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<372, col. b><sup>2</sup>

DISPUTATIO XII.

*De causis entis in communi.*

Postquam dictum est de essentiali ratione, et proprietatibus  
entis in quantum ens est, priusquam ad divisiones eius de-  
5 scendamus, oportet de causis eius exacte disputare. Nam  
licet Physicus de causis disputet, id tamen est nimis con-  
tracte et imperfecte, quatenus ratio causae in Physica ma-  
teria, vel cum aliquo motu aut Physica mutatione exerce-  
tur: ratio autem causae universalior est et abstractior: nam  
10 secundum se abstrahit a materia, tam sensibili, quam intel-  
ligibili: et ideo propria eius consideratio ad Metaphysicum  
pertinet. Primo quidem quatenus ipsamet ratio causae, seu  
causalitas (ut aiunt) aliquem gradum entis participat: de quo  
oportet declarare quid, et quo modo sit. Secundo, quia ipsa  
15 causalitas est veluti proprietas quaedam entis ut sic: nullum  
est enim ens quod aliquam rationem causae non participet.  
Tertio, quia ad scientiam pertinet considerare causas sui  
obiecti. Quamvis autem non omne ens comprehensum sub  
obiecto huius scientiae, habeat veram ac propriam causam,  
20 nam Deus causam non habet: tamen omnia alia praeter ip-  
sum causam habent: et in eis non solum determinatae seu  
particulares rationes entis, sed etiam ipsa entis ratio per se ac  
proprie causatur, ita ut verum sit dicere, ens in quantum ens  
specificative, etsi non reduplicative, habere causam. Eo vel  
25 maxime quod eiusdem doctrinae est rationem causae et ef-  
fectus contemplari: nullum autem est ens quod non <373>

DISPUTATION XII.

*On the causes of being in general.*

After what has been said about the essential *ratio* and properties of be-  
ing insofar as it is being but before descend to the divisions of being,  
5R we must discuss the causes with precision. For, although causes are  
discussed in physics, that discussion, nevertheless, is rather contracted  
and incomplete, insofar as the *ratio* of cause in physics is concerned  
with matter or with some motion or physical change. But the *ratio* of  
cause is more universal and abstract. For with respect to itself it ab-  
stracts from matter, sensible as well as intelligible. For this reason, its  
10R proper consideration belongs to metaphysics. First, indeed, insofar as  
the very *ratio* of cause—or causality, as they say—participates in a cer-  
tain grade of being. Concerning this, it needs to be shown what and  
in what way it is. Second, because this causality is as it were a kind  
of property of being as such. For there is no being that does not par-  
15R ticipate in some *ratio* of cause. Third, because it belongs to science to  
consider the causes of its object. Moreover, although not every being  
comprehended under the object of this science has a true and proper  
cause—for God does not have a cause—nevertheless, every other being  
besides God has a cause. And in those beings not only the determinate  
and particular *rationes* of being but the very *ratio* of being itself is *per*  
20R *se* and properly caused so that it is true to say that being insofar as it  
is being specifically even if not reduplicatively has a cause. Especially  
in view of the fact that it belongs to the same doctrine to contem-  
25R plate the *ratio* of cause and effect. But there is no being that is not  
either an effect or a cause. In addition, although God does not have a

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes: many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

30 sit vel effectus, vel causa. Accedit quod, licet Deus non  
habeat veram et realem causam: quaedam tamen rationes  
eius concipiuntur a nobis ac si essent causae aliarum, ad quas  
35 melius declarandas utile etiam erit veras rationes causandi  
praenosceri. Ob has ergo rationes ad Metaphysicum per-  
tinet causarum consideratio. De quibus pauca prius in com-  
muni dicemus de ratione causae et membris eius: deinde  
fusus de singulis, postremo eas inter se, et cum effectibus  
variis modis conferemus.

### SECTIO I.

*Utrum causa et principium idem omnino sint.*

Causam esse est  
longe  
notissimum.

40 1. Non inquirimus an causa sit, quia nihil est per se notius:  
ad investigandum autem quid sit, commode a ratione prin-  
cipii initium sumimus, quoniam omnis causa principium  
est, et per illud tamquam per genus, vel loco generis definiri  
potest, et debet. Ratio igitur dubitandi in proposita quaes-  
tione ex variis dictis Aristotelis sumitur, nam interdum sig-  
nificat, causam et principium, idem omnino esse; et re-  
ciprocè dici. Nam in 4. *Metaphysicae* cap. 2. ait, *ita comparari*  
45 *inter se causam et principium, sicut ens, et unum*: ens autem  
et unum convertuntur inter se, ut supra dictum est. Item  
5. *Metaphysicae* cap. 1. ubi varios modos principii enumerat,  
in fine ita concludit: *Totidem autem modis et causae dicun-*  
50 *tur, omnes enim causae, principia sunt*. Rursus cum 1. *Phys-*  
*icae* privationem inter principia rei naturalis numerasset,  
in 12. *Metaphysicae* cap. 2. eam causam vocat: sentit ergo  
causam et principium esse idem. Et huic sententiae favet  
modus loquendi aliquorum Patrum Graecorum, qui etiam  
55 in divinis personis Patrem vocant causam Filii, eo quod  
sit principium eius: et similiter Patrem et Filium causam  
Spiritus sancti: quod est indicium, apud Graecos idem esse  
*causam* quod *principium*. Quod significavit, illos Patres ex-

30R true and real cause, nevertheless certain *rationes* of him are conceived  
by as if they were causes of others. In order better to explain these  
it will also be useful first to know the true *rationes* of causing. On  
account of these reasons, then, the consideration of causes belongs to  
metaphysics. Concerning these causes, we will first say a few things in  
general about the *ratio* of cause and about its members. Then we will  
have a more extended discussion about the individual kinds of causes  
and, finally will compare them in various ways to each other and with  
35R their effects.

### SECTION I.

*Whether cause and principle are entirely the same.*

1. We are not asking whether there is a cause, since nothing is  
more known *per se*. But in order to investigate what a cause is, we  
fittingly make our beginning with the *ratio* of principle, since every  
cause is a principle and it can and ought to be defined through the  
latter as through a genus or with that in the genus position.

A reason for doubting, therefore, in the proposed question is  
taken from the various things said by Aristotle. For sometimes he  
indicates that ‘cause’ and ‘principle’ are entirely the same and can be  
said reciprocally. For in *Metaphysics* IV.2 he says: ‘Cause and princi-  
ple are related to each other just as being and one are’. But being and  
one are convertible with each other, as was said above.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, in  
*Metaphysics* V.1 where he lists the various modes of principles, he con-  
cludes at the end as follows: ‘Causes are spoken of in as many ways,  
for all causes are principles’. Again, since in *Physics* I he numbered  
privation among the principles of a natural thing, in *Metaphysics* XII.2  
he calls it a cause. He, therefore, thinks that cause and principle are  
the same. And the Greek Fathers’ way of speaking favours this view,  
who in the case of the divine persons also call the Father the cause of  
the Son in virtue of the fact that he is the principle of the Son.<sup>4</sup> Like-  
wise, the Father and the Son are the cause of the Holy Spirit. This  
is evidence that among the Greeks ‘cause’ is the same as ‘principle’.<sup>5</sup>

That there is a  
cause is very  
well-known.

From the Greek  
Fathers’ way of  
speaking.  
Damascene, *De*  
*fide* I, chs. 8, 9,  
and 11;  
Athanasius in the  
acts of the Nicean  
synod; Gregory  
of Nazianzus,  
Oration 29 (‘On  
Dogma and the  
Appointment of  
a Bishop’) and  
Oration 35,  
which is the first  
concerning the  
Son and the third  
theological  
oration.

<sup>3</sup>*DM* 4.4.

<sup>4</sup>The numbering of the orations by Gregory of Nazianzus in the marginal citations seems incorrect, but I have not yet properly sorted this out.

<sup>5</sup>Suárez here uses the Latin terms rather than the Greek ‘*aition*’ and ‘*arche*’.

Ex modo  
loquendi Patrum  
Graecorum.  
Damas. lib. 1. *De*  
*fide* cap. 8. et 9. ac  
11. Athanas. in  
Actis Nicenae  
synodi. Nazian.  
orat. 29. de  
dogmate, et  
constitutione  
Episcop. et orat.  
35. quae est 1. de  
Filio et 3. de  
Theologia.

ponens Concilium Florentinum, sess. ult. Ratio vero esse  
 60 potest, quia principium relationem dicit ad principiatum,  
 sicut causa ad effectum: principiatum autem idem esse vide-  
 tur quod effectum. <col. b>

2. Aliquando vero significare videtur Aristoteles cau-  
 sam latius patere quam principium: ait enim libro 5. *De gen-*  
 65 *eratione animalium* cap. 7. de ratione principii esse, *ut ipsum*  
*quidem causa sit multorum, sed ipsius nulla sit superior causa,*  
 non est autem de ratione causae ut non habeat superiorem  
 causam: ergo iuxta Aristotelis sententiam, principium quid  
 contractius est quam causa. Unde etiam 1. *Physicae* cap. 5. de  
 70 de ratione principiorum ait esse, *ut non sint ex sese, nec ex aliis,*  
*sed alia ex ipsis,* de ratione autem causae non est ut non sit  
 ex principiis et causis: latius ergo patet causa quam prin-  
 cipium. Denique aliunde apparet manifestum, principium  
 generalius quid esse, quam causam: nam omnis causa prin-  
 75 cipium est, ut ex Aristotele retulimus: non tamen omne  
 principium potest dici causa: privatio enim, teste Aristotele,  
 est principium generationis, non tamen causa, et aurora est  
 principium diei et non causa. Et apud Theologos sana et  
 80 recepta doctrina est, in divinis personis unum esse prin-  
 cipium alterius, non tamen causam, ut patet ex D. Thoma 1. p.  
 q. 33. art. 1. ad 1.

*Varii principiorum modi, et illorum ordo.*

3. Ad explicandam hanc quaestionem incipiendum est  
 a nomine et ratione principii: quoniam vero, ut Dama-  
 scenus ait *Dialogus contra Manichaeos* in initio, principii  
 5 vocabulum, aequivocum, id est analogum, est, melius erit  
 varias eius significationes enumerare, quas ibi recenset Dam-  
 ascenus et prius Aristoteles 5. *Metaphysicae* cap. 1. Ut vero  
 aliqua certa methodo a nobis tradantur, primo distinguere

(This indicated the Council of Florence, last session, expositing those  
 60R Fathers.<sup>6</sup> The reason can be that principle expresses a relation to the  
*principiatum* just as causes expresses a relation to the effect. But the  
*principiatum* seems to be the same as the effect.<sup>7</sup>

2. Sometimes, however, Aristotle seems to indicate that cause  
 extends more broadly than principle. For in *On the Generation of*  
 65R *Animals* V.7 he says that it belongs to the notion of principle ‘that  
 it itself be the cause of multiple things but that there be no higher  
 cause of it’. But it does not belong to the nature of a cause not to have  
 a higher cause. Therefore, according to Aristotle’s view, principle is  
 something more contracted than cause. Hence, in *Physics* I.5 he also  
 70R says that it is of the nature of principles ‘to not be from themselves  
 and not from other things but for other things to be from them’. But  
 it is not of the nature of cause not to be from principles and causes.  
 Cause, therefore, clearly extends farther than principle. Finally, from  
 elsewhere it appears obvious that principle is more general than cause.  
 75R For every cause is a principle, as we cited from Aristotle, but not every  
 principle can be called a cause. For privation, as Aristotle attests, is a  
 principle of generation but it is not a cause, and the dawn is a principle  
 of the day but not a cause of it. And the sound, received doctrine  
 among the theologians is that in the case of the divine persons one is  
 80R the principle of another but not the cause, as is clear from St. Thomas  
 in *ST* Ia.33.1 ad 1.

*Different modes of principles and their order.*

3. In order to explain this question, we should begin from the  
 name and the *ratio* of principle. But, because (as John of Damascus  
 said in the beginning of the *Dialogue against the Manicheans*) the word  
 5R ‘principle’ is equivocal, that is, analogical, it will be better to enumer-  
 ate its various significations. John of Damascus lists them in the cited  
 place and Aristotle before him in *Metaphysics* V.1. But as a certain re-  
 liable method has been taught by us, we can first divide principle into

<sup>6</sup>The Council of Florence in 1439 was one of the attempts to overcome the Great Schism of 1054 between East and West. One of the main sources of contention in the schism was the Latin term ‘filioque’ that the Latin churches used in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed so that it read that the Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father and the Son’ rather than reading that the Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father’ as the Greek churches preferred. The *filioque*-clause was discussed at great length at the Council of Florence and a resolution of sorts was eventually achieved. The intended reconciliation, however, never materialized and so the churches of East and West still disagree about whether to use the *filioque*.

<sup>7</sup>I will use the Latin term ‘*principiatum*’ to preserve the etymological connection with principle (*principium*), but it could be translated as ‘grounded’ or ‘originated’. As should be clear from the text, the *principiatum* is that of which the principle is a principle.

Principium  
complexum seu  
cognitionis quid.

