

<18, col. b>²

Utrum actus voluntatis necessarii sint propter finem, et consequenter an sint proprie actus humani.

Whether necessary acts of the will are for the sake of an end and consequently whether they are properly human acts.

Arguitur pro neg.
parte.

5 1. Ratio dubii est, quia divus Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, articulo secundo, duo supponit: primum est, solum actus illos esse proprie humanos, quorum homo est dominus: habet autem homo dominium solum liberorum actuum, quia illi tantum sunt in ejus potestate: ergo ex sententia D. Thomæ solum actus liberi sunt humani. Alterum est, solum actus humanos esse propter finem, quia de iis tantum docet esse propter finem: ergo actus necessarii non erunt propter finem. In contrarium autem est, quia hi actus videntur esse ex propria causalitate et motione finis præconcepti. Supponendum imprimis est, non esse sermonem de illo modo imperfecto agendi propter finem, qui dicitur de agentibus naturalibus, quæ potius moventur in finem, quam se in illum moveant, de quo late, in disp. 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 10, sed sermo est de proprio modo operandi propter finem ex propria ordinatione ipsius hominis operantis.

5R

1. The reason for doubting is that St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.2 assumes two things. The first is that only those acts are properly human of which the human being is master. But a human being has dominion only of free acts, because those alone are in his power. Therefore, according to the view of St. Thomas, only free acts are human. The second assumption is that only human acts are for the sake of an end, because it is only about these that he teaches that they are for the sake of an end. Therefore, necessary acts will not be for the sake of an end. But the contrary is the case, since these acts seem to be from the proper causality and motion of the preconceived end. It should be assumed in the first place that the discussion is not about that imperfect way of acting for the sake of an end that is attributed to natural agents, which are more moved to the end than that they move themselves to it (concerning which more [is said] in *DM XXIII*, sec. 10). Rather, the discussion is about the proper way of acting for the sake of an end by a proper ordination of the acting human being himself.

It is argued for the negative side.

Arguitur pro affirm.

10 Deinde suppono, duobus modis posse actum voluntatis esse necessarium, primo ex imperfectione, ut contingit in actibus indeliberatis, in quibus voluntas excitatur antequam ratio perfecte advertere possit, ut in motibus primo primis et indeliberatis. Secundo ex perfectione, ut contingit in amore Dei, quem habent beati: ille enim ab intrinseco est necessarius, non ex inadvertentia, aut imperfectione, sed potius ex perfectissima cognitione summi boni, ex quo amore potest oriri alius actus electionis necessariae, si sit de objecto habente necessariam connexionem cum prædicto amore.

10R

Next, I assume that an act of the will can be necessary in two ways. The first is from imperfection, as happens in undeliberated acts in which the will is excited before reason can fully notice it, as especially in first and undeliberated motions. The second is from perfection, as happens in the love for God which the blessed have. For that is necessary from something intrinsic, not from an inadvertency or imperfection, but rather from a most perfect cognition of the highest good, from which love can arise another act of necessary election, if it is of an object having a necessary connection with the aforementioned love.

It is argued for the affirmative.

The first note towards a resolution.

Notatio 1. pro resolutione.

15 20 25

15R

20R

25R

The second note.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

1. Assertio de
actibus voluntatis
ex perfecta
advertentia.
Probat 1.

30 2. Dico ergo primo, ut actio voluntatis sit perfecte propter
finem, non esse de ratione illius ut sit libera, sed sat est, ut
ex perfecta advertentia, et iudicio rationis procedat. Probat 1.
35 primo, quia perfecta causalitas finalis reperiri potest sine liber-
tate: Deus enim clare visus per suam liberam bonitatem trahit
voluntatem ad sui dilectionem <19> necessariam, tanquam fi-
nis ultimus summe amabilis. Dictum est autem, idem esse,
35 actum esse propter finem, et esse ex propria causalitate finis:
ergo hoc sufficit ut actus sit propter finem, etiamsi liber non
sit. Et ad hæc applicari potest ratio divi Thomæ 1, 2, in ar-
tículo 1, quæst. 1, quia talis actus est sub proprio objecto, et
motivo voluntatis perfecte proposito et applicato: ergo est sub
40 ratione finis, atque adeo propter finem. Secundo sic explicatur:
nam ex intentione finis necessario sequitur electio medii, si il-
lud ut unicum et necessarium proponatur, et hoc non obstat,
quominus illa electio sit proprie propter finem: ergo etiamsi
45 fingamus intentionem esse simpliciter necessariam, et conse-
quenter ex illa ortam esse electionem necessariam, nihilominus
illa electio erit proprie omnino propter finem, quia non ob-
stante necessitate fit cum perfecta ordinatione medii ad finem:
ergo ulterius etiam ipsa intentio, quamvis contingat esse nec-
50 cessaria, nihilominus erit propter finem, dummodo procedat ex
perfecta finis cognitione, et ex efficacissima motione illius in
suo genere, atque adeo eadem ratione idem erit de actu amoris
necessario procedente ex simili cognitione et motione objecti
boni, quod contingit tantum in visione beata: et ideo divus
55 Thomas radicem operationis propter finem, nunquam tribuit
libertati, sed perfectæ cognitioni rationis, per quam et propor-
tio mediorum cum fine, et ipsius finis cum operante cognosci
potest, ut videre est 3, contra Gentes, c. 2, et 1, 2, q. 1, art. 2,
ubi probat bruta non operari propter finem formaliter et pro-
60 prie, quia carent prædicta cognitione.

