

<10, col. b>²

Quomodo se habeat finis ad objectum adæquatum voluntatis.

How the end is related to the adequate object of the will.

Non videri finem
adæquatum
objectum
voluntatis.

5 1. Decisio hujus quæstionis ex præcedenti haberi potest, et a
D. Thoma tangitur 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, eritque utilis ad ea quæ
dicenda sunt, et ideo breviter præmittenda. Ratio autem dubi-
tandi est, quia objectum adæquatum voluntatis est bonum: dix-
imus autem, non omne bonum habere causalitatem finis, sed
solum illud, quod est propter se amabile, non autem bonum
utile, ut sic. Unde Aristoteles 1, Magnor. moral., cap. 5: *Bono-
rum*, inquit, *quædam sunt finis, quædam vero non*: unde conclu-
ditur argumentum, quia voluntatis objectum est omne id, circa
10 quod voluntas versatur, non solum autem versatur circa finem,
sed etiam circa media: ergo non est finis objectum adæquatum.
In contrarium autem est, quia divus Thomas, citato articulo
primo, dicit, finem esse objectum voluntatis; et videtur loqui
15 de objecte adæquato, quia alias non recte concluderet volun-
tatem omnia operari secundum rationem finis, quia potentia
operatur omnia sub ratione objecti sui: est enim hoc verum
de objecto adæquato, et non de alio, et ideo comparat divus
Thomas finem respectu voluntatis colori respectu visus: est
20 autem color objectum adæquatum visus. Confirmari potest
ex Aristotele 2, Physic., capite tertio, dicente, *finem et bonum
idem esse*: et 1, Ethic., capite septimo, *illud esse uniuscujusque rei
bonum, cujus gratia operatur*: ergo sicut bonum, ita et finis est
25 objectum adæquatum voluntatis, quia quidquid voluntas amat
est finis, vel propter finem.

Arguitur
contrarium ex
D. Thom.

Item ex Arist.

Auctorum
varietas in
præsenti quæst.

5R 1. A settling of this question can be reached from the previous one. It is
also touched on by St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1. And it will be useful
for those things which are to be discussed and therefore should briefly
be presented. Moreover, the reason for doubting is that the adequate
object of the will is good. We said, moreover, that not every good has
the causality of an end, but only that good which is lovable for its own
10R sake. Useful good as such, however, does not. Hence, Aristotle says
in *Magna moralia* I, cap. 5: ‘Of goods certain ones are ends but certain
others not’. From which the argument is concluded: since everything
to which the will is directed is an object of the will, but it is directed not
only to the end but also to means, therefore the end is not the adequate
object. To the contrary, however, because St. Thomas in the cited first
15R article says that the end is the object of the will. And he seems to be
talking about an adequate object, because otherwise he does not rightly
conclude that the will does everything following the nature of an end
since a power does everything under the aspect of its object. For this is
true of an adequate object and not of others. For this reason St. Thomas
20R compares an end with respect to the will to colour with respect to sight.
Colour, moreover, is the adequate object of sight. It can be confirmed
from Aristotle, *Physics* II, cap. 3, ‘the end and the good are the same’,
and from *EN* I, cap. 7, ‘that is the good for each thing for the sake of
which it acts’. Therefore, just as good is the adequate object of the will,
25R so also is the end, because whatever the will loves is an end or for the
sake of an end.

It does not seem
that the end is an
adequate object
of the will.

The contrary is
argued from
St. Thomas.

Likewise from
Aristotle.

