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<7, col. b>²

Sub qua ratione boni moveat finis, et consequenter an media participant causalitatem finis.

*Under what aspect of good an end moves and, hence, whether means participate in the causality of an end.*³

Resolutio
affir. quoad
bonum
honestum et
delectabile.

1. Cum triplex sit bonum, honestum, delectabile et utile:
de duobus primis nulla est quæstio, quia de honesto per se
notum est esse maxime per se expetibile, quinimo ait divus
Thomas, 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 6, rationem honesti in hoc con-
sistere, quod sit per se conveniens: de bono vero delectabili
dixit Aristoteles 10, Ethic., cap. 2, et cum eo D. Thomas, 1,
2, quæst. 2, art. 6, ad 1, stul- <8> tum esse quærere propter
quid appetatur. Nam delectatio ex se habet appetibilitatem.
Unde constat utramque hanc rationem boni esse sufficientem
ad causandum finaliter, quia quod movet ut per se appetatur,
etiam habet vim ad movendum ut alia appetantur propter ip-
sum finem, si fuerint necessaria, alias prior motio non esset
efficax, nam ex efficaci intentione finis sequitur electio medii si
necessaria sit. Tota ergo quæstio versatur de bono utili, quod
non est propter se bonum, nec propter se amabile, sed tantum
propter aliud: loquimur enim formaliter de bono utili, ut sic,
nam si contingat bonum quod est utile ad unum finem, esse
alias per se conveniens, vel delectabile, illud est accidentarium
ad rationem utilis, et sub ea ratione participabit objectum il-

5R

10R

15R

20R

1. Good is threefold: honest, delightful, and useful.⁴ About the first two there is no question, since it is *per se notum* of honest good that it especially is choiceworthy in itself. Indeed, St. Thomas says in *ST* Ia.5.6 that the nature of honest good consists in being agreeable in itself. But with respect to delightful good, Aristotle said in *EN* X, cap. 2—and St. Thomas agrees with him in *ST* IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1—that it is foolish to ask for the sake of what it is desired. For delight holds desirability in itself. Hence it is clear that each of these aspects of good is sufficient for final-causing. For that which moves so that it is desired in itself also has the strength to move so that other things, if they are necessary [for attaining the end], are desired for the sake of the end. Otherwise the former motion would not be efficacious, for from an efficacious intention for the end follows the election of means if they are necessary. Therefore, the whole question is about useful good, which is not good for its own sake and is not lovable for its own sake but only for the sake of something else. For we are speaking formally about useful good as such. If it happens that a good that is useful for one end is otherwise agreeable or delightful in itself, that is accidental to the aspect of useful good and under that aspect that object will participate in another aspect

An affirmative
resolution with
respect to honest
and delightful
good.

The doubt only
concerns useful
good as such.

Dubitatio solum
versatur de bono
utili, ut sic.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³Suárez also discusses this material in *DM* XXIII.6.

⁴Suárez uses the traditional threefold division of good into *honestum*, *delectabile*, and *utile*. Translation of these terms is liable to lead to unhappy results. For example, one might be tempted to translate *honestum* with ‘moral good’ or ‘virtuous good’, but those English expressions really do not cover a wide enough range of cases. I will here translate the terms with the archaic expressions ‘honesty’ or ‘honest good’, ‘delight’ or ‘delightful good’ (‘pleasure’ would be another option), and ‘useful good’. Suárez discusses this division in more detail in *DM* X.

