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<39><sup>2</sup>

*De beatitudine in communi; an sit, at quid sit.*

Beatitudo hominis re ipsa idem est cum ultimo fine cum solum differre videantur, quod sub nomine finis indicat formalem rationem causæ: sub nomine autem beatitudinis solum dicit rationem boni perfecti et consummati: unde Deus dicitur habere beatitudinem perfectam, quamvis non habeat proprie ultimum finem: in homine vero quia beatitudo est res ab ipso distincta, quæ illam movet ad sui amorem, et inquisitionem propter seipsam et reliqua omnia in ipsam ordinando ut in bonum perfectum, sicut Aristoteles dixit 1, Ethic., cap. 4, ideo beatitudo habet rationem finis. Atque ob hanc causam, postquam dictum est de communi ratione et causalitate finis ultimi, oportet inquirere, quid sit finis ultimus, seu quæ sit vera hominis beatitudo: de qua tria potissimum disputantur: Quid sit? Quæ perfectiones illam consequantur? Et quomodo appetatur, vel comparetur? Antequam vero ad hæc accedam, oportet de significatione vocis, et de quæstione, an sit beatitudo, pauca præmittere.

SECTIO I.

*Quæ sit communis ratio beatitudinis, et propria hujus vocis significatio.*

Quorumdam non contemnenda acceptio duplex beatitudinis.

5 1. Hæc quæstio est prima <col. b> omnium, juxta Aristotelem 1, Poster., cujus materia est maxime necessaria, ut fixum ac certum scopum possit habere disputatio: nam ex de-

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

*Concerning happiness in general: whether it is and what it is.*

5R The happiness of a human being is the same thing as his ultimate end, since they only seem to differ because the formal nature of a cause is indicated by the name ‘end’ while the nature of perfect and consummate good is expressed by the name ‘happiness’. This is why God is said to have perfect happiness even though he does not properly have an ultimate end. But because in the case of a human being happiness is something distinct from him that moves him to love it and to search for it for its own sake and with all remaining things ordered to it as to a perfect good (as Aristotle says in *EN* I, c. 4), therefore happiness has the nature of an end. And for this reason, after one has spoken about the general nature and causality of the ultimate end, one ought to inquire into what the ultimate end is or what true happiness for a human being is. Three matters are especially disputed concerning this: What is it? 15R What perfections follow it? And in what way is it desired or acquired? But before I will approach these matters, I should first talk a little about the signification of the word and of the question whether there is such a thing as happiness.

SECTION I.

*What the general ratio of happiness is and what the proper signification of the word is.*

5R 1. This question is the first of all those whose matter—according to Aristotle in *Post. I*—is especially necessary in order for the disputation to have a fixed and certain target. For it is a defect that the scholastics

Of those not shunned, ‘happiness’ has two senses.

fectu ejus, scholastici in hac re multiplicatis hujus nominis acceptionibus, plures quæstiones revocant ad disputationem de modo loquendi, ut videre licet in Scoto, in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 3, 5 et 6, et Durando, quæst. 4 et 6, Paludano, quæst. 3, Majore, quæst. 1 et 5, Ochamo, in 4, quæst. ult., art. 4, et Olchoto, q. 8, articulo 2, apud quos, omissis aliis divisionibus, de quibus dicam in sect. 3, illa est celebrior, quod *beatitudo* interdum est nomen collectivum, significant aggregatum omnium perfectionum hominis; interdum vero significat simplicem perfectionem, verbi gratia, perfectissimam hominis operationem. Quam distinctionem alii rejiciunt tanquam gratis, et sine fundamento confictam, quoniam *beatitudo* nomen univocum est, atque ita unam aliquam rationem significare debet. Sed revera non potest rejici, quia et in re ipsa, et in usu sapientum habet magnum fundamentum; sed debet proprie et commode explicari.

