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De fine hominis disp. 1, sect. 6[1]

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<12, col. b>[2]

Quotuplex sit finis.

1. In hac quæstione explicandæ sunt nonnullæ partitiones finis, quæ necessariæ sunt, et magnam lucem afferunt ad ea omnia quæ in discursu hujus materiæ tractanda sunt; pressius tamen quam in disput. 23, Metaphysicæ, section. 2, et ad rem Theologicam accommodate.

1. Divisio finis in ultimum et proximum. Sensus prædictorum membrorum.

Primo ergo dividitur finis in ultimum, et proximum sive non ultimum; quæ divisio colligitur ex D. Thoma, in hac quæstione, præsertim art. 4, et ab Aristotele 2, Physic., c. 3, et aliis locis. Ut autem intelligantur singula membra, et aliquæ subdivisiones, communiter notandum est duo convenire fini proprie dicto; primum est, ut propter se ametur, in quo includitur negatio ordinationis ejus ad aliud, atque hinc fit ut omnis finis formaliter sub ratione finis consideratus habeat rationem ultimi: unde si in dicta divisione ultimus finis sub hac ratione sumatur, non ultimus dicetur solum illud medium, quod participat rationem finis, quatenus aliud ad ipsum ordinatur; sæpe autem contingit, ut particulare bonum, quamvis propter intrinsecam bonitatem ametur, simul tamen referatur in ulteriorem finem, quomodo potest amari eleemosyna, et propter intrinsecam misericordiæ honestatem, et ut medium ad impetrandam veniam pro peccatis; atque hoc modo talis finis dicitur non ultimus, quia licet sub quadam ratione participet cau- <13>

What kinds of ends there are.

1. Some of the divisions of ends that are necessary and that bring greater light to all those things to be discussed in the course of this subject are to be explained in this question, albeit more concisely than in *DM* XXIII.2 and adapted to the theological subject.

The 1st division of ends into ultimate and proximate. The sense of those members.

Therefore, ends are first divided into ultimate and proximate or non-ultimate. This division is gathered from St. Thomas, in this question, especially art. 4, and from Aristotle *Phys.* II, c. 3, and other places. But so that the individual members and other subdivisions are understood, it should be noted generally that there are two ways for something to qualify as an end properly speaking.[3] The first is, as loved for its own sake, in which is included a negation of its ordering to something else, and which results in every end formally considered under the aspect of an end having the nature of an ultimate end. Hence if in the stated division the ultimate end were taken under this aspect, that means alone which participates in the nature of an end only insofar as something is ordered to it would be called not ultimate.[4] For it often happens that a particular good, although loved for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, is at the same time, however, referred to a more ultimate end. In this way alms can be loved both for the sake of the intrinsic moral goodness (*honestatem*) of mercy and as a means for obtaining pardon for sins. And in this way, such an end is called not ultimate, because although under a certain aspect it participates in the causality of an end, yet the will does not stop in it but tends towards something more ultimate. Therefore, that is called absolutely ultimate in

[1] Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

[2] Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivés edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

[3] Cf. *DM* XXIII.2.14.

[4] It looks like there are several different ways of translating the previous sentences with rather different results.

3 necessariæ] necessaria V.

salitatem finis, tamen voluntas in illo non sistit, sed ulterius tendit: ille ergo dicetur ultimus absolute in quo sistit voluntas non referendo illud in aliud, qui quidem est ultimus in executione, quia illo consecuto quiescit voluntatis motus; est autem primus in intentione, quia est id, quod primo propter se amatur.

Explicantur aliter eadem membra unde subdivisiones aliæ resultant.

