

<41, col. b>²

Utrum ostendi possit beatitudinem hominis esse possibilem, aut futuram esse?

Whether it can be shown that human happiness is possible or is going to be.

Arguitur pro
neg. parte.

1. Ratio dubii est, quia perfecta beatitudo repugnat cum imperfectione humanæ naturæ: quomodo ergo ostendi potest humanam naturam esse capacem tantæ perfectionis? Antecedens declaratur primo, quia beatitudo, ut diximus, requirit collectionem omnium bonorum, et excludit omnia mala: homo autem natura sua subjectus est multis malis, et miseriis, quæ vitare non potest. Secundo, et principaliter, quia pars beatitudinis, et via necessaria ad illam consecutionem, est nihil mali velle, seu carere peccato, quod non potest homo sua natura, cum constet contrariis affectibus, et inter se pugnantibus. Tertio, quia de ratione beatitudinis est æternitas, nam qui timet carere bono, quod habet, non potest esse beatus; sed homo, ut homo, non est perpetuus natura sua: ergo. Dicet fortasse aliquis, hanc rationem totam solum procedere de beatitudine priori modo accepta, ut significat collectionem bonorum omnium, non vero de essentia beatitudinis. Sed contra hoc est, quia licet tota collectio bonorum non sit de essentia beatitudinis, tamen de ratione beatitudinis essentialis est, ut secum afferat, et postulet statum illum perfectum: ergo requirit subjectum capax illius status.

5R

10R

15R

20R

Eusio
præcluditur.

2. In hac quæstione agere possumus solum formaliter de beatitudine prout a nobis definita est, an homo sit capax illius, vel materialiter, seu in particulari, an cognosci possit qua re et quo modo beatificandus sit homo: et hoc modo tractat illam Scotus in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 2, et contendit, posse ratione nat-

25R

1. The reason for doubt is that perfect happiness is incompatible with the imperfection of human nature. Therefore, how can it be shown that human nature is capable of such perfection? The antecedent is shown first, because happiness, as we said, requires a collection of all goods and excludes every bad. But a human by his nature is subject to many bads and miseries which cannot be avoided. Second, and principally, because part of happiness and a necessary road to its acquisition, is to will no bad things or to be free from sin, which a human by his nature cannot be, since he exists with contrary affects that fight among themselves. Third, because happiness is eternal of its nature, for he who fears losing the good which he has cannot be happy. But a human as human is not everlasting by his nature. Therefore.

Perhaps someone will say that this whole arguments only works concerning happiness taken in the first way as signifying a collection of all goods, but not concerning the essence of happiness. But to the contrary, although the whole collection of goods does not belong to the essence of happiness, it is, nevertheless, essential to the nature of happiness that it brings [them] with it and requires that perfect state. Therefore, it requires a subject capable of that state.

2. In this question we can deal [i] only formally concerning happiness as it was defined by us, whether a human being has the capacity for it, or [ii] materially or in particular, whether it can be known by what and in what way a human being should be made happy. Scotus discusses it in the latter way in *Sent.* IV, dist. 49, q. 2, and contends that

It is argued for
the negative side.

An evasion is
blocked.

Which difficulty
is being disputed
here.

Quæ hic
disputetur
difficultas.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

30 urali probari esse hominem capacem beatitudinis consistentis
in visione Dei: quam quidem sententiam ego falsam existimo:
sed non potest hic ex professe probari, donec ratio et natura
illius beatitudinis magis cognita sit: et ideo in priori tantum
sensu breviter est hæc quæstio expedienda, in qua præterea
35 potest esse sermo aut de capacitate tantum, aut etiam de facto
an possit probari, hominem aliquando posse consequi beati-
tudinem suam. Denique in hoc procedere quæstio potest, aut
ex principiis revelatis, aut ex solis principiis naturæ.

