

© Sydney Penner 2011

<15, col. b><sup>2</sup>

*De actionibus voluntatis, quæ sunt propter finem.*

Ex dictis in disputatione præcedenti satis constat, voluntatem nostram operari propter finem: quod etiam est tanquam per se notum apud philosophes, et ex modo loquendi Sacræ Scripturæ, ubi etiam in sectione 4, numero 6, confirmatum est. Et ratione patet; quia, cum homo utatur ratione, cognoscit in fine propriam <16> rationem finis, propter quam est appetibilis, et proportionem mediorum in finem, et ita potest ordinare unum ad alterum, atque adeo operari propter finem. Duo ergo explicanda supersunt, primo in quibus actionibus: secundo, quot modis operetur homo propter finem.

SECTIO I.

*Utrum omnes actus liberi voluntatis humanæ sint propter finem?*

1. Ratio dubitandi pro neg. parte.

1. Ratio dubitandi est primo, quia tantum media, quæ ordinantur ad consequendum finem, videntur esse propter finem: hoc enim in rigore significat illa particula, *propter*: sed non omnes actus liberi voluntatis sunt media ad finem consequendum, ut patet primo de actu electionis: ille enim habet pro objecto medium (est enim electio de mediis): non potest autem ipsa dici medium: Deinde, multo minus intentio finis, quæ antecedit electionem, habet rationem medii. Secundo, quia id fit propter finem, quod fit ex amore finis: sed non omnis actus voluntatis fit ex amore finis, ut constat saltem de ipsomet amore, quia

Secunda.

10

*Concerning actions of the will which are on account of the end.*

It is clear enough that our will acts for the sake of an end from what was said in the preceding disputation. It is also *per se notum*, as it were, among the philosophers and from the way of speaking in the Holy Scriptures, whereby it was also confirmed in sec. 4, n. 6 [of the preceding disputation]. And it is evident by reason, given that when a human being uses reason, he cognizes in the end [i] the proper nature of the end for the sake of which it is desirable and [ii] the relation of means to the end. As a result, he can order one thing to another and to that extent act for the sake of the end. Two things, therefore, remain to be explained: in what actions? and, in how many ways can a human act for the sake of an end?

SECTION I.

*Are all free acts of the human will are for the sake of an end?*

1. The reason for doubting is, first, that only the means which are ordered to the pursuit of the end seem to be for the sake of the end. For the phrase ‘for the sake of’ taken rigorously signifies this. But not all free acts of the will are means for the pursuit of the end, as is especially clear concerning an act of election. For it has a means for an object (for it is an election of means). Moreover, it cannot be called a means. Next, much less does the intention for the end, which precedes election, have the nature of a means.

Secondly, [one can doubt] because what is done for the sake of an end is that which is done from a love for the end. But not every act of the will is done from a love for the end, as is clear at least of the very love itself, since it

The first reason for doubting for the negative side.

The second reason.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

2 quæ ] qua V.

non supponit alium amorem. Unde fieri potest aliter argumen-  
 tum: nam primus actus circa finem, qui est amor, seu simplex  
 voluntas, non procedit ab alio actu, a quo ordinatur in finem:  
 15 ergo non est propter finem: nam *esse propter* dicit quamdam 15R  
 ordinationem ad finem, sicut in actu intellectus, quamvis as-  
 sensus conclusionis sit propter principia, tamen assensus prin-  
 cipiorum non potest dici esse propter principia. Atque ex  
 20 his rationibus videtur enervari divus Thomas, discursus 1, 2, 20R  
 quæst. 1, art. 1. Nam licet verum sit omnes actus voluntatis  
 versari circa finem aliquo modo, quod tantum concludit sua ra-  
 tione: patetque ex dictis, disputat. 1, tamen inde non fit omnes  
 actus esse propter finem, quia non omnes sunt media ad finem,  
 nec omnes ordinantur ad finem ex priori intentione, seu affectu  
 25 ad finem. In contrarium vero est D. Thomas: et ideo observan- 25R  
 dum inter actus liberæ voluntatis quosdam esse imperatos, qu-  
 osdam elicitos: et inter hos, quosdam esse qui versantur circa  
 media, ut electio, et usus: alios, qui circa finem: inter eos autem  
 quidam antecedunt consecutionem finis, ut sunt amor, et inten-  
 30 tio, quidam vero consequuntur, ut delectatio: et amor etiam 30R  
 tunc durare potest: de hoc ultimo dicam disputat. sequenti, de  
 cæteris in præsentia. <col. b>

