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DE ANGELIS, LIB. 7, CAP. 10¹

<857, col. a>WHETHER THE FIRST SIN OF PRIDE IN LUCIFER WAS AN EXCESSIVE OR INORDINATE DESIRE FOR HIS OWN NATURAL HAPPINESS (Utrum primum peccatum superbiam in Lucifero fuerit nimius, seu inordinatus appetitus suae beatitudinis naturalis)

1. Diximus in generali peccasse Luciferum per superbiam propriam et specificam : nunc <col. b> investigandum superest, cujusnam objecti, aut excellentiae fuerit appetitus; ut sic in particulari cognoscatur, quae et talis fuit illa superbia. Et quia res est valde incerta, eo quod nec satis revelata nobis sit, nec sola ratione ostendi possit, eo quod sit de facto contingente praeterito; ideo varia cogitatae sunt excellentiae, de quibus ille appetitus angelicus esse potuerit, per quas discurrendum erit, ut de singulis videamus, quae fuerint possibiles, et quid de illis possit verisimiliter de facto conjectari. Ut autem a notioribus incipiamus, dicemus prius de appetitu beatitudinis, de quo potissimum divus Thomas, et alii antiqui theologi opinati sunt, et postea per alias excellentias discurremus. Et quoniam duplex est beatitudo, naturalis, scilicet, et supernaturalis, prius de naturali dicemus tanquam de summa excellentia inter naturales, et ipsi naturali inclinationi magis propinqua.

2. *Prima sententia affirmativa.*—Multi ergo theologi docuerunt, Luciferum peccasse per nimium inordinatumque affectum suae beatitudinis naturalis. Hunc dicendi modum inter duos, quos maxime probabiles existimat, ponit D. Thomas, d. quæst. [sic] 63, art. 3, et Cajetanus ibi illum praefert alteri modo dicendi de beatitudine supernaturali statim tractando. Idemque habet S. Thomas 3, contra Gent., cap. 109, et ibi Ferrara, §*Ad evidentiam*. Et idem sentit Capreolus, in 2, dist. 4, quæst. 1, art. 3, ad arg., contr. 1 et 2 concl., et Marsilius, quæst. 2, art. 2, in 4 ejus parte, et q. 5, art. 1, concl. 6, per totam, et Holkot, quæst. 3. Item in 2, dist. 5, Hervæus,

1. We said in general Lucifer sinned through characteristic and specific pride. Now it remains to be investigated for what object or excellence his desire was so that thus in particular was cognized what and how great that pride was. And since the matter is most uncertain, given that it has not been sufficiently revealed to us nor can be shown by reason alone and given that it concerns a past contingent fact, there are a variety of excellent views about what that angelic appetite could have been for. We ought to go through these so that we may see of each individually which were possible and which of these can be conjectured more verisimilar. But so that we may start from what is better known, we will speak first about the appetite for happiness, about which St. Thomas and other ancient theologians mostly have thought, and afterwards we will run through the other excellences. And because happiness is divided into two, namely, natural and supernatural, we will speak first about natural happiness just as about the excellence that is highest among natural [ones] and more near to natural inclination itself.

2. *The first affirmative view.*—Therefore, many theologians taught that Lucifer sinned through an excessive and inordinate affection for his own natural happiness. In [*ST IaIIæ I.*]63.3, St. Thomas places this way of speaking among two which he considers most probable. And Cajetan in that place prefers it to the other way of speaking about supernatural happiness (which is to be discussed shortly). And St. Thomas has the same [view] in *SCG III.109*, as well as [Franciscus de Sylvestris] Ferrariensis in that place, §*Ad evidentiam*. And Capreolus thinks the same thing in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 4, q. 1, art. 3, ad arg., contr. 1 et 2 concl.. Also Marsilius in q. 2, art. 2, in its fourth part, and q. 5, art. 1, concl. 6 throughout; Holcot in q. 3; Hervæus

¹Latin text is from vol. 2 of the Vivès edition.

