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DE HIS QUÆ AD NATURALEM BEATITUDINEM PERTINENT.

De hac re aliqua supra dicta sunt, quæ hic sunt supponenda, tradentes enim nonnullas <col. b> divisiones beatitudinis, disp. 4, sect. 3, ostendimus, necessarium esse dari aliquam beatitudinem hominis naturalem. Deinde, tractando de objecto beatitudinis, disp. 5, sect. 2, ostendi solum Deum esse objectum beatitudinis etiam naturalis, quoniam ipse solus est finis ultimus hominis quacumque ratione consideretur. Rursus, disputando de essentia formalis beatitudinis, disp. 6, sect. 2, conclusimus commune esse beatitudini naturali, ut in operatione consistat, et consequenter illam debere esse operationem mentis, seu partis intellectivæ, secundum quam est homo capax Dei. Reliquum ergo est ut aliqua addamus, quæ de hac beatitudine desiderari possunt: quæ fere ad similitudinem eorum, quæ de supernaturali beatitudine dicta sunt, erunt explicanda.

SECTIO I.

In quo consistat proprie hæc beatitudo naturalis.

1. Sententia Philosophi.

1. Omissis aliorum philosophorum sententiis, de quibus supra dictum est, sententia Aristotelis, ut etiam attigimus, in disp. 30, Metaphysicæ, sect. 11, a num. 36, in hoc negotio est, propriam et perpetuam beatitudinem hominis consistere in contemplatione substantiarum separatarum, quod præsertim intelligendum est, ratione divinæ substantiæ, vel naturæ, cætera vero omnia requiri ut dispositiones quasdam ad hanc contemplationem.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

ON THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO NATURAL HAPPINESS.

Some things were said above concerning this matter which need to be assumed here, for when discussing some divisions of happiness in disp. 4, sect. 3, we showed that it is necessary to grant some natural happiness for a human being. Next, in discussing the object of happiness in disp. 5, sect. 2, I showed that only God is the object even of natural happiness, because he alone is the ultimate end for a human being under any aspect that might be considered. On the other hand, in disputing about the formal essence of happiness in disp. 6, sect. 2, we concluded that what is common to natural happiness is that it consists in action and that consequently it must be the action of the mind or of the intellective part in virtue of which a human being has the capacity for God. It remains, therefore, to add something about those things which can be desired concerning this happiness. Which ones are generally similar to those which were attributed to supernatural happiness will be explained.

SECTION I.

In what this natural happiness properly consists.

1. Omitting the views of other philosophers (which were discussed above), the question regarding the view of Aristotle (as we also touched on in *DM* XXX.11 from n. 36) lies in this: [whether] the proper and everlasting happiness of a human being consists in the contemplation of separate substances. This should be understood especially in the aspect of divine substances or natures; all the other [substances or natures], indeed, are required as certain dispositions towards this contemplation.

1. The view of the Philosopher.

25	Sic toto libr. 1, <i>Ethic.</i> , et libr. 10, cap. 8 et 9, et ideo 7, <i>Polit.</i> , cap. 3, hanc contemplationem præfert omni humanæ actioni, etiam gubernationi Reipublicæ, et ideo 5, <i>Metaphysicæ</i> , cap. 2, sapientiam laudat, et præfert omnibus, et libr. 12, cap. 7, dicit, Deum contemplatione sui esse beatum, nos vero quando illi,	25R	Thus in all of book I of <i>EN</i> and book X, cap. 8 and 9. And for that reason in <i>Pol.</i> VII, cap. 3, he places this contemplation before every human action, even before the governing of the republic. And for that reason in <i>Metaph.</i> V, cap. 2, he praises wisdom and places it before everything else and in XII, cap. 7, he says that God is happy in contemplation of himself		
30	ut possumus, similes efficitur. Hanc sententiam secutus est D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 5, et quæst. 4, art. 3, et 1 part., quæst. 62, art. 1 et 64, art. 1, ad 1, idem 3, cont. <i>Gent.</i> , cap. 44, et in 3, dist. 29, quæst. 2, et exponendo Aristotelem. Cujus rationes sunt primo, quia contemplatio est de se diuturnior, magisque perpetua, est enim immaterialior, et carens contrario.	30R	but we [are happy] when we make ourselves similar to him insofar as we can. St. Thomas follows this view in [<i>ST</i>] IaIIæ.3.5 and 4.3; [<i>ST</i>] Ia.62.1 and 64.1 ad 1; <i>SCG</i> III, cap. 44; <i>Sent.</i> III, dist. 29, q. 2; and in explaining Aristotle. The reasons for this are, first, because contemplation is of itself longer-lasting and more everlasting, for it is more immaterial and lacks a contrary. Secondly, because it is <i>per se</i> more sufficient than the other things, because it is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of another and because it needs very little assistance. Thirdly, because it is an especially performable action, because it is especially in harmony with a nature according to its highest grade. Whence there is a fourth reason:	The first reason for it.	
Eius ratio 1.				The second.	
35	Secunda, quia est per se sufficiens magis quam cætera, quia propter se quæritur, et non propter aliud, et quia paucissimis adiumentis eget. Tertio, quia est operatio maxime operabilis, quia est maxime consentanea naturæ secundum gradum supremum ejus.	35R	because it is the most perfect action and especially proper to a human being, in which he especially differs from brute animals and agrees with God and immaterial substances. Finally, because a human being becomes especially intimate to God through this action.	The third.	
Tertia.				The fourth.	
40	Quarta, unde est quarta ratio, quia est perfectissima operatio, et maxime propria ho- <145> minis, in qua maxime differt a brutis, et cum Deo, et substantiis immaterialibus convenit. Denique, quia per hanc actionem fit homo maxime familiaris Deo.	40R		The fifth.	
Quinta.					
2. Sententia aliorum.	45	2. Secunda sententia ait, consistere hanc beatitudinem in amore Dei naturali super omnia. Tenet Cano, lib. 9, de <i>Locis</i> , cap. 9, ubi reprehendit Aristotelem, quod omnino fuerit oblitus hujus actus, et Scotus 4, dist. 49, quæst. 3, art. 2, qui tamen existimat Aristotelem sub contemplatione amorem comprehendisse, quia rationes ejus non magis procedunt de actu intellectus, quam voluntatis, ipse quoque existimat voluntatem esse perfectiorem	45R	2. The second view says that this happiness consists in a natural love for God beyond all other things. Cano holds [this view] in <i>De Locis Theologis</i> IX, cap. 9, where he blames Aristotles for being entirely oblivious of this act. Scotus also [holds this view] in IV, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 2, although he thinks that Aristotle included love under contemplation, because his arguments advance no more with respect to an act of intellect than with respect to an act of will. He likewise thinks that the will is the more perfect power. He grants that any natural cognition of God can be in a sinner. Hence, it seems to be only love that perfectly unites a human being with his ultimate natural end.	The view of the others.
Eius fundamentum.	50	potentiam: accedit, quod quælibet cognitio naturalis Dei potest esse in peccatore, unde solus amor esse videtur, qui conjungit hominem perfecte cum suo fine ultimo naturali.	50R	The view's foundation.	
Resolutio autoris bimembris.	55	3. Hæc quæstio, suppositis supra dictis, disp. 6 et 7, de beatitudine supernaturali, facile expediri potest. Dicendum est consequenter, hanc beatitudinem consistere in perfectissima naturali conjunctione cum Deo per intellectum et voluntatem, quantum ex creaturis naturali lumine intellectus cognosci potest. Quod est verum sive loquamur de homine ex anima, et corpore composite, sive de anima separata; et hoc sequuntur auc-	55R	The author's two-part solution.	
	60		60R		