10 possumus duplex principium, aliud rei, aliud cognitionis seu  
scientiae, quod alio modo solet distingui in principia incom-  
plexa, et complexa: nam principium rei incomplexum est,  
cognitionis autem complexum. Quamquam enim prin-  
cipia cognoscendi frequenter desumantur ex principiis rei,  
15 proxime tamen non sunt principia scientiae nisi prout ex  
eis fiunt principia complexa. Et hoc modo, ait Aristoteles  
supra, *suppositiones demonstrationum vocantur principia*: et  
2. *De sophisticis elenchis* cap. ult. in principiis cognoscendis  
ait praecipue insistendum esse, quia illis cognitis, facile est  
cognoscere ea quae sequuntur. De his autem principiis com-  
20 plexis nihil amplius a nobis dicendum est, nam quae ad hanc  
doctrinam necessaria sunt, disp. 1 et 3. sunt tradita: reliqua  
vero ad libros *Analytica posteriora* <374> spectant. Denom-  
inatio autem principii quae his tribuitur, ad aliquod genus  
causalitatis pertinet, vel ad aliquam habitudinem ex his  
25 quae statim numerabimus: nam quia cognitio res quaedam  
est, principium cognitionis secundum aliquam habitudinem  
dicitur, in qua convenit cum aliis principiis rerum.

4. Principium igitur rei dici potest aut solum ratione or-  
dinis, et cuiuscumque connexionis, aut ratione intrinsecae  
30 habitudinis. Priori modo dixisse videtur Aristoteles in *Poet-  
ica*, aliquantulum a principio: *Principium illud esse dicimus  
quod non necessario post aliud est, et post ipsum aliquid esse  
vel fieri natum est*. Haec autem appellatio sub hac ratione  
multiplex est. Primo enim in omni actione aut negotio  
35 illud unde inchoatur, principium dicitur, quod aliquando  
est arbitrarium, seu casuale, aliquando est debitum ipsi rei,  
vel saltem magis consentaneum, ut convenienter fiat, vel  
spectata natura rei quae fit, vel interdum considerata cog-  
nitione operantis. Atque hoc modo in ordine traditae sci-

10R two: one of the thing, the other of cognition or of *scientia*. Another  
customary way is to divide it into simple (*incomplexa*) principles and  
complex principles. For a principle of a thing is simple, but a princi-  
ple of cognition is complex.<sup>8</sup> For although the principles of cogniz-  
ing are frequently taken from the principles of things, nevertheless,  
15R proximately they are not principles of *scientia* except insofar as they  
become complex principles. And in this way, Aristotle says earlier,  
'the hypotheses of demonstrations are called principles'.<sup>9</sup> And in *On  
Sophistical Refutations* in the last chapter of book II he says that this  
must be insisted on especially in the case of the principles of cogniz-  
ing, since once those are cognized it is easy to cognize those things  
20R that follow. But nothing further need be said by us about these com-  
plex principles, for those things that are necessary for this doctrine  
were already related in disputations 1 and 3; the remaining things per-  
tain to the *Posterior Analytics*. But the denomination of principle that  
is attributed to these belongs to some genus of causality of to some  
25R disposition (*habitudinem*) of those that we will number at once.<sup>10</sup> For  
since cognition is a kind of thing, it is called a principle of cognition  
according to some disposition, in which it agrees with other principles  
of things.

30R 4. Therefore, something can be called the principle of a thing ei-  
ther by reason of an order or of some sort of connection alone or by  
reason of an intrinsic disposition. Aristotle seems to have spoken in  
the first way in the *Poetics* a little after the beginning: 'We call that a  
principle which is not necessarily after another, and after itself there  
35R is something or something started to become. On this account, how-  
ever, this appellation is manifold. For, first, in every action or activity  
that from whence it arises is called a principle. Sometimes this is an  
arbitrary or chance thing, sometimes it is owed to the thing itself or  
at least it is very fitting in order for it to come about agreeably, either  
with respect to the nature of the thing that is brought about or some-  
40R times in consideration of the cognition of the one operating. Aristotle

Complex  
principles or  
what the ones of  
cognition.

<sup>8</sup>Suárez presumably has in mind that the premises of demonstrative knowledge are complex because they predicate something of something, e.g., 'Some animals are rational'.

<sup>9</sup>*Metaphysics* V.1 1013a15.

<sup>10</sup>'*Habitus*' could also be translated with 'relation'. One should be cautious, however, about assuming that *habitus* refers to the categorial relations discussed under the name 'relation' in *DM* 47.

40 entiae ait supra Aristoteles, id quod est notius nobis appel-  
 lari posse principium doctrinae, quia inde convenienter in-  
 choatur scientia. Secundo in successione seu ordine tem-  
 poris aurora dicitur principium diei, quia inde incipit dies.  
 Tertio in ordine loci qui primus sedet, dicitur principium  
 45 caeterorum, et locus etiam ille ex quo fons oritur, dici so-  
 let principium eius. Quarto addit Damascenus etiam sol-  
 ere dici propter ordinem dignitatis, ut, *Rex (ait) est prin-*  
*cipium eorum quibus praeest:* quamvis hoc possit ad causalitatem  
 pertinere, ut Aristoteles significat. Denique quidquid  
 50 alteri praesupponitur, potest dici principium eius, ut fun-  
 damentum dicitur principium domus, et unitas principium  
 numeri. Et in omni re quae extensionem habet vel lati-  
 tudinem, prima pars aut primum extremum, quod aliis sup-  
 ponitur, dici potest principium totius, vel reliquarum par-  
 55 tium. Unde haec acceptio vel denominatio principii latis-  
 sima est, et variis modis potest multiplicari, ita ut non pos-  
 sit ad certam et scientificam rationem revocari, quia est fere  
 aequivoca denominatio.

Strictius  
 acceptum  
*principium* quid  
 significet

60 5. Alio igitur modo, et magis philosophico, dicitur  
 principium ratione alicuius habitudinis per se inter ipsum,  
 et id cuius est principium, ita ut ex illo aliquo modo per  
 se oriatur. Quod duobus modis accidere potest. Primo  
 65 per positivum influxum et communicationem sui esse: qui  
 modus respectu rerum <col. b> creatarum semper est cum  
 dependentia et causalitate, ut explicabimus: quare huius-  
 modi principium, philosophice loquendo, semper induit rati-  
 onem causae. Solum in divinis personis invenitur prin-  
 cipium cum vero influxu, et communicatione proprii esse  
 sine causalitate: cur autem hoc ita sit, sectione sequenti ex-  
 70 plicare tentabimus. Unde hoc genus principii quatenus rati-  
 onem causae includit, in tot membra dividi potest, quot  
 causa. Sunt enim quaedam principia intrinsece constituen-  
 tia rem: alia vero sunt extrinseca, quae esse influunt in rem,  
 et extra illam manent, ut finis, et efficiens, de quibus postea  
 75 dicendum est.

Privatio qualiter  
 dicitur  
 principium rei  
 naturalis.

6. Secundo potest aliquid ex alio per se oriri ut ex prin-  
 cipio, non per positivum influxum, sed solum propter nec-

speaks in this way above in relation to the transmitted *scientiae*: that  
 which is better-known to us can be designated a principle of doctrine,  
 since *scientia* is suitably entered into from there. Second, with regard  
 to the succession or order of time, the dawn is called a principle of  
 the day because that is where the day begins. Third, with regard to  
 45R the order of place, what lies first is called a principle of the remaining  
 things, and that place from which a spring originates is customarily  
 called its principle. Fourth, John of Damascus adds that it is custom-  
 ary to call something [a principle] on account of the order of dignity:  
 ‘A king’, he says, ‘is a principle of those whom he leads’, although this  
 50R can pertain to causality, as Aristotle indicates. Finally whatever is pre-  
 supposed by another can be called its principle, as the foundation is  
 called a principle of the house, and unity a principle of number. And  
 in every thing that has extension or latitude, the first part or the first  
 55R extreme that is presupposed by the others can be called a principle of  
 the whole or of the remaining parts. Hence, this meaning (*acceptio*)  
 or denomination of principle is very broad and can be multiplied in  
 various ways, so that it cannot be brought to a certain and scientific  
 account (*rationem*). For it is almost an equivocal denomination.

60R 5. Therefore, in another and more philosophical way, something  
 is called a principle on account of some disposition *per se* between it-  
 self and that of which it is the principle such that the latter in some  
 way arises *per se* from the former. This can happen in two ways. First,  
 through a positive influx and communication of the principle’s own  
 65R being. With respect to created things, this way always involves depen-  
 dence and causality, as we will explain. For this reason, a principle of  
 this kind, speaking philosophically, always takes on the *ratio* of cause.  
 Only in the divine persons does one find a principle with true influx  
 and communication of proper being but without causality. (But why  
 70R this is so we will try to explain in the following section.) Hence, this  
 genus of principle, insofar as it includes the *ratio* of cause, can be di-  
 vided into as many members as there are causes. For there are certain  
 principles intrinsically constituting a thing, but others are extrinsic,  
 which inflow being into a thing and remain external to that thing, as  
 75R the end and efficient cause do, concerning which we must speak later.

What the stricter  
 sense of  
 ‘principle’  
 signifies.

6. Second, something can arise *per se* from something else as from  
 a principle, not through a positive influx but only on account of a

How privation is  
 called a principle  
 of a natural thing.

80 essariam et per se habitudinem ad aliud. Quo modo pri-  
 vatio inter principia rei naturalis numeratur ab Aristotele,  
 quae mediam quamdam rationem habere videtur inter duos  
 modos principiorum declaratos. Nam ille prior latissimus  
 est, et solum fundatur in quolibet ordine prioritatis, nec re-  
 85 quirat habitudinem per se, sed in quolibet genere composi-  
 tionis, aut successionis inveniri potest: privatio autem per-  
 fectioni modo et magis intrinseco dicitur principium genera-  
 tionis naturalis. Alter vero modus principii per influxum,  
 perfectior est quam ut possit privationi convenire, quia pri-  
 vatio cum non sit vera res, non potest habere proprium in-  
 fluxum in rem quae fit, seu in eius generationem: et multo  
 90 minus potest intrinsece componere rem genitam. Dicitur  
 ergo principium propter intrinsecam habitudinem genera-  
 tionis ad ipsam: nam quia generatio essentialiter est transi-  
 tus de non esse ad esse, ideo per se supponit privationem, et  
 ex illa tamquam ex necessario termino per se fit: hac ergo  
 95 ratione dicitur privatio esse principium rei naturalis, non  
 quidem constitutionis eius in facto esse, sed generationis.

Forma aliter  
 generationis,  
 aliter rei genitae  
 principium.

100 7. Immo (ut hoc obiter dicam) etiam forma ut est prin-  
 cipium generationis, longe aliter est principium, quam ut  
 est principium rei genitae et constitutionis eius: ipsius enim  
 rei est principium per influxum et causalitatem formalem,  
 ut infra declarabimus: generationis autem non potest esse  
 principium hoc modo, quia ipsa non potest esse causa pro-  
 105 pria eius <375> generationis per quam fit, ita ut in eam  
 vere influat, nisi forte reducat ad causam finalem: nam  
 finis generationis est formae introductio: vel etiam ad for-  
 malem extrinsecam, in quantum generatio speciem sumit  
 a forma ad quam tendit: quae causalitates Physicae sunt  
 valde impropriae respectu talis formae, ut postea patebit.  
 Et ideo haec ratio principii qua forma dicitur principium  
 110 generationis, proprie pertinet ad hunc postremum modum:  
 nam generatio per se et intrinsece intendit formam, ut for-  
 malem terminum ad quem tendit: quod satis est ut dicatur  
 generationis principium. Secus vero est de materia: quia

Materia qualiter  
 principium  
 generationis.

<sup>11</sup>*DM* 15.

80R It seems to have a kind of intermediate *ratio* between the two kinds  
 of principle that have already been explained. For the former kind is  
 most broad and is founded merely on any kind of order of priority.  
 It does not ever require a disposition *per se*, but can be found in any  
 genus of composition or succession. Privation, however, is called a  
 85R principle of natural generation in a more perfect and more intrinsic  
 way. But the second kind of principle through influx is more perfect  
 than anything that can agree with privation. For privation, since it is  
 not a real thing, cannot have a proper influx into a thing that comes  
 to be or into its generation. Much less can it intrinsically compose the  
 generated thing. Therefore, it is called a principle on account of an in-  
 90R trinsic disposition of the generation toward it. For because generation  
 is essentially a transition from non-being to being, it for that reason  
*per se* presupposes privation, and comes to be *per se* from it as from a  
 necessary terminus. For this reason, therefore, privation is said to be  
 95R a principle of a natural thing, not indeed of its constitution as a being  
 having been made already but of its generation.

100R 7. Indeed, if I may mention this in passing, even form when it is a  
 principle of generation is a principle in a very different way than when  
 it is a principle of the generated thing and of its constitution. For of  
 the thing itself it is a principle through influx and formal causality,  
 as we will show below,<sup>11</sup> but it is not a principle in this way of the  
 generation. For it cannot be a proper cause of the generation through  
 which it is made such that it truly inflows being into it, unless per-  
 105R haps it were reduced to a final cause (for the end of generation is the  
 introduction of the form) or even to an extrinsic formal [cause] in-  
 sofar as generation takes its species from the form to which it tends.  
 [But] these physical causalities are very improper with respect to such  
 a form, as will be clear later. And for this reason this *ratio* of princi-  
 ple according to which a form is said to be a principle of generation  
 properly pertains to this last kind [of principle]. For generation *per*  
 110R *se* and intrinsically intends the form as the formal terminus to which  
 it tends. That is sufficient for calling it a principle of generation.

But it is otherwise with matter, since matter also has a kind of

Form is a  
 principle of  
 generation in one  
 way, a principle  
 of the generated  
 thing in another  
 way.

How matter is a  
 principle of  
 generation.

115 haec etiam respectu generationis habet aliquem influxum et  
causalitatem, licet diversum ab ea quam habet circa constitu-  
tionem rei naturalis, in hanc enim rem naturalem influit ma-  
teria intrinsece constituendo illam per seipsam: in genera-  
tionem vero non ita, sed solum sustentando, et recipiendo il-  
lam. Et haec sint per occasionem dicta de his principiis quia  
120 illis solet per antonomasiam nomen principii rei naturalis  
accommodari. Denique ad hanc ultimam principii denom-  
inationem possunt reduci aliqua exempla posita in prima  
et generali denominatione, quatenus in eis reperiri potest  
ordo per se, et ab intrinseco necessarius: sic enim punctus  
125 dici potest per se principium lineae, et primus gradus, totius  
qualitatis, et fundamentum, domus: quamquam in his talis  
modus principii per se semper reducitur ad aliquod genus  
influxus seu causalitatis.