quæst. 1, art. 3, in fin., Richardus, art. 1, quæst. 1 et 2, Ægidius, quæst. 1, art. 2, Bassolis, quæst. 1, a. 2, et possunt etiam referri Gabriel, dist. 2, art. 2, quæst. 2, et Scotus, quæst. 2. Nam idem objectum peccati angelici assignant, quamvis differant in modo explicandi speciem peccati; et præsertim Scotus, qui primum peccatum Angeli ponit in amore complacentiæ, seu amicitia ad se ipsum: certum est autem, quod illo amore amavit Angelus beatitudinem suam naturalem, quia illam jam habebat; ergo in illa maxime sibi complacuit, tanquam in maximo suo bono naturali, quamvis simul amaverit suum esse, et totam perfectionem suæ naturæ, quam illa beatitudo, vel supponit, vel secum affert. Ita enim videntur intelligendi reliqui auctores, cum de beatitudine naturali loquuntur. Differt autem Scotus a cæteris, quia non vocat illam complacentiam sui, propriam superbiam, sed, vel communem, vel spiritualem <858> luxuriam, de qua differentia jam satis dictum est. Fundamentum huius sententiæ est, quia actus superbiæ per arrogantiam, et elationem ex consideratione propriæ beatitudinis naturalis, est possibilis in Angelo, et ex parte objecti habet majorem propinquitatem cum natura angelica, et aliqualem veluti occasionem in propensione naturali ad amorem naturalem sui ipsius; ergo verisimile est, hanc fuisse primam Angeli superbiam.

3. *Ratio difficultatis contra hanc opinionem.*—Hæc vero sententia mihi valde difficilis est, non solum de facto, sed etiam de possibili. Ratio autem difficultatis tacta est in præcedenti capite, quia amor beatitudinis naturalis ex objecto bonus est et honestus, ut ibi est probatum in genere de amore innatæ perfectionis naturalis, et omnes concedunt. Nec oportet in hoc distinguere inter amorem naturalem et electivum (in quo Ferrara supra laborat), quia, amor propriæ beatitudinis, licet sit naturalis quoad specificationem, nihilominus quoad exercitium est liber, et sub ea ratione est electivus: et fortasse quoad electionem, seu motivum amandi potest etiam in specie habere varietatem, et ut sic dici electivus, et liber quoad specificationem. Ille igitur amor etiam ut liber est moralis actus ex objecto, ac per se loquendo honestus: quia vera beatitudo naturalis est maximum bonum naturæ, quod per se secundum rationem rectam appeti potest. Quomodo ergo potuit ab Angelo appeti, ut in illo

in II, dist. 5, q. 1, art. 3, towards the end; Richard in art. 1, q. 1 and 2; Ægidius in q. 1, art. 2; and Bassolis in q. 1, art. 2. And Gabriel, dist. 2, art. 2, quæst. 2, and Scotus, q. 2 can also be cited. For they assign the same object to the angelic sin, although they differ in how they explicate the species of sin, especially Scotus, who places the first sin of the Angel in the love characteristic of pleasure or friendship to himself. Moreover, it is certain that in that love the Angel loved his own natural happiness, since he was already holding that. Therefore, having that maximally for himself fancied him, just as having his maximal good, although at the same time he loved his being and the complete perfection of his nature, which that happiness either supposes or produces in him. For thus the remaining authors should be understood when they speak of natural happiness. But Scotus differs from the rest, because he does not call that pleasure of his proper pride, but either common or spiritual luxury, concerning which difference enough has already been said. The foundation of this view is that the act of pride through arrogance and glorification from a consideration of proper natural happiness is possible in the Angel and that on the part of the object it has a greater nearness to the angelic nature and a certain as it occasion in the natural propensity for a natural love for him himself. Therefore, it is verisimilar that this was the first pride of the Angel.