25	<p>lud aliam rationem finis, nam quatenus utile est, proprie habet rationem medii, et ideo hæc quæstio coincidit cum illa, an medium, ut medium, finaliter causet, in qua re tres excogitari possunt diversæ sententiæ, quas latius attuli, disput. 23, <i>Metaphysicæ</i>, sect. 6.</p>	25R	<p>of end. For insofar as it is useful, it properly has the aspect of a means. And therefore this question coincides with the question whether means insofar as they are means final-cause. One can think of three different views with respect to this question, which I report more extensively in <i>DM</i> XXIII.6.⁵</p>	The affirmative first view.
1. Sententia affirm.	<p>2. Prima est, bonum utile, ex hoc solum quod utile est, atque adeo omne medium, sive sit primum, sive secundum, posse habere rationem causæ finalis. Hanc sententiam videtur indicare Gabriel, in 1, dist. 38, quæst. 1, art. 1, ubi ex sententia Gregorii distinguit triplicem finem, unus est, qui per se appetitur, et alia propter ipsum, qui est finis ultimus in aliqua serie. Alius qui non propter se appetitur, sed alia appetuntur propter ipsum, ut sunt media intermedia: tertius est, qui nec propter se appetitur, nec alia propter ipsum: sed solum ipse appetitur propter alia, ut est primum medium in executione, et</p>	30R	<p>2. The first view is that useful good—and, consequently, every means—simply by the fact that it is useful can have the nature of a final cause. Gabriel seems to indicate this view in I, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, where according to the view of Gregory he distinguishes three kinds of ends. One kind is that which is desired for its own sake and other things for its sake, which is an end ultimate in some series. Another kind is that which is not desired for its own sake but other things are desired for its sake, as intermediate means are. The third kind is that which neither is desired for its own sake nor has other things desired for its sake but it itself is only desired for the sake of something else, as the means first in execution and last in intention is. But an argument for this view can be that final causality consists in motion of the will, but the will is not only moved to the end but also to every means, seeing that the will desires the latter. Nor is the will only moved by an ultimate end or by a good that is lovable for its own sake. It is also moved by good itself and by useful means as such. Therefore, the causality of an end is found in them. The last part of the minor, in which there is a difficult, is proven: for the means itself is a useful good and utility is some goodness existing in the means, for it does not inhere in the end but in that very thing that is useful for the end. Therefore, a means by reason of its utility draws the will to itself. Secondly, the will is determined to electing one means rather than another not by the end but by the means, namely, because it is more apt to be placed together with the end. Therefore, there is in the means itself a causality with respect to the will for enticing and determining it.</p>	The first argument for it.
Eius ratio 1.	<p>40 quoadquidem illum appetit, nec etiam movetur a solo fine ultimo, seu a bono per se amabili: sed etiam ab ipso bono, et medio utili, ut sic: ergo in illo reperitur causalitas finis. Probaturn ultima pars minoris, in qua est difficultas, quia ipsum medium est bonum utile, et utilitas est aliqua bonitas in ipso existens, non enim inhæret in fine, sed in ipsa re, quæ est utilis ad finem: ergo medium ratione suæ utilitatis trahit voluntatem ad se. Secundo, quia voluntas determinatur ad eligendum hoc medium potius quam illud, non a fine, sed a medio, scilicet, quia est magis aptum ad comparandum finem: ergo est in ipso medio causalitas res-</p>	35R	<p>45 40R 45R</p>	The second argument.
Ratio 2.	<p>50 et determinandam illam.</p>	50R	<p>50R</p>	The negative second view is urged by appeal to Aristotle.
2. Sentent. negans suadet ex Arist.	<p>55 3. Secunda sententia extreme contraria est, nullum medium participare rationem, vel causalitatem finis: cui videtur favere Aristoteles, loco citato supra, sect. 2, num. 2, ex 2, <i>Metaphysicæ</i>, cap. 2, ubi dicit de ratione finis esse, <i>ut alia appetantur</i></p>	55R	<p>3. The second view is the extreme contrary that no means participate in the nature of causality of an end. Aristotle seems to favour it in the passage cited above in sect. 2, n. 2, from <i>Metaph.</i> II, cap. 2, where he says that it belongs to the nature of an end ‘that other things are desired</p>	

⁵This may well indicate that Alvarez, the editor, has cut some text here.

