

<30, col. b>²

Utrum possit homo simul intendere duos ultimos fines simpliciter et positive, et propter illos operari?

Whether someone can at the same time intend two unqualifiedly and positively ultimate ends and act for the sake of them.

Hic finis dupliciter consideratur.

5 1. Finis ultimus simpliciter, ut supra dixi, et constat ex Aristotele 1, Ethicorum, c. 7 et 8, est finis perfectus, et bonum sufficientis, atque adeo maxime necessarium intendenti talem finem. Unde dupliciter apprehendi potest: primo sub ratione communi sufficientis boni, etc., non constituendo illum in una vel
10 alia re determinate, et hic vocari solet finis ultimus formaliter, in quo non habet locum præsens quæstio, quia, cum concipiatur abstracte et confuse, clarum est non posse concipi nisi per modum unius: nam qui appetit esse beatus absolute et præcise, non potest in ipsa beatitudine varietatem, et multitudinem excogitare, donec de re cogitet, qua beatificandus est. Secundo igitur modo concipi potest ultimus finis ut constitutus in re aliqua, aut rerum collectione, qui dicitur finis ultimus realis, seu
15 materialis: et de hoc est quæstio, an necessario sit unus tantum: agimus autem de fine intento ex formali, aut virtuali hominis intentione, quia de connaturali fine ultimo, ad quem homo tendit impetu naturæ, seu ordinatione divina, non est dubium quin sit unus, ut latius infra cum agemus de beatudine, et de
20 hoc fine procedunt duæ rationes ultimæ D. Thomæ, prima secundæ, quæst. 1, art. 5, quæ possunt etiam accommodari ad finem ultimum formalem: de quibus dicemus plura, sect. ultim. hujus disputationis.

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1. An unqualifiedly ultimate end, as I said above and as is clear from Aristotle, [*Nicomachean*] *Ethics*, book 1, c. 7 and 8, is a perfect end and sufficient good, and to that extent is very much necessary to the one intending such an end. Hence, it can be apprehended in two ways. First, under the general concept of sufficient good, etc., not as establishing that in one or another determinate thing, and this is customarily called an ultimate end formally. With respect to it, the present question does not have a place, because, although it may be conceived abstractly and confusedly, it is clear that a [formally ultimate end] cannot be conceived except in the manner of one. For whoever desires to be happy absolutely and precisely cannot think of variety and multiplicity in the happiness itself, as long as he thinks of the thing by which he will be made happy. In the second way, therefore, the ultimate end can be conceived as constituted in some thing or collection of things, which is called a real or material ultimate end. And the question is concerning this, whether it is necessarily one as such. We, moreover, deal with the end intended by a formal or virtual human intention, because concerning the connatural ultimate end to which a human tends by a natural impetus or divine ordering it is not doubted but that it is one, as [we discuss] more extensively below when we deal with happiness, and concerning this end two ultimate reasons appear in St. Thomas, [*ST*] IaIIae.1.5, which can also be adapted to an ultimate formal end, concerning which we say more in the last section of this disputation.

This end is considered in two ways.