3. *The nature of the difficulty with this opinion.*—But this view is very difficult for me, not only with respect to the fact, but also with respect to possibility. Moreover, the nature of the difficulty was touched on in the preceding chapter, since the love for natural happiness according to the object is good and honest, as was shown there in general concerning love of innate natural perfection. And everyone concedes this. Nor is it necessary in this to distinguish between natural and elective love (in which Ferrariensis takes pains above), since, the love of proper happiness, although it is natural with respect to specification, nevertheless is free with respect to exercise and is free under that character. And perhaps with respect to election or the motive for loving it can also have variety in species and as such be called elective and free with respect to specification. That love, therefore, as free is a moral act from the object and is *per se* honest in speaking, since true natural happiness is the maximal good of nature that can be desired *per se* according to right reason. Therefore, in what way could it be desired by the Angel so

affectu per superbiam peccaverit? Ad solvendam ergo hanc difficultatem varii modi excogitati sunt, quibus deordinatio, et excessus illius amoris explicatur, quos expendere oportet : nam si nullus inventus fuerit sufficiens, tota sententia sufficienter improbabitur.

4. *Scotus uno e tribus modis positæ difficultati occurrit.—Rejicitur primus modus.—*Primo ergo Scotus, d. q. 2, §*Ad videndum*, tres inordinationes, seu excessus dicit fuisse posibles in illo amore, et probabile reputat aliquo ex illis modis Angelum peccasse, scilicet, quia intensius amavit beatitudinem suam, quam deberet, vel quia citius voluerit illam habere, quam Deus ordinasset, vel quia sine debita causa, ut sine meritis illam habere voluerit. Verum est tamen Scotum ibi loqui indefinite de beatitudine, et non in particulari de naturali : et quamvis ipse omnem beatitudinem putet esse naturalem, saltem in ratione appetibilis naturaliter, potuit tamen loqui de beatitudine in se supernaturali, ut est visio, <col. b> et charitas Dei consummata, de qua in sequenti capite dicemus. Nunc de naturali beatitudine quam Angeli per naturales vires suas cum generali Dei concursu habere possunt, dicimus, nullo modo potuisse Angelum aliquo ex illis modis, illam appetendo peccare. Nam imprimis propter solam intensionem actus nunquam peccatur, si alioqui actus ex objecto, et aliis circumstantiis bonus est. Imo etiamsi actus minus intensus aliter esset malus, quam per superbiam, in quocumque alio genere vitii, propter solam intensionem non fieret superbia, quia intensio de se, ac per se non est circumstantia mutans speciem, sed augens in individuo speciem, quam invenit. Unde a fortiori si actus supponitur bonus ex omni alio capite, intensio non transfert illum in speciem superbiæ, imo nec illum malum reddet, sed potius ejus bonitatem augebit per se loquendo. De qua re satis dictum est in capite præcedenti, et latius in 1, 2, dicitur. Et specialiter confirmatur, quia naturalis beatitudo maxime consistit in cognitione, et amore Dei super omnia, sed talis amor nunquam potest esse malus propter intensionem, ut ibi Scotus ex professo probat; ergo amare beatitudinem illam non potest esse malum propter intensionem : quia sicut amare Deum, ita et amare amorem Dei tanto est melius, quanto ferventius; maxime quando utrumque eodem actu fit, ut in ipsa beatitudine

that it sinned in that affection through pride? In order to solve this difficulty, therefore, various ways are devised by which the disorder and excess of that love is explained. These ways must be evaluated. For if nothing devised will have been sufficient, then the entire view is sufficiently condemned.

4. *Scotus answers the posited difficulty on one of three ways.—The first way is rejected.—*First, therefore, Scotus, d. q. 2, §*Ad videndum*, says that three disorders or excesses were possible in that love and thinks it probable that the Angel sinned in one of these ways, namely, either because he loved his happiness more intensely than he ought, because he wished to have it sooner than God had ordained, or because he wished to have it without due as without merits. But it is true that Scotus speaks indefinitely of happiness there and not in particular about natural happiness. And, although he himself thinks that every happiness is natural, at least with regards to the concept of the naturally desirable, nevertheless, he could speak about happiness that is in itself supernatural, as is the consummated vision and charity of God, concerning which we will talk in the next chapter.