*Esse prius, omni principio qualiter commune.*

8. Ex hac principiorum enumeratione colligi potest primo  
commune esse omni principio ut sit aliquo modo prius  
principiato: hoc enim prae se fert ipsum principii nomen.  
5 Immo Aristoteles citato loco 5. *Metaphysicae* colligit, *com-*  
*munne omni principio esse ut sit primum*: quod aliquid maius  
est quam esse prius: nam hoc solum dicit antecessorem ad  
principiatum: illud vero dicit negationem prioris. Sed con-  
siderandum est, principium simpliciter in aliquo genere, vel  
10 sub aliqua ratione dici, quod ita est principium ut non sit  
principiatum sub illa ratione, nam si sit principiatum ab alio  
in ea serie, non erit principium simpliciter in illo ordine, sed  
tantum secundum quid respectu alicuius: verbi gratia punc-  
tus tunc est proprie principium lineae, <col. b> quando  
15 ante illum nullus punctus, et consequenter nec pars lineae  
antecessit: punctus autem continuans partes lineae, tantum  
respective potest dici principium subsequentium partium,  
cum sit terminus praecedentium. Quod clarius in tempore  
considerare licet: absolute enim illud solum instans est prin-  
20 cipium temporis, ante quod instans nullum tempus praeces-  
sit, sed immediate subsequitur: instans autem intermedium

115R influx and causality with respect to generation, although different  
from that which it has concerning the constitution of a natural thing.  
For matter inflows into this natural thing, intrinsically constituting it  
through itself. But in generation it does not [constitute] but only sus-  
tains and receives. And these things are occasionally said about these  
principles, since the name ‘principles of a natural thing’ is customarily  
applied to them through antonomasia.

120R Finally, some examples posited for the first and general denomi-  
nation can be reduced to this last denomination of principle insofar as  
a *per se* and from intrinsic necessity order can be found in them. For  
in this way a point can be called a *per se* principle of a line, a first grade  
of the whole quality, and a foundation of the house, although in these  
cases such a kind of *per se* principle is always reduced to some genus  
of influx or causality.

*In what way being before is common to every principle.*

5R 8. From this enumeration of principles one can gather, first, that  
it is common to every principle that it be prior in some way to the  
*principiatum*. For the very name ‘principle’ shows this. In fact, Aris-  
totle in the cited passage from *Metaphysics V* gathers that ‘it is common  
to every principle that it be first’, which is something stronger than  
being before. For the latter merely implies being antecedent to the  
*principiatum* but the latter implies the negation of anything prior [to  
the principle]. It should be considered, however, that what is called  
the unqualified principle in some genus or under some aspect is that  
which is a principle in such a way that it is not a *principiatum* under  
that aspect. For if it is the *principiatum* of something else in that series,  
it will not be the unqualified principle in that order but only a qual-  
ified principle with respect to something else. For example, a point  
10R is then properly the principle of a line when there is no other point  
before it and consequently no part of the line precedes it. But a point  
on continuing parts of the line can be called a principle only with re-  
spect to the subsequent parts, since it is the terminus of the preceding  
parts. This may be considered more clearly in the case of time. For in  
15R an absolute sense only that instant is the principle of time which has  
no time preceding it but is immediately followed. An intermediate in-

Concil. Tolet. VI. et XI. in principio. Dionys. c. 1. *De caelest. hierarch.* et 2. *De div. nom.* Cap. Damnaemus, de summa Trinit. et fide cathol. Nazianz. orat. 29. Athanas. orat. in illud dictum. Deus de Deo. Aug. 4. *De Trin.* c. 20.

25 non dicitur simpliciter principium temporis, sed tantum respective vel sub aliqua determinata ratione, scilicet principium diei, vel anni. Et ad hanc verborum proprietatem videntur alludere Sancti cum dicunt, Patrem aeternum, esse principium, fontem, et originem totius deitatis. Non enim ita loquuntur quia Pater sit principium ipsius naturae divinae: quia iuxta fidem catholicam divina natura non habet principium, quia a nullo procedit, alias ab eo distinguetur: unde sicut damnatur haec locutio, essentia generat: ita et haec, essentia generatur, vel procedit. Vocant ergo Patrem principium divinitatis, quia in illo gradu, seu ordine (ut ita dicam) divinarum personarum solus ipse ita est principium aliarum personarum in divinitate subsistentium, ut nullum principium habeat: et ideo dicitur principium divinitatis, id est omnis communicationis divinitatis. Filius autem, quia principium habet, non potest absolute vocari principium divinitatis: dicitur autem vere principium Spiritus sancti, seu communicationis divinitatis per modum spirationis, quia sub ea ratione non habet principium. Sic igitur de ratione omnis principii est ut sit prius eo cuius est principium, quod si absolute et simpliciter in aliquo ordine principium sit, erit etiam primum in illo ordine.

Forma an prior generatione.

45 9. Dices, Forma est principium generationis rei naturalis, et tamen nullo modo est prior generatione, cum sit formalis terminus eius. Item obiiciet Theologus in divinis personis nullam propriam prioritatem inveniri, cum tamen in eis sit propriissima ratio principii. Ad priorem partem respondetur formam esse <376> priorem generatione in ratione termini per se, ad quem ordinatur generatio, quae revocatur ad prioritatem in ordine intentionis. Non deerit tamen qui dicat formam etiam esse priorem natura in executione et in genere causae formalis: sed id non recte dicitur respectu generationis, quia ut dixi, non est propria causa illius, satis ergo est prior habitudo generationis ad formam ut haec sit principium illius, quidquid sit de propria causalitate respectu illius. Dices, Ergo actus vocari poterit principium

stant, however, is not called an unqualified principle of time, but only respectively or under some determinate aspect, namely, the principle of a day or of a year.

25R The saints seems to allude to this property of the words when they say that the eternal Father is the principle, fount, and origin of the whole deity. For they do not say that because the Father is the principle of the divine nature itself. For according to the catholic faith the divine nature has no principle, since it proceeds from nothing. Otherwise it would be distinguished from that [from which it proceeds]. Hence, just as the phrase ‘the essence generates’ is condemned, so also the phrase ‘the essence is generated or proceeds’. Therefore, they call the Father the principle of divinity because in that grade or order (if I may speak in this way) of divine persons only the Father is the principle of the other persons subsisting in divinity in such a way that he himself has no principle. And for that reason he is called the principle of divinity, that is, of every communication of divinity. The Son, however, because he has a principle cannot be called the principle of divinity in an absolute sense. Moreover, he is not truly called a principle of the Holy Spirit or of the communication of divinity through the mode of spiration because under that aspect he does not have a principle. In this way, therefore, it belongs to the *ratio* of every principle to be before that of which it is the principle, and, if it is the principle absolutely and unqualifiedly in some order, it will also be first in that order.

45R 9. You may say that a form is a principle of the generation of a natural thing and yet in no way is prior to the generation since it is its formal terminus. Likewise, a theologian will object that no proper priority can be found among the divine persons, yet there is a most proper *ratio* of principle among them.

50R To the former part, it is responded that a form is prior to generation in the *ratio* of the terminus *per se* to which the generation is ordered, which is called back to the priority in the order of intention. Nevertheless, one who says that form is also prior in nature in execution and in the genus of formal cause will not be incorrect. But that is not rightly said with respect to generation, because, as we said, form is not a proper cause of that. The prior disposition of generation to the form is enough, therefore, for the latter to be the principle of the former, whatever may be the case about the proper causality with re-

Concil. Tolet. VI. et XI. in principio. Dionys. c. 1. *De caelest. hierarch.* et 2. *De div. nom.* Cap. Damnaemus, de summa Trinit. et fide cathol. Nazianz. orat. 29. Athanas. orat. in illud dictum. Deus de Deo. Aug. 4. *De Trin.* c. 20.

Whether a form is prior to generation.



60 potentiae: quia licet sit posterior generatione, vel tempore, quam potentia, tamen est terminus quem per se respicit potentia, et a quo speciem sumit: unde natura est prior ordine intentionis. Respondetur primo concedendo sequelam in eo genere principii specificantis: quod enim est inconueniens? Deinde multo maior est ratio de forma respectu generationis, quia forma est ita extrinseca generationi, ut inseparabiliter, et intime ac essentialiter habeat illam coniunctam, 65 ita ut non possit intelligi actualis generatio quin ibi interueniat forma actu informans: actus vero est magis extrinsecus potentiae.

70 10. Altera pars obiectionis ad Theologos magis pertinet. Inter quos diversitas quaedam est fortasse potius in modo loquendi, quam in re. D. Thomas itaque in 1. p. q. 42. art. 3. in corpore, licet concedat inter Divinas personas esse ordinem originis, negat tamen simpliciter unam esse priorem alia, quia in Trinitate (inquit) est ordo naturae sine prioritatem. Et in solutione ad secundum declarat, 75 ibi nec prioritatem naturae esse, nec intellectus, quia illae personae et relativae sunt, et in unamet natura subsistunt: unde nec ex parte naturae habere possunt prioritatem, cum illa eadem sit: nec ex parte relationum, cum correlativa sint simul natura, et intellectu. Quapropter idem Doctor sanctus dicta q. 33. art. 1. ad 3. ita respondet difficultati, quam nunc tractamus, ut negare nostram assertionem videatur. Dicit enim, quamvis nomen *principii* sumptum sit a prioritatem, non tamen significare prioritatem. Nam frequens est, ut in nomine aliud sit, quod significet, aliud vero illud, a quo ad significandum imponitur. Nec sibi est contrarius D. Thomas, cum 1. p. q. 40. art. 4. inquit, personam producentem esse nostro modo intelligendi priorem persona producta. Nam ibi loquitur de modo intelligendi 80 nostro imperfecto et confuso. In altero autem loco agit de intelligenti- <col. b> tia perfecta, quae rebus ipsis prout in se sunt, debetur. Et ita intelligunt Caietanus et Thomistae, et cum eis in re concordat Durandus in 1. p. dist. 9. q. 2. et dist. 20. q. 2. Estque haec sententia satis proba-

60R spect to the former. You may say that an act will then be able to be called the principle of a power. For, although it is posterior in generation or in time than the power, nevertheless, it is the terminus which the power respects *per se* and from which it takes its species. Hence, by nature it is prior in the order of intention. It is responded by first 65R conceding the consequent in that genus of specifying principles. For what would be objectionable about that? Furthermore, the *ratio* of the form with respect to generation is much greater, since the form is extrinsic to the generation in such a way that it has that conjunction inseparably, intimately, and essentially, such that the actual generation 70R cannot be understood without the involvement of an actually informing form. But an act is more extrinsic to a power.

75R 10. The latter part of the objection belongs more to the theologians. Some of the differences between them are perhaps more verbal than real. Consequently, in *ST Ia.42.2 co.*, St. Thomas, although he concedes that there is an order of origin, among the divine persons, he denies that strictly speaking one is before the others, since in the Trinity, he says, there is an order of nature without priority. And in the response to the second argument he declares that in the Trinity there is neither priority of nature nor of intellect, since those persons 80R both are relatives and they all subsist in the very same nature. Hence they cannot have priority on the part of nature, since that is the same, nor can they have priority on the part of the relations, since the correlatives are also the same in nature and intellect.

85R As a result, the same holy Doctor in the same work, *Ia.33.1 ad 3*, responds in such a way to the difficulty that we are now discussing that he seems to deny our assertion. For he says that, although the name ‘principle’ is taken from priority, it nevertheless does not signify priority. For it often happens that what signifies in a name is one thing but that there is something else by which it is imposed in order to signify. Nor is St. Thomas opposing himself, since in *ST Ia.40.4*, he says in our way of understanding the person producing is prior to the person produced. For here he speaks about our imperfect and confused way of understanding. But in the other place he talks about perfect intelligence, which must [present] things as they are in themselves. 90R This is the way Cajetan and the Thomists understand the matter and in this case Durandus agrees with them in *I, dist. 9, q. 2, and dist. 20, q. 2*. And this view is probable enough and that way of speaking is 95R

95 bilis, modusque ille loquendi cautus est, et securus: iuxta  
 quam opinionem assertio nostra limitari poterit, ut Meta-  
 physice intelligatur, non Theologice, id est, de principio, 100R  
 quod lumen naturae cognoscit, non quod sola fides reve-  
 lat. Nihilominus Scotus in 1. p. dist. 12. q. 2. et dist. 28.  
 100 q. ultima, quem sequitur Gabriel in 1. p. dist. 9. q. 3. con-  
 cedit, sicut in divinis personis una est principium alterius,  
 ita esse priorem, non duratione, perfectione aut natura, sed 105R  
 origine tantum. Nam haec prioritas imperfectionem non in-  
 cludit, et in ipsa ratione principii producentis necessario in-  
 cluditur. Utrumque patet, quia solum importat in persona  
 105 producente, quod habeat esse absque tali origine, secundum  
 quam alia persona ab illa procedit: ut Pater habet esse ab-  
 110 sique generatione, Filius vero non nisi per generationem: et  
 uterque habet esse absque spiratione, sanctus vero Spiritus  
 non nisi per illam. Quod genus prioritatis inter correlativa  
 non potest in creatis rebus inveniri, quia unum relativum ut  
 115 tale est non procedit ab alio: in Divinis autem reperitur pro-  
 cessio unius correlativi ab alio, quatenus talia sunt. Et iuxta  
 hanc sententiam, assertio nostra universaliter verum habet:  
 nam si in Divinis personis vera invenitur, multo magis in  
 creatis. Non est autem mirum, quod sicut ratio principii  
 in illis personis singularis est, ita etiam modus prioritatis sit  
 120 peculiaris, et longe alterius rationis ab omnibus, qui in crea-  
 turis inveniuntur. Estque hic modus loquendi etiam proba-  
 bilis, et in re (ut opinor) non contradicit D. Thomas, quia  
 ipse nunquam expresse negavit hoc prioritatis genus in Di-  
 125 vinis personis, sed alia, quae in creaturis inveniuntur. Tacuit  
 tamen, nunquamque usus est illa locutione, sed ordinem  
 originis appellavit non prioritatem. Et sane non sine causa,  
 tum quia in rebus Divinis modus loquendi Patrum imitan-  
 130 dus est, apud quos illa locutio non reperitur: tum etiam,  
 quia prioritas originis non est absolutae prioritatis, prout  
 in Divinis personis reperitur: quia prioritas simpliciter et  
 sine addito asserta imperfectionem aliquam in re, quae pos-  
 terior dicitur, indicare videtur. Item, quia illud dicitur ab-  
 solute prius, quod potest aut esse, aut saltem exacte intelligi  
 sine alio: una vero persona divi- <377> na neutro modo 135R

cautious and safe. According to this opinion, our assertion can be limited so that it is understood metaphysically but not theologically, that is, as concerning the principles that are cognized by the light of nature but not those revealed only through faith.