37–38 paucissimis adiumentis eget. Tertio, quia] *om.* V.

65 tores supra citati in simili; neque ab illa discrepat Scotus et Soto, dist. 49, quæst. 5, art. 4, conclus. 5, Medina 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 7, qui sic etiam Aristotelem intelligunt, nam inter alia dixit, illam contemplationem facere sapientem, vel amicum, et carum Deo, 1 Ethic., cap. 7, et 7 Polit., cap. 1, et alibi requirit virtutem animi ad beatitudinem.

Prius membrum suadetur.

70 4. Rationes sunt claræ, nam imprimis quod divina cognitio sit necessaria, satis probatur rationibus Aristotelis: item, quia est quædam assecutio supremi boni hominis: item, quia satiat perfectissimum quemdam appetitum, et capacitatem hominis: denique, quia per hunc actum intelligit homo suum ultimum finem, estque non solum propter aliud, sed propter se expetibilis. Advertendum est, valde errare eos, qui dicunt, hanc beatitudinem ex parte intellectus consistere in clara visione Dei, ut est prima causa naturalis, quod interdum videntur insinuare qui ponunt naturalem appetitum ad videndum Deum; est enim hoc omnino falsum, quia illa visio, utcumque consideretur, est supernaturalis, et non debita naturæ, et posset homo creari absque ordinatione ad illam consequendam, ut supra, disp. 4, sect. 3, a num. 3, ostensum est, neque quidquam re- <col. b>

Excluditur quorundam placitum circa idem membrum.

75 fert distinctio de visione Dei, ut prima causa, vel sub alia ratione, quia omnis visio Dei est ejusdem rationis, et per eam videtur Deus ut in se est, tam ut trinus, quam ut unus, et tam ut auctor gratiæ quam naturæ.

Posterius membrum unde suadetur.

85 5. Altera vero pars de amore mihi videtur certissima propter rationes factas, num. 2, in quo est maxime notanda differentia inter supernaturalem et naturalem beatitudinem, quod in supernaturali visio intellectus necessario secum affert amorem, et ideo non potest ulla ratione sola cognitio dici essentialis beatitudo integra; quis enim dicat dæmonem esse essentialiter beatum naturali beatitudine, quia habet perfectam cognitionem naturalem Dei, cum non habeat amorem? Item potest sic explicari, quia homo et est ens physicum et morale: ergo nisi utraque ratione sit consummatus, et ultimate perfectus, non potest dici beatus: quamvis autem per cognitionem in esse physico valde perficiatur, tamen in esse morali tota ejus perfectio pendet ex amore: ergo maxime pertinet ad beatitudinem essentialem naturalem ejus.

65R disagree with this. Nor Soto, dist. 49, q. 5, art. 4, concl. 5, and Medina, IaIIæ.3.7, who also understand Aristotle in this way, for among other things he says that this contemplation brings about wisdom or makes one a friend of or beloved to God (*EN* I, cap. 7, and *Pol.* VII, cap. 1) and elsewhere he requires virtue of the soul for happiness.

70R 4. The reasons are clear, for, in the first place, the fact that divine cognition is necessary is satisfactorily proven by the arguments of Aristotle. First, because it is a certain comprehension of the highest good for a human being. Also, because it satisfies a certain most perfect human desire and capacity. Finally, because a human being understands his ultimate end through this act and it is worth seeking not only for the sake of something else but for its own sake. It should be noted that they greatly err who say that this happiness on the part of the intellect consists in clear vision of God as he is the first natural cause. Those who posit a natural desire for seeing God sometimes seem to suggest this. But this is entirely false, because that vision—in whatever way it is considered—is supernatural and not owed to nature. And a human being could be created without an ordering to the pursuit of that, as was shown above in disp. 4, sec. 3, from n. 3. Nor can a distinction concerning the vision of God as first cause or under some other concept refer to anything, because every vision of God is of the same nature and God is seen through it as he is in himself, as three just as much as one and as author of grace as much as author of nature.