1. Assertio, de
fide.

3. Dico ergo primo secundum fidem: Certum est homi-
nem esse capacem absolutæ et <42> perfectæ beatitudinis, et
de facto consecuturum illam. Probat, quia Deus in Scri-
40 tura sacra promisit hanc beatitudinem omnibus, ut per se
constat: hæc autem promissio supponit in homine capaci-
tatem ad recipiendam illam, quia Deus non promittit impossi-
bilia. Rursus quamvis Deus non promittat hanc beatitudinem
omnibus absolute, sed justis, et consequenter promissio re-
45 spectu omnium non sit absoluta, sed conditionata, scilicet,
si in iustitia decesserit: tamen et ex eadem sacra Scriptura, et
ex aliis regulis fidei, constat et posse, et de facto impleri hanc
conditionem in multis hominibus. Quod denique illa sit beati-
tudo absoluta et perfecta, constat ex modo, quo de illa lo-
50 quitur, et ex his, quæ de illa docet, vocat enim illam superem-
inens bonum, *quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in
cor hominis ascendit, vocat æternum gloriæ pondus, æternum
gaudium*, quod negat omne malum, et omnem tristitiam, et
alia similia, quæ postea videbimus.

2. Assertio.
1. Probatio.

4. Dico secundo, ex principiis naturæ probari potest,
hominem esse capacem alicujus beatitudinis. Probat, primo
experimento ipso, nihil enim magis receptum fuit apud omnes
philosophos, quamvis enim de re, in qua consistit beatitudo
humana, fuerit inter illos infinita dissensio ut sequenti dis-
60 putatione attingam: tamen quod aliqua sit beatitudo homi-
nis fuit summa consensus, et ita hoc sumit tanquam primum
fundamentum moralis philosophiæ Aristotelis, in 1, Ethic.

it can be shown by natural reason that a human being has the capac-
ity for happiness consisting in the vision of God. As a matter of fact,
I consider this view false. But this cannot be expressly proven until
the *ratio* and nature of that happiness is better known. For this rea-
son, this question should be resolved briefly only in the former sense.
In this, furthermore, the discussion can be either about the capacity
alone or also about whether it can be proven that in fact a human be-
ing can at some point achieve his happiness. Finally, the question can
proceed in this either from revealed principles or from principles of
nature alone.

3. I speak first, then, in accordance with the faith: It is certain that
a human being is capable of absolute and perfect happiness and will
in fact achieve it. It is proven, because God promised this happiness
to everyone in holy Scripture, as is clear in itself. But his promise
assumes a capacity in the human for receiving it, since God does not
promise impossible things.

On the other hand, since God does not promise this happiness
to everyone absolutely but promises it to the just, consequently the
promise is not absolute with respect to everyone, but conditional,
namely, ‘if he departed in justice’. Nevertheless, both from the same
holy Scripture and from other rules of the faith, it is clear both that
this condition can be and in fact is fulfilled in many humans. Finally,
that this is absolute and perfect happiness is clear from the way in
which it is spoken of and from the things that [Scripture] teaches con-
cerning it. For it calls it a super-eminent good ‘that neither the eye has
seen nor the ear has heard nor the heart of man ascended’; it calls it
‘the weight of eternal glory’, ‘eternal joy’, that denies every bad and
every sadness and everything similar, which we will see later.

4. I say, second, that it can be proven from the principles of na-
ture that a human is capable of some happiness. It is shown first from
experience itself, for nothing was more received by all the philoso-
phers. For although there was infinite dissension among them con-
cerning the thing in which human happiness consists, as I will touch
on in the following disputation, yet that something is the happiness
of a human was the highest consensus. And thus this can be taken as
the first foundation of Aristotle’s moral philosophy in *EN* I. Second,

The first
assertion: from
faith.

The second
assertion.
The first proof.

The second.

Secunda. Secundo declaratur ratione in superioribus tacta, quia homo
 65 habet aliquem finem ultimum: ergo potest illum consequi, 65R
 alias frustra et insipienter ordinaretur in illum: sed consecutio
 finis ultimi est beatitudo: ergo.