1. Beatitudinis  
acceptio ex  
sententia  
Auctoris.

2. Primo ergo beatitudo significare potest statum quemdam felicem, in quo habebit homo plenitudinem bonorum et complementum suorum desideriorum, qui interdum in sacra Scriptura nomine *Regni cælorum* appellatur Matth. 25: *Venite, benedicti, accipite regnum*: interdum nomine *vite æternæ*, ibidem: *Et ibunt hi in vitam æternam*: interdum nomine *gloriæ*, *Et ita intrare in gloriam suam*, Luc. 24. Atque hoc modo videtur definiisse beatitudinem Boetius, dicens: *Est Beatitudo status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus*. Sic etiam intelligi potest quod Augustinus dixit 15, de Trinit., cap. 5: *Beatus est qui habet omnia quæ vult*; et quod dixit, libro I de libero Arbitrio, cap. 13: *Beate vivere, est bonis veris certisque gaudere*. Sic Gregorius Nyssenus, lib. de Beatitud., in princ.: *Beatitudo, inquit, est comprehensio quædam omnium earum rerum*

<sup>3</sup>I will use ‘felicitous’ for ‘felix’, although it’s not an entirely, well, felicitous translation, and reserve ‘happy’ for ‘beatus’ and ‘happiness’ for ‘beatitudo’.

<sup>4</sup>Vulgate reads: ‘Tunc dicit rex his qui a dextris ejus erunt: Venite benedicti Patris mei, possidete paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi’.

<sup>5</sup>Vulgate reads: ‘Et ibunt hi in supplicium æternum: justi autem in vitam æternam’.

<sup>6</sup>Vulgate reads: ‘Nonne hæc oportuit pati Christum, et ita intrare in gloriam suam?’

11 ult.] *om. V.*

13 3] 2 *V.*

21 debet] *om. V.*

29 24] 23 *A V.*

33 1] *om. V.*

in this matter turn many questions to a dispute over ways of speaking by multiplying the senses of this name. One can see this in Scotus, IV, dist. 49, qq. 3, 5 and 6; Durandus, qq. 4 and 6; Paludanus, q. 3; [John] Maior, qq. 1 and 5; Ockham, IV, art. 4 of the last question; and Holkot, q. 8, art. 2. Among these senses, other divisions about which I will speak in sect. 3 having been set aside for the moment, the more famous sense is that ‘happiness’ sometimes is a collective name, signifying the aggregate of all perfections of a human being. But sometimes it signifies a single perfection, for example, a human being’s most perfect activity. Others reject this distinction as serving no purpose and fashioned without foundation, because the name ‘happiness’ is univocal and so should signify some one nature. But it cannot really be rejected because it has a strong foundation both in the thing itself and in the use of the wise. But this should be properly and agreeably explained.

2. First, therefore, happiness can signify a certain felicitous state,<sup>3</sup> in which a human being has an abundance of goods and a full complement of the things he desires, which in the sacred Scriptures is sometimes designated by the name ‘kingdom of heaven’, e.g., in Matt. 25[:34]: ‘Come, you who are blessed, receive the kingdom’.<sup>4</sup> And sometimes by the name ‘eternal life’, e.g., in [Matt. 25:46]: ‘And these will enter into eternal life’.<sup>5</sup> And sometimes by the name ‘glory’, e.g., in Luke 24[:26]: ‘And thus to enter into his glory’.<sup>6</sup>

And Boethius seems to define happiness in this way, saying: ‘Happiness is a perfect state with an aggregation of all goods’. What Augustine says can also be understood in this way: ‘Happy is he who has everything that he wants’ (*de Trin.* XV, c. 5) and ‘To live happily is to rejoice in true and certain goods’ (*de lib. arb.*, I, c. 13). Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa in the beginning of *de Beatitud.*: ‘Happiness’, he says, ‘is

The 1st sense of ‘happiness’ in the author’s view.

quæ in homine intelliguntur, a qua nihil abest eorum, quæ per-  
 tinent ad bonorum desiderium, atque cupiditatem. Sic etiam  
 D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 5, art. 3 et 4, dicit, beatitudinem  
 40 esse perfectum, ac sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludens, et  
 omne desiderium implens. Sic denique videtur loqui interdum  
 de beatitudine Aristoteles dicens, bene vivere, et bene agere, et  
 45 felicem esse, eadem esse putant omnes 1, Ethic., cap. 4. Et ra-  
 tio adjungi potest supponendo hujusmodi statum esse possi-  
 bilem ho- <40> mini, et ad perfectam omni ex parte felic-  
 itatem requiri: nam hic status concipitur per modum unius  
 completi et consummati boni: ergo potest una voce signifi-  
 45 cari. Quid ergo impedit quominus hac voce *beatitudo* vel *fe-*  
*licitas* significetur, cum hæc sit accommodata, et nulla alia sit  
 50 ad hoc imposita. Et confirmatur, nam in homine solemus dis-  
 tinguere beatitudinem animæ et beatitudinem corporis, et sic  
 dicimus, Christum in via habuisse animæ beatitudinem, non  
 55 tamen corporis, et sancti dicunt animas nunc esse beatas, non  
 tamen habere beatitudinem omni ex parte completam: ergo in  
 his omnibus locutionibus supponitur *beatitudinem* uno modo  
 significare hujusmodi statum omni ex parte perfectum.