2. Secundo convenit fini ut alia propter ipsum amentur: et ex hoc capite potest illa divisio aliter explicari et membra ejus subdividi: est enim quidam finis qui dicitur ultimus simpliciter: alter secundum quid, seu in aliqua serie, quomodo sanitas dicitur ultimus finis medicinæ, quia omnia, quæ cadunt sub hanc artem, ad hunc finem referuntur, et ultra non tendunt, et sic de aliis: ultimus autem finis simpliciter subdividi potest. Nam quidam est ex natura institutus, et est ille, propter quem homo est creatus, et ad quem debet se et omnia sua referre: alius vero est, quem homo sibi instituit ex propria intentione, qui interdum est illemet, propter quem est creatus, scilicet Deus, et tunc dicitur habere homo verum ultimum finem simpliciter in intentione sua. Interdum vero hic finis intentus ab homine est distinctus ab illo propter quem est creatus, et talis dicitur ultimus finis falsus. Non est autem facile ad explicandum quomodo dicatur homo intendere aliquid ut ultimum, sive finem simpliciter: nam si dicamus de ratione hujus finis esse ut homo se et omnia sua in illum referat, videtur sequi justum, quia interdum venialiter peccat non amare Deum ut ultimum finem, quia non refert in illum omnes actus suos, nam actiones peccati venialis non referuntur in Deum ab operante. Si vero dicamus ut quidam dicunt, de ratione finis ultimi esse, ut in eum referantur omnia, quæ sunt referibilia in ipsum hoc non erit proprium finis ultimi simpliciter, sed convenit omni fini, qui est ultimus in aliqua serie, necesse est enim ut in eum referantur omnia, quæ ad ipsum pertinent, et non alia.

Dubium quid sit finem esse ultimum simpliciter.

[5] Suárez also discusses this division in *DM* XXIV.1.

39 et] *om.* V.
46 falsus] *om.* V.

which the will stops without referring it to something else, which indeed is ultimate in execution, because by that having been achieved the motion of the will rests. It is, however, first in intention, because it is that which is first loved for its own sake.

The same members are explained differently from which different subdivisions result.

2. In the second way, something qualifies as an end as other things are loved for its sake. And from this head that division can be explained differently and its members subdivided differently. For there is a certain end which is called ultimate *simpliciter*. Another is [called ultimate] *secundum quid* or [called ultimate] of some series. Health is called the ultimate end of medicine in this way, because everything which falls under this art is referred to this end and they do not tend beyond it. Similarly, for other cases.[5]

Moreover, ultimate ends *simpliciter* can be subdivided. For a certain one is instituted by nature and is that for the sake of which man was created and to which he ought to refer himself and everything that belongs to him. But another one is that to which a human being institutes himself by a proper intention, which sometimes is the former thing for the sake of which he was created, namely, God, and then the human being is said to have the true ultimate end *simpliciter* in his intention. But sometimes this end intended by the human being is distinct from that for the sake of which he was created and such is called a false ultimate end.

A doubt about what it is for an end to be ultimate *simpliciter*.

It is not easy, however, to explain in what way the human being is said to intend something as an ultimate or as an end *simpliciter*. For if we say that the nature of this end is to be such that the human being refers himself and everything that belongs to him to it, it seems to follow that the just person, because sometimes he sins venially, does not love God as ultimate end, because he does not refer all of his actions to God, for actions of venial sin are not referred to God by the one acting. But if we say—as some do—that the nature of an ultimate end is to be so that all things are referred to it which are referrible to it, this will not be a proper ultimate end *simpliciter*, but is consistent with every end which is ultimate in some series, for it necessary so that all things are referred to it which pertain to

Resolutio proximi dubii.

3. Quocirca de ratione finis ultimi simpliciter, imprimis est, ut ex debito et meritis ejus, homo referat in ipsum se, et omnia sua absolute et simpliciter: unde, ut intentio ultimi finis undequaque perfecta sit, necesse est ut nihil in homine admittat, quod non sit referibile in talem finem; ut autem absolute et simpliciter conservetur, quamvis non cum tota perfectione sua, satis est ut nihil admittat, quod sit absolute contra- <col. b> rium tali fini, et omnino repugnet consecutioni ejus. Atque hoc modo finis non ultimus proportionaliter distinguendus erit: nam respectu finis ultimi simpliciter, omnis finis alius particularis dicetur non ultimus: et similiter in unaquaque serie, vel arte omnis alius finis, ad quem non referuntur omnia, dicetur non ultimus. Atque hinc intelliguntur aliæ divisiones sub aliis terminis, quæ rem eamdem aliis verbis continent: solet enim dici quidam finis ultimus positive, alius vero negative: rursus quidam finis ultimus universalis, alius particularis: quidam finis ultimus operantis, alius vero tantum alicujus operis: quando enim finis ultimus talis est ut omnia simpliciter ad ipsum referantur, ille est ultimus etiam positive , quia omnia in illum tendunt, et propterea etiam est finis ultimus operantis, quia se et omnia sua in illum refert: quando finis vero est solum privativus in aliqua serie, vel aliquo ordine, tunc est particularis et negative, quia solum dicitur ultimus propter negationem ulterioris termini in illo ordine.