Now about the natural happiness which the Angels can have through their natural strength along with the general concursus of God, we say that in no way can an Angel sin by desiring it in any of these ways. For, in the first place, one never sins on account of the intensity (*intensionem*) of an act alone, if otherwise the act is good according to the object and other circumstances. On the contrary, even if the act less intense would be bad in any way other than through pride, in whatever other genus of vice, it would not become pride on account of its intensity alone, since the intensity of and through itself is not a circumstance changing the species, but augments the species which it finds in the individual. Hence, *a fortiori* if the act is assumed good according to every other head, the intensity does not shift it into the species of pride. Indeed, neither will it make it bad, but it will rather augment its goodness of itself. Concerning this matter enough was said in the preceding chapter and more will be said in 1, 2.¹

And it is especially confirmed since natural happiness chiefly consists in cognition and in the love of God above all, but such a love can never be bad on account of its intensity, as Scotus expressly shows in that place. Therefore, to love that happiness cannot be bad on account of intensity. Since just as to love God, so also to love the love of God is so much the better as it is more fervent, especially when each happens by

jam possessa invenitur.

the same act, so that it is found in the very happiness already possessed.²

1 What is being cited here?

2 Is intensity a measure of the feeling that accompanies one's love for something or a measure of preference with respect to other goods?

5. *Rejicitur secundus modus et tertius.*—Deinde excessus in affectanda nimia celeritate non potuit in naturalem beatitudinem cadere. Quia Angelus a principio habuit concreatam naturalem beatitudinem : ergo non potuit in appetitu obtinendi illam affectare nimiam celeritatem, cum neque potuerit illam appetere, ut futuram, sed de illa jam consecuta gaudere. Et simili ratione in ordinatio tertia in hac beatitudine locum non habet : quia hæc non est data Angelo propter merita, sed ut connaturalis illi; ergo ex hac parte non potuit Angelus peccare ex parte causæ. Nec etiam potuit peccare volendo illam habere suis viribus naturalibus, illam efficiendo, nam hic est modus naturalis ejus.

5. *The second and third ways are rejected.*—Next, excess by excessive quickness in desiring (*affectanda*) cannot happen in the case of natural happiness, since the Angel has from the beginning a co-created natural happiness. Therefore, he could not in the desire for obtaining it desire excessive quickness, since he could not desire it as something future, but could rejoice that it was already gained. And for a similar reason the third way in this ordering has not place with respect to this happiness, since it was not given to the Angel for the sake of merits but as co-natural to him. Therefore, with respect to this part the Angel could not sin according to the part of a cause. Nor could he sin by willing to have it by his natural strength, by effecting it, for this is his natural mode.

6. Dices, potuisse excedere volendo illam efficere, et habere sine influxu Dei. At hoc dici non potest. Duobus enim modis potest intelligi illa negatio, seu exclusio divini influxus : uno modo ex parte objecti, ita ut Angelus directe, et in objecto voluerit esse beatus naturaliter sine ullo influxu Dei, etiam per <859> generalem concursum. Et hic modus est plane impossibilis, quia supponimus in Angelo errorem contra lumen, et evidentiam naturalem, nimirum, se posse elicere actus suos, quibus naturaliter beatus fit sine influxu Dei. Nam si cognoscit, se non posse efficere actus beatificos sine influxu Dei; quis fieri potest, ut velit esse beatus sine influxu Dei? Nam eadem ratione non potest velle esse sine creatione, vel conservatione Dei, et similia. Et hoc latius prosequemur infra tractantes de appetitu naturalis æqualitatis Dei. Alio ergo modo potest illa negatio, seu exclusio fieri ex parte ipsius actus appetendi beatitudinem, id est, ut ametur præcise ipsa beatitudo : non amando expresse, ac formaliter influxum Deum illam, seu non amando illam formaliter, et expresse, ut naturale donum Dei. Et hic etiam modus vix cogitari in Angelo potest, præsertim in suo initio, et ante omne peccatum, quia perfecte comprehendebat suam naturalem beatitudinem, et eodem actu intuebatur causam necessariam ejus, quæ est Deus : ideoque amando illam, non poterat non

6. You may say that he could exceed by willing to effect it and to have it without the influx of God. But this cannot be said. For that negation or exclusion of divine influx can be understood in two ways. In one way, on the part of the object so that thus the Angel directly and in the object wished to be naturally happy without any influx of God even through a general concursus. And this way is clearly impossible, because we are supposing in the Angel an error contrary to light and natural evidence, without doubt, that he can elicit his acts by which he becomes naturally happy without the influx of God. For if he recognizes that he cannot effect happy acts without the influx of God, what can happen so that he wishes to be happy without the influx of God? For by the same reason he cannot will to be without the creation or conservation of God and so forth. And we will pursue this more widely below when discussing the natural desire for equality with God.