1. Obiectio
contra assert.
Diluitur.

60 3. Obijcies primo; ergo processio Spiritus sancti in Deo est
propter finem, quia licet sit necessaria, tamen est a voluntate
ex perfecta cognitione divinæ bonitatis. Respondeo, negando
consequentiam ob ea, quæ diximus in disputatione prima: nam
65R

2. Therefore, I say, first, an act of the will is perfectly for the sake
of an end not by reason of its being free, but it is enough that it proceed
from a perfect awareness and a judgement of reason. This is proven,
first, from the fact that perfect final causality can be found without
freedom. For God having been clearly seen draws the will to a neces-
sary delight in him through his own free goodness as the most lovable
ultimate end. But it was said that it was the same for an act to be for the
sake of an end and to be from the proper causality of an end. Therefore,
this suffices so that an act is for the sake of an end even if it is not free.
And the argument of St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 can be applied to
this: for such an act is under the proper object and motive of the will
having been perfectly proposed and applied. Therefore, it is under the
aspect of an end and therefore [it is] for the sake of an end.

Secondly, it is explained in this way: for from a necessary intention
of the end follows the election of a means, if that is proposed as unique
and necessary and this does not stand in the way so that that election is
not properly for the sake of the end. Therefore, even if we imagine an
intention that is strictly necessary speaking and consequently a neces-
sary election has arisen from it, nevertheless that election will properly
be entirely for the sake of the end, since with necessity not standing in
the way it happens with the perfect ordination of a means to an end.
Therefore, further, even the intention itself, although it happens to be
necessary, will still be for the sake of the end, provided that it proceeds
from a perfect cognition of the end and from the most efficacious mo-
tion of that in its genus. And therefore for the same reason the same
will be true in the case of a necessary act of love proceeding from the
similar cognition and motion of a good object that happens only in the
beatific vision. For this reason St. Thomas never attributes the root of
activity for the sake of an end to freedom but to perfect cognition of
the reason, through which both the proportion of the means to the end
and of the end itself to the one acting can be cognized, as is seen in SCG
III, c. 2 and in [ST] IaIIæ.1.2, where he shows that brute animals do
not act for the sake of an end formally and properly since they lack the
aforementioned cognition.

3. You will object first: therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit
in God is for the sake of an end, because, although it is necessary, nev-
ertheless it is by will from a perfect cognition of divine goodness. I
respond by denying the consequence for the reason we offered in the

The first
assertion: about
acts of the will
coming from a
perfect
awareness.
It is proven, first.

Secondly.

The first
objection to the
assertion.
It is refuted.

