to an alternative division of the text: IV, c. 38, n. 2.⁷I.e., IV, c. 20, n. 4.⁸I.e., IV, c. 20, n. 5.

Nissen.	280	<p>ium fratrem, inter alia, <i>pura mente puram veritatem intuentes, atque hanc labore exhaustam mercedem inveniamus, ut perfectius summi boni consortio, et contemplatione fruamur, quem quidem sacræ nostræ disciplinæ tum libri, tum animæ theologi laude florentes esse profitentur.</i> Nyssenus etiam, libro de Beatitudinibus, in sexta, circa illam promissionem: <i>Quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt, promissio tanta est ut superet extremum terminum beatitudinis, quid enim aliquis potest ejusmodi <col. b> boni, aliud desiderabit, cum omnia habeantur in eo, quem videt, nam videre in usu Scripturæ sacræ idem significat, quod habere:</i> Ps. 127, <i>ut videam bona Jerusalem: ergo, inquit, qui Deum videt, quidquid in bonis numeratur per hoc, quod videt adeptus est.</i> Subobscurius hoc indicat Damascenus, libro de Fide, capite 12, et libro 4, capite ultimo, in fine, et Bernardus, sermone quinto de Assumptione, et libro 3, de Consideratione. Denique argumentum hoc concludere possumus verbis Concilii Francofordiensis in Epistola ad Episcopos Hispanos, in fine, <i>prædicamus eum (scilicet Christum) Deum verum et vivum, ac vere filium Dei, ut ad ejus beatissimam visionem pervenire mereamur, in qua est vera beatitudo, et beata æternitas.</i></p>	275R	<p>happiness'. And Gregory Nazianzen [says] most pleasingly in sermon 10 of <i>Cæsarium fratrem</i>, among other things: 'gazing with pure mind upon pure truth and we find a reward here for our pursuit of exhausting toil on behalf of virtue so that we may enjoy there the more perfect sharing and contemplation of the highest good, which, indeed, both books and theological souls, flourishing with praise, declare to be the end of our sacred discipline.'⁹ [Gregory of] Nyssa, also, in <i>De beat.</i> VI, [says] concerning that promise: 'Since they will see God, the promise is so great that it will surpass the utmost limits of happiness. For what else can one desire after this kind of good, since he has all things in that which he sees. For "to see" signifies the same thing as "to have" as it used in sacred Scriptures, as is the case in Psalm 128[:5]: "I may see the good of Jerusalem". Therefore he who sees God possesses everything that is counted as good through the fact that he sees.' [John] of Damascus indicates this somewhat more obscurely in <i>De fide</i> ?, c. 12, and towards the end of the last chapter of book IV. Also Bernard in the fifth sermon on the Assumption and in <i>De consideratione</i> III. Finally, we can conclude this argument with the words of the Council of Frankfurt in the letter to the Spanish bishops, towards the end: 'We declare him', namely, Christ, 'the true and the living God and truly the son of God, so that we may deserve to come to the most happy vision of him, in which is true happiness and happy eternity'.</p>	Nazianzen.
Damasc. Bernar.	290	<p>8. Tertio agendum est ratione, quæ in duplici fundamento niti debet contrario fundamentis Scoti. Primum est quia visio Dei absolute est maxima perfectio per modum actus secundi, quæ est in beatis, quæ potest probari præcipue ex comparatione inter intellectum et voluntatem, nam intellectus est simpliciter perfectior potentia: ergo optimus actus intellectus est perfectior optimo actu voluntatis; sed ille est visio, hic amor: ergo absolute visio superat amorem. Antededens non est hoc loco late probandum et disputandum, pertinet enim ad scien-</p>	280R	<p>8. Thirdly, the argument which ought to be advanced with a double foundation against the foundations of Scotus should be discussed. The first is because the vision of God is absolutely the greatest perfection in the mode of a second act, which is in the blessed. This can be proven especially from the comparison between intellect and will, for the intellect is the more perfect power <i>simpliciter</i>. Therefore, the best act of the intellect is more perfect than the best act of the will. But the former is vision; the latter, love. Therefore, vision absolutely surpasses love. The antecedent is not more extensively proven and disputed in</p>	Gregory of Nyssa.
3. Ratione ex duplici fundam. 1. Fundamentum.	300	<p>305</p>	295R	<p>300R</p>	The third argument from two foundations. The first foundation.

⁹Suárez appears to have misquoted this passage. I have translated the relevant part of the following version: *At tu, divinum et sacrum caput, utinam cælos penetres, atque in Abrahamæ sinu, quicumque tandem ille est, conquiescas, et Angelorum choream, ac beatorum virorum gloriam et splendorem spectes; vel potius una tripudies et exultes, omnia, quæ hic sunt, ex alto deridens, nimirum et divitias, ut appellantur, et abjectas dignitates, et falsos honores, et imposturam, quam sensus faciunt, et hujus vitæ jactationem, ac tanquam in nocturna pugna confusionem et ignorantiam, magno illi Regi astans, atque illinc emicante lumine impletus; cujus exiguo rivulo hic suscepto, quantum scilicet in speculis et ænigmatibus adumbrare atque conspiciari possumus, utinam ad ipsum fontem postea perveniamus, pura mente puram veritatem intuentes, atque hanc laboris in virtutis studio exhausti mercedem inveniamus, ut perfectius illic summi boni consortio et contemplatione fruamur; quem quidem sacræ nostræ disciplinæ finem, tum libri, tum animæ theologiæ laude florentes, esse profitentur* (*Collectio selecta SS. Ecclesiæ Patrum* ... [Parisiis: apud Parent-Desbarres, 1835], v. 49, p. 250). In this edition, it appears in sermon 7, n. 17.

Vide authorem
lib. 5. *de anima*
c. 9.

310 tiam de anima, et tractatur etiam, in 1 part., quæst. 82, art. 3,
ubi probatur a divo Thoma ex ratione objectorum, quia objec- 305R
tum intellectus est abstractius, atque adeo spiritualius ex suo
modo: quod etiam intelligi potest ex modo operandi, nam
revera intellectus subtilius et artificiosius operatur quam vol- 310R
untas. Quod etiam in facultatibus sensitivis considerare licet,
nam phantasia, seu cogitativa altiorem modum operandi ha-
bet, quam appetitus sensitivus. Declarari præterea potest, quia
intellectiva, seu cognoscitiva potentia est immediatior essentia 315
et substantiæ, quam voluntas, seu appetitus, nam intellectus
immediate intelligitur consequi substantiam, voluntas autem
medio intellectu: unde est veluti passio illius, seu per illum re- 315R
sultans: nam sicut appetitus naturalis oritur ex forma naturali,
ita appetitus elicitus ex forma apprehensa, et consequenter vol-
untas operandi vitaliter oritur ex facultate cognoscendi. Quod 320
ulterius potest in hunc modum declarari, nam intelligere est,
quod per se pertinet ad gradum rationalem, seu intellectualem,
ut sic, et est prima operatio, in qua distinguitur ab inferiori 320R
gradu sensitivo: illa ergo potentia, in qua maxime viget vis
utendi ratione, est perfectissima in illo <74> gradu, hæc autem 325
est intellectus, qui per se est potentia rationalis, voluntas enim
solum per participationem hoc habet, quatenus a ratione di- 325R
rigitur, ut illi obedire possit, ut Aristoteles dixit 1, *Ethic.*,
cap. ult., unde in Deo ipso, ubi facultas et actus intelligendi
sunt ipsa essentia Dei ipsum intelligere est veluti formale esse, 330
quod constituit primo ipsam essentiam Dei: amare vero, secun-
dum rationem, potius intelligitur esse substantia, seu natura 330R
Dei solum per identitatem ratione infinitatis: et fortasse hac
ratione, inter alias, processio per intellectum in Deo sicut est
origine prima, ita ex vi suæ rationis formalis est magis commu- 335
nicativa ipsius divinæ naturæ, quam processio per voluntatem,
et ideo illa est generatio, et non ista: ergo facultas intelligendi
sicut est immediatior gradui rationali, ita est perfectior; et ideo 335R
libertas, et quidquid est perfectionis in voluntate, provenit ab
intellectu ut a radice.

Vide auctorem
lib. 11. *de Trinit.*
cap. 5. & 6.

340 9. Sed dicet aliquis, esto hoc verum sit, inde tamen ad
summum sequitur inter naturales operationes utriusque poten-
tiæ perfectissimam intellectus superare perfectissimam volun- 340R

this place for it pertains to the science of the soul and is also treated in
Ia.82.3, where it is proven by St. Thomas by reason of the objects since
the object of the intellect is more abstract and therefore more spiritual
in its way. It can also be understood according to the way of acting,
for the intellect really acts more precisely and skillfully than the will.
One may also consider this in the sensitive faculties, for imagination
or the cogitative faculty has a higher way of acting than the sensitive
appetite. In addition, it can be shown, since the intellective or cognos-
citive power belongs more immediately to essence and substance than
the will or appetite. For intellect is immediately understood to fol-
low from substance, but the will by means of the intellect. Hence, the
will is as if a property of it or resulting from it. For just as natural
appetite arises from a natural form so elicited appetite from an appre-
hended form and, consequently, the will in acting vitally arises from
the faculty of cognizing. This can, further, be shown in this way: for to
understand is what belongs *per se* to the rational or intellectual level [of
being], as such, and is the first action in which it is distinguished from
the lower sensitive level. Therefore, that power in which the power
of using reason maximally flourishes is the most perfect in that level.
But this is the intellect, which is *per se* the rational power, for the will
only has this through participation insofar as it is directed by reason
so that it can obey reason, as Aristotle said in the last chapter of *EN* I.
Hence, in God himself, where the faculty and act of understanding are
the very essence of God, to understand itself is as if the formal being
which constitutes the first essence itself of God. But to love, follow-
ing reason, is rather understood to be the substance or nature of God
only through identity by reason of infinity. And perhaps for this rea-
son, among others, just as procession through intellect in God is first
by origin, so also it is more communicative of divine nature itself than
procession through the will. And for this reason the former is genera-
tion and not the latter. Therefore, just as the faculty of understanding
is more immediate to the rational level, so also it is more perfect. And
for this reason, freedom and whatever is of perfection in the will comes
forth from the intellect as from a root.

See the author's
De An. V, cap. 9.

See the author's
De Trin. XI,
cap. 5 and 6.

9. But someone may say: suppose this is true. Still, at most what
follows from that is that among the natural actions of either power the
most perfect [actions] of intellect surpass the most perfect [actions] of

An evasion.

Evasio.

	<p>345 tatis: non vero in supernaturalibus, ut sunt visio, et amor charitatis, quia cum in his actibus facultates animæ operentur ut instrumenta per potentiam obedientialem, fieri potest ut potentia naturaliter minus perfecta ad perfectiorem actum perficiendum eleuetur, sicut in via fit. Respondetur, eadem proportione</p>		
Præcluditur 1.	<p>350 posse argumentum procedere comparando ipsum intelligere et velle in ordine supernaturali, quod etiam in illo ordine intelligere ex suo genere est perfectius, ut probant rationes factæ applicatæ eadem proportione; ergo perfectissima intellectio illius ordinis, est excellentior perfectissimo actu voluntatis: sed huiusmodi est visio Dei clara, ut postea dicemus. Et confirmatur, quia est participatio illius visionis Dei per essentiam, quæ est ipsum esse Dei, et est in supremo ordine, in quo potest illa visio participari, et ideo efficit etiam maxime similes Deo, ut indicat ille locus 1, Joan. 3, atque nos maxime coniungit.</p>	345R 350R	It is forestalled, firstly.
Secundo.	<p>355 Denique quamvis istæ potentiæ eleventur per potentiam obedientialem, tamen hoc habet fundamentum in natura earum juxta illud Augustini, de Prædestinat. Sanct.: <i>Posse habere fidem, naturæ est hominum: habere autem gratiam, est fidelium:</i> utraque autem potentia est æque capax in suo ordine, et ideo cum eadem proportione elevari possunt: si ergo operatio naturalis intellectus perfectissima excedit operationem voluntatis etiam illa, ad quam maxime elevatur per gratiam, erit perfectior, quam omnis operatio voluntatis: non est ergo dubium quin ex parte perfectionis magis sit constituenda beatitudo in visione, quam in amore.</p>	355R	Secondly.
Tertio.	<p>360 10. Sed quia ex hoc solo principio non potest formaliter inferri solam visionem esse totam essentiam beatitudinis, ideo in hac opinione addendum est secundum fundamentum, scilicet solum actum intellectus esse consecutionem, seu adeptionem ultimi finis, hoc autem duabus viis ostendi potest, ita ut una sit directe ostensiva, altera vero quasi indirecte, excludendo actus voluntatis, nam cum ultimus finis noster qui pure spiritualis est, attingi non possit nisi per actus voluntatis, vel intellectus, si omnes actus voluntatis excluduntur a ratione consecutionis, recte concluditur totam consistere in actu intellectus.</p>	360R 365R	Thirdly.
2. Fundamentum bipartitum.	<p>5 11. Prior pars variis modis, seu rationibus ostendi potest: Prima sumitur ex proprio modo operandi intellectus, trahit</p>	5R 10R	The second foundation in two parts.
Prior pars fundamenti directe ostensiva actuum intellectus. Ostensio 1. inefficax.	<p>11. The former part can be shown by various ways or arguments. The first is taken from the intellect's proper ways of acting. For it draws</p>		The first part of the foundation is directly evident of the acts of the intellect. The first proof is ineffectual.

enim ad se res, quas intelligit, in quo differt a voluntate, quæ
 15 potius fertur ad res, quas amat: ergo intellectus ex modo
 operandi suo est aptissima potentia, ut anima per actum ejus
 teneat, et consequatur ultimum finem suum. Hæc ratio ha-
 20 bet quamdam apparentiam, tamen et fundatur in locutione
 quadam fere metaphorica: nam intellectus dicitur trahere res
 ad se, solum quia in se recipit objecti speciem, et per eam
 in se format intentionalem similitudinem, seu conceptum rei
 25 cognitæ. Deinde jam supra diximus, consecutionem finis
 non esse necessario intelligendam per modum tractionis, hoc
 enim valde materiale est, sed solum per talem conjunctionem
 cum objecto, quæ sit accommodata naturæ illius, et satiet
 desiderium inquirentis tale objectum: ergo ex eo quod intel-
 30 lectus illo modo operatur: non satis probat in illo esse conse-
 cutionem objecti.

2. Ostensio etiam
 insufficiens.

12. Secunda ratio esse potest, quia visio fit per assimila-
 30 tionem, quod non habet amor, nam ille potius fit quasi per im-
 petum et inclinationem: videtur autem consecutio Dei optime
 fieri per assimilationem ad ipsum, juxta illud, *Similes ei erimus*:
 cum enim creaturæ omnes habeant Deum pro ultimo fine,
 omnes aliquo modo intendant illi assimilari, et tunc censen-
 35 tur illum finem maxime consequi, quando illi maxime assim-
 ilantur, juxta uniuscujusque capacitatem: creatura ergo ratio-
 nalis, quæ speciali modo habet Deum pro ultimo fine, quatenus
 eum in se potest attingere per illam operationem, maxime il-
 lum consequitur quo illi maxime fit similis: hæc autem est co-
 40 gnitio, seu visio, ut dictum est. Hæc ratio, est etiam
 apprens, tamen enervari potest, quia illa similitudo cognitio-
 nis tantum est intentionalis: item quia per amorem assimilatur
 etiam beatus Deo, non quidem similitudine intentionalis, sed
 per participationem eminentissimam divini actus, et operatio-
 45 nis: et quia sicut per amorem Deus quiescit in se, et unitur sibi
 affective: unde fit, ut omnia ad se propter se diligat: ita beatus
 amando quiescit in Deo, et unitur illi summo affectu, et omnia
 alia in illum, et propter illum diligit.

3. Ostensio etiam
 infirma.

13. Tertia ratio affertur in hoc puncto, quia visio facit
 50 præsentem rem visam, amor vero non ita, sed potius prære-
 quirir præsentiam factam per cognitionem, ut possit haberi.

15R to itself those things which it understands. It differs in this from the
 will, which rather is brought to the things which it loves. Therefore,
 the intellect in its way of acting is the most apt power in order for
 the soul through its act to hold (*teneat*) and follow its ultimate end.
 This argument has a certain appearance; still, it is also founded in a
 certain locution that is almost metaphorical. For the intellect is said to
 draw things to itself only because it receives in itself a form (*speciem*)
 20R of the object and through that forms in itself an intentional likeness
 or concept of the thing cognized. Also, as we already said above, the
 attainment of the end should not necessarily be understood in the mode
 of drawing (*tractionis*)—for this is very material—but only through such
 a conjunction with the object as is suited to its nature and satisfies the
 25R desire of one inquiring into such an object. Therefore, from the fact
 that the intellect acts in that way is not sufficiently proven that the
 attainment of the object is in that.

12. The second argument can be that vision happens through a
 likeness, which love does not have for it happens more, as it were,
 30R through impetus and inclination. But the attainment of God seems
 to happen best through a likeness to him, according to that passage:
 ‘we shall be like him’. For since all creatures have God as their ulti-
 mate end, they all intend to be become like him in some way and then
 are thought most to follow that end when they become most like him
 according to the capacity of each one. Therefore, a rational creature—
 35R which has God as its ultimate end in a special way insofar as it can attain
 him in himself through that action—follows him to the highest degree
 by that with which he becomes most similar to him. But this is cogni-
 tion or vision, as was said. This argument is also apparent, yet can be
 40R weakened, since that similarity of cognition is only intentional. Also
 because the happy person also become like God through love; not, in-
 deed, by an intentional similarity but through a most eminent sharing
 in the divine act and action. And because just as God rests in himself
 through love and is united to himself affectively whence it happens that
 he loves everything according to himself and for his own sake, so also
 45R a happy person in loving rests in God and is united to him in highest
 affection and loves everything else in him and for his sake.

13. The third argument is brought forward with this point, since
 vision makes the thing seen present. But love does not do this but rather
 50R prerequisites the making present having been done through cognition so

The second proof
 is insufficient.

The third proof is
 also unsound.

Hæc tamen ratio et parum differt a præcedentibus, et videtur petere principium variatis solis terminis, quia rem fieri præsentem ex vi cognitionis, quid aliud est, quam cognosci, seu repræsentari menti per intentionalem similitudinem: hic enim non potest esse sermo de præsentia locali, seu reali indistantia, aut conjunctione entitatum, quia hæc nec multum refert ad rationem beatitudinis explicandam, nec proprie fit per operationem, licet fortasse præsupponatur ad illam, quatenus talis operatio fieri debet ab ipso Deo, quod tam in operatione voluntatis, quam intellectus locum habet: est sermo de præsentia objectiva, in qua significatione nihil aliud est esse præsens, quam videri, quod quidem verum est amori non convenire: tamen probandum est hoc esse necessarium ad consecutionem: dici enim potest, quod licet amor non faciat illo modo præsens, facit tamen unitum suo modo, nam etiam facit amatum esse in amante.

Quid conficiant prædicta ostensiones.

14. Hæc igitur rationes directe et ostensive non sufficiunt ad probandam solam visionem esse consecutionem: videntur tamen mihi sufficienter probare visionem non posse excludi a ratione consecutionis, quia si visio est perfectissima operatio naturæ intellectualis ut ostensum est, et immediate attingit ipsum ultimum finem, et maxime facit illi similem tum intentionaliter, tum etiam secundum participationem perfectissimi actus divini, quo Deus se videt. Et præterea facit præsens objectum ut conjunctum cognoscenti, et quodammodo constituit illum in potestate videntis, ut ille possit frui et satiari. Quæ quæso ratio afferri potest, cur talis operatio non habeat rationem consecutionis? in rebus enim materialibus, quibus utendum est tunc dicimur adipisci aliquam rem, quando ita constituitur nostra potestate, <col. > ut illa uti possimus nostro arbitrio; ergo in ultimo fine, quo fruendum est, tunc recte dicemur adipisci illum, quando ita constituit in potestate nostra, ut pro voluntate nostra illo frui possimus. De qua re est elegans locus apud D. Thomam, 1 p., quæst. 12, art. 7, ad 3, ubi ad hunc modum explicat rationem consecutionis.

