

© Sydney Penner 2010

<35, col. b>²

Utrum necesse sit, hominem semper operari propter finem ultimum simpliciter a se intentum.

Whether it is necessary that a human being always act for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that he himself intends.

Duplex sensus
quæstionis.

5 1. Duplex potest esse sensus quæstionis, primus absolutus, an necessarium sit præcedere in homine aliquam intentionem finis ultimi absolute propter quem operetur. Secundo ex hypothesi, an postquam homo habuit talem intentionem, necessarium sit, ut ab illa procedant omnes alii actus circa fines particulares.

5R

1. The question can have two senses. The first is absolute: whether it is necessary that there precede in a human being some intention for an absolutely ultimate end for the sake of which he acts. The second is by hypothesis: whether after a human being had such an intention, it is necessary that all other acts about particular ends proceed from it.

Two senses of the
question.

Expeditur prior
sensus.

10 Prior sensus resolutus fere est ex dictis in prima sectione hujus disputationis, pauca vero addenda sunt propter quosdam auctores, qui necessarium putant, ut ante omnes intentiones finem particularium, antecedant in homine secundum rationem operante, intentio finis ultimi universalis, non quidem finis ultimi materialis, quia non est necesse, ut in aliqua re particulari primum omnium ponatur finis ultimus simpliciter, quia neque hoc

10R

10R The former sense was nearly resolved by what was said in the first section of this disputation, but a few words should be added because of certain authors who think that in a human being acting rationally an intention for the universal ultimate end must precede before every intention for a particular end—[a universal ultimate end, but] not indeed a material ultimate end, because it is not necessary for an unqualifiedly ultimate end to be placed first of all in some particular thing, for neither is this necessary for the posterior acts which are turned to particular goods. And this is hardly possible for a human being, because to constitute the ultimate end in this or that thing is very difficult and requires powerful cognition. Therefore, these authors speak of the formal ultimate end, that is, of the complement of all good. For they want it to be necessary that the first act of a human will is about felicity or about the good in general or about the perfect and complete good of a human being, so that acts concerning particular goods arise from this disposition (*affectu*).

The former sense
is explained.

De 2. sensu
placitum
aliquorum.

15 est necessarium ad posteriores actus, qui versantur circa particularia bona, nec fere homini possibile, quia constituere finem ultimum in hac, vel illa re, est valde difficile, et magnam cognitionem requirit: loquuntur ergo hi auctores de fine ultimo formali, id est, de complemento totius boni, volunt enim necessarium esse, ut primus actus humanæ voluntatis sit circa felicitatem, vel circa bonum in communi, seu circa perfectum et completum bonum ho- <36> mini, ut ex hoc affectu oriantur actus circa particularia bona. Huic sententiæ videtur favere divus Thomas, prima secunda, quæst. 1, art. 6, ad 3, in illis verbis: *Virtus primæ intentionis, quæ est respectu ultimi finis, movet in quocumque appetitu cujuscumque rei, etsi de ultimo fine actu non cogitet.* Idem videtur sentire in 1 part., quæst. 60, art. 2,

15R

20R

25R

25R St. Thomas seems to favour this view in these words from [ST] IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3: ‘The force of the first intention which is with respect to the ultimate end moves in any desire for whatever thing, even if one does not actually think about the ultimate end’. The same seems to be thought in Ia.60.2 [co.]; in Capreolus, [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1, concerning the