	65	ubi non est causalitas finis, non est actio propter finem: diximus autem in Deo ad intra non esse causalitatem finis, quia ibi nulla est actio proprie, nec Deus est finis sui ipsius, et ita licet dici possit Deum se amare propter bonitatem suam, tanquam per rationem amandi, non vero tanquam propter finem, nec ex causalitate finis.	70R	first disputation. ³ For where there is no causality of an end, there is no action for the sake of an end. But we said in God within there is no causality of an end because there is no proper action there nor is God his own end. And so, although one can say that God loves himself for the sake of his own goodness, just as through a reason for loving, but it is not as for the sake of an end nor from the causality of an end.	
2. Obiectio.	70	4. Obijcies secundo: videri idem dicendum de delectatione, vel de fruitione Dei, quod illa etiam sit propter finem, nam ex dictis videtur sequi esse propter finem, quia licet sit actio necessaria, tamen est voluntaria, cum sit elicit a voluntate, et consequenter est a propria <col. b> causalitate objecti boni, quod consecutum delectat propter bonitatem suam: ergo rationes factæ numero 2, procedunt etiam de hoc actu. Hoc dubium attingit Fonseca 5, Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, quæst. 10, sectione 2, non sub ratione delectationis, sed satietatis, aut quietis appetitus, quam dicit factam esse propter finem, quatenus assecutio finis, ad quem consequitur; facta est propter finem; postquam vero finis consecutus est, inquit ille, non est propter finem, quia assecuto fine cessat actio propter finem.	75R	4. You will object secondly: it seems that the same should be said about delight or about the enjoyment of God, that that also is for the sake of the end, for from what was said it seems to follow that it is for the sake of the end, because although it is a necessary action, nevertheless, it is voluntary, since it is elicited by the will and consequently is by a proper causality of the good object, which, having been achieved, delights for the sake of its goodness. Therefore, the arguments made in n. 2 also work with regards to this act. Fonseca mentions this doubt in <i>Metaph.</i> 5, c. 2, q. 10, sec. 2, not under the nature of delight but of satiety or of the rest of desire, which is said to have come about for the sake of the end insofar as the achievement of the end after which it followed was made for the sake of the end. But after the end has been achieved, he says, it is not for the sake of the end, because action for the sake of the end ceases with the end having been achieved.	The second objection.
Responsio quorundam.	80	Sed hæc doctrina videtur solum habere locum in eo fine, qui consistit in aliquo effectu facto, non vero in illo, qui consistit in operatione. Item consistit in satietate et quiete privativa et mortua, qualis est in rebus inanimatis, non vero in positiva et vitali, qualis est in viventibus, quam nomine delectationis significamus: hoc enim quamdiu est, fit, et ideo videtur esse proprie propter finem. Nihilominus non censeo hunc actum esse tam proprie propter finem, sicut est intentio, vel amor. Et ratio est, quia non immediate oritur ex propria causalitate finis, nec ex directo imperio et motione alicujus actus voluntatis, qui sit propter finem, sed solum resultat naturaliter ex amore finis jam consecuti: objectum enim bonum immediate et per se movet ad amorem sui, ex quo sine alia motione resultat delectatio, si finis sit præsens: et ideo tale objectum non habet propriam et immediatam causalitatem in illum actum: ergo ille non est propter finem proprie tanquam actus elicited, nec etiam tanquam imperatus, quia non est actus, qui proprie pen-	80R	<i>Metaph.</i> 5, c. 2, q. 10, sec. 2, not under the nature of delight but of satiety or of the rest of desire, which is said to have come about for the sake of the end insofar as the achievement of the end after which it followed was made for the sake of the end. But after the end has been achieved, he says, it is not for the sake of the end, because action for the sake of the end ceases with the end having been achieved.	The response of some.
Non satisfacit.	85		85R	But this doctrine seems to have a place only with respect to that end which consists in some effect having come about, but not with respect to that [end] which consists in activity. Likewise, [with respect to those ends which] consist in satiety and in privative rest and the rest of death, the sort that are in inanimate things, but not in positive and vital ones, the sort that are in living beings, which we signify with the name 'delight'. For this happens as long as it is and therefore it seems to properly be for the sake of the end. Nevertheless, I do not think that this act is as properly for the sake of an end as is intention or love. The reason is that it does not immediately arise from the proper causality of the end nor from the direct command and motion of some act of the will which is for the sake of the end, but only results naturally from the love for the end that has now been achieved. For the good object immediately and <i>per se</i> moves to a love for itself from which delight results without any other motion, if the end is present. And therefore such an object does not have a proper and immediate causality in that	It does not satisfy.
Exactior responsio.	90		90R		
	95		95R		
	100		100R		A more accurate response.

³DFH 1.1.10.

100 det ex motione voluntatis, sed naturaliter resultat ex præsentia
finis: non est ergo propter finem, sed est quid consequens asse-
105 cutionem finis.