85R 5. But the other part concerning love seems most certain to me on account of the reasons given in n. 2, with regard to which the difference between supernatural and natural happiness should especially be noted. In the supernatural [case] vision of the intellect necessarily brings love along with itself and for that reason cognition alone cannot for any reason be called complete, essential happiness. For who says that a demon is essentially happy by natural happiness because he has a perfect natural cognition of God when he does not have love? Also, it can be explained in this way, because a human being is also a physical and moral being. Therefore, unless he is consummate and ultimately perfect in each aspect, he cannot be called happy. Moreover, although he is greatly perfected in physical being through cognition, nevertheless his whole perfection with respect to moral being depends on love. Therefore, it very much belongs to his essential natural happiness.

The first member is recommended.

What is pleasing to some concerning the same member is excluded.

Hence the latter member is recommended.

In beatitudine
naturali
simpliciter
præfertur amor.

100 6. Quæres, quis horum præcipue requiratur in hac beati-
tudine. Omissis opinionibus, supra disput. 7, sect. 1, tractatis, 100R
mihi videtur utendum distinctione paulo ante insinuata: nam
si consideretur homo in genere naturæ, et entis physici, præ-
cipua pars est cognitio, quia, ut suppono, est perfectus actus,
et supremus perfectissimæ potentiæ, atque adeo perfectissimus
105 in genere entis, quod est præcipue verum de anima separata, et
idem est probabile de toto homine, quia cum cognitio Dei, in
utroque statu sit abstractiva, et per effectus; forte non est essen-
tialiter diversa, et quia in ordine naturalis beatitudinis homo in
110 hac vita, non tantum considerandus est ut viator, sed ut exis-
tens in eo statu, in quo naturaliter beatificandus est, quia extra
hunc statum non potest naturaliter beatificari totus homo, sed
anima tantum, ut statim dicam, sect. seq., at vero considerando
hominem ut morale agens, præcipua pars beatitudinis ejus est
115 amor, quia solus ille est efficax principium honestatis, et rec-
titudinis in humanis operationibus, quod non habet specula-
tio naturalis. Unde si altera ex his operationibus eligenda es-
set, præferendus esset amor, quia revera est magis necessarius
ad bonitatem et honestatem simpliciter, et non est infallibiliter
120 conjunctus cum illa cognitione, unde etiam fit, ut magis per-
tineat ad amorem Dei propter se. <146>

Vera cognitio,
speculativane, an
practica
præferatur ad
beatitudinem
naturalem.

125 7. Hinc facile constat quænam cognitio naturalis maxime
ad beatitudinem pertineat, speculativa, an practica. Aristoteles
enim et D. Thomas, speculativam maxime requirunt; quod pro-
cedit considerato homine in esse naturæ; tamen in ordine ad
125R mores maxime necessaria est cognitio practica, etsi non sit ex-
cludenda speculativa, in qua practica fundatur, imo ipsa practica
cognitio quamvis necessaria sit, non tamen proprie propter se,
et ut pars beatitudinis, sed ut conditio ad amorem requisita.

130 8. Ultimo facile constat, quomodo aliæ animi virtutes, vel
earum operationes ad hanc beatitudinem requirantur. Aristote-
les ait, secundario requiri, quia vere in eis non consistat essen-
tia naturalis beatitudinis, sunt tamen vel dispositiones ad eam
prærequisitæ, vel proprietates illam comitantes. Atque idem ju-
135R dicit esse potest de aliis scientiis intellectus: idemque pro-

6. You may ask which of there is particularly required in this happi-
ness. Omitting the opinions discussed above in disp. 7, sect. 1, it seems
to me that [we] should use the distinction suggested a little earlier. For
if a human being is considered in the genus of nature and of a phys-
ical being, the principal part is cognition, because it is, as I suppose, the
supreme and perfect act of the most perfect power and for that reason
the most perfect in the genus of being. This is clearly true of the sepa-
rated soul and the same is probably [true] of the whole human being,
[i] because since cognition of God is abstractive and by means of effects
in each state, it is perhaps not essentially different [between the states]
and [ii] because in relation to natural happiness a human being in this
life should not only be considered as a traveler but also as existing in that
state in which he should naturally be made happy, since beyond this state
the whole human being cannot naturally be made happy but only his
soul as I will show at once in the following section. On the other hand,
however, considering a human being as a moral agent, the principal part
of his happiness is love, because love alone is the effective principle of
honestas and rectitude in human actions, which natural speculation does
not have. Hence, if one of these actions must be elected, love should
be placed first, because, strictly speaking, it really is more necessary for
goodness and *honestas*. And it is not infallibly conjoined with that cogni-
tion, as a result of which it also happens that it belongs more to the love
of God for his own sake. 120R

7. From here it is easily clear which natural cognition—specula-
tive or practical—especially belongs to happiness. For Aristotle and
St. Thomas require especially speculative [cognition], which results
from having considered humans as beings of nature. Nevertheless, in
the moral order practical cognition is especially necessary, even if spec-
ulative [cognition]—in which practical [cognition] is grounded—should
not be excluded. Indeed, although practical cognition itself is necessary,
it is not nevertheless properly for its own sake and as a part of happiness,
but as a condition for the requisite love.

8. Lastly, it should be readily clear in what way the other virtues
of the soul and their actions are required for this happiness. Aristotle
says that they are required secondarily, because the essence of natural
happiness does not really consist of them. Nevertheless, they are either
prerequisite dispositions for it or properties concomitant to it. And the
same judgement can be made concerning other sciences of the intellect.

Strictly speaking,
love is placed first
in natural
happiness.

Whether
speculative or
practical true
cognition is
placed first for
natural
happiness.

135 portionaliter dicendum de aliis corporis bonis, et fortunæ, quæ
 requiri possunt ut instrumenta, vel media necessaria ad beati-
 tudinem, non vero proprie ut pars beatitudinis, ut dicam, sec-
 tionem sequenti, ubi solvemus difficultates omnes, quæ in doct-
 rina data possunt occurrere.

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SECTIO II.

Quomodo possit homo acquirere beatitudinem naturalem.