Nevertheless, Scotus grants in I, dist. 12, q. 2, and dist. 28, last q., (Gabriel follows him in I, dist. 9, q. 3) that just as among the divine persons one is the principle of another, so also one is prior, not in duration, perfection, or in nature, but in origin alone. For this priority does not include imperfection, and is necessarily included in the very *ratio* of a producing principle. Each is clear, since it only requires that in the producing person that it have being apart from such an origin according to which the other person proceeds from it, as the Father has being apart from generation but the Son does not have it except through generation. And each has being apart from spiration, but the Holy Spirit does not except through spiration. This genus of priority between correlatives cannot be found in created things, since one relative as such does not proceed from another. But in the divine case there is found a procession of one correlative from another insofar as they are such. And according to this view, our assertion has truth universally. For if it is found to be true in the case of the divine person, much more is it true in the case of created things. Moreover, it is not surprising that just as the *ratio* of principle in those persons is unique, so also the mode of priority is peculiar and of a very different character than everything that can be found among creatures.

And this way of speaking is also probable and in reality (as I think) does not contradict St. Thomas, since he never explicitly denies this kind of priority among the divine persons, but denies other kinds that are found among creatures. Nevertheless, he leaves it unmentioned and never uses that locution, but he pronounces that order of origin is not priority. And reasonably and not without cause, both because in divine matters the Fathers' way of speaking should be imitated and that locution is not found among them, and also because the priority of origin is not absolute priority as it is found in the divine persons. For priority that is unqualified and without any asserted additions seems to imply some imperfection in the thing that is called posterior. Likewise, because that is said to be absolutely prior which either can exist or can at least be understood exactly without another. But a divine person is not related to another in either way.

ad aliam comparatur. Quod vero addunt aliqui, unam personam divinam esse priorem alia in ordine naturalis enumerationis, quomodo, primam, secundam, et tertiam personam numeramus: hoc (inquam) non est diversum a praecedenti, nam hic modus enumerandi non fundatur nisi in prioritatem originis, unde in re ipsa non indicat aliud prioritatis genus, declarat autem optime ille enumerandi modus hunc modum prioritatis originis, si congruis verbis, et sano sensu declaratur, non esse omnino alienum a modo loquendi Ecclesiae, et Doctorum. Unde cum illo addito acceptari potest, sufficiensque est ut in universum verum sit, omne principium esse aliquo modo prius eo, cuius est principium: quamvis hoc semper maneat singulare in Trinitate, quod cum ratio principii absolute, et simpliciter conveniat uni personae respectu alterius, ratio autem prioris solum cum addito, et limitatione tribuatur, nam illud absolute dictum nullam imperfectionem in altero extremo, hoc vero aliquam indicare videtur. Prioritas ergo originis dicto modo explicata, satis est ut vera ratio principii in divinis inveniatur: unde quod D. Thomas ait, nomen principii sumptum esse a prioritatem, non vero significare illam, si per prioritatem intelligat absolutam et positivam prioritatem, quae imperfectionem connotet in principiatio, verum est: si tamen sit sermo de pura antecessione quasi negativa, sub ea ratione sub qua principium dicitur, sic non solum nomen principii sumptum est a prioritatem, sed etiam illam significat, et requirit cum proportione debita, ut declaratum est, et constat ex definitione Aristotelis, et ex omnibus adductis.

*Descriptio principii in communi consummatur.*

Inter principium  
et principiatum  
connexio  
requisita.

11. Secundo infertur ex dictis, ad rationem principii non satis esse ut sit prius alio, sed necessarium esse ut inter illa sit aliqua connexio, vel consecutio unius ab alio, quod principium denominatur. Hoc patet ex communi modo concipiendi hominum, et inductione facile declaratur. Nam

<sup>12</sup>It is unclear to me how best to read the Latin in the last sentence.

Some people, however, add that one divine person is prior to another in the order of natural enumeration, in the way that we number them the first, second, and third person. This, I say, is not different from the previous claim, for there is no ground for this mode of enumerating if not in the priority of origin. Hence, in reality this does not indicate a different kind of priority. That mode of enumerating, however, best shows this mode of the priority of origin if with fitting words and sound sense it is shown not to be wholly alien to the way of speaking of the Church and the Doctors.

Hence, once that has been added, it can be accepted and it is sufficient so that it is universally true that every principle is in some way prior to something else of which it is the principle, although this always remains unique in the case of the Trinity, insofar as the *ratio* of principle absolutely and unqualifiedly agrees with one person with respect to another, but the *ratio* of prior is attributed only with an addition and limitation. For the former said absolutely implies no imperfection in either extreme, but the latter seems to indicate some imperfection. Therefore, once the priority of origin has been explained in the stated way, it is sufficient so that a true *ratio* of principle can be found in the divine case. Hence, the claim that St. Thomas makes—that the name ‘principle’ is taken from priority but does not signify it—is true if priority is understood to be absolute and positive priority, which connotes imperfection in the *principiatum*. Nevertheless, if the discussion is about a pure, negative, as it were, coming before (*antecessione*), under which *ratio* something is called a principle, then in that way the name ‘principle’ not only is taken from priority but also signifies it and requires due proportion to it, as was shown and is clear from Aristotle’s definition and from everything else that has been brought up.<sup>12</sup>

*The description of principles in general is completed.*

11. Second, it is inferred from what was said that for the *ratio* of principle it is not enough that something be prior to another. It is also necessary that there be some connection [between them] or the resulting of one from the other that is denominated the principle. This is clear from the common way of conceiving of human beings,

The required  
connection  
between  
principle and  
*principiatum*.

10 homo heri natus non est principium eius qui hodie nascitur, licet sit prior illo, et in divinis si Spiritus sanctus non procederet a Filio, Filius non posset dici principium eius, etiamsi cogitari aliquo modo posset ratione prior, eo scilicet modo quo actus intellectus <col. b> dicitur prior actu voluntatis. Est ergo necessaria aliqua connexio, vel consecutio: et ideo iuxta varios modos talis consecutionis, varia etiam est denominatio principii: interdum enim oritur ex situ: interdum ex successione intrinseca: aliquando ex dimanatione, et sic de aliis superius enumeratis. Atque hoc totum significavit Aristoteles dicto loco 5. *Metaphysicae* cum dixit, *Principium esse primum, unde aliquid est*, etc. nam illa dictio *unde*, praedictam connexionem vel consecutionem indicat. 20 Est autem hoc cum proportionem intelligendum, nam esse potest principium in actu et in potentia, et utroque modo requirit habitudinem ad alterum, quod ad illud consequitur, vel actu vel potentia.

Aristoteles.

25 12. Atque ita concluditur descriptio principii in communi et confusissime sumpti, quam sub his terminis D. Thomas tradit 1. p. q. 33. art. 1. *Principium est id a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo*: ubi verbum illud *procedit*, non est sumendum stricte pro vera origine, sed pro quocumque consecutione, vel connexionem, ut hactenus locuti sumus: et ad hoc significandum addidit fortasse D. Thomas illam particulam *quocumque modo*. Atque hoc sensu sumpta est illa definitio ex praedicto loco Aristotelis, dicentis principium esse, *id unde aliquid est*. Consulto enim videtur abstinuisse a peculiari verbo significanti originem, vel alium modum emanationis, ut per illam particulam *unde*, omnem modum coniunctionis seu consecutionis complecteretur. Addit vero ad maiorem explicationem principium esse, *Id unde aliquid est, aut fit, aut cognoscitur*, ut simul cum descriptione generalem quamdam divisionem principiorum explicaret: ad illa enim tria membra modo commemorata possunt omnia principia revocari, praesertim ea quae sunt per se: nam quae sunt per accidens, vix possunt ad certam methodum

Principii generalis quaedam divisio.

10R and is easily shown by induction. For a human being born yesterday is not the principle of one born today even though it is prior to the it. And among the divine persons, if the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son, the Son would not be called its principle, even if he could be thought in some way prior in reason, namely, in the way in which an act of intellect is said to be prior to an act of will. Therefore, some connection or resulting is necessary. For this reason, the denomination ‘principle’ is various after the varios modes of such resulting. For sometimes it arises from position, some from an intrinsic succession, sometimes from dimanation, and so on concerning the others enumerated above. And Aristotle indicated all this in the cited passage from *Metaphysics* V when he said that ‘a principle is first, from which something is ...’ For that phrase ‘from which’ implies the aforementioned connection or resulting. This must, however, be understood with proportion, for a principle can be in actuality or potentiality, and in either way it requires a disposition to another which results from it, either actually or potentially.

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35R

40R

12. And so the description of principle taken generally and most vaguely is concluded, which St. Thomas taught under these terms in *ST Ia.33.1* [co.]: ‘a principle is that from which something proceeds in any way whatsoever’. The word ‘proceeds’ there should not be taken strictly for true origin, but for any resulting or connection whatsoever, in the way we have been speaking so far. Perhaps in order to signify this, St. Thomas adds the little phrase ‘in any way whatsoever’. This is the way that definition from the cited passage<sup>13</sup> from Aristotle where he says that a principle is ‘that from which something is’ should be taken. For he seems deliberately to have avoided a peculiar word signifying origin or any other mode of emanation, so that every kind of conjunction or resulting is included through that phrase ‘from which’. For a more thorough explanation, he adds that a principle is ‘that from which something is, or comes to be, or is cognized’. He does this in order to explain a certain division of principles at the same time along with the general description. For all principles, especially those that are *per se*, can be brought under only these three aforementioned members. (Those that are *per accidens* cannot easily be brought under a reliable method except insofar as they are reduced

Aristotle.

St. Thomas.

A certain general division of principle.

<sup>13</sup>See the previous paragraph.

45 revocari, nisi quatenus reducuntur ad ea quae sunt per se. Sic igitur principia omnia aut sunt principia rei in fieri, aut  
 50 principia rei in esse: et ad haec duo membra reducuntur omnia  
 55 principia rerum, quia non potest intelligi in rebus aliis  
 status nisi in fieri, vel in esse: et non semper principium  
 effectationis, est principium constitutionis rei, ut patet in  
 60 privatione. Sub principio autem eius quod fit, comprehenditur  
 omne principium motus vel operationis ut sic, vel cuiuslibet  
 rei successivae: nam ista omnia <378> habent suum  
 esse in fieri: sub principio vero eius quod est, includuntur  
 omnia principia rerum, quae aliquo modo habent esse  
 (ut aiunt) in facto esse. Quia vero etiam res successivae, et  
 65 actiones ipsae aliquo modo sunt, ideo generalius sumendo  
 verbum *est*, dici solet a Theologis *Principium esse id, unde  
 aliquid est*. Atque eodem posset sub his verbis comprehendi  
 principium cognitionis, et revera comprehenditur, si cog-  
 70 nitio consideretur quatenus quaedam res est, quae fit, vel  
 est: merito tamen Aristoteles tertium membrum adiunxit  
 de principiis cognitionis, ut significaret non semper prin-  
 cipium cognitionis esse principium rei cognitae, sed saepe  
 alia esse principia rei in esse cognito, a principiis eiusdem  
 rei in esse aut fieri. Non addidit autem in speciali princip-  
 75 ium amandi, quia hoc nullum est nisi vel principium es-  
 sendi, vel cognoscendi. Atque ex his satis constat tum de-  
 scriptio, tum etiam divisio ab Aristotele tradita: divisio (in-  
 quam) dicta, quae est trimembris. Post illam vero subiungit  
 80 Aristoteles aliam bimembrem, dicens, *aliud esse principium  
 intrinsecum, aliud extrinsecum*, quae est subdivisio priorum  
 membrorum, ut ipsemet satis clare indicat. Atque ad illam  
 trimembrem divisionem revocat omnes acceptiones prin-  
 cipii quas supra numeraverat: et omnes alias quae excogitari  
 possunt. Non enim sollicitus fuit in enumerandis omnibus  
 75 significationibus ipsius vocis, quod prolixum esset et min-  
 ime necessarium, sed eas quae vel erant magis usitatae, vel  
 ex quibus aliae facile poterant cognosci. Et ideo supervaca-  
 neum censo scrupulose inquirere aliam sufficientiam illius  
 enumerationis. Quod si quis copiosam de illa re disputa-  
 80 tionem requirat, legat Fonseca lib. 5 *Metaphysicae* cap. 1.