2. *Acceptio magis  
 propria.*

3. Magis vero proprie juxta scholasticam consuetudinem  
 accipi solet beatitudo prout significat summam quamdam per-  
 fectionem hominis, qua conjungitur optimo ac summo bono,  
 60 seu fini ultimo suo, quæ alio modo dici solet perfectissima ho-  
 minis operatio, qua suum finem ultimum consequitur. Atque  
 hoc modo frequentius videtur loqui de beatitudine Aristoteles  
 1 et 10, Ethic., et D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 2, cum docet, beat-  
 itudinem consistere in contemplatione, vel in optima opera-  
 65 tione; si vero requirit alia bona ad statum beatificum, solum est  
 quatenus huic optimæ operationi deserviunt, ut aliquo modo  
 perficiunt hominem in ordine ad illam. Atque hoc modo lo-  
 quitur de beatitudine frequentius D. Thomas in hac materia,  
 et tota quæst. 2, in 1, 2, et cum absentia beatitudinis excludit  
 70 cætera bona creata præter Deum, et quæst. 3, artic. 1 et 4, et  
 sæpe alias cum docet beatitudinem consistere in adeptione seu  
 possessione summi boni. Item eadem ratione dicunt sæpe et  
 sancti Patres et philosophi, hominem esse capacem beatitudinis

35R a certain comprehension of all those things which are understood in a  
 human, by which none of those are absent which pertain to the desire  
 and cupidity for goods'. Likewise, St. Thomas says in [ST] IaIIæ.5.3  
 and 4 that happiness is a 'perfect and sufficient good, excluding all bad  
 and satisfying every desire'. Finally, it seems that sometimes Aristotle  
 40R speaks in this way concerning happiness, saying: 'to live well and to do  
 well and to be felicitous are thought by everyone to be the same' (EN I,  
 c. 4).

And a reason can be added for supposing that this sort of state is  
 possible for humans and can require every part for perfect felicity. For  
 45R this state is conceived in the mode of one complete and consummate  
 good. Therefore, it can be signified by one expression. What, there-  
 fore, stands in the way so that this expression 'happiness' or 'felicity'  
 does not signify, when this is suitable and no other expression has been  
 imposed for this? And it is confirmed for we are accustomed to dis-  
 50R tinguishing between the happiness of the soul and the happiness of the  
 body in a human, and thus we say that Christ had happiness of the soul  
 during his earthly life but not happiness of the body. And saintly souls  
 are said to be happy now, but nevertheless not to have complete happi-  
 ness in every part. Therefore, in all these locutions it is assumed that  
 55R 'happiness' in one way signifies this sort of state perfect in every part.

3. But according to scholastic custom happiness is usually more  
 properly taken as signifying a certain highest perfection of a human be-  
 ing, in which he is conjoined with his best and highest good or ultimate  
 end, which in another way is usually said to be a human being's most  
 60R perfect activity by which his ultimate end is acquired. And Aristotle  
 seems to speak more frequently in this way concerning happiness in  
 EN I and X, as well as St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.2, when he teaches that  
 happiness consists in contemplation or in the best activity. But if other  
 goods are required for the beatific state, it is only insofar as they serve  
 65R this best activity so that they in some way perfect the human being in  
 relation to the best activity. And St. Thomas speaks more often in this  
 way concerning happiness in this matter and in all of q. 2, and when  
 the absence of happiness excludes the remaining created goods besides  
 God, and q. 3, art. 1 and 4 and often elsewhere when he teaches that  
 70R happiness consists in the attainment or possession of the highest good.

Likewise, for the same reason, both the holy Fathers and the  
 philosophers often say that a human being is capable of the happiness

The 2nd sense is  
 more proper.