The difference of
authors on the
present question.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

tum adæquatum voluntatis sub fine media comprehendendo. Alii vero, qui illud negant, docent, finem esse objectum principale voluntatis, quia omnia, quæ voluntas vult, aliquo modo ordinantur in finem: non tamen adæquatum, quia non quidquid voluntas vult, est finis. Alii autem distinctione utuntur. Conradus, ad citatum art. 1, distinguit duplex objectum voluntatis, scilicet per se, et per accidens, et dicit, objectum adæquatum per se, tam motivum, quam terminativum esse finem, media vero solum esse objecta per accidens. Alii denique Thomistæ distinguunt de objecto motivo et terminativo, et docent, finem esse adæquatum objectum motivum voluntatis: non autem terminativum, quia voluntatis actus etiam ad media terminantur. Et hæc sententia magis ad veritatem accedit, quam alio modo, ita declaro. Possumus enim loqui aut de objecto formali, quod est voluntati ratio operandi: aut de materiali objecto, circa quod voluntas operatur, ut videre licet in exemplis supra positis, sectione præcedenti, num. 5, de amore proximi propter Deum, vel adorationis imaginis propter rem repræsentatam: nam res, quæ amatur, vel adoratur, est divina voluntas, vel excellentia præcepti, et ideo merito datur objectum formale in istis.

1. Assertio unde probetur.

3. Dico ergo primo, rationem adæquatam operandi voluntatis, atque adeo formale objectum adæquatum voluntatis esse finem. Hanc existimo esse mentem divi Thomæ, loco citato, et eam probant, quæ posteriori loco adducta sunt in ratione dubitandi: et sequitur ex dictis in sectione præcedenti, quia tota causalitas finis est in ipso fine non solum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu mediorum: ergo solus finis est adæquata ratio operandi voluntatis, quia illud est voluntatis ratio operandi, quod illam attrahit, seu movet ad operandum. Est autem advertendum, sermonem esse de voluntate operandi proprie ex causalitate finis, in qua non solum exterior effectus, sed etiam interior actus est ex causalitate finis: nam si sit sermo de divina voluntate amante Deum ipsum propter summam bonitatem, objectum ejus proprie non est finis: quia ille actus non est ex causalitate finis: tamen in hoc habet proportionem, quod est de

Nota exceptionem.

43 licet] est V.

the will by including means under the end. But others, who deny that, teach that an end is the principal object of the will because everything that the will wishes is in some way ordered to the end. It is, however, not adequate, because not anything whatever that the will wishes is an end. Others, moreover, use a distinction. Conradus, at the cited art. 1, distinguishes a two-fold object of the will: namely, *per se* and *per accidens*. And he says that the adequate object *per se*, more motive than terminative, is the end, but means are only objects *per accidens*. Finally, others of the Thomists distinguish between motive and terminative objects and teach that the end is an adequate motive object of the will, but not an [adequate] terminative [object], because acts of the will are also terminated at means.

And this view comes closer to the truth, which I show in another way as follows: for we can speak either of the formal object which is the reason for the will's acting or of the material object concerning which the will acts, as may be seen in the examples given above in the preceding section, n. 5, in the case of love for one's neighbour for the sake of God or of adoration of an image for the sake of the thing represented. For the thing that is loved or adored is the divine will or the excellence of the precepts and for this reason the formal object is justifiably given in those.

3. Therefore, I say, first, that the adequate reason for the will's acting will—and therefore the adequate formal object of the will—is the end. I consider this to be the mind of St. Thomas in the cited place and those things which were brought up in following place in the reason for doubting prove it. And it follows from what was said in the preceding section, because the complete causality of the end is in the end itself not only with respect to itself but also with respect to the means. Therefore, the end alone is the adequate reason for the acting of the will, because that which draws the will or moves it to action is its reason for acting. It should be noted, however, that the discussion is about wills acting properly by causality of an end in which not only the exterior effect but also the interior act is from the causality of the end. For if the discussion were about the divine will loving God himself for the sake of the highest good, its object is not properly the end since that act does not result from the causality of the end. Nevertheless, it is analogous in

Whence the first assertion may be shown.