2. Divisio in finem cuius, et cui.

4. Secunda divisio est in finem cujus et finem cui, quæ divisio sumitur ex Aristotele 2, de Anima, cap. 4, nam licet Argilopilus transferat *finem quo et finem cui*, tamen priora verba sunt magis consentanea textui græco et melius explicant sensum divisionis: dicitur enim finis cujus forma illa, vel bonum, cujus adipiscendi gratia operatur voluntas, ut est, verbi gratia, visio beata, vel sanitas, etc., finis autem cui, dicitur persona ipsa, seu subjectum, cui bonum illud amatur, vel quæritur, ut est homo, qui sibi quærit sanitatem.

it but not others.

Resolution of the last doubt.

3. Wherefore, it is above all of the nature of an ultimate end *simpliciter* that a human being by duty and merits refer himself and everything that belongs to him to it absolutely and *simpliciter*. Hence, so that the intention of the ultimate end from wherever is perfect, it is necessary so that nothing that is not referrible to such an end admits in the human. But so that it is preserved absolutely and *simpliciter*, although not with its complete perfection, it is enough so that nothing that is absolutely contrary to such an end and entirely repugnant to its attainment admits.

And in this way an end not ultimate should be proportionately distinguished. For with respect to an ultimate end *simpliciter*, every other particular end may be called non-ultimate. And, similarly, in each series or art, every other end to which not everything is referred, may be called non-ultimate. And hence other divisions are understood under other terms, which comprise the same matter with different words. For it is customary to call a certain ultimate end positive, but another negative. Again, a certain ultimate end universal, another particular. A certain ultimate end of the one acting, but another only of some act. For when the ultimate end is such that everything is referred to it *simpliciter*, it is also a positive ultimate end, because everything tends to it and therefore it is also the ultimate end of the one acting, because he and everything that belongs to him is referred to it. But when the end is only privative in some series or in some order, then it is particular and negative, because it is called ultimate only on account of the negation of a more ultimate *terminus* in that order.

The 2nd division into *finis cuius* and *finis cui*.

4. The second division is into *finis cuius* and *finis cui*, which division is taken from Aristotle, *DA* II, c. 4. For although Argyropoulos[6] translated it to *finis quo* and *finis cui*, the former words are more consistent with the Greek text and better capture the sense of the division. For that form or good for the sake of the obtaining of which the will moves is called a *finis cuius*, that is, for example, the beatific vision or health or other things like that. But a *finis cui* is called the person or subject himself, for whom that good is loved or sought, for example, a human who seeks health for himself.

[6]The reference is presumably to John Argyropoulos (1415âĂŞ1487), the Byzantine lecturer who taught Greek—and Aristotle—to a number of notable Italian humanists. The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (ed. by William Smith, 1870) mentions a Latin translation of book III of De Anima but none of book II, though it does note that a commentary on De Anima has been credited to him.

An ambo divisionis membra proprie participent rationem finis. Placitum Gabrielis et aliorum. Eiusque fundamentum.