Item nomine <i>finis</i> .	<p>60 <i>propter ipsum, et ipse non, propter alia; ergo nullum medium habet rationem finis: nec dici potest Aristoteles ibi loqui de fine ultimo; nam potius ex illo primo intendit probare perveniendum esse ad aliquem finem ultimum, et non procedi in infinitum in causa finali: loquendo ergo de fine ut sic, vere in</i> 60R <i>2, Phys., cap. 3, dicit, omnia media etsi inter se subordinata sint, esse propter unum finem intentum, verbi gratia, propter sanitatem: et 1 Ethic., cap. 7, dicit, in unaquaque serie illud esse finem, quod ultimo appetitur. Et ideo adjungi potest confirmatio ex ipso nomine finis; significat enim id, quod est extremum,</i> 65R <i>et in quo sistit voluntas tendens ad finem, sed non habet rationem extremi, nisi id, quod propter se amatur, nec voluntas in alio sistit, nam per quodcumque medium ulterius tendit in finem: ergo.</i></p>	<p>for its sake but not itself for the sake of something else'. Therefore, no means has the nature of an end. Nor can it be said that Aristotle is speaking here about the ultimate end. Rather, he intends to prove from this first point that one should come to some ultimate end and not proceed to infinity in the final cause. Therefore, he must be speaking about the end as such. Indeed, in <i>Phys.</i> II, cap. 3, he says that 'all means even if subordinated among themselves are for the sake of one intended end', for example, for the sake of health. And in <i>EN</i> I, cap. 7, he says that 'in each series that is the end which is desired ultimately'. And therefore a confirmation can be added from the very name 'end', for it signifies that which is the extreme and in which the will tending to an end stops. But a thing does not have the nature of an extreme except that which is loved for its own sake. Nor does the will stop in anything else, for through any means whatever it tends to a further end. Therefore.</p>	Likewise from the name 'end'.
3. Sententia distinctione utens.	<p>70 4. Tertia sententia distinguit: nam medium considerari potest, vel quatenus amatur propter aliud, vel quatenus aliud amatur propter ipsum: et priori ratione negatur habere finis rationem, quia sub illa exercet formalem rationem medii: medium autem et finis ut sic, saltem ratione formali distinguuntur. Posteriori autem ratione dicitur habere rationem finis, quia ut sic, non exercet rationem medii, sed potius rationem termini, non ultimi, sed proximi et intermedii. Ex quo fit, illud medium, quod est executione primum, seu intentione, ac resolutione ultimum, nullo modo habere rationem finis, quia tantum propter aliud eligitur, et nihil amatur propter ipsum: reliqua vero media, quæ inter primum medium et finem ultimum intercedunt, participabunt rationem finis modo jam dicto. Hanc opinionem tenet Ægidius, in 2, d. 38, quæst. 2, art. 2, et significat Gabriel 2, d. 1, quæst. 5, art. 1, citans Ocham ibi quæst. 3, art. 1, et videtur sententia divi Thomæ 3, contra Gent., cap. 2, ubi in ratione finali inquit: <i>In his, quæ sunt ad finem, omnia intermedia sunt finis respectu prioris:</i> et in 2, Phys., in lect. 5, in hunc modum explicat citatum locum Aristoteles, dicens: <i>De ratione finis non esse, quod sit ultimum simpliciter, sed solum respectu præcedentis:</i> et eodem modo ex-</p>	<p>70R 4. The third view makes a distinction: for a means can be considered either insofar as it is loved for the sake of something else or insofar as something else is loved for its sake. And it is denied to have the nature of an end by the former aspect, for it exercises the formal nature of a means under that aspect. But a means and an end as such are only distinguished by a formal nature. But by the latter aspect it is said to have the nature of an end, because as such it does not exercise the nature of a means but rather the nature of a <i>terminus</i> (not an ultimate but a proximate and intermediate one). Hence it results that that means which is first in execution or last in intention and resolution has in no way the nature of an end, because it is only elected for the sake of something else and nothing is loved for its sake. But the remaining means—which stand between the first means and the ultimate end—participate in the nature of the end in the way just mentioned. Ægidius holds this opinion in II, dist. 38, q. 2, art. 2, and Gabriel indicates it in II, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1, citing Ockham, q. 3 of the same distinction, art. 1. And it seems to be St. Thomas's view in <i>SCG</i> III, cap. 2, where he says in the final argument: 'In those things which are for the end every intermediate is an end with respect to the former thing'. And in <i>Phys.</i> II, lect. 5, he explains the passage cited from Aristotle in this way, saying: 'It does not belong to the nature of an end to be unqualifiedly ultimate but only to</p>	The third view uses a distinction.
Qui ei adhæreant, vel faveant.	<p>80 85 90</p>	<p>80R 85R 90R</p>	Who holds or favours it.

63 in] om. V.

74 sic] om. V.

83 38] 28 V.

