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Quotuplex sit beatitudo.

What kinds of happiness there are.

Prætermittuntur
diuisiones
quædam.

1. Hanc dubitationem etiam præmitto, quia pertinet ad quæ-
tionem an est, et fundamentum erit eorum, quæ dicenda sunt,
et ordinis in hac materia servandi. Omitto autem imprimis di-
5 visionem beatitudinis, in veram et falsam, quoniam tantum de
vera agimus: et falsa in infinitum multiplicari potest pro libito
humanæ voluntatis. Omitto præterea divisionem beatitudinis
in objectivam et formalem, quia et utraque explicata jam est,
et ex utraque consurgit unus finis, et una beatitudo. Denique
10 omitto divisionem beatitudinis in essentialem et accidentalem,
quoniam hæc quidem coincidit cum his, quæ diximus de beat-
itudine vel pro essentia vel pro statu: nam ea, quæ reperiun-
tur in statu beatitudinis præter essentiam, possunt dici acci-
dentia beatitudinis, quamvis in eis sit latitude: nam quædam
15 sunt maxime intrinseca, et inseparabilia ab essentiali beatitu-
dine; alia vero sunt magis extrinseca; de quibus omnibus postea
videbimus. Notandæ igitur sunt tres, vel quatuor divisiones
præcipuæ.

1. Divisio
beatitudinis in
naturalem et
supernaturalem.
Fundatur in
D. Thom.

2. Primo dividitur beatitudo in naturalem et supernatu-
20 ralem. Hac divisione utitur sæpe D. Thomas, 1, p., q. 23, a. 1,
dicens: hominem ordinari ad duplicem finem, alterum naturæ
proportionatum, alterum superantem facultatem naturæ; idem
autem est finis ultimus et beatitudo, ut diximus. Item q. 62,
art. 1, distinguit in Angelis hanc duplicem beatitudinem, et
25 dicit, eos fuisse creatos in beatitudine naturali, non vero super-
naturali, juxta doctrinam Augustini, libro de Eccl. dogmat. (si
ejus est opus), capit. 59. Addit vero <44> ibi beatitudinem nat-

1. I also present this questioning, because it pertains to the question
of whether happiness exists and it will be the foundation for the things
that remain to be discussed and for the order to be kept in this material.
5R I leave aside, however, the first division of happiness into true and false,
because we are discussing only true happiness. And false happiness can
be multiplied to infinity through the whims of human will. In addition,
I leave aside the division of happiness into objective and formal, both
because each has already been explained and because each arises from
10R one end and one happiness. Finally, I leave aside the division of hap-
piness into essential and accidental, because this indeed coincides with
these, because we spoke of happiness either through essence or through
state. For those things which are found in the state of happiness in ad-
dition to essence can be called accidents of happiness, although it is in
15R them with latitude. For certain ones are especially intrinsic and insepa-
rable from essential happiness, but others are more extrinsic, concern-
ing all of which we will see later. Three or four divisions, therefore,
should especially be noted.

2. First, happiness is divided into natural and supernatural. This
20R division is often used by St. Thomas, who says in [ST] Ia.23.1 that
a human being is ordered to a twofold end, one proportionate to his
nature and the other surpassing the faculty of nature. Moreover, as we
said, the ultimate end and happiness are the same thing. Likewise, in
Ia.62.1 he distinguishes in the angels this twofold happiness and says
25R that those creatures were in natural happiness, but not supernatural,
according to the teaching of Augustine in *libro de Eccl. dogmat.* (if that
is his work), c. 59 [i.e., c. 29, al. 59]. But he adds there that natural

Certain divisions
are ignored.

The first division
of happiness into
natural and
supernatural.
It is grounded in
St. Thomas.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

uralem esse quodammodo beatitudinem, vel quia comparata
 est ad supernaturalem, est imperfecta, vel propter aliam rati-
 onem, quam infra subjiciam. Eadem distinctione, agens de
 hominibus, utitur D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 62, art. 1, in corpore, et
 ad 3, et q. 109, art. 5, ad 3, et q. 110, art. 3, et optime in 3, dis-
 tinct. 23, quæst. 1, art. 4. quæst. 3, et ex hac divisione colligit
 etiam necessitatem gratiæ, et divisionem virtutum in infusas,
 et acquisitas.

Accedit ratio.