3. Obiectio.

5. Tertio præcipue objici potest contra hanc doctrinam,
quia operatio necessaria non est humana; ergo non est propter
105 finem. Consequentia probatur, quia, ut divus Thomas signifi-
cat citato articulo 1, solum operationes humanæ sunt propter
finem. Probatur vero antecedens ex eodem D. Thoma, in eo-
dem articulo, *quia illa operatio est humana, cujus homo est domi-*
110 *nus*; est autem dominus tantum actionum liberarum, non enim
dicitur homo dominus actionis suæ solum, quia illam possidet
vel efficit, nam etiam possidet vitam, cujus non est dominus,
115 et efficit nutritionem, et augmentum quorum dominio caret;
nec dicitur dominus, quia habeat jus ad talem actionem, vel
usum ejus, quia ad actum peccati non habet <20> jus, et tamen
est dominus illius actus: et servus non habet jus ad omnes ac-
120 tiones suas, quia potius est apud dominum, et tamen est domi-
nus suarum actionum: consistit ergo hoc dominium tantum in
libera voluntate agendi, vel omittendi suas actiones: ergo ubi
non est libertas, nec dominium erit, nec actio humana.

Cur actio
necessaria non
censeatur
humana.
1. Ratio ex Caiet.

6. Hæc difficultas petit, ut explicemus, quid necessarium
120 sit, ut actio sit humana. Aliqui enim universaliter docent, ac-
tionem necessariam non esse actionem humanam. Cujus du-
plex ratio addi potest ex Cajetano, prima secundæ, quæstione
prima, articulo primo: quia illa non est actio, quamvis late
125 loquendo sit operatio: *propria enim*, inquit, *actio illa est, qua*
homo se movet; in actione autem necessaria potius agitur, quam
agat; hæc vero ratio mihi non placet, quia actio immanens
vere est actio, licet contingat esse necessaria: quamvis enim ac-
130 tio transiens sit etiam actio, ut sumitur in prædicamento ac-
tionis, distinguit tamen Aristoteles interdum actionem a fac-
tione, ut videre licet in 2, Physicorum, text. quinquagesi-
mo-septima, et quinquagesimo-secundo: et 9, Metaphysicæ,
135 text. quinquagesimo-sexto: tamen, ut exposuit divus Thomas,

Displicet hæc
ratio.

105 quia] *om.* V.

act. Therefore, it is not for the sake of the end properly as an elicited act
or even a commanded act, since it is not an act which properly depends
on a motion of the will, but it naturally results from the presence of
105R the end. Therefore, it is not for the sake of the end, but is what follows
from the attainment of the end.

5. Thirdly, it can especially be objected against this doctrine, be-
cause a necessary action is not human. Therefore, it is not for the sake
of an end. The consequence is proven from that fact that, as St. Thomas
110R indicates in the cited art. 1, only human actions are for the sake of an
end. But the antecedent is shown from the same St. Thomas in the same
article: ‘because that action is human of which a human being is mas-
ter’. But he is master only of free actions, for it is not said that a human
being is master of his actions only because he possesses it or brings it
115R about. For he also possesses life, of which he is not master, and brings
about nutrition and increase of which he lacks mastery. Nor is he called
a master because he has the right to such an action or its use, because
he does not have to the right to an act of sin and yet he is master of that
act. And a servant does not have the right to all his actions, because it
120R lies more with the master, and yet he is master of his actions. There-
fore, this mastery consists only in the free will acting or omitting his
actions. Therefore, where there is no freedom, there will be no mastery
nor human action.

6. This difficulty demands that we explain what is necessary for an
action to be human. For some teach universally that a necessary action
is not a human action. Two reasons can be added for this from Cajetan
125R [ST] IaIIæ.1.1.

One is that it is not an action (*actio*), although it is an activity (*op-*
eratio) more broadly speaking: ‘for that’, he says, ‘is a proper action by
which a human being moves himself’. But in a necessary action he is
130R moved more than that he moves. But this reason is not pleasing to me,
because an immanent action really is an action even though it happens
to be necessary. For although a transeunt action is also an action,
so that it is taken up in the category of action, nevertheless Aristotle
distinguishes between doing (*actionem*) and making (*factione*), as may
135R be seen in *Phys.* II, t. 57 and 52 and in *Metaph.* IX, t. 56. Nevertheless,
as St. Thomas explained in [ST] IaIIæ.57.4, ‘making’ names a transeunt

The third
objection.

Why a necessary
action is not
considered
human.

The first reason
from Cajetan.

This reason
displeases.