Iudicium auctoris de præcedentibus sententiis.	<p>ponit Aristoteles 1, Eth., cap. 7, ubi certe <9> videtur philosophus multum favere, nam aperte dicit, non omnes fines esse perfectos et propter se expetibiles, et inter fines ponit divitias et instrumenta artis, quæ sine dubio sunt media ulterioris finis, licet comparentur ut finis respectu earum actionum, per quas fiunt, vel acquiruntur. Inter has sententias hæc postrema melius loquitur, et simpliciter verior est: tamen, quia secunda in aliquo sensu dicit etiam aliquid verum, oportet aliam distinctionem adhibere præter jam dictam. Possumus enim loqui de fine aut quoad propriam causalitatem finis, prout a nobis explicata est, vel solum, quoad rationem et denominationem termini, propter quem aliquid sit.</p>	95R	<p>be ultimate with respect to the preceding [means]'. He explains in the same way [the passage] from Aristotle, <i>EN</i> I, cap. 7, where the Philosopher certainly seems greatly to favour [this view], clearly saying that not every end is perfect and choiceworthy for its own sake. He also places wealth and the instruments of arts among the ends. But these are without doubt means to a further end, although they are related as an end with respect to those actions through which they are made or acquired. Among these views, this last one speaks better and is, strictly speaking, truer. Still, since the second view also says something true in some sense, some distinction beyond the one just made must be applied. For we can speak about the end either with respect to the proper causality of the end—as I explained it—or only with respect to the nature and denomination of a <i>terminus</i> for whose sake something is.</p>	The judgement of the author concerning the preceding views.
1. Assertio.	<p>5. Dico ergo primo, propriam causalitatem finis reperiri tantum in eo fine, qui in sua serie est ultimus, atque adeo in bono tantum, quod propter se amatur, et non propter aliud. Hæc conclusio colligitur ex Aristotele in secunda sententia citato: et probatur ratione, quia omnia media a primo usque ad ultimum, non sunt amabilia propter se, sed solum ratione finis: ergo media non trahunt voluntatem ad se, sed solus finis est qui trahit voluntatem ad omnia media. Unde divus Thomas, 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 6. Utilia, inquit, dicuntur, quæ non habent in se, unde desiderantur: ergo non habent in se, unde causent finaliter: ergo tota causalitas est a bono per se amato. Secundo, quia media, ut amantur propter aliud, non exercent causalitatem finis: ergo nec illam exercent quatenus aliud amatur propter ipsa: ergo nullo modo sunt finis. Primum antecedens recte probatur, ab ultima opinione, et ex communi modo loquendi omnium philosophorum constat: non enim distinguunt finem qui sit etiam medium, a fine ut fine. Item, quia tota causalitas ipsius finis, ut supra visum est, comprehenditur in illis duobus actibus, <i>quod propter se ametur, vel alia propter ipsum</i>: quin potius causalitas finis maxime censetur exerceri in electione mediorum propter finem. Probatur vero prima consequentia, quia si medium, quatenus ipsum eligitur vel amatur, non habet vim causandi finaliter: ergo nec illam habebit,</p>	105R	<p>5. I say, first, therefore, that the proper causality of an end is found in that end which is ultimate in its series and, therefore, only in good loved for its own sake and not for the sake of another good. This conclusion is gathered from Aristotle as cited in the second view. And it is proven by reason, for all means from the first one to the last one are not lovable for their own sake but only by reason of the end. Therefore, means do not draw the will to themselves. Rather, it is only the end which draws the will to all the means. Hence, St. Thomas in <i>ST</i> Ia.5.6 says that those things are called useful which do not have in themselves that for which they are desired. Therefore, they do not have in themselves that by which they final-cause. Therefore, all the causality is from the good that is loved for itself. Secondly, because means insofar as they are loved for the sake of something else do not exercise the causality of an end. Therefore, neither do they exercise it insofar as something else is loved for their sake. Therefore, they are in no way the end. The first antecedent is rightly proven by the last opinion and it is obvious from all philosophers' common way of speaking, for they do not distinguish the end which is also a means from the end as end. Likewise, because the whole causality of the end itself, as was seen above, is comprehended in these two acts: that it is loved for its own sake and that other things are loved for its sake, lest the causality of the end be thought exercised chiefly in the election of means for the sake of the end. But the first consequence is proven, because if a means does not have the power to</p>	The first assertion.
Probatur 1.	<p>110</p>	110R	<p>It is proven, first.</p>	It is proven, first.
Probatur 2.	<p>115</p> <p>120</p> <p>125</p>	115R	<p>It is proven, secondly.</p>	It is proven, secondly.

110 qui] quia V.

