

<6>²

Utrum finis exerceat causalitatem suam sub ratione boni cogniti.

Explicuimus causalitatem finis et effectum ejus: sequitur ut dicamus de ratione causandi, seu de virtute, per quam
5 causat. De qua duo sunt certa, circa quæ alia erunt dubitanda et explicanda.

Finis ratio, seu
virtus per quam
causat, est
bonitas.
Ostenditur
auctoritate
D. Thom. et
aliorum.

1. Primo igitur certum est, finem in suo genere causare, quatenus quoddam bonum, et conveniens est. Hæc est sententia D. Thomæ 1, 2, quæst. 1, a. 1, in fine corporis, 10R
quam late tractat 3, cont. Gentes, cap. 2 et 3, ubi probat, idem esse operari propter finem, et propter bonum: et 1 p., q. 5, a. 4, similiter probat bonum habere rationem finis, ubi in solutione ad 2, in hunc modum explicat illud Dionysii 4, c. de Divinis nominibus: *Bonum est diffusivum sui*. Eandem doctrinam habet Alensis, 1 p., q. 17, memb. 3. et 34, memb. 1, et colligitur ex Aristotele, 1 Ethicor., cap. 7, dicente: *Id esse unicuique bonum, cujus gratia cætera operantur*. Idem lib. I Ethic., in fine, et 2, Phys., cap. 3, ubi dicit, *finem et bonum idem esse*. Ratio 20R
vero constat ex dictis, quia causalitas finis in hoc consistit, quod trahit voluntatem ad se propter se amandum, vel alia propter ipsum: sed nihil potest trahere voluntatem nisi bonum, quatenus bonum est: ergo bonitas est a qua habet finis virtutem causandi finaliter; est ergo illi 25R

Whether an end exercises its causality under the aspect of cognized good.

We have explained the causality of an end and its effect. The next thing to talk about is the *ratio* of its causing or the force through which it causes. Two things are certain concerning this, but other related matters that are doubtful and should be explained.

1. The first thing, then, that is certain is that the end causes in its genus insofar as it is a kind of good and agreeable thing.³ This is St. Thomas's view in *ST IaIIæ.1.1*, co. (towards the end). He discusses it more thoroughly in *SCG III*, c. 2 and 3, where he shows that to act for the sake of the end is the same as to act for the sake of the good. In *ST Ia.5.4* he likewise shows that good has the *ratio* of an end, where in his solution ad 2 he in this way explains Dionysius's statement from *On the Divine Names*, c. 4: 'Goodness is self-diffusive'. [Alexander] of Hales holds the same doctrine in *Sent. I*, q. 17, memb. 3 and q. 34, memb. 1, and it is gathered from Aristotle, who says in *EN I*, c. 7: 'That is the good of each for whose sake everything else is done' [1097a17–18]. Likewise at the end of book I and in *Phys. II*, c. 3, where he says: 'the end and the good are the same'.⁴ And the reason is clear from what was said, for the causality of the end consists in drawing the will to itself on account of being loved in itself or to other things for its sake. But nothing can draw the will except something good insofar as it is good. Therefore, goodness is that

The *ratio* of the end or the force through which it causes is goodness. It is shown by the authority of St. Thomas and others.

And by reason.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition, M = 1629 Mainz edition, and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³This claim is treated at greater length in *DM* 23.5.

⁴195a22–25?

25 ratio causandi.

Exponitur
Cajetanus circa
rationem
causandi
finaliter.

2. Hanc autem veritatem per se claram, obscuri-
orem reddit Cajetanus, 1 p., art. 4, q. 5, dicens, bonitatem
formalem esse ipsam rationem causæ finalis in actu ex-
ercito, non vero in actu signato, nisi tantum fundamen-
taliter. Quorum verborum sensus in idem redit. Nam
per hoc nomen *bonum* non explicatur res sub habitu-
dine ad effectum, seu actum finaliter causandi, et hoc
vocavit Cajetanus finem in actu signato, quam rationem
non <col. b> significat formaliter ratio *boni*, sed tantum
explicat perfectionem objecti, seu convenientiam quam
habet cum voluntate, ex qua habet quod finalisare pos-
sit, quam habitudinem formaliter explicat nomen, seu
ratio *finis*: et ideo dicitur fundari in bonitate. Et hoc
modo dixit Cajetanus *bonum* significare rationem finis
in actu exercito fundamentaliter, ac si in causa efficiente
diceremus calorem, verbi gratia, esse finem agentis fun-
damentaliter, tamen ut sic non significare formaliter ip-
sam habitudinem efficientis.