Suppositio ad
 quæstionis
 decisionem.

1. Ut intelligatur difficultas hujus quæstionis, quomodo
 possit homo consequi beatitudinem naturalem, constituamus
 5 hominem in ordine ad finem ultimum suum conditum in puris
 naturalibus, id est, neque ordinatum ad altiorem finem, quam
 sit naturæ debitus, neque in se habentem alias facultates, vel
 virtutes præter eas, quæ naturam consequuntur, vel per natu-
 rales actus comparari possunt, neque ex parte Dei recipientem
 10 alia beneficia, neque aliud providentiæ genus, quam sit ordini
 naturæ consentaneum, nam ad intelligendam propriam nostræ
 naturæ conditionem, oportet præscindere omnia quæ supra natu-
 ram sunt, quod non solum per intellectum fieri potuit, sed re
 ipsa potuit fieri a Deo, quod mihi fere tam certum est, quam
 15 est certum omnia hæc supernaturalia bona esse mere gratuita, et
 nullo modo nostræ naturæ debita.

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15R

Arguitur negative
 imprimis ex parte
 intellectus quoad
 statum præsentis
 vitæ.

2. Quo posito principio, multiplex oritur difficultas in
 præsentis quæstione, quæ sic explicatur, nam si homo potest
 consequi beatitudinem naturalem, vel hoc est in statu præsen-
 20 tis vitæ, vel in statu animæ separata, vel in aliquo statu, in quo
 post primam separationem iterum anima esset corpori unienda:
 in nullo horum statuum: ergo nullo modo. De statu præsen-
 tis vitæ probatur variis modis, primo ex parte intellectus, quia
 in hac vita vix potest cognitio Dei acquiri, et quamvis ab uno,
 25 vel altero possit, non tamen communiter ab hominum mul-
 titudine: beatitudo autem esse debet bonum commune, nam
 aliæ res naturales ut plurimum consequi possunt suum finem
 in pluribus individuis, cur non humana natura? Rursus, qui
 possunt aliqualem cognitionem Dei assequi, illam fere semper

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And the same should be said analogously of the other goods of body
 and fortune which can be required as instruments or necessary means
 for happiness, but not properly as a part of happiness, as I will say in
 the following section where we will resolve all the difficulties which can
 occur in the given doctrines.

SECTION II.

In what way a human being can acquire natural happiness.

1. In order for the difficulty of this question—in what way a human
 being can pursue natural happiness—to be understood, we place him in
 relation to his ultimate end put in him in purely natural [ways], that
 is, neither ordered to a higher end than is owed to nature nor having in
 himself faculties or virtues other than those which follow on his nature
 or which can be acquired through natural acts, neither receiving other
 benefits on the part of God nor another kind of providence than is ap-
 propriate to the order of nature. For in order to understand the proper
 condition of our nature, it is necessary to prescind from everything that
 is beyond nature, which could have been done not only through the in-
 tellect, but itself could really have been done by God, which is almost as
 certain to me as it is certain that all these supernatural goods are purely
 by grace and in no way owed to our nature.

The supposition
 for a resolution
 of the question.

2. Once the principle has been posited, a complex difficulty arises
 in the present question. It is explained in this way: for if a human being
 can acquire natural happiness, this is either in the state of the present life
 or in the state of the separated soul or in some state after the first separa-
 tion where the soul will again be united with a body. [But] in none of
 these states. Therefore, [a human being can acquire natural happiness]
 in no way. Concerning the state of the present life, it is proven in various
 ways. **First**, on the part of the intellect, because cognition of God can
 hardly be acquired in this life. Even if it could [be acquired] by one or
 another, still, [it could] not generally [be acquired] by the multitude of
 humans. But happiness ought to be the general good, for other natural
 things can at most acquire their end in many individuals—why not hu-
 man nature? On the other hand, those who can achieve some kind of

It is argued
 negatively in the
 first place on the
 part of the
 intellect as long
 as it is in the state
 of the present
 life.

2. Arguitur ex parte voluntatis.	30 habent admixtam multis opinionibus incertis, et, quod pejus est, multis erroribus, unde est axioma theologorum, non posse hominem suis viribus assequi sine errore omnes veritates naturales, et præsertim divinas. Secundo, ex parte voluntatis multorum opinio est, non posse hominem in pura natura diligere super omnia Deum amore proprio benevolentia, quia quoad naturales vires non est potentior homo in pura natura, quam sit nunc in natura lapsa, in qua non potest diligere Deum sine gratia. Rursus licet admittamus posse aliquo modo, tamen certum est non posse perseveranter: non est autem beatitudo, quæ non est diturna. Unde est tertia difficultas ex parte appetitus, ex quo fit, ut non possit homo constans ex his contrariis viribus suis vitare omnia peccata, etiam mortalia, et contra legem naturæ: ergo non posset homo sibi relictus non esse miser, quia non posset vitare peccatum mortale, et post illud commissum, non posset viribus suis illud a se expellere, nec remissionem illius naturaliter consequi; homo autem existens in peccato, dignus est æterna pœna et miseria. Quarto, hinc fit ut in hac vita necessario desit a perfectio necessaria ad beatitudinem, quæ est perpetuitas, primum, quia hæc vita non est perpetua; hoc tamen non multum urget, satis enim esset si beatitudo duraret quamdiu durat vita. Secundo id probatur, qui fere nullus est, nec esse potest per naturam, qui in eo statu toto tempore vitæ perseveret, et quamvis demus, posse hoc accidere, nullus tamen est, qui de hoc possit esse securus, sed semper sub <147> timore cadendi ab eo statu; quænam ergo erit hæc felicitas, ut omittam, non posse hominem in hac vita habere cætera omnia, quæ ad statum beatitudinis necessaria sunt, quia non posset carere doloribus aliisque miseriis.	30R cognition of God, perhaps always have it contaminated with many uncertain opinions and, what is even worse, many errors. Hence, it is an axiom of the theologians that a human being cannot achieve without error by his own strength all natural truths and especially divine [truths].	
	35	35R	Secondly, it is argued on the part of the will.
3. Ex parte appetitus sensitivi.	40	40R	Thirdly, on the part of the sensitive appetite.
Ex parte amissibilitatis cui subest naturalis beatitudo.	45	45R	
Quoad statum separationis arguitur etiam negative primo.	50	50R	[Fourthly,] on the part of the amissibility to which natural happiness is subject.
Secundo.	55	55R	
	60	60R	It is also argued negatively with respect to the state of separation.
	65	65R	Secondly.