Probat 3.	130	<p>quatenus aliud amatur propter ipsum: quia si non habet vim trahendi voluntatem ad se, multo minus habebit vim trahendi voluntatem ad alia propter se: ergo sola hæc vis et causalitas est in fine. Tertio argumentor ex specificatione actuum, nam omnes actus circa media, sive sint immediate propter finem ultimum in illa serie, sive sint eligendo unum medium propter aliud, omnes, inquam, illi <col. b> actus sumunt suam speciem ab actibus voluntatis, quatenus est principium eorum: ergo. Antecedens autem per se notum et certum est, ut latius dicturi</p>	130R	<p>final-cause with respect to itself being elected or loved, it will then not have it with respect to something else being loved for its sake. For if it does not have the power of drawing the will to itself, it will much less have the power of drawing the will to other things for its sake. Therefore, this power and causality is only in the end. Thirdly, I argue from the specification of acts, for all acts concerning means—whether elected immediately for the sake of the ultimate end in that series or elected for the sake of another means—all these acts, I say, take their species from the acts of the will insofar as they are the principles of the former acts.</p>	It is proven, thirdly.
Probat 4.	135	<p>sumus, tractatu tertio. Tandem confirmari potest conclusio exemplis: nam in adoratione, verbi gratia, quæ dicitur respectiva, quamvis res adorata sit, verbi gratia, imago, vel calix, vel aliquid hujusmodi, tamen tota ratio et causa adorationis est excellentiæ personæ, propter quam fit adoratio: ita autem se habet medium respectu finis sicut imago respectu personæ repræsentatæ. Simile exemplum est in dilectione, qua proximus amatur præcise propter Deum: nam licet proximus sit res amata, tamen tota ratio et causa ipsius amationis, est bonitas Dei: sic ergo et in præsentia.</p>	135R	<p>Therefore. Moreover, the antecedent is <i>per se notum</i> and certain, as we will discuss more extensively in the third treatise. Finally, the conclusion can be confirmed by example. In adoration, for example, which is called respective, although the adored thing is, for example, an image, a chalice, or something like this, still, the whole reason and cause for the adoration belongs to the more excellent person for whose sake the adoration happens. A means, moreover, is related to the end in the same way that the image is related to the person represented. The love by which a neighbour is loved precisely for the sake of God is a similar example. For although the neighbour is the thing loved, nevertheless the whole reason and cause for the loving itself is the goodness of God. So also, therefore, in the present case.</p>	It is proven, fourthly
2. Assertio.	145	<p>6. Dico secundo, considerando in fine habitudinem termini, quæ explicatur illa voce, <i>propter quam, vel, cujus gratia aliquid fit</i>: hoc modo dici possunt media interjacentia inter</p>	150R	<p>6. I say, secondly, in considering the relation of the <i>terminus</i> to the end, which is explained by the phrase ‘for the sake of which or on account of which something is done’: in this way the means that lie between the first means and the ultimate end can be said to participate in the nature of an end. The foundations of the third view and the way of speaking not only by philosophers and theologians but also by Sacred Scripture (Christ, for example, is said in this way to have died for the sake of our salvation, although not that but the glory of God was the ultimate end for his death) proves this. Moreover one cannot deny that the nature of the end is explicated through these words. In fact, Aristotle usually proves from them that something is an end, because we respond through that to the question why something is. Finally, it is obvious that a remote means is not ordered to an ultimate end except by the mediation of a proximate means to which it is referred immediately. In fact, it does not have agreeability and proportion to the end itself except by a proximate means’ mediation. It is, therefore, ordered to that proximate means as to a near end or <i>terminus</i>. Under this as-</p>	The second assertion.
Unde probetur.	150	<p>primum medium et ultimum finem, participare rationem finis. Hoc probant fundamenta tertiæ sententiæ et modus loquendi, non solum philosophorum et theologorum, sed Sacræ etiam Scripturæ: sic enim dicitur Christus, verbi gratia, mortuus propter nostram salutem, quamvis ille non fuerit finis ultimus mortis ejus, sed gloria Dei: non potest autem negari, quin per hæc verba explicetur ratio finis, quinimo Aristoteles inde probare solet aliquid esse finem, quia per illum respondemus quæstioni, propter quid. Denique quia constat remotum medium non ordinari ad finem ultimum, nisi mediante proximo medio, ad quod immediate refertur: imo nec habet convenientiam et proportionem cum ipso fine, nisi mediante medio proximo: ergo ordinatur ad illud ut ad propinquum finem, seu terminum: ergo sub hac ratione participat illud medium ra-</p>	155R	<p>the nature of an end. The foundations of the third view and the way of speaking not only by philosophers and theologians but also by Sacred Scripture (Christ, for example, is said in this way to have died for the sake of our salvation, although not that but the glory of God was the ultimate end for his death) proves this. Moreover one cannot deny that the nature of the end is explicated through these words. In fact, Aristotle usually proves from them that something is an end, because we respond through that to the question why something is. Finally, it is obvious that a remote means is not ordered to an ultimate end except by the mediation of a proximate means to which it is referred immediately. In fact, it does not have agreeability and proportion to the end itself except by a proximate means’ mediation. It is, therefore, ordered to that proximate means as to a near end or <i>terminus</i>. Under this as-</p>	Whence it is proven.
	160		160R		