Secundo certum est ut bonum causet finaliter nec-
essarium esse ut cognitum sit; quia appetitus vitalis se-
quitur formam apprehensam, et ideo ferri non potest
nisi in objectum cognitum ut constat ex philosophia, et
ex 1 p., quæst. 80 et sequentib., et ex quæst. 8 et 9, 1, 2,
viderique possunt quæ scripsi in disp. 23, Metaphysicæ,
sect. 7, et libr. 2, de Orat. mentali, cap. 13. Hinc vero
oriebatur occasio disputandi quomodo se habebat esse
cognitum ad rationem causandi finalem, an scilicet sit
tantum conditio necessaria, vel etiam ratio causandi, et
consequenter an bonum cognitum causet finaliter se-
cundum esse cognitum, vel secundum esse reale. Quam
quæstionem late tractat 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, Medina, et
Cajetanus ibid., et antea in 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 4, et Fer-

by which an end has the power of final-causing and is, therefore, the *ratio* of causing for it.

2. This truth which is clear in itself is rendered rather ob-
scure by Cajetan when he says in [his commentary on] *ST* Ia.4.5
that formal goodness is the very *ratio* of the final cause in the
exercised act but not in the signified act, unless merely funda-
mentally. The sense of those words comes to the same thing. For
through this word ‘good’ one does not indicate a thing under a
disposition to an effect or to an act of final-causing (and Cajetan
calls this the end in the signified act). The *ratio* of ‘good’ does not
formally signify this *ratio*. Rather, it only indicates the perfection
of the object or the agreeability which it has to the will, as a re-
sult of which it has that which allows it to final-cause. The name
or *ratio* of an end indicates this disposition. For this reason it
is said to be founded in goodness. And in this way Cajetan said
that ‘good’ signifies the *ratio* of an end in the exercised act fun-
damentally, as if we were to say that in an efficient cause heat,
for example, is the agent’s end fundamentally, yet as such it does
not formally signify the disposition itself of the efficient cause.

Secondly, it is certain that in order for good to final-cause it
is necessary that it have been cognized, because the vital ap-
petite follows an apprehended form and therefore cannot be
brought to anything other than a cognized object. This is clear
from the philosophers and from *Sent.* p. 1, q. 80 and follow-
ing and from *ST* IaIIæ.8–9. And what I wrote can be seen in
DM 23.7 and *De Orat. mentali* lib. 2, c. 13.⁵ But from here has
arisen an occasion for disputing how cognitive being (*esse cog-
nitum*) is related to the nature of final-causing, whether, namely,
it is only a necessary condition or also a *ratio* of causing, and
consequently whether cognized good final-causes according to
cognitive being or according to real being. This question is dis-
cussed more thoroughly in Medina’s and Cajetan’s [commen-
taries on] *ST* IaIIæ.1.1 and before that in Ia.5.4, and by Ferrara

Cajetan on the
nature of
final-causing is
explained.

⁵This is presumably one of the places where Suárez’s posthumous literary executor deleted material and inserted a reference to his fuller discussions elsewhere.

49 23] 13 V.

54 cognitum causet] causet cognitum M V.

60 rarius 1, cont. Gent., cap. 44, et aliqui theologi in 2, dist. 1, præsertim Gabriel, part. 5, alii vero in 2, dist. 25, præsertim Scotus et Capreolus. Sed quoniam hæc res in disput. 23 Metaphysicæ, sect., 8, a me late traditur, et, ut existimo, nihil difficultatis habet, dicam breviter quæ sentio, et quod ad Quæstiones Theologicas postea tractandas est necessarium.

Cognitio objecti finalizantis non pertinet ad rationem causandi finaliter, sed est sola conditio.

65 3. Advertendum est ergo, interdum appetere voluntatem objectum cognitum solum in ordine ad cognitionem, ut, verbi gratia, quando contemplando rosam non appetit illam habere, sed tantum considerare et cognoscere, et tunc esse cognitum non solum est conditio, sed est ratio, movendi voluntatem, quia non solum est quid prærequisitum ut voluntas moveatur, sed etiam est terminus appetitionis, cujusmodi est quæcumque alia res quæ judicatur esse conveniens, et hoc modo quando homo delectatur tantum in cognitione non vero
75 in re cognita secundum se, esse cognitum est id, a quo actus accipit suam rationem et bonitatem vel <7> malitiam: sicut est quando homo appetit videre Deum, illud esse visum pertinet ad formale objectum, quod est causa finalisandi. Aliquando vero voluntas appetit objectum cognitum ut re ipsa illud habeat et consequatur,
80 ut quando appetit sanitatem, et tunc plane ratio finalisandi est bonitas, quam in re ipsa objectum habet, vel habere apprehendit, quia illud est finis voluntatis, in quod tendit impetus agentis, sed non tendit nisi in esse reale ipsius finis, ut illud habeat et obtineat: ergo. Item,
85 illud habet propriam rationem finis, quo consecuto, quiescit voluntas, et quo deficiente frustratur ab intentione sua, sed non quiescit in sola apprehensione, nisi re ipsa finem consequatur, et nisi hoc obtineat, frustrari dicitur: ergo signum est moveri a fine secundum suum esse
90