Circa hanc vero divisionem inquiri potest, an utrumque ejus membrorum habeat rationem finis. Quibusdam enim videtur solum finem *cui*, esse proprium finem: at vero finem *cujus* esse lato quodam modo finem. Ita Gabriel, in 2, dub. 1, quæst. 5, secutus Ocham, ibi quæst. 3, art. 1. Et fundamentum ejus est, quia de ratione finis proprie dicti est ut ametur amore amicitiæ, finis autem *cujus* non amatur amore amicitiæ, sed concupiscentiæ, cum ametur alteri qui est finis cui, qui proprie amatur amore amicitiæ: et videtur sentire divus Thomas, prima secundæ, quæst. 26, articulo quarto, ubi dicit, *illum amari simpliciter, cui bonum aliquod amatur: bonum autem ipsum, quod alicui amatur, tantum amari secundum quid*. Et confirmatur, quia finis *cujus* videtur multum convenire cum medio: nam <14> sicut medium est propter finem, et non e contrario, ita finis *cujus* est propter finem *cui*, et non e converso. Item sicut medium non est amabile, nisi propter proportionem, quam habet cum fine: ita finis *cujus gratia* non amatur, nisi quia est proportionate et conveniens illi, cui amatur: ergo solus finis *cui* est proprie et ultimate finis.

Contrarium quorumdam placitum.

5. Aliis autem e contrario videtur, solum finem cujus gratia fit operatio, esse proprie finem; illum vero, cui hic finis amatur, esse tantum subjectum, quod perficit, vel actuat ipse finis: quæ habitudo est distincta a propria habitudine finis. Quod potest confirmari illo exemplo de visione beata, quæ est finis operationum omnium hominum, et non proprie ordinatur ad hominem, ut ad finem: quod maxime verum est de ipso Deo, qui est proprie finis ultimus, et homo sibi illum appetit ut eo fruatur, et tamen non potest homo dici finis ipsius Dei, quamvis sit is, cui Deus amatur et inquiritur. Et confirmatur: nam ubicumque Aristoteles agit de fine proprie, et sub ratione causæ, rationem finis attribuit fini *cujus gratia*, ut patet 2, Physic., cap. 3 et 7, ubi hoc sensu dicit finem esse primum in intentione, et ultimum in executione et coincidere cum forma, quæ est effectus agentis: atque ibidem ait, *sumus et nos quodammodo finis*: signifi-

Suadetur 1.

Secundo.

114 hic] *om.* V.

Whether both members of the division properly participate in the nature of an end. It pleases Gabriel and others. Its foundation.

But concerning this division it can be asked whether both of these members have the nature of an end. For to certain people it seems that only the *finis cui* is a proper end. But in truth a *finis cuius* is an end in a certain more general way. Thus Gabriel in [*Sent.*] II, dub. 1, q. 5, following Ockham there in q. 3, art. 1. And the foundation of it is because concerning the nature of an end it is properly called as it is loved with the love of friendship, but a *finis cuius* is not loved with the love of friendship but with the love of concupiscence, when it is loved for another who is the *finis cui*, who properly is loved with the love of friendship. And St. Thomas seems to think [this] in [*ST*] IaIIæ.26.4 where he says: 'that is loved strictly speaking for whom some good is loved, but the good itself, that is loved for another, is only loved in a manner of speaking'.

And it is confirmed, because a *finis cuius* seems to agree with many means. For just as a means is for the sake of an end and not the other way around, so a *finis cuius* is for the sake of a *finis cui* and not the other way around. Likewise, just as a means is not lovable except for the sake of the proportion it has with the end, so a *finis cuius* is not loved except because it is proportionate and agreeable to the one (*cui*) is loved. Therefore, only a *finis cui* is properly and ultimately an end.

The contrary is pleasing to certain others.

5. To others, however, it seems the other way around: only the *finis cuius* for the sake of which an action happens is properly an end. But he for whom this end is loved is only the subject who executes or implements the end itself, which habitude is distinct from the proper habitude of an end. This can be confirmed by that example of the beatific vision, which is the end of all human action and is not properly ordered to a human as to an end. That is especially true concerning God himself, who is properly the ultimate end, and a human desires him for himself in order to enjoy him, and yet the human cannot be called the end of God himself, although it is he for whom God is loved and sought.

It is urged, firstly.

Secondly.