Tertio.	70	<p>junctæ corpori, etiam separatæ; quia ejus vires naturales eadem sunt in utroque statu: tum maxime, quia si homo ex hac vita non potest decedere sine aversione ab ultimo fine, manebit necessario illa aversio in anima separata, quam non poterit per naturales vires a se expellere, neque cum illa poterit esse beata. Tertio est specialis difficultas, quia naturali appetitui non satisfacit per solum felicem statum animæ separatæ, nisi totus homo beatificetur, quia aliæ res omnes non perveniunt ad suos fines in una, vel altera parte, sed in tota natura, et quia ad providentiam auctoris naturæ pertinet ut totus homo, qui bene vel male operator, beatus fiat vel miser.</p>	70R	<p>conjoined to the body, then also separated. For its natural strengths are the same in either state. Also, especially, because if a human being from this life cannot die without turning from the ultimate end, that turning away will necessarily remain in the separated soul which will not be able drive it out by itself through natural strength. Nor will it be able to be happy with it. There is a third special difficulty because a natural desire is not satisfied through a felicitous state of the separated soul alone, unless the entire human being is made happy. For not all other things come to his ends in one or another part but rather in his whole nature. And since he belongs to the providence of the author of nature as a whole human being, he who will act well or badly, will be made happy or miserable.</p>	Thirdly.
Quoad statum reunionis arguitur.	80	<p>4. De statu tandem reunionis habet ille certe primam et secundam difficultatem supra positam, et aliam propriam, quia ille status supponit resurrectionem hominis, quæ nec naturalis est, nec naturæ debita, et præterea illa admissa quærendum superest, quale esset corpus, ad quod esset anima reditura: quia si esset tale, quale nunc habemus, redeunt difficultates positæ in primo membro, et præterea semper futuri essemus in quodam perpetuo circulo mortis et resurrectionis; si vero esset alterius conditionis, jam esset præter debitum naturæ: nullo ergo modo intelligi potest homo beatus in pura natura. Ut respondeamus, supponamus quod alibi dixi, aliud esse loqui de facultate proxima ad eliciendos actus, in quibus consistit beatitudo, aliud de facultate ad exequenda omnia media, vel tollenda omnia impedimenta beatitudinis.</p>	75R	<p>4. Concerning the state of final reunion, it also certainly has the first and second difficulties posited above and another one of its own. For that state assumes the resurrection of the human being which is neither natural nor owed to nature. And in addition, once that has been granted, one still needs to ask what kind of body it would be to which the soul will return. For if it is of such a kind as we have now, the difficulties posited for the first member return and, in addition, we will in the future always be in a sort of perpetual circle of death and resurrection. But if it is of another condition, then it is already beyond what is owed to nature. Therefore, in no way can a human being be understood to be happy in pure nature. In order that we may respond, we assume what we said elsewhere, namely, that it is one thing to speak of the proximate faculty for eliciting the acts in which happiness consists and another [to speak] of the faculty for carrying out all the means or removing all the impediments to happiness.</p>	It is argued with respect to the state of reunion.
1. Assertio.	95	<p>5. Dicendum primo, hominem ex natura sua habere facultatem per se sufficientem ad eliciendum illos actus, in quibus consistit beatitudo. Sic D. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 5, art. 5, nam hanc beatitudinem naturalem vocat beatitudinem imperfectam, et hoc sensu dicit, posse viribus naturæ acquiri. Probatur, quia certum est, hominem viribus naturæ posse consequi aliquam veram Dei cognitionem, ut 1 part., quæst. 2 et 12, dicitur, et constat experientia; quod vero hæc cognitio sufficiat, non obstantibus difficultatibus, n. 2, positis, infra patebit. Rursus de actu amoris benevolentiae, et super omnia Dei auctoris naturæ, mihi certum est (et nescio an aliquis hoc negaverit) esse in voluntate humana per se, et secundum naturam suam consideratam</p>	95R	<p>5. It should be said first that a human being by his nature has a faculty that is in itself sufficient for eliciting those acts in which happiness consists. St. Thomas says this in [ST] IaIIæ.5.5 for calls this natural happiness imperfect happiness and in this sense he says that it can be acquired through the strength of nature. It is proven because it is certain that a human being through the strength of nature can achieve some true cognition of God, as is said in I, q. 2 and 12, and is clear from experience. But that this true cognition suffices—the difficulties posited in n. 2 not standing in the way—will be clear below. Concerning the act of benevolent love and beyond all else of God as the author of nature, it is certain to me (and I do not know whether anyone has denied this) that there is in the will of a human being through itself and considered according to his</p>	1. Assertion.
Probatur quoad actum intellectus.	100		100R		It is proven with respect to the act of intellect.
Item quoad actum voluntatis.					Likewise with respect to the act of will.