Intrinsecum  
principium quod,  
quod vero  
extrinsecum.

to those that are *per se*.

45R So, then, all principles are either principles of a thing in coming  
 to be (*in fieri*) or principles of a thing in being (*in esse*). All princi-  
 50R ples of things can be brought under these two members, since no state  
 other than becoming or being can be understood of things. And a  
 principle of effecting is not always a principle of the constitution of  
 the thing, as is clear in the case of privation. Under the principle of  
 that which comes to be, however, is included every principle of mo-  
 55R tion or operation as such or any sort of successive thing. For every  
 such thing has its being in becoming. But under the principle of that  
 which is included every principle of things that in some way have  
 being in the being having been made (as they say). But because even  
 60R successive things and actions themselves in some way are, for that rea-  
 son the word ‘is’ must be taken more generally. It is customarily said  
 by the theologians that ‘a principle is that from which something is’.  
 And a principle of cognition can be included in the same way under  
 these terms. It really is included, if cognition is considered insofar  
 as it is a kind of thing that comes to be or is. Nevertheless, Aristotle  
 justifiably added a third member about the principles of cognition  
 to indicate that a principle of cognition is not always a principle of a  
 thing cognized, but often the principles of a thing cognized in being  
 are different from the principles of the same thing in being or in com-  
 65R ing to be. Moreover, he did not add a special principle of loving, since  
 this is nothing other than either a principle of being or of cognizing.  
 And from these things both the description and also the division—the  
 aforementioned division that has three members—taught by Aristotle  
 are sufficiently clear.

70R After that, Aristotle adds in another two-fold division, saying:  
 ‘one is an intrinsic principle, another is extrinsic’. This is a subdivi-  
 sion of the prior members, as he himself makes sufficiently clear.

75R And he brings every sense of principle that he enumerated earlier  
 and all the others that can be thought of under this three-fold divi-  
 sion. For he was not anxious to enumerate every signification of that  
 word—which would be prolix and hardly necessary—but only those  
 that either are of more use or from which something else can be read-  
 80R ily understood. For this reason I think it superfluous to search scrupu-  
 lously for another sufficiency of that enumeration. But if someone  
 needs a copious disputation concerning this matter, he may read Fon-

Which principles  
are intrinsic and  
which extrinsic.

per quaestiones septem, praesertim in quarta.

*Analogia principii declaratur.*

13. Tertio ex dictis infertur, Principium non dici mere  
 equivoce de omnibus membris quae sub illo continentur, su-  
 periusque numerata sunt, quandoquidem non tantum nom-  
 5 en, sed etiam aliqua ratio nominis est illis communis. Du-  
 bitari vero solet an sit univoca, vel analoga. Ad quod bre-  
 viter dicendum est non posse esse univocam. Tria enim  
 possunt in principio considerari, unum est res ipsa quae  
 denominatur principium: aliud propria relatio secundum  
 10 esse, quae principia ad principiatum concipitur: tertium  
 <col. b> est id quod intelligitur tamquam proxima ratio  
 fundandi illam relationem, quae est consecutio illa seu di-  
 manatio principiatum a principio. In nullo autem ex his con-  
 veniunt univoce ea omnia quae principia dicuntur. Primum  
 15 patet, quia principium denominatur non tantum ens increa-  
 tum, sed etiam creatum, nec solum ens reale, sed etiam rati-  
 onis: sed haec non conveniunt univoce in aliqua ratione  
 propria et intrinseca: ergo. Atque eadem ratio fieri potest de  
 20 secundo, nam etiam relatio principii communis est ad crea-  
 tum et increatam, quamvis hanc posteriorem Philosophia  
 non agnoscat. Item ad relationes reales et rationis. Et ex his  
 idem concludi potest de tertio: primo quidem, quia tanta  
 est varietas in illis rationibus seu connexionibus principi-  
 atorum cum principiiis, ut vix inter se conveniant nisi in  
 25 nomine et proportionalitate aliqua. Secundo, quia quando  
 id quod denominatur principium, est ens rationis tantum,  
 ratio fundandi relationem principii non potest esse realis:  
 in aliis vero rebus saepe est vera dimanatio et processio re-  
 alis. Rursus haec interdum est creata, interdum increata: est  
 30 ergo in his eadem ratio analogiae. Tandem, quia principia  
 quae solum ob successionem temporis aut ordinem situs, vel  
 aliam similem accidentalem connexionem sic denominan-  
 tur, longe distant a principiiis per se, et maxime ab illis, quae  
 per verum influxum et causalitatem talia sunt. Neque huic

seca, *Metaphysics*, V.1, the first seven questions, especially the fourth.

*The analogy of principles is shown.*

13. Third, it is inferred from what has been said that ‘principle’ is not  
 said merely equivocally of all the members that are contained under  
 it and that were listed above, since not only the name but also the *ra-*  
 5 *tio* of the name is common to them. It is usual to wonder whether  
 it is univocal or analogous. To which it ought to be replied briefly  
 that it cannot be univocal. For three things can be considered in a  
 principle. One is the thing itself that is denominated a principle. An-  
 other is the proper relation according to being (*relatio secundum esse*)  
 10 that the principle bears to the *principiatum*. The third is that which  
 is understood as the proximate grounding reason (*ratio fundandi*) for  
 that relation, which is that resulting or emanation of the *principia-*  
*tum* from the principle. But in none of these do all those things that  
 are called principles agree univocally.

The first case is clear, since not only uncreated being but also cre-  
 ated being is denominated principle, not only real being but also being  
 of reason. But these do not agree univocally in any proper and intrin-  
 sic *ratio*. Therefore. And the same argument can be made concerning  
 the second case. For the relation of a principle is also common to cre-  
 ated and uncreated being, even if philosophy does not recognize the  
 latter.<sup>14</sup> Likewise for real relations and relations of reason. And from  
 these the same thing can be concluded for the third case. First, indeed,  
 because the variety in those *rationes* or connections of the *principiata*  
 to their principles is so great that they agree with each other in hardly  
 15 anything other than in name and some proportionality. Second, be-  
 cause when that which is denominated a principle is merely a being of  
 reason, the grounding reason for the relation of the principle cannot  
 be real. But in other things there often is a true emanation and real  
 procession. In turn, this is sometimes created but sometimes unre-  
 20 created. Therefore, in these cases there is the same *ratio* of analogy. Fi-  
 nally, because the principles that are denominated principles only on  
 account of the succession of time or of the order of position or some  
 other similar accidental connection are very different from principles  
 25 *per se* and especially different from those that are such through a true

<sup>14</sup>See n. 10.

35 analogiae obstat unitas descriptionis datae: nam termini  
quibus illa constat, adeo sunt transcendentales, ut analogiam  
in se involvant. Neque etiam obstat quod fere semper ab-  
absolute et sine addito *principium* dicatur de quocumque sig-  
nificato supra posito: nam hoc accidere potest vel propter  
40 proportionalitatem claram et notam, vel quia ex subiecta  
materia constat in qua significatione sumatur vox: vel certe  
propter aliquam propriam et intrinsecam rationem prin-  
cipii, iuxta ea quae inferius dicemus de analogia entis.

Idem respectu  
diversorum et  
attributionis et  
proportionalitatis  
analogum.

14. Quaeret autem fortasse aliquis qualis sit haec analo-  
45 gia, et de quibus significatis *principium* primario dicatur.  
De qua re multa dicunt interpretes dicto lib. 5. *Metaphys-*  
*icae* cap. 1. Ego tamen breviter censeo hanc analogiam  
non esse unam sed multiplicem respectu diversorum sig-  
nificatorum: non enim <379> repugnat idem nomen pri-  
50 mario significans rem aliquam ad quasdam alias transferri  
per attributionem, ad alias vero per proportionalitatem. Ut  
sanum primario significans animal, per attributionem signi-  
ficat medicinam, per proportionalitatem vero pomum inte-  
grum et incorruptum. Sic igitur dicendum censeo de prin-  
55 cipii nomine respectu suorum significatorum. Est autem  
considerandum, aliud esse loqui de prima impositione huius  
vocis prout ab hominibus facta est, aliud de re significata per  
illam, ut in simili distinguit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 13. art. 6.  
60 Priori modo existimo hanc vocem impositam esse ad sig-  
nificandum principium motus, vel temporis, nam quia pri-  
ores Philosophi non cognoscebant nisi res corporales, in eis  
primum distinxerunt principium, medium, et finem: haec  
autem videntur primum cognita ex motu seu actione ali-  
65 qua: et ideo verisimile est nomen principii, primum fuisse  
impositum ad significandum principium motus vel actio-  
nis, vel partem illam magnitudinis a qua incipit motus. Et  
fortasse hoc significavit Aristoteles primo loco hanc accep-

Ordo  
impositionis  
vocis principium  
ad sua significata.

<sup>15</sup>*DM* 28.3.

62 distinxerunt ] distinxerant V.

35R influx and causality.

Nor does the unity of the description [of principle] given op-  
pose this analogy. For the terms with which it is constructed are tran-  
scendental precisely to the point that they involve analogy in them-  
selves. Nor is it any problem that ‘principle’ is almost always said  
40R absolutely and without any addition concerning any of the signifi-  
cates mentioned above. For this can happen on account of a clear and  
well-known proportionality, because in what signification the word is  
taken is clear from the subject matter, or, at any rate, on account of  
some proper and intrinsic *ratio* of principle. We will say more about  
45R these things below when discussing the analogy of being.<sup>15</sup>

14. Perhaps someone will ask what this analogy is and which of  
the significates of ‘principle’ is said primarily. Interpreters have said  
a great deal about this matter concerning the aforementioned *Meta-*  
*physics* V.1. Nevertheless, I, briefly, think that this analogy is not one  
50R but is multiple with respect to different significates. For it is not re-  
pugnant for the same name that primarily signifies some thing to be  
transferred to other things through [the analogy] of attribution and  
to yet other things through [the analogy] of proportionality. For ex-  
ample, ‘health’ primarily signifies an animal but through attribution  
55R signifies the medicine and through proportionality signifies a sound  
and uninjured fruit. This, then, is what I think should be said about  
the name ‘principle’ with respect to its significates.

It should be considered, however, that it is one thing to speak  
about the first imposition of this expression as it has been made by  
human beings and another thing to speak about the signified thing  
through it (as St. Thomas distinguishes in a similar case in *ST* Ia.13.6  
[co.]). In the former way, I think this imposed expression is for sig-  
nifying the principle of motion or of time. For since earlier philoso-  
60R phers were not aware of anything but corporeal things, they first dis-  
tinguished principle, means, and end by reference to corporeal things.  
65R These, moreover, seem to have been cognized first from some motion  
or action. And for this reason it is likely true that the name ‘princi-  
ple’ was first imposed for signifying the principle of notion or action  
or that part of magnitude from which motion begins. Perhaps Aris-

The same term  
with respect to  
different things is  
analogous by  
attribution and  
by  
proportionality.

The order of  
imposition of the  
expression  
‘principle’ to its  
significates.

tionem enumerans. Hinc vero derivata est haec vox per proportionem vel proportionalitatem ad alia significata.

Quid primario,  
secundario quid  
significet  
*principium*.

15. At vero quantum ad rem significatam principalius significat haec vox principia per se quam per accidens: et ea praesertim quae sunt principia per verum et realem influxum, quia in his est multo verior et proprior dimanatio unius ab alio et origo, quam nomen principii prae se fert. Haec autem ratio principii cum causalitate coniuncta est respectu creaturarum, et convenit tum Deo, tum etiam creaturis. Et hac ratione potest de Deo, et creaturis dici secundum analogiam attributionis: verbi gratia esse principium efficiens analogice dicitur de Deo et creaturis, non secundum proportionalitatem tantum, sed propter veram, et realem convenientiam, analogam tamen et includentem attributionem, ut inferius generaliter explicabimus in analogia entis ad Deum et creaturas. Et idem dici potest de principio finali, vel exemplari. Quomodo vero ratio principii communis sit principio efficienti, finali, et exemplari, pertinet ad divisionem de causa in haec et alia membra, de qua infra dicemus. In solo autem Deo ad intra (quod Philosophia non agnovit) reperitur vera ratio principii positivi ac per se cum vero influxu seu pro- <col. b> ductione absque causalitate, quae est altior et mirabilior ratio principii.

De Deo, ut Dei,  
et creaturarum  
principium est,  
qualiter dicatur  
*principium*.

16. Unde merito solet a Theologis inquiri an principium in communi, etiam dictum de ipso Deo, ut est principium creaturarum, vel ut una persona divina est principium alterius, sit univocum, vel analogum. Quidam putant esse analogum, et per prius dici de Deo secundum emanationes ad extra, quam ad intra, quia creatura procedit a Deo, non tantum secundum personam, sed etiam secundum naturam, et essentiam: et ideo maior ratio principii videtur esse in Deo respectu creaturarum, quam sit in Patre aeterno respectu Filii, cuius personam producit, non naturam. Et confirmatur, quia ratio principii respectu creaturarum est absoluta et essentialis: alia vero relativa et notionalis; ea vero quae sunt essentialia, ex propriis conceptibus videntur potentiora, et priora notionalibus. Confirmatur secundo, quia

70R totle indicated this in the first passage in which he listed this meaning. But through proportion or proportionality this expression has been extended from here to other significates.