Posterior pars fundamenti exclusiva actuum voluntatis.
1. Ratio exclusiva, ex D. Thom.

15. Superest ergo ut alia via indirecta ostendam voluntatem non posse habere actum, qui sit consecutio, nec totalis, nec partialis: hoc autem tribus aliis rationibus ostendi solet.

that it can be had. Yet this argument also differs little from the preceding ones and it seems to beg the question by varied terms alone, since the thing becomes present by the power of cognition which is something else than to be cognized or represented by the mind through intentional similarity. For the discussion here cannot be about local presence or real indistance or the conjunction of entities, since this is not of much relevance for explaining the nature of happiness nor does it properly happen through action, although perhaps it is presupposed for action since such action must be done by God himself, which has as much a place in the action of the will as in the action of the intellect. The discussion is about objective presence, by which signification to be present is nothing other than to be seen. It certainly is true that this does not apply to love. Still, it needs to be proven that this is necessary for attainment [of the end]. For it can be said that although love does make [something] present in that way, nevertheless, it brings about a unity in its way for it also makes the beloved be in the lover.

14. Therefore, these arguments do not directly and ostensively suffice for proving that vision alone is attainment. Still, they seem to me sufficiently to prove that vision cannot be excluded from the nature of attainment. If vision is the most perfect action of intellectual nature as way shown, it both immediately reaches the ultimate end itself and brings about similarity to it to the highest degree both intentionally and according to the sharing in the most perfect divine act by which God sees himself. And, in addition, it makes the object present as conjoined to the cognizer and in a certain way sets it up in the power of the seer so that he can enjoy it and be satisfied. What reason, I ask, can be brought forward for why such an action does not have the nature of attainment? For in the case of material things which one is to use we are said obtain some thing when it is put in our power in such a way that we can use it by our decision. Therefore, in the case of the ultimate end which one is to enjoy, we will rightly be said to obtain it when it is put in our power in such a way that we can enjoy it according to our will. St. Thomas has an elegant passage concerning this matter in [ST] Ia.12.7 ad 3, where he explains the nature of attainment in this way.

What the mentioned proofs do accomplish.

15. It remains, therefore, for me to show by the other indirect way that the will cannot have an act which is attainment, neither wholly nor partially. But this is usually shown by three other arguments. The

The latter part of the foundation is exclusive to acts of the will.
The first exclusive argument, from St. Thomas.

90 Prima est, illa quam attigit D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1,
ad 2, et quæst. 3, art. 4, ad 2, et latius 3, contr. Gent., cap. 26,
quia primum volitum, seu primum objectum voluntatis non
potest esse actus ejus, nam actus, quo voluntas [sic] vult
95 suum actum, est reflexus, unde necesse est ut supponat actum
habentem aliud objectum, in quod directe tendat, quod qui-
dem non sit actus voluntatis, quia potentia prius movetur ab
objecto, quam ab actu suo: ergo primum objectum voluntatis
non potest esse actus voluntatis: ergo non potest esse ultimus
100 finis: ergo nec consecutio ejus, quia hæc etiam habet rationem
ultimi finis. Probatur autem prima consequentia, quia ultimus
finis est primum volitum, seu primum objectum voluntatis.

Cur non
satisfaciat
proxima ratio.

100 16. Hanc rationem late defendit Cajetanus et Ferrarius,
fateor tamen mihi esse valde difficilem, primo quidem, quia
satis est quod ultimus finis objectivus sit primum objectum ap-
petibile directe a voluntate: non videtur autem necessarium,
105 nec ex tota ratione ultimi finis probari potest, quod consecutio
ejus sit etiam appetibilis actu a se distincto. Quod in hunc
modum explico: aut enim consideratur homo prius quam con-
sequatur ultimum finem, verbi gratia, pro statu viæ aut in eo
105R statu, in quo jam tenet ultimum finem; in priori statu bene
potest homo primo directe amare ultimum finem et consecutio-
nem ejus, etiamsi fingamus illam esse futuram in actu volun-
tatis, ut, verbi gratia, si quis nunc credat gaudium beatificum
110 futurum esse adeptionem sui finis, cur non poterit actu primo,
et directe illum intendere, et consequi illum, et propter hunc
finem primo operari juxta illud, finis præcepti est charitas? Si
vero loquamur de homine jam possidente ultimum finem, si
115 amando possidet, cur non satis est ut objectum illius amoris sit
primum appetibile a voluntate, et quod ille amor dum directe
fertur in illud objectum, simul quasi reflexe feratur <76> in se
120 ipsum, et sit magis volitus quam omnis alius actus voluntatis,
vel per ipsummet actum, vel per alium, si voluntas velit for-
malem reflexionem facere, certe non apparet in hoc esse aliquid
120R contra rationem ultimi finis, vel consecutionis ejus ut sic: ergo

90R first is the one which St. Thomas mentions in IaIIæ.1.1 ad 2, 3.4 ad 2,
and more extensively in SCG III, c. 26. The first thing that was willed
or the first object of the will cannot be its act, for the act by which the
will wills its act is reflexive. Hence, it is necessary that it suppose an act
having another object to which it directly tends. This object is certainly
not an act of the will, since the power is moved by the object before it
is moved by its act. Therefore, the first object of the will cannot be an
act of the will. Therefore, it cannot be the ultimate end and, therefore,
95R neither its attainment, since this also has the nature of the ultimate end.
Moreover, the first consequence is proven, since the ultimate end is the
first thing that was willed or the first object of the will.

100R 16. Cajetan and Ferrarius¹⁰ defend this argument more extensively.
Still, I admit that it seems most difficult to me. First, indeed, because it
is enough that the objective ultimate end is the first object directly desir-
able by the will. But it does not seem necessary (nor can it be proven
according to the entire nature of the ultimate end) that its attainment is
also desirable by an act distinct from it. I explain this in the following
105R way: either the human being is considered before he pursues the ulti-
mate end—for example, as in the state on the way—or in that state in
which he already holds (*tenet*) the ultimate end. In the former state, he
can well first directly love the ultimate end and its attainment, even if
we imagine that it will be in the act of will, as, for example, if someone
now believes that beatific joy will be the achievement of his end. Why
110R will he not be able to intend and pursue it by a first act and directly and
first act for the sake of this end according to that passage ‘charity is the
end of the law’ [1 Tim. 1:5]? But if we are talking about the human as
already possessing the ultimate end, if in loving he possesses, why is it
not enough that the object of his love is first desirable by the will and
that this love, as long as it is directly brought to that object, at the same
time, as it were, is brought reflexively to it itself and is willed more
than all the other acts of the will, either through the very act itself or
through another act? If the will wishes to make a formal reflection, it
120R is certainly not evident that there is something in this that is contrary
to the nature of the ultimate end or its attainment as such. Therefore,

Why the last
argument does
not satisfy.

¹⁰Usually, Suárez uses ‘Ferrariensis’ to refer to Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (e.g., in n. 6); is this a reference to the same person? Or to the early 16th century Octavianus Ferrarius? But the latter seems less likely.

ex illa præcisa ratione non satis excluditur actus voluntatis.

Instatulterius prædicta ratio. 125
17. Deinde insto contra rationem hanc in hunc modum, nam sicut ultimus finis dicitur primum objectum amabile, ita dici potest primum objectum intelligibile, quia hic non est sermo de primo ordine temporis, seu successione durationis; quia in hoc sensu primus finis non est ultimum volitum, præsertim loquendo de fine ultimo particulari, ut constat ex dictis, disputatione prima: igitur propositio illa intelligenda est de primo ordine perfectionis, seu natura; secundum se: et hoc modo, sicut finis ultimus est primum objectum appetibile, ita et intelligibile, quia sicut est objectum supremum voluntatis, ita et intellectus: hinc autem inferri non potest, quod ultimus finis formalis non sit actus intellectus, quia satis est, quod finis ultimus objectivus sit per se primum objectum intelligibile, actus vero perfectissimus; qui circa illud versatur, sit etiam in supremo ordine intelligibilium, tanquam consecutio illius objecti: ergo idem proportionaliter dici potest de voluntate.

2. Ratio exclusiva ex Durando. 140
18. Est ergo secunda ratio, qua usus est Durandus in 4, distinct. 49, quæst. 1, quia appetitus non est propter se, nullus enim præcise appetit propter appetendum, sed propter consequendum id, quod appetit, ut patet discurrendo per omnem appetitum naturalem, sensitivum; atque eadem ratio est intellectivo; ergo cum voluntas sit potentia ad appetendum, et omnis actus ejus sit appetitio quædam, non potest illa ut sic esse consecutio, sed potius debet ad consecutionem ordinari, seu per consecutionem satiari; unde in omni natura hoc reperitur, quod alia est facultas data ad appetendum, alia vero ad consequendum, et possidendum.

Objicitur contra hanc rationem. 155
19. Hæc vero ratio videtur ad summum de amore concupiscentiæ procedere, qui refertur ad bonum amantis: nam hoc amore amamus nostrum commodum, quod non obtinemus amando, ut avarus non obtinet divitias qui amat illas, et sic de aliis. Unde in hoc amore semper videtur consecutio ab effectu distingui, et ideo non potest etiam habere rationem ultimi finis in suo ordine, quia est propter aliud: at vero in puro amore amicitia, et præsertim <col. b> respectu Dei, non videtur huc

an act of the will is not excluded by this argument alone.

17. Next, I challenge this argument in this way: just as the ultimate end is called the first lovable object, so also it can be called the first intelligible object, since this is not a discussion about being first in the order of time or in the succession of duration. Because in this sense, the first end is not the ultimate willed [end], especially when speaking about a particular ultimate end, as is clear from what was said in the first disputation. Therefore, this proposition should be understood as concerning being first in the order of perfection or nature, according to itself. And in this way, just as the ultimate end is the first desirable object, so also the [first] intelligible [object], since just as it is the supreme object of the will, so also of the intellect. But it cannot be inferred from this that the formal ultimate end is not an act of the intellect, since it is sufficient that the objective ultimate end be *per se* the first intelligible object. But a most perfect act, which turns concerning it, is also in the highest order of intelligibles, just as the attainment of that object. Therefore, the same can be said proportionately about the will.

18. There is, therefore, a second argument, which Durandus uses in IV, dist. 49, q. 1: desire is not for the sake of itself, for nothing desires strictly for the sake of desiring, but rather for the sake of obtaining that which it desires, as is clear by running through every natural [and] sensitive appetite. And the same argument applies to the intellective [appetite]. Therefore, since the will is a power for desiring and every one of its acts is a certain desire, this¹¹ as such cannot be attainment but rather must be ordered to the attainment or be satisfied through attainment. Hence, this is found in every nature, that a faculty is given one thing for desiring but another for pursuing and possessing.

19. But this argument seems at most to proceed concerning concupiscent love that is referred to the good of the lover. For by this love we love our advantage, which we do not obtain by loving it. For example, a miser does not obtain wealth who [merely] loves it, and likewise for other things. Hence, in the case of this love attainment seems always to be distinguished from the effect and it cannot also have the nature of an ultimate end in its order since it is for the sake of something else. But, on the other hand, in the case of pure friendship love, especially with

The mentioned argument is pursued further.

The second exclusive argument from Durandus.

An objection against this argument.

¹¹Is the 'illa' referring to the will or to the desire?

160 procedere: nam hoc amore solum volumus bonum divinum,
 ut illi bene sit, unde in hoc sistit ut in ultima perfectione sua:
 talis ergo amor ex se non ordinatur ad aliam consecutionem,
 quia hoc solo contentus est, quod Deus in se bonis abundet; 160R
 ergo hic amor habet rationem ultimi, et non est datus ad con-
 sequendum aliud bonum, sed solum ut nos conjungat summo
 165 bono amando illi bonum, quod habet.

respect to God, [the argument] does not seem to proceed to this point.
 For by this love we only will divine good so that it is well with him (*ut
 illi bene sit*). Hence, it stops in this as in its ultimate perfection. There-
 fore, such love is not ordered from itself to another attainment, since
 it is content in this alone that God in himself overflows with goods. 160R
 Therefore, this love has the nature of an ultimate [end] and was not
 given for pursuing another good but only so that it joins us to the high-
 est good by loving the good to it which it has.

Tripliciter
 occurrit
 Durandus.
 Primo.

20. Quæ objectio non latuit Durandum: tribus autem
 modis illam solvere conatur: primo, quod circa Deum non
 est proprius amicitiae, seu benevolentiae, quia Deus nullo bono
 indiget, nec indigere potest, et ita non possumus velle illi
 5 aliquod bonum denuo ei acquirendum, quod proprie pertinet
 ad amorem benevolentiae. Sed in hoc valde deceptus est, 5R
 quia charitas est vere amicitia ad Deum, imo si erga aliquem
 esse potest pura benevolentia, est ad Deum, nam est bonum
 maxime propter se amabile, et super omnia, etiam supra ip-
 sum amantem: nec refert quod Deus non acquirat bona intrin- 10R
 seca, quia inde solum fit hæc bona non amari Deo per modum
 desiderii, non tamen excluditur quin amari poterunt simplici
 amore, quo amatur quodlibet bonum, etiam postquam possi-
 detur. Unde dicit secundo hunc amorem, secundum quod
 15 possibilis est, esse debitum Deo ex justitia, et ideo magis habere
 rationem meriti. Verum licet hoc concederemus de amore
 viae, quia est liber, tamen ut est necessarius in patria, potest
 habere rationem finis et præmii: unde sub eadem ratione non
 potest proprie dici debitum morali, seu legali debito, quia ea,
 20 quæ sunt necessaria, non cadunt sub hoc debitum: tum etiam,
 quia impertinens est ad rationem consecutionis beatitudinis,
 quod ille actus, in quo consistit, sit debitus Deo, vel debito
 morali, si talis actus posset esse liber, vel debito connaturali- 20R
 tatis; quia quodammodo debetur Deo propter bonitatem suam
 summus amor potentialis, et in solutione hujus debiti potest 25R
 esse maxima hominis perfectio. Tertio ergo dicit, et hoc etiam
 sequuntur aliqui Thomistæ, beatitudinem consistere in nostris
 commodis, ut ex Anselmo, supra retuli, et ideo amore amic-
 itiae ut sic, non posset pertinere ad nostram beatitudinem,
 30 quia talis Amor, ut idem Anselmus ait, non spectat ad affec- 30R

20. This objection does not escape the notice of Durandus. More-
 over, he tries to solve it in three ways. First, [he says] that with respect
 to God there is no proper friendship [love] or benevolent [love], be-
 cause God lacks no good nor can lack [any good] and thus we cannot
 will for him some good to be acquired anew for him, which properly
 belongs to benevolent love. But he is greatly deceived in this, since char-
 ity truly is friendship with God; indeed, if there can be pure benevo-
 lence to anyone, it is to God. For he is the good most lovable for its
 sake and beyond all else, even beyond the lover himself. Nor does it
 matter that God does not acquire intrinsic goods, since from that it
 only happens that these goods are not loved by God through the mode
 of desire. Still, it is not prevented that they could be loved with the
 simple love by which any good whatever is loved even after it is pos-
 sessed. Hence, he says, secondly, that this love, according to which it is
 possible, is a debt to God by justice and therefore has more the nature
 of merit. To be sure, although we conceded this concerning the love
 of the way, since it is free, nevertheless, as it is necessary in the home-
 land, it can have the nature of an end and of a reward. Hence, it cannot
 properly under the same aspect be called a moral or legal debt to God,
 since those things which are necessary do not fall under this debt. Also,
 moreover, because it does not pertain to the nature of the attainment
 of happiness that that act in which it consists is a debt to God, either
 a moral debt, if such an act could be free, or a debt of connaturality,
 since in a certain way the highest potential love is owed to God for the
 sake of his goodness and the greatest perfection of a human being can
 be in the payment of this debt. Thirdly, therefore, he says—and some
 Thomists also follow this—that happiness consists in our advantages, as
 from Anselm, [whom] I mentioned above. And, therefore, friendship
 love as such could not pertain to our happiness, since such love, as the
 same Anselm says, does not pertain to the affection for advantage but

Three responses
 occur to
 Durandus.
 The first.

Secundo.

The second.

Tertio.

The third.

tionem commodi, sed justitiæ. Sed hoc etiam mihi non satisfacit, quia ille amor, qui respectu Dei est amicitiae, est maximum commodum nostrum. Unde ex amore commodi possumus hunc amorem amicitiae divinae nobis amare, <77>
 35 maxime quia non est necessarium et nostram beatitudinem
 semper nobis amore concupiscentiae amemus, nam ex vi amicitiae divinae possumus nobis desiderare beatitudinem: sicut alibi dixit divus Thomas *Charitas a charitate diligitur*: et inter solvunda argumenta Scoti plura dicemus.

3. Ratio exclusiva
 ex D. Thom.

21. Tertia et ultima ratio D. Thomæ, loco citato, est, quia omnis amor voluntatis vel antecedit consecutionem boni amati, vel subsequitur: ergo nunquam ille potest esse consecutio. Antecedens patet, quia actus voluntatis vel est desiderium, et hoc intrinsece postulat, ut sit de bono nondum habito, et ideo antecedit consecutionem: vel est delectatio, et hæc intrinsece est de bono jam consecuto: supponit ergo consecutionem: non enim delectamur ut consequamur, sed quia consecuti sumus. Contra quem discursum statim occurrit objectio, quia præter hos actus reperitur amor. Sed huic objectioni occurrit idem D. Thomas 3, contra Gentiles, cap. 25, ratione 5, quia eadem ratio est de amore et desiderio, nam amor est de se indifferens ad bonum consecutum, et non consecutum, unde interdum antecedit desiderium. Ex quo sumitur confirmatio, nam amor charitatis in via reperitur: ergo non potest esse actus, in quo consistat essentialis beatitudo, quia in via nullo modo consequimur objectum beatificum ut sic.

Objectio contra
 hanc rationem
 impugnatur.

Impugnationis
 Evasio duplex.
 Prima.
 Secunda.

22. Ad quam rationem respondet Scotus primo in via, et patria dari amores specie distinctos: sed hoc non est necessarium, nec hoc loco examinandum, et fortasse contrarium probabilius est. Secundo et apparentius respondet, non esse necessarium actum illum, qui est essentialis beatitudo, differre specie in natura entis ab illo actu, qui reperiri potest extra statum beatificum, sed satis est quod differat in modo, et conditionibus, quamvis sint extra essentiam talis actus; quia beatitudo non dicit actum illum secundum speciem ejus nudam, sed cum tali perfectione et modo, sicut de visione beatifica a nobis dictum est, l. 2, de Attributis Dei: nam illa visio (si fuit in Paulo in raptu) ejusdem speciei fuit cum visione beatifica, et

to the affection for justice. But this does not seem satisfactory to me, since this very love which is of friendship with respect to God is our greatest advantage. Hence, we can love this divine friendship love for us out of a love for advantage, especially since it is not necessary and since we always love our own happiness for us with concupiscent love. For we can desire happiness for us out of the force of divine friendship, just as St. Thomas said elsewhere: ‘Charity is loved by charity’. And we will say more during resolving the arguments of Scotus.

21. The third and last argument of St. Thomas, in the cited place, is that every love of the will either precedes the attainment of the loved good or follows it. Therefore, it can never be the attainment. The antecedent is clear, since an act of the will is either desire (and he postulates this intrinsically so that it is concerning a good that is not yet possessed and for this reason precedes attainment) or delight (and this is intrinsically concerning the good already attained; therefore, it assumes attainment, for we are not delighted in order to pursue but because we have pursued). An objection against this discussion occurs at once, since love is found besides these acts. But the same St. Thomas resists this objection in *SCG* III, c. 25, rat. 5, since the same argument applies to love and desire, for love is of itself indifferent to whether the good is attained or not attained. Hence, sometimes it precedes desire. A confirmation is taken from this, for the love of charity is found on the way. Therefore, it cannot be the act in which essential happiness consists, since we in no way attain the beatific object as such on the way.