105	vim, et efficaciam naturalem sufficientem ad eliciendum illum actum, ideo enim omnes fatentur hominem in statu innocentiae potuisse viribus naturae elicere talem actum, et idem concedunt de Angelis: et eadem ratio est de anima separata. Ex quo aperte concluditur voluntatem per se esse ad hoc potentem, ut probat ratio facta, quia voluntas in quocumque statu est eadem omnino quoad naturam intrinsecam et vires naturales: quod si aliqui docent in statu naturae lapsae non posse elicere hunc actum, non est ex defectu virtutis activae per se, sed ex impedimentis, scilicet quia illa virtus in hoc statu ita est impedita, ut non possit tam perfectum actum perficere: quod an consequenter dicatur, alibi dicendum est: nunc nobis sufficit, quod facultas per se, et intrinseca non deest. Et ratio est, quia ille actus non est in sua substantia supernaturalis, nec regulatur, nisi ratione naturali: ergo facultas per se elicitive illius est etiam naturalis. Tandem in hoc differt naturalis beatitudo a supernaturali, quod illa consistit in actibus, ad quos natura dedit facultatem, et capacitatem in suo ordine proportionatam, ut colligitur ex D. Thoma, 1, 2, q. 109, ad ult., et 1 p., q. 23, et 62, a. 1, et hac ratione dicemus infra, disp. seq., esse in homine appetitum ad naturalem beatitudinem, non vero ad supernaturalem: ergo si aliqua est in homine naturalis beatitudo, necesse est ut sit naturalis facultas in homine ad eliciendas illas actiones, in quibus consistit.	105R	nature natural power and efficacy sufficient for eliciting that act. In fact, for this reason everyone acknowledges that in the state of innocence one could by the strength of his nature elicit such an act. And they concede likewise concerning the angels. And the argument is the same for the separated soul. From this it is obviously concluded that the will is through itself capable of this, as the argument made above proves, because the will in whatever state is entirely the same with respect to its intrinsic nature and natural strength. If some teach that in the state of lapsed nature one cannot elicit this act, that it is not from a lack of active strength <i>per se</i> but from impediments—namely, because that strength is impeded in this state in such a way that it cannot complete such a perfect act—whether this is consequently said, it should be discussed elsewhere. For not it is enough for us that the <i>per se</i> and intrinsic faculty is not lacking. And the reason is because that act is not supernatural in its substance nor is it regulated except by natural reason. Therefore, the faculty <i>per se</i> elicitive of it is also natural. Finally, natural happiness differs from supernatural happiness in that it consists in acts for which nature provides a faculty and capacity proportionate in its order, as is gathered from St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.109 ad ult. and I, q. 23 and 62, a. 1. And for this reason we will say below in the following disputation that there is in a human being a desire for natural happiness but not for supernatural happiness. Therefore, if there somehow is natural happiness in a human being, it is necessary that there be a natural faculty in the human being for eliciting those actions in which it consists.	110R	Finally, generally with respect to the acts in which the nature of happiness stands.	
110		115R		120R		
115		125R		130R		
Denique generaliter quoad actus in quibus stat ratio beatitudinis.		135R	6. Dicendum secundo: Possibile est hominem consequi hanc beatitudinem naturalem per media naturae proportionata et consentanea. Hæc conclusio probari potest primo rationibus communibus, quod media esse debent proportionata fini, hinc enim colligimus ad supernaturalem beatitudinem assequendam necessaria esse supernaturalia media. Item, quia natura non inclinatur ad finem nisi per sufficientia media: neque auctor naturae unum instituit, seu ordinat nisi per aliud, quia esset valde diminuta providentia. Item quia omnes aliae naturae creatae possunt assequi suos fines naturales per media consentanea naturae; cur ergo natura humana erit in hoc pejoris conditionis? Denique hoc videntur supposuisse omnes philosophi, qui de beatitudine disputaverunt; tamen in particulari hoc melius probabitur, et declarabitur satisfaciendo difficultatibus initio positis.	140R	6. It should be said secondly: it is possible the a human being achieve this natural happiness through means proportionate to and appropriate for his nature. This conclusion can first be proven by the common notions that means ought to be proportionate to the end, for from here we gather that supernatural means are necessary for gaining supernatural happiness. Also, because nature does not incline to an end except through sufficient means. The author of nature does not institute or ordain the one except through another, because providence would be greatly diminished. Also, because all other created natures can gain their natural ends through means appropriate to their natures. Therefore, why would human nature be in this worse condition? Finally, all philosophers who have disputed concerning happiness seem to have supposed this. Still, this in particular will be better proven and shown by satisfying the difficulties posited in the beginning.	2. The assertion is multiply proven. First. Second. Third. Fourth.
2. Assertio probatur multipliciter. Primo.		135R		140R		
Secundo.		140R				
Tertio.						
Quarto.						

Expediuntur 140
difficultates in
n. 4.

7. Primo igitur ex tribus statibus ibi consideratis, tertius, positus n. 4, relinquendus est, non enim existimo illum pertinere ad ordinem naturæ, ut recte probant rationes ibi insinuate, et latius disputatum est in materia de Resurrectione, 3 p., tom. 2, disp. 7, sect. 7. Nec obstat specialis difficultas ibi insinuata, quia non est necesse ut homo possit consequi aliter suum finem, quam potest existere, nulla enim res naturalis aliud postulat, nisi quod dum existit possit suum finem consequi: sicut ergo homo secundum naturam integram corruptibilis est, secundum animam vero est immortalis et æternus, ita satis est, quod pro aliquo tempore possit naturaliter esse beatus in toto composito, perpetuo vero solum in anima.

Quid de
beatitudine
priorum duorum
statuum senserint
Philosophi.

