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<25, col. b><sup>2</sup>

*De ultimo fine hominis in communi, et de modo operandi propter illum.*

5 Postquam de fine generaliter dictum est, oportet ut de illo in  
particulari aliqua dicamus, quoniam hic finis et præcipuam ra-  
tionem finis habet, et primum principium est omnium oper- 5R  
abilium, et ejus ratio in beatitudine po- <26> tissimum reper-  
itur, ad quam totus hic sermo de fine refertur: diximus autem  
supra, disput. 1, sect. 6, num. 2, alium esse finem ultimum sim-  
pliciter et positive, alium vero ultimum secundum quid et neg-  
10 ative: et quamvis præcipua hujus disputationis intentio sit de  
priori, tamen ob majorem claritatem et doctrinæ complemen-  
tum, dicemus etiam de posteriori, et primo videbimus quam  
sit necessarius hic finis ad operationes humanas: deinde, an sit  
unus tantum vel possit esse multiplex.

15 SECTIO I.

*Utrum necessarium sit constituere aliquem finem ultimum homi-  
nis, et actionum ejus.*

20 Dupliciter intelligi potest hominem ordinari ad finem ulti-  
mum: uno modo, ex intentione auctoris naturæ, ordinatione  
quasi extrinseca, et passiva: alio modo ex libera voluntate et

*On the ultimate end of humans in general, and the manner of acting for  
the sake of it.*

After what has been said of the end in general, it is necessary that we  
say something about it in particular, because this end not only has the  
special character of an end but also is the first principle of everything  
that can be done and its character is to be found above all in happiness,  
to which this whole discussion about the end is directed. Moreover, we  
said above (disp. 1, sect. 6, n. 2) that it is one thing for an end to be the  
unqualifiedly and positively ultimate end, and another thing, however,  
10R [for it to be] a qualifiedly and negatively ultimate end. And although  
the main purpose of this disputation is concerning the former, never-  
theless, for the sake of greater clarity and completeness of doctrine, we  
will also talk about the latter. And first we will see how this end is nec-  
essary for human activity; then, whether there is only one or whether  
15R it is possible for there to be more than one.

SECTION I.

*Whether it is necessary to set up some ultimate end for humans and their  
actions.*

20R A human being ordered to an ultimate end can be understood in two  
ways: in one way, by the intention of the author of nature, an order-  
ing that is, as it were, extrinsic and passive; in the second way, by free

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

17 *actionum*] *actionem* V.  
20 *extrinseca*] *intrinseca* V.

actione sua, atque adeo ordinatione quasi intrinseca et activa, quia nimirum homo per actum suæ voluntatis aliquem finem ultimum sibi præstituit, in quem dirigat actiones suas, qui potest intelligi vel finis ultimus simpliciter, vel secundum quid.

I. Assertio;  
homini competit  
aliquis finis  
ultimus  
simpliciter.  
Probatur autorit.

25 1. Dico ergo primo dari aliquem finem ultimum simpliciter, ad quem, et propter quem homo institutus est ab auctore naturæ. Hæc conclusio est simpliciter de fide, ut etiam ostendi in disputat. 24, Metaphysicæ, sect. 1, quia constat  
30 Deum esse finem ultimum creaturarum omnium, et juxta illud Apocalypsis 1, *Ego sum  $\alpha$  et  $\omega$* ; quod latius tractatur, 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 4, et specialiter constat esse finem ultimum hominis, qui proprie et peculiari modo potest Deum attingere, ut latius infra probabimus, disputat. 5, agentes de  
35 objecto beatitudinis. Et hoc etiam est lumine naturæ notum, quod homo habeat aliquem finem ultimum sibi communicabilem, et ita posuerunt omnes philosophi, qui de beatitudine disputarunt: ut videre est apud Aristotelem 2, Ethicor., a princip., et Ciceronem, 1. de Finibus, et alia congerit Augustinus, lib. 9, de Civitate, fere per totum. Et ratio est facilis, quia  
40 homo nec frustra, nec casu est in mundo: est ergo effectus propter aliquem finem: et cum in finibus non procedatur in infinitum, necesse est ut sit factus propter aliquem finem ultimum. Deinde ipsa constitutio naturæ humanæ hoc intrinsece postulat, tum quia alias non haberet homo natura sua certum termi- <col. b> num in quem secundum rectam rationem operationes suas dirigeret: unde fieret, ut neque etiam posset recte vitam suam instituere: tum denique, quia sicut in intentionibus, et electionibus non potest in infinitum procedi, sed deveniendum necessario est ad aliquem ultimum finem; ita in  
45 singulis rebus necesse est, ut tota natura inclinetur ad aliquid ultimum, sicut contingit in arte: licet contingat in una arte, multas esse actiones, necesse tamen est ut omnes tendant in unum aliquem finem: nam si ars est una, et multas actiones sub se comprehendit, necesse est aliquem ordinem inter eas ser-

Item ratione.

