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<149, col. b>²

DE APPETITU BEATITUDINIS.

Divus Thomas, 1, 2, in quæstione de consecutione beatitudinis hanc partem addidit de appetitu, imo videri potest, debuisse hoc dubium ante alios articulos præmittere, quando tendentia in beatitudinem a naturali appetitu incipit, et ideo forte Soto dist. 49, quæst. 2, articul. 1, hunc ordinem mutavit; tamen non immerito D. Thomas hanc disputationem in postremum locum suæ quæstionis reservavit, quia objectum appetibile prius cognosci debet, quam appetitus, et ideo cognita ratione beatitudinis, facilius explicabitur appetitus ejus. Supponenda ergo est vulgaris distinctio appetitus innati et eliciti, quorum prior solum consistit in pondere naturæ, et ideo communis est cum aliis viventibus et inanimatis, et in quibus inest, perpetuo inest; posterior vero consistit in actu vitali proveniente ex cognitione: unde est proprium viventium vita animali vel rationali, et solum adest quando vivens actu operatur et cognoscit: de utroque est dicendum tam respectu beatitudinis supernaturalis quam naturalis, vel in communi, vel in particulari.

SECTIO I.

20 *Utrum homo appetitu innato appetat naturalem beatitudinem in particulari, et in communi?*

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³Q. 5, art. 8.

5 Soto] Scotus V.

CONCERNING THE DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS.

5R St. Thomas, in the question concerning the attainment of happiness in the *Prima Secundæ*, adds this part concerning desire.³ Of course, it could seem that one ought to discuss this doubt before the other articles, since a tendency to happiness starts from a natural desire. And perhaps for this reason Soto changes the order in dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1. Nevertheless, it is not without merit that St. Thomas reserves this disputation for the last spot in the question, because the desirable object must first be cognized, then desired. And therefore by the *ratio* of happiness having been cognized, the desire for it will be explained more easily. The common distinction between innate and elicited desire should, therefore, be assumed. The former of these only consists in the weight of nature and is therefore [had in] common with other living and inanimate things. And in which it belongs, it forever belongs. But the latter consists in a vital act coming forth from cognition. Hence, it is proper to things living by an animal or rational life and is present only when a living thing actually acts and cognizes. Concerning either it should be said as much in respect to supernatural happiness as to natural, either in general or in particular.

20R SECTION I.

Whether a human being desires with an innate desire natural happiness in particular and in general

1. Assertio
affirmat. de
beatitudine in
particulari.
Probatum primo.

25 1. Primo de beatitudine naturali in particulari res est sine con-
troversia, hominem illam appetere appetitu innato: sic omnes,
in 4, dist. 49, Scotus, quæst. 6, Durandus, quæst. 8, Paludanus,
quæst. 7, Major, quæstion. 6. Rationes sunt claræ: primo, quia
in homine est capacitas naturalis ad hanc beatitudinem tam pas-
siva, quam etiam facultas activa: omnis autem potentia natu-
raliter inclinatur ad actum sibi connaturalem, præsertim ad
perfectissimum: omne enim perfectibile appetit suam perfec-
tionem: beatitudo autem, ut sæpe dictum est, est maxima perfec-
tio, et si naturalis sit, est etiam proportionata. Tandem appeti-
tus sciendi maxime naturalis est, beatitudo autem est perfec-
tissima quædam pars hujus scientiæ. Et idem fieri potest de
amore: atque hinc se- <150> quitur, cum dictum sit, hanc beati-
tudinem consistere in cognitione et amore Dei, hunc appetitum
naturaliter tendere in Deum, ut in finem ultimum, proprium et
particularem, et in cognitionem et amorem ejus, tanquam in il-
lius consecutionem. Quod late probat divus Thomas, 3, contra
Gentes, capite 25 et sequentibus. Et de hoc ad minimum intelligi-
tur illud Augustini: *Fecisti nos Domine ad te, et inquietum est cor
nostrum donec perveniamus ad te*, 1, Confess., cap. 1. Rationes
sunt eadem quæ supra factæ.

In qua potentia
insit innatus
appetitus ad
beatitud.
1. Opinio.