135	<p>prima secundæ, quæstione quinquagesima-septima, articulo quarto, factionem vocavit actionem transeuntem, actionem vero eam quæ immanens est. Quod vero inter immanentes illa dicatur actio, quæ est libera, et quæ non necessaria, nec ex Aristotele, nec ex usu et modo loquendi haberi potest, nec est juxta mentem S. Thomæ illo art. 1, qui distinguit actionem</p>	140R	<p>action, but ‘doing’ that which is immanent. But the claim that those immanent [acts] that are free and not necessary are called ‘doings’ cannot be gathered either from Aristotle or from the use and way of speaking. Nor is it according to the mind of St. Thomas in that art. 1, who distinguishes action into action of a human and human action. Therefore, that also which is not human is still action.</p>	The second reason is also rejected.
140	<p>in actionem hominis, et actionem humanam: ergo illa etiam quæ non est humana, est etiam actio. Secunda ratio est ejusdem Cajetani, in fine articuli 5, actionem voluntatis ex perfecta cognitione procedentem, et simul necessariam, qualis est amor beatificus, non esse humanam, quia est plusquam humana, scilicet quodammodo divina; agitur autem hic de homine ut homo est, non ut elevato ad participationem divinæ naturæ per gloriam. Sed nec hoc placet, sequitur enim supernaturalem Dei amorem viæ, etsi liber sit, non esse actum humanum, quia est plusquam humanus, et quodammodo divinus, procedit enim ex participatione divinæ naturæ per gratiam.</p>	145R	<p>The second reason is from the same Cajetan at the end of art. 5: an action of the will proceeding from perfect cognition and at the same time necessary (of the kind that the love of the blessed is) is not human, because it is more than human, namely, it is divine in a certain way. But here one is talking about a human being as he is human, not as elevated to a participation in the divine nature through glory. But this does not please, for it follows that supernatural love for God in this life, even if it is free, is not a human act, because it is more than human and divine in a certain way, for it proceeds from a participation in the divine nature through grace.</p>	
145	<p>7. Sustinendo ergo hunc dicendi modum, aliter est explicanda ejus ratio, advertendo, dupliciter dici posse esse aliquam actionem hominis propriam; loquor autem de homine <col. b> ut intellectualis est, et distinguitur a cæteris creaturis inferioribus, non ut ab Angelis distinguitur, nam quæ hic de homine tractamus, omnia similiter in Angelis inveniuntur, ut constat ex 1 part., quæst. 60.</p>	150R	<p>7. Therefore, in sustaining this way of speaking, the reason for it should be explained otherwise, by noticing that something can be said to be a proper action of a human being in two ways. But I am speaking of a human insofar as he is intellectual and is distinguished from the rest of the lower creatures, not as he is distinguished from the angels. For what we are discussing here concerning a human being was found to be similar to angels in every respect, as is clear from [ST] Ia.60.</p>	A note for returning the true reason.
150	<p>Primo ergo est aliqua actio propria hominis quoad substantiam et entitatem, non vero quoad modum, ut est, verbi gratia, intellectio necessaria; convenit enim homini, ut ratione utitur: nec actus talis speciei potest reperiri in inferiori creatura, modus tamen, scilicet quod ex necessitate fiat, communis est aliis rebus: et idem est de actionibus cogitative et aliis, quæ licet convenient homini secundum gradum genericum, non tamen præcise consideratum, sed ut conjunctum, et elevatum per gradum rationalem: et hæ actiones dicuntur proprie hominis, ut homo est, non tamen humanæ.</p>	155R	<p>First, therefore, is a proper action of a human being with regard to its substance and entity but not with regard to its mode, as is, for example, necessary intellection. For it is agreeable to a human being, as it uses reason. Nor can such an act of appearance be found among lower creatures, a mode, nevertheless, namely, that it happens by necessity, is common with other things. And it is the same with cogitative actions and others which although they are agreeable to a human being according to his generic position, nevertheless not as considered apart but as conjoined and elevated through a rational position. And these actions are properly said of a human being as he is human, yet are not human.</p>	Proper actions of a human being although not expressly human.
155	<p>Secundo modo contingit actionem esse propriam hominis ut homo est, et in substantia, et in modo, quia scilicet efficiuntur cum indifferentia, et sine necessitate: et hoc modo videtur locutus divus Thomas, dict, quæstione 1, art. 1, quia hæc</p>	160R	<p>In the second way it happens that an action is properly of a human being as he is human, both in substance and in mode, because, namely, they are brought about with indifference and without necessity. And St. Thomas seems to have spoken in this way in the aforementioned</p>	Actions properly human.
160		165R		
165		170R		
Altera ratio etiam reiicitur.				
Notatio pro reddenda vera ratione.				
Actiones propriae hominis licet non humanæ presse.				
Actiones propriae humanæ.				