1. Assertio  
 affirm. de actibus  
 imperatis.

2. Primo ergo de actionibus imperatis a voluntate lib-  
 era, certa res est esse propter finem, quia hujusmodi actiones  
 35 esse solent potissima media ad finem consequendum. Item 35R  
 quia procedunt ex intentione finis, media electione amati: ergo  
 propter finem: ergo propter eundem fiunt. Sed in his actioni-  
 bus imperatis hæc breviter observanda sunt; primo interdum  
 eas esse media ad finem, non solum ratione ipsarum prout sunt  
 40 in fieri, sed etiam ratione terminorum prout permanent in 40R  
 facto esse, ut, verbi gratia, cum fit domus, non solum ædifica-  
 tio, sed domus ipsa facta dicitur esse propter finem: quomodo  
 dixit bene Aristoteles instrumenta artis esse media: solum in  
 modo loquendi est notanda differentia, quia *propter finem fieri*,  
 45 solum dicitur de actione proprie, vel de termino, quamdiu sunt 45R  
 in fieri: res autem jam factæ cessantibus actionibus dicuntur  
 esse, vel factæ esse propter finem, non vero tunc fieri. Secundo  
 vero observandum est, interdum actionem imperatam non or-

Observatio  
 altera.

32 in præsentia. ] in hoc ultimo dicam, disputat. sequenti, de cæteris in præsentia. V.

does not suppose another love. Hence, the argument can be made in another  
 way: for the first act concerning an end, which is love or simple will, does  
 not proceed from another act by which it is ordered to the end. Therefore,  
 it is not for the sake of the end, for ‘to be for the sake of’ expresses a certain  
 ordering to an end, just as in the case of acts of the intellect the assent to the  
 principles cannot be said to be for the sake of the principles, even though  
 the assent to a conclusion is for the sake of the principles.

And for these reasons St. Thomas seems to be weakened in the discus-  
 sion in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1. For although it is true that all acts of the will are  
 directed to an end in some way, that hardly finishes his argument. And it  
 is clear from what was said in disp. 1 that it does not follow from that that  
 every act is for the sake of an end, since not all [acts] are means to an end  
 and not all [acts] are ordered to an end by a prior intention or affect for the  
 end. But St. Thomas disagrees. It should, therefore, be observed that among  
 acts of free will one kind has been commanded and another kind has  
 been elicited. And among the elicited acts, there is one kind that is directed  
 to means (e.g., election and use) and another that is directed to the end.  
 Among the latter, moreover, some precede the attainment of the end (e.g.,  
 love and intention), but others follow (e.g., delight). Love can remain even  
 then. I will speak about this last one in the following disputation, but about  
 the rest in the present one.

2. First, therefore, concerning acts having been commanded by a free  
 will, it is certain that they are for the sake of an end, since actions of this kind  
 are usually chiefly means for the pursuit of the end and since they proceed  
 from an intention for the end by means of an election of the thing loved.  
 Therefore, for the sake of the end. Therefore, they are done for the sake of  
 the same.

But a couple of things should be noted about these commanded actions.  
 First, sometimes they are means to an end not only by reason of themselves  
 as they are in coming to be but also by reason of the *termini* as they remain  
 in having been made. For example, when a house is made, both the building  
 process and the house that has been made are said to be for the sake of the  
 end, as Aristotle rightly says that the instruments of art are means. A dif-  
 ference in the way of speaking should, however, be noted, since ‘being done  
 for the sake of an end’ is properly said only of action or of a *terminus* as long  
 as they are in the stage of becoming. But things already having been done  
 by actions that have ceased are said to be or to have been done for the sake

A note towards a  
 resolution.

The first  
 assertion:  
 affirmative about  
 commanded acts.

An observation  
 on behalf of this  
 assertion.



85 lius. Deinde, quia illa actio proprie humana: ergo fit ab ef-  
 ficiente propter aliquem finem, non enim fit temere, vel casu,  
 sed tendit ad definitum scopum, et hoc non habet ex directione,  
 seu motione extrinseca superioris agentis, sed ex interna direc- 90R  
 90 tionem ipsius hominis operantis: ergo in eo actu propriissime  
 operatur homo propter finem tanquam se movens in finem for-  
 malem ejus cognitionem. Denique hoc magis, et a fortiori con-  
 stabit ex sequenti dubio.