75R 15. On the other hand, as far as the thing signified is concerned, this expression ‘principle’ more principally signifies *per se* principles than *per accidens* principles, and especially those that are principles through a true and real influx. For in those there is a much truer and more proper origin and emanation of one thing from another, which [is the aspect to which] the name ‘principle’ draws attention. Moreover, this *ratio* of principle is conjoined with causality with respect to creatures and agrees both with God and also with creatures. And with this *ratio* it can be said of God and of creatures according the analogy of attribution, not only according to proportionality, but on account of a true and real fittingness, yet analogous and including attribution, as we will explain more generally below [when discussing] the analogy of being to God and creatures. And the same thing can be said about the final and exemplary principle. But how the *ratio* of principle is common to the efficient, final, and exemplary principles pertains to the division of cause into these and other members, about which we will talk below. But only in God and towards himself is found the true *ratio* of a positive and *per se* principle (which philosophy does not recognize) with a true influx and production but apart from causality, which is a higher and more marvelous *ratio* of principle.

What ‘principle’  
signifies  
primarily and  
what secondarily.

95R 16. Hence, it is rightly customary for theologians to ask whether principle in general, having been said of God himself as principle is of creatures or as one divine person is the principle of another, is univocal or analogous. Some think it is analogous and is said of God according to the emanations to external things before [according to emanations] to internal things, since creatures proceed from God not only according to his person but also according to his nature and essence. For this reason, there seems to be a greater *ratio* of principle in God with respect to creatures than there is in the eternal Father with respect to the Son, whose person but not nature is produced. It is confirmed, since the *ratio* of principle with respect to creatures is absolute and essential, but the other one is relative and notional. But those that are essential seem better according to the proper concepts and prior to the notional ones. It is confirmed, second, because power *simpliciter*

How ‘principle’  
is said of God as  
he is the principle  
of God and of  
creatures.



105 potentia simpliciter in Deo prius dicitur de potentia pro-  
 ducendi ad extra, quam ad intra: unde Deus simpliciter est  
 omnipotens per potentiam operandi ad extra, non vero ad  
 110 intra, alias Spiritus sanctus non esset omnipotens eo quod  
 ad intra producere non possit. At vero eadem est ratio de  
 principio quae de potentia, cum principium sit ratione po-  
 tentiae. Atque ita sentit Durandus in 1. p. dist. 29. q. 1.  
 Durandus.

17. Aliis vero placet esse analogum, per prius dictum  
 de principio ad intra quam ad extra, tum quia relatio prin-  
 cipii ad creaturas est rationis: inter personas vero divinas est  
 115 realis, tum etiam quia principium est unde aliquid est: sed  
 creatura analogice est respectu divinae personae proceden-  
 tis, quia haec procedit in esse increato, illa in creato: ergo  
 illa processio est longe nobilior, etiam secundum analogiam:  
 ergo etiam ratio principii quae illi respondet, per prius dici-  
 120 tur secundum emanationem ad intra quam ad extra. Atque  
 huius sententiae videtur esse D. Thomas 1. p. q. 33. art. 1.  
 ad 4. et art. 3. Sed illis locis non agit de nomine principii,  
 sed de nomine *patris*, de quo est longe diversa ratio. Sed  
 sub nomine principii id expresse affirmat in 1. p. dist. 29.  
 125 q. 1. art. 2. ubi Capreolus, Albertus, Richardus, et alii idem  
 sentiunt.  
 D. Thomas.  
 Capreolus.  
 Richardus.  
 Albertus.

18. Tertia vero sententia esse potest hoc nomen *prin-*  
*cipium* esse univocum ad illas duas rationes: non enim re-  
 pugnat idem nomen quod est analogum respectu plurium,  
 130 <380> esse univocum respectu aliquorum, ut per se con-  
 stat, et infra tractando de communitate entis et accidentis  
 latius dicemus. Quod autem ita sit in praesenti quoad hanc  
 partem de qua agimus, probatur quia hic non intervenit  
 analogia proportionalitatis, nec attributionis. Prior pars  
 135 probatur, tum quia alias solum per translationem diceretur  
 Deus principium creaturarum, non per proprietatem,  
 tum etiam quia D. Thomas supra expresse fatetur dari unam  
 rationem communem originis processionis creaturarum a  
 Deo, vel unius personae divinae ab alia, quae est, *aliquid*  
 140 *ab aliquo esse*: et sic etiam dari unam communem rationem

in God is said more about the power for producing external things  
 than from the power for internal things. Hence, God is omnipotent  
 110R *simpliciter* through the power of operating on external things, but not  
 through the power of operating internally. Otherwise the Holy Spirit  
 would not be omnipotent as a result of not being able to produce in-  
 ternal things. But the reasoning is the same in the case of principle as  
 in the case of power, since [God] is a principle by reason of power.  
 115R (Durandus thinks this in I, dist. 29, q. 1.)

17. But to others it is pleasing [to say] that it is analogous [but] is  
 said of the principle to internal things before [being said of the prin-  
 ciple] to external things, both [i] because the relation of the principle  
 to creatures is of reason but between the divine persons is real and  
 120R also [ii] because a principle is that from where something is but crea-  
 ture is analogical with respect to the divine persons proceeding since  
 the latter proceeds to uncreated being but the former to created being.  
 Therefore, the former procession is far more noble, even according  
 to the analogy. Therefore, the *ratio* of principle that corresponds to  
 it is said more according to the emanation of to internal rather than  
 125R to external things. St. Thomas seems to be of this view in *ST* Ia.33.1  
 ad 4 and Ia.33.3. But in other places he does not deal with the name  
 ‘principle’ but with the name ‘father’, concerning which there is a  
 very different argument. But with respect to the name ‘principle’, he  
 expressly affirms it in I, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, where Capreolus, Albert,  
 Richard, and others think the same thing.

18. The third view can be that this name ‘principle’ is univocal  
 with respect to those two *rationes*. For it is not repugnant for the same  
 name that is analogous with respect to multiple things is univocal with  
 respect to some of them, as is obvious in itself and as we will talk  
 more about below when discussing the community of being and of  
 accidents. But that it is so with respect to the part we are discussing  
 now is proven on grounds that neither the analogy of proportionality  
 or of attribution intervenes here.

The former part is proven, both because otherwise God would  
 said to be the principle of creatures only through transference and  
 not through propriety and because St. Thomas expressly admitted to  
 giving one common *ratio* of the origin of procession of creatures from  
 God or of one divine person from another, namely, that ‘something  
 is from something’. And in that way is also given one common *ratio*

Durandus.

St. Thomas.

Capreolus.  
Richard.  
Albert.

principii: in analogia autem proportionalitatis non est una communis ratio. Secunda autem pars probatur, quia Deus ut dicitur primum principium personarum, non refertur ad se ut est principium personarum: ergo nulla potest ibi esse analogia attributionis. Item, quia alias Spiritus sanctus diceretur principium creaturarum per attributionem ad Patrem, vel ad Filium, quod videtur satis absurdum. Item quia hic cessat ratio analogiae attributionis, quae esse solet inter Deum et creaturas, nimirum quod omne esse seu omnis perfectio creaturae primario est in Deo, et ab illo pendet: hic autem una ratio principii non causatur ab alia, neque ab illa pendet: immo nec emanatio creaturarum per se pendet ex emanationibus divinarum personarum: quia multitudo personarum non erat per se necessaria ad productionem ad extra: cessat ergo in praesenti omnis ratio analogiae attributionis.

19. In hac re distinguenda videntur illa tria, quae supra in omni principio distinximus, scilicet relatio principii, proxima ratio talis relationis, et id quod principium nominatur. Quoad primum non est dubium quin hic sit analogia, quia relatio principii Dei ad creaturas est rationis: personae autem divinae producentis ad productam est realis. Et hunc sensum declaravit expresse Scotus dist. 29. q. 1. Immo haec analogia, vel non est attributionis, sed proportionis tantum: vel saltem si est attributionis, non est secundum communem conceptum: quia hic nullus est ad ens rationis, et reale.

20. Quoad secundum etiam existimo probabilius rationem principii actualis dici analogice, et principalius de Deo secundum processiones ad intra, quam ad extra, propter rationes adductas. Est autem haec analogia attributionis, et non solum proportionis, si- <col. b> cut est analogia entis, et aliorum attributorum quae de Deo et creaturis proprie dicuntur. Nam haec analogia principii fundatur in analogia quae est inter creationem et processiones

of principle. But in an analogy of proportionality there is no one common *ratio*.

The second part is proven, because when God is said to be the first principle of creatures one does not refer to him as the principle of the [divine] persons. Therefore, there can be no analogy of attribution here. Likewise, since otherwise the Holy Spirit would be called the principle of creatures through attribution to the Father or to the Son, which seems absurd enough. Also, because here the *ratio* of an analogy of attribution that there usually is between God and creatures—namely, that every being or every perfection of creatures is primarily in God and depends on God—ends, since here one *ratio* of principle is not caused by the other and does not depend on it. Indeed, the emanation of creatures does not *per se* depend on the emanation of the divine persons, since the multiplicity of persons is not necessary *per se* for the production of things external [to God]. Therefore, every *ratio* of analogy of attribution ends in the present case.

19. In this matter three things should be distinguished which we already distinguished above for every principle,<sup>16</sup> namely, the relation of the principle, the proximate reason for such a relation, and that which is named the principle. With respect to the first there is no doubt but that there is an analogy here, since the relation of principle from God to creatures is a relation of reason, but that of the producing divine person to that produced is real. Scotus expressly declares this sense in dist. 29, q. 1. Indeed, this analogy is either not of attribution but only of proportion or, if it is an analogy of attribution, it is not according to a common concept, since there is no common concept between being of reason and real being.

20. With respect to the second, I also think that it is more likely that the *ratio* of an actual principle is said analogically and more primarily of God according to the internal processions than according to the processions to external things for the reasons already given. This is, moreover, an analogy of attribution and not only one of proportion, just as the analogy of being and of the other attributes said properly both of God and creatures. For this analogy of principle is grounded in the analogy that there is between creatures and the pro-

<sup>16</sup>See n. 13.

163 declaravit ] declarat V.

divinarum personarum in ratione originis seu emanationis. Quia si productiones non conveniunt univoce in communi ratione productionis, nec ratio principii potest esse univoca, praesertim cum esse hoc modo actuale principium creaturarum, non conveniat Deo nisi per denominationem extrinsecam ab emanatione creaturae ab ipso. Quod autem ratio processionis analogica sit respectu creaturae, et increatae: quodque per prius dicatur de processione increata, probatur primo ex generali regula divinorum attributorum, quae proprie semperque per prius de Deo dicuntur: ut infra probatur sumus. Habet autem verum non tantum in essentialibus, sed etiam in personalibus: nam persona analogice dicitur de creata et increata: et pater aut Filius, dicuntur analogice de divinis personis et humanis.

21. Secundo, quia etiam in hac ratione est aliquo modo necessaria dependentia, et antecessio naturalis inter origines ad extra, et ad intra. Nam licet creatio ex parte sua per se non requirat Trinitatem personarum, et consequenter nec processiones ad intra: ex parte tamen Dei per se ac necessario illas requirit, et ab eis suo modo pendet. Tum quia omnis effectio per se pendet a persona agente: in Deo autem non potest esse persona sine productione, vel processione ad intra. Tum etiam, quia creaturarum productio ex se pendet ex intelligentia et amore: non potest autem esse in Deo intelligentia sine Verbo, nec amor sine Spiritu sancto. Et iuxta hanc considerationem dixit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 45. art. 6. *Processiones personarum esse rationes productionis creaturarum*: et in responsione ad primum addit quod *procesiones divinarum personarum sunt causa creationis*. Atque ita solutum manet fundamentum, quod referendo tertiam sententiam attulimus contra hanc partem. Fundamentum autem Durandi nil obstat, immo declarat, processiones divinarum personarum, cum sint sine ulla dependentia vel imperfectione, esse adeo eminentis rationis, ut non possint cum creatis productionibus univoce convenire. Quod ergo in persona producta, essentia non producat sed communicetur tantum, non minuit veritatem productionis sed potius pertinet ad infinitam perfectionem eius.

D. Thomas

cession of the divine persons in the *ratio* of origin or of emanation. For if the productions do not agree univocally in general by reason of production, then the *ratio* of principle also cannot be univocal, especially since to be in this way an actual principle of creatures does not agree with God except through an extrinsic denomination based on a creature's emanation from him.

Moreover, that the *ratio* of procession is analogous with respect to created and uncreated things and that it is said primarily of uncreated procession is proven, first, from the general rule of divine attributes, which are properly always said primarily of God, as we will show below. This is true not only with essential attributes but also with personal attributes. For person is said analogically of created and uncreated things, and father and son are said analogically of divine persons and human persons.

21. [It is proven,] second, because even in this *ratio* there is in some way a necessary dependency and natural antecedence between the origins directed outwards and those directed inwards. For although creation for its part does not *per se* require a Trinity of persons and, consequently does not require internal processions, nevertheless, on the part of God they are *per se* and necessarily required and in his way depends on them. [This is so] because every effecting depends *per se* on the acting person, but in God there can be no person without production or internal procession. Also because the production of creatures depends of itself on intelligence and love. But there cannot be intelligence in God without the Word and there cannot be love without the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas speaks according to this consideration in *ST Ia.45.6*: 'the processions of the persons are the *rationes* of the productions of creatures'. And in response to the first argument he adds that 'the processions of the divine persons are causes of creation'. In this way the foundation which in referring to the third view we raised against this part is destroyed.

Durandus's foundation, moreover, is no obstacle. Indeed, he shows that the processions of the divine persons—since they are without any dependency or imperfection—are for that reason of an eminent *ratio*, such that they cannot agree univocally with the created productions. Therefore, that in the produced person the essence is not produced but only communicated does not lessen the truth of production but rather belongs to its infinite perfection, just as that

St. Thomas.