Note the exception.

	re propter se bona et amabili, quamvis sine causalitate propter summam perfectionem. <col. b>	65R	that it is of the thing that is good and lovable in itself, although without causality on account of the highest perfection [of God].	
Obiectio.	4. Sed obijcies, quia interdum voluntas nostra operatur circa aliquod objectum, nec intendendo illud ut finem, nec eli- gendo propter finem, sed per simplicem quamdam complacentiam volendo illud actu imperfecto, quem <i>velleitatem</i> vocant:		4. But you will object because sometimes our will acts for the sake of some object, neither intending it as end nor choosing it for the sake of an end, but willing it through a kind of simple complacency with an imperfect act that they call a 'velleity'. Therefore, the reason for such an act is in no way an end. It is also a sign of this that such an act is also directed to an impossible thing. An end, however, since it expresses order to being and to execution, is always something possible.	An objection.
Dilutio.	ergo ratio talis actus nullo modo est finis. Cujus signum etiam est, quia talis actus versatur etiam circa rem impossibilem: finis autem cum dicat ordinem ad esse, et ad executionem, semper est aliquid possibile. Respondetur hujusmodi actum semper versari circa objectum, propter aliquam bonitatem, quæ in ipso apparet, vel absolute, vel sub aliqua conditione: et hoc modo etiam ille actus est ex causalitate finis, quia tale objectum per il- lam bonitatem movet et trahit illam voluntatem ad eliciendum simplicem affectum, et hoc modo etiam ille actus est ex causalitate finis, non quidem ut dicit ordinem ad intentionem, vel executionem, de quo procedit argumentum factum, sed solum ut dicit ordinem ad effectum voluntatis, quem excitat.	70R	5. I respond that an act of this sort is always directed to the object for the sake of some goodness that appears in it, either absolutely or under some condition. And in this way that act is also by a causality of an end, because such an object through that goodness moves and draws that will to eliciting a simple affect and in this way that act is also by causality of an end, not indeed as it expresses order to intention or execution, concerning which the argument made works, but only as it expresses order to the effect of the will which it excites.	The resolution.
2. Assertio unde probetur.	5. Dico secundo, finem non esse objectum materiale adæquatum voluntatis. Hoc probat prior ratio dubitandi in principio posita: quia voluntas etiam versatur circa media: nec recte appellantur media solum objecta per accidens voluntatis, ad eum modum, quo substantia, verbi gratia, dicitur objectum per accidens visus, nam potentia non attingit per proprium ac- tum hujusmodi objectum per accidens, sed solum attingit ob- jectum per se, quod conjungitur objecto per accidens, quod valde remote et extrinsece accipit hanc denominationem: at vero voluntas vere ac proprie versatur circa media immediate et in se attingendo illa per proprium actum distinctum ab illo, quo versatur circa finem ut objectum quod intendit per actum electionis, quo immediate vult et eligit ipsa media: comprehen- duntur ergo sub objecto per se, quamvis materiali.	80R	5. I say, secondly, that the end is not the adequate material object of the will. The first reason for doubting posited in the beginning shows this. For the will is also directed to means. Not only objects <i>per accidens</i> of the will are rightly called means, according to that way by which substance, for example, is called the object <i>per accidens</i> of sight (for a power does not reach through a proper act of this sort a <i>per accidens</i> object but only reaches a <i>per se</i> object that is connected to a <i>per accidens</i> object, which receives this denomination very remotely and extrinsi- cally). But, on the other hand, the will is truly and properly directed to means immediately and in itself attains them through a proper act distinct from that by which it is directed to an end as the object which it intends through an act of election, by which it immediately wishes and chooses the means themselves. Therefore, they are comprehended under the <i>per se</i> object, although material.	Whence the second assertion may be shown.
Quæstiuncula suborta, an medium simul et finis sint adæquatum objectum voluntatis. Scoti responsio.	6. Sed quæret aliquis, an totum materiale objectum volun- tatis comprehendatur sub hoc disjuncto, finis vel medii: nam Scotus, in 1, distinct. 1, quæst. 3, negat, <i>quia potest voluntas</i> , inquit, <i>habere aliquem actum, qui nec versetur circa finem, nec</i> <i>circa media</i> , quia potest voluntas esse de bono nec propter se, quod spectat ad finem; nec propter aliud quod pertinet	85R	6. But someone will ask whether the whole material object of the will is comprehended under this disjunction: end or means. For Scotus in [<i>Sent.</i>] I, dist. 1, q. 3 denies [it] 'because the will can', he says, 'have some act which is directed neither to an end nor to a means'. For the will can be of the good neither for its own sake (which regards the end) nor for the sake of something else (which pertains to means), but it	A small question that has arisen: whether a means and end at the same time are an adequate object of the will. The response of Scotus.