1. Arg. pro affirm. parte.

25 2. Atque hinc oritur ratio dubitandi in hac quæstione, quia

2. And from here arises a reason for doubting in this question,

The 1st arg. for the affirmative part.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Demonstratur.	65	tione, seu aggregato earum. Hæc est sententia D. Thomæ 1, 2, quæst. 1, artic. 5, et prima ratio ejus est demonstratio, quia finis ultimus integer, et totalis est ille, quem homo appetit ut complementum suorum desideriorum, atque adeo ut bonum sibi sufficiens et aliis præferendum, ac maxime necessarium; sed, si homo simul appetat duo bona, impossibile est ut utrumque existimet esse tale, quale descripsimus debere ultimum finem, quia si unum existimatur sufficiens, alterum non potest reputari necessarium, quia sufficiens est quod non indiget alio, vel e contrario, si utrumque existimatur necessarium, in neutro quiescet appetitus: ergo neutrum erit integer finis ultimus.	65R	timate end is constituted by a collection or aggregate of them. This is the view of St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.5. The first argument for it is the demonstration: because the integrated and complete ultimate end is that which a human being desires as something that fulfills his desires and therefore as a good sufficient to him and preferred to all others and maximally necessary. But, if a human being desires at the same time two goods, it is impossible for either to be thought such as what we described the ultimate end as needing to be, because if one is thought sufficient, then the other one cannot be thought necessary, because to be sufficient is to not need something else. Or the other way around, if both are thought necessary, the appetite will rest in neither. Therefore, neither will be the integrated ultimate end.	It is demonstrated.
Instantia bipartita.	70	<col. b> 5. Dices, unde constat totum illud esse de ratione ultimi finis, vel saltem cur non poterit homo hoc ignorare, et ita ex ignorantia saltem, appetere plures ultimos fines? Responderetur ad priorem partem, id constare ex ipsa vocis impositione, et ex communi hominum sapientum usu, qui hoc intelligunt per ultimum finem. Item, quia in hoc distinguitur finis ultimus et totalis a partiali, seu particulari fine. Ultimo denique ex re ipsa, quia constat, posse hominem intendere aliquid in quo plene quiescat, et ad quod dirigat se, et omnia sua quantum est ex modo appetendi, et intendendi talem finem: hinc ergo appellamus ultimum finem simpliciter. Unde ad alteram partem responderetur, quamvis possit homo speculative ignorare quid significet ultimus finis simpliciter, et ideo posse existimare se amare plura ut ultimos fines, tamen revera et practice, atque in exercitio non intendere illos, ut totales fines, sed ut partiales, quandoquidem ita appetit, ut non sit contentus altero, sed utroque aggregate. Atque hinc obiter constat non esse necessarium ut homo constituat hunc ultimum finem in una re, seu in uno bono, potest enim plurium collectionem appetere ut ultimum terminum suorum desideriorum: sic enim philosophi multi posuerunt beatitudinem vel in collectione bonorum temporalium, vel in eis simul cum virtute: neque in hoc est ulla repugnantia ex modo appetendi, vel ex ratione finis ultimi, ut ex dictis constat.	70R 75R	5. You may say: Is it clear from this that that whole is of the nature of an ultimate end or at least why it will not be able to be the case that a human being ignore this and thus from ignorance at least desire more than one ultimate end? To the first part I respond that it is clear from the imposed words themselves and from the common use of wise men who understand this through an ultimate end. Likewise, because in this is distinguished an ultimate and complete end from a partial or particular end. Lastly, finally, from the thing itself, because it is clear that a human being can intend something in which he fully rests and direct himself and everything of his to it by a mode of desiring and intending such an end. This, therefore, we call an unqualifiedly ultimate end. Hence, to the second part I respond that although a human being can speculatively ignore an unqualifiedly ultimate end signifies and therefore can think himself to love more than one thing as an ultimate end, yet in reality and practically and in exercise he does not intend them as complete ends but as partial [ends], seeing that he desires them in such a way that he is not content with one of them but [only] with the aggregate of both. And from this, by the way, it is clear that it is not necessary that a human being constitute this ultimate end in one thing or in one good, for he can desire a collection of multiple [goods] as the ultimate <i>terminus</i> of his desires. For many philosophers in this way placed happiness either in a collection of temporal goods or in those along with virtue. Nor is there any repugnance in this in the way of desiring or from the nature of an ultimate end, as is clear from what has been said.	A twofold objection.
Satis fit secundæ.	80	85	85R	90R	He satisfies the second part.
2. Assertio.	100	6. Dicendum secundo, neque etiam disjunctive potest	100R	6. It should be said, secondly, that a human being also cannot in-	The 2nd assertion.