De affectu  
 simplici circa  
 finem  
 quorundam  
 placitum.  
*Vasquez 1.2.*  
*disp. 3. cap. 2.*

5. Est autem specialis difficultas de actu amoris, seu vol- 95R  
 untatis simplicis circa finem: quidam enim gravis auctor exis-  
 95 timat, hunc autem nec esse propter finem ut a voluntate pro-  
 cedit, nec esse ab ipso fine formaliter, sed effective, atque ita  
 solum esse propter finem respecta ipsius objecti ut efficientis,  
 eo modo quo actiones agentium naturalium sunt propter finem 100R  
 ex naturæ institutione. Fundamentum ejus est supra tactum,  
 100 quia ille actus non fit ex amore finis. Hæc sententia mihi non  
 placet, et primo quia sine causa hic auctor miscuit præsentem  
 difficultatem cum alia an objectum appetibile concurrat effec-  
 tive ad actum voluntatis: hæc enim quæstio, non solum habet 105R  
 105 locum respectu amoris, sed etiam respectu intentionis, et cu-  
 juscumque actus, et quantum ad præsens attinet, illa efficientia  
 non est necessaria, quia cum amor seu appetitio non sit per  
 modum assimilationis, sed per modum impetus ipse appetitus  
 est sufficiens principium illius, nec satis intelligi- <col. b> tur 110R  
 110 quo modo bonum cognitum priusquam existat possit habere  
 effectivam causalitatem. Secundo, quidquid sit de efficientia,  
 male negatur objectum appetibile habere causalitatem finalem  
 respectu simplicis amoris: nam metaphorice movet, et trahit  
 115 voluntatem ad se, ut supra probatum est. Tertio, cum dici-  
 tur hujusmodi bonum, seu objectum appetibile movere vol-  
 untatem propter finem inquiri quis sit ille finis: nam vel est  
 ipsummet bonum quod movet ad amandum se propter se, et  
 tunc sequitur ipsummet bonum esse finem talis appetitionis, et  
 concurrere ad illam in genere causæ finalis, quod intendimus: 120R  
 120 vel est aliquis alius finis extrinsecus, ut magis insinuant auc-  
 tores illius sententiæ: et hoc revera falsum est, quia finis ut fi-

96 formaliter ] formaliliter V.

which happens thanks to something happens from a love for that. Next,  
 because that action is properly human. Therefore, it is done by effectiveness  
 for the sake of some end, for it does not happen blindly or by chance but  
 tends to a definite target. And it does not have this from the direction or  
 extrinsic motion of a further agent but from the internal direction of the  
 acting human being himself. Therefore, in that act the human being most  
 properly acts for the sake of an end just as a formal cognition of it moves him  
 to the end. Finally, this will be clearer and even stronger from the following  
 doubt.

5. But there is a special difficulty concerning the simple act of love or  
 will directed to an end. For a certain author of importance judges that this is  
 not for the sake of the end as it proceeds from the will nor is from that end  
 formally, but effectively and so it is for the sake of the end only by respect  
 of that object as effective object in the way in which the actions of natural  
 agents are for the sake of an end by the institution of nature. His foundation  
 was mentioned above, because that act is not done from a love for the end.

This view is not pleasing to me. First, because this author without cause  
 mixed up the present difficulty with another one, i.e., whether a desirable  
 object concurs effectively with the act of will. For this question not only  
 has a place with respect to love but also with respect to intention and any  
 act whatever. And, insofar as it touches on the present matter, that efficiency  
 is not necessary, because, since love or desire is not by way of likeness but  
 by way of impetus, the desire itself is a sufficient principle of it. Nor is it  
 sufficiently understood in what way good cognized before it exists can have  
 effective causality.

Secondly, whatever is the case regarding efficiency, it is bad to deny that  
 the desirable object has final causality with respect to simple love. For it  
 moves metaphorically and draws the will to itself, as was shown above.

Thirdly, when it is said that a good of this kind or desirable object moves  
 the will for the sake of an end, I ask what that end is. For either it is that  
 very good itself that moves to the loving of it for its own sake—and then it  
 follows that the good itself is the end of such a desire and concurs with it in  
 the genus of cause (final, which we intended)—or it is some other extrinsic  
 end, as the author of that view very much suggests. And this really is false,  
 because an end as end does not move to loving it for the sake of something  
 else but to loving it for the sake of its own goodness and others for its sake,  
 for when it is loved for the sake of something else it is no longer loved as an

About the simple  
 affect for an end  
 pleasing to  
 certain people.  
 Vasquez IaIIæ,  
 disp. 3, cap. 2.