ad media, sed abstrahere de bono ut sic, abstrahendo a bono propter se, vel propter aliud: hoc enim objectum apprehendi potest <12> per intellectum, qui quamlibet rationem realem potest abstrahere, et est sufficiens ad movendam voluntatem: ergo est etiam sufficiens materia circa quam versatur actus ejus. Imo etiam sequitur contra priorem assertionem, formalem rationem objectivam talis actus non esse finem, sed aliquid abstractum, et universalius fine. Et pro hac sententia citari solent alii Nominales in illa distinctione prima, Ocham, Gabriel, Major et alii, qui dicunt, dari actum medium inter cæcitatem et visum: sed hi fortasse alio sensu locuti sunt, ut videbimus infra agentes de his actibus.

Vera resolutio. 7. Dicendum tamen est, omnia objecta voluntatis sufficienter comprehendi sub fine et mediis intelligendo, ut dixi, nomine finis, quicquid propter suam bonitatem amatur, sive ametur actu efficaci, sive non efficaci, sive sit primario intentum, sive secundario, tanquam quid conjunctum fini primario. Hæc conclusio colligitur ex Aristotele 3, *Ethicor.*, cap. 3 et 4, quatenus in rationibus, quibus ibi utitur distinguit fines, et media tanquam duo membra complectentia totum objectum voluntatis. Et eodem modo philosophatur Nyssenus sive Nemesius, lib. 5 *Philosophiæ*, cap. 4, et Damascenus, lib. 2, de *Fide*, cap. 22, et D. Augustinus 1, de *Doct. Christian.*, cap. 8, ubi omnia bona a voluntate amabilia ad ea revocat *quibus utendum est, vel fruendum*. Idem sumitur ex D. Thoma 1, cont. *Gent.*, cap. 86, et 1, 2, q. 8, ubi Cajetanus, art. 1, aliique etiam Thomistæ hoc sequuntur: Gregorius, in 1, dubion., q. 1. Probatur ratione, quia omne bonum amatur, vel propter se, vel propter aliud; ergo vel ut finis, vel ut medium: sed illa duo opponuntur contradictorie, quia in objecto, quod propter se amatur, ut sic, includitur negatio, videlicet, quod non ametur propter bonitatem alterius: ergo inter illa duo non potest medium inveniri, quia hoc ipso, quod medium non ordinetur ad aliud, propter quod amatur, amabitur propter se: et ostendo sic, quia quicquid amatur a voluntate est bonum, honestum, delectabile, aut utile: sed duo priora habent rationem finis, quantum est de se, quia ex se habent unde amentur: quod si interdum ad aliud referantur, est illis extrinsecum, et tunc in-

abstracts concerning the good as such, abstracting from the good for its own sake or for the sake of something else. For this object can be apprehended through the intellect, which can abstract any real nature you please, and it is sufficient for moving the will. Therefore, it is also sufficient matter for its act to be directed to it. Indeed, it also follows—contra the prior assertion—that the formal objective reason for such an act is not the end but something abstract and more general than the end. Other nominalists (Ockham, Gabriel, Major, and others), I, dist. 1, are usually cited for this view. They say that a middle act is given between blindness and sight. But perhaps these were speaking in another sense, as we will see below in dealing with these acts.