22. Scotus responds to this argument, first, that loves distinct in species are given on the way and in the homeland. But this is not necessary nor should it be examined in this place. And perhaps the contrary is more probable. He responds, secondly and more apparently, that it is not necessary that that act which is essential happiness differ in species in the nature of the being from that act which can be found beyond the beatific state, but it is sufficient that they differ in mode and in conditions, although they are beyond the essence of such an act, since that act is not called happiness according to its bare species, but with such a perfection and mode, just as was said by us concerning the beatific vision in *De attributis Dei*, book II. For that vision (if it was in Paul when he was carried up) was of the same species as the beatific vision and yet

The third
 exclusive
 argument from
 St. Thomas.

An objection
 against this
 argument is
 resisted.

A twofold
 evasion of this
 response.
 First.
 Second.

70 tamen in illo non habuit rationem beatitudinis, quia non fuit
per modum permanentis, immutabilis, inamissibilis: sic ergo
amor viæ, quia ex modo, et statu suo mutabilis est, atque amis-
sibilis: non talis est, qualis ad beatificandum requiritur: amor
75 vero patriæ est immutabilis et inamissibilis, atque adeo est in
statu perfecto: ille ergo esse poterit actus beatificus: hic autem
amor sic per- <col. b>fectus non abstrahit a præsentia et ab-
sentia, sed necessario postulat Deum clare visum.

Impugnatur
etiam proxima
Evasio.

80 23. Sed contra rationem hanc procedit altera pars D. Tho-
mæ, quæ est delectatio: nam sicut delectatio supponit bonum
consecutum, ita hic amor Dei immutabilis, et maxime perfec-
tus, supponit Deum clare visum, et consecutum: imo si quid
habet perfectionis, quæ sit propria status beatifici, illam ha-
bet ratione visionis: ergo hic etiam amor eadem ratione ex-
cludendus est, qua delectatio. Et hæc videtur tota vis rationis
D. Thomæ, et sententiæ ejus quoad ultimum punctum: quæ
85 tamen responsionem non improbabilem habere videtur: probat
enim illa ratio amorem beatificum necessario supponere
aliquam præsentiam, atque adeo consecutionem aliquam ob-
jecti beatifici: quod etiam Scotus concessit, distinguens du-
plicem consecutionem quasi partialem: alteram priorem origi-
90 ne, quam dixit esse in intellectu: alteram in voluntate, origi-
ne quidem posteriorem, perfectione autem priorem, ut ipse
putavit: et quamvis nos hoc ultimum non admittamus, tamen
ex discursu facto, non videtur satis concludi illam consecutionem
et præsentiam, quæ est per intellectam, licet necessario
95 antecedit talem amorem, esse unicam, et totalem adeptionem
objecti beatifici et non veluti consummari, et integrari per ip-
sum amorem: hoc ergo solum manet difficile in hac opinione.

Sustinetur tamen
probabiliter dicta
Evasio.

100 24. Est ergo quarta sententia affirmans de essentia beatitudinis
formalis esse actum intellectus, et voluntatis simul. Ita opinantur
in 4, d. 49, Albertus Magnus et Thomas de Argentina, qui existimavit
rem hanc esse jam definitam. In eadem opinione est Bonaventura,
articulo primo, quæstione quinta, qui beatitudinem ponit in tribus
105 dotibus animæ quas esse dicit, amorem, visionem, fruitionem, ut sit
perfectum spirituale matrimonium inter Deum et animam. Richardus,
articulo primo, quæstione septima, requirit visionem et amorem,

4. Sententia stat
pro actu
intellectus &
voluntatis simul.
Quidam putant
hoc esse ab
Ecclesia
definitum.

70R it did not have in that the nature of happiness, since it was not in a per-
manent, immutable, and inamissible mode. In such a way, therefore,
the love on the way, since it is mutable and amissible in its mode and
state, is not of the kind that is required for making one happy. But the
love of the homeland is immutable and inamissible and therefore is in
a perfect state. It will, therefore, be able to be the beatific act. More-
over, this love so perfect does not abstract from presence and absence
75R but necessarily postulates God clearly seen.

80R 23. But the other part of St. Thomas's [argument], which is de-
light, proceeds against this argument. For just as delight supposes an at-
tained good, so this immutable and most perfect love of God supposes
that God has been clearly seen and achieved. Indeed, if he has anything
of perfection, which is proper to the beatific state, he has it by reason
of vision. Therefore, this love should be excluded for the same reason
for which delight [is excluded]. And this seems to be the whole force
of St. Thomas's argument and of his view with respect to the last point.
Nevertheless, he seems to hold this response as not improbable. For
85R this argument shows that beatific love necessarily supposes some pres-
ence and for that reason some attainment of the beatific object. Scotus
also conceded this, distinguishing two, as it were, partial attainments:
the one prior in origin which he said is in the intellect, the other in the
will indeed posterior in origin but prior in perfection, as he thought.
90R And, although we do not admit this last [part], nevertheless, according
to the discussion already had, it does not seem sufficient for concluding
that this attainment and presence which comes through the intellect
(although it necessarily precedes such love) is the unique and complete
achievement of the beatific object and not as something to be consum-
mated and integrated through love itself. Therefore, this alone remains
95R difficult in this opinion.

100R 24. There—There is, therefore, a fourth view that affirms that the
essence of formal happiness is an act of the intellect and of the will at the
same time. Albert the Great and Thomas of Argentina, who thought
this matter had already been settled, suppose in this way in IV, dist. 49.
Bonaventure is of the same opinion in art. 1, q. 5. He places happiness
in the three gifts of the soul which he calls love, vision, and enjoyment,
as it is the perfect spiritual marriage between God and soul. Richard, in
art. 1, q. 7, requires vision and love, but adds inamissibility, which he
thinks is a special act of the will. But he does not think rightly in this,

This evasion is
also resisted.

Yet the stated
evasion is
sustained with
probability.

The fourth view
stands for an act
of the intellect
and of the will
and the same
time.
Some think that
this is settled by
the Church.

addit vero inamissibilitatem, quam putat esse specialem actum voluntatis. Sed in hoc non recte sentit, ut postea in quarta sectione videbimus, sequitur vero hoc de visione et amore Supplement. Gabrielis, quæst. 2, art. 2, et Paludanus, quæst. 3, et Marsalius, quæst. ultima, ponit beatitudinem in visione et gaudio: existimo tamen non distinguere gaudium ab amore boni præsentis. Fuit etiam hæc opinio Hugo de Sancto Victore super capit. 7, de Divinis nomin., tenet etiam <78> Vega, libro septimo in Tridentin., capite tert., et Corduba late, libro primo Quæst., qu. 42, qui citat Alensem, sed falso: et hi duo auctores ultimi existimant etiam hanc sentientem esse definitam, quia in Clementina, *Ad nostrum, de Hæret.*, dicitur indigere nos lumine gloriæ ad videndum, et Deo beate fruendum: apparentius videtur, quia Benedictus XI, in Extravag., quam referunt Marsilius, Castro et alii, definit, post Christi passionem animas, quæ ex hac vita discedunt, si justæ sint, et plene purgatæ, statim videre Deum, et videndo fini, et hac visione et fruitione esse beatas.

Non est revera definitum.

25. Sed ut hoc de definitione expediamus, non est verum quidquam in hoc esse definitum, scilicet, an essentia beatitudinis in uno, vel pluribus actibus consistat: nam in priori loco sermo est contra Begardos et Beguinas qui asserebant hominem natura sua fieri beatum, et non indigere ad hoc lumine gloriæ. Hoc ergo est quod Pontifex cum Concilio definit, indigere nos lumine gloriæ, ut elevemur ad beatitudinem illam, et ut Deo fruamur: an vero beatitudo sit in visione, vel in fruitione, vel in utraque, impertinens est ad illam definitionem: in posteriori vero loco definitio est contra sententiam, quæ asserebat animas non beatificari usque ad diem iudicii: obiter vero dicitur ibi animas beatificari videndo et fruendo, quod etiam simpliciter verum est, quia de facto utrumque est in beatis, et qui utrumque habet, necessario est beatus, sive utrumque sit de essentia, sive non, maxime quia adhuc in opinione versatur, quid sit fruitio, et an sit ipsamet visio, ut vult Soto, vel amor, ut Scotus putat vel delectatio, ut creditur esse opinio D. Thomæ, in 1, 2, qu. 11, de quo nonnihil infra, disp. 9, sect. 3, non est ergo in hoc aliquid de fide.

as we will see later in the fourth section. But concerning this [point] about vision and love, Gabriel [Biel] in the *Supplement*, q. 2, art. 2, Paladanus in q. 3, and Marsalius in the last question place happiness in vision and joy. Nevertheless, I do not think that they distinguish joy from the love of goods that are present. This was also the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor on c. 7 of *De Div. nom.* Vega also held [this view] in *Tridentin.* VII, c. 3, and Corduba (who cites Alexander of Hales, but falsely) more extensively in *Quæst.* I, q. 42. These last two authors also think that this view is settled, since Clement in *Ad nostrum, de Hæret.* says that ‘we lack the light of glory for living and for enjoying God happily. It seems more apparent, because Benedict XI in *Extravag.* decrees that after the passion of Christ the souls which leave this life at once see God if they are just and well purged and by seeing the end they are happy in this vision and enjoyment. Marsilius, Castro, and others cite this [statement].

25. But in order that we explain the decree, it is not true that anything is settled in this [passage from Benedict XI], namely, whether the essence of happiness consists in one or multiple acts. For in the first place the discussion is directed against Beghards and Beguines who assert that a human being becomes happy by nature and does not lack the light of glory for this. This, therefore, is what the Pope settles with the Council: that we lack the light of glory for raising [ourselves] to that happiness and for enjoying God. But whether happiness is in vision or in enjoyment or in both is irrelevant to this definition. But, on the other hand, the decree does conflict with the view which asserts that souls are not made happy until the day of judgement. But it does say there, by the way, that souls are made happy by seeing and enjoying, which is also true, strictly speaking, since in fact either belongs to the happy and he who has either necessarily is happy, whether either belongs to its essence or not. For so far what most concerns the opinion is what enjoyment is: whether it is the very vision itself, as Soto proposes, or love, as Scotus thinks, or delight, as the opinion of St. Thomas in IaIIæ.11 is believed to be (which [we will discuss] in some measure below in disp. 9, sec. 3). Therefore, nothing in this is a matter of faith.

It is not really settled.

Favent tamen huic opinioni Pontifices & Patres.	145	26. Videtur tamen hæc opinio consentanea modo loquendi Pontificum, et illi favent sancti Patres citati in tribus opinionibus relatis: ideo enim interdum beatitudinem ponunt in visione, interdum in amore, vel gaudio, quia hæc connexa sunt, et unam essentiam beatitudinis constituunt. Ad duo testimonia. Primum est Augustini, lib. 1 de Moribus Eccles., cap. 3, dicens: <i>Beatus, quantum existimo, nec ille dici potest, qui non habet quod amat, qualecumque sit, nec qui habet, quod amat, si noxium sit, nec qui non habet, quod amat, etsi optimum sit, quartum restat, ut video, ubi beata vita inveniri queat, cum id quod est hominis optimum, et amatur, et habetur: <col. b> quid enim est aliud, quod dicimus frui, nisi præsto habere quod diligis?</i> Secundum est Bernardi, epist. 19, ubi tractans illud ad Coloss. 3, <i>et vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo: In Deo, inquit, quia necdum possumus contemplari per speciem, nec plene complecti per amorem, dedit nobis interim et sapere per fidem, et quærere per desiderium: et infra: Si enim adhuc absentes iniciat fides et desiderium, præsentibus profecto consummat intellectus et amor: et infra: His ergo fortasse quasi duobus animæ brachiis, intellectu, scilicet, et amore, id est, cognitione et delectatione veritatis, amplectitur et comprehenditur ab omnibus sanctis, longitudo, latitudo, sublimitas et profunditas.</i>	145R 150R 155R 160R	26. Still, this opinion seems in harmony with the Popes' way of speaking and the holy Fathers cited in the three reported opinions. Indeed, for this reason happiness is sometimes placed in vision, sometimes in love or joy, since these are connected and constitute one essence of happiness. But I add two <i>testimonia</i> . The first is from Augustine in <i>De mor. eccl.</i> I, c. 3, saying: 'In my view, neither he who does not have what he loves, whatever that may be, nor he who has what he loves if that is harmful nor he who does not love what he does not have even though it is the best good can be called happy. ¹² [...] A fourth case remains, as I see it, where the happy life can be found: when that which is his best good is both loved and possessed. For what else do we call enjoyment except to have at hand that which you love?' The second is from Bernard in letter 19, ¹³ where he is treating the passage from Col. 3[:3]: "and your life is hidden with Christ in God", since we cannot yet be contemplated through sight nor be fully embraced through love. Meanwhile he granted to us to understand through faith and to seek through desire'. And further down: 'For if until now faith and desire initiate those who are absent, understanding and love certainly perfect those who are present [to God]'. And further: 'Therefore, the length and breadth, the height and depth, [that is, the eternity, the charity, the goodness, and the wisdom of God], is embraced and comprehended by all the saints with these two, as it were, arms of the soul, namely, understanding and love, that is, cognition and delight'.	Still, the popes and Fathers favour this opinion.
Ratio pro eadem.	170	27. Ratione probatur hæc sententia, conjungendo omnes adductas pro aliis: et quia de visione satis aperte videtur ostensum pertinere ad essentiam, de charitate id amplius persuadet, quia charitas Dei est ultimus finis noster, vel totus, vel certe intrans essentiam ejus: sed finis ultimus est beatitudo ejus: ergo. Antecedens ostenditur primo ex Paulo 1, ad Timoth. 1, dicitur, <i>finis præcepti Caritas</i> . Dices, Paulum loqui de charitate viæ, quæ est finis omnium aliorum præceptorum. Sed contra; nam D. Thomas 2, 2, quæst. 44, art. 6, cum Augustino, libro de Perfectione justitiæ, docet charitatem patriæ esse finem, ad quem ordinatur perfectio charitatis viæ; imo dicunt in præcepto charitatis Dei, non solum esse mandatum,	165R 170R 175R	27. This view is proven by reason, by joining all those adduced for the other views. And since it seems sufficiently clearly to have been shown concerning vision that it belongs to the essence, it is more than persuaded concerning charity, since the charity of God is our ultimate end, either the whole [end] or at least entering into its essence. But the ultimate end is his happiness. Therefore. The antecedent is shown, first, because of Paul saying in 1 Tim. 1 that the 'end of the law is charity'. You may say that Paul is speaking about the charity of the way which is the end of all other laws. But to the contrary, for St. Thomas in IIaIIæ.44.6, along with Augustine in <i>De perf. iust.</i> , teaches that the charity of the homeland is the end to which the perfection of the charity of the way is ordered. Indeed, they say that not only is commanded	An argument for it. The antecedent of the posited argument is proven first from Paul. An evasion is resisted.

¹²The quotation is erroneous. The description of the third kind of person should read: *qui non amat, quod habet, etsi optimum sit*.

¹³Note that the numbering varies in different editions. For example, it is number 6 in Francis Aidan Gasquet's selection of Bernard's letters printed in 1904 (see <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/bernard/letters.ix.html>).

	180	quid in hac vita exequendum sit, sed etiam esse demonstratam et ostensam charitatis perfectionem in alia vita obtinendam, ad quam ut ad finem tendendum est: unde per charitatem viæ inquirimus Deum, juxta illud Cantic. 2: <i>Quæram quem diligit anima mea</i> : per charitatem autem patriæ tenebimus illum: ad quod applicari potest illud Cantic. 3: <i>Tenui eum, nec dimittam</i> , et 1, Joan., cap. 4: <i>Deus charitas est, et qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i> . Sed dicit aliquis ex D. Thoma, in 3, dist. 27, quæst. 2, art. 2, ad 2, charitatem non dici finem præcepti, quia ad eum, ut ad finem ordinentur actus præcepti, sed quia per eam aliæ virtutes in finem ordinantur. Respondetur, D. Thomam ibi agere de charitate habituali, quam dicit esse virtutem moventem et ordinantem alias virtutes ad finem ultimum, quod verissimum est, licet revera non sit hic sensus Pauli in citato loco 1, ad Timoth. 1.	180R	
Replica.	185		185R	It is bent back.
Expeditur.	190		190R	It is resolved.
Probaturo secundo idem antecedens.	195	28. Præterea ostenditur secundo illud antededens, nam etsi loquamur de actu, verum est <79> charitatem non esse finem ultimum objectivum, in quem sunt omnia referenda, nam hic est solus Deus, qui est charitas per essentiam: et hoc sensu etiam est verum dilectionem esse, quæ omnia referuntur in Deum, imo etiam se ipsam in Deum refert, et in visionem beatificam ipsius Dei, quia, ut supra dictum est, non est contra rationem ipsius finis ultimi formalis, quod referatur ad finem ultimum objectivum: quinetiam hoc spectat ad excellentiam talis finis, et ad debitum ordinem hominis in illum. Quapropter quod dilectio ordinet se, et omnia in Deum, non excludit, quin ipsa possit esse perfecta conjunctio cum ultimo fine, ad quam, ut ad finem reliquæ omnes actiones referuntur, vel ad inchoandam illam in hac vita, vel ad perficiendam in patria: et ita exposuit testimonium Pauli Augustinus, in Enchiridio, capite 121, propter quod idem divus Thomas 2, 2, quæstione 27, articulo 6, ad 3, dicit expresse, actum interiorum charitatis habere rationem finis, quia ultimus finis hominis sistit in hoc, quod anima Deo inhæreat, juxta illud psalmi 72: <i>Mihi autem Deo adhærere bonum est</i> . Quod tandem ratione declaratur, quia amor Dei in patria est propter se diligibilis ultimate absque relatione ad alium finem præter Deum in se, quia amicitia divina	195R	
	200		200R	
	205		205R	
Declaratur amplius.	210		210R	It is shown more thoroughly.
		in the law of charity of God what should be followed in this life but also the perfection of charity to be obtained in another life—to which one should tend as to the end—is demonstrated and shown. Hence, we seek after God through the charity of the way, according to Song of Sol. 2 [3:1]: ‘I seek him whom my soul loves’. But we will hold him through the charity of the homeland, to which Song of Sol. 3[3] (‘I held him and would not let him go’) and 1 John 4[16] (‘God is charity and he who remains in charity remains in God and God in him’) can be connected. But someone may say that according to St. Thomas in III, dist. 27, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2, charity is not called the end of the law because the acts of the law are ordered to it as to the end but because through it the other virtues are ordered to the end. It is responded that St. Thomas here deals with habitual charity, which he says is the virtue that moves and orders the other virtues to the ultimate end. This is most true, although this is not really the sense of Paul in the cited place from 1 Tim. 1.		
		28. In addition, the antecedent is shown, secondly: for even if we speak about an act, it is true that charity is not the ultimate objective end to which all things are referred, for that is God alone, who is charity through essence. And in this sense it is also true that love is that which refers all things to God; indeed, it refers it itself to God and to the beatific vision of God himself, since, as was said above, it is not contrary to the nature of the ultimate formal end itself that it be referred to the ultimate objective end. In fact, this belongs to the excellence of such an end and to the order owed by the human being to him. For this reason, the fact that love orders itself and everything to God does not prevent it itself from being able to be a perfect conjunction with the ultimate end to which as to an end all the remaining actions are referred, either by beginning it in this life or by perfecting it in the homeland. And Augustine explained in this way the <i>testimonium</i> of Paul in <i>Ench.</i> , c. 121. On account of the same thing St. Thomas in <i>IIaIIæ.27.6 ad 3</i> expressly says that an interior act of charity has the nature of an end because the ultimate end of a human being stops in this that the soul inheres in God, according to Psalm 73[28]: ‘But for me it is good to cling to God’. Which, finally, is shown by reason, because the love of God in the homeland is ultimately lovable for its own sake apart from a relation to some other end beyond God in himself, since divine friendship is a good maximally lovable for its own sake, even without order		The second proof of the same antecedent.