45 2. Solent vero inquirere scholastici, in qua facultate hominis
sit hic appetitus. Paludanus, quem sequitur Soto, existimat esse
in voluntate, quia est appetitus totius suppositi, videntur tamen
in suo discursu æquivocationem committere, et ab appetitu in-
nato transferre sermonem ad elicitedum. Durandus collocat in in-
tellectu, in quo etiam existimat esse naturalem appetitum sci-
endi, quia hic appetitus non distinguitur a capacitate naturali,
quam unaquæque potentia habet ad actum suum. Alii distinc-
tione utuntur, dicentes, hunc appetitum esse in utraque poten-
tia, tamen proprie esse in voluntate, sicut etiam esse potest in ap-
petitu sensitivo in ordine ad objecta proportionata, quia istæ po-
tentiæ tendunt in bonum sub ratione boni; in intellectu vero, et
in aliis facultatibus esse improprie, quia non tendunt in bonum
sub ratione boni, sed sub ratione veri, vel aliis particularibus ra-
tionibus. Ita Fonseca, 1, Metaphysicæ, quæst. 1, sect. 3.

Decisio autoris;
et assertio 1.

55 3. Mihi videtur fere distinctio, et quæstio de modo lo-
quendi. Supponendo ergo formaliter beatitudinem includere ac-

25R 1. First, it is uncontroversial concerning natural happiness in a partic-
ular thing that a human being desires it with an innate desire. Thus
everyone [says] in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49: Scotus in q. 6, Durandus in
q. 8, Paludanus in q. 7, and Mair in q. 6. The reasons are clear. First,
because there is a natural capacity in a human for this happiness as a
passive and also as an active faculty. Moreover, all powers naturally
are inclined to the acts co-natural with them, especially to the most
perfect. For everything perfectible desires its perfection. Happiness,
30R moreover, as was often said, is maximal perfection. And if it is natural,
it is also proportionate.

35R Finally, the appetite for knowing (*sciendi*) is most natural. Hap-
piness, moreover, is a certain most perfect part of this knowledge (*sci-
entia*). And the same can happen concerning love. And from this it
follows, as was said, that this happiness consists in the cognition and
love of God. This appetite naturally tends to God as to an ultimate
end, proper and particular, and in the cognition and love of God, just
as in the attainment of him. Which St. Thomas shows more broadly
in *SCG* 3, cap. 25 and following. And concerning this at least is under-
stood the statement of Augustine: ‘You made us, Lord, for yourself,
and our heart is restless until it reaches you’ (*Confess.* I, c. 1). The
reasons are the same as the ones given above.

45R 2. But scholastics are accustomed to inquiring in what faculty of
a human this desire is. Paludanus, whom Soto follows, thinks it is in
the will, because it is the appetite of the supposed whole. Yet they
seem to commit an equivocation in their discussion and to switch the
discussion from innate desire to elicited desire. Durandus places it in
the intellect, in which he also thinks the natural desire for knowledge
(*sciendi*) is, because this desire is not distinguished from a natural ca-
pacity, which each power has for its act. Others make use of another
distinction, saying, this appetite is in either power, yet it is properly
in the will, just as it can also be in the sensitive appetite in relation to
a proportionate object, because those powers tend to good under the
aspect of good. But in the intellect and in other faculties it is improper-
ly, because they do not tend to good under the aspect of good, but
under the aspect of true or other particular aspects. Thus Fonseca in
Metaph. I, q. 1, sect. 3.

60R 3. To me the distinction and question almost seem to be merely a
manner of speaking. Therefore, by supposing that happiness formally

The 1st assertion
affirmative
concerning
happiness in
particular.
It is proven,
firstly.

Secondly.

In what power
the innate desire
for happiness
belongs.
The 1st opinion.

The 2nd opinion.

The decision of
the author and
the 1st assertion.