3. Et ratione declaratur: nam imprimis quod sit aliqua
 beatitudo hominis supernaturalis simpliciter de fide certum
 est, quoniam Dei visio, et amor ac fruitio, quæ illam conse-
 quuntur, supernaturalia sunt, ut partim in sequentibus dice-
 mus, partim constat ex materia de charitate et gratia. Ex quibus
 etiam certum est, media, quibus illa beatitudo comparatur, esse
 supernaturalia, resurrectio etiam ad vitam immortalem et glo-
 riosam omnino supernaturalis est. Datur ergo beatitudo su-
 pernaturalis. Quod vero præter hanc detur naturalis præter
 dicta, sect. præcedenti, potest ex altero membro ita declarari:
 nam si beatitudo illa supernaturalis est, potuit ergo Deus ab-
 sque miraculo condere hominem non ordinando illum ad illam
 beatitudinem, nec providendo illi modum, aut media, quibus
 illam consequi possit, in quo nihil ageret contra, vel præter
 id, quod debitum est tali naturæ; sed homo sic conditus nec-
 essario habiturus esset aliquam beatitudinem naturalem, ad
 quam, si velit, possit pervenire: ergo necesse est præter su-
 pernaturalum beatitudinem dari in humana natura aliquam
 beatitudinem naturalem. Major mihi videtur certa, primo ex
 communi consensu theologorum, qui in hoc sensu distinguunt
 hominem constitutum in puris naturalibus, ab homine elevato
 ad finem supernaturalem, et utrumque statum censent esse pos-
 sibilem, quoniam alias hominem esse ordinatum in hunc finem
 naturalem, esset debitum ipsi naturæ, et consequenter non es-
 set donum gratiæ, ut recte dixit Thomas, 1, 2, q. 110, art. 4,

Suadetur maior
 propositio
 rationis factæ.

³Supernatural?

33 23] 25 V.

55 distinguunt] distinguunt V.

60 donum] donorum V.

happiness is happiness in a certain way, either because it is imperfect
 compared to supernatural [happiness] or on account of another reason,
 which I will present below. St. Thomas uses the same distinction in
 discussing human beings in [*ST*] IaIIæ.62.1 co. and ad 3; 109.5 ad 3;
 110.3; and best in [*Sent.*] III, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 4, q. 3. And from this
 division he gathers also the necessity for grace and the division between
 infused and acquired virtues.

3. And it is shown with this reasoning: for, first, some supernat-
 ural happiness for a human being simply is certain by faith, since the
 vision, love, and enjoyment of God, which attend it, are supernatural,
 as we will discuss partly in the following sections and is clear partly
 from the material on charity and grace. From these it is also certain
 that the means by which this happiness is acquired are supernatural.
 Resurrection to immortal life and glory is wholly supernatural. There-
 fore, supernatural happiness is given. But that natural [happiness] is
 given in addition to this, besides what was said in the preceding section,
 can be shown from the other part. For if that happiness is supernatu-
 ral, then God could have made a human being without a miracle by not
 ordering him to that happiness nor providing the way or means to him
 by which he can seek after it. Nothing in this would go contrary to or
 beyond that which is owed to such a nature. But a human being having
 been made in that way would necessarily have some natural happiness
 to which, if he wished, he could reach. Therefore, it is necessary that
 in addition to supernatural happiness some natural happiness be given
 to human nature.

Reason is added.

The major seems certain to me, first from the general consensus
 of theologians, who in this sense distinguish between a human being
 constituted in purely natural [conditions] from a human elevated to a
 supernatural end and they think that either state is possible, because
 otherwise that a human being is ordered to this natural³ end would be
 owed to nature itself and consequently it would not be a gift of grace, as
 Thomas rightly says in [*ST*] IaIIæ.110.4 ad 2, for grace is beyond every-

The major
 proposition of
 the argument just
 made is urged.

ad 2, gratia enim est supra omne naturæ debitum. Consequens autem est valde falsum, magnamque præbens occasionem errori Pelagii: quia si ordinatio in hunc finem esset naturæ debita, etiam media sufficientia ad eundem finem deberentur naturæ: nam sicut qui dat formam, dat consequentia ad formam; ita qui dat finem, necesse est ut conferat media conducentia ad illum finem, alias superflua esset talis ordinatio ad talem finem, præsertim, quia media et finis debent inter se servare proportionem, et ideo sunt ejusdem ordinis et sub eadem providentia cadunt. Propria vero ratio a priori est, quia finis non debetur nisi ratione ipsius esse quasi primarii et substantialis: finis ergo supernaturalis solum correspondet ipsi gratiæ, quæ est participatio veluti substantialis divinæ naturæ. Sicut ergo hæc gratia non est debita humanæ naturæ, ita nec beatitudo illa, quæ est proprius finis illius: sicut ergo potuit humana natura creari absque gratia, et absque ulla promissione illius, salva omni proprietate et providentia tali naturæ debita, ita potuit creari sine ordinatione ad finem supernaturalem.