8. Circa alios vero duos status videtur esse controversia inter antiquos philosophes: nam Aristoteles, 1, Ethic., cap. 10, significat naturalem beatitudinem in hac vita esse comparandam, et irridet Solonem eo quod dicit, beatitudinem solum contingere homini post mortem: at vero Plato, in Cratyl. et Phædon., e contrario asseruit, beatitudinem reservari in sæculum futurum; ex quo Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 5 Stromat., circa princ., hæc refert verba: *Non dico fieri posse, ut omnes homines sint beati præterquam pauci, donec vixero, bona autem spes est fere ut postquam excessero omnia consequar.* Et in eadem sententia est Tullius, lib. de Finib., et alii, quos refert Eugubinus, l. 10, cap. 11, ubi reprehendit Aristotelem, quod oblitus fuerit vitæ futuræ: sed non existimo Aristotelem in hoc errasse. Dicendum est ergo, utrumque esse aliquo modo verum, nam, ut paulo ante dicebam, homo in unoquoque statu eo modo, quo <col. b> est, potest conjungi suo ultimo fini, in quo consistit essentialis beatitudo. Item probatur illa ratione, quia non solum pars hominis, sed homo ordinatur ad beatitudinem naturalem: ergo oportet ut non solum anima, sed etiam homo possit aliquo modo beatificari: et hoc est quod intendit Aristoteles, qui addit 1, Eth., cap. 7, hominem non posse beatificari quo homo est, sed quo est in ipso divinius, et ideo, inquit, *conandum esse, ut homo se ipsum perficiat secundum id, quod in ipso divinius est*, id est, non tantum secundum id, quod est mortale, sed secundum id etiam, quod immortale est: quia vero pro statu hujus vitæ nulla naturalis beatitudo esse potest non admixta variis imperfectionibus et in-

145R

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7. First, therefore, of the three states that were considered here, the third posited in n. 4 should be disregarded, for I do not think that it pertains to the order of nature, as the arguments suggested here and discussed more broadly in the material on the resurrection in III, tom. 2, disp. 7, sect. 7, rightly proves. Nor does the special difficulty suggested here pose a problem, since it is not necessary that a human being can achieve his end otherwise than if he can exist. For no natural thing demands another except that as long as it exists it can achieve its end. Therefore, just as a human being according to his integrated nature is corruptible but according to his soul is immortal and eternal, so also it is enough that he can naturally be happy for some time as a composite whole but perpetually only in the soul.

8. But there seems to be a controversy among the ancient philosophers concerning the other two states. For Aristotle in *EN* I, c. 10, indicates that natural happiness should be secured in this life and he ridicules Solon for saying that happiness only comes to a human after death. But Plato, on the other hand, in *Crat.* and *Phaedo*, asserted the contrary: that happiness is reserved for the future age. As a result, Clement of Alexandria in *Stromata* V, near the beginning, reports these words: “I do not say that it can happen that all humans are happy beyond a few—as long as I live, but there is good hope that afterwards perhaps I will exceed everything that I pursue.” And Tullius has the same view in *De fin.*, as well as others to whom Agostino Steuco refers in book X, c. 11, where he accuses Aristotle of forgetting that there will be a future life. But I do not think that Aristotle erred in this. Therefore, it should be said that each [position] is true in some way, for, as I was saying a little earlier, a human being can be joined with his ultimate end in each state in that way in which he is, in which essential happiness consists. Also, it is proven by the argument that because not only a part of the human being but the [whole] human being is ordained to natural happiness. Therefore, it must not be only the soul. But the human being can also be made happy in some way. And this is what Aristotle intended. He adds in *EN* I, c. 7, that a human being cannot be made happy by that which is human but by that in him which is more divine. ‘And therefore’, he says, ‘a human being should attempt to perfect himself according to that which is more divine in himself’. That is, not only according to that which is mortal, but also according to that which is immortal. But because in the state of this life there can be no natural happiness that is not mixed

The difficulties in
n. 4 are resolved.

What the
philosophers
thought about
the happiness of
the prior two
states.

180 commodis, ideo ait Aristoteles beatificari hominem hic, tamen
ut hominem: quia vero anima separata erit liberior ab omnibus
his incommodis, quæ corpus consequuntur; ideo alii philosophi
reservari dicebant beatitudinem ad illum statum, et præsentem
vitam solum esse veluti viam quamdam ad illum statum con-
sequendum, quod Aristoteles non negavit, sed addidit hic esse
185 aliqualem beatitudinis modum, atque hinc soluta relinquitur se-
cunda difficultas in secundo membro seu statu posita, in num. 3.
aliæ duæ communes erant cum aliis positis, num. 2, in primo
membro, sive statu.

Ad difficultates
in n. 2 generatim.

190 9. Ad quas primo in genere dici potest, hominem quidem
habere in se intrinsecas facultates per se sufficientes ad conse-
quendam beatitudinem naturalem, et exercendo actus, qui sunt
media ad illam, et hoc satis esse ut hoc dicatur possibile possi-
bilitate physica. Quod vero impedimenta extrinseca tantam ho-
195 mini difficultatem ingerant, ut moraliter non possit semper uti
ea facultate physica, et accidentarium, et extrinsecum est, prove-
niens ex quadam mirabili compositione, quæ est in homine
ex naturis adeo distantibus, ut sunt caro et spiritus, et ex ap-
petibus contrariis, quam imperfectionem non tenetur auctor
naturæ auferre. Deinde hinc fit, quod licet gratis daremus, nul-
lum hominem naturæ suæ relictum assecuturum de facto beati-
tudinem naturalem, non inde fieret aut ipsam in se esse impossi-
200 bilem naturaliter, aut media non esse naturæ proportionata: sed
solum sequitur hanc naturam tot esse implicatam obstaculis, ut
moraliter non valeat omnia vitare: sed quia hæc non satisfaci-
unt, quando videtur pertinere ad providentiam auctoris naturæ,
205 ut ita provideat, et subveniat defectibus rerum naturalium, ut
<149> possint assequi suos fines, ideo aliquid amplius est ad
singulas difficultates dicendum.

Ad primam
speciatim.