It is rejected, first.

It is rejected,  
 secondly.

It is rejected,  
 thirdly.

nis non movet ad amandum se propter aliud, sed ad amandum se propter suam bonitatem et alia propter se, nam quando ipse amatur propter aliud jam non amatur ut finis, sed potius, ut medium, et talis amor potius oritur ex motione finis alterius extrinseci, quam hujus, qui dicitur amari propter aliud. Quarto, quidquid sit de efficientia objecti, negari non potest quod amor sit ab ipsa voluntate, nam cum sit actus vitæ, necesse est ut voluntas efficiat talem actum propter finem, quia omne agens agit propter finem: ergo talis actus non tantum ut est ab objecto: sed etiam ut a voluntate, est propter finem; nec dici potest esse propter finem illo imperfecto modo, quo actiones agentium naturalium sunt propter finem, quia illa actio procedit ex perfecta cognitione finis, et in eum tendit non tantum motione, seu ordinatione superioris agentis, sed ex intrinseca cognitione et facultate, et ordinatione amantis, et hoc est agere propter finem proprie. Unde divus Thomas 3, cont. Gent., cap. 2, dicit, agentia per intellectum non esse dubium quin agant propter finem, quia agunt præconciendo in intellectu, id, propter quod agunt, et ex tali præconceptione agunt.

6. Quare dicendum est, hujusmodi actum amoris non minus esse propter finem, quam actum intentionis, et utrumque esse propter finem, nisi fortasse de nomine sit disputatio. Est aperta D. Thomæ sententia 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, in corpore, ubi universaliter docet omnem actum humanum voluntatis esse propter finem; certum autem est simplicem amorem, verbi gratia, Dei ut ultimi finis libere elicatum, esse actum humanum. Deinde in ratione sua ait non aliter actum esse <18> propter finem, nisi quia est sub ratione finis, qui est objectum voluntatis, sentiens ut actus humanus sit propter finem satis esse quod sit ex propria causalitate finis; ostensum est autem amorem esse ex causalitate finis, et negari non potest quin fiat sub propria et perfecta ratione objecti voluntatis: ac denique in solutione ad primum expresse docet voluntatem ultimi finis esse propter finem. Probatur etiam ex communi modo loquendi, dicimur enim recte amare Deum ut ultimum finem, propter se ipsum, et quia ultimus finis noster est. Item, amamus finem propter bonitatem illius; sed ratio boni est ratio finis: ergo eodem modo amamus finem propter ipsum

end, but rather, as a means, and such a love arises more from the motion of another extrinsic end than from this, which is said to be loved for the sake of something else.

Fourthly, whatever concerns the efficiency of the object, it cannot be denied that love is from the will itself, for when it is an act of life it is necessary that the will effect such an act for the sake of the end, because every agent acts for the sake of an end. Therefore, such an act is for the sake of an end not so much as it is from the object but rather as it is from the will. Nor can it be said to be for the sake of the end in that imperfect way by which the actions of natural agents are for the sake of an end, because that action proceeds from a perfect cognition of the end and tends to that not only by motion or by the ordination of higher agent, but from an intrinsic cognition and faculty and by the ordination of the one loving. And this is properly to act for the sake of an end. Hence, St. Thomas says in *SCG* III, c. 2 that there is no doubt but that agents act for the sake of an end through intellect, since they act by preconceiving in the intellect that for the sake of which they act and they act from such a preconception.

6. Wherefore it should be said that an act of love of this kind is no less for the sake of an end than an act of intention. And both are for the sake of an end, unless perhaps there is a dispute about the name. The view of St. Thomas is clear in [*ST*] IaIIæ.1.1 co., where he universally teaches that every human act of will is for the sake of an end. Moreover, it is certain that simple love, for example, for God as the ultimate end freely elicited, is a human act.

Next, in his argument he does not say otherwise than that an act is for the sake of an end, except because it is under the nature of an end, which is the object of the will, thinking that a human act being for the sake of an end is enough for it to be from the proper causality of an end. Moreover, it was shown that love is from the causality of an end and it cannot be denied that it does not come about beneath a proper and perfect character of an object of the will. And, finally, in ad 1 he expressly teaches that the will for an ultimate end is for the sake of the end.

It is proven also by the common way of speaking, for we say rightly to love God as the ultimate end for the sake of him himself and because he is our ultimate end. Likewise, we love an end for the sake of its goodness, but the nature of good is the nature of an end. Therefore, in the same way

It is rejected, fourthly.