140 uralium nihil refert vel ad mutandam intentionem, vel ad sa-
 tiandum hominis appetitum. Quod explicatur illa duplici ra-
 tione facta in præcedenti assertione contrario modo inducta:
 primo quidem, quia illa intentio sufficit ad adhibenda media,
 et electiones faciendas usque ad assecutionem ipsius finis: quod
 145 si interdum necesse est adhibere aliquod speciale medium ad
 consequendum illum finem potius in una re quam in alia, illud
 est raro et per accidens, et tunc jam determinabitur intentio ad
 rem illam potius quam ad aliam: non quia habeat aliam ratio-
 nem boni, nec quia censeatur sufficientior ad saturandum ap-
 150 petitum, sed quia accidit ut fortasse hic et nunc facilius acquiri
 possit, quam alia. Secundo, quia cum illis in rebus sit eadem ra-
 tio boni, quæ licet per se sufficit ad satiandum appetitum, qui
 non quærit nisi tale ac tantum bonum, et in illo ponit finem
 suum.

Obiectio contra
 præced. assert.

155 8. Sed objici potest, nam ille, qui sub dis- <col. b> junc-
 tione ita appetit duas res, revera utramque appetit: ergo non
 potest alterutra earum satiari: ergo non potest eas disjunctive
 appetere per modum ultimi finis, sed necessarium est, ut ap-
 petat aggregatum utriusque tanquam ultimum. Antecedens
 160 patet, quia si quis velit interficere Petrum, aut furari bona
 ejus, peccat peccato furti et homicidii: ergo signum est illum
 consentire in utrumque peccatum, atque adeo utrumque velle.
 Respondetur, eum, qui tantum sub disjunctione vult unum
 e duobus, revera non velle absolute et simpliciter utrumque.
 165 Quod patet primo, quia cum illo proposito stat voluntas efficax
 non committendi utrumque. Secundo, quia homo id tantum
 vult, quod sibi proponit per modum objecti, proponit autem
 sibi disjunctum, ut in alterutra parte exequendum, et non in
 utraque simul. Tertio, quia qui vult orare, vel eleemosynam
 170 facere, non ita meretur sicut ille, qui vult orare, et eleemosy-
 nam facere. Et idem est in malis objectis, præsertim si sint
 ejusdem rationis: qui enim proponit furari decem vel a Petro,
 vel a Paulo, non ita peccat, ac si proponeret furari decem a
 Petro, et decem a Paulo: ergo voluntas, quæ fertur ad aliquod
 175 disjunctum, non est absoluta respectu singularium partium,
 sed potius tantum secundum quid et quasi conditionaliter, et
 ideo si membra illa tantum materialiter diversa sint, illa vol-

things refers nothing either to changing intention or to satisfying the
 human appetite. This is explained by the two reasons given in the pre-
 ceding assertion brought in the opposite mode. First, certainly, because
 that intention suffices for applying the means and making the choices
 all the way to the comprehension of the end itself. If it is sometimes
 145R necessary that some particular means be applied in pursuing that end
 more in one thing rather than another, that is rare and *per accidens* and
 then in that case the intention will be determined to that thing more
 than to the other, not because it has another aspect of good nor be-
 150R cause it is thought more sufficient for sating the appetite, but because
 it happens that perhaps it can more easily be acquired here and now
 than another. Second, because when there is the same aspect of good
 for these in the things, which, granted, in itself suffices for satisfying
 the appetite, he does not strive for except if it is such and only such a
 good and in that he places his end.