	175	est omnibus modis propria hominis, ut homo est, et per illum tendit homo ad consecutionem sui finis, et bene, vel male operatur, et dignus est laude, vel vituperio. Ac denique, quia, licet consideratione physica aliquæ actiones possunt dici humanæ, quia procedunt ab anima humana, ut rationalis est, tamen consideratione morali solum, hæ postremæ dicuntur proprie humanæ, quia ille modus est totius esse moralis fundamentum seu ratio: et hæc doctrina est valde probabilis.	175R	q. 1, art. 1, because this is in every way proper to a human being as human and through it a human being tends to the attainment of his end, acts either well or badly, and is worthy of either praise or blame. And, finally, because they procede from the human soul as it is rational, yet in a moral consideration alone, these latter are called properly human, because that mode is the foundation or nature of all moral being. And this doctrine is very probable.	
Aliorum ratio duplex. Prior quæ non placet.	180	8. Aliis vero placet, actum, etiamsi necessarius sit, dummodo sit a voluntate ex plenaria potestate operante, esse actionem humanam: idque dupliciter: primo, per extrinsecam denominationem, scilicet quia est libera in sua causa: verbi gratia, actus amoris Dei in patria ortus est ex actionibus liberis, quibus homo meruit illum statum, et ideo dicitur humanus, et liber in sua causa. Sed hoc non placet, primo enim non est universalis ratio: in aliquibus enim est ille actus sine præcedentibus actionibus liberis, ut in infantibus baptizatis: tum quia est valde improprium, quia ille actus non imperatur a præcedenti actione humana, nec ab illa informatur nisi valde remote. Alius modus apparens est, quod ille actus intrinsece sit humanus, quia est perfectissime voluntarius, et illa necessitas, quam <21> habet, non est ex imperfectione, sed potius ex perfectione nascitur: nam sicut operari libere circa bona non summe bona, nec simpliciter necessaria perfectionis est, ita circa summe bonum, et summe necessarium ferri necessario ad perfectionem pertinet: ideo Deus sicut alia libere, ita se necessario amat, et utrumque ex infinita perfectione videtur autem esse proprie actus humanus, qui ex maxima perfectione hominis, et, ut sic dicam, ex plenaria potestate, et advertentia rationis procedit.	180R	8. But to others it is pleasing that an act is a human action even if it is necessary, provided that it is from the will by a full power acting. And there are two [reasons]. First, through an extrinsic denomination, namely, because it is free in its cause. For example, an act of love for God in the homeland has arised from the free actions by which the human being won that state, and therefore is called human and free in its cause. But this does not please, for, first, it is not a universal reason. For in others that act is without preceding free actions, as in baptized infants. Also, because it is very improper, because that act is not commanded by a preceding human action nor is it informed by except very remotely.	Two arguments of others. The first one which does not please.
Posterior.	190	9. Mihi autem in hac re videntur hæc duo: primum, prædictam controversiam magis pertinere ad modum loquendi, quam ad rem: nam si per actionem humanam intelligamus moralem, et dignam laude, aut reprehensione, sic sola actio libera est humana, et hic videtur esse usitator modus loquendi quem sequitur D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, si autem per actionem humanam intelligamus perfecte, rationaliter, et ab intrinseco procedentem ex plena hominis voluntate, sic ac-	190R	The other way is apparent: that that act is human intrinsically, because it is more perfectly voluntary and that necessity which it has is not born from imperfection but rather from perfection. For just as to act freely for a good that is not the highest good is not necessary <i>simpliciter</i> for perfection, so [to act] for the highest good even the highest necessity to bring necessarily pertains to perfection. Therefore just as God [loves] others things freely, so he loves himself necessarily, and both from infinite perfection. But a properly human act seems to be that which proceeds from the maximal perfection of a human and, if I may speak in this way, from the full power and attention of reason.	The second.
1. Auctoris pronuntiatum circa 3. obiectionem.	205		205R	9. To me, however, these two things appear to me in this matter. First, the aforementioned controversy pertains more to a manner of speaking than to a real dispute. For if by human action we understand action that is moral and worthy of praise and blame, then only free action is human. And here the more usual way of speaking seems to be the one that St. Thomas follows in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1. But if by human action we understand something perfectly, rationally, and intrinsically proceeding from the full will of the human being, then the act of beati-	The first pronouncement of the author concerning the third objection.
	210		210R		