215	est bonum propter se maxime diligibile, etiam sine ordine ad visionem: item, quia creaturam inhærere suo creatori, et perfecte converti ad suum principium, est per se, et ex propria ratione magna perfectio creaturæ, et quasi consummatio ejus: sed nihil amplius requiri potest ad rationem finis ultimi: ergo	215R	to vision. Likewise, since for a creature to inhere in its creator and to be transformed perfectly to its principle is <i>per se</i> and by its proper nature the great perfection of the creature and, as it were, its consummation. But nothing more can be required for the nature of an ultimate end. Therefore, love of this kind is either the ultimate formal end or at least of its essence. It is, therefore, of the essence of human happiness.	
220	hujusmodi dilectio, vel est ultimus finis formalis, vel saltem de essentia ejus: est ergo de essentia humanæ beatitudinis.			
1. Assertio auctoris in hac controversia.	29. Hactenus aliorum sententias retulimus, superest, ut ex omnibus dictis quid nobis dicendum sit colligamus. Dico ergo primo, essentiam beatitudinis formalis primo, et principaliter consistere in visione Dei clara, in qua quasi in fonte, et radice tota perfectio beatitudinis continetur. Hanc conclusionem ut existimo, persuadent sufficienter omnia, quæ pro tertia sententia a numero sexto, adducta sunt primo, quia ex his habetur illam visionem esse præcipuam operationem creaturæ intellectualis simpliciter et absolute. Secundo, quia etiam est ostensum in ratione consecutionis, et conjunctionis cum ipso fine in se et immediate esse perfectissimam. Tertio, quia est veluti forma primo, et essentialiter distinguens statum beatificum a non beatifico, ita ut sine illa <col. b> revera homo non possit esse beatus absolute beatitudine supernaturali, nec habere alios actus circa Deum cum illa perfectione, quam illa beatitudo postulat: e contrario vero posita illa visione ex natura rei sequatur omnis alia perfectio ad statum beatificum necessaria, quod non habet aliqua alia operatio: ergo recte dicitur illa visio, et præcipua forma illius beatitudinis, et tota beatitudo, saltem in radice.	220R	29. Up to this point we have referred to the views of the others; it remains that we gather together what we should say from all the things that have been said. I say, first, therefore that the essence of formal happiness consists first and principally in a clear vision of God, in which the complete perfection of happiness is contained as in a fountain and root. All the [arguments] which were adduced for the view in nn. 3–6 are, I think, sufficiently persuasive for this conclusion, because as a result of these it is held that that vision is the special action of an intellectual creature, <i>simpliciter</i> and absolutely. Secondly, because it was also shown in the argument of achievement and union with the end in itself and immediately to be most perfect. Thirdly, because it is as if the first form and essentially distinguishing the beatific state from the non-beatific, so that without that the human being really cannot be absolutely happy with a supernatural happiness nor have other acts concerning God with that perfection which that happiness requires. But, conversely, by that vision having been posited by the nature of the thing every other perfection necessary for the beatific state and which does not have some other action follows. Therefore, that vision is rightly and especially called the form of that happiness and complete happiness, at least in root.	The first assertion of the author in this controversy.
Unde probetur.	225	225R		Whence it is proven.
230	230	230R		
235	235	235R		
240	240			
2. Assertio.	30. Atque hinc sequitur, et dico secundo, solum actum voluntatis et amorem perfectum Dei ex charitate, non posse esse essentiam totam beatitudinis: unde inter opiniones supra citatas opinio Scoti, si in hoc sensu ab eo intellecta est, minus apparet probabilis. Probatur conclusio, quia solus amor ex se non est sufficiens satiare totam hominis capacitatem, totumque desiderium erga Deum, quin potius ex se, si aliud non supponitur, aptus est causare desiderium præsentiae, seu consecutionis claræ ipsius Dei: nec etiam de se causa efficax talis præsentiae, sed potius prærequirit illam, ut inde perficiatur. Quod in hunc modum præterea declaro, quia omnis amor, etiamsi	230R	30. And from this it follows—and I say secondly—that an act of will and perfect love for God out of charity alone cannot be the whole essence of happiness. Hence, among the opinions cited above the opinion of Scotus—if it was understood in this sense by him—appears less probable. The conclusion is proven: because love alone by itself is not sufficient to satisfy the whole capacity of a human and the whole desire directed towards God. But rather, it of itself, if nothing else is assumed, is suitable for causing the desire for the clear presence or achievement of God himself. Nor is it of itself the efficacious cause of such presence but rather it requires such presence in order to be perfected by it. Which I also show in this way, because all love, even if it is friendship	The second assertion.
Suadetur.	5	5R		It is urged.
10	10	10R		

15 sit amicitiae, ut sit satiat, requirit adeptionem boni amati:
est autem differentia inter amorem concupiscentiae et amicitiae,
quia per concupiscentiam amamus nobis aliquod bonum prop-
rium, ideo consecutio talis boni consistit in reali possessione
20 illius boni, et illa est quae satiat amorem: at vero in amore am-
icitiae amamus alteri bonum ut ei insit, et ideo consecutio talis
boni, et satiety talis amoris videtur in hoc consistere, quod ille,
quem amo, habeat bonum illud, quod illi amo: tamen quia hoc
25 bonum, prout in alio est, non potest satiare diligentem, ideo
satiety talis amoris videtur in hoc consistere, quod clare videat
amatam possidentem omnia illa bona, quae illi appetit: ergo
impossibile est, quod talis amor satiet amantem sine tali vi-
sione: ergo non potest solus ille esse tota essentia beatitudinis,
30 sed necessario requirit consortium visionis, id est, vel tanquam
causam antecedentem ex generali ratione, qua amor supponit
cognitionem, vel tanquam formam suo modo satiantem ipsum
amorem.

15R love, requires the attainment of the loved good in order to be satis-
fied. But there is a difference between concupiscent love and friendship
love, since through concupiscent love we love some good proper to us.
Therefore, the achievement of such a good consists in the real posses-
sion of that good. And that is what satisfies the love. But, on the other
hand, in the case of friendship love we love a good for another so that
it belongs to the other. And, therefore, the achievement of such a good
and the satisfaction of such a love seems to consist in this: that he whom
20R I love have that good which I love to him. Still, since this good, insofar
as it is in another, cannot satisfy the lover, the satisfaction of such a love
seems for that reason to consist in this: that he clearly see the beloved
possessing that good in its entirety which he desires to the beloved.
Therefore, it is impossible that such a love satisfy the lover without
25R such vision. Therefore, that [love] alone cannot be the whole essence
of happiness, but necessarily requires the conjunction of vision, that is,
either as an antecedent cause according to the general reason by which
the love presupposes cognition or as a form in its own way satisfying
the love itself.

3. Assertio,
bipartita. 30 31. Dico tertio, amor charitatis et amicitiae divinas est
simpliciter necessarius, ut homo sit supernaturaliter perfecte
beatus: et absolute dicendus est de essentia ipsius bealitudi-
nis. Prior pars difficultatem non habet, eam enim sufficienter
probant quae adducta sunt in 1, 2, et 4 opinione, et praeterea
ad eam declarandam addi potest doctrina divi Thomae, in 3,
35 <80> distinct. 26, quaest. 2, art. 2, ubi dicit, felicitatem super-
naturalem requirere conjunctionem amicitiae cum Deo; quia
cum illa felicitas non sit connaturalis, oportet ut per charitatem
fiat aliquo modo connaturalis. Deinde addi potest, quod idem
D. Thomas docet, in 1 parte, quaestione 43, articulo 5, ad 2,
40 et in 1, distinctione 14, quaestione 4, articulo 1, ad tertium,
scilicet, cognitionem sine amore gratuito non sufficere ad per-
fectam similitudinem Dei, sed necessarium esse amorem, qui
conjungat hominem Deo cognito secundum rationem conve-
nientiae. Unde, quod attinet ad modum loquendi, multi etiam
45 Thomistae absolute docent, si homo videat Deum, et actu non
amet, suspendente Deo concursu suum, illum hominem non
esse dicendum beatum, non tantum perfecte, sed nec etiam
simpliciter et absolute. Atque hoc expresse docet Soto, in 4,

30R 31. I say, thirdly, that divine charity love and friendship love is
strictly speaking necessary in order for a human to be supernaturally
and perfectly happy. And it should be said absolutely of the essence of
happiness itself. The first part has no difficulty, for those things which
were presented in the first, second, and fourth opinions sufficiently
prove it. Furthermore, in order to show it one can add the doctrine of
35R St. Thomas in III, dist. 26, q. 2, art. 2, where he says that supernatural
happiness requires a conjunction of friendship with God, since when
that felicity is not connatural, it must be made connatural in some way
through charity. Next, what the same St. Thomas teaches in Ia.43.5 ad 2
and in I, dist. 14, q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, can be added, namely, that cognition
without gratuitous love is not enough for perfect similarity to God,
40R but a love which conjoins the human being to God cognized under the
aspect of agreeability is necessary. Hence, what holds to a way of speak-
ing, many of the Thomists also absolutely teach that if a human being
sees God and does not actually love [him], then, as a result of God sus-
pending his concursus, that human being should not be called happy,
not only [not called] perfectly [happy], but also not [called happy]
45R strictly speaking and absolutely. And Soto explicitly teaches this in IV,
dist. 49, q. 1, art. 4, in the last solution to the first argument of the first

The third
assertion, in two
parts.

Whence the first
part is proven.
The doctrine of
St. Thomas
comes up.

50 distinct. 49, quæst. 1, art. 4, in ultima solutione ad 1 primæ
 opinionis: qui tamen rationem insinuat, non quia amor sit formalis
 beatitudo, aut de essentia ejus, sed quia licet visio sit tota
 beatitudo, non tamen beatificat quasi formaliter tantum in-
 hærendo, sed efficiendo, vel causando amorem, *et ideo*, inquit,
 55 *si non actu causat amorem, quamvis de se sit sufficiens beatitudo,*
tamen non actu beatificat. Quod mihi non satisfacit, quia si vi-
 sio non tantum formaliter, sed etiam effective, et radicaliter be-
 atificat, necesse est, ut aliquid aliud præter visionem beatificet
 formaliter, quia necesse est hunc effectum, qui est esse beatum
 formaliter, fieri per aliquam formam: ergo vel illa est sola vi-
 60 sio, et sic amor non erit necessarius, nec erit verum, visionem
 beatificare effective, sed tantum formaliter; vel si effective be-
 atificat, necesse est, quod efficiat aliquid formaliter beatificans,
 id est, omnino, vel ex parte: atque ita non sola visio, sed etiam
 65 amor erit forma beatificans, et consequenter erit de essentia
 beatitudinis formalis, de qua disputatur.

50R opinion. He, nevertheless, suggests the argument not because love is
 formal happiness or of its essence, but because, although vision is the
 whole of happiness, still, it does not make one happy formally, as it
 were, only by inhering [in him] but by effecting or causing love. ‘And
 therefore,’ he says, ‘if it does not actually cause love, it will not actu-
 55R ally make him happy even though it is of itself sufficient happiness.’
 This is not satisfactory to me, since if vision makes one happy not only
 formally but also effectively and as from a root, then it is necessary
 that something else beyond vision make one happy formally, since it
 is necessary that this effect—which is to be happy formally—be made
 60R through some form. Therefore, either that [form] is vision alone (and
 in that case love will not be necessary and neither will it be true that
 vision makes one happy effectively but only formally) or, if it makes
 one happy effectively, it is necessary that it effect something that for-
 mally makes one happy, that is, either wholly or in part.¹⁴ And in that
 65R case it is not vision alone but also the love that will be the form that
 makes one happy. And consequently it will be of the essence of formal
 happiness, which is what is in dispute.

32. But others says that vision alone does not make one happy
 without love, not because love is part of essential formal happiness, but
 70R because it is a necessary condition without which vision will not have
 the nature of comprehension and as a result will also not have the na-
 ture of making one happy. But this argument, whatever it is, whether
 75R it can be applied to concupiscent love or is inadmissible (concerning
 which we will speak later), nevertheless cannot have a place in the case
 of friendship love. For this love does not concur nor is it aimed at in
 happiness only on account of vision or as its condition, namely, as that
 is in some perfect state, but *per se* as it is a certain perfect connection
 with the ultimate end, ultimate in its order and maximally desirable for
 80R its own sake and formally bestowing some perfection with respect to
 the ultimate end which it attains immediately, which is not conferred
 by vision nor by any other act and without which the ultimate per-
 fection of the human being would be greatly diminished and halved as
 it were. And this is the reason (so that we approach the second part
 of the assertion) which compelled me to say that this love not only is
 85R necessary but also is of the essence of this happiness. Soto in the end

Effugium.

32. Sed dicunt alii, visionem solam non beatificare sine
 amore, non quia amor sit pars essentialis formalis beatitudi-
 nis, sed quia est conditio necessaria, sine qua visio non habebit
 70 rationem comprehensionis, et consequenter nec rationem be-
 atificantis. Sed hæc ratio, quidquid sit, an applicari possit ad
 amorem concupiscentiæ, vel inamissibilitatem, de quibus infra
 dicemus: tamen in amore amicitæ non potest habere locum:
 quia hic amor non concurrat, nec petitur in beatitudine, solum
 75 propter visionem, seu ut conditio ejus, nimirum ut
 ille sit in aliquo perfecto statu, sed per se ut est perfecta quæ-
 dam connexio cum ultimo fine, ultima in suo ordine et propter
 se maxime appetibilis, et formaliter tribuens perfectionem ali-
 quam respectu ultimi finis, quem immediate attingit, quam
 80 non confert visio, nec aliquis alius actus, et sine qua hominis ul-
 tima perfectio esset valde diminuta et quasi dimidiata. Et hæc
 est ratio (ut ad secundam partem assertionis accedamus) quæ
 me cogit ut dicam, hunc amorem non solum esse necessarium,
 sed etiam esse de essentia hujus beatitudinis, quod tandem sub

Præcluditur.

Probatur 2. pars
 eiusdem asser.

A way of escape.

It is precluded.

The second part
 of the same
 assertion is
 proven.

¹⁴Is there a missing negation in this sentence?

85 his terminis concessit Soto, in illa d. 49, quæst. 3, art. 4, et quod
 90 amplius est D. Thomas in materia 1, 2, quæst. 4, art. 8, ad 3,
 aperte dicit, perfectionem charitatis quantum ad dilectionem
 Dei esse essentialem beatitudini: vocat autem perfectionem
 95 charitatis ipsum actum perfectæ dilectionis Dei, nam de hoc ibi
 disputat, differentiam ponens inter illum et dilectionem prox-
 100 imi; et quæst. 1, art. 8, dixit creaturam rationalem consequi
 suum finem ultimum cognoscendo et amando Deum. Denique
 locus supra citatus ex 2, 2, videtur etiam expressus: quæ loca
 nobis aperiunt viam ad explicandam doctrinam, quam habet
 in 1, 2, quæst. 3, ne sibi videatur contrarias: solum enim in-
 95 tendit, ut existimo, beatitudinem non posse consummari in
 sola voluntate, et id quod est veluti omnino proprium beatitu-
 dinis, debere potius ad intellectum pertinere, quam ad volun-
 100 tatem: et ideo 3, contra Gentes, cap. 26, ubi hoc fusius disputat,
 sæpe explicat beatitudinem principaliter ac magis esse in intel-
 lectu, quam in voluntate: cum vero ait beatitudinem consistere
 in contemplatione, idem D. Thomas, quæst. 22, de Veritate,
 art. 11, ad 11, explicuit, cum est sermo de contemplatione non
 105 excludi amorem et citat Gregorium, homil. decima quarta, in
 Exod., quod est notandum ad explicanda varia sanctorum dicta
 in numero septimo adducta.

33. Tandem ut simul omnibus objectionibus satisfaciamus,
 cum amor amicitiae divinæ habeat omnia quæ diximus, quæ ra-
 tio afferri potest cur non sit de essentia beatitudinis? Respon-
 110 dent primo, quia est indifferens ad viam et beatitudinem: nec
 enim satisfacere videtur quod supra ex Scoto dicebatur amorem
 cum tali modo esse proprium beatitudinis, quia si amor est de
 essentia, necesse est non solum modum amoris, sed etiam sub-
 stantiam esse de essentia beatitudinis: sed hoc esse non potest,
 quia substantia amoris est indiffe- <81> rens ad beatitudinem,
 115 et non beatitudinem. Deinde respondeo, hanc potius rationem
 convincere hunc amorem, etiam quoad substantiam suam, esse
 de essentia beatitudinis, quamvis in illo solo non possit beat-
 itudo consistere; quia sive videatur Deus, sive non videatur,
 prima et maxime necessaria perfectio ad debitum hominis sta-

108 beatitudinis?] beatitudinis. V.

concedes this under these terms in that dist. 49, q. 3, art. 4. And, what
 is more, St. Thomas treats in the matter of IaIIæ.4.8 ad 3 clearly says
 that the perfection of charity with respect to the love of God is essen-
 tial to happiness. But he calls the perfection of charity that very act
 90R of the perfect love of God, for he there disputes concerning this mat-
 ter, placing a difference between the love of God and the love of one's
 neighbour. And in q. 1, art. 8, he says that a rational creature pursues
 his ultimate end by cognizing and loving God. Finally, the place cited
 above from IIaIIæ also seems explicit. These places disclose to us a way
 95R of explaining the doctrine which he has in IaIIæ.3, lest he seem to con-
 tradict himself. For he only intends, as I think, that happiness cannot
 be brought to perfection in the will alone that which is just as wholly
 belonging to happiness ought rather to belong to the intellect than the
 will. And for that reason in SCG III, cap. 26, where he disputes this at
 100R greater length, he often explains that happiness is principally and to a
 greater extend in the intellect than in the will. But when he says that
 happiness consists in contemplation, the same St. Thomas explains in
De Veritate q. 22, art. 11, ad 11, that although the discussion is about
 contemplation love is not excluded. And he cites Gregory, fourteenth
 105R homily on Exod., which should be noted for explaining the various
 statements from the saints presented in n. 7.

33. Finally, so that we may satisfy satisfy all the objections at the
 same time, since divine friendship love has everything which we said,
 what reason can be provided for why it would not be of the essence
 of happiness? They respond, first: because it is indifferent to the way
 110R and to happiness. For it does not seem to satisfy what was said above
 according to Scotus that love with such a mode is proper to happiness,
 since if love is of the essence, then it necessarily is not only a mode of
 love. But substance is also of the essence of happiness. But this cannot
 be, because the substance of love is indifferent between happiness and
 not happiness. I then respond that this argument rather convinces [me]
 115R that this love even with respect to its substance is of the essence of hap-
 piness, although happiness cannot consist in it alone. For whether God
 is seen or not seen, first and foremost, the necessary perfection for the
 appropriate state of a human being with respect to God is conjunction

St. Thomas is explained according to the third view alleged in n. 6.

The last argument for the same second part. One evasion from this argument.

It does not prevail.