60 tum intellectus et voluntatis, est non dubium, quin ex ea parte,
 qua includit amorem, appetitus ejus omnino sit in voluntate, ut
 recte Scotus, non solum quia voluntas est appetitus universalis,
 sed quia est proprium perfectibile per illum actum: at vero qua
 parte consistit in actu intellectus proximus appetitus ejus natu- 65R
 65 ralis est in intellectu, ut recte probat fundamentum Durandi: si-
 cut etiam appetitus formæ est immediate in materia prima, et in
 universum omnis potentia inclinatur in suum actum; et quamvis
 forte tota hæc appellatio appetitus metaphorica sit in eo modo,
 quo est, non est cur dicatur improprius, quia licet intellectus in- 70R
 70 clinetur ad operandum circa suum objectum sub ratione veri,
 tamen, ut habet appetitum innatum, inclinatur in suum actum
 sub ratio- <col. b> ne boni, et perfectionis sibi convenientis:
 at vero quodammodo mediate etiam voluntas pondere naturæ
 inclinatur in actum intellectus, quia inclinatur ad appetendum 75R
 75 per actum elicited omnem hominis perfectionem, quarum una
 ex præcipuis est hæc cognitio intellectus: inclinatur ergo volun-
 tas in actum intellectus, non ut actum suum, sed ut objectum.
 Addi potest, si verum est, hos actus etiam manere immediate ab
 ipsa substantia animæ, hunc appetitum innatum etiam in ipsa 80R
 80 substantia inesse tanquam in radicali, et principali principio illo-
 rum, ex illo generali principio, quod omnis vis activa naturaliter
 est propensa ad actum suum.

4. Jam de beatitudine in communi est nonnulla diversitas
 inter auctores. Scotus, loco citato, et quæst. 1 Prologi negat
 85 habere hominem appetitum innatum ad beatitudinem in com-
 muni: quia natura, inquit, ad determinatam et particularem per-
 fectionem tendit: unde tendere in universalem, proprium vide-
 tur actus eliciti. Quod fundamentum adeo universale non vide-
 tur verum, quia etiam appetitus naturalis potest esse ad objec-
 tum commune, sicut est appetitus materiæ ad formam: imo 90R
 90 hoc ipso quod potentia potest per actum elicited appetere ob-
 jectum commune, videtur necessario supponi appetitus innatus
 ad bonum illud: posset tamen in particulari urgeri argumento
 Scoti, quia appetitus innatus solum est ad veram beatitudinem,
 non ad falsam, hæc autem beatitudo tantum est una in particu- 95R
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includes an act of intellect and will, there is no doubt but that by that
 part by which it includes love its desire is entirely in the will, as Scotus
 rightly [says], not only because the will is the universal appetite, but
 because it is properly perfectible through that act. But on the other
 hand by that part which consists in an act of intellect its proximate de- 65R
 sire is naturally in the intellect, as the foundation of Durandus rightly
 shows. Just as also the appetite for form is immediately in first matter
 and in general every power is inclined to its act. And although per-
 haps this complete appellation of desire is metaphorical in that way,
 by which it is why it is not called improper, because although the in- 70R
 tellect is inclined to act on account of its object under the aspect of
 true, yet, so that it has an innate desire, it is inclined to its act under
 the aspect of good and the perfection agreeable to it. But in a certain
 way the will also mediately by a weight of nature is inclined to the act
 of intellect, because it is inclined to desiring through an elicited act 75R
 every human perfection, among which one in particular is this cog-
 nition of the intellect. Therefore the will is inclined to an act of the
 intellect not as its act but as object. It can be added, if it is true, that
 these acts also remain immediately by the substance itself of the soul,
 this innate desire also belongs in the substance itself as in a radical and 80R
 80 primary principle of them, by that general principle that all active
 strength naturally is disposed to its act.

4. Now concerning happiness in general there is some diversity
 among the authors. Scotus, in the cited passage and in q. 1 of the
 prologue, denies that humans have an innate desire for happiness in
 general. Because nature, he says, tends to determinate and particular
 perfection. Hence, to tend to universal [perfection] seems proper to
 an elicited act. This foundation thus far does not seem universally
 true, because a natural desire can also be to an object in general, just
 as is the appetite of matter to form. Indeed, the very fact that a power
 can through an elicited act desire a general object seems necessarily to
 assume an innate desire for that good. Yet it can in particular be urged
 by the argument of Scotus, because an innate desire is only for true
 happiness, not for false. But this happiness is only one thing in particu- 90R
 90 lar, namely God and the attainment of him. Therefore, this desire is
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De appetitu ad
 beatitudinem in
 communi
 autorum
 controversia.