2. Pronuntiatum. 210 tus beatitudinis dici potest actus humanas. Secundum est,
 quocumque modo istorum loquamur, facile posse expediri ter-
 tiam objectionem factam, in num. 5, nam si dicamus actum
 beatificum, verbi gratia, esse humanum, ad D. Thomam re-
 spondendum est, vel sub dominio talis actus comprehendisse 215R
 215 non solum liberum, sed etiam voluntarium perfecte, quia
 utrumque fundatur in plena potestate libertatis, vel certe lo-
 cutum esse de homine viatore, et per actus suos tendente in
 finem suum, in quo nulla est actio humana, quæ non sit libera;
 si autem demus illum actum non esse humanum, neganda est 220R
 220 consequentia: ad D. Thomam vero dicendum est, nunquam
 posuisse exclusivam, sed solum dixisse, omnem actionem hu-
 manam esse propter finem, ex quo non sequitur, omnem ac-
 tionem propter finem esse humanam. Unde cum illo articulo
 primo definivisset omnem actionem humanam esse propter 225R
 225 finem abstinuit ab actione libera: ergo signum est non locu-
 tum fuisse exclusive.

2. Assertio de
 actibus voluntatis
 ex inadvertentia.

10. Secundo principaliter dicendum est actus voluntatis,
 qui ob inadvertentiam, seu indeliberationem rationis absque
 fiunt, non esse proprie et perfecte propter finem. Ita colligitur
 ex D. Thoma, hic art. 1, ad 3, cont. Gent., cap. 82, et ratio 230R
 230 ex dictis est facilis, quia propria operatio propter finem oritur
 ex eo, quod ratio cognoscit rationem finis, et proportionem
 mediorum ad ipsum: ergo quando ratio non potest perfecte
 adver- <col. b> tere, non erit propria operatio propter finem,
 et hoc magis constabit ex sequenti dubio. 235R
 235

Quæstiuncula de
 non utentibus
 perfecte ratione.

11. Hic vero quæret aliquis an homines, qui non possunt
 perfecte uti ratione, ut sunt pueri, amentes et dormientes, pos-
 sit interdum operari propter finem: nam ex proxima assertione
 videtur sequi pars negativa, quæ confirmari potest: nam si hi
 possunt operari propter finem: ergo possunt conferre medium 240R
 240 cum fine: et cognoscere eorum proportionem: ergo eadem ra-
 tione poterunt conferre unum medium cum alio: ergo eligere:
 ergo libere operari: ergo peccare.

12. In contrarium autem videtur esse experientia et ra- 245R

tude can be called a human act.

Secondly, in whichever way of these we are speaking, a third objec-
 tion can easily be obtained, in n. 5. For if we speak say, for example,
 that the beatific act is human, then one should respond to St. Thomas
 either that not only such acts as free ones abut also perfectly voluntary
 ones were included under mastery, because each is founded in the full
 power of liberty or surely we were speaking of humans in this life and
 through his acts tending to his end, in which none is a human action
 which is not free. But if are given that that act is not human, then the
 consequence should be denied. But it should be said to St. Thomas that
 nothing exclusive was set up but it was only said that all human actions
 are for the sake of an end, from which it does not follow that all actions
 for the sake of an end are human. Hence, with that first article having
 had defined that all human actions are for the sake of an end, he with-
 held from free action. Therefore, it is a sign that he was not speaking
 exclusively.

10. Secondly, one should say principally that acts of the will which
 are done on account of inadvertency or the nondeliberation of reason
 are not properly and perfectly for the sake of an end. This is gathered
 from St. Thomas here in art. 1, ad 3, and from *SCG* c. 82.⁴ And the
 reason is easily [seen] from what was said, because proper action for
 the sake of an end arises from reason cognizing the nature of the end
 and the relation of the means to it. Therefore, since reason cannot give
 perfect attention, it will not properly act for the sake of an end. This
 will be even clearer from the following doubt.

11. But here someone will ask whether human beings who cannot
 perfectly use reason, as is the case with children, the mentally ill, and
 those who are sleeping, can sometimes act for the sake of an end. For
 from the preceding assertion seems to follow a negative answer, which
 can be confirmed. For if they can act for the sake of an end, then they
 can assign means to the end and cognize the relation between them.
 Therefore, by the same reason they will be able to compare one means
 to another. Therefore, [they will be able] to elect [one]. Therefore,
 [they will be able] to act freely. Therefore, [they will be able] to sin.

12. But experience and reason seems to be to the contrary, for al-

The second
 pronouncement.

The second
 assertion: about
 acts of the will
 from
 inadvertency.

A small question
 concerning not
 using perfect
 reason.

⁴Which book?