Of the 2nd sense
pleasing to some.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

	et Capreolus, in 1, dist. 1, quaest. 5, art. 1, circa primam conclusionem, et in 4, dist. 49, quaest. 3, a. 1, et Cajetanus, eadem			
	30 1, 2, et 1 part., quaest. 22, art. 2, dub. 2. Citari etiam solent Durandus, in 2, dist. 38, quaest. 3, et dist. 39, quaest. 3, et Henriquez, quodlibeto 3, quaest. 17. Sed hi auctores nihil expresse dicunt, sed solum voluntatem naturaliter ferri in bonum sibi propositum.	30R	first conclusion and in [<i>Sent.</i>] IV, dist. 49, q. 3, a. 1; and in Cajetan, [<i>ST</i>] IaIIæ.1.6 and in Ia.22.2, dub. 2. They usually also cite Durandus in [<i>Sent.</i>] II, dist. 38, q. 3 and dist. 39, q. 3 and Henry [of Ghent] <i>Quodl.</i> III, q. 17. But these authors say nothing expressly but only that the will is naturally carried to a good proposed to it.	
Eorum fundamentum primum.	35 2. Fundamentum hujus sententiæ est primo, quia voluntas non potest amare bonum imperfectum, nisi propter perfectum: quodlibet autem particulare bonum est imperfectum: ergo voluntas non appetit illud nisi ex vi intentionis boni perfecti et consummati. Secundo, quia sicut secundæ causæ efficientes, pendent essentialiter in causalitate sua ab influxu primæ causæ, et ita particulares fines pendent ab ultimo: ergo sicut non potest causa secunda agere, nisi movente prima, ita non possunt fines	35R	2. The foundation of this view is first because the will cannot love an imperfect good except for the sake of a perfect [good]. Moreover, any particular good you please is imperfect. Therefore, the will does not desire it except by strength of an intention for a perfect and complete good.	Their 1st foundation.
Secundum.	40 dependent essentialiter in causalitate sua ab influxu primæ causæ, et ita particulares fines pendent ab ultimo: ergo sicut non potest causa secunda agere, nisi movente prima, ita non possunt fines particulares movere nisi movente ultimo, quia non movet nisi virtute præcedentis intentionis: ergo necesse est ut hujusmodi intentio præcedat. Tertio, quia, juxta Aristotelem, ita se habet finis ultimus in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia in speculabilibus: sed non potest intellectus assentire conclusionibus, nisi præcedat assensus circa principia: ergo nec potest voluntas ferri in particulares fines nisi præcedat intentio circa ultimum.	40R	Secondly, because just as second efficient causes depend essentially in their causality on the influx of a first cause, so also particular ends depend on an ultimate [end]. Therefore, just as a second cause cannot act without the moving of a first [cause], so particular ends cannot move without the moving of an ultimate [end], because they do not move except by virtue of the preceding intention. Therefore, it is necessary that the intention precede in this way.	2nd.