The controversy
 among authors
 concerning a
 desire for
 happiness in
 general

84 Prologi] Trologi V.

lari, scilicet Deus et consecutio ejus: ergo hic appetitus non est in beatitudinem in communi, quia solum videtur esse communis prout abstrahit a vera et falsa beatitudine.

Assertio 2.

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Suadetur primo.

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Secundo.

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Tertio.

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5. Nihilominus dicendum est secundo cum communi sententia, esse in homine naturalem appetitum ab beatitudinem etiam in communi. Sic reliqui theologii citati: videri potest Cajetanus, 1 p., quæst. 82, art. 1; explicatur primo, quia actus ille elicited, quo potest homo amare beatitudinem in communi, est valde connaturalis et proportionatus naturæ: ergo est in homine appetitus innatus ad amorem illum: ergo et ad beatitudinem in communi, saltem ut est objectum ejus, quia etiam ipsum objectum totum est proportionatum naturæ. Secundo, quia licet beatitudo rigorose sumpta pro essentia beatitudinis dicat determinatos actus, tamen absolute pro statu, includit collectionem omnium <151> bonorum: unde hoc modo beatitudo in communi nihil aliud est, quam perfectio, seu congregatio bonorum omnium: sed homo naturaliter appetit hoc appetitu innato, abundare omnibus bonis sibi convenientibus: ergo hoc etiam modo appetit naturaliter beatitudinem in communi. Tertio, quamvis naturalis beatitudo objectiva sit tantum una numero in particulari, tamen beatitudo formalis in variis actibus reperiri potest: ergo ex hoc capite appetitus hic non limitatur ad unum actum, sed tendit in ipsam rationem beatitudinis, quæ communis est omnibus illis: ergo ex hoc etiam capite tendit in beatitudinem in communi, licet appetitus naturæ tendat in rem determinatam, tamen in illa includitur ratio communis, et ratione illius potissime appetitur. Et hac etiam ratione recte dicitur appetitus innatus tendere in communem rationem vel beatitudinis, vel alterius boni: nam revera naturalem appetitum inclinari ad commune bonum nihil aliud est, quam inclinari veluti sub disjunctione ad hunc, vel illum actum, in quo invenitur illa communis perfectio, nam hac ratione ille appetitus est quasi indifferens ad multa, et erit contentus quolibet illorum dummodo in se contineat rationem illam communem. Atque sic patet responsio ad fundamentum Scoti, in numero quarto.

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not for happiness in general, because it only seems to be general as it is abstracted from true and false happiness.

5. Nevertheless, it should be said, second, with the common view, that there is in a human being a natural desire also for happiness in general. Thus the rest of the cited theologians [say] and, it can seem, Cajetan, p. 1, q. 82, art. 1. It is explained, firstly, because that elicited act, by which a human being can love happiness in general is very connatural and proportionate to nature. Therefore, there is in a human being an innate desire for that love. Therefore, also for happiness in general, at least as an object of it, because that whole object is also proportionate to nature.

Secondly, because although happiness rigorously taken through the essence of happiness expresses a determinate act, yet in that state is absolutely included the collection of all goods. Hence, in this way happiness in general is nothing other than perfection or the congregation of all goods. But a human being naturally desires this with an innate desire, [namely] that all goods agreeable to him abound. Therefore, in this way also he naturally desires happiness in general.

Thirdly, although objective natural happiness is only one in number in particular things, nevertheless, formal happiness can be found in various actions. Therefore, from this source, this desire is not limited to one action, but tends to the aspect itself of happiness, which is common to many actions. Therefore, from this source also it tends to happiness in general, although a desire of nature tends to a determinate things, yet in that is included a common nature and by that nature of it is especially desired. And by this reason it is also rightly said that an innate desire tends to a common nature, either of happiness or some other good. For in fact for a natural desire to be inclined to common good is nothing other than for it to be inclined just as under a disjunction to this or that act, in which is found that common perfection. For by this reason, that desire is as if indifferent to many and it will be content by whatever of those provided it contains in itself that common nature. And thus the response to the foundation of Scotus given in n. 4 is clear.

Second assertion.

It is proven, firstly.

Secondly.

Thirdly.