4. Jam vero probanda est minor propositio principalis rationis, et probatur facile ex dictis supra, quia homo sic creatus habet aliquem finem ultimum, et illum posset suis actionibus aliquo modo attingere cognoscendo et amando illum: ergo esset capax alicujus beatitudinis proportionatæ et connaturalis sibi: ergo in humana natura datur aliqua beatitudo naturalis præter supernaturalem. Dices: Esto, hoc verum sit de homine in puris naturalibus condito, non inde fit etiam nunc habere hominem hanc beatitudinem naturalem. Respondetur, aliud esse loqui de re, aliud de nomine: nam quod ad rem attinet, non potest homo nunc non esse capax illius beatitudinis, seu perfectionis, quam haberet in puris naturalibus, quia nunc est eadem natura, et consequenter eadem capacitas: unde cum gratia non destruat naturam, sed perficiat, non privat illam hac perfectione naturali. Et ita certum est in supernaturali beatitudine habiturum hominem omnem perfectionem sibi connaturalem, quomodo probat D. Thomas, 1 p., q. 12, a. 12, hominem videntem Deum non privari cognitione naturali Dei, quin potius

60R thing owed to nature. Moreover, the consequence is certainly false and presents a great occasion for the Pelagian error. Because if ordination to this end were owed to nature, sufficient means to this end would also be owed to nature. For just as what gives a form gives the consequences to the form, so also what gives the end necessarily is such that it confers the means conducive to that end. Otherwise, such an ordination to such an end would be superfluous, especially because the means and the end ought to preserve proportion between themselves and therefore they are of the same order and fall under the same providence. But a proper argument is from the former, because an end is not owed except by reason of itself being as it were primary and substantial. Therefore, a supernatural end only corresponds to grace itself, which is just as a participation in substantial divine nature. Therefore, just as this grace is not owed to human nature, so neither is that happiness, which is its proper end. Therefore, just as human nature could have been created without grace and without any promise of it, save every property and providence owed to such a nature, so it could have been created without ordination to the supernatural end.

4. But now the minor proposition of the principle argument should be shown and it is shown easily from what was said above, because a human being created thus would have some ultimate end and would be able to attain it in some way with his actions by knowing and loving it. Therefore, he would be capable of some happiness proportionate and connatural to him. Therefore, some natural happiness is given in human nature in addition to supernatural.

85R You may say: It shall be that this is true of a human being in purely natural conditions but that it does not happen for that reason that he now has this natural happiness. I respond that it is one thing to speak of the thing and another [to speak] of the name. For what pertains to the thing, a human cannot now not have the capacity for such happiness or perfection which he would have in purely natural [condition], because he is now the same nature and consequently [has] the same capacity. Hence, since grace does not destroy nature but perfects, it does not rob [his nature] of this natural perfection. And thus it is certain that in supernatural happiness a human being will have every perfection connatural to him, just as St. Thomas shows in [ST] Ia.12.12 that a human

The minor of the same argument is urged.

An objection is removed.

Suadet minor eiusdem rationis.

Instantia remouetur.

maxime in illa perfici; et idem proportionaliter est de amore. Quod vero spectat ad modum loquendi, facile concedemus naturalem beatitudinem non mereri nunc beatitudinis nomen absolute dictæ et sine aliquo addito diminuente, quia in homine elevato ad finem supernaturalem illa non habet rationem ultimi termini, seu perfectionis ultimæ, propter quod si aliquis homo fortasse illam habere posset absque alia, ut aliqui existimant de pueris excedentibus in solo originali peccato, non posset dici simpliciter beatus, sed potius miser, quia caret beatitudine illa simpliciter, propter quam creatus est.

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2. Divisio in beatitud. patriæ, et viæ

5. Secundo, dividitur beatitudo in beatitudinem perfectam vitæ futuræ et imperfectam hujus vitæ. Hac utitur frequenter divus Thomas in hac materia, patet 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 2, ad. 4, et art. 5, et quæst. 5, art. 3, et habet fundamentum in Aristotele 1, Ethicor., cap. 9 et 10, et potest accommodari utrique membro præcedentis divisionis. Et ita potest facile reddi illius ratio: nam quod spectat ad supernaturalem beatitudinem, certum de fide est secundum legem ordinariam, et, seclusis privilegiis, non obtineri in hac vita in tota sua perfectione essentiali, ut postea suo loco disputabimus: necesse est tamen ut pro tempore hujus vitæ aliquid sit optimum etiam in ordine gratiæ, per quod homo maxime jungatur suo supernaturali fini quantum pro hoc statu potest: illud ergo habebit rationem beatitudinis hujus vitæ, quæ licet comparata ad illam, quam speramus, sit imperfecta et revera non sit beatitudo, quia non sistit in illa, sed futuram inquit per illam: nihilominus in ordine ad hunc statum viæ, dici potest beatitudo, quia est optimum et ultimum ejus.