Instantia. 5. Dices, hac ratione probaretur bruta esse beatitudinis
 70 capacia, quia etiam habent suum finem ultimum, et possunt
 pervenire ad suam ultimam perfectionem. Scotus supra re-
 spondet esse aliquo modo capacia cujusdam beatitudinis im-
 70R perfectæ: tamen Aristoteles 10, Ethicor., cap. 8 et 9, et Au-
 gustinus, quem nuper citavi, simpliciter negant bruta esse ca-
 pacia beatitudinis, et Gregorius Nyssenus, in lib. de Beatitu-
 75 dinibus, dicit, hominem esse capacem beatitudinis, quia est
 ad imaginem Dei, quod est proprium intellectualis naturæ: 75R
 igitur secundæ rationi factæ addendum est ex D. Thoma 1, 2,
 quæst. [1], art. [8], quamvis Deus sit finis ultimus omnium,
 non tamen eodem modo, quia non eodem modo potest at-
 80 tingi ab omnibus: homo enim potest suis actibus immediate
 attingere <col. b> Deum cognoscendo et amando: et ideo 80R
 potest proprie consequi illum finem, atque adeo potest pro-
 prie esse beatus: nam, ut recte dixit Scotus, beatitudo signi-
 ficat consecutionem optimi, atque ultimi boni simpliciter: at
 85 vero animalia bruta non possunt attingere Deum immediate
 suis actionibus, sed solum aliquam perfectionem creatam qua
 85R aliquo modo imitentur Deum, et ideo non possunt consequi
 illum finem ultimum secundum se, et ideo non sunt capacia
 beatitudinis: et hinc est quod homo dicitur immediate crea-
 90 tus propter Deum, aliæ vero inferiores creaturæ sunt immedi-
 ate propter ipsum hominem, et per illum ultimate tendunt in
 90R Deum. Et confirmatur hæc ratio ex naturali appetitu hominis
 ad beatitudinem, hic enim innatus est omnibus hominibus, ut
 dicturi sumus late in fine hujus materiæ, et frequenter dispu-
 95 tat Augustinus, libro primo, de libero Arbitr., capite decimo-
 quarto, et lib. de Vita beata, et lib. 10, Confess., cap. 20, et 95R

it is shown by the argument given in previous sections. For a human being has some ultimate end. Therefore, he can achieve that; otherwise, he would have been ordered to it in vain and foolishly. But the achievement of the ultimate end is happiness. Therefore.

5. You will say that by this argument is proven that non-rational animals have the capacity for happiness, because they also have their ultimate end and can reach their ultimate perfection. Scotus above responds they have in some way a capacity for a certain imperfect happiness. Nevertheless, Aristotle in *EN X*, c. 8 and 9, and Augustine, whom we just cited, simply deny that non-rational animals have the capacity for happiness and Gregory of Nyssa says in *The Beatitudes* that a human being is capable of happiness because he is [made] in the image of God, which is proper to intellectual nature. Therefore, one should add to the second argument that was made³, drawing from St. Thomas [*ST*] IaIIæ.[1.8], that although God is the ultimate end for all things, he is not, nevertheless, the ultimate end in the same way for all things, since he cannot be reached in the same way by all things. For a human being can by his actions immediately attain God by knowing and loving him, and therefore he can properly acquire that end. For this reason, he can properly be happy. For, as Scotus rightly said, happiness signifies the acquisition of the best and ultimate good strictly speaking. But, non-rational animals, on the other hand, cannot reach God immediately by their actions, but only some created perfection by which they in some way imitate God, and therefore they cannot acquire that ultimate end according to itself. For this reason, they are not capable of happiness. This is the reason that a human being is said to be created immediately for the sake of God, but other lower creatures are said to be created immediately for the sake of human beings and through them ultimately tend to God.

And this argument is confirmed by a human being's natural appetite for happiness, for this is innate to all humans, as we will soon discuss more broadly at the end of this material and as Augustine frequently argues (*De libero arbitrio* I, c. 14; *De vita beata*; *Conf. X*, c. 20;

An objection.

It is resolved.

A confirmation.

³In the previous paragraph.

77 1] 5 A V.

77 8] 2 A 1 V.