60R

65R

70R

75R

80R

85R

90R

in [his commentary on] *SCG* I, c. 44, and by other theologians in *Sent.* II, dist. 1, especially Gabriel in part. 5, but others, especially Scotus and Capreolus, in II, dist. 25. But since I discuss this matter more thoroughly in *DM* 23.8, and, as I think, poses no difficulty, I will say briefly what I think and what is necessary for discussing the theological questions afterwards.

3. It should be noted, then, that sometimes the will desires a cognized object only in relation to cognition, as, for example, when in contemplating a rose it does not desire to possess it but only to consider and cognize it.⁶ In that case to be cognized (*esse cognitum*) is not only a condition but also the reason for moving the will, because not only is the cognition a prerequisite for the will to be moved but it is also the *terminus* of the desire just like any other thing that is judged to be agreeable. And in this way when a human being is delighted in the cognition alone but not in the cognized thing according to itself, to be cognized is that from which the act takes its *ratio* and goodness or badness, just as when a human being desires to see God, that being seen belongs to the formal object that is the cause of final-causing.

But sometimes the will desires the cognized object so that it has and obtains that thing itself, as when it desires health. In that case, the *ratio* of final-causing is clearly the goodness that the object has or is thought to have in reality. For the former is the will's end to which the impetus of the agent tends. But it does not tend except to the real being of the end itself, in order to have and obtain it. Therefore.

Likewise, that has the proper *ratio* of an end by the achievement of which the will is at rest and by the lack of which it is frustrated from its intention. The will, however, is not at rest in the apprehension alone, unless that attains the end in reality, and it is said to be frustrated unless the latter is obtained. This is an indication, then, that the will is moved by the end according

The cognition of the final-causing object does not belong to the *ratio* of final-causing but is only a condition.

It is shown firstly.

It is shown secondly.

⁶Cf. *De Actibus Qui Vocantur Passiones Tum Etiam de Habitibus* 1.5.3.

59 vero] *om.* V.

83 habere] *om.* M V.

89 consequatur] consequantur V.

Existencia realis
non ingreditur
etiam rationem
causandi
finaliter.

95 reale. Non est autem intelligendum requiri ad causalitatem finis quod res illa, quæ est finis a parte rei præexistat, quia cum solum moveat metaphorice per cognitionem, satis est quod animo apprehendatur, et quasi in imagine repræsentetur; sensus ergo est rem illam secundum esse reale, quod objicitur, et in ea apprehenditur, movere voluntatem, et habere causalitatem finis, quia secundum illud esse judicatur conveniens: movet autem, ut diximus, quatenus conveniens judicatur; cognitio igitur hujus convenientiæ et bonitatis, non est propria ratio movendi, quia tunc voluntas non appetit cognoscere, sed dicitur esse cognitio necessaria per modum approximationis, non quidem secundum locum, sed tantum subordinationem potentiarum animæ; et quia sine illa non habet finis illum modum quo indiget ad suam causalitatem. Et hoc modo explicata hæc sententia clarior est, ut patet ex Scoto, Gabriele, Cajetano et Ferrario, locis supra citatis, et nullam habet difficultatem alicujus momenti.

Notatio pro
præcedente
doctrina.

110 4. Ut tamen facile dissolvantur multa argumenta, quæ hic multiplicat Medina; oportet ultimo advertere, quod sicut in causa efficiente approximatō non est ratio agendi, sed conditio, potest tamen ratione illius variari actio, si diversum agens applicetur, ita et in hac apprehensione, seu cognitione intellectus, contingere potest, ut ratione illius varietur actio voluntatis, si in objecte aliud esse, seu aliam rationem apprehendat boni, vel mali: quo sensu dici solet finem specificare actum voluntatis, non ut in re est, sed ut apprehenditur: nam licet eleemosyna, verbi gratia, in re sit bona, si quis illam existimat malam, actio voluntatis non est bona, sed mala. Propter quam rationem videtur dixisse divus Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 31, artic. 3, ad 1, cum objectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, diversitatem apprehensionis pertinere ad diversitatem objecti, atque idem sentit Cajetanus, q. 30, art. 3. Sed hæc non sunt contraria, quia tunc apprehensio boni tantum variat objectum in quantum in illo apprehendit et applicat diversum esse ob-

to its real being.