8. But one can object, for the person who under a disjunction de-
 sires two things in this way, really desires both of them. Therefore, he
 cannot be satisfied by either of them. Therefore, he cannot desire them
 disjunctively in the way an ultimate end is desired, but it is necessary
 160R that he desire the aggregate of each of them as ultimate. The antecedent
 is clear because if someone wishes to kill Peter or to steal his goods, he
 sins by the sins of theft and homicide. Therefore, it is a sign that he
 shared in each sin and therefore wished each of them. I respond that
 he who only under a disjunction wishes one of two does not in real-
 ity absolutely and unqualifiedly want each of them. This is clear, first,
 because with that purpose the will stands effective not by committing
 to each of them. Second, because the human who only wants what he
 proposes to himself in the mode of an object, proposes a disjunction
 to himself so that he pursues either part but not both at the same time.
 170R Third, because he who wishes either to worship or to give alms does not
 thereby earn merit just as the one who wishes to worship and give alms.
 And the same is true in bad objects, especially if they are of the same
 nature. For he who proposes either to steal ten from Peter or ten from
 Paul does not sin the same degree as if he were to steal ten from Peter
 and ten from Paul. Therefore, the will which is brought to some dis-
 175R junction is not absolute with respect to a single part but rather is only
 [brought] qualifiedly and as if conditionally. And therefore if those
 members are only materially diverse, that willing is equivalent in force

An objection
 against the
 preceding
 assertion.

The solution.

untas æquivalet voluntati unius rei determinatæ habentis eamdem bonitatem, vel malitiam: in illo autem exemplo in contrarium adducto, quia in singulis membris disjunctiones sunt malititæ formaliter diversæ, ideo opus voluntatis ab utraque illarum partium sumit malitiam, quia non solum peccat voluntas absolute volendo pravum actum, sed etiam volendo illum sub conditione, scilicet in defectu alterius, et quia in eo casu in utrumque consentit saltem conditionaliter, ideo utriusque malitiam participat, quamvis utraque fit minor, quam si objectum esset copulative volitum. Unde propter eandem causam si quis consentiat in objectum disjunctum constans una parte honesta, et altera turpi, simpliciter peccat ea malitia, quam sub disjunctione appetit, ut si proponat subvenire proximo, vel ex propriis bonis, vel ex alienis, furando illa, si aliter non possit ei subvenire.

Ad 1. & 2.
argum. in n. 1.

9. Ad argumenta initio facta, primum solutum est explicando primam conclusionem. Ad secundum vero facile respondetur, eum, qui mutat intentionem finis ultimi, hoc ipso retractare priorem intentionem, et ideo neque <33> actu, neque virtute intendere duos ultimos fines.

Ad 3. in eodem
num. 2.
Responsio
Adriani.

10. De tertio vero argumento multa scribuntur ab auctoribus, sed quando illa difficultas ad materiam de peccatis, in tract. 5, spectat, breviter est expedienda. Primo ergo respondet Adrianus, quodl. 5, art. 3, negando eum, qui peccat mortaliter necessario constituere ultimum finem suum in creatura, quia revera non diligit illam plus quam Deum, imo nec plus quam rem aliam temporalem: qui enim peccat, verbi gratia, propter voluptatem carnis, non daret totam substantiam suam ut ea voluptate frueretur brevi tempore: ergo non diligit illam voluptatem plus quam substantiam. Rursus, illemet, qui sic peccat propter concupiscentiam, fortasse non negasset fidem et religionem divinam, etiamsi oporteret totam substantiam perdere: ergo illemet amat Deum plus quam substantiam suam: ergo plus quam voluptatem: ergo signum est illum hominem, dum sic peccavit mortaliter, non amasse illam

to a willing for one determinate thing having the same goodness or badness. Moreover, in that example brought in for the contrary, because in the single members the disjunctions are formally diverse badnesses, therefore the work of the will takes up badness from each of those parts, because not only does the will sin absolutely in willing a corrupt act, but also in willing it under a condition, namely, in the absence of something else. And because in that case it consents conditionally in each of them, therefore it participates in the badness of each of them, although each of them becomes less than if the object were conjunctively willed. Hence, on account of the same cause, if someone consents to a disjunctive object that clearly is morally good (*honestata*) in part and shameful in part, he unqualifiedly sins by that badness which he desires under the disjunction (for example, if he proposed to assist his neighbour, either with his own goods or with foreigners' goods, plundering them if he could not assist him otherwise).