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will and its action (for without doubt a human being first determines through an act of his will some ultimate end for himself towards which he directs his actions), and, for that reason, an ordering that is, as it were, intrinsic and active. This end can be understood either as an unqualifiedly ultimate end or as a qualifiedly ultimate end.<sup>3</sup>

1. In the first place, then, I say that some unqualifiedly ultimate end is given to which (*ad quem*) and for the sake of which (*propter quem*) humans were made by the author of nature. This conclusion is, strictly speaking, of the faith, as I showed in *Disputationes metaphysicæ* 24, sect. 1, because [1] it is evident that God is the ultimate end of all creatures and [2] on account of Rev. 1[:8] ('I am the Alpha and the Omega'), which is discussed more extensively in [*ST*] Ia.5.4 and [3] it is evident, in particular, that [God] is the ultimate end of humans who are able to reach God strictly speaking and in a special way,<sup>4</sup> as we will show more extensively below in disp. 5 when dealing with the object of happiness. That a human being has some ultimate end communicable to himself is also known by the light of nature. All philosophers who have disputed concerning happiness have supposed this, as is seen in Aristotle, in the beginning of *EN* II, and in Cicero, *De finibus* I, and Augustine collects others throughout Book IX of *De civ. Dei*.

And the reason is easy: because humans are in the world neither vainly nor by chance. They are, therefore, an effect for the sake of some end. And since one does not proceed into infinity with ends, it is necessary that it have come about for the sake of some ultimate end. Therefore, this establishment of human nature intrinsically demands these things. Both [i] because otherwise a human by his own nature would not have a fixed *terminus* in the following of which right reason could direct his actions, with the result that he would not be able to set up his own life rightly, and, finally, [ii] because just as in intentions and choices one is not able to proceed into infinity, but some ultimate end must necessarily be arrived at, so in each individual thing it is necessary that the whole nature be inclined to something final, just as in the case in art. Although it is the case that in one art there are many actions, nevertheless it is necessary that they all aim at some one end. For if art is one and many actions are included under it, it is necessary that

1st assertion:  
some  
unqualifiedly  
ultimate end is  
applicable to a  
human. It is  
proven from  
authority.

And from reason.

<sup>3</sup>Neither the 1628 nor the Vivés editions number the first paragraph.

<sup>4</sup>The idea here is that God is the ultimate end of humans, in a way that is distinctive of or peculiar to humans. Non-rational animals do not have God as their ultimate end in the same way.

55 vari, atque adeo omnes ferri ad aliquid, quod est perfectum, et  
consummatum in tali arte: sic ergo cum natura hominis una  
sic, et plures operationes complectatur, perfecta ejus institutio  
intrinsece postulat ordinem, atque adeo imperfectiora propter  
60 perfectiora, et hæc propter id, quod in homine est perfectissimum,  
sicque illud habebit rationem ultimi finis.

Obiectio contra  
nunc dicta  
soluitur.

2. Dices, hoc discursu ad summum probari, vivere secundum  
rectam rationem esse finem ultimum hominis, non tamen  
quod in eo gradu et ordine detur aliquis finis ultimus, quia in  
eo gradu sunt multæ virtutes, omnes propter se amabiles, quæ  
65 possunt intendi per modum finis ultimi. Respondeo, etiamsi  
stemus totum id, quod argumentum postulat, id non esse contra  
positam assertionem, quia nunc non agimus de fine ultimo,  
in quo consistat, an in una re, vel operatione, sed solum an sit,  
et hoc concludit ratio facta. De alio vero puncto acturi sumus,  
70 disput. 6, sect. 3, agentes de beatitudine. Addit præterea Durandus,  
in 2, distint. 38, quæst. 4, num. 8, rationem factam posse  
proportionaliter applicari, nam in ipso vivere secundum  
rationem est multitudo actionum et operationum, inter quas  
potest etiam servari ordo, ut imperfectiora ad perfectiora ordi-  
nentur: ac denique tota rationalis vita ad id, quod summum  
75 et perfectissimum est; quod latius tractaturi sumus agentes de  
beatitudine.