7. It should, however, be said that all objects of the will are sufficiently comprehended under the end and means by understanding, as we said, by the name ‘end’ whatever is loved for the sake of its goodness, either loved with an efficacious act or not, either with a primary intention or with a secondary intention as something conjoined with a primary end. This conclusion is gathered from Aristotle, *EN* III, cap. 3 and 4, since in the arguments which he uses here he distinguishes ends and means as two members making up the entire object of the will. And Gregory of Nyssa or Nemesius philosophizes in the same way in *Philosophiæ* V, cap. 4; John of Damascus in *de Fide* II, cap. 22; and St. Augustine in *de Doct. Christ.* I, cap. 8, where he calls all goods lovable by the will ‘which are to be used or enjoyed’. The same is taken from St. Thomas, *SCG* I, cap. 86 and *ST* IaIIæ.8, where Cajetan in art. 1 and also other Thomists follow this. [Also,] Gregory in 1, dub., q. 1.

It is proven by reason, because every good is loved either for its own sake or for the sake of something else; therefore, either as end or as means. But these two are opposed as a contradiction, because in an object which is loved for its own sake, as such, is included a negation, namely, that it is not loved for the sake of the goodness of something else. Therefore, no intermediate can be found between these two, because by the very fact that a means is not ordered to another for the sake of which it is loved means that it will be loved for its own sake. And I show it in this way: because whatever is loved by the will is good—honest, pleasurable, or useful. But the former two have the nature of an end, insofar as concerns themselves, because they have in themselves that for which they are loved. If sometimes they are referred to another,

The true resolution.

It is proved by authority.

Likewise by reason.

140 ducunt rationem medii. Tertium autem bonum, scilicet utile,
proprium habet rationem medii.

Euasio Scoti
occluditur.

145 8. Ad hoc respondet Scotus posse amari bonum, vel con-
ueniens, ut ab his omnibus abstrahit: sed hoc non recte dicitur,
quia bonum aut est tale per intrinsecam bonitatem aut solum
per habitudinem ad extrinsecam bonitatem: priori modo ha-
bet rationem finis, posteriori vero rationem medii: non potest
autem abstrahi una ratio communis utrique, quia in hujusmodi
150 analogia non datur ratio communis objectiva, sicut non potest
intelligi quod aliquis amet sanum in communi, ut abstrahit ab
eo quod formaliter intrinsece sanum est, et ab eo quod dicitur
tale per habitudinem ad sanitatem: sed unusquisque amat sani-
tatem propter seipsam: signum vero, vel instrumenta sanitatis
propter ipsam: sic igitur quando quis amat bonum in com-
muni, revera amat illud quod est in se, et per se conveniens,
155 et ille est appetitus finis non in particulari, sed in communi,
descendendo autem ad particularia bona, nullum est quod ab
illis duabus rationibus abstrahat, scilicet propter se, vel propter
aliud: igitur finis et media exhauriunt totum objectum volun-
tatis.

140R

it is extrinsic to them and then they introduce the nature of a means.
But the third good, namely, useful good, has the proper nature of a
means.

145R

8. Scotus responds to this that it is possible for the good or the
agreeable to be loved as it is abstracted from all these. But this is not
rightly said, because the good either is such through intrinsic goodness
[or through extrinsic goodness]. In the first way it has the nature of
an end, but in the latter it has the nature of a means. Moreover, one
general nature cannot be abstracted from either, because in this sort
of analogy a common objective nature is not given, just as it cannot be
understood that someone loves health in general as abstracted from that
which is formally intrinsically healthy and from that which is called
such through a habitude to healthiness. But each one loves healthiness
150R for its own sake, but a sign or instrument of healthiness for the sake
of it. So therefore when someone loves good in general, he really loves
that which is in itself and *per se* agreeable and that is the appetite for
the end not in particular but in general. Moreover, by descending to
particular goods, nothing is such that it is abstracted from those two
natures, namely, for the sake of itself or for the sake of something else.
Therefore, an end and means exhaust the entire object of the will.

150R

155R

Scotus's evasion
is blocked.