75 secundum animam, et non secundum corpus, si enim sit sermo  
 de collectione bonorum, hæc partim in anima, partim in cor-  
 pore reperiuntur: tamen loquendo proprie de beatitudine in 75R  
 prædicta significatione pro adeptione ultimi finis, hæc in anima  
 reperitur, ut postea dicemus, et ideo sancti in solis animabus  
 dicuntur simpliciter beati, quamvis careant ex parte bonorum,  
 80 quæ ad corpus pertinent: et similiter Christus in via fuit bea-  
 tus propter beatitudinem animæ. Denique hac ratione dicitur 80R  
 solus homo proprie capax beatitudinis, ut docuit Augustinus,  
 lib. 83, Quæst., quæst. 5, et lib. 12, de Civit., cap. 1, nam si  
 sit sermo de statu perfecto, et de collectione omnium perfec-  
 tionum, quæ na- <col. b> turæ debentur, sic unaquæque res  
 85 juxta capacitatem suæ naturæ potest dici capax suæ felicitatis, si  
 sit in statu perfecto juxta naturam suam; tamen quia beatitudo  
 proprie significat, et requirit conjunctionem cum ultimo fine,  
 attingendo illum aliquo modo in se per propriam operationem  
 90 creaturæ capax beatitudinis, ideo sola creatura rationalis dicitur  
 capax beatitudinis simpliciter, quia illa sola est capax hujus  
 operationis, in qua consistit beatitudinis essentia.

Ratio declarans  
 hanc propriam  
 acceptionem.

4. Ratione denique ita potest hoc declarari, quia licet  
 ad statum perfectum beatitudinis multa concurrant, tamen  
 95 necesse est, ut inter illa aliquid sit summum, ad quod cætera  
 referantur, vel ex eo tanquam ex primo fonte dimanent, aut  
 in eo eminenter contineantur: quia non potest esse aggregatio  
 multorum perfecta, sine aliquo ordine multorum inter se: il-  
 lud ergo, quod est summum et perfectum in eo statu, dicitur 100R  
 essentia beatitudinis: cætera vero sunt veluti proprietates aut  
 accidentia ejus. Vel aliter, quamvis multa bona reperiantur in  
 beato, non tamen per omnia attingit suum supremum finem,  
 aut illum consequitur: ergo non omnia æque pertinent ad beat-  
 itudinem, neque ad rationem ultimi finis: ergo beatitudo signi-  
 105 ficat perfectionem ultimam ad quam cætera referuntur; merito  
 essentia beatitudinis non dicitur consistere in tota illa collec-  
 tione, sed in eo, quod est in illa supremum et ultimum: hoc  
 igitur proprie significare potest hæc vox *beatitudo*; atque hoc  
 fere modo utemur illa in tota hac materia; statum vero beat-  
 itudinis ad tollendam æquivocationem hoc modo semper ap- 110R

of the soul and not of the happiness of the body, for if the discussion  
 is about the collection of goods, these are found partly in the soul and  
 partly in the body. Nevertheless, speaking properly concerning happi-  
 ness in the aforementioned signification as the attainment of the 75R  
 ultimate end, this is found in the soul, as we will say later, and therefore  
 the holy are called happy only in their souls, strictly speaking, how-  
 ever much they may lack the goods which pertain to the body. And,  
 80R similarly, Christ was happy during his earthly life on account of the  
 happiness of the soul.

Finally, for this reason only a human being is properly called ca-  
 pable of happiness, as Augustine taught in *Quæst.* lib. 83, q. 5 and *de*  
*Civit.* XII, c. 1. For if the discussion is about a perfect state and a col-  
 lection of all the perfections owed to a nature, each thing can be called  
 capable of its felicity according to the capacity of its nature, if it is in  
 the perfect state according to its nature. Nevertheless, because happi-  
 ness properly signifies and requires conjunction with the ultimate end  
 by arriving at it in some way in itself through the proper activity of a  
 creature capable of happiness, for this reason only a rational creature is,  
 85R strictly speaking, capable of happiness because only it is capable of this  
 activity in which the essence of happiness consists. 90R