9. To the arguments made at the beginning, the first was resolved in explaining the first conclusion. And to the second is easily responded that he who changes his intention for the ultimate end by the very doing of this retracts his former intention and therefore neither actually nor virtually intends two ultimate ends.

10. But concerning the third argument many things are written by authors, but when that difficulty concerning the matter of sin appears in treatise 5, it should be briefly explained. First, therefore, Adrianus³ responds in *Questiones Quodlibeticæ* q. 5, art. 3, by denying that he who sins mortally necessarily sets his ultimate end in a created thing because he does not really love that more than God, nor, indeed, more than another temporal thing. In fact, he who sins, for example, for the sake of carnal pleasure would not give his complete substance so that he might enjoy that pleasure for a brief time. Therefore, he does not love that pleasure more than [his] substance. Again, he who sins in this way for the sake of concupiscence perhaps did not deny the faith and divine religion, even if he might have to destroy [his] entire substance. Therefore, he loves God more than his substance; therefore, more than pleasure. Therefore, this is a sign that that human, when he thus sinned mortally, did not love that pleasure more than everything else nor more

To the 1st and
2nd arguments in
n. 1.

To the 3rd
argument in n. 2.
Adrianus's
response.

³Born Adriaan Florenszoon Boeyen; became for a short time the unhappy Pope Adrian VI.

		voluptatem plus quam omnia, nec plus quam Deum, nec per modum ultimi finis. Et similia argumenta multiplicat Adrianus, quæ magna ex parte congerit Medina: et juxta hanc sententiam est facilis responsio ad argumenta.	215R	than God; nor [did he love it] in the way an ultimate end is loved. And Adrian multiplies similar arguments, most of which are collected by [Bartolomé de] Medina. And with this view the response to the arguments is easy.		
Rejicitur a Cajetan. & aliis.	215	11. Tamen Cajetanus, Conradus, Medina et alii hanc sententiam communiter rejiciunt, asserentes, qui mortaliter peccat, constituere finem ultimum in creatura. Et videtur aperta sententia D. Thomæ 2, 2, quæst. 24, art. 10, ad 2, ubi dicit, <i>duplex est cupiditas; una, qua finis in creatura constituitur, quæ mortificat totaliter charitatem, cum sit venenum ipsius</i> , etc., ubi necesse est loqui de fine ultimo. In eadem est sententia Scotus, in 1, dist. 1, q. 5, ubi dicit <i>peccatorem, quantum in se est, frui creatura</i> ; loquitur autem de fruitione simpliciter prout est ultimi finis. Cui sententiæ favet modus loquendi sacræ Scripturæ ut est illud ad Philip. 3: <i>Quorum Deus venter est</i> ; et illud Jerem. 3: <i>Me dereliquerunt fontem aquæ vivæ</i> . Unde sumitur ratio: nam qui peccat mortaliter, avertitur a Deo tanquam ab ultimo fine: ergo convertitur ad creaturam, ut ad finem ultimum. Juxta hanc vero opinionem ad difficultatem tactam respondent aliqui, peccatorem non converti ad creaturam, circa quam peccat, ut ad finem ultimum, sed ad seipsum, quem diligit plusquam Deum, juxta illud Matth. 10: <i>Qui diligit animam suam plusquam me, non est me dignus</i> , et illud Augustini 14, de Civit., cap. ult.: <i>Amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei ædificat civitatem Babylonis</i> , unde D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 77, art. 4, dicit omnia peccata oriri ex amore sui. Sed hæc responsio non satisfacit, quia ipse peccator non est finis <i>cujus</i> , sed <i>cui</i> amatur bonum illud, cujus gratia peccat, et de illo bono dicitur quod habeat rationem finis ultimi illius peccati, nec est contra rationem finis ultimi, quod alicui appetatur. Unde propter illud bonum censetur peccator deserere Deum, et illo fruitur tanquam bono adepto et sufficienti sibi. Quapropter aliter responderi potest, si plura peccata mortalia tantum successive committantur, tunc peccatorem toties intendere vel mutare finem ultimum, quoties de novo mortaliter	220R	11. Nevertheless, Cajetan, Conradus, Medina, and others generally reject this view, asserting that he who sins mortally does set his ultimate end in a created thing. And it clearly appears to be the view of St. Thomas in [ST] IIaIIæ.24.10 ad 2, where he says: ‘Cupidity is two-fold: one, by which the end is placed in a created thing, which altogether kills charity, since it is its poison . . .’ ⁴ He must be speaking here of an ultimate end. Scotus’s view is the same in [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 5, where he says: ‘a sinner, insofar as he is in himself, enjoys a created thing’. Moreover, he speaks of enjoyment strictly speaking as it is of an ultimate end. The mode of speaking in the holy Scriptures supports this view, for example, that [passage] from Phil. 3[:19], ‘whose God is the belly’, and that from Jer. 3 [i.e., 2:13]: ‘They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water’. Whence the argument is taken: For he who sins mortally is turned from God just as from an ultimate end. Therefore, he is turned to a created thing as to an ultimate end. But concerning this opinion some respond to the mentioned difficulty that the sinner does not turn to the created thing concerning which he sins as to an ultimate end, but to himself, whom he loves more than God, as that [passage says] in Matth. 10: ‘Whoever loves his soul more than me is not worthy of me’ ⁵ and that [passage] from the last chapter of book 14 of Augustine’s <i>City of God</i> : ‘Self-love up to contempt of God builds the city of Babylon’. Hence, St. Thomas says in [ST] IaIIæ.77.4 that all sins arise from self-love. But this response does not satisfy, because the sinner himself is not the <i>finis cuius</i> , but rather the <i>finis cui</i> , [i.e., the end for whom] that good for the sake of which he sins is loved. And concerning that good is said that it has the nature of the ultimate end of that sin, nor is it contrary to the nature of an ultimate end that it is desired for something else. Hence, on account of that good the sinner is thought to forsake God and he enjoys that just as a good that is both attained and sufficient for him. For this reason one can respond in another way: if many mortal sins are committed only successively,		It is rejected by Cajetan and others.
Eorum responsio ad 3. argum.	230		230R		Their response to the 3rd argument.	
Non citat verba, sed sensum.	235		235R		He does not cite words, but sense.	
Non satisfacit.	240		240R		It is not satisfactory.	
Aliorum responsio probabilis.	245		245R		A probable response of others.	