Tertium.	45 3. Sed quod attinet ad hanc priorem partem, sive sensum quaestionis, dicendum est, non esse necessarium absolute, ut ante intentiones seu appetitiones particularium bonorum præcedat intentio finis ultimi vel formalis, vel materialis. Hæc est sententia Scoti, in 4, distinct. 49, quaest. 3, et in 1, quaest. 4, ubi Major modum hunc sequitur, et plane idem sentit Durandus, secundo loco supra citato, Medina 1, 2, ad art. 6, supra citatum. Tandem judicat hanc sententiam probabiliorum. Et probari facile potest ex dictis, sect. 1 hujus disputationis, et ex parte illam confirmat: quis est enim, qui hujusmodi actum in se expertus sit ante omnes alios? Et ratione demonstratur breviter, quia vel necessitas hujus actus oritur ex intellectione, aut ex ob-	45R	Thirdly, because, according to Aristotle, the ultimate end is related to desirable things just as the first principle to speculative things. But the intellect cannot assent to conclusions without assent to the principle having preceded. Therefore, neither can the will be brought to particular ends without an intention for the ultimate [end] preceding. ³	3rd.
1. Assertio pro priore sensu quaestionis.	50 3. Sed quod attinet ad hanc priorem partem, sive sensum quaestionis, dicendum est, non esse necessarium absolute, ut ante intentiones seu appetitiones particularium bonorum præcedat intentio finis ultimi vel formalis, vel materialis. Hæc est sententia Scoti, in 4, distinct. 49, quaest. 3, et in 1, quaest. 4, ubi Major modum hunc sequitur, et plane idem sentit Durandus, secundo loco supra citato, Medina 1, 2, ad art. 6, supra citatum. Tandem judicat hanc sententiam probabiliorum. Et probari facile potest ex dictis, sect. 1 hujus disputationis, et ex parte illam confirmat: quis est enim, qui hujusmodi actum in se expertus sit ante omnes alios? Et ratione demonstratur breviter, quia vel necessitas hujus actus oritur ex intellectione, aut ex ob-	50R	3. But with regards to the first part or sense of the question, it should be said that it is not necessary absolutely that an intention for an ultimate end, either formal or material, go before intentions or desires for particular goods. This is the view of Scotus in [<i>Sent.</i>] IV, dist. 49, q. 3 and in I, q. 4, where John Mair follows this way. And Durandus clearly thinks the same, in the second place cited above, [i.e., <i>Sent.</i> II, dist. 39, q. 3, as well as Medina in [<i>ST</i>] IaIIæ. ad art. 6, cited above. In the end, he judges this view more probable. And it can easily be proven from what was said in sect. 1 of this disputation and confirms it from the part. For is there anyone who has experienced an act of this sort in himself that is before everything else?	The 1st assertion for the prior sense of the question.
Demonstratur tripartito argumento.	60 3. Sed quod attinet ad hanc priorem partem, sive sensum quaestionis, dicendum est, non esse necessarium absolute, ut ante intentiones seu appetitiones particularium bonorum præcedat intentio finis ultimi vel formalis, vel materialis. Hæc est sententia Scoti, in 4, distinct. 49, quaest. 3, et in 1, quaest. 4, ubi Major modum hunc sequitur, et plane idem sentit Durandus, secundo loco supra citato, Medina 1, 2, ad art. 6, supra citatum. Tandem judicat hanc sententiam probabiliorum. Et probari facile potest ex dictis, sect. 1 hujus disputationis, et ex parte illam confirmat: quis est enim, qui hujusmodi actum in se expertus sit ante omnes alios? Et ratione demonstratur breviter, quia vel necessitas hujus actus oritur ex intellectione, aut ex ob-	60R	And it can be demonstrated briefly by argument, because the neces-	It is demonstrated by a tripartite argument.