4. This can, finally, be established by reason in this way: although  
 many things concur for this perfect state of happiness, it is, neverthe-  
 less, necessary that something among them is highest to which the re-  
 maining are referred or from which they flow just as from a first spring  
 or in which they are eminently contained. For there cannot be a perfect  
 aggregate of many things without some order between the many things.  
 Therefore, that which is the highest and perfect in that state is called the  
 essence of happiness. But the others are, as it were, properties or acci-  
 dents of it. Or, to put it differently, although many goods are found  
 in a happy [life], one does not, nevertheless, attain one's supreme end  
 through all of them nor does it follow from all of them. Therefore, not  
 all pertain equally to happiness nor to the nature of an ultimate end.  
 Therefore, happiness signifies the ultimate perfection to which the re-  
 maining things are referred. The essence of happiness is rightly not  
 said to consist in that entire collection, but in that which is supreme  
 and ultimate among [the members of that collection]. The expression  
 'happiness', therefore, can properly signify this. And we will generally  
 use it in this way in this entire discussion. But in order to avoid equiv-

A reason  
 establishing this  
 proper sense.

pellabimus, quamvis in eo statu possit esse latitudo, et in illo oporteat aliqua distinctione uti, quam opportuniori loco trademus.

Beatitudo partim  
formalis, partim  
objectiva.

115 5. Atque ex his sequitur primo, quod sicut supra agentes de fine diximus interdum finem significare rem, quæ intenditur: interdum vero consecutionem illius rei, ita in præsentī in beatitudine duo possunt considerari, aliud est res, qua vel quibus beatificamur, aliud est consecutio illius rei; illa vocatur objectum beatitudinis, seu beatitudo objectiva: hæc vocatur beatitudo formalis, seu per modum consecutionis: utraque vero constituit unam beatitudinem, quia una sine altera beatificare non potest, sed utramque in suo genere concurrere necesse est. Unde concludi potest formalis quædam, et generalis descriptio beatitudinis, <41> saltem quoad quid nominis, *est enim consecutio ultimi, ac supremi boni, quod ab homine desiderari potest, et in quo cætera virtute continetur, seu ad illud referuntur*: quæ descriptio ex communi consensu omnium, qui de beatitudine loquuntur, sumitur; et sacra Scripture etiam hac ratione de beatitudine loquitur per modum possessionis, seu consecutionis, Matth. 25, *possidete regnum*: 1, ad Corinth. 4: *Sic currite ut comprehendatis*, ad Philip. 3: *Sequor, si quo modo comprehendam*. Et ratio esse potest, quia beatitudo dicit terminum, quamdiu autem homo inquit, non quiescit, terminatur autem inquisitio ad acquisitionem: ergo necesse est ut beatitudo in acquisitione consistat. Quod exemplo falsæ beatitudinis declarari etiam potest, nam avarus, qui beatitudinem suam ponit in divitiis, non censet se beatam illas inquirendo, aut vendendo, sed obtinendo et possidendo; et idem de similibus. Idem ergo erit in vera beatitudine, quæ consistit in consecutione veri ac supremi boni. Sic Gregorius Nyssenus explicans sextam beatitudinem, *Beati mundo corde*.

Sed inquireret aliquis, quæ sit formalis ratio hujus consecutionis. Respondetur nunc in communi solum dici posse consistere in aliqua conjunctione hominis cum illo bono, quo beatif-

icatione we will always designate the state of happiness in this way, although there can be latitude in that state and one should make some distinction in it, which we will make in an opportune place.

5. And from these things it follows, first, that just as we said above when talking about the end that sometimes the end signifies the thing which is intended and sometimes the acquisition of that thing, so at present two things can be considered in happiness: one is the thing by which or in which we are made happy and the other is the acquisition of that thing. The former is called the object of happiness or objective happiness; the latter is called formal happiness or happiness in the mode of attainment. But both together constitute one happiness, because one without the other cannot make one happy, but it is necessary that both of their genus come together. Hence, a certain formal and general description of happiness can be composed, at least insofar as the name is concerned: **for it is the attainment of the most ultimate and supreme good that can be desired by a human and in which the remaining [goods] are virtually contained or to which they are referred.** This description is taken from the general consensus of everyone who talks about happiness. And holy Scripture also for this reason talks about happiness in the mode of possession or attainment: ‘take hold of the kingdom’ (Matt. 25[:34]),<sup>7</sup> ‘Run so as to get [the prize]’ (1 Cor. 4[i.e., 9:24]),<sup>8</sup> and ‘I press on, if in that way I may take hold’ (Phil. 3).<sup>9</sup> And the reason can be that happiness expresses a *terminus*. As long as a human being searches, he does not rest, but his search is terminated by the attainment. Therefore, it is necessary that happiness consists in attainment. It can also be shown by the example of false happiness, for the miser who places his happiness in wealth does not consider himself happy in seeking wealth or in selling, but in obtaining and possessing. And likewise for similar cases. Therefore, it will be the same in true happiness, which consists in the acquisition of the true and supreme good. Gregory of Nyssa explains the sixth beatitude—‘Happy are the pure in heart’ ([Matt. 5:8])—in this way.