95R Nor should one understand as required for the causality of the end that the thing that is the end pre-exist in reality, since it is sufficient that it be apprehended by the mind and be represented in an image, as it were. The sense, therefore, is that that thing moves the will and has the causality of an end according to the real being that is presented and is apprehended in it. It moves, moreover, as we said, insofar as it is judged agreeable. For this reason, the cognition of this agreeability and goodness is not properly the *ratio* of moving, because in this case the will does not desire to cognize. But the cognition is said to be necessary in the mode of coming close, not, indeed, according to place, but only according to the subordination of the soul's powers, and because without that the end does not have that mode which it needs for its causality. And this view is clearer when explained in this way, as is clear from Scotus, Gabriel, Cajetan, and Ferrara in the places cited above, and it has no difficulty of any importance.

110R 4. Nevertheless, so that the many arguments which Medina multiplies in this place are easily resolved, it is necessary finally to notice that just as in the case of an efficient cause coming close together is not the *ratio* of acting but a condition for it and yet the action can be varied by reason of it, if a different agent is applied, so also it can happen with this apprehension or cognition by the intellect that by reason of it the action of the will is varied, if some other being or another aspect of good or bad is apprehended in the object. The end is usually said to specify the act of the will in this sense, not as it is in reality but as it is apprehended. For although giving alms, for example, is good in reality, if someone thinks it bad, the action of the will is not good but bad. For this reason St. Thomas seems to have said in *ST IaIIæ.31.3 ad 1* that when the object of the will is apprehended as good, difference of apprehension belongs to difference of the object. And Cajetan thinks the same in q. 30, art. 3. But these are not contraries, because apprehension of the good now varies the object only insofar as different being of the object is apprehended and applied in it and consequently different goodness

Real existence
is not even a
constituent of
the *ratio* of
final-causing.

A note
concerning the
preceding
doctrine.

130 jecti, atque adeo distinctam bonitatem, vel convenien-
 tiam, quæ, ut dixi, est ratio movendi voluntatem. Quo-
 circa quando dicitur objectum movere *ut apprehen-* 130R
sum, cavenda est æquivocatio in illa particula redupli-
 cante: nam si reduplicet solam denominationem prove-
 nientem ab apprehensione ita ut ipsa apprehensio sit
 135 forma, per quam finis movet, falsum est, ut dixi, si autem
 reduplicet ipsum esse objectivum, quod apprehendit, 135R
 sic vera est locutio, atque eodem modo diversitas cogni-
 tionis, quæ se tenet tantum ex parte potentiæ, aut cog-
 nitionis, seu in propriis qualitatibus ipsius actus intelli-
 140 gendi, ut sunt, verbi gratia, quod sit clara, vel obscura, et
 similis, hæc, inquam, diversitas non variat rationem fi-
 nis, et consequenter nec motionem voluntatis: at vero
 diversitas cognitionis, quæ redundat in objecto, scilicet
 quia aliud est quod cognoscitur, vel alia proprietas in eo
 145 apprehenditur, hæc variat finem et motionem, quia pro-
 ponit, et appropinquat subjectum secundum aliud esse 145R
 objectivum: unde quasi diversificat illud, et sic reddit di-
 versam cognitionem non ex parte esse cogniti absoluti,
 sed ex parte objecti quod cognoscitur. Et hæc de causal-
 150 itate, effectu et principio, seu forma, quæ est principium
 finis.

or agreeability, which, as I said, is the *ratio* of moving the will.

Wherefore, when it is said that the object moves 'as ap-
 prehended', one should avoid equivocation in that reduplicating
 phrase. For if it only reduplicates the denomination arising from
 the apprehension such that the apprehension itself is the form
 through which the end moves, the statement is false, as I said.
 But if the objective being itself (which is apprehended) is redup-
 135Rlicated, the expression is true. In the same way the diversity
 of cognition, which holds only on the part of the power, either
 in cognition or in the proper qualities of the act of understand-
 ing itself (some examples are that it is clear, or obscure, and so
 on), this diversity, I say, does not vary the *ratio* of the end and
 consequently neither the motion of the will.

But, on the other hand, the diversity of cognition which re-
 dounds to the object (namely, because something else is cog-
 nized or other properties are apprehended in it) varies the end
 and the motion, because it proposes and approaches the sub-
 145Rject according to other objective being. Hence it diversifies it,
 as it were, and so delivers different cognition not on the part
 of cognitive being absolutely, but on the part of the object that
 is cognized. And that [suffices] concerning the causality, effect,
 and principle or form, which is the principle of an end.