⁴Quotation is not exact.

⁵I am not sure which verse Suárez has in mind. Cf. vss. 37–38: ‘Whoever loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and whoever loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me; and whoever does not take up the cross and follow me is not worthy of me’.

peccat, præsertim si peccatum sit diversum a præcedentibus, vel illi repugnans quantum ad conversionem: nam quamvis præcedentia peccata semper moveant habitualiter, et quantum ad reatum, tamen intentio actualis, vel virtualis peccantis mutari potest, atque hoc modo semper manet fixa in uno ultimo fine. Si autem simul committat plura peccata mortalia, tunc non convertitur ad singula objecta talium peccatorum ut ad fines ultimos totales, sed partiales tantum, et ultimus finis totalis erit aggregatum ex illis omnibus. Et hæc responsio est probabilis et facile sustineri potest.

Notatio ad probabiliorum responsum.

12. Vera tamen doctrina, ut existimo, est, dupliciter intelligi posse eum, qui mortaliter peccat, ponere ultimum finem in creatura primo formaliter ac propria intentione: secundo tantum interpretative, seu imputative. Prior modus verus non est, ut recte probant argumenta Adriani et exempla ipsa: non enim omnis peccator dum peccat, ita diligit creaturam circa quam peccat ut se, et omnia sua in illam referat, et ut illam amet expresse, et formaliter tanquam bonum sibi sufficiens: quin potius nec semper amatur ut finis proximus res illa, circa quam peccatur, sed solum ut medium; ut cum quis furatur propter mœchiam, non constituit finem in objecto furti, quantum est ex formali intentione sua. Posterior igitur modus verus est, nam quia peccator propter bonum creatum deserit suum finem ultimum et bonum illud præfert divinæ amicitiae, ideo interpretative censetur diligere illam creaturam plus quam Deum, ut amicum et ultimum finem: et hac ratione imputative et interpretative dicitur ponere ultimum finem in creatura.