And it is confirmed: for wherever Aristotle deals with the end proper and under the nature of a cause, he attributes the nature of an end to a *finis cuius*, as is clear in *Phys.* II, c. 3 and 7, where in this sense he says that the end is first in intention and ultimate in execution and coincides with the form which is the effect of the agent. And in the same place he says that 'we are ourselves also an end in a certain way', signifying that a *finis cui* is

cans finem cui tantum quodammodo, et secundum quid esse finem.

Authoris resolutio utrumque membrum participare proprie rationem finis.

6. Nihilominus dicendum censeo utrumque horum posse participare rationem finis: ac frequentius ita concurrere, ut ex utroque quodammodo insurgat unus finis integer, qui primo intenditur et inquiritur. Probatur et explicatur: nam in utroque eorum potest esse ratio sufficiens ad terminandum motum voluntatis propter se ipsum, et propter suam bonitatem: sic enim quando homo inquirit sanitatem, et se diligit cui sanitatem vult, non propter extrinsecam bonitatem, sed propter id quod ipse est, et propter identitatem, quam secum habet, et similiter diligit sanitatem propter bonitatem ejus: in quo multum differt a medio, quia medium solum censetur amabile quatenus est utile ad aliud: salus vero ratione sui, quatenus per se perficit hominem cui amatur. Atque ita finis totalis hujus intentionis est homo sanus, in quo includuntur prædicti duo fines quasi componentes integrum finem. Quomodo etiam dicit sæpe Aristoteles *potentiam esse propter operationem tanquam propter finem* <col. b> *cujus gratia*, cum tamen operatio sit etiam propter potentiam ut ipsam actuet et perficiat, quia quod per se intenditur, est quod potentia sit in actu ultimo constituta. Igitur ratio finis utrique horum proprie convenit, et ideo Aristoteles, citatus num. quarto, in dicto loco de Anima, utrique illam attribuit.

Quodnam horum sit potior finis.

Responsio spectatis membris quoad suum esse.

7. Sed ut hoc magis explicetur, inquiri potest, quis horum sit principalior finis: potest autem fieri comparatio vel in esse rei, vel in esse causæ: si comparentur priori modo, non potest universalis regula tradi: nam interdum unus finis est res perfectior, interdum alius, nam cum homo intendit acquirere sanitatem, perfectior res est finis *cui*, scilicet homo, quam finis *cujus*, scilicet sanitas: quando vero homo intendit acquirere Deum, perfectior res est finis *cujus gratia*, scilicet Deus, quam finis *cui*, qui est homo. Et ratio est, quia interdum res perficitur a forma, quæ in esse entis est minus perfecta, quia præter perfectionem, quam habet ipsa forma, intendit acquirere aliam perfectionem alterius formæ, quamvis inferior sit. Interdum vero perficitur res

an end only in a certain way and in a manner of speaking.

The resolution of the author that both members participate properly in the nature of an end.

6. Nevertheless, I think it should be said that both of these can participate in the nature of an end and more frequently they concur so that from both of them one integrated end arises in a certain way, which first is intended and sought.

It is proven and explained: for in both of them can be a sufficient nature for terminating the motion of the will for its own sake and for its own goodness. For thus when a human seeks health and selects himself as the one for whom he wishes the health, it is not account of the extrinsic goodness but on account of that which he is himself and on account of the identity which he has with it, and similarly he selects health for the sake of the goodness of it. In this respect it differs greatly from a means because a means is thought lovable only insofar as it is useful for something else. But health is a reason in itself, insofar as it in itself perfects the human for whom it is loved.

And so the complete end of this intention is a healthy human, in which are included the just-mentioned two ends as if components of an integrated end. In this way also Aristotle often says that 'potency is for the sake of action just as for the sake of a *finis cuius*, when nevertheless an action is also for the sake of a potency as it actualizes and perfects it, because what is in itself intended is that the potency is ultimately constituted in actuality. Therefore, the nature of an end properly agrees with both of these and for that reason Aristotle, cited in n. 4, in the place mention in *DA*, attributes it to both of them.

Which one of these, then, is more an end.