Explicatur D. Thom.	165	<p>tionem finis: unde tandem fit medium ultimum in electione, seu resolutione, quod est primum in usu et executione, non enim posset proprie dici finis cum non moveat ut finis, nec propter se aliquid moveat, sed omnino ipsum fiat propter aliud: ergo nec rationem causæ, nec rationem termini, quæ est in fine, proprie participat. Verum est, interdum divum Thomam, 1 parte, quæstione quinta, articulo sexto, vocare bonum utile ut sic terminum proximum motionis voluntatis, sed illud intelligitur non proprie de ratione terminandi, quæ est in fine, sed eo modo, quo omne objectum, seu materia, circa quam versatur actus mentis, seu voluntatis, potest dici terminus ejus, et adhuc sub ea ratione non ipsum objectum, ad quod <10> terminatur electio, seu motio interior voluntatis, sed ipsemet voluntatis actus est quasi secundum medium, quod ad finem ordinatur, nam talis electio fit propter finem consequendum.</p>	165R	<p>pect, then, that means participates in the nature of an end. For this reason, finally, the means that is first in use and execution happens last in election or resolution. For it cannot properly be called an end when it does not move as an end and nothing else is moved for its own sake but it itself happens wholly for the sake of something else. Therefore, it does not properly participate in the nature of a cause or in the nature of the <i>terminus</i> that is in the end. It is true that in <i>ST</i> Ia.5.6 St. Thomas sometimes calls useful good as such a proximate <i>terminus</i> of the will's motion. But that should be understood not as being properly about the nature of terminating that is found in an end but in that way in which every object or matter to which an act of mind or will is direct can be called the act's <i>terminus</i>. And, besides, under this aspect the object itself in which election or the internal motion of the will is terminated is not, as it were, ordered to the end, but the very act of will itself is what, according to the means, as it were, is ordered to the end. For such an election is made for the sake of the end that is to be pursued.</p>	St. Thomas is explained.
Ad fundam. in n. 3. et 4.	180	<p>7. Ex dictis constat responsio ad fundamenta secundæ et tertiæ opinionis, quia prout a nobis exposita sunt, non sunt contraria, et ita fundamenta earum probant assertiones positas. Ad fundamenta vero primæ opinionis, respondetur, quamvis medium, ut amatur propter finem, materialiter terminet actum voluntatis, tamen solum finem esse, qui trahit voluntatem ad hujusmodi materiale objectum, quod non est appetibile, nisi ex bonitate finis. Ad primam vero probationem, quod utilitas est in medio, respondetur, si per utilitatem intelligamus formam aliquam, vel vim activam, ratione cujus medium conferat ad consequendum finem: verum est hujusmodi utilitatem esse in ipso medio: verbi gratia, in potione amara est virtus expellendi pravum humorem, et sic de aliis: et hoc modo illa forma est aliqua bonitas conveniens illi rei, cujus est perfectio: nihilominus tamen respectu ejus, qui amat hujusmodi rem solum ut medium, tota illa utilitas non est appetibilis, nisi ex bonitate finis, a quo quodammodo extrinsece informatur. Et hoc modo loquendo de bonitate et utilitate medii ut appetibilis est ab operante propter finem, sic negatur intrinseco in medio,</p>	175R	<p>7. The response to the foundations of the second and third opinions is obvious from what has been said, because they are not contrary as I explained them and so their foundations prove the posited assertions. But to the foundation of the first opinion, I respond that, although the means as it is loved for the sake of the end materially terminates the act of the will, nevertheless it is only the end which draws the will to a material object of this kind that is not desirable except by the goodness of the end. But to the first proof (that utility is in the means), I respond: if by utility we understand some form or active power by reason of which the means is directed at achieving the end, it is true that a utility of this sort is in the means itself. For example, the power to expel a bad humour is in the bitter potion and so on for similar cases. And in this way that form is some goodness agreeable to that thing whose perfection it is. But, still, with respect to the one who loves a thing of this kind only as a means, all that utility is not desirable except as a result of the goodness of the end by which it is informed extrinsically in a certain way. And speaking in this way about the goodness and utility of the means as desirable for the one acting for the sake of the end, I deny that it is intrinsically in the means. Rather, it is extrinsically [in</p>	To the foundations in nn. 3 and 4. To the first argument in n. 2.