But if someone asks what the formal nature of this acquisition is, I respond that for the moment it can generally only be said to consist in

Happiness, partly  
formal, partly  
objective.

A description of  
integrated  
happiness.

<sup>7</sup>Vulgate: ‘Tunc dicet rex his qui a dextris ejus erunt: Venite benedicti Patris mei, possidete paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi’.

<sup>8</sup>Vulgate: ‘Nescitis quod ii qui in stadio currunt, omnes quidem currunt, sed unus accipit bravium? Sic currite ut comprehendatis’.

<sup>9</sup>Vulgate: ‘non quod jam acceperim, aut jam perfectus sim: sequor autem, si quomodo comprehendam in quo et comprehensus sum a Christo Jesu’.

145 icandus est. An vero hæc conjunctio fiat per unionem, vel op-  
 145R erationem, vel alio modo, pertinet ut ita dicam, ad materialem  
 rationem beatitudinis, quæ postea est a nobis explicanda: nam  
 ex formali ratione consecutionis, ut sic, illud proprie definiri  
 potest. Itaque videtur hæc ratio in hoc consistere, quod res, seu  
 150 bonum, ita possideatur ac teneatur, sicut appetitur et desider-  
 150R atur; nam cum hæc consecutio sit terminus desiderii, et sati-  
 etas ejus, tunc censetur res consecuta quando ita obtinetur si-  
 cut desideratur, quod videre licet in falsa beatitudine, nam qui  
 illam ponit in divitiis, eas assequitur per dominium et pos-  
 155 sessionem; qui vero in delectatione ciborum, habebit conse-  
 155R cutionem per sensum gustus et tactus, et sic de cæteris: ergo  
 sicut in falsa beatitudine, consecutio respondet pravo appeti-  
 tui, ita in vera beatitudine illa censetur vera consecutio quæ  
 terminat, et apta est satiare perfectum ac rectum appetitum  
 160 veri, et summi boni; et quoniam hic appetitus est consenta-  
 160R neus, et proportionatus fini, seu objecto suo, ideo consecutio  
 illi respondens erit etiam proportionata tali objecto, atque adeo  
 talis erit, qualis res illa, quæ summum bonum postulaverit, seu  
 165 quatenus natura sua apta fuerit ut possideatur et <col. b> te-  
 165R neatur; qualis autem in particulari sit, postea dicemus.

some conjunction of a human being with that good by which he is to  
 be made happy. But whether this conjunction happens through union  
 or action or in some other way pertains, if I may speak this way, to the  
 material nature of happiness, which is to be explained by us later. For  
 from the formal nature of attainment as such the former can properly  
 be defined. And so it seems that this nature consists in this, that the  
 thing or good is seized and held just as it is sought and desired (*appeti-*  
*tur et desideratur*). For when this attainment is the *terminus* of a desire  
 and satisfies it, then the thing is considered to have been achieved when  
 it is obtained in the way that it is desired. One may see this in the case  
 155R of false happiness, for he who places it in wealth pursues it through  
 ownership and possession, but he who places it in the delight of food,  
 will have attainment through the senses of taste and touch, and so on  
 for the rest. Therefore, just as in false happiness attainment responds to  
 a depraved desire, so in true happiness that is considered a true attain-  
 160R ment which terminates and is apt to satisfy the perfect and right desire  
 for the true and highest good. And because this desire is fitting and pro-  
 portionate to its end or object, the attainment corresponding to it will  
 also be proportionate to such an object and will be just like the thing  
 which the highest good demanded or insofar as its nature was apt for  
 possessing and holding. What it is in particular, however, we will talk  
 165R about later.