³Aquinas seems to make arguments very much like this in *ST* Ia.60.2 co. and *Sent.* IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, co.

Primo.	65	jecto, aut ex voluntate ipsa <col. b> indigente hujusmodi actu ad alios subsequentes, sed nullum horum potest probabiliter dici primum de intellectu. Probat, quia nihil est, quod necessitet illum ad cogitandum prius de bono: quin potius facilius excitet ad aliquam exteriorem cogitationem, tum quia movetur a sensibus, qui primo offerunt particularia bona: tum etiam, quia in infantia ante usum rationis habet homo consuetudinem cogitandi de his particularibus bonis. Secundum de objecto, etiam per se constat, quia si objectum illud non sit prius cognitum, non prius movebit voluntatem: ostensum autem est non necessario prius cognosci, aut proponi, et aliunde in bonis particularibus, quæ per se bona sunt, est sufficiens ratio objectiva ad movendam voluntatem, et terminandum actum ejus, quia in quolibet bono continetur communis boni ratio, quæ est formalis ratio objecti voluntatis. Et hinc tandem concluditur ultima pars, quod nec ex parte voluntatis creatæ datur hæc necessitas, quia si objecto sit sufficiens ratio, ut per se ametur, voluntas habet sufficientem virtutem, ut eliciat actum circa illud absque priori actu, quia habet naturalem inclinationem ad bonum, et vires ad appetendum illud si sibi proportionatur: hac enim ratione quælibet alia potentia animæ sive sensitiva, sive intellectiva, potest primo operari circa quodlibet objectum, si sibi sufficienter proponatur: nulla est ergo necessitas, ut ille actus generalis alios antecedit, nec rationes contrariæ sententiæ aliquid probant.	65R	sity of this act arises either [i] from the intellection, [ii] from the object, or [iii] from the will itself requiring an act of this kind before other subsequent [acts]. But none of these can plausibly be said.	
Secundo.	70	4. Circa secundum sensum quæstionis positæ, qui sequuntur primam sententiam citatam, numer. 3, consequenter dicunt, supposita intentione ultimi finis, necessarium esse ut reliquæ particulares intentiones ab illa procedant ut a causa et ratione operandi: imo ad hoc ponunt illam primam intentionem, ut sit causa cæterarum. Dicendum tamen est, etiamsi contingat illam universalem intentionem præcedere, non esse necessarium, ut ab illa procedant omnes posteriores actus voluntatis, qui versantur circa particularia bona. Ex quo evidentius constat, illam intentionem non esse necessaria. Probat, quia talis intentio, vel influeret actu, vel virtute in actus posteriores: neutrum autem dici potest: ergo nullo modo, omitto enim relationem mere habituales, quia, ut supra dixi, hæc non consistit in aliquo influxu	70R	Firstly, concerning the intellect. It is shown: because there is nothing that necessitates it to cognizing first concerning the good. In fact, it more easily excites to some external cogitation, first, because it is moved by the senses, which in the first place offer particular goods, and then also, because a human being in infancy before he has the use of reason has a custom of thinking about these particular goods.	First.
Tertio.	75	80	85R	Secondly, concerning the object. It also is evident <i>per se</i> , because if that object is not first cognized, it will not first move the will. Moreover, it was shown that it is not necessarily first cognized or proposed, and, from elsewhere, in the case of particular goods which are good <i>per se</i> , an objective reason is sufficient for moving the will and terminating its act, because the nature of general good, which is the nature of the object of the will, is contained in any good whatever.	Second.
2. Assertio pro 2. sensu quæstionis.	90	95	95R	And from here, finally, is concluded the last part, that this necessity is not given on the part of the created will, because if the object is a sufficient reason so that it is loved <i>per se</i> , the will has sufficient strength for eliciting an act concerning it without a prior act. [This is] because it has a natural inclination to the good and strength for desiring that if it is proportionate to the will. For this reason any other power of the soul, whether sensitive or intellective, can first act concerning any object, if it is sufficiently proposed to it. Therefore, there is no necessity that that general act precede the others, nor do the arguments for the contrary view show anything.	Third.
Probatur.	95			4. Concerning the second sense of the posited question, those who follow the first cited view, n. 3, consequently say that, an intention for the ultimate end having been assumed, it is necessary that the remaining particular intentions proceed from it as from a cause and reason for acting. Indeed, for this reason they posit that first intention so that it is the cause of the rest. Nevertheless, it should be said that even if happens that that universal intention precede, it is not necessary that all the posterior acts of the will which are turned to particular goods proceed from it. From this it is even more evident that that intention is not necessary.	2nd assertion for the 2nd sense of the question.
				It is proven: for such an intention either actually or virtually gives influx to the posterior acts. But neither can be said. Therefore, [it gives influx to them] in no way (for I omit the merely habitual relation, because, as I said above [in disp. 2, sec. 4, n. 3], this does not consist in any in-	It is proven.