Consecarium ex  
assertione.

3. Atque ex hac conclusione sequitur omnes homines  
convenire in hoc ultimo fine, vel secundum naturæ propensionem,  
quia est hominum natura; vel secundum Dei ordinationem,  
quia tota humana species ad eundem finem adeo distincta est:  
at vero secundum appetitum elicitive non omnes homines eundem  
finem intendunt, quia hoc pendet ex eorum libertate et cognitione,  
vel ignorantia. Addit vero D. Thomas, quæst. 1, art. 7, omnes,  
85 qui habent affectum bene dispositum, convenire in hoc ultimo fine  
etiam secundum intentionem elicitam. Quod intelligendum est juxta  
modum et qualitatem bonæ dispositionis: nam si illa dispositio sit  
supernaturalis, et ex cognitione, ac virtute supernaturali procedat,  
90 omnes, qui illam participaverint, convenient in eodem fine  
supernaturali: si autem dispositio fuerit tantum naturalis, seu

60R some order be kept among them and, indeed, that all be brought into  
relation with something which is perfect and consummate in such an  
art. Likewise, therefore, since the nature of humans is one in this sort  
of way and embraces many actions, a perfect arrangement of it intrin-  
sically posits order. And, indeed, the more imperfect things on account  
of the more perfect and these on account of that which is most perfect  
in humans and so it will have the character of an ultimate end.

65R 2. You will say that this reasoning proves at most that the ultimate  
end of humans is to live following according to right reason. Never-  
theless, some ultimate end is not yet given in the same grade and or-  
der, because there are many virtues in the same grade—all worthy to be  
loved for their own sake—which can be intended through the mode of  
an ultimate end. I respond: even if we should grant everything which  
70R the argument posits, it is not contrary to the posited assertion, because  
we are not now asking what the ultimate end consists in or whether  
it is one thing or action, but only with whether there is one. And  
the reasoning given concludes this [matter]. But we will deal with the  
other point in disp. 6, sect. 3, when dealing with happiness. In addition,  
75R Durandus adds in 2, dist. 38, q. 4, n. 8, that the given reasoning can be  
applied analogously, for to live following reason involves in itself a mul-  
titude of actions and activities among which order can still be preserved  
so that the more imperfect are ordered to the more perfect and, finally,  
the entire rational life to that which is the highest and most perfect. We  
80R will discuss this more extensively when dealing with happiness.

85R 3. And from this conclusion it follows that all human beings agree  
in this ultimate end. They either follow the inclination of nature (be-  
cause it is the nature of human beings) or they follow the ordination of  
God (because the entire human species has for that reason been marked  
off to the same end). But, to be sure, not all human beings intend the  
same end in following elicitive appetite, because this depends on their  
freedom and cognition or ignorance. In addition, St. Thomas says in  
[ST IaIIae.]1.7 that everyone who has a well-disposed affection agrees  
90R in this ultimate end even when following elicited intention. What must  
be understood equally is the mode and quality of the good disposition.  
For if that disposition is supernatural and precedes from supernatural  
cognition and virtue, all who have participated in it agree in the same  
supernatural end. If, however, the disposition is only natural or moral,  
they agree in the ultimate natural end either formally having been in-

An objection  
against what was  
just said is  
resolved.

Consequences of  
the assertion.

95 moralis, convenient in fine ultimo naturali vel formaliter intento, vel saltem interpretative, quia omnes intendunt secundum rectam rationem vivere. Unde licet in finibus proximis differere possint, ut Durandus notavit, loco citato, quia unus potest unam virtutem intendere, alius aliam: tamen omnes tendent in eundem ultimum finem, quia ille finis adeo perfectus est, ut inquit Bonaventura, in 2, distinct. 38, art. 1, quæst. 4, ut omnes bene operantes ad se trahat, et solus ipse possit affectum bene dispositum satiare.