Response to the seen members as far as their being.

7. But in order to explain this further, it can be asked which of these is the more principal end. Moreover, a comparison can be made either in the being of the thing or in the being of the cause. If they are compared in the first way, no universal rule can be given. For sometimes one end is more perfect, sometimes the other. For when a human intends to acquire health, the more perfect thing is the *finis cui*, namely, the human, rather than the *finis cuius*, namely, health. But when the human intends to attain God, the more perfect thing is the *finis cuius*, namely, God, rather than the *finis cui*, which is the human.

And the reason is because sometimes one thing is perfected by a form which in the existence of the being is less perfect, because in addition to the perfection which the form itself has, it intends to acquire another perfection of another form, although it is inferior. But sometimes the thing

Discutitur dubium, spectatis membris in ratione finis.

per conjunctionem ad aliam perfectiorem se, ut homo per conjunctionem ad Deum: ergo propter hanc causam potest finis *cujus gratia* interdum esse res minus perfecta, interdum vero perfectior, quam res, seu persona cui amatur. At vero si comparetur in esse finis, videtur sane finis *cui* frequentius participare rationem finis principaliorem, tum quia in eo genere amoris videtur magis amari: tum etiam, quia in illo sistit maxime tota motio voluntatis. In contrarium vero urget illud argumentum, quia honeste, et sancte amamus Deum nobis; in quo amore Deus est finis *cujus* et non *cui*: et tamen dici non potest quod nos tunc amemus eo amore magis, quam Deum, alias amor ille esset inordinatus: nec etiam dici potest quod nos simus principalior finis illius motionis, alias nos essemus finis ultimus nostri et non Deus, quod est plane falsum.

Decisio Auctoris.

8. Quapropter in hac parte dicendum censeo, non posse tradi universalem doctrinam, sed distinctione utendum esse et considerandum quale sit illud bonum, quod alicui amatur, et cujus gratia fit operatio, nam si bonum illud sit particulare et quasi secundaria, et accidentaria perfectio ejus cui amatur: sic finis *cui*, induit principaliorem ratio- <15> nem finis, quia ejus perfectio simpliciter magis intenditur. Signum etiam est, quia hujusmodi finis amari potest non solum ut finis, sed etiam ut medium, et amor illius sæpe oritur ex priori amore ipsius personæ cui amatur: ut homo ex absoluto et perfecto amore sui, qui est amor benevolentiæ, amat sanitatem, et potest illam amare non solum ut perfectionem formalem suam, sed etiam ut medium utile ad alia. At vero interdum bonum illud, cujus acquirendi gratia homo operatur, seu quod sibi amat, est maximum ac summum bonum respectu ejus cui amatur, ut est Deus respectu hominis, et tunc illud bonum est præcipuum, etiam in ratione finis, quia ille est simpliciter finis ultimus, et non potest recte ad alium ordinari ut ad finem. Unde quando homo sibi amat hoc bonum, non ordinat illud ad se ut ad finem, sed potius amat

196 seu] sed V.
197 cui] qui V.

is perfected through a conjunction with another thing more perfect than itself, e.g., a human through a conjunction with God. Therefore, on account of this cause a *finis cuius* can sometimes be a thing less perfect and sometimes a thing more perfect than the thing or person for whom (*cui*) it is loved.

A doubt for the seen members in the case of the nature of an end is discussed.

But, on the other hand, if it is compared in the being of the end, it seems reasonable that the *finis cui* more frequently participates in the more principal nature of an end, both because it seems to be loved more in that genus of love and also because the complete motion of the will especially stops in that. But that argument to the contrary is pressed, because we love God for us with an honest and sacred love, in which love God is a *finis cuius* and not a *finis cui*. And yet it cannot be said that we then love it more with that love than God. Otherwise that love would be inordinate. Nor can it be said that we are more principally the end of the motion. Otherwise, we would be our ultimate end and not God, which is plainly false.

The decision of the author.