120	tum respectu Dei est conjunctio cum illo per hunc amorem: ergo signum est hunc actum esse propter se et propter perfectionem sui objecti maxime necessariam homini, ut in quolibet statu sit beatus, juxta uniuscujusque status capacitatem: nec est ullum inconueniens quod aliqua perfectio possibilis in statu	125R	with him through this love. Therefore, it is a sign that this act is for its own sake and for the sake of the perfection of its object especially necessary for a human being, so that in any state he is happy according to the capacity of each state. Nor is it at all disagreeable that some perfection possible in the state of this life is of the essence of the happiness of the homeland, since that happiness of the homeland does not exclude the perfection of live but the imperfections. And perhaps for this reason St. Thomas in the cited place from IaIIæ did not remember love, since he considered it, as it were, a general perfection necessary and essential in every state and only expressed that it is proper and, as it were, specific to that happiness.	
125	viæ, sit de essentia beatitudinis patriæ, quia illa beatitudo patriæ non excludit perfectionem vitæ, sed imperfectiones: et ideo fortassis D. Thomas, citato loco 1 secundæ, non meminit amoris, quia existimavit, illum esse quasi generalem perfectionem in omni statu necessariam et essentialem, et illud tantum declaravit, quod est proprium et quasi specificum illius beatitudinis.	130R		
Altera evasio.	34. Alii extrema quadam ratione respondent illum amorem non esse de essentia, quia non est de solo Deo immediate, sed de Deo viso, unde supponit Deum jam consecutum, ut sic dicam, et obtentum. Sed hæc est aperta æquivocatio; nam licet hic amor supponat Deum visum, tamen pro objecto per se, et proximo, ac directe solum habet Deum, qui proponitur per visionem tanquam per necessariam conditionem, quod nihil obstat quominus amor sit immediata conjunctio cum solo Deo formaliter, ac realiter distincta ab ea, quæ est per visionem, et per se expetibilis, et non solum propter visionem.		34. Others by a kind of extreme of reason respond that this love is not of the essence because it is not immediately about God alone but about God as seen. Hence, it assumes that God has already been attained and obtained (if I may speak in this way). But this is clearly an equivocation. For although this love assumes God as seen, still, it only has God as an object <i>per se</i> , proximately, and directly. God is proposed through vision as through a necessary condition, which does not prevent the love from formally being an immediate union with God alone, really distinct from that which is through vision and <i>per se</i> desirable and not only for the sake of vision.	An another evasion.
Refellitur.	135	135R	135R	It is refuted.
140	140R	140R		
Tertia evasio.	35. Tandem dicunt alii, amorem resultare ex visione, et ideo non posse habere rationem essentiæ, sed potius passionis: atque ita qui haberet solam visionem sine amore, dicendum fore beatum essentialiter, quia quasi in fonte, et radice haberet totam perfectionem amoris. Sed hoc etiam nullo modo probari potest, quia hæc dilectio solum supponit visionem ut conditionem sine qua non: vel ad summum, per modum principii efficientis partialis, juxta varias opiniones de modo quo actus intellectus requiritur ad actum voluntatis: hoc autem nihil obstat quominus perfectio illa, quam formaliter confert amor, sit valde distincta a perfectione quam confert visio, et in suo genere sit ultima, et maxime necessaria ad debitam conjunctionem cum fine ultimo, unde sub ea <col. b> ratione, qua visio est principium amoris, comparatur ad illum ut actus primus	145R	145R	A third evasion.
Improbatur.	150	150R	150R	It is disproven.
155	155R	155R	155R	

135 obtentum. Sed] obtentum, sed V.

	ad secundum et ultimum: et ideo non potest esse satis ad formalem beatitudinem habere amorem solum in tali radice, quia beatitudo non consistit in actu primo, sed secundo: sicut qui haberet lumen gloriæ, et Deum unitum per modum speciei, jam haberet visionem in radice, et tamen non esset beatus formaliter, quia solum haberet actum primum et non secundum: sicut autem comparatur lumen ad visionem, quoad conjunctionem cum ultimo fine, quæ fit per intellectum: ita comparatur visio ad amorem quoad conjunctionem, quæ fit cum eodem ultimo fine per amorem in voluntate: et ideo sicut sine visione actuali non esset inchoata essentia beatitudinis per solum lumen, vel speciem: ita sine actuali amore non esset consummata per solam visionem, nec in his rebus, quarum essentia consurgit ex proportionem plurium, est inconveniens, quod una pars essentiæ causetur in aliquo genere ab aliqua altera. Quod patet exemplis manifestis: nam in substantiis materialibus materia et forma, quæ sunt partes substantiales et essentielles compositi, habent inter se causalitatem, et materia necessario supponitur formæ. Inter accidentia, etiam necessaria ad perfectam dispositionem seu temperamentum alicujus rei potest facile intelligi causalitas, seu ordo per se, ut inter calorem, vel raritatem, vel siccitatem: et magis theologice Fides et Caritas sunt per se necessariæ ad justitiam viæ, et caritas est quasi forma essentialis, quamvis necessario supponat fidem. Et ratio generalis est, quia non est contra rationem essentiæ totius, quod partes inter se habeant per se ordinem et connexionem: sic igitur quamvis inter amorem et visionem beatificam sit hujusmodi ordo, quod amor supponit visionem velut conditionem necessariam, vel ut causam efficientem, nihilominus potest amor pertinere ad essentiam beatitudinis, quia formaliter constituit hominem in sua ultima perfectione, non solus ille, sed simul cum visione.		
160		160R	
165		165R	
Accedunt exempla.	170	170R	Examples are brought up.
	175	175R	
Et ratio generalis.	180	180R	And a general reason.
	185	185R	
4. Assertio bimembris.	190		The fourth assertion, in two parts.
Expeditur posterius membrum.		190R	The latter part is explained.
			not be enough for formal happiness to have love alone in such a root, since happiness does not consist a first act but in a second act, just as he who has the light of glory and is united to God <i>per modum speciei</i> already has the vision in root and yet is not formally happy since he only has the first act and not the second. Also, just as light is related to vision with respect to union with the ultimate end which comes about through the intellect, so also is vision related to love with respect to the union which comes about with the same ultimate end through love in the will. And for that reason just as without vision there would be no inchoate essence of happiness through light or species alone, so also without actual love there would be no consummated [essence of happiness] through vision alone. Nor is it unsuitable that in these things out of which the essence arises from a proportion of multiple things one part of the essence is caused in one genus from some other [genus]. This is clear from obvious examples. For in material substances matter and form, which are substantial and essential parts of the composite, have causality between themselves and matter is necessarily assumed of the form. Between accidents, even [ones] necessary for the complete disposition and orderly arrangement of some thing, a causality or <i>per se</i> order can easily be understood, as between heat, rareness, and dryness. And, more theologically, faith and charity are <i>per se</i> necessary for the justice of the way and charity is, as it were, the essential form although it necessarily presupposes faith. And the general reason is that it is not contrary to the nature of the whole essence that the parts have an order and connection between themselves. Thus, therefore, although there is an order of this kind between love and the beatific vision (that love presupposes vision as a necessary condition or as an efficient cause), nevertheless, love can belong to the essence of happiness, since it formally places a human being in his ultimate perfection, not it alone but at the same time with vision.
			36. I say, fourthly, that properly concupiscent love is not strictly speaking necessary for objective or formal happiness nor for the essence of happiness. Still, it can be found in that as a secondary perfection of it. This latter part is not lacking for evidence, since such an act is good in its genus and appropriate to nature and does not include imperfection repugnant to happiness. Therefore, it can be found in it. I will say

Expeditur prius. 195 itudini: potest ergo in eo reperiri: de quo plura dicam infra, disputatione 9, <82> sect. 2. Prior vero pars facile etiam patet ex dictis supra in secunda et tertia opinione, ubi ostendimus amorem concupiscentiæ semper ordinari ad aliam actionem quæ sit consecutio boni concupiti: hinc ergo consequitur illum non posse habere rationem ultimi finis, nec objectivi, nec formalis, et consequenter nec beatitudinis totalis aut partialis. 200

Objectio contra 4. assertionem. 205

37. Sed occurrit difficultas sumpta ex testimoniis Augustini supra citati, num. 16, ubicumque enim requirit amorem ad beatitudinem præcipue, videtur loqui de amore concupiscentiæ, quo aliquis appetit se esse beatum, et amat possessionem illius boni quo existimat se fore beatum: et sic dicit beatum esse, qui habet omnia, quæ vult, et frui esse præsto habere quod diligit, quod pertinet ad amorem proprii commodi, ex quo constat, ut dixit etiam Anselmus. Propter quam difficultatem dixerunt aliqui amorem concupiscentiæ, quamvis directe per se non sit de essentia, nec pars essentiæ beatitudinis, esse tamen simpliciter necessarium, ut et homo possit simpliciter beatus appellari, et ipsa visio, vel quilibet alius actus possit habere rationem beatificæ consecutionis, quia est veluti dispositio necessaria ex parte subjecti, ut sit capax actualis beatitudinis et conditio necessaria ex parte objecti, ut possit obtineri per modum finis, et objecti beatificantis. Quod explicatur exemplo falsæ beatitudinis: nam possessio divitiarum, verbi gratia, non potest beatificare hominem etiam falsa et apparenti beatitudine, nisi intelligamus talem hominem amare sibi divitias ut ultimum finem suum: posito autem hoc amore, illa possessio intelligitur habere rationem beatitudinis respectu talis hominis, quia est terminus desideriorum ejus, et satietas amoris illius. Unde eademmet possessio sine amore non habet rationem consecutionis, et cum amore habet illam propter dispositionem subjecti, quæ redundat in conditionem objecti, quod possidetur vel ut res quædam tantum, vel ut summum bonum, et finis ultimus: sic ergo proportionali ratione intelligi potest in vera beatitudine, nam visio, verbi gratia, non habet quod sit consecutio formaliter beatifica, ex hoc præcise quod visio est: nam 220

D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 4, in ea distinguit has duas rationes, et similiter 1 p., quæst. 12, art. 7, ad 1, et in 1, d. 1, q. 1, ubi dicit 225

195R more things about this below in disp. 9, sec. 2. But the former part is also easily clear from what was said in the second and third opinions, where we showed that concupiscent love is always ordered to another action which is the attainment of the good for the one desiring. From this, therefore, it follows that the former cannot have the nature of the ultimate end, whether objective or formal, and consequently neither of complete or partial happiness.

200R 37. But a difficulty occurs that is taken from the testimony of Augustine cited above in n. 16, for wherever he especially requires love for happiness, he seems to talk about the concupiscent love by which someone desires himself to be happy and loves the possession of that good by which he thinks he will be happy. And so he says that someone is happy who has everything that he wants and has ready to hand to enjoy what he loves, which pertains to the love for proper advantage, by which it is clear, as Anselm also says. On account of this difficulty, some said that concupiscent love, although directly and *per se* is not of the essence of happiness nor a part of the essence, is, nevertheless, strictly speaking necessary so that a human being can even be called happy, strictly speaking, and [so that] vision itself, or whatever other act can have the nature of beatific achievement, [can be called happy], since it is as if a necessary disposition on the part of the subject so that he is capable of actual happiness and a necessary condition on the part of the object so that it can be obtained in the mode of an end and of a happy-making object. This is explained by an example of false happiness. For the possession of riches, for example, cannot make a human being happy even by a false and seeming happiness, except we understand such a human being to love riches for himself as his ultimate end. But once this love has been posited, that possession is understood to have the nature of happiness with respect to such a human, since it is the *terminus* of his desires and the satisfaction of his love. Hence, the very same possession without the love does not have the nature of attainment and with the love it has that on account of the disposition of the subject which overflows into the condition of the object which can be possessed either as some thing only or as the highest good and ultimate end. Therefore, in the case of true happiness it can be understood in the same way by proportional reason, for vision, for example, does not have what is formally the beatific attainment from the fact alone that it is vision. For St. Thomas in [*ST*] IaIIæ.4 distinguishes in it these 205R 210R 215R 220R 225R

The former part is explained.

An objection against the fourth assertion.

consecutionem sequi ex visione: visio ergo ut visio tantum
 respicit objectum ut intelligibile, ut consecutio vero respicit
 ut summum bonum, et finem ultimum. Item, ut visio solum
 235 respicit <col. b> intellectum, ut consecutio vero respicit etiam
 voluntatem, quia satiat affectum ejus. Unde dici solet voluntas,
 consequi non tantum per seipsam, sed etiam, per intellectum,
 quia actus ab illa elicitus non sufficit ad satiandam illam sine
 240 actu intellectus: hæc autem omnia supponunt in voluntate af-
 fectum propriæ beatitudinis, et summi boni sui, qui est amor
 concupiscentiæ: ergo sine hoc non potest homo intelligi bea-
 tus, nec beatifice consequi, aut tenere aliquod bonum. Juxta
 245 amorem, quia est aliquo modo causa ejus: tamen in ratione
 consecutionis, et formæ actualiter beatificantis esse posteri-
 orem secundum rationem, quia sub hac ratione antecedit amor
 in genere dispositionis ex parte subjecti necessarii, ut beatifi-
 cari possit. Unde tandem fit visionem non constituere beatum
 250 solum veluti physice inhærendo intellectui, sed simul veluti ob-
 jective, satiando amorem.

Dilutio
 præcedentis
 objectionis.

38. Hæc doctrina aliquando probabilis mihi visa est, nunc
 tamen non videtur necessaria, et verius judico eum, qui haberet
 visionem, et amorem amicitiae, etiamsi nullam actum alium
 255 amoris concupiscentiæ habere intelligatur, esse simpliciter bea-
 tum essentialiter, quia revera est conjunctus huic ultimo fini
 perfecto modo, quantum propter ipsum ultimate conjungi
 necesse est, et in hoc consistit ratio beatitudinis: habet enim
 260 rationem termini et finis ultimi. Deinde tam ad intentionem
 Augustini quam ad reliqua omnia sufficit amor amicitiae Dei;
 Augustinus enim non loquitur specialiter de amore concupis-
 centiæ, sed simpliciter de amore boni beatificantis; intelligit
 enim hunc amorem debere esse proportionatum tali bono; in
 265 falsa enim beatitudine, quia bonum est imperfectum, et per se
 non habet quod sit finis hominis, sed ex sola intentione ipsius
 hominis ordinantis potius tam bonum ad se, quam se ad ip-

239–240 affectum] effectum V.

257 ipsum] om. V.

two aspects. And similarly in I, q. 12, art. 7, ad 1, and in I, dist. 1, q. 1,
 where he says that attainment follows from vision. Vision as vision
 alone, therefore, concerns the object as intelligible, but as attainment
 it concerns [the object] as the highest good and ultimate end. Also, as
 vision alone it concerns the intellect, but as attainment it also concerns
 235R the will since it satisfies its affect. Hence, it is usually said that the will
 seeks not only through itself but also through the intellect, because the
 act elicited by it does not suffice for satisfying it apart from an act of
 intellect. But all these presuppose in the will an affect for one's own
 happiness and one's highest good, which [affect] is concupiscent love.
 240R Therefore, without this a human being cannot be understood as happy
 or as happily pursuing or holding some good. Another discussion fol-
 lows on this one: although vision as cognition or a kind of knowledge
 precedes the mentioned love in the order of nature, since it is in some
 way its cause. Nevertheless, in the nature of attainment and of the form
 that actually makes happy it is posterior according to its nature, since
 245R under this nature love precedes in the genus of disposition on the part
 of the necessary subject so that it can make one happy. Hence, finally,
 it turns out that vision does not constitute happiness only physically by
 inhering in the intellect, but at the same time objectively by satisfying
 250R love.

38. This doctrine at one point seemed probable to me, but now it
 does not seem necessary and I judge it more likely to be true that he
 who has the vision and friendship love—even if he is not understood to
 have any other act of concupiscent love—is essentially happy, strictly
 255R speaking, because he really is united with this ultimate end in a perfect
 way, insofar as on account of this it is necessary to be ultimately united
 and the nature of happiness consists in this. For it has the nature of
 a *terminus* and ultimate end. Next, friendship love for God suffices
 according to the intention of Augustine as according to all the others.
 260R For Augustine does not speak specifically about concupiscent love, but,
 strictly speaking, about love for the good that makes one happy. For
 he understands that this love ought to be proportionate to such a good.
 For in false happiness—since the good is imperfect and does not *per se*
 have that which is the end for a human being, but by the intention alone
 265R of the human being himself who is more ordering the good to himself

The preceding
 objection is
 washed away.

sum bonum, ideo amor ibi concurrrens est concupiscentiæ, et
 necesse est ut antecedit totam falsam illam felicitatem. At vero
 in solida, ac vera felicitate, de qua agimus, bonum beatificans
 270 est perfectissimum, et per se maxime amabile, et natura sua est
 ultimus finis hominis in quem debet homo et omnia sua, et se 270R
 referre: et ideo amor per se necessarius in hac beatitudine non
 est nisi amor amicitiae.

Enucleatur
 amplius hæc
 dilutio.

39. Deinde hoc amore amicitiae amat homo perfecte suam
 275 beatitudinem objectivam, et præterea saltem virtute amat suam
 beatitudi- <83> nem formalem, quia hoc ipso quod amat 275R
 Deum, amat amare Deum, quia ipsemet amor intrinsece est
 voluntarius, et consequenter aliquo modo volitus per reflex-
 ionem ibi virtute inclusam. Unde etiam fit, ut virtute amet
 280 ipsam visionem vel quatenus intelligitur necessaria ad amorem
 conditio, vel quatenus est perfecta unio ad amicum, quam 280R
 amor amicitiae maxime cupit: ac denique fit, ut amando Deum
 ut ultimum finem, seipsum virtute amet, non sibi, sed Deo:
 ergo etiamsi demus, amorem propriae beatitudinis esse aliquo
 285 modo necessarium ad beatificam consecutionem, prædictus
 amor sufficit. Quod vero hic amor sit per proprium actum
 distinctum et specialem, et præsertim quod sit ex motivo prop-
 rii commodi, potest quidem pertinere ad quamdam perfec-
 tionis extensionem; non vero est cur sit simpliciter necessarius
 290 ad beatitudinem essentialem, nec satis intelligitur quomodo
 visio, et amor amicitiae non habeant rationem consecutionis be-
 atificaei absque amore concupiscentiae, et quod eo posito illam
 habeat, cum tamen hujusmodi amor nec sit pars consecutionis,
 nec intrinsece illam constituat, nec componat, ut ostensum est:
 295 nam id, quod dicitur de conditione necessaria ex parte objecti,
 vel de dispositione ex parte subjecti, revera non satisfacit, quia
 hoc totum nihil addit prioribus actibus, nisi denominationem
 extrinsecam, vel in objecto, vel in actibus ipsis, quæ parum re-
 ferre videntur ut tales actus habeant, vel non habeant rationem
 300 consecutionis. Quod probatur, quia objectio nihil addit,
 nisi quod sit amatum tali amore concupiscentiae, quæ in eo tantum
 est denominatio extrinseca, nihilque perfectionis ei additur, ut
 ea ratione possit vel non possit beatificare: nam visio ex parte 300R

than himself to the good—for that reason the love concurring here is
 concupiscent love and it is necessary that it precede that whole false
 felicity. But on the other hand in the case of lasting and true felicity
 which we are talking about, the good that makes one happy is most
 perfect and most lovable *per se* and is by its nature the ultimate end for
 a human being to which he ought to refer himself and everything that
 belongs to him. And for this reason love is not *per se* necessary for this
 happiness except friendship love.

39. Next, a human being perfectly loves his objective happiness
 with this friendship love and in addition he at least virtually loves his
 formal happiness, since by the very fact that he loves God he loves
 to love God, since the love itself is intrinsically voluntary and conse-
 quently in some way is willed through a reflection virtually included
 here. Hence it is also the case that he virtually loves the vision itself
 either insofar as it is understood as a necessary condition for the love or
 insofar as it is a perfect union with the friend for whom the friendship
 love eagerly longs. And finally it is also the case that in love God as
 his ultimate end he virtually loves himself, not for himself but for God.
 Therefore, even if we granted that love for one's happiness is in some
 way necessary for beatific attainment, the aforementioned love suffices.
 But that this love is through a proper act distinct and special and espe-
 cially that it comes from a motive for one's own advantage can indeed
 pertain to a certain extension of perfection. But this is not why it is
 strictly speaking necessary for essential happiness nor is it sufficiently
 understood why vision and friendship love do not have the nature of
 beatific attainment apart from concupiscent love but why it does when
 the latter has been posited, since, nevertheless, a love of this kind is not
 a part of attainment nor does it intrinsically set it up or compose it, as
 was shown. For that which is said about the necessary condition on
 the part of the object or about the disposition on the part of the subject
 does not really satisfy, since this whole thing adds nothing to the prior
 acts except an extrinsic denomination either in the object or in the acts
 themselves, which seem to refer too little for such acts to have or not
 to have the nature of attainment. This is proven because the objection
 adds nothing except what is loved by such a concupiscent love which
 is only an extrinsic denomination in that and adds nothing of perfec-
 tion to it. For vision by its own part does not make one happy because
 through it I see that God is loved by me but because I see him to be so

This washing
 away is explained
 more fully.