174 terminatur] determinatur V.

176 nam] om. V.

sed extrinsece a fine. Propter quod dixit divus Thomas, 1 part., 200R
loco citato in num. præced., bonum utile tantum esse analogice
bonum.

Ad 2. rationem
ibid.

200 8. Ad secundam probationem respondetur comparando
205 varia media ad finem, posse inveniri æqualitatem in ipsis mediis
ut utilia sunt ad finem, et tunc si voluntas eligat unum præ
210 alio, tota causa finalis illius determinationis est finis, efectiva
voluntas libere operans, et possunt in eadem deter-
215 minatione duo distingui, unum est absolutum, scilicet quod
voluntas hoc eligat præ illo, et hoc non est necesse quod sit a
fine, nec requirit causam finalem positivam, quia illa compa-
220 ratio præter electionem unius medii, solum addit negationem
alterius, et ad non eligendum non requiritur specialis finis, sed
solum quod illud medium non sit necessarium. Atque idem
225 dicendum est (si contingat media esse inæqualia) voluntatem
pro libertate sua eligere quod minus utile est, quod, an facere
possit, disputabimus infra, tract. 2. At vero quando media sunt
inæqualia, et voluntas eligit quod est utilius, totum illud at-
tribuitur fini, ut causæ finali, quia ille, quantum est de se, ad
hoc <col. b> totum movet, quod si interdum voluntas non ita
230R movetur, non est ex defectu finis, sed ex libertate voluntatis,
quæ non patitur necessitatem a fine. Et hoc quidem verum
est, quando excessus medii est proprie ac formaliter in utili-
tate: nam si contingat esse in aliis conditionibus, verbi gratia,
235R quia est suavius, vel delectabilius, tunc non solum a fine, sed
ab ipso medio provenit, quod voluntas magis ad illud trahatur,
quam ad aliud, sed sub ea ratione medium non se habet ut pure
medium, sed admiscetur aliqua ratio finalis finis proximi, quia
240R res illa, quæ est medium, jam non solum amatur propter utili-
tatem ad aliud, sed etiam, quia est aliquo modo per se bona et
amabilis.

it] from the end. For this reason St. Thomas said in the place cited in
the previous paragraph from *ST Ia* that useful good is only analogically
good.

8. To the second proof I respond that by comparing various means
to the end an equality can be found in the means as useful for the end,
and then, if the will elects one in preference to the others, the end is
the entire final cause of that determination. But the effective [cause]
is the will acting freely. Two things can be distinguished in the same
determination. One is absolute, namely, that the will elects this one in
preference to the others. And for this it is not necessary that it results
from the end nor does it require a positive final cause, since that com-
parison beyond the election of one of the means only adds a negation of
another. And a special end is not required for not electing something;
rather, all that is needed is that that means not be necessary. And like-
wise it should be said (if the means happen to be unequal) [about the
case] where the will by its freedom elects a less useful means. (Whether
this can happen we will discuss below in the second treatise.) But, on
the other hand, when the means are unequal and the will elects the one
that is more useful, that is wholly attributed to the end as final cause,
because it, insofar as it is of itself, moves to this whole. If the will some-
times is not moved in this way, that is not a result of a defect of the
end but of the freedom of the will, which does not undergo necessity
from the end. And this is certainly true when a means exceeds what
it properly and formally has in utility. For if it happens to be in other
conditions—for example, because it is more pleasing or delightful—the
fact that the will is drawn more to it than to another means comes then
not only from the end but from the means itself. But under that aspect
the means does not hold itself purely as a means but it is mixed with
some final aspect of a proximate end. For that thing which is the means
is now not only loved for the sake of its utility for something else but
also because it is in itself good and lovable in some way.

To the second
argument in n. 2.

196 dixit] *om.* V.

203–204 determinatione] terminatione V.