100 4. Dicendum est secundo, non est necesse ut omnis homo, quando primo operatur, intendat propria et formali intentione elicita aliquem finem ultimum simpliciter, in quem se et omnia sua referat. Probat, quia talis intentio neque est absolute necessaria per se, neque ad alias operationes: ergo nullo modo est necessaria. Prior pars antecedentis probatur, quia omnis intentio voluntatis in via est libera saltem quoad exercitium, vel etiam quoad specificationem, si sit de re aliqua determinata. Posterior vero pars probatur, quia ad operationes morales sufficit intentio particularis finis, qui proprie intendatur, et sit ultimus tantum secundum quid, et negative. Unde explicatur, et confirmatur conclusio, nam quando homo pervenit, verbi gratia, ad usum rationis, potest inchoare operationes suas morales a particularibus objectis, verbi gratia, intendendo honorem, salutem, vel quid simile prius quam tractet de fine ultimo simpliciter, et propter illos fines potest libere eligere et operari: nec dici potest quod saltem interpretative intendat finem illum particularem tanquam finem ultimum simpliciter et positive hoc enim necessarium non est, alias in tali affectu peccaret mortaliter, quod est plane falsum, quia fieri potest ut tale objectum nec contra præceptum sit, nec contra charitatem, et consequenter ut nec formaliter, nec virtute, seu interpretative ametur ut summum bonum. <col. b>

125 5. Dicendum tertio, necessarium esse hominem exercentem actiones humanas intendere aliquem finem ultimum saltem negative et secundum quid. Juxta quam conclusionem

<sup>5</sup>See 2.4.5.

<sup>6</sup>That is, becomes a young adult.

95R tended or at least interpretatively,<sup>5</sup> because everyone intends to live in accordance with right reason. As a result, although they differ with respect to proximate ends (as Durandus wrote in the cited place) because one can intend one virtue and another another, they still all aim at the same ultimate end because that end is indeed the more perfect (as Bonaventure says in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 38, art. 1, q. 4), so that it draws to itself everyone acting well and it alone can satisfy the well-disposed affection.

105R 4. Second, it must be said that it is not necessary that every human being, when he first acts, intend with a proper and formal elicited intention some unqualifiedly ultimate end to which he directs himself and all his [actions]. This is proven: because such an intention is neither absolutely necessary through itself nor for other actions. Therefore, it is necessary in no way. The first part of the antecedent is proven: because every intention of the will in this life is free at least with respect to exercise, or even with respect to specification, if it is determinate according to some thing. Now the latter part is proven: because for moral actions an intention of a particular end suffices which is properly intended and is ultimate only qualifiedly and negatively. Hence, the conclusion is confirmed and explained: for when a human being arrives at, for example, the use of reason,<sup>6</sup> he can begin his moral actions with a particular object, intending, for example, honour, good health, or something similar, which he deals with before dealing with the unqualifiedly ultimate end. And he can freely choose and act for the sake of those ends. Nor can it be said that he at least interpretatively intends that particular end as an unqualifiedly and positively ultimate end, for this is not necessary. Otherwise he would sin mortally with such an affection. This is plainly false, because it can happen that such an object is neither contrary to precept nor contrary to charity, and consequently that it is loved neither formally nor virtually nor interpretatively as the highest good.

125R 5. Thirdly, it must be said that it is necessary that a human performing human actions intend some ultimate end at least negatively and qualifiedly. Saint Thomas can be understood as agreeing with this

2. Assertio, prima hominis actio non necessario est circa ultimum finem simpliciter. Probat.

Confirmatur.

3. Assertio, in actionibus humanis semper intenditur finis aliquo modo ultimus.

2nd assertion: the first action of a human is not necessarily concerning the unqualifiedly ultimate end.

It is confirmed.

3rd assertion: an ultimate end is always intended in some manner in human actions.

130 potest intelligi D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 4, et eam con-  
vincit ratio ejus, quia non est progressus in infinitum in finibus,  
sicut neque in aliis causis per se ordinatis, de qua præter Arist- 130R  
totelem 2, *Metaphysicæ*, cap. 2, legi potest idem D. Thomas  
1, contr. *Gent.*, cap. 3, et lib. 2, cap. 16, et lib. 3, cap. 17,  
et Scotus, in 1, distinct. 2, quæst. 1, et Durandus, distinct. 3,  
quæst. 1. Atque hinc sequitur, primum actum hominis incip- 135R  
ientis operari humano modo necessario esse debere circa ali-  
quid per modum finis ultimi saltem negative: quia necesse est, ut  
aliquid propter se ametur, ut possint alia propter ipsum amari:  
illud autem, quod propter se amatur, ut sic habet rationem ul-  
timi, quia ut sic, non refertur in aliud: si enim referretur, jam  
illud aliud esset prius amatum. 140R

Instantia una  
contra proxime  
dicta diluitur.