305 sua non beatificat, quia per eam video Deum esse amatum a
me, sed quia video ipsum in se talem esse, nam videre esse amatum
idem fere est, quod videre meum actum ut terminatum
ad ipsum: meus autem actus non est objectum, nec pars objecti
beatificantis.

Evasioni satisfit.

40. Dices, non beatificare quidem visionem Dei amati,
quia amatus esse cognoscitur, requirere tamen hanc condi-
tionem, quo amatus sit: sicut etiam in suo genere beatificat
amor Dei visi, non quia ipsa visio sit pars objecti, sed quia
5 est conditio necessaria. Respondetur tamen non esse simile
nam visio prærequiritur ex generali ratione amoris, seu ap-
petitus eliciti, ut approximatio objecti, vel causa necessaria ad
amorem: at vero e contrario amor non est per se necessarius ad
visionem, et ideo <col. b> si non concurrat ut objectum ejus,
10 vel ut constituens cum illa unam integram consecutionem finis
ultimi, non est, cur ex parte objecti sit conditio necessaria, ut
visio habeat rationem consecutionis, præsertim cum objectum
ejus ex se sit finis ultimus, et summum bonum hominis. Atque
eadem ratio fieri potest de amore amicitiae, quod non pendeat
15 ab amore concupiscentiae, nec requirat illum ut conditionem
ex parte objecti necessariam, ut in suo genere sit conjunctio
cum ultimo fine sufficiens ad beatificandum: ac denique idem
argumentum fieri potest de dispositione ex parte subjecti: cur
enim necesse est quod sit actu amans ex intentione proprii
20 commodi? nam licet non amet hoc modo, tamen revera amat
hoc maximum bonum, et illi perfecte conjungitur illud, quod
possidet, et ille alius amor imperfectus, et concupiscentiae, ref-
erendus est in eundem ultimum finem dilectum amore amici-
tiae, ut perfecto modo habeatur; ergo per se non est simpliciter
25 necessarius.

Satisfit amplius.

41. Unde aliter addo, etiam visionem ipsam secundum se,
ut antecedit omnem amorem, esse saltem partialem consecu-
tionem Dei, ut est supremum objectum intelligibile, et ulti-
mum, in quod potest tendere intellectualis natura per supre-
30 mam operationem suam: addito autem amore amicitiae perfici-
tur essentialiter conjunctio cum ultimo fine, et visio solum re-
cipit denominationem seu habitudinem ad voluntatem, quia
satiat ostendendo illi in re amata omne bonum, quod illi amat,

305R great in himself. For to see that what is loved exists is almost the same
as to see my act as terminated in what is loved. My act, moreover, is
not the object nor is it part of the object that makes one happy.

40. You may say that the vision of God as loved does indeed make
one happy because the one loved is cognized, yet it requires this condi-
tion where the one loved exists just as in its genus the love of God seen
also makes one happy, not because the vision itself is part of the object
5R but because it is a necessary condition. Nevertheless, it is responded
that it is not similar. For vision is a prerequisite as a result of the gen-
eral nature of love or elicited desire, as an approach of the object or a
necessary cause for the love. But on the other hand, conversely, love is
not *per se* necessary for vision and for that reason, if it does not concur
10R as its object or as constituting with it one integral attainment of the ulti-
mate end, it is not the reason why it is a necessary condition on the part
of the object, as vision has the nature of attainment, at least when its
object of itself is the ultimate end and highest good for a human being.
And the same argument can be made concerning friendship love, that
it does not depend on concupiscent love nor require it as a necessary
15R condition on the part of the object, so that in its genus union with the
ultimate end is sufficient for making one happy. And, finally, the same
argument can be made concerning the disposition on the part of the
subject. For why is it necessary that he is actually loving from an inten-
20R tion for his own advantage? For although he does not love in this way,
still he really loves this highest good and what he possesses is perfectly
united with him and that other imperfect love, even concupiscent love,
ought to be referred to the same ultimate end loved with a friendship
love in order for it to be had in a perfect way. Therefore, it is not *per se*
25R and strictly speaking necessary.

He satisfies the
evasion.

41. Hence, I add in a different way that vision itself according to it-
self as it precedes every love is also at least a partial attainment of God as
he is the supreme and ultimate intelligible object to which intellectual
nature can tend through its highest action. Moreover, once friendship
love has been added the union with the ultimate end is essentially per-
30R fected and the vision only receives a denomination or habitude to the
will, since vision satisfies it by showing every good thing in the things
that is loved which it loves in it. And thus from both acts one complete

He satisfies it
more fully.

	et ita ex utroque actu sufficienter resultat una completa essentia formalis beatitudinis.		essence of formal happiness sufficiently results.	
5. Assertio.	35 42. Ultimo dicendum est, delectationem, seu gaudium, prout est actus, seu res distincta ab amore amicitiae Dei secundum se, non esse de essentia beatitudinis, sed esse proprietatem per se ac necessario consequentem ipsam. Hæc est sententia	35R	42. Lastly, it should be said that delight or joy, insofar as it is an act or thing distinct from the friendship love for God after himself is not of the essence of happiness but is a property that <i>per se</i> and necessarily follows it. This is the view of St. Thomas in [<i>ST</i>] IaIIæ.3.4 and 4.1 and of Scotus in II, dist. 49, q. 7. But in order for this to be understood, it should be noted that this joy of charity can be understood in two way.	The fifth assertion.
Eius unus sensus expeditur.	40 D. Thomæ, 1, 2, q. 3, art. 4, et q. 4, art. 1 et 2, Scoti, dist. 49, q. 7. Ut autem intelligatur, advertendum est, dupliciter intelligi posse hoc gaudium charitatis: primo, quod sit tantum complacentia quædam de bonis, et perfectionibus, quas Deus in se habet, ita ut totum objectum hujus gaudii sit Deus, et bonum increatum, quod in ipso est. Et hoc modo existimo gaudium non distingui re ab illo amore amicitiae, quo diligitur Deus propter se, quia, ut Aristoteles dixit, amare aliquem est velle alicui bonum: complacere autem de bono divino nihil aliud est quam velle ut illud habeat et possideat: ergo non potest esse ille actus res distincta ab amore. <84> De qua re dicturi sumus plura, disp. 9, sect. 3, quapropter hoc gaudium sub hac ratione consideratum ita pertinet ad essentiam beatitudinis, sicut ipse amor amicitiae: et hoc etiam probant et confirmant, quæ in secunda opinione adducta sunt.	40R	40R First, that it is only a certain pleasure taken in the goods and perfections which God has in himself, so that in that way the whole object of this joy is God and the uncreated good that is in him. And I think that in this way joy is not really distinguished from that friendship love by which God is loved for his own sake. For, as Aristotle said, to love someone is to wish good to him. But to take pleasure in the divine good is nothing other than to wish that he have and possess that. Therefore, this act cannot be a thing distinct from the love. We will say more about this matter in disp. 9, sect. 3, about why this joy considered under this aspect thus pertains to the essence of happiness, just as friendship love itself does. And those things that were adduced in the second opinion also prove and confirm this.	One sense of it is explained.
Sensus alter intentus proponitur.	55 43. Alio ergo modo potest intelligi in beatis, quod est gaudium seu delectatio consequens ad ipsas operationes videndi et amandi Deum: sunt enim illæ natura sua jucundissimæ, quomodo dixit Aristoteles 10, Ethicorum, cap. 7: <i>Arbitramur voluptatem felicitati admixtam esse oportere</i> : et de eadem voluptate dixerat ibi, cap. 4, quod perficit operationem ut quidam finis resultans, sicut pulchritudo perficit juventutem. De hac delectatione intelligitur conclusio posita, et ita facile patet ejus ratio ex dictis: primo quidem, quia, ut divus Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 3, dixit, hujusmodi voluptas supponit finem jam perfecte adeptum, et inde ipsa resultat et consequitur. Secundo, quia, ut Aristoteles dixit 1, Ethicor., cap. 6 et 7, finis perfectus est, qui tantum est propter se: talis autem finis est felicitas: hæc vero delectatio non tam est propter se, quam propter operationem, ut recte docuit D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 4, art. 2, et latius 3, contra Gentes, capite 26. Unde delectatio ex operatione habet, quod sit honesta, et quod se-	55R	43. Now, what the joy or delight following the actions of seeing and loving God is in the happy can be understood in another way. For they are by their own nature most pleasing just as Aristotle said in <i>EN</i> X, cap. 7: ‘We judge that pleasure must be mixed with felicity.’ And concerning the same pleasure he said here in cap. 4 that it perfects activity as a kind of resulting end just as beauty perfects youth. The posited conclusion is understood concerning this delight and thus its nature is easily clear from what was said. First, indeed, because, as St. Thomas said in IaIIæ.3, pleasure of this kind presupposes an end already perfectly secured; it results from and follows on that. Secondly, because, as Aristotle said in <i>EN</i> I, cap. 6 and 7, an end is perfect which is only for its own sake. But felicity is such an end. But this delight is not so much for its own sake as for the sake of activity, as St. Thomas rightly teaches in IaIIæ.4.2 and more thoroughly in <i>SCG</i> III, cap. 26. Hence, delight has from activity what is honest and what can be loved according to right reason. Therefore, the nature of the formal ultimate end does not fit it, but neither does it seem <i>per se</i> first intended by the one seeing	The other intended sense is proposed.
Probatur 1.	60	60R	60R	The first proof.
Secundo.	65	65R	65R	The second.
	70			

<p>cundum rectam rationem amari possit: ergo non convenit illi ratio ultimi finis formalis, quin potius nec videtur per se primo intenta a vidente et amante Deum, sed quasi resultans ex tali operatione: propter quod Scotus et alii censent, hujusmodi voluptatem non esse actionem, sed meram passionem voluptatis. Tertio denique, quia hujusmodi gaudium non versatur immediate circa solum Deum in se, sed circa operationem, per quam beatus jungitur Deo, quia, ut dixi, non est tantum de bonis ipsius Dei in se: ergo est de conjunctione cum ipso Deo, quæ fit per operationem. Dices: Est de ipso Deo ut mihi unito, et hoc satis est ut tali actu attingam Deum in se et immediate; sicut in virtute spei talis modus attingendi Deum sufficit ut sit virtus theologica. Respondetur, verum quidem esse attingere aliquo modo Deum, tamen hoc ipso, quod attingit illum ut adeptum, hoc ipso deficit a ratione consecutionis, tum quia supponit illam, tum etiam, quia non est ultimate propter se, sed propter operationem, ut dixi: unde intelligitur hanc delectationem dici quietem seu satietatem animæ, quia est perfectio consequens perfectam consecutionem boni amati, unde non est ipsa, <col. b> quæ per seipsam maxime satiat, sed bonum ipsum et consecutio ejus, ex quo sequitur illa vitalis animæ quies, et ideo non est illa beatitudo, sed est perfectio concomitans beatitudinem: solet autem gaudium illud beatificum vocari beatitudo, vel e contrario, beatitudo ipsa vocari gaudium, quia est inseparabile gaudium illud a beatitudine, et sæpe res nominamus ab effectibus nobis notioribus.</p>	<p>70R 75R 80R 85R 90R</p>	<p>and loving God but rather, as it were, resulting from such activity. On this account Scotus and others think that pleasure of this kind is not action but a mere passion of pleasure. Thirdly and finally, because joy of this kind is not concerned immediately with God alone in himself but with the activity through which the happy person is united with God, because, as I said, it is not only about the goods of God in himself. Therefore, it is about the union with God himself, which happens through activity. You may say: It is about God as he is united to me and this is enough so that by such an act I attain God in himself and immediately, just as in the case of the virtue of hope such a way of attaining God suffices for it to be a theological virtue. It is responded that it is indeed true that it is in some way to attain God, yet by this fact itself that it attains him as secured, by this itself it falls short of the nature of attainment; first, because it presupposes it, but also because it is not ultimately for its own sake but for the sake of activity, as I said. Hence, it is understood that this delight is called the quieting or satisfying of the soul, since it is the perfection following on the perfect achievement of the loved good. Hence, it is not itself that which through itself most satisfies, but the good itself and its achievement [does that]. From this follows that quiet of the vital soul. And, therefore, that is not happiness but it is a perfection accompanying happiness. But usually that beatific joy is called happiness or, the other way around, happiness itself is called joy, because that joy is inseparable from happiness and we often name things from their better-known effects.</p>	<p>The third. A urging against the last proof is washed away.</p>
<p>44. Ex his, quæ pro aliis opinionibus adduximus, solum restant solvenda duo fundamenta Scoti, quæ possunt contra primam conclusionem a nobis positam procedere: reliqua enim omnia vel confirmant nostram sententiam, vel facile ex dictis expediuntur. Ad primum ergo fundamentum positum n. 2, negamus simpliciter, actum charitatis in patria esse perfectiorem actu visionis, aut habitum charitatis lumine gloriæ. Ad primam vero instantiam seu probationem, quæ sumebatur ex quibusdam locis D. Thomæ, ejus discipuli frequentius illa explicant de statu viæ.</p>	<p>95R 100R</p>	<p>44. From those things which we brought up on behalf of other opinions, only the two foundations of Scotus that can procede against the first conclusion posited by us remain to be resolved. For all the remaining ones either confirm our view or can easily be answered from what has been said. In response to the first foundation which was posited in n. 2, therefore, we deny that strictly speaking an act of charity in the homeland is a more perfect act of vision or habit of charity by the light of glory. But in response to the first instance or proof which was taken from certain passages from St. Thomas, his disciples more frequently explicate it as concerning the state of this life.</p>	<p>He satisfies the arguments posited in n. 2. In response to the first argument.</p>
<p>45. Ferrariensis vero 3, contra Gentes, c. 26, versus fin., non quiescit in hac solutione, quia D. Thomas, præsertim in</p>	<p>105R</p>	<p>45. But Ferrarius in SCG III, cap. 26, towards the end, does not permit this solution, because St. Thomas, especially in that last place</p>	<p>Ferrarius responds otherwise.</p>
<p>Tertio. Instantia contra proximam probationem diluitur.</p>			
<p>Satisfit argumentis in n. 2. positis.</p>			
<p>Ad 1. arg.</p>			
<p>Aliter respondet Ferrariensis.</p>			

110 illo loco ultimo, 1 p., agit de distinctione ordinum Seraphi-
 norum et Cherubimorum, et dicit, supremum ordinem de-
 nominatum esse ab amore, quia respecta Dei amor est melior
 cognitione. Constat autem, illos ordines sumpsisse sua nomi-
 na ex beatificis perfectionibus: loquitur ergo D. Thomas de 110R
 amore et cognitione, etiam in patria: aliis vero locis indistincte
 loquitur, absolute affirmans, respectu Dei amorem esse me-
 liorem. Quapropter ipse Ferrariensis respondet, D. Thomam
 universaliter esse intelligendum, etiam de statu patriæ: tamen
 non esse explicandum de excessu simpliciter, sed secundum 115R
 quid, ita ut visio sit simpliciter perfectior, quia excedit in ob-
 jecte formali: amor vero secundum quid excedat, quatenus tendit
 in objectum prout est in se, et non prout est in cognoscente,
 seu amante, sicut tendit cognitio et scientia.

1. Difficultas
 contra
 responsionem
 Ferrariensis.
 Secunda.

125 46. Hæc Ferrariensis ratio habet alias difficultates: pri-
 mum ex ea sequitur etiam in via charitatem non superare
 simpliciter fidem, sed tantum secundum quid, quod non est
 verum, ut infra dicam. Secundo non satisfacit difficultati,
 quam ibi tractat D. Thomas; cur enim supremus ordo Angelo-
 rum denominabitur ab amore, quia secundum quid excedit, et 125R
 non potius a scientia, si est simpliciter perfectior. Quam objec-
 tionem conatur solvere ipse Ferrariensis, sed revera non satis-
 facit. Tertio, quod ad rem magis spectat, non apparet sufficiens
 <85> ratio, propter quam amor in patria excedat visionem in
 attingendo Deum prout in se est, quia hoc etiam habet visio:
 130 nam *videbimus eum sicuti est*: nec refert, quod res cognita at-
 tingatur prout est in intellectu, quia Deus ipse, prout in se est,
 ita erit in intellectu beati. 130R

Tertia.

Effugium pro
 Ferrar.
 præcluditur.

140 Quod si dicas, essentiam Dei uniri intellectui secundum
 capacitatem ejus, non secundum totum modum suum. Re-
 spondetur in hoc non esse considerandam unionem essentiæ
 per modum speciei intelligibilis, in qua maximam vim suæ so-
 lutionis Ferrariensis constituit: illa enim unio, si qua est, solum
 est per modum actus primi, et ideo antecedit potius, quam con-
 stituat beatitudinem, et præterea non est unio formalis et pro-
 pria, sed solum ad efficiendum, quomodo etiam Deus ut cog- 140R

in Ia,¹⁵ deals with the distinction between the orders of Seraphim and
 of Cherubim and says that the highest order was designated by love
 since with respect to God love is better than cognition. Moreover, it
 is clear that those orders took up their names from the beatific perfec-
 tions. St. Thomas, therefore, speaks about love and cognition even in
 the homeland. But in other places he speaks obscurely, affirming abso-
 lutely that love is better with respect to God. For this reason the same
 Ferrarius responds that St. Thomas should always be understood [as
 also speaking] of the state of the homeland. Yet he should not be expli-
 cated with excess [as] strictly speaking but [as] *secundum quid*. Thus as
 vision is strictly speaking more perfect because it exceeds in the formal
 object, but love *secundum quid* because it exceeds to the extent that it
 tends to the object as it is in itself and not as it is in the cognizer or lover
 the way cognition and knowledge tends.

46. This argument of Ferrarius has another difficulty. First, it also
 follows from it that charity does not strictly speaking surpass faith on
 the way, but only *secundum quid*, which is not true as I was will say
 below. Secondly, it does not satisfy the difficulty which St. Thomas
 treats here. for why the supreme order of angels is designated from love
 since it exceeds *secundum quid* instead of after knowledge, if it is strictly
 speaking more perfect. Ferrarius himself tries to solve this objection
 but he does not really satisfy. Thirdly, what pertains more to the thing,
 there is no sufficient reason on account of which love in the homeland
 exceeds vision in attaining God as he is in himself, since vision also has
 this. For 'we will see him as he is' [(1 John 3:2)]. Nor does it matter
 that the cognized thing is attained as it is in the intellect, since God
 himself as he is in himself will also be thus in the intellect of the happy.

The first
 difficulty against
 Ferrarius's
 response.
 The second.

The third.

46.2 If you say that the essence of God is united to the intellect ac-
 cording to its capacity, not according to his whole mode, it is responded
 that in this one should not consider the union of essence through the
 mode of an intelligible species, in which Ferrarius sets up the greatest
 force of his solution. For that union, if it is one, is one only through the
 mode of a first act and therefore does not precede more than what con-
 stitutes happiness; and, in addition, it is not a formal and proper union
 but only for effecting just as also God as cognized or the cognition itself

An escape for
 Ferrarius is
 closed off.

¹⁵Ia.108.6.