245	tio, nam licet isti habeant imperfectum usum rationis, exercere tamen possunt actus intellectus, ut colligitur ex D. Thoma, in 4, dist. 4, quæstione prima, articulo quarto, quæst. 1, ad 3, et 1 part., quæst. 8, art. 2, ad 2, quia, cum utantur phantasmatis, non sunt ita ligati, quominus possint recipere in intellectu	250R	though these people have an imperfect use of reason, nevertheless, they can exercise an act of intellect, as is gathered from St. Thomas in [<i>Sent.</i>] IV, dist. 4, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 3 and [<i>ST</i>] Ia.8.2 ad 2, because, although they use phantasms, they are not brought thus brought together so that they can receive species in the intellect and use these also for for composing and syllogizing. Therefore, they can cognize through the intellect good and the utility of means to the end [and] from a proper ordination of the will act for the sake of an end.	
255	species, et illis uti etiam componendo et syllogizando: possunt ergo per intellectum cognoscere boni et utilitatem medii ad finem ex propria voluntatis ordinatione operari propter finem. Atque ita sane dicendum videtur, licet isti homines non habeant perfectum dominium suarum actionum, nec perfectam rationis cognitionem: et ideo non tam perfecte operantur propter finem sicut cordati homines: nam si non sint omnino insani, possunt aliquo modo operari propter finem, quod probat experientia. Unde, si interrogentur, propter quid appetant sanitatem, respondent, quia ægrotare est disconveniens sibi: et si rogentur, cur utantur medicina, respondent, quia conferi ad sanitatem: signum ergo est non ita privatos esse ratione, quin possint medium cum fine conferre, atque adeo unum ad alterum ordinare, quod est operari propter finem. Confirmatur: nam aliquando experimur in his omnibus quasdam actiones procedentes ex quadam veluti prudentia et sagacitate, quæ non possunt referri in solum instinctum naturæ, sicut solet fieri in brutis: homo enim, quia ratione utitur, non habet a natura huiusmodi instinctus: ergo proveniunt illi actus ex cognitione rationis, atque adeo ex ordinatione unius ad alterum.	255R	And it seems reasonable to speak thus, although these humans do not have perfect mastery of their actions nor the perfect cognition of the reason. And therefore they do not as perfectly act for the sake of the end as prudent humans. For if they are not wholly insane, they can in some way act for the sake of an end, which experience shows. Hence, if they are asked for the sake of what they desire health, they respond that it is because being sick is disagreeable to them. And if they are asked why they use medicine, they respond that it is because it brings them to health. It is a sign, therefore, that they have not been so robbed of reason that they cannot bring together means with an end and therefore order one to another, which is to act for the sake of an end. It is confirmed: for sometimes we experience in all of these certain actions proceeding from a certain as if providence and sagacity which cannot be referred to the instinct of nature alone, as would usually happen with brute animals. For a human being, because he uses reason, does not have an instinct of this sort by nature. Therefore, these acts come from the cognition of reason and therefore by the ordination of one thing to another.	The affirmative side is proven more.
260	Pars affir. probatur magis.	260R	One experiment.	
265	Experimentum unum.	265R	Another.	
270	Alterum.	270R	The little question of the negative side is satisfied.	
275	Satis sit parti negatiuæ quæstiunculæ.	275R		
280	13. Ad adducta vero in contrarium num. 11, jam dictum est, ad operationem propter finem non esse necessariam libertatem: deinde an his hominibus sit aliqua indifferentia et libertatis vestigium, dicemus infra agentes de electione: interim videri potest Victor in <i>Relectione de pueris pervenientibus ad usum rationis</i> . Quidquid autem de hoc sit, certum est huiusmodi homines non esse capaces culpæ, præsertim mortalis, quia non possunt perfecte cognoscere rationem boni, honesti et ultimi finis: de quo suo loco dicemus.	280R	13. But to what was adduced to the contrary in n. 11, it was now said that freedom is not necessary for action for the sake of an end. Next, we will discuss below when dealing with election whether there is some indifference and vestigial freedom in these humans. Meanwhile, one can look at [Francisco de] Vitoria in <i>Relectione de pueris pervenientibus ad usum rationis</i> . ⁵ Moreover, whatever is the case with this, it is certain that human being like this are not capable of culpability, especially mortal, because they cannot perfectly cognize the nature of good, honest, and ultimate ends. We will say more about this in its place.	

⁵*De eo ad quod tenetur homo cum primum venit ad usum rationis*, ed. by T. Urdánoz (Madrid: 1960). Cf. also Suárez, *De legibus* II.6.25.