210 10. Ad primam de cognitione respondetur, veram Dei cog-
nitionem naturalem esse ita possibilem homini, ut multi illam
assequantur, nec necesse est ut in hac vita omnes possint vacare
huic speculationi, et scientiæ naturali, sed satis est ut possint
aliquo modo cognoscere Deum esse, et quod possint se, et om-
215 nia illa in illum, ut in ultimum finem referre. Neque etiam
est mirandum, quod hoc ipsum raro, et in paucioribus contin-
gat, quia hæc est conditio, et imperfectio humanæ naturæ, et

with various imperfections and disadvantages, Aristotle for that reason
says that a human being can be made happy here only insofar as he is
human. But because the separated soul will be freer from all these disad-
vantages which follow the body, other philosophers for this reason said
185R that happiness is reserved for that state and that the present life is only
as a kind of road to achieving that state. Aristotle did not deny this, but
added that this is some mode of happiness. And from this having been
resolved, the second difficulty in the second member or state posited in
n. 3 is left behind. But the other two [difficulties] were common with
190R the others posited in n. 2 for the first member of state.

195R 9. In those one can first say in general that a human being does in-
deed have in himself intrinsic faculties that are *per se* sufficient for achiev-
ing natural happiness and for exercising the acts which are the means to
it. And this is enough for this to be called possible by physical possi-
bility. But if it is the case that an extrinsic impediment forces so great
200R a difficulty on the human being that he cannot always morally use the
physical faculty, it is both accidental and extrinsic, arising from a cer-
tain marvelous composition, which is in the human as a result of natures
to that extent distant, as flesh and spirit are, and from contrary desires.
The author of nature is not bound to remove this imperfection. Next,
it results henceforth that although we freely grant that no human being
having forsaken his nature will in fact achieve natural happiness, it does
not thereby result either that it in itself is naturally impossible nor that
205R the means [to it] are not proportionate to his nature. But it only follows
that this nature is entangled with so many obstacles that it is not morally
strong enough to avoid all [of them]. But since these are not satisfac-
tory, since they pertain to the providence of the author of nature, as he
thus assists and provides for the defects of natural things so that they can
achieve their ends, therefore something more needs to be said in response
210R to each difficulty.

In response to the
difficulties in n. 2
generally.

215R 10. It is responded to the first [difficulty] concerning cognition that
true natural cognition of God is possible for a human being in such a way
that many attain it. Nor is it necessary that in this life everyone can be
free for this speculation and natural knowledge, but it is sufficient that
they can in some way cognize that God is and that they can refer them-
selves and all other things to him as to an ultimate end. It should also not
surprise us that this happens rarely and in fewer cases, since this is the
condition and imperfection of human nature and since this depends on

To the first in
particular.

Ad secundam. 220 quia hoc pendet ex libertate; undo fit, ut etiam beatitudinem supernaturalem pauci assequantur, et inter Angelos multæ species caruerunt sua beatitudine. Ad secundam de amore jam responsum est ad priorem partem ejus: altera vero pars de perseverante amore coincidit cum difficultate tertia.

Ad tertiam responsio 1. Responsio 2. 225 11. Ad quam dicitur primo quod qui ex hac vita decederent ante usum rationis, statim assequerentur in alia naturalem beatitudinem. Secundo, qui brevi tempore ratione uterentur, possent moraliter se conservare sine peccato, quia hoc possibile est tempore brevi, etiam homini lapsu, et in puris naturalibus, fortasse id posset fieri aliquantulum longiori tempore, non quia intrinseca compositio, et impedimenta, quæ inde proveniunt, essent alia, sed quia impedimenta extrinseca essent minora, nam in eo statu non est consideranda impugnatio dæmonis, ad providentiam enim Dei pertinet ut hanc non permittat, nisi dando sufficientem gratiam ad illam superandam. Ablata autem illa dæmonis pugna, multa alia impedimenta auferentur, quæ ex illa sequuntur. Tertio, est probabile Deum daturum fuisse homini in eo statu aliquod providentiæ genus, quo et moraliter posset conservari sine lapsu, præsertim mortali, et quo etiam obtineret remissionem peccati, si quantum in se est, faceret, vel se converteret in Deum amore naturali super omnia, quia sine hoc genere providentiæ vix posset homo non esse miser: hæc autem providentia non esset debita homini, proprie loquendo, sed esset ex quadam liberalitate Dei, quam, ut ita dicam, Deus sibi ipsi deberet, id est, suæ providentiæ et sapientiæ, ac bonitati: differret autem a providentia gratiæ in hoc, quod per eam non elevaretur homo ad finem, vel media supernaturalia, sed tantum tollerentur impedimenta, ut posset bene naturaliter operari: melius autem Deus homini providit, et omnes difficultates abstulit, <col. b> gratiam et supernaturalia dona illi conferendo.

230 235 240 245

220R freedom. Hence it also happens that few achieve supernatural happiness and among the angels many species lack their happiness. There was a response to the first part of the second [difficulty] concerning the love now. But the other part concerning persevering love coincides with the third difficulty.

225R 11. To this it is said first that those who pass from this life before the use of reason at once attain natural happiness in the other [life]. Secondly, those who use reason for a brief time can morally preserve themselves without sin since this is possible for a brief time even for a human in a lapsed state and in purely natural [states]. Perhaps it can happen for a slightly longer time, not because the intrinsic composition and impediments which arise thenceforth would be different but because the extrinsic impediments would be lesser. For in that state the attack of the devil should not be considered, for it belongs to the providence of God not to permit this except when giving sufficient grace to overcome it. Moreover, once the fight with the devil has been removed, many other impediments are removed which follow from it. Thirdly, it is probable that God was about to give some kind of providence to a human being in that state by which he could morally preserve [himself] without falling, especially mortally, and by which he would also obtain remission for his sin, if insofar as he is concerned brought or turned himself to God by a natural love beyond all else. For without this kind of providence a human being can hardly fail to be miserable. But this providence would not be owed to a human, properly speaking, but would come from a certain liberality of God, which, if I may speak in this way, God would owe to himself, that is, to his providence and wisdom and goodness. Moreover, it differs from the providence of grace in that the human being is not thereby lifted up to his end or supernatural means; rather, only the impediments are removed so that he can naturally act well. But God better provided for humans and removed all difficulties by conferring grace and supernatural gifts on them.

230R 235R 240R 245R

To the second.

The first response to the third [difficulty.] The second response.

The third response.