215 Sicut quod Pater <381> aeternus producat Filium, non  
tantum similem in natura specifica, sed etiam eiusdem nu- 220R  
mero naturae, non minuit veritatem generationis, sed per-  
tinet ad infinitam perfectionem eius, ut optime annotavit  
D. Thomas 1. p. q. 41. art. 5. ad 1.

220 22. Quod vero ad tertiam attinet, id est, ad id quod  
principium denominatur, si omnino materialiter (ut ita di- 225R  
cam) sumatur, clarum est non posse intercedere analogiam,  
neque esse aliquid prius quam id quod primum principium  
creaturarum denominatur. Neque etiam esse potest aliquid  
225 perfectius, quam id quod ex parte talis principii est radix et  
origo talis denominationis: est enim infinita perfectio eius.  
Immo etiam si non adeo materialiter de illo principio loqua- 230R  
mur, sed formaliter: quatenus est (ut sic dicam) principium  
in potentia, sic etiam existimo rationem principii non posse  
dici minus proprie aut per posterius de Deo ut est princip-  
230 ium creaturarum: et hoc persuadent nonnulla argumenta  
facta in prima et tertia opinione. Et maxime quod haec de-  
nominatio est absoluta, aeterna, et essentialis: sumitur enim  
ex attributo omnipotentiae, potentia autem Dei in ratione  
235 potentiae activae, vel productivae non est analogice poten-  
tia, sed primario ac principaliter. Ratio ergo principii prout  
ab illa praecise sumitur, non potest esse analoga. 240R

Satisfit  
obiectioni.

240 23. Dices. Ergo potentia non dicitur analogice de po-  
tentia creandi, et generandi, vel spirandi: consequens autem  
videtur falsum, nam talis est potentia, qualis est actio vel  
productio, sed productio est analoga, ergo et potentia. Re- 245R  
spondeo primum concedendo non esse talem analogiam,  
quae posterius dicatur de potentia creandi: quia, ut dixi, po-  
tentia effectiva Dei non potest esse analogice potentia: quia  
per nullam proportionem aut attributionem ita nominatur:  
245 et quia est prima ac perfectissima potentia. Unde addo vel  
quoad hoc esse univocationem, vel si est aliqua analogia, ut  
fortasse est, per prius potentiam productivam dici de poten-  
tia creandi, etc. quam generandi, etc. Ratio est, quia for- 250R  
malis ratio potentiae, quae actum primum ad producendum  
significat, cum omni proprietate et perfectione reperitur  
250 in Deo respectu creaturarum: respectu autem internarum 255R

the eternal Father produces the Son not only in the like specific na-  
ture but also of the same number of nature does not lessen the truth  
of generation but belongs to its infinite perfection. St. Thomas well  
notes this in *ST Ia.41.5 ad 1*.

22. But with respect to the third thing, that is, with respect to that  
which is denominated the principle, if it is taken wholly materially (if  
I may speak in this way), then it is clear that no analogy can intercede  
and that there is nothing before that which is denominated the first  
principle of creatures. Nor can there be anything more perfect than  
that which on the part of such a principle is the root and origin of  
such a denomination. For it is its infinite perfection.

230R In fact, if for that reason we do not speak materially of that prin-  
ciple but rather formally, insofar as (if I may speak in this way) the  
principle is in potency, in that way I also think the *ratio* of principle  
cannot be said less properly or more secondarily of God insofar as he  
is the principle of creatures. Some of the arguments made for the first  
and third opinions recommend this, especially that this denomination  
is absolute, eternal, and essential. For it is taken from the attribute of  
omnipotence, but the power of God in the *ratio* of an active or produc-  
tive power is not analogically a power but primarily and principally.  
Therefore, the *ratio* of principle as taken precisely from that cannot  
be analogous. 235R

23. You will say that therefore power is not said analogically of  
the power for creating, the power of generating, or the power of spi-  
rating. But the consequent seems false, for the power is such as the  
action or production is. But the production is analogous. 240R

245R Therefore, so is the power. I respond, first, by conceding that it  
is not an analogy of the sort that afterwards is said of the power of  
creating. For, as I said, the effective power of God cannot be a power  
analogically. For it is not named that through any proportion or at-  
tribution and it is the first and most perfect power. Hence I add that  
either there is univocity with respect to this or, if there is some anal-  
ogy, as there perhaps is, then productive power is said of the power for  
creating and so on before being said of the power of generating and so  
on. The reason is that the formal *ratio* of power, which signifies a  
first act for producing, is found with every property (*proprietate*) and  
perfection in God with respect to creatures. But with respect to in- 250R

An objection is  
addressed.

originum, vel divinarum personarum procedentium, magis est secundum modum concipiendi nostrum, quam secundum rem. Quia in re non tam est actus primus quam ultimus respectu interna- <col. b> rum processionum, ut latius infra constabit tractando de scientia, voluntate, et potentia Dei. Ratio autem est, quia potentia Dei respectu creaturarum est ad emanationem transeuntem reipsa distinctam, et non necessario fluentem a tali potentia: et ideo illa est propriissime potentia et actus primus respectu talis emanationis: at vero potentia generandi vel spirandi est secundum processionem immanentem, quae in re non potest esse tantum in potentia, sed semper in actu, nec potest esse in re distincta ab eo quod a nobis concipitur per modum potentiae, quantum ad absolutam perfectionem eius, ut constat ex D. Thoma 1. p. q. 41. art. 5. et ideo secundum rem et veritatem proprius dicitur potentia de creativa, quam de generativa, etc.

24. Neque obstat quod origo, vel productio sit analogata tum quia potentia Dei non sumit rationem suam ex habitudine ad extrinsecum, sed ex sua essentiali et absolutissima perfectione: tum etiam quia ad excellentiam divinae potentiae absolute sumptae pertinet ut neque ex necessitate sit coniuncta suae actioni, nec etiam possit habere actionem sibi adaequatam seu eiusdem ordinis: atque ita fit ut imperfectio quam essentialiter includit productio seu dependentia creaturae, non solum non diminuat perfectionem, et proprietatem potentiae Dei ad agendum extra se, sed etiam sit manifestum indicium infinitae perfectionis eius. E contrario vero excellentia internarum originum indicat summam et infinitam perfectionem et proprietatem actuum immanentium Dei, et consequenter aliquo modo minuit proprietatem potentiae in actu primo, ut declaratum est. Atque haec sint obiter dicta propter declarandam exacte analogiam principii. Illud vero magis Theologicum est quod quaeri solet an principium dictum intra Deum de generante, et spirante sit univocum, vel analogum: in quo ego censeo cum Scoto loco supra citato esse univocum, sicut est relatio vel persona, neque in his quae cum omni proprietate dicantur

ternal origins or the producing of divine persons, it is more according to our way of conceiving than according to reality. For in reality it is not so much the first act as the last act with respect to the internal processions, as will become more clear below in discussing the *scientia*, will, and power of God. The reason, moreover, is that the power of God with respect to creatures is for a transeunt emanation that is really distinct and not necessarily flowing from such a power. For this reason, that is most properly a power and first act with respect to such an emanation. On the other hand, the power for generating or spirating is according to an immanent procession, which in reality cannot be only in potency but is always in act. Nor can it be really distinct from that which is conceived in the mode of a power by us, as far as its absolute perfection is concerned. This is clear from St. Thomas, *ST Ia.41.4*. For this reason, according to reality and truth, power is said more properly of the creative power than of the generative power and so on.

24. Nor is it a problem that origin or production is analogous. For the power of God does not take its *ratio* from a disposition to something extrinsic but rather from its essential and most absolute perfection. Also, it belongs to the excellence of the divine power taken absolutely such that it is not of necessity conjoined with its action and it cannot have an action adequate to itself or of its order. And so it happens that an imperfection that essentially includes production or dependency in a creature not only does not lessen the perfection and proper sense (*proprietatem*) of God's power for acting externally but even is a manifest indication of its infinite perfection. In the other direction, the excellence of the internal origins indicates the highest and infinite perfection and propriety of the immanent acts of God and consequently in some way lessens the proper sense of the power in first act, as was shown. And these things were said in passing for the sake of explaining precisely the analogy of principle.

But the question that is often asked, whether principle when said of God with respect to generating and spirating internally is univocal or analogous, is more theological. On this matter, I along with Scotus in the place cited above think that it is univocal, just as the relation or person. Nor do I understand any analogy or attribution in those things that are said in every proper sense of the divine persons, since

Whether principle is said univocally of the generative principle and the spirative principle.

Principium generativum, et spirativum an dicantur univoce.

290 de divinis personis intelligo analogiam, vel attributionem, cum ibi nulla sit dependentia, aut imperfectio, vel prioritas naturae. Rursus quaeri solet utrum principium ad extra dictum de Deo ut creante, vel operante ex praesupposita materia, sit analo- <382> gum: quod aliqui sentire videntur: ego vero censeo esse univocum: quia effectio univoce dicitur de creatione, et educatione, praesertim quae a Deo fit ut a primo agente, sed de his haec sunt satis.

*Principium de Deo creante, et operante ex subiecto qualiter dicatur.*

*Principalis quaestionis resolutio.*

*Principium latius patet quam causa.*

25. Ultimo ex dictis colligitur responsio ad quaestionem propositam, propter quam tam multa de Principio diximus, scilicet, Principium et causam non esse omnino idem, nec reciproce dici, sed principium communius esse quam causam. Ita docet expresse D. Thomas 1. p. q. 33. art. 1. ad 1. inde rationem sumens cur in Deo una persona dicatur principium alterius, et non causa. Idem habet in 1. p. dist. 29. art. 1. in corp. et ad 2. et *De potentia* q. 10. art. 1. ad 9. et est communis sententia. Quam recte probant rationes dubitandi positae in principio in tertio loco, et ex omnibus dictis de Principio manifeste constat. Nam *Principium* dicitur etiam de eo qui proprie non influit in alium, causa vero minime. Item hinc fit ut principium non tantum entibus realibus, sed etiam entibus rationis seu privationi conveniat: causa vero non item. Est ergo haec conclusio manifesta comparando causam ad principium in tota sua generalitate: si vero comparatur ad principium vere ac per se influens aliquod esse in eo cuius est principium, est etiam vera conclusio, tamen ita difficilis, ut non possit cognosci lumine naturae, quia in solo Trinitatis mysterio reperitur talis principii modus, et ideo difficile est discrimen et rationem assignare, de quo dicemus sectione sequenti.

*Solvuntur argumenta.*

An principium et causam idem Aristoteles reputaverit. 25 26. Ad primum testimonium Aristotelis initio positum multi respondent per illam regulam dialecticam, exemplo

295R here there is no dependency, imperfection, priority of nature.

In turn it is often asked whether principle directed outwards is said analogously of God with respect to creating and with respect to operating in cases where matter is presupposed. Some seem to think so. But I think that it is univocal. For effecting is said univocally of creation and education, especially where they come to be by God as by a first agent. But this is enough about these matters.

How 'principle' is said of God creating and of God operating on a subject.

*Resolution of the main question.*

25. Last, from the things that have been said, the response to the proposed question on account of which we have said so much about 'principle' can be gathered: namely, that principle and cause are not entirely the same and cannot be said reciprocally. Rather, principle is more general than cause. St. Thomas teaches this explicitly in *ST Ia.33.1 ad 1*, taking from there the reason why in God one person is said to be the principle of another but not said to be the cause. He holds the same view in *I, dist. 29, art. 1, co.* and *ad 2*, and in *De potentia q. 10, art. 1, ad 9*. It is also the common view. The arguments for doubting posited at the beginning in the third place rightly show this, and it is manifestly clear from everything that has been said about 'principle'. For 'principle' is said even of that which does not properly inflow into another, but 'cause' minimally. Also, from here it happens that principle agrees not only with real beings but also with beings of reason or privations. But cause does not. Therefore, this conclusion is obvious when comparing cause to principle in its whole generality. But if it were compared to principle as truly and *per se* inflowing some being in that of which it is a principle, the conclusion would also be true although difficult such that it could not be cognized by the light of nature. For such a kind of principle is found only in the mystery of the Trinity. For this reason it is difficult to assign a distinguishing feature and *ratio*. We will discuss this in the following section.

It is clear that 'principle' is said more broadly than 'cause'.

*The arguments are resolved.*

25R 26. To the first testimony from Aristotle related at the beginning, many respond with the dialectical rule that truth is not required of

Whether Aristotle reckoned principle and cause to be the same.

Varii Aristotelis  
loci ad id  
expenduntur.

rum non requiri veritatem: in eo enim loco obiter et gratia  
exempli posuit Aristoteles principium et causam. Sed haec  
dura interpretatio est, vel modesta potius concessio Aris-  
30 totelici lapsus. Alii exponunt nomen causa ibi non accipi  
proprie, sed vulgari modo, prout de quacumque occasione  
vel conditione necessaria dicitur. Sed haec etiam expositio  
35 *principium*. Dicitur ergo po- <col. b> test, Aristotelem duo ibi  
dicere de ente et uno. Primum est, esse idem. Secundum est,  
converti inter se: cum ergo Aristoteles ait, *sicut principium*  
*et causa*, non comparat ea in secundo, sed in primo: intendit  
enim docere ens et unum esse idem re, non tamen ratione: et  
40 ad hoc inducit exemplum dicens quod se habent sicut prin-  
cipium et causa, non sicut tunica et vestis: unde immediate  
post illa verba *principium et causa*, subdit, *sed non ut quae*  
*una ratione dicuntur*. Vel si in utroque fiat comparatio, non  
oportet universaliter intelligi de principio et causa, sed in-  
45 definite: quod aliquando principium et causa, licet mutuo  
consequantur, ratione differant, verbi gratia principium et  
causa efficiens.