The fourth assertion: affirmative about the just mentioned act of simple love. It is proven first from St. Thomas.

Secondly, from the common way of speaking.

160 finem, sicut in assensu primorum principiorum, assentimur il-  
lis propter immediatam connexionem ipsorum. 160R

3. Ex ratione.

7. Denique, ut rationem explicemus, hujusmodi actus  
amoris considerari potest, vel ut directe tendit in objectum, vel  
ut includit reflexionem supra se ipsum quatenus ipse est volit-  
165 tus, cum sit voluntarius. Priori modo est propter finem, non  
quod sit propter extrinsecam rationem volendi talem finem,  
sed quia est propter intrinsecam bonitatem ejus, et propria  
motione, et causalitate illius: in quo eadem est ratio de inten-  
tione et amore, ut numero 5, dicebam, contra ultimam sen-  
170 tentiam, quia etiam intentio versatur circa finem propter se ip-  
sum, et non propter extrinsecam rationem. Nec probari potest  
quod particula illa, *propter*, significet extrinsecam rationem  
volendi, ut ex communi loquendi modo ostensum est. Si vero  
ille actus consideretur posteriori ratione, sic amari potest et  
175 propter se ipsum, vel propter suam bonitatem et propter objec-  
tum, scilicet quia est tendentia in illud, ut in simili recte dixit  
D. Thomas, in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 1, art. 1, quæst. 2, et ex illo  
Capreolus, in 1, dist. 1, quæst. 1, a. 3, ad argumenta contra  
sententiam communem. Ac denique esse potest propter ipsum  
operantem ut propter finem *cui*, vel ut ipsum perficiat: ergo, 180R  
180 etc.

Ad 1. rationem  
dubitandi in  
num. 1.

8. Ad rationes ergo dubii in principio positas facilis est  
responsio ex dictis. Ad primum enim negatur solum media  
esse propter finem, nam hoc solum est verum, quando finis  
est extrinseca ratio volendi: tamen simpliciter omnis actus, qui  
185 est ex propria causalitate finis præconcepti, est propter finem. 185R  
Ad secundum negatur esse propter finem esse ex amore finis,  
ita ut amor necessario supponendus sit ante actionem quæ est  
propter finem, sed sufficit ut actio sit ex bonitate ipsius finis  
trahentis <col. b> voluntatem ad sui amorem: nam quod ex  
190 parte voluntatis intercedat diversitas actuum, et quod unus sup-  
ponat, non refert ad causalitatem finis, sed potius pertinet ad  
quamdam efficientiam inter ipsos actus. 190R

we love an end for the sake of the end itself, just as in assenting to first principles, we assent to them for the sake of the immediate connection of them.

7. Finally, so that we may explain this argument, an act of love of this kind can be considered either as it tends directly to the object or as it includes reflection beyond it of itself to the extent that it itself is willed when it is voluntary.

In the first way it is for the sake of an end. Not that it is for the sake of an extrinsic reason for willing such an end, but because it is for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, both by a proper motion and by its causality, in which is the same nature of intention and love, as I said in n. 5 against the last view. Because an intention also turns concerning an end for the sake of it itself and not for the sake of an extrinsic reason. Nor can it be shown that that particle ‘for the sake of’ (*propter*) signifies an extrinsic reason for willing, as was shown from the common way of speaking.

But if that act is considered in the latter characterization, then it can be loved even for its own sake or for the sake of its goodness and for the sake of its object, namely, because there is a tendency to that St. Thomas rightly says in parallel in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 1, q. 2, and from that Capreolus in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3 against the common view. And, finally, it can be for the sake of the one acting himself as for the sake of a *finis cui* or as it perfects him. Therefore, etc.

8. Therefore, the response to the reasons for doubting posited in the beginning is easy from what has been said. For regarding the first, it is denied that only means are for the sake of an end, for this is only true when the end is an extrinsic reason for willing. Yet, strictly speaking, every act which is from the proper causality of an end preconceived is for the sake of the end. Regarding the second, it is denied that to be for the sake of an end is to be from the love for the end, so that love must necessarily be presupposed before the action which is for the sake of the end. Rather, it is sufficient that an action is from the goodness of the end itself drawing the will to love for it. For the fact that a diversity of acts comes between on the part of the will, and that one supposes that, does not refer to the causality of the end but rather pertains to a certain efficiency between those acts.

Thirdly, from  
reason.

To the first  
reason for  
doubting in n. 1.