8. For this reason I think in this part it should be said that a universal doctrine cannot be given but that it is necessary to use a distinction and to consider what kind of good it is that is loved for someone and for the sake of which the action is done. For if that good is particular and as if secondary and its accidental perfection is loved for someone (*cui*), then the *finis cui* clothes itself in the more principal nature of an end, because its perfection is more intended, strictly speaking. And a sign of this is because an end of this sort can be loved not only as end but also as a means, and love for it often arises from a prior love for that person for whom (*cui*) it is loved. As a human being from an absolute and perfect love for himself, which is the love of friendship, loves health, and can love it not only as his formal perfection, but also a means useful for others.

But sometimes that good for the sake of the acquiring of which the human acts or which he loves for himself is the maximal and highest good with respect to him who is loved, as God is with respect to the human, and then that good is principal, even in the nature of an end, because it is the ultimate end, strictly speaking, and cannot be rightly ordered to another as to an end. Hence, when a human loves this good for himself, he does not order it to himself as to an end, but rather loves to be united to that good as his ultimate end and good. From which it follows and

conjungi illi bono ut bono et ultimo fini suo. Ex quo sequitur, et tandem intelligitur, quod licet respectu agentis vel mediorum, finis *cujus* et *cui*, induant rationem finis, tamen comparando illa inter se, non est necesse, ut mutuo, seu adinvicem unus sit finis alterius vel e contrario: ut in prædicto exemplo, quamvis homo sibi amet Deum, tamen non ordinat Deum ad se ut ad finem, sed potius ipse ordinatur ad Deum, ut ad finem ultimum, non quidem ut medium, proprie loquendo, sed ut subjectum, quod potest consequi hujusmodi finem.

3. Divisio finis in eum qui consistit in operatione tantum, vel in re operata.

9. Tertia divisio est: nam aliquando finis est operatio tantum, ut est, verbi gratia, contemplatio, visio, citharizatio, et in universum omnis actio, quæ non intenditur, ut ex illa aliquis effectus resultet et maneat, sed propter se. Interdum vero finis est aliquis effectus resultans ex actione, ut est domus in ædificatione, et sic de aliis. Quæ divisio quamvis respectu finis ut sic videatur materialis, quia magis sumpta est ex rebus, quæ sunt finis, quam ex ratione finalisandi, tamen illa sæpe usus est Aristoteles, ut 1, Ethic., cap. 1, et 1, Mag. mor., cap. 3, quia ad explicandum ultimum finem humanarum actionum necessaria est. Et quidem circa finem, qui consistit in re facta, nihil notandum occurrit, nec multum refert ad moralem considerationem, quia finis hominis, ut postea dicemus, non consistit in re facta aliqua, sed in operatione. Circa aliam ergo partem est observandum: etiam in illo fine, qui dicitur consistere in operatione potentiæ, distingui actionem physicam a termino producto et <col. b> facto, quia nulla est actio, per quam non aliquid fiat, ut patet: tum in actionibus immanentibus, in quibus et est actio et qualitas facta, quæ dicitur proprie actus immanens: et in transeuntibus, quæ interdum debent esse finis, ut est citharizatio, cantus, etc., nam in illis est sonus, qui fit, et actio, per quam fit; tamen quia termini harum actionum tales sunt, ut non durent nisi quamdiu fiunt; ideo tam actio quam terminus computatur per modum unius finis, quamvis revera finis sit ipse actus, seu terminus, qui per actionem fit. Secundo est observandum in hujusmodi actionibus maxime immanentibus, dari præter actum objec-

Expeditur posterius membrum.

Pro priori membro notatio 1.

Notatio 2.

finally is understood that although with respect to the agent or the means the *finis cuius* and the *finis cui* clothe themselves with the nature of an end, nevertheless in comparing that between the them, it is not necessary that by exchange or in turn one is an end of the other or the other way around. As in the previously given example, although the human being loves God for himself [i.e., for the human being], nevertheless he does not order God to himself as to an end, but rather he himself is ordered to God as to the ultimate end, not indeed as a means, properly speaking, but as a subject that can seek after an end of this sort.

The 3rd division of ends into those which consist in the action along and those which consist in the thing having been done.