27. Ad secundum testimonium ex 5. *Metaphysicae* re-  
spondent aliqui etiam ibi sumi nomen causae lato et vulgari  
50 modo. Sed hoc aperte est contra mentem Aristotelis, cum  
distincte tractet de principio et causa: et utriusque signifi-  
cata Philosophice et proprie exponat. Alia expositio est,  
cum Aristoteles ait, tot modis dici causam, quot princip-  
ium, non esse intelligendum positive, sed negative, id est  
55 causam non dici aliis modis, quam his quibus dicitur prin-  
cipium, licet non necesse sit dici omnibus illis modis. Et  
quidem licet proprietas illius vocis *tot modis* refragari huic  
expositioni videatur, tamen ratio quam Aristoteles subiungit,  
videtur cogere ad illam admittendam: subdit enim: *Quo-*  
60 *niam omnes causae principia sunt*. Ex qua ratione ineptis-  
sime inferretur, causam dici omnibus modis quibus dicitur  
principium: esset enim argumentari a superiori id inferius  
affirmative: ut si quis colligeret, *Omnis substantia est ens:*  
*ergo quot modis dicitur ens, totidem dicitur substantia.*

examples. For in that passage Aristotle posits principle and cause in  
passing for the sake of giving an example. But this interpretation is  
harsh or rather a modest admission of an Aristotelian lapse. Others  
30R explain that the name ‘cause’ in that passage is not taken properly but  
in the everyday way as expressing a certain occasion or necessary con-  
dition. But this interpretation also has a difficulty, to be touched on  
below, for even in the everyday sense the name ‘cause’ is never taken  
as broadly as ‘principle’. Therefore, it can be said that Aristotle here  
35R says two things about being and one. The first is that they are the  
same. The second is that are convertible with each other. Therefore,  
when Aristotle says ‘just as principle and cause’, he is not comparing  
them in the second way but in the first. For he means to teach that  
being and one are the same in reality but not the same in reason. To  
40R do this he brings up the example, saying that they are related just as  
principle and cause but not as undergarment and garment. For this  
reason after those words ‘principle and cause’ he immediately adds  
‘but not as those that are called the same in reason’. Or if the compar-  
ison were made in either case, it would not be understood universally  
45R of principle and cause but indefinitely: that sometimes principle and  
cause, although they follow on each other, differ in reason (for exam-  
ple, principle and efficient cause).

27. To the second testimony, from *Metaphysics* V, some respond  
that here, too, the name ‘cause’ is taken in the broad and everyday  
50R sense. But this is clearly contrary to the mind of Aristotle, since he  
discusses principle and cause distinctly and explains the significates of  
each philosophically and properly. The other interpretation is that  
when Aristotle says that cause is said in as many ways as principle is,  
it should not be understood positively but negatively. That is, cause  
55R is not said in ways other than those in which principle is said, but it  
is not necessary said in all those ways. And certainly, although the  
proper sense of that phrase ‘as many’ seems opposed to this interpre-  
tation, nevertheless, the reason that Aristotle added seems to compel  
admitting it. For he also says: ‘since all causes are principles’. From  
60R this reason it would be most foolish to infer that cause is said in every  
way in which principle is said. That would be to argue affirmatively  
from superior to inferior. This is the same as if someone were to for-  
mulate: every substance is a being, therefore, in as many ways as being  
is said substance is said.

Various passages  
from Aristotle  
are examined for  
it.

Alensis. 65 28. Aliam vero expositionem indicat Alexander Alen-  
 sis, scilicet tot modis dici principium quot dicitur causa,  
 quia omnis causa est principium. Ita ut post enumeratas  
 significationes principii subiunxerit Aristoteles quasi gen-  
 70 eralem regulam, quod principium etiam dicitur omnibus  
 modis quibus dicitur causa, quamvis non illis solis. Et iuxta  
 hunc sensum optime quadrat ratio Aristotelis: tamen vix  
 potest accommodari ad priora verba. Alia expositio indi-  
 catur a D. Thoma, scilicet, principii acceptiones ibi numer-  
 75 atas tot convenire causae, quamvis non sub eadem ratione:  
 nam ex causa incipit motus, et sic de aliis. Iuxta quam expo-  
 sitionem probatio Aristotelis aliter est inducenda, scilicet,  
 ut <383> inde confirmet, illas acceptiones habere locum  
 in principio, quia etiam habent locum in causa, quia omnis  
 80 causa principium est: inde tamen non sequitur causam et  
 principium reciproce dici, quia licet acceptiones ibi numer-  
 atae secundum alias rationes possint causae accommodari,  
 tamen principium latius patet, quia dicitur omnibus il-  
 lis modis quibus dicitur causa, et secundum propriam ra-  
 tionem causae: et praeterea dicitur aliis modis secundum  
 85 generalem principii rationem.

29. Ad tertium testimonium ex 12. *Metaphysicae*, ubi  
 Aristoteles privationem vocat causam, communis omnium  
 et necessaria expositio est ibi fuisse usum nomine causae  
 vulgari modo, prout causa dicitur quidquid ad aliud quovis  
 90 modo requiritur.

30. Sed dicit aliquis; Ergo si vere, et cum proportione  
 loquamur, fatendum est, principium et causam reciproce  
 dici, nam si utrumque in tota sua amplitudine, et analo-  
 95 gia, et vulgari usu sumatur, convertuntur: si autem stricte  
 et cum omni proprietate causa sumatur, etiam convertitur  
 cum principio eodem modo sumpto. Si vero causa sumatur  
 proprie, et principium late; et ideo dicatur principium gen-  
 95 eralius esse quam causa, impropria fit comparatio: et eadem  
 ratione dici posset causa latius patere quam principium, quia  
 100 si causa large sumatur et principium proprie, latius patebit.  
 Respondeo negando utramque partem assumptionis: nam  
 comparando principium proprium ac per se ad propriam et

65R 28. Alexander of Hales suggests another interpretation, namely,  
 that principle is said in as many ways as cause is said, since every cause  
 is a principle. In this way, after enumerating the significations of prin-  
 ciple, Aristotle added a general, as it were, rule, that principle is also  
 said in all the ways that cause is said although not only in those ways.  
 70R Aristotle's argument can best be squared according to this sense. Nev-  
 ertheless, it can hardly be accommodated to the earlier words.

Another interpretation is suggested by St. Thomas, namely, the  
 meanings of principle listed in this passage are as many as agree with  
 cause, although not under the same *ratio*. For motion begins from  
 cause, and likewise for the others. According to this interpretation,  
 75R Aristotle's proof is different from inducing, namely, it is confirmed  
 from the fact that those meanings have a place in principle because  
 they also have a place in cause, since every cause is a principle. Hence,  
 from there it does not follow that cause and principle are said re-  
 80R ciprocally, since although the meanings numbered there according to  
 other *rationes* can be accommodated to cause, nevertheless, principle  
 is clearly broader, since it is said in all the ways that cause is said and  
 according to the proper *ratio* of cause, and, furthermore, it is said in  
 other ways according to the general *ratio* of principle.

85R 29. To the third testimony, from *Metaphysics* XII, where Aristo-  
 tle calls privation a cause, the common and necessary interpretation  
 according to everyone is that here there is a use of the name 'cause' in  
 the everyday way, in the way where cause is said of anything that is  
 required in any way for something else.

90R 30. But someone will say: therefore, if we speak truly and with  
 proportion, it should be admitted that principle and cause are said  
 reciprocally, for they are convertible if each is taken in its whole  
 breadth, analogy, and common use, and cause is also convertible with  
 principle if each is taken strictly and with every proper sense. But  
 95R But if cause is taken properly and principle broadly and then for that  
 reason principle is said to be more general than cause, the compari-  
 son is improper. By the same reasoning cause could be said to apply  
 more widely than principle, since if cause is taken widely and princi-  
 ple properly, then it will be wider.

100R I respond by denying each part of the assumption. For in com-  
 paring proper and *per se* principle to proper and *per se* cause, principle

Alexander of  
 Hales.



per se causam, communius est principium, ut patet Theologicè in principiis divinarum processionum, et Physicè in privatione. Et sumendo utrumque in sua latissima significatione, etiam existimo principium esse quid communius. Nam licet causa sic sumpta plura comprehendat quae non sunt proprie, vere, ac per se causae; tamen nihil comprehendit quod sub generali significatione principii non contineatur: principium vero aliqua complectitur quae nullo modo dicuntur causae, etiam vulgari sermone: primogenitus enim vocatur principium filiorum, non tamen causa ullo modo.

Græci Patres  
causae nomine  
pro principio usi.

31. Ad modum loquendi Patrum Graecorum respondetur usurpasse nomen causae latius, quam in Latina proprietate possit aut debeat usurpari: re tamen ipsa non attribuisse nomen causae personis divinis ad intra quatenus proprie dicit relationem ad effectum, et in eo indicat aliquam imperfectionem: sed solum ut dicit originem unius ad alia.

Principiatum an  
aliquid in divinis,  
et quod principii  
correlativum.

32. Ad rationem, Theologi negant Principiatum esse correlativum Principii in divinis: et ideo licet concedant Patrem esse principium Filii, negant tamen Filium esse principiatum a Patre. Ita D. Thomas 1. p. q. 33. art. 1. ad 2. et alii communiter. Iuxta quem loquendi modum, correlativum principii erit, id quod est ab alio. Quae sententia merito approbata est a Theologis Latinis ob reverentiam mysterii Trinitatis, et ad tollendam occasionem erroris: nam principiatum videtur significare aliquid factum, ut supra argumentabamur, vel etiam indicat idem, quod initiatum, et consequenter indicat initium essendi. Omisso vero illo mysterio, et ablata vocis invidia, si nomine principii solum significetur id quod est correlativum principii, sic negatur idem esse principiatum quod causatum, vel effectum: sed significare tantum id quod ad alio est, vel quod habet principium, non durationis (haec enim aequivocatio etiam tollenda est) sed vel originis, vel cuiusvis alterius modi. Atque in hoc sensu sunt explicandi Graeci, qui, ut D. Thomas supra refert, admittunt Filium principii a Patre.

121 in divinis ] om. A.

121 et ideo licet concedant ] Licet igitur dicant V.

is more common as is clear in theology in the case of the principles of divine processions and in physics in the case of privation. And when taking each in its widest signification, I also think that principle is more common. For although cause thus taken encompasses many things that are not properly, truly, and *per se* causes, nevertheless, it encompasses nothing that is not contained in the general signification of principle. But principle includes some things that in no way are called causes, even in everyday speech. For a first-born son is called a principle of the sons but in no way is called a cause.

31. To the Greek Fathers' way of speaking, it is responded that they apply the name 'cause' more broadly than it can properly or ought to be applied in Latin. But in reality they do not attribute the name 'cause' between the divine persons insofar as it implies a relation to an effect and thereby indicates some imperfection. Rather, they attribute it only insofar as it implies the origin of one thing from another.

The Greek  
Fathers use the  
name 'cause' for  
principle.

32. In response to the argument, theologians deny that there is a *principiatum* correlative to principle in the divine cases. For that reason, although they grant that the Father is the principle of the Son, they, nevertheless, deny that the Son is the *principiatum* of the Father. St. Thomas says this in *ST Ia.33.1 ad 2*, and it is commonly said by others. According to this way of speaking, the correlative of a principle will be that which is from another. This view is rightly approved by the Latin theologians on account of reverence for the mystery of the Trinity and in order to avoid occasion for error. For *principiatum* seems to signify something that was made, as we argued above, or at least it indicate the same thing as that it was begun and consequently indicates the beginning of being. But having set aside that mystery having removed the dislike for the expression, if by the name '*principiatum*' one only signifies that which is the correlative of principle, one would thus deny that *principiatum* is the same as what is caused or as effect. Rather, it would only signify that which is from another or that has a principle, but not one of duration (for this equivocation should also be removed) or of origin or anything of any other mode.

Whether there is  
a *principiatum*  
in the divine cases  
and what is  
correlative to  
principle.

Solvuntur quae  
probant causam  
principio  
latiorem.

140 33. Ad argumenta secundo loco facta, quibus probatur  
causam latius patere quam principium, respondetur Aris-  
totelem in primo testimonio non loqui generatim de prin-  
cipio, sed de primo principio in aliquo ordine, quod habeat  
influentiam et causalitatem. De quo principio ibidem dix-  
erat, *licet magnitudine parvum sit, facultate esse magnum*. Et  
145 de hoc primo principio negat habere causam superiorem,  
scilicet in illo ordine. Nam solum Primum principium ab-  
solute et in tota latitudine entis nullam habet causam. Et  
eodem sensu in 1. *Physicae* ponit in definitione principio-  
rum entis naturalis quod *non sint ex aliis*: eo scilicet modo,  
150 quo ens naturale est ex ipsis, quia illa sunt prima principia in  
illo ordine. De quibus principiis ut principia sunt, et eorum  
propria definitione in *Philosophia* disputandum est: ut vero  
aliqua eorum sunt causae, de illis dicetur inferius. 150R

33. In response to the arguments made in n. 2, by which it  
was shown that cause is applied more widely than principle, it is re-  
sponded that Aristotle in the first testimony is not speaking generally  
about principle but about the first principle in any order, which has  
influence and causality. In the very same place he said about this prin-  
ciple: ‘although it is small in magnitude, it is great in ability’. By  
this he denies that the first principle has a superior cause, namely, in  
that order. For only the first principle absolutely and in the whole  
breadth of being has no cause. In the same sense in *Physics* I he posits  
in the definition of the principles of natural being that ‘they are not  
from other things’, namely, in the way in which natural being is from  
them, because they are first principles in that order. One ought to  
discuss these principle insofar as they are principles and their proper  
definition in philosophy. But insofar as some of them are causes, we  
will discuss them below.

The arguments  
that show cause  
to be broader  
than principle are  
resolved.