Auctoris responsio ad 3. argum. in fine num. 2.

13. Ex qua doctrina est facilis responsio ad difficultatem positam: cum enim dicimus, non posse aliquem intendere plures ultimos fines, <34> intelligendum id est de propria et formali intentione, nam in hac reperitur repugnantia supra posita, at vero interpretative tantum, et secundum moralem imputationem non repugnat intendere plura ut ultimos fines, quia tunc in actibus formalibus non est repugnantia, quia neuter eorum tendit in objectum suum formaliter, ut in summum bonum sufficiens: id autem quod implicite tantum, et in-

then the sinner intends or changes his ultimate end as many times as he sins mortally concerning something new, especially if the sin is different from the preceding ones or incompatible with it insofar as turning to it. For although the preceding sins always move habitually and with respect to guilt, nevertheless the actual or virtual intention of the sinner can be changed and in this way always remain fixed on one ultimate end. If, however, he commits many mortal sins at the same time, then he is not turned to a single object of such sins as to complete ultimate ends but only as to partial [ends], and the complete ultimate end will be the aggregate of all those. And this response is probable and can easily be supported.

12. Nevertheless, it is a true doctrine, as I think, that to say that he who sins mortally places the ultimate end in creatures can be understood in two ways: first, by a formal and proper intention, second, by an intention that is only interpretative or imputed. In the first way, it is not true, as the arguments of Adrian and the examples themselves rightly proved. For not every sinner while he sins thus loves the created thing concerning which he sins so that he refers himself and all his actions to it and so that he loves it expressly and formally as his sufficient good. On the contrary, that thing concerning which he sins is not even always loved as a proximate end but only as a means. For example, when someone is enraged on account of an adulteress, he does not constitute his end in the object of his rage insofar as his formal intention is concerned. Therefore, in the latter way it is true, for because the sinner deserts his ultimate end on account of a good created thing and prefers that good to divine friendship, he therefore is thought interpretatively to love that created thing more than God as a friend and ultimate end. And for this reason he is said interpretatively and by imputation to place his ultimate end in a created thing.

13. With this doctrine there is an easy response to the posited difficulty. For when we say that someone cannot intend multiple ultimate ends, it should be understood concerning proper and formal intention, for in this is found the repugnance posited above. But on the other hand if it is only about interpretative intention and according to moral imputation, then it is not repugnant to intend multiple things as ultimate ends, because then there is not a repugnance in formal acts, because neither of them tends to the object itself formally, as sufficient for the highest good. Moreover, that which only implicitly and inter-

Notes towards a more probable response.

The response of the author to the 3rd argument at the end of n. 2.

285 interpretative continetur in actu, non variat rationem operis, nec modum operandi; unde fit, ut peccator in informali modo suo operandi aliquid amet ut medium, et tamen illi imputetur, ac si amaret ut finem: et idem est de amore talis objecti super alia bona: nam quantum est ex formali affectu, non semper diligit 290R illud plus quam alia omnia: tamen interpretative illi imputatur, ac si ita diligeret.

pretatively is contained in the act does not vary the nature of the work nor the mode of acting. Hence it happens that the sinner in his informal mode of acting loves something as a means and yet it is imputed to him as if he had loved it as end. And likewise concerning love of such an object beyond other goods. For insofar as it is from a formal affect, the person does not always love it more than all others. Nevertheless, interpretatively it is imputed to him as if he loves it thus.