140 6. Dices primo, nonne satis erit ut antecedit voluntas,  
seu intentio boni in communi? Respondetur, posse hanc in-  
tentionem esse omnium primam, non tamen esse satis ut ex  
illa progrediatur homo immediate ad electiones faciendas, sed 145R  
necesse est ut prius figat intentionem in aliquo particulari ob-  
jecto propter se amando, quia media, et executio eorum ver-  
santur circa singularia, et ideo non habent determinatam utili-  
tatem vel proportionem, donec cum re aliqua determinata con-  
ferantur, quæ per illa consequenda sit, et ideo illa generalis in- 150R  
tentio non sufficit ac movet, et excitat ad amandum particulare  
150 bonum, quod sub illo communi continetur.

Instantia altera.

155 7. Dices secundo, quia fieri potest ut amor alicujus boni  
determinati, verbi gratia, honoris, præcesserit ante usum rati-  
onis, et postea adveniente usu rationis, ex vi illius fieri elec-  
tiones: ergo fieri potest ut prima operatio humana sit circa  
Soluitur 1. 155 bonum tantum propter aliud amatum. Respondetur, etiamsi  
concederemus totum, non esse contra assertionem positam,  
quia illud est per accidens, nos vero per se loquimur de homine, 160R  
qui simpliciter incepit operari, verbi gratia, Adam cum pri-  
mum creatus fuit: et idem est de Christo, de Beata Virgine  
et de Angelis. Secundo dicitur in eo eventu cum ante elec-

conclusion in [*ST*] IaIIae.1.4, [co.], and his account establishes it [the  
conclusion], because there is not a progression into infinity with ends,  
just as there also is not in other causes ordered *per se*. Concerning these,  
in addition to Aristotle in 2 *Metaphysicæ*, cap. 2, one can read the same  
Saint Thomas in *cont. Gentiles* lib. 1, cap. 3 and lib. 2, cap. 16 and lib. 3,  
cap. 17, Scotus in 1, distinct. 2, q. 1, and Durandus in distinct. 3, q. 1.  
And from here it follows that the first act of a human beginning to oper-  
ate in a human way necessarily must be about something in the manner  
of an ultimate end at least negatively. Because it is necessary that some-  
thing be loved for its own sake so that other things can be loved for  
its sake. That, however, which is loved for its own sake so that it thus  
has the character of an ultimate [end], because it is such, is not directed  
towards something else. For if it were directed, that other thing would  
be prior in being loved. 140R

6. [But] you may say first: will it not be enough that the will or  
an intention of the good in general goes before?<sup>7</sup> It is answered: it is  
possible that this intention comes first, yet it is not enough so that a  
human can immediately proceed from it to the choices that must be  
made. Rather, it is necessary that he first fix an intention on some par-  
ticular object that ought to be loved for its own sake, because means and  
their execution have to do with singular things. And, therefore, they do  
not have determinate usefulness or proportion until they are brought  
together with some determinate thing which is to be obtained through  
them. For this reason that general intention does not suffice either to  
move or to excite to loving a particular good which is contained under  
that general [good]. 145R

7. Secondly, you may say: for it can happen that love of some de-  
terminate good (honour, for example) occurs before the use of reason  
and afterwards by a developing use of reason choices are made because  
of the force of it [i.e., the love]. Therefore, it can happen that the  
first human action is concerned with a good only loved for the sake  
of something else. I answer: even if we conceded the whole point, it  
would not be against the posited assertion, because that [example] is  
*per accidens*; we, however, speak *per se* concerning a human, who began  
to act strictly speaking (for example, Adam when first created; and the  
same is true of Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and of the angels). Secondly,  
160R

One objection  
against what was  
just said is  
resolved.

A second  
objection.

It is resolved,  
first.

Secondly.

<sup>7</sup>This objector is going in the other direction, by suggesting that we can get by with even less, i.e., all we need is a recognition that something is good. Cf. 3.6.1.

tionem antecedere debeat consultatio, necessarium etiam esse, moraliter <28> loquendo, ut præcedat intentio rationalis, qua 165R  
velit homo consequi finem illum per convenientia media, hæc  
enim est, quæ movet ad consultationem; unde non sufficit ille  
165 quasi naturalis affectus, qui potest antecedere.

it is said that in the event when deliberation ought to go before choice  
it is also necessary, morally speaking, that rational intention go before,  
by which [intention] a human wills to follow that end through appropriate means. This [intention], indeed, is what moves to deliberation.  
Hence, that natural, as it were, affection which can precede does not suffice.