100 et vera causalitate, sed est mere extrinseca. Probatum ergo prior
 pars de actuali influxu, quia hic non est sine actuali cogitatione:
 non semper autem actu cogitamus de <37> ultimo fine quando
 aliquid appetimus in particulari. Altera vero pars de virtuali in-
 fluxu probatur, quia fieri potest ut illa intentio tanto tempore
 105 antecesserit, ut omnino non maneat nec in memoria, nec, in
 aliquo effectu suo: influxus autem virtualis intelligi non potest
 sine aliquo istorum, ut supra ostensum est, disput. 2, sect. 4,
 num. 4; ergo. Et confirmatur, nam licet demus præcessisse in
 homine appetitum consummati boni sui, tamen fieri potest, ut
 110 talis homo nunquam contulerit particulare bonum, verbi gratia,
 sanitatem cum illo objecto universalis, considerando nimirum
 hoc bonum esse partem quamdam illius completi boni: ergo
 quando voluntas postea appetit hoc particulare bonum, non
 movetur ex vi prioris intentionis, sed solum ex vi præsentis ob-
 115 jecti, quia ad amandum, vel eligendum ex vi præcedentis inten-
 tionis, non sufficit sola intentio, sed requiritur etiam collatio
 objecti electionis cum objecto intentionis, quæ fit per consulta-
 tionem, ut postea dicam.

5. Atque ex his tandem concluditur, non esse necessarium
 120 hominem operari semper propter ultimum finem simpliciter a
 se intentum, seu ex vi intentionis suæ, vel quia non est necesse
 ut talis intentio antecedit, vel quia etiamsi antecesserit, non
 est necesse ut ab illa procedant reliqui omnes actus: utrumque
 enim ostensum est. Et ita soluta relinquatur quædam confir-
 125 matio posita in fine sectionis præcedentis huc remissa, et ex ibi
 dictis confirmari etiam potest hæc veritas. Quo autem sensu
 D. Thomas sit exponendus, dicam, sect. sequent., ex quo etiam
 facile patebunt solutiones rationum primæ sententiæ in num. 2,
 quæ solum probant ad summum voluntatem debere semper
 130 moveri ab aliquo objecto bono per se amabili, quod in se inclu-
 dat rationem communem boni, et in virtute contineat aliquo
 modo saltem implicite et interpretative ultimum finem, ut jam
 explico.

Confirm.

Concluditur
proposita
quæstio.

100R flux and true causality, but is merely extrinsic). Therefore, the prior part
 concerning actual influx is proven, because this does not exist without ac-
 tual cogitation. Moreover, we do not always think about the ultimate end
 when we desire something in particular. But the other part concerning
 virtual influx is proven because it can happen that that intention went be-
 fore by such a long time that nothing remains in memory or in any effect
 105R of it. Virtual influx, however, cannot be understood without something
 of these, as was shown above, disp. 2, sec. 4, n. 4. Therefore.

And it is confirmed: for although we may grant that the desire for his
 consummate good precedes in a human being, yet it can happen that such
 a human being will never consider a particular good, for example, health,
 110R with respect to that universal object, considering without doubt that this
 good is a certain part of that complete good. Therefore, when the will
 afterwards desires this particular good it is not moved by the strength of
 the prior intention, but only by the strength of the present object, because
 the intention alone does not suffice for loving or electing with the strength
 115R of the preceding intention, but it requires also the bringing together of the
 object of election with the object of the intention, which happens through
 consideration (*consultationem*), as I will talk about later.

5. And from these is finally concluded that it is not necessary that a
 human being always act for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that
 120R he has intended or [that he always act] from the force of his intention
 [for such an end], either because it is not necessary that such an intention
 go before or because even if it went before it is not necessary that all the
 remaining acts proceed from it. For each of them has been shown. And
 [with the question] thus resolved, a certain confirmation posited at the
 125R end of the preceding section and having been referred to here remains.
 And from what was said there this truth can also be confirmed. Moreover,
 in what sense St. Thomas should be explained, I will say in subsequent
 sections, by which also it will easily be clear what the solutions of the
 arguments of the first view in n. 2 are, which only show at most that the
 will ought always to be moved by some good object lovable in itself, that
 130R in itself includes the general nature of good and in virtue of that contains
 the ultimate end in some way, at least implicitly and interpretatively, as I
 will explain now.

It is confirmed.

The proposed
question is
concluded.