77 Deus] om. V.

		in Enchirid., cap. 25, sed appetitus naturalis fundatur in naturali capacitate, et non tendit nisi in rem aliquo modo naturæ possibilem, quia appetitus naturalis est naturæ consentaneus: ergo beatitudo, quæ est objectum hujus appetitus, est res possibilis homini cujus ipse est capax natura sua.	100R	and <i>Ench.</i> c. 25). But natural desire is founded in natural capacity and does not tend to anything except to something in some way possible for that nature, since natural desire is appropriate to nature. Therefore, happiness, which is the object of this desire, is a possible thing for a human, [something] of which he is capable by his nature.	
3. Assertio.	100	6. Dico tertio, ex principiis etiam naturæ potest humanis rationibus satis congruentibus ostendi humanam speciem fore aliquando beatificandam. Loquor de specie humana, quia non est necesse ut in omnibus suis individuis consequatur suum finem; quia cum multiplicatio individuorum sit quodammodo per accidens, non est inconveniens aliqua deflectere a suo fine, præsertim quia cum homo sit liberi arbitrii, per eum stare potest quominus suum finem consequatur: satis ergo erit quod in aliquibus individuis hæc species suum finem obtineat. Hoc autem probari potest, quia ad convenientem providentiam auctoris naturæ spectat ita gubernare et dirigere singulas naturas in suos fines ut non omnino illis frustretur: primo quidem, quia viderentur frustra creati homines propter talem finem, si nunquam neque in ullo individuo illum essent consecuturi: quid enim prodesset hominis capacitas beatitudinis, si nunquam esset implenda? Secundo, quia id, quod nunquam accidit in omnibus individuis alicujus speciei etiamsi quamplurima multiplicentur, merito dici potest impossibile, si non omnino physice, seu metaphysice, saltem moraliter, et humano modo loquendo: pertinet autem ad providentiam auctoris naturæ, et quodammodo debitum est ipsi humanæ naturæ ita dirigi in suum finem, ut possit illum consequi. Tertio possumus etiam uti ratione, qua Chrysostomus et alii Patres sæpe utuntur ad probandam resurrectionem, nam quidam homines totam vitam in vitiis, et in peccatis transigunt, alii honeste vivunt: pertinet ergo ad providentiam auctoris naturæ illos punire, hos remunerare: ergo respondere debet operibus virtutis aliquod beatitudinis præmium.	100R	6. I say, third, that it can be shown even from the principles of nature by sufficiently congruent human reasons that the human species will sometimes be made happy. I speak of the human species, because it is not necessary that each and every individual achieve his end. Because when the multiplication of individuals is in a certain way <i>per accidens</i> , it is not disagreeable that someone is turned aside from his end, especially because when a human has freewill, it can result through that that his end is not achieved. Therefore, it will be sufficient that this species obtain its end in some individuals.	The third assertion.
Explicatur.	105		105R	Moreover, this can be proven, because it belongs to the agreeable providence of the author of nature to govern and direct each nature to his end such that it is not wholly frustrated for them. First, indeed, because created human beings would seem to be frustrated on account of such an end, if no individual were ever able to achieve it. For what would be the use of a capacity for human happiness if it were never fulfilled?	It is explained.
Probat triplici capite.	110		110R	Second, because that which never happens in any individual of some species even if they are multiplied as far as possible, is deservedly called impossible—if not entirely physically or metaphysically impossible, at least impossible morally and in a human way of speaking. Moreover, it belongs to the providence of the author of nature and in a certain way it must be that human nature is directed to its end in such a way that it can achieve it.	It is proven from three sources.
Primo.	115		115R	Thirdly, we can also use the argument which Chrysostom and other Fathers often use to prove the resurrection, for certain humans complete an entire life in vices and sins but others live righteously (<i>honeste</i>). Therefore, it belongs to the providence of the author of nature to punish the former and to reward the latter. Therefore, some prize ought to answer virtuous actions.	The first.
Secundo.	120		120R	7. You will say that, speaking absolutely, God was able to govern human affairs in such a way that no human would attain happiness, permitting everyone to fall into sin and to harden in it all the way to the end of life, just as it is believed happened to many species of angels.	The second.
Tertio.	125		125R		The third.
Instantiæ occurritur.	130		130R		An objection comes up.

135 evenisse creditur. Respondetur: ideo non dixi rationes factas
 esse demonstrationes, sed morales rationes multum suadentes 135R
 et ostendentes modum providentiæ maxime consentaneum
 divinæ sapientiæ et bonitati. Unde licet non negemus po-
 tuisse Deum id facere de potentia absoluta; negamus tamen id
 esse satis consentaneum et naturis rerum, et convenienti or-
 140 dini universi. Ad exemplum autem Angelorum respondetur, 140R
 illud supponere omnes Angelos esse specie diversos, et in sin-
 gulis speciebus tantum esse unum individuum: quo admissio,
 non est similis ratio, quia non poterat species angelica per-
 145 mittere peccare, et cadere a suo fine, quin omnia individua ejus-
 dem speciei permitterentur eodem modo cadere, quia supponit 145R
 non esse multa, sed unum, et alioquin fuit conveniens
 etiam Angelos permitti suæ libertati, et ideo in illis censetur
 illud non esse inconveniens, quia omnes conveniunt in eodem
 gradu, et in eodem modo tendendi in suum finem: homines
 150 autem habent suum proprium modum, et quodammodo spe- 150R
 cialem gradum constituunt.