150 nitus seu cognitio ipsa potest comparari ad voluntatem aliquo
modo ut actus primus, quia movet et determinat ad operan-
dum. Denique, quia si visio illa fieret per speciem creatam,
non minus beatificaret, nec esset minus perfecta: igitur ad rem
præsentem solum spectat unio objectiva: et hoc modo sicut 145R
amor tendit in totum Deum prout in se est: et e contrario sicut
visio ex parte videntis non attingit Deum perfecte, nec total-
iter, quia attingit per verbum creatum et finitum, ita nec amor
ex parte amantis attingit perfecte et totaliter, quia attingit per
155 impetum creatum et finitum. 150R

Sustinetur
responsio data in
n. 4.

160 47. Quapropter necessario limitanda est illa doctrina
D. Thomæ ad statum viæ: ad objectionem vero illam in n. 45,
de ordinibus Angelorum primo dici potest probabile esse illum
ordinem fuisse distinctum secundum perfectiones viæ, nam in
patria sive amor excedat, sive visio, tamen illæ duæ perfec-
tiones semper comitanter se habent, ita ut qui perfectius amat,
perfectius videat, et e contra: et ideo non videntur posse dis-
tingui ordines ex illis perfectionibus prout in patria sunt: at
vero in via non ita se habent, nam Lucifer excessit in cogni-
tione, non vero in amore. Hujus etiam signum est, quod illa 160R
distinctio ordinum suo modo reperta fuit in dæmonibus. Aut
etiam dici potest, illa nomina imposita fuisse ab hominibus,
vel propter ordines, et ideo perfectiorem ordinem nominasse
ab ea perfectione, quæ in ipsis viatoribus est maxima: vel tan-
dem illa nomina sumpta sunt potius ex effectibus, ita ut supre-
mus ordo intelligatur habere vim inflammandi et accendendi
170 charitate: alius vero illuminandi: ille autem prior effectus in
hominibus est perfectior. Ex hisque patet responsio ad tertiam
probatorem. <col. b>

Ad 2. argum.
eodem in n. 2
quomodo
respondeant
nonnulli.

175 48. Secunda probatio prædicti fundamenti Scoti in eo-
dem n. 2, sumebatur juxta dictum Anselmi, ex ratione ap-
petibilis propter se et propter aliud. Thomistæ igitur con-
tendunt, amorem patriæ ordinari ad visionem, et propter il-
lam amari. Ita Cajetanus, 1 part., q. 26, a. 2, indicat Ferrari-
ensis supra, Soto, dist. 49, quæst. 1, art. 3, et idem Durandus,
quæst. 4. Sed mihi non placet hæc sententia, et dicti auctores
180 videntur mihi in æquivoco laborare: primo, quia non satis dis-

Non satisfaciunt
primo.

can be compared to the will in some mode as a first act, since it moves
and determines one to acting. Finally, since if that vision were to come
about through a created species, it would no less make one happy nor
would it be less perfect. Therefore, only objective union is relevant for
the present matter. And in this mode just as love tends to all of God as
he is in himself, and, conversely, just as vision on the part of the one
seeing does not attain God either perfectly or completely, since it at-
tains [him] through a created and finite word, so also love on the part
of the one loving does not attain [him] perfectly and completely, since
it attains [him] through a created and finite impetus. 150R

47. For this reason that teaching of St. Thomas must necessarily
be limited to the state of the way. But in response to that objection in
n. 45 about the orders of angels, it can first be said that it is probable
that that order was distinct according to the perfections of the way, for
whether love or vision exceeds in the homeland, those two perfections
at any rate always hold themselves concomitantly so that as a more per-
fect one loves, a more perfect one sees and conversely. And for that
reason it seems that the orders cannot be distinguished according to
their perfections as they are in the homeland. But, on the other hand,
on the way they do hold themselves in that way, for Luther exceeds in
cognition but not in love. It is also a sign of this that the distinction of
the orders was found in its way among the demons. But it can also be
said that those names were imposed by human beings either on account
of the orders and therefore the more perfect order was named by that
perfection which is greatest in those pilgrims or, finally, those names
were taken instead from the effects so that as the supreme order is un-
derstood to have the power of inflaming and kindling charity but the
other for illuminating. But the former effect is the more perfect one for
human beings. And from these things the response to the third proof is
clear. 170R

48. The second proof for the mentioned foundation of Scotus in
the same n. 2 was taken from a statement by Anselm from the notion
of desirable for its own sake and for the sake of something else. The
Thomists, then, contend that the love of the homeland is ordered to
vision and is loved for its sake. Cajetan (Ia.26.2), Ferrarius (above),
Soto (dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3), and Durandus (the same, q. 4) indicate this.
But this view does not please me and the listed authors seem to me to
work with an equivocation, since they do not sufficiently distinguish

The response
given in n. 4 is
sustained.

How some
respond to the
second argument
in the same n. 2.

They do not
satisfy, firstly.

tingunt inter amorem concupiscentiæ et amicitia, nam licet, quod asserunt, possit verificari de amore concupiscentiæ non tamen amicitia, loquendo de primaria ratione amandi et tali amore, præsertim in patria: amor enim via, quatenus est liber et meritorius, ordinari potest recte ad visionem patriæ consequendam; quod præcipue intendit Anselmus, loco citato, dum ait, Deum creasse hominem ut ipsum amaret, et amando ad ipsius fruitionem perveniret: at vero amor amicitia Dei secundum se, et maxime in statu suo perfecto, qualis est beatificus, non est primo amabilis propter visionem, sed propter se ipsum, et propter excellentiam et bonitatem sui objecti, quod ex terminis videtur per se notum ex ipsa ratione amoris amicitia. Et præterea declaratur in hunc modum: quia, si amor ordinatur ad visionem, vel hoc est quatenus visio perficit hominem et cedit in ejus commodum: et hoc non: quia hoc non spectat ad amorem amicitia, sed concupiscentia: vel quatenus ipsamet visio ordinari potest ad laudem et gloriam ipsiusmet Dei, qui propter se amatur: sed quamvis demus hoc modo posse amorem ordinari ad visionem, tamen negari non potest quin hoc sit quasi extrinsecum illi, et quin ipse amor per se, et immediate ordinetur ad Deum, et pertineat etiam ad illius gloriam, et sit illi debitus propter seipsum, etiamsi per impossibile non posset cum visione conjungi: imo ulterius fieri etiam potest ut ipsa visio ordinetur ad amorem, et propter ipsius perfectionem ametur, quatenus talis perfectio sine visione haberi non potest: et hoc est, quod intendit Scotus, qui tamen sine causa in aliud extremum inclinavit, sentiens visionem omnino ordinari ad amorem.

Aliorum
responsio.

49. Paludanus vero quamdam distinctionem indicat, loc. cit., nam potest, inquit, spectari visio ut mera speculatio est, et hoc modo, inquit, est propter se et non propter amorem. Quod etiam significavit D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 3, art. 5, vel potest considerari ut est actus practicus, et hoc modo ait esse propter amorem, et in illo non consistere formalem beatitudinem ullam, sed solum antecedenter requiri ad eam partem beatitudinis, quia consistit in amore, quanquam Paludanus sub dubio relinquit, an hic actus practicus sit res distincta a visione, vel ipsamet visio sub diversa ratione; de qua re diximus, lib. 2,

between concupiscent love and friendship love. For although what they assert can be verified concerning concupiscent love, it can, nevertheless, not [be verified] concerning friendship love, when speaking about the primary nature of loving and such love, especially in the homeland. For the love of the way, to the extent that it is free and meritorious, can rightly be ordered to the consequent vision of the homeland (which is primarily what Anselm intended in the cited place while he says that God created man so that he would love him and by loving would arrive at his fruition). But, on the other hand, friendship love for God according to himself—and especially in his perfect state which is his beatific state—is not in the first place lovable for the sake of vision but for its very own sake and for the sake of the excellence and goodness of its object. This seems known immediately from the terms by the very nature of friendship love. And it is further shown in this way: because, if love is ordered to vision, this is either insofar as vision perfects a human being and results in his advantage (and not this, since this does not pertain to friendship love but to concupiscent love) or insofar as the vision itself can be ordered to the praise and glory of God himself who is loved for his own sake (but although we grant that in this way love can be ordered to vision, nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this is as it were extrinsic to it and that this very love is *per se* and immediately ordered to God and belongs also to his glory and is owed to him for his own sake, even if *per impossibile* it could not be conjoined with vision. Indeed, in addition it can also happen that the vision itself is ordered to love and is loved for the sake of its perfection insofar as such perfection cannot be had without vision. And this is what Scotus intends. Nevertheless, he inclined without cause to the other extreme, thinking that vision is wholly ordered to love.

49. But Paludanus indicates a certain distinction in the cited place, for, he says, vision can be seen as pure speculation and in this way, he says, it is for its own sake and not for the sake of love. St. Thomas also signified this in IaIIæ.3.5. Or it can be considered as a practical act and in this way he says that it is for the sake of love and no formal happiness consists in it. Rather, it is only required antecedently for that part of happiness which consists in love, although Paludanus leaves in doubt whether this practical act is a thing distinct from vision or whether it is the same vision under a different aspect. We talked about this matter in *De Attrib.* II, cap. 18, from n. 10, when dealing with the

Secondly.

A response of
others.

Vera responsio.

de Attrib., cap. 18, a n. 10, tractantes de actu visionis. Nunc, quidquid de hoc sit, in præsentī difficultate dicendum est, tam visionem, quam amorem esse propter se, et propter excellentiam sui objecti, et ideo utraque participare rationem consecutionis, seu beatitudinis formalis, quia revera uterque actus habet rationem ultimi in ordine suo, quamvis sese possint mutuo juvare, et ut sic possint aliquo modo alter ad alterum ad invicem ordinari.

Arguitur proxima responsio.

50. Dices, esto hoc verum sit quod uterque actus sit propter se, tamen simpliciter videtur magis intentus amor, quam visio. Quod patet ex intentione primi agentis, qui est Deus; nam principaliter videtur creasse hominem ut ipsum amaret, quam ut cognosceret, quia omnia principaliter creavit Deus propter se ipsum: ad ipsum autem Deum magis refertur amor, quam visio, nam amor et se ipsum et visionem, et omnia alia refert in Deum, visio autem non ita: ergo ex intentione primi agentis homo est præcipue propter amorem: ergo etiam ipse homo magis debet intendere amorem, quam omnia alia, quia tunc intentio ejus erit maxime perfecta cum fuerit conformior intentioni creatoris. Ac denique hæc videtur esse propria, et intrinseca natura talium actuum, quia verisimile est ita esse institutum a Deo, sicut natura apti sunt ordinari.

Satisfit.

51. Respondetur ex Anselmo supra Deum primario creasse hominem ut ipsemet Deo frueretur, id est, ut illum consequeretur, ac possideret, quod tam fit per visionem, quam per amorem, quod autem ex illis duobus magis Deus intenderit, non explicat Anselmus, et vix potest fieri talis comparatio, quia illi duo actus, ut beatifici sunt, sunt necessario conjuncti, et complent unam essentiam beatitudinis, et quilibet sino altero esset aliquo modo imperfectus, quia ex visione habet amor necessitatem et immutabilitatem suam, propterea per visionem quodammodo satiatur. Rursus ex amore fit quodam modo amabilior ipsa visio, quatenus conjunctio, et familiaritas cum amico ex amicitia nascitur: si tamen aliqua comparatio tandem faciendā est, dicendum est magis creasse Deum hominem ut se videret, non solum quia ipsa est altior operatio, sed etiam quia est quodammodo fons aliarum perfectionum, et

act of vision. At the moment, whatever the case may be with this, it should be said concerning the present difficulty that vision more than love is for its own sake and for the sake of the excellence of its object. And for this reason each participates in the nature of achievement or of formal happiness, since in reality each act has the nature of [being] ultimate in its order, although both can mutually assist the other and as such can in some way be mutually ordered one to another.

50. You may say: grant that it is true that each act is for its own sake. Still, strictly speaking it seems love is intended more than vision. This is evident from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For he seems more principally to have created human beings to love him than to know him, since God created all things principally for his own sake. But love is more referred to God himself than vision, for love refers both itself and vision and all other things to God, but vision does not do so. Therefore, according to the intention of the first agent, human beings exist primarily for the sake of love. Therefore, the same human beings also ought more to intend love than all other things, since then their intentions will be maximally perfect since they will be more conformed to the intention of the creator. And, finally, this seems to be the proper and intrinsic nature of such acts, since it seems likely that they were set up in that way by God, just as they are suited by nature to be ordered.

51. It is responded in accordance with Anselm above that God primarily created human beings to enjoy God, that is, to pursue and possess him, which happens as much through vision as through love. But Anselm does not say which of these two God intends more. And there can hardly be such a comparison, since those two acts, in order to make one happy, are necessarily conjoined and make up one essence of happiness. And whichever would, without the other one, be imperfect in some way, since love has its necessity and immutability from vision. For this reason it is in a certain way satisfied through vision. In turn, vision itself is in a certain way made more lovable from love, insofar as the union and familiarity with a friend is born from friendship. Yet if some comparison must finally be made, it should be said that God created human beings more for seeing him, not only because it is the higher activity, but also because it is in a certain way the spring of the other perfections and also because it *per se* falls to the great glory of

The true response.

It is argued against the last response.

It is satisfied.

Ad 4.
probationem in
eodem n. 2. de
comparatione
visionis et
amoris.
Quid dicendum
in una quadam
comparatione.

30 quia etiam per se cadit in magnam Dei gloriam, ut in sequenti
argumento explicabo.

52. Quarta probatio ejusdem fundamenti, in eod. n. 2,
petit aliam comparisonem, quæ sit amabilior operatio, amor,
an visio? In qua re, omissis aliorum sententiis, supponen-
35 dum est, comparisonem esse præcise faciendam non quatenus
unus actus supponit alium, vel includit: sic enim amor beati-
ficus, ut sic, supponit visionem, non vero e contrario: et hoc
modo potest amor dici amabilior visione. Quomodo loquitur
Durandus, in illa quæst. 4, ad 2, sed est frivola comparatio,
40 quia solum est dicere, optabilius est habere duos actus, quam
unum, quanquam in hoc genere sit etiam quædam æqualitas:
nam si amor supponit visionem, visio necessario secum affert
amorem. Præcise igitur hæc duo conferendo, possunt com-
parari vel ad amorem concupiscentiæ, vel amicitiae; et quidem
45 sub priori ratione videntur se habere sicut excedens et exces-
sum, visio enim superat, quatenus est major perfectio in genere
entis, unde cum appetitus concupiscentiæ sit ad propriam per-
fectionem, videtur major esse ad majorem perfectionem. Ali-
unde vero amor superat, quia est magis conjunctus voluntati,
50 *et amabile quidem bonum, unicuique autem proprium*, ut dixit
Aristoteles. Propter quam rationem licet charitas inclinet ad
amorem Dei, tamen charitas mea magis inclinat ut ego amem,
quam ut amet alius, etiamsi alius perfectius sit amaturus. Ni-
hilominus dicendum est, hoc amore simpliciter magis amari
55 visionem, quia voluntas non est tantum appetitus particularis
propriæ perfectionis sibi in homine inhærentis, sed est appeti-
tus universalis totius boni hominis, et ideo magis amat majus
bonum ipsius hominis, etiamsi sit minus intrinsecum ipsi vol-
untati.

Quid in altera
comparatione
dicant quidam.

60 53. Secundo possunt comparari hi duo actus ad amorem
amicitiæ, et hoc modo fere omnes Thomistæ facile dant amo-
rem esse amabiliorem visione, et appetitive esse præferen-
dum illi, ita ut si solum alter ex his actibus esset homini dan-
dus, et daretur ei optio ut vel visionem, vel amorem eligeret,
65 debeat potius ex vi amoris amicitiae eligere amorem, quam vi-

God, as I will explain in the following argument.

52. The fourth proof of his foundation (in the same n. 2) asks for
another comparison: which activity is more lovable, love or vision? In
this matter, with the other views having been set aside, it should be as-
sumed that the comparison should be made not just insofar as one act
presupposes or includes another. For in this way beatific love, as such,
presupposes vision but not the other way around. And in this way love
can be called more lovable than vision. Durandus speaks in this way
in that q. 4, ad 2, but it is a frivolous comparison, since it is only to
say that it is more desirable to have two acts than one (although in this
genus there is also a certain equality for if love presupposes vision, vi-
sion necessarily brings love with itself). Therefore, in comparing these
two precisely, they can be compared either to concupiscent love or to
friendship love. And indeed under the former aspect they seem to be
related as exceeding and exceeded, for vision surpasses insofar as it is a
greater perfection in the genus of being. Hence, since concupiscent de-
sire is directed to one's own perfection, [vision] seems to be greater for
the greater perfection. But from the other perspective love surpasses,
since it is more of a union of the will. 'And indeed the lovable [is] the
good, moreover what is proper to each one', as Aristotle says.¹⁶ For this
reason although charity inclines towards love of God, still, my charity
inclines more so that *I* love than that someone *else* love, even if the
other one who would love is more perfect. Nevertheless, it should be
said that strictly speaking vision is loved more by this love, since the
will is not only a particular desire for proper perfection inhering in one
oneself but is also a universal desire for the whole good of one. And for
that reason it loves the greater good of one oneself more even if it is less
intrinsic to the will itself.

60R 53. Secondly, these two acts can be compared to friendship love.
And in this way almost all the Thomists easily grant that love is more
loveable than vision and should be preferred *appretiative* to it in such a
way so that if either of these acts by itself were to be given to a human
being and the option is given to him to elect either vision or love, he
ought by the force of friendship love to elect love rather than vision.

In response to the
fourth proof in
the same n. 2
concerning the
comparison of
vision and love.
What should be
said in the case of
one certain
comparison.

What certain
people say about
the other
comparison.

¹⁶EN VIII.5. Cf. DM XXIII.5.

sionem, quia veluti primum funda- <87> mentum amicitiae est amor. Unde est id, quod in ordine amicitiae maxime amatur, et propter quod amantur reliqua: nam si visio ipsa amabilis est, ex amicitia hoc habet, quatenus est conjunctio, vel praesentia, aut familiaritas amici: ergo hoc ipsum habet ex vi amoris.

Confirmant
suum placitum.

70 54. Et confirmatur, quia amor omnia refert in amicum Deum, quia eum constituit ut finem omnium actionum hominis, et facit illum praeferre caeteris rebus omnibus: ergo ex amore amicitiae videtur hic amor praefendus visioni: nec hoc repugnat rationi beatitudinis, nec etiam inde sequitur hunc amorem esse praecipuam perfectionem beatitudinis, quia quod amor sub hac ratione praeferatur visioni, non est quia sit major perfectio intrinseca beatitudinis, sed quia magis pertinet ad bonum divinum, quod licet sit extrinsecum ipsi beato, tamen praefendum est bonis propriis, et intrinsecis ipsius beati, quia debet diligere Deum plusquam se ipsum; non est autem de ratione beatitudinis formalis ut praeferatur omni bono extrinseco, seu quatenus cedit in gloriam, vel honorem alterius, sed quod praeferatur omni bono intrinseco, quatenus est perfectio ipsius beati. Nam hoc est quod dixit Anselmus beatitudinem constare ex commodis: quae doctrina, loquendo generaliter, non potest improbari, quia si per impossibile id, quod est minus commodum mihi in esse, seu perfectione meae naturae, esset magis placitum Deo, illud esset ex amore charitatis praefendum majori commodo meo: unde si Deo beneplacitum esset, ut ego carerem visione ejus, hoc deberem plus amare, quam ipsam visionem propter eandem causam.

Refelluntur.

55. Nihilominus tamen ablata omni extrinseca suppositione de voluntate Dei, seu positivo praeepto, et praecise comparando actum visionis et amoris, non video cur ex natura rei actus amoris sit praefendus visioni in ordine ad amorem amicitiae divinas, nec videtur id satis consentaneum his, quae diximus in solutione ad secundum: nam si amor est praefendus ex amore amicitiae; ergo ille est magis intentus a Deo, quam visio, quia Deus omnia propter se ipsum operatus est, ut consequenter magis intendit id, quod magis ad ipsum, seu ad ejus gloriam pertinet; magis autem pertinet ad Deum id, quod ex amicitia ipsius magis est diligendum. Unde si hoc verum

65R For love is as the first foundation of friendship. This is why it is the case that in the order of friendship it is loved most and that the other things are loved for its sake. For if vision itself is lovable, it has this from friendship insofar as it is a union, presence, or familiarity. Therefore, it has this very feature by the force of love.