9. The third division is: for sometimes the end is the action itself, as it is, for example, in contemplation, vision, playing the harp, and in general every action which is not intended so that from it some effect result and remain but [rather is intended] on account of itself.

But sometimes the end is some effect resulting from the action, as is a house in building and likewise for others. This division although with respect to the end as such seems material, because it is taken more from the things which are the ends than from the nature of finally causing, nevertheless it was often used by Aristotle, as in *EN* I, c. 1 and *MM* I, c. 3, because it is necessary for explaining the ultimate end of human action. And indeed on account of the end which consists in the thing having been done, nothing to be noted comes to mind, nor does it matter much for moral considerations, because the end of a human, as we will say afterwards, does not consist in some thing having been done, but in action.

The latter member is taken care of.

The 1st note regarding the former member.

Therefore, regarding the other part it should be observed: even in that end which is said to consist in the action of a power is distinguished the physical from the *terminus* having been produced and made, because there is no action through which nothing becomes, as is clear. Moreover, in immanent action, in which both an action and quality are made, which is properly called an immanent act and in transitive [actions], which sometimes ought to be ends, as are playing the harp, singing, and so on. For in these the sound which is made also is an action through which it is made. Yet because the *termini* of these actions are such that they do not endure except as long as they are made, therefore the action more than the *terminus* is reckoned in the manner of one end, although in reality the end is the act itself or the *terminus* which is made through the action.

The 2nd note.

Secondly, it should be observed that especially immanent actions of this sort are given beyond the object act, regarding which the act itself is

tum, circa quod versatur ipse actus, ut, verbi gratia, visio Dei, est finis ultimus hominis tanquam operatio quædam, cujus objectum est Deus ipse, et in his non solum actio, sed etiam objectum datur, et est vere finis, quia illius gratia fit actio, scilicet ad possidendum illum, et fruendum illo.

Subdivisio resultans ex præced. divisione.

10. Atque hinc oritur alia subdivisio finis, qua sæpe usus est divus Thomas in hac materia, præsertim prima secundæ, quæstion. secunda et tertia, et quæstione decima, articulo tertio ad tertium, et in 1, distinct. prima, quæstione secunda, articulo primo ad primum: scilicet, quod finis alius est ut adeptio, alius ut res adepta, qui etiam dici solet finis formalis et objectivus, et finis quo, et finis qui, id est, qui acquiritur et quo acquiritur: qui duo, ait divus Thomas, non sunt duo fines distincti, sed integrant unum finem, quia nec objectum attingi potest, nisi per actum, nec actus fieri potest, nisi circa objectum, et ideo eadem est intentio, et motio agentis ad acquirendum actum et objectum: constituunt ergo et componunt illa duo unum finem: possunt autem inter se conferri eo modo, quo fecimus n. 7, inter finem *cujus* et *cui*, et eadem fere doctrina proportionaliter applicari potest, et ideo hæc sufficiant de fine in communi.

turned, as, for example, the vision of God is the ultimate end of a human just as a certain action whose object is God himself. And in these not only the action but also the object is given and is truly an end, because the action is done for the sake of it, namely, for the sake of possessing him and enjoying him.

A subdivision resulting from the previous division.

10. And from here another subdivision of ends arises, of which St. Thomas often makes use in this matter, especially in [*ST*] IaIIæ.2, 3, 10.3 ad 3 and in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 ad 1, namely, that one end is that of achievement and another that of the thing having been achieved, which is customarily called a formal end vs. objective end and a *finis quo* vs. *finis qui*, that is, what is acquired and by what it is acquired. These two, says St. Thomas, are not two distinct ends, but are integrated into one end, because the object cannot be attained except through the act nor can the act be done except on account of the object. Therefore, it is the same intention and motion of the agent for acquiring both the act and object. Therefore, these two constitute and compose one end. Moreover, they can be brought together in the way by which we brought together the *finis cuius* and *finis cui* in n. 7. Almost the same doctrine can be applied proportionately. And therefore these [divisions] suffice concerning the end in general.