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Confertur præsens diuisio cum præcedenti quoad vnum membrum.

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Confertur quoad alterum.

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6. Atque eadem ratio facile applicari potest ad beatitudinem naturalem quæ in suo gradu, et ordine cum majori perfectione acquiri posset in hac vita quam supernaturalis beatitudo in ordine suo, quia posset homo in hac vita cognoscere et contemplari Deum in creaturis, illum amare et alia honesta opera exercere, quæ omnia majorem proportionem habent

125R

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105–106 caret beatitudine illa simpliciter, propter quam] *om.* V.
116 ut] *om.* V.

being seeing God is not deprived of natural cognition of God, lest he not rather be especially perfected in that. And it is proportionately likewise with love. But looking at that as a way of speaking, we readily concede that natural happiness does not now merit the name ‘happiness’, absolutely speaking and without diminishment by some added qualifier, because in a human being elevated to a supernatural end it does not have the nature of an ultimate *terminus* or ultimate perfection. On account of this if some human perhaps can have that without the other, as some think concerning children who die with only original sin, he could not be called happy strictly speaking. Rather, he would be miserable because he lacks that happiness for the sake of which he was created.

5. Secondly, happiness is divided into the perfect happiness of future life and the imperfect happiness of this life. This division is used frequently by St. Thomas in this matter. It is clear in [ST] IaIIæ.3.2 ad 4, 3.5, and 5.3 and has a foundation in Aristotle in *EN* I, c. 9 and 10 and can be accommodated to either member of the preceding division. And thus the argument for it can easily be reused. For as far as supernatural happiness is concerned, it is certain by faith that according to ordinary law and apart from special privileges it is not obtained in this life in its complete essential perfection, as we will discuss later in its place. Still, it is necessary that for the duration of this life something is best even relative to the grace through which a human being is especially conjoined with his supernatural end insofar as he can through this state. Therefore, that will have the nature of the happiness of this life, even though in comparison to that for which we hope it is imperfect and really is not happiness, because [the will] does not stop in it but seeks the future through it. Nevertheless, relative to this state of life, it can be called happiness because it is its best and ultimate [state].

The second division into the happiness of this life and of the next life.

The present division is compared to the previous one with respect to one member.

6. And the same reasoning can easily be applied to natural happiness which in its rank and order can be acquired with greater perfection in this life than supernatural happiness in its order, because a human being can know and contemplate God in this life in creatures, love him, and exercise other honest works, which all have greater proportion with cognition and natural love of God, which the separated

It is compared with respect to the other member.

cum cognitione, et amore Dei naturali, quæ potest habere anima separata, quam habeat cognitio fidei, verbi gratia, cum visione clara Dei. Atque ita philosophi naturalem beatitudinem hominis posuerunt præcipue pro statu hujus vitæ: supposita
 135 vero animi immortalitate, necesse est, ut etiam post hanc vitam
 possit esse beata, quæ dicitur etiam beatitudo hominis ratione
 partis præcipuæ: an vero illa etiam beatitudo communicanda
 esset corpori, stando in providentia naturali, attingemus alio
 140 loco. Atque ex hac duplici divisione colligitur ordo servandus
 in hac materia: nam primo ac præcipue dicendum est de beati-
 tudine supernaturali futuræ vitæ, et obiter attingemus quæ per-
 tinent ad beatitudinem imperfectam, scilicet, naturalem hujus
 vitæ, postea vero de naturali beatitudine in utroque etiam statu
 disseremus.