70R 54. And it is confirmed, since love refers everything to God as friend, since it sets him up as the end of all the actions of the human being and makes him preferred to all the other things. Therefore, according to friendship love it seems that this love should be preferred to vision. Nor is this repugnant to the nature of happiness. Nor does it follow from this that this love is the special perfection of happiness, since the fact that love is preferred to vision under this aspect is not because it is a greater intrinsic perfection of happiness but rather because it pertains more to divine good, which, although it is extrinsic to happy person, nevertheless should be preferred to the goods proper and intrinsic to the happy person. For one ought to love God more than oneself. But it is not of the nature of formal happiness that it be preferred to all extrinsic goods or insofar as it falls to the glory or honour of another, but that it is preferred to every intrinsic good insofar as it is a perfection of the happy person. For this is what Anselm says, [namely], that happiness is made of advantages. This doctrine, speaking generally, cannot be disproven. For, if, *per impossibile*, that which is less advantageous to me in the being or perfection of my nature were more pleasing to God, one should according to charitable love prefer that to my greater advantage. Hence, if it were well-pleasing to God that I lack vision of him, I ought for the same reason to love this more than the vision itself.

85R 55. Nevertheless, however, all the extrinsic [goods] having been removed by a supposition about the will of God or a positive precept and by precisely comparing an act of vision and [an act] of love, I do not see why an act of love should be preferred *ex natura rei* to vision in the order of divine friendship love. Nor does this seem sufficiently consistent with those things which we said in the solution to the second [argument]. For if love is to be preferred according to friendship love, it therefore was intended more by God than vision, since God does all things for his own sake so that it follows that he intends that more which pertains more to him or to his glory. But that which should be loved more according to friendship with him is what pertains more to

They confirm
that it is pleasing
to him.

They are refuted.

105 est comparando visionem ad amorem, si unus actus ad alium
sit referendus, potius est ordinanda visio ad amorem, quam e
contrario. Thomistæ igitur, qui unum admittunt et alteram 105R
negant, <col. b> non omnino consequenter loquuntur. Tan-
dem ex amore amicitia divina amamus Deo bonum propter
se: illud ergo in hoc genere præferendum est, quod est ma-
110 jus bonum divinum; et vero nec amor meus, nec visio mea est
bonum intrinsecum Deo, utrumque autem est quodammodo 110R
bonum extrinsecum, nam visio est veluti quædam clara notitia
excellentiæ divinae, unde pertinet quasi ad extrinsecam gloriam
et bonam famam, ex qua nascitur laus, et honor ipsius Dei, et
115 præterea est visio regula amoris, et illum dirigit et excitat.

Auctoris
responsio.

120 56. Videtur ergo satis probabiliter dici quod sicut voluntas,
et intellectus ita comparantur, ut voluntas excedat in aliquibus
proprietatibus, scilicet in ratione moventis quoad usum, et
quoad libertatem, et nihilominus intellectus est simpliciter per-
fectior: ita etiam visio, et amor se habent respectu Dei, nam
125 amor excedit ratione moventis, et ordinantis omnia in Deum
ut in finem: nihilominus visio simpliciter superat in ratione
manifestantis divinam excellentiam, et causantis ac dirigentis
ipsum amorem. Addo tamen hoc potissimum intelligi de ipso
130 actuali amore, nam ille solus comparatur cum actuali visione:
quod ideo adverto, quia si sit sermo de radicali amicitia, ut
sic dicam, inter Deum et hominem, quæ includit divinam gra-
tiam et benevolentiam Dei erga homines, hæc absolute præfer-
enda est actuali visioni, quia simpliciter est majus bonum ho-
135 minis, et finis ac radix ipsius visionis, quamvis, quia non in-
telligitur esse per modum actus secundi, sed per modum actus
130R primi, non censetur pertinere ad formalem beatitudinem, sed
esse fundamentum ejus.

Consule
authorem *lib. 6.
de gratia. cap. 13.
n. 3.*

Ad 1. confir. in
*num. 2. in uno
sensu.*

135 57. Atque ex his constat quid dicendum sit de contrariis,
ex quorum comparatione sumebatur confirmatio prima illius
quartæ probationis: duo enim opposita hic possumus intel-
135R ligere, unum est per modum privationis, scilicet carentia ac-
tualis amoris et visionis, et de hoc nulla est difficultas supposi-
tis quæ diximus, nam præcise comparando, illa privatio magis
fugienda est, cujus positivum oppositum magis diligendum,
140 nam in idem recidunt. Unde si visio magis est diligenda, magis 140R

God. Hence, if this is true in comparing vision to love, if one act ought
to be referred to another, it is rather by ordering vision to love than
the other way around. Consequently, the Thomists who admit one
and deny the other do not speak entirely aptly. Finally, we love good
for God for his own sake by divine friendship love. That, therefore,
should be preferred in this genus which is the greater divine good. But,
on the other hand, neither my love nor my vision is a good intrinsic to
God, but both are in a certain way extrinsic goods. For vision is as if a
certain clear cognition (*notitia*) of divine excellence; hence, it pertains
as it were to extrinsic glory and good reputation, from which the praise
and honour of God himself is born. And, furthermore, vision is the
rule of love and directs and excites it.

115R 56. It seems sufficient, therefore, to say probably that just as the
will and the intellect are related in such a way that the will exceeds in
some properties (namely, with regard to moving to use and to freedom)
and yet the intellect is strictly speaking more perfect, so also do vision
and love hold themselves with respect to God. For love exceeds with
regard to moving and ordering all things to God as to an end, yet vision
120R strictly speaking surpasses with regard to manifesting divine excellence
and with regard to causing and directly the love itself. I add, neverthe-
less, that this is above all understood about the actual love itself, for that
alone can be compared to actual vision. I draw attention to this because
125R if the discussion is about the root of friendship, if I may speak in this
way, between God and a human being, which includes the divine grace
and benevolence of God towards human beings, this should absolutely
be preferred to actual vision, since it is strictly speaking a greater good
for a human being and is the end and root of the vision itself, although,
130R since it is not understood to be through the mode of a second act but
through the mode of a first act, it is not thought to pertain to formal
happiness but [is thought] to be its foundation.

57. And it is clear from these things what should be said about
the contraries out of a comparison of which the first confirmation of
that fourth proof was taken. For we can understand the two opposites
here. One is through the mode of privation, namely, the lack of actual
love and vision, and concerning this there is no difficulty in supposing
what we said, for by comparing precisely, that privation should be fled
more whose positive opposite should be loved more. For they come
to the same thing. Hence, if vision should be loved more, then the

The response of
the author.

Consult the
author's *De
Gratia* VI, cap.
13, n. 3.

In response to the
first confirmation
in n. 2 in one
sense.

etiam fugienda privatio visionis. Alterum est positive oppositum, seu contrarie, ut sunt odium Dei, et falsa existimatio, seu error circa Deum, quo modo videtur detestabilius odium, quia
 145 est majus peccatum, quam hæresis, et tunc urget argumentum, quia illud est melius, cujus oppositum est pejus. <88>

58. Ad quod dici potest primo odium esse majus malum in genere moris, non vero in entitate naturali, et ideo non sequi visionem esse minus perfectam in suo esse. Dices, saltem sequitur esse minus perfectam in genere moris. Respondetur in eo genere *proprie et formaliter*, non esse comparabiles visionem et amorem beatificum, quia illi non sunt actus morales cum sint ab intrinseco necessarii, et actus in genere moris constituantur per libertatem. Dico autem *proprie et formaliter*, quia radicaliter comparabiles sunt quatenus vel esse possunt principia, et radices totius bonitatis, et rectitudinis moralis, et hoc modo etiam habent quamdam æqualitatem, in quantum tam ex vi amoris beatifici, quam visionis sit homo impeccabilis, et quodammodo excedit visio in quantum est prima radix illius beatitudinis: possunt etiam comparari objective, primo quatenus possunt esse objecta amoris, seu desiderii boni moraliter, et ut sic etiam excedit visio, ut dictum est. Unde si res attente consideretur, uterque istorum actuum talis est, ut nullum admittat positivum contrarium, et ideo odium *proprie* opponitur amori libero, seu viæ, et error similiter cognitioni, quæ haberi potest in via: et ideo non est mirum quod odium in genere moris sit detestabilius. Secundo dici potest, non esse veram illam regulam, illud scilicet esse perfectius, cujus contrarium est minus perfectum, vel e converso: nam licet albedo, verbi gratia, sit perfectior qualitas, quam calor, non inde fit nigredinem esse perfectiorem frigiditate: nec e contrario ex eo quod frigiditas sit imperfectior nigredine, non sequitur calorem esse perfectiorem albedine, quia fieri potest ut tota latitudo duorum contrariorum sit in alio ordine et genere, ad quod non attingant alia duo inter se contraria, igitur illa consequentia non est formalis.

59. In secunda confirmatione illius quartæ probationis Scoti, in fine num. 2, quæritur comparatio inter intellectum et voluntatem, quæ hoc loco tractanda non est: et ad ea,

privation of vision should be fled more. The other is positively the opposite or contrary, as are the hatred of God and a false judgement or error concerning God. In this way hatred is seen as more detestable, since it is a greater sin than heresy. And then, the argument presses, since the latter is better, its opposite if worse.

58. To which it can be said, first, that hatred is a worse evil in the moral genus, but not as a natural entity and therefore it does not follow that vision is less perfect in its being. You may say: at least it follows that its being is less perfect in the moral genus. It is responded that *properly and formally* beatific vision and love are not comparable in that genus, since they are not moral acts given that they are intrinsically necessary and acts in the moral genus are constituted through freedom. Moreover, I say *properly and formally* since they are comparable at root in one way insofar as they can be principles or roots of the whole of moral goodness and rectitude. In this way they also have a certain equality insofar as a human being is impeccable just as much from the strength of beatific love as from [the strength of beatific] vision. And in a certain way vision exceeds insofar as it is the first root of this happiness. They can also be compared objectively, first insofar as they can be the objects of love or of morally good desire. And as such vision also exceeds, as was said. Hence, if the matter is considered carefully, each of these acts is such that it does not admit any positive contrary. Hatred, therefore, is properly opposed to free love or [to love] had on the way and, likewise, error to the cognition that one can have on the way. And therefore it is no wonder that hatred is more detestable in the moral genus. Secondly, it can be said that that rule (namely, that that whose contrary is less perfect is more perfect or the other way around) is not true. For although whiteness, for example, is a more perfect quality than heat, it does not follow that blackness is more perfect than coldness. Nor the other way around from the fact that coldness is less perfect than blackness, does it follow that heat is more perfect than whiteness. For it can happen that the whole range of two contraries is in another order and genus which the other two things contrary with each other do not touch. Therefore, that consequence is not formal.

59. In the second confirmation of that fourth proof of Scotus, in the end of n. 2, a comparison between intellect and will is sought, which need not be discussed in this place. And to those things which

Ad eandem confirm. in altero sensu responsio 1.

Responsio 2.

Ad 2. confir. in fine n. 2.

The first response to the same confirmation in the other sense.

The second response.

In response to the second confirmation in the end of n. 2.

180 quæ ibi adducuntur uno verbo dicendum est, solum probare
voluntatem secundum quid, et in aliquibus proprietatibus ex-
cedere intellectum: specialis autem difficultas, quæ in illo ar-
gumento tangitur, scilicet an omnis actus intellectus sit perfec-
tior quocumque actu voluntatis, tractabitur melius sectione se-
185 quenti.

Ad 2. arg.
principale Scoti
quoad 1. eius
probationem.

60. Ad alterum fundamentum, seu caput argumentorum
Scoti, in num. 3, quibus probat amorem habere rationem
consecutionis, uno verbo respondere possumus, concedendo
<col. b> totum id, quod probat; quia, ut diximus, etiam amor
5 pertinet ad essentialem conjunctionem cum ultimo fine, quæ
dici potest consecutio saltem partialis, si tamen ille contendat
ut præferatur dilectio visioni. Respondendum est breviter ad
primum, per visionem et amorem uniri animam objecto, aut
summo bono suo, et ideo utrumque actum pertinere ad beati-
tudinem.

Instantiæ
occurritur.

61. Quod si urgeas, quia amor magis unit, quam cognitio,
ut D. Thomas etiam affirmat 1, 2, quæst. 28, art. 1, ad 3. Re-
spondent Thomistæ, amorem magis unire affective, visionem
autem magis unire realiter, quia requirit intimam unionem
15 essentiæ divinæ cum intellectu per modum speciei: sed jam
sæpe dixi hanc unionem per modum speciei non multum re-
ferre ad rationem beatitudinis explicandam: tum quia ibi non
est alia unio præter efficientiam: tum etiam, quia totum il-
lud, quidquid est, antecedit solum per modum actus primi.
20 Unde aliter idem divus Thomas, in 4, distinct. 49, quæst. 1,
artic. quæstion. 2, ad 1, dicit, amorem perfectius unire, quia
perficit unionem, quæ facta est per intellectum: quibus verbis
significat præcise comparando non esse perfectiorem unionem
affectus, sed quatenus supponit, seu concludit aliam: ne tamen
25 sit tantum de nomine disputatio, et ne hæreamus in locution-
ibus metaphoricis, advertendum est, aliud esse loqui de pro-
pria unione formali: aliud vero de unione quasi effectiva, seu
causali. Priori modo nec amor, nec cognitio unit physice, et
realiter operantem objecto, sed tantum objective: et hoc modo
30 dicitur amor unire solum, quia est propensio in bonum ama-
tum: cognitio vero dicitur unire, quia facit præsentem rem
cognitam, non quidem præsentia locali, seu reali indistantia,

180R are brought up there, it should be said in a word that it only shows that
the will *secundum quid* and in some properties exceeds the intellect.
But a special difficulty which is touched on in that argument—namely,
whether every act of the intellect is more perfect than any act of the
will—will be better discussed in the following section.

60. To the other foundation or head of the arguments of Scotus, in
n. 3, by which he proves that love has the nature of attainment, we can
respond in a word by conceding all of what he proves. For, as we said,
love also pertains to the essential union with the ultimate end, which
5R can be called at least a partial attainment. If, nevertheless, he insists
that love is preferred to vision, it should be responded briefly at first
that through vision and love the soul is united to its object or to its
highest good and therefore each act pertains to happiness.

In response to
Scotus's second
principal
argument with
respect to its first
proof.

61. If you urge that since love unites more than cognition does, as
St. Thomas also affirms in IaIIæ.28.1 ad 3, the Thomists respond that
love unites more affectively, but vision unites more in reality, since it re-
quires an intimate union of the divine essence with the intellect through
15R the mode of species. But I already said numerous times that this union
through the mode of species is not really relevant to explaining the na-
ture of happiness. First, because there is no other union beyond an
efficient [union] there. Then also because that whole thing, whatever
it is, only precedes through the mode of a first act. Hence, the same
St. Thomas says otherwise in IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. q. 2, ad 1, that
love unites more perfectly, since it perfects the union what was made
20R through the intellect. By these words he indicates that in making a
precise comparison it is not the more perfect union of affect, but in-
sofar as it presupposes or contains another. Nevertheless, lest there be
only a dispute of words and lest we adhere to metaphorical locutions,
it should be noticed that it is one thing to speak about a proper formal
union but another [to speak] about a union that is, as it were, effective
25R or causal. In the former way, neither love nor cognition unites phys-
ically and in reality the one acting to the object; rather, [they unite]
only objectively. And in this way love alone is said to unite, since it is
an inclination to the loved good. But cognition is said to unite because
it makes the cognized thing present. This is not, indeed, a local pres-

An urging is
resisted.

35 sed vitali, et actuali præsentia, quæ in hoc consistit, quod per
 cognitionem formatur res in mente, sicut est in se, quod non
 fit per amorem, et utraque istarum unionum habet aliquid pro-
 prium, in quo excedit aliam; simpliciter autem nobilior est ea,
 quæ fit per intellectum propter rationes supra dictas: at vero
 loquendo de unione causali, seu effectiva, amor excedit, quia
 refert amantem in amatum, et facit ut omnes cogitationes ejus
 40 sint in illo, aut propter illum; tamen hic excessus est tantum
 secundum quid, sicut voluntas excedit intellectum in ratione
 moventis ad usum.

Ad 1. confir. in
 num. 4.

62. Ad primam confirmationem, quod voluntatis est in-
 tendere in bonum ut bonum, et <89> finem ut finem; respon-
 detur, hoc esse verum considerando rationem, sub qua tendit;
 loquendo autem de ratione, in quam tendit potentia, etiam in-
 tellectus apprehendit, seu videt summum bonum, quatenus est
 45 summum bonum et in se, et respecta hominis; non est autem
 necesse ut consecutio boni fiat sub eadem ratione, sub qua ap-
 petitur quantum ad modum attingendi, sed solum necesse est
 ut illud bonum apprehendat, et teneat eo modo, quo desidera-
 tum est; et ideo sæpe ac frequentius contingit ut bonum per
 50 aliam potentiam comparetur et obtineatur, et per aliam ap-
 petatur, ut ex dictis facile ostendi potest.

Ad secundam in
 eodem n.

55 63. Ad secundam confirmationem respondetur primo,
 non oportere ut præmium detur in eadem potentia, in qua est
 meritum, pugnat enim miles manibus, et coronatur in capite,
 quia qui meretur, vel præmiatur non est potentia, sed homo,
 qui potest uti diversas instrumentis ad efficiendum meritum,
 60 et suscipiendum præmium, ut dixit divus Thomas, quodl. 8,
 art. 19. Adde vero etiam in voluntate recipi aliquo modo es-
 sentiale præmium et gaudium, nec delectatio est omnino extra
 illud, cum sit proprietates per se conjuncta illi: tum etiam, quia
 ipsa visio aliquo modo satiat ipsam voluntatem, dum complet
 65 desiderium ejus.

35R
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ence or a real negation of distance, but a vital and actual presence that
 consists in this: that the thing is formed in the mind through cognition
 just as it is in itself. This does not happen through love. And each of
 these unions has something proper in which it exceeds the other. But,
 strictly speaking, the more noble is that which happens through the in-
 tellect on account of the reasons stated above. But, on the other hand,
 when speaking about the causal or effective union, love exceeds, since
 it refers the lover to the loved and makes it the case that all his thoughts
 are about it or for its sake. Still, this exceeding is only *secundum quid*,
 just as the will exceeds the intellect under the aspect of moving to use.

62. To the first confirmation (that it belongs to the will to intend
 the good as good and the end as end), it is responded that this is true
 when considering the aspect (*rationem*) under which it tends. But when
 speaking about the nature (*ratione*) to which a power tends, the intellect
 also apprehends or sees the highest good, insofar as it is the highest
 good both in itself and with respect to a human being. But it is not
 necessary for the attainment of the good that it happen under the same
 aspect under which it is desired with respect to the mode of attaining.
 Rather, it is only necessary that it apprehends and holds that good in
 that way in which it was desired. And for that reason it frequently
 and routinely happens that the good is compared and obtained through
 another power and that it is desired through another [power], as can
 easily be shown from what was said.

In response to the
 first confirmation
 in n. 4.

63. To the second confirmation, it is responded first that it is not
 required that a reward be given in the same power in which it was mer-
 ited. For a soldier often fight with his hands and is crowned on his
 head, because he who is deserving and rewarded is not the power but
 the person who can use different instruments for effecting merit and
 admiring reward, as St. Thomas said in *Quodl.* VIII, art. 19. But I add
 also that reward and joy is received essentially in some way in the will,
 for delight is not wholly outside it, given that it is a property *per se* con-
 joined with it. Then also because vision itself in some way satisfied the
 will itself as long as it completes its desire.

In response to the
 second
 confirmation in
 the same n. 4.