Ad argum. in
 num. 1.

8. Ad rationem dubitandi in principio positam proce-
 dendo ex principiis revelatis dicimus duo: Primum est, non
 155 posse hominem suæ naturæ viribus, aut per naturales causas 155R
 illum felicem statum consequi. Secundum est, in hac vita
 omnino non posse ad illum pervenire, etiam per auxilia
 gratiæ secundum legem ordinariam. Nihilominus satis est,
 illum statum fore aliquando possibilem homini cum divina
 ope, et auxilio. Procedendo autem ex principiis naturæ, dice-
 160 mus similiter duo sumpta ex Aristotele. Primum est, beati-
 tudinem possibilem homini secundum naturam suam esse im-
 perfectam, non tamen omnino nullam. Et hoc est, quod Aris-
 165 toteles dixit 1, Ethic., c. 10, <col. b> posse nos esse beatos,
 tamen ut homines. Unde non est de essentia cujuscumque 165R
 beatitudinis, ut absolute et simpliciter excludat omnem de-
 fectum, sed primo et per se est de ejus essentia, ut sit conse-
 cutio ultimi finis: consequenter vero habet ut excludat omne
 malum, quantum fieri poterit, juxta subjecti capacitatem. Se-

It is responded that it was for that reason not said that the arguments
 made were demonstrations but moral reasons greatly persuading and
 showing the mode of providence most appropriate to divine wisdom
 and goodness. Hence, although we do not deny that God could bring
 that about by absolute power, we do, nonetheless, deny that it would
 be appropriate both to the natures of things and to the agreeable order
 of the universe.

To the example of the angels, moreover, is responded that it as-
 sumes that every angel is a different species and that there is only one
 individual in each species. By that having been admitted, it is not a
 similar argument, because an angelic species could not be permitted
 to sin and to fall from its end without every individual of that species
 being permitted in the same way to fall. For there is assumed to be
 only one individual, not multiple ones. And besides, it was agreeable
 also to permit the angels their freedom, and therefore the former is
 not considered disagreeable in them, since they all belong to the same
 grade and they all tend in the same way to their end. Human beings,
 however, have their own way and in a certain way constitute a special
 grade.

8. To the reason for doubting given in the beginning, we make
 two points proceeding from revealed principles. The first is that a
 human being cannot through his natural strengths or through natu-
 165 ral causes achieve that felicitous state. The second is that in this life
 he cannot wholly reach that, even through the help of grace in ac-
 cordance with the ordinary law. Nonetheless, it is sufficient that that
 state will be possible for a human being at some point with divine
 power and help.

Moreover, proceeding from principles of nature, we may simi-
 larly make two points taken from Aristotle. The first is that the hap-
 piness possible for a human being in accordance with his nature is
 imperfect and yet not wholly nothing. And this is what Aristotle says
 in *EN* I, c. 10: we can be happy still as humans. Hence it is not of the
 essence of whatever happiness that it absolutely and strictly speaking
 exclude every defect, but it is primarily and essentially of its essence
 that it is the attainment of the ultimate end. But consequently it holds
 so that it excludes every bad insofar as that will be able to happen in

To the argument
 in n. 1.

170 cundum est, quod Aristoteles dixit 10, Ethic., cap. 7, talis vita
superat hominis naturam, non enim hoc *ipso quo homo est*
ita vivit, sed quo est quid in ipso divinum, id est, quatenus
mentem habet et immortalem animam, in qua posset homo
perpetuam beatitudinem consequi, et carere temporalibus in-
commodis, et aliquo modo satiari juxta naturæ capacitatem. 175R

accordance with the capacity of the subject. The second is what Aristotle says in *EN X*, c. 7: such a life surpasses human nature, for 'it is not insofar as he is human that one lives like this, but insofar as there is something divine in him'. That is, insofar as he has a mind and an immortal soul, in which the human being can achieve everlasting happiness and be free from temporal disadvantages and in some way be satisfied in accordance with the capacity of his nature.