3. Divisio
 beatitudinis in
 speculativam, et
 practicam, non
 satis placet.

145 7. Tertio dividi solet beatitudo in speculativam et practi-
 cam: et habet fundamentum in Aristotele 10 Ethic., cap. 7, 8
 et 9, et illa etiam utitur D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 7, et
 quæst. 5, art. 4, et alii <col. b> theologi in 4, dist. 49, præsertim
 Paludanus, quæst. 4, art. 2. Et videtur in eo fundata hæc
 150 divisio, quod ad consummatam hominis beatitudinem requir-
 itur perfectio non tantum cognitionis, sed etiam operis, seu
 quod idem est, scientia et virtus. Nihilominus tamen hæc di-
 visio non est admodum necessaria vel propria, quia vel neutra
 istarum est beatitudo hominis, sed pars beatitudinis ejus, quæ
 155 ex utraque conflatur: vel certe (quod verius est) si altera tantum
 est beatitudo, altera non meretur hoc nomen, nisi valde impro-
 prie, quatenus est aliquid ad completum statum beatitudinis
 necessarium. Et ita sentiunt Aristoteles et D. Thomas de felici-
 tate, quia cum non sit propter se, sed propter aliud non habet
 160 propriam beatitudinis rationem, ut postea latius videbimus.

4. Divisio, quæ
 etiam reiicitur.

165 8. Quarto dividitur a quibusdam beatitudo in beatitudinem
 hominis et in beatitudinem tantum potentiæ alicujus, quo-
 modo beatitudo hominis, verbi gratia, licet non consistat in
 amore, tamen beatitudo voluntatis dicitur consistere in amore.
 Sed hæc divisio nec ab aliis auctoribus celebrata est neque ab
 165 Scoto probatur aliqua ratione, neque aliquam utilitatem affert
 ad ea quæ dicenda sunt; et præterea valde improprie dicitur

soul can have, than the cognition of faith has, for example, with a clear vision of God. And thus the philosophers placed the natural happiness of a human being especially through the state of this life. But the soul having been supposed immortal, it is necessary that it can also be happy after this life, which is also called happiness of a human by reason of the special part. But whether that happiness is also to be communicated to the body, remaining in natural providence, we will touch on in another place. And from this twofold division is gathered the order that should be kept in this matter. For first and foremost should be spoken of the supernatural happiness of the future life and in passing we will touch on those things which pertain to imperfect happiness, namely, the natural [happiness] of this life, but afterwards we will also discuss natural happiness in either state.

7. Thirdly, it is customary to divide happiness into speculative and practical. And this has a foundation in Aristotle in *EN* X, c. 7, 8, and 9, and it is also used by St. Thomas in [*ST*] IaIIæ.3.7 and 5.4 and by other theologians in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49, especially by Paludanus in q. 4, art. 2. And it seems that this division is founded in the fact that for consummate happiness of a human being is required perfection not only of cognition but also of works, or, what is the same, of [both] science and virtue. Nevertheless, this division is still not completely necessary or proper, because either [i] neither of them is the happiness of a human but is only a part of his happiness which is composed of both or, surely (which is more correct), [ii] if one of them alone is happiness, the other does not merit this name except very improperly insofar as it is something necessary for the complete state of happiness. And Aristotle and St. Thomas think this concerning felicity, because since it is not for its own sake but for the sake of another it does not have the proper nature of happiness, as we will see more thoroughly later.

The third
 division of
 happiness into
 speculative and
 practical is not
 satisfactory.

8. Fourthly, happiness is divided by certain people into the happiness of a human being and the happiness of some power alone, in which way, for example, although the happiness of a human does not consist in love, nevertheless the happiness of the will is said to consist in love. But this division is not upheld by other authors nor is it proven with some argument by Scotus nor is it of any use for the things that need to be discussed. And, in addition, it is improper to talk of a

The fourth
 division, which is
 also rejected.

170 potentia beatificari, persona enim est vel natura, quæ proprie
per personam beatificatur. Tandem vel operatio potentiæ est
consecutio ultimi finis integra, vel partialis; aut nullo modo
175 est consecutio: si primum, per talem operationem non solum
persona, sed etiam potentia beatificatur vel in totum, vel ex
parte, quia per talem operationem consequitur aliquo modo
beatitudo hominis, nec personæ, cum sermo sit de beatitudine
175R propria, quæ consistit in consecutione ultimi finis. Solum igitur
duæ primæ divisiones ad discursum hujus materiæ nobis
deserviunt.

power being made happy, for it is a person or a nature which properly
is made happy through the person. Finally, the activity of the power
is the achievement either of an integrated ultimate end or of a partial
[ultimate end]. But there is no achievement in either way. If the first,
then through such an action not only the person but also the power is
made happy either in whole or in part, because its end is achieved in
some way through such an action. But if the second is spoken of, then
such an action will be happiness neither of the human nor of the per-
son, since the discussion is of happiness proper, which consists in the
achievement of the ultimate end. Therefore, only the first two divisions
are useful for our discussion of this material.