Therefore, in the other way that negation or exclusion can happen on the part of the very act of desiring happiness, that is, so that the happiness itself is loved precisely, [i.e.,] by not loving expressly or formally that influx of God or not loving it formally or expressly as a natural gift of God. And this way can also hardly be thought in the Angel, especially in its beginning and before all sin, since he was perfectly comprehending his natural happiness and in the same act was looking at its necessary cause, which is God.

velle illam a tali causa. Admissa vero illa præcisione in apprehensione naturalis beatitudinis, ut est propria perfectio Angeli, non considerando emanationem ejus a Deo, seu quod sit donum Dei, nulla superbia, imo nullum peccatum esset amare beatitudinem propriam, non volendo actu illam, ut donum Dei, nec quod sit, vel non sit ex influxu Dei. Quia recognoscere illam, ut donum Dei, non ita cadit sub præceptum, ut obliget semper, et pro semper, sed satis est nunquam id excludere positive, et suis temporibus opportunis illam recognitionem habere. Pertinet enim ad præceptum gratitudinis, quod non pro semper obligat. Ex his ergo titulis nulla deordinatio, nec ratio superbiæ in appetitu naturalis beatitudinis invenitur.

7. *Quo pacto alii prædictam difficultatem expediunt.*—Secundus ergo principalis modus explicandi malitiam superbiæ in illo actu, est, quia Angelus per appetitum deliberatum quievit in sua beatitudine naturali, tanquam sibi sufficiente, et ultima, et consequenter se avertit a supernaturali beatitudine, ad quam converti tenebatur. Ita explicat D. Thomas quam alii sequuntur. Verumtamen statim occurrit objectio similis præcedenti, quia illa quies in beatitudine naturali duobus modis potuit includere aversionem a supernaturali, scilicet, vel formaliter, seu privative, aut contrarie, vel tantum negative, seu præcisive. Prior modus intelligitur esse per actum positivum dis- <col. b> plicentiæ, seu aversionis a beatitudine supernaturali, nimirum, quod ita voluerit Angelus suam beatitudinem naturalem, ut positive despexerit supernaturalem; illamque habere noluerit. Secundus autem modus erit quiescendo in beatitudine naturali, non ascendendo ad supernaturalem, quasi per incogitantiam, non appetendo illam actu, neque in illam alteram referendo. Prior modus videtur aut impossibilis, aut creditu difficilis : posterior autem insufficientis ad inducendum grave peccatum, præsertim commissionis, et superbiæ.

8. *Priorem explicandi modum amplectitur Vasquez.*—Priorem ergo modum eligit P. Vasquez, disp. 235, cap. 1, dicens illum esse possibilem, quanquam incertum sit, an ita de facto fuerit, quia hoc posterius est facti contingentis præteriti. Unde neque ratione ostendi potest ita factum esse, nec auctoritate constat : quoad hanc partem

And therefore in loving the happiness he was not able to wish it apart from such a cause. But having admitted that precision in the apprehension of natural happiness, so that it is a proper perfection of the Angel, not considering its emanation from God or that it is a gift of God, it is no pride, indeed no sin, to love proper happiness, not wishing it by that act as a gift of God nor that it be or not be by the influx of God. Since to recognize it as a gift of God, does not thus fall under a precept so that it obliges and always and forever, but it is enough that he never positively excludes it and that he have that recognition in his opportune times. For it pertains to the precept of gratitude that it does not oblige forever. Therefore, from these headings no disorder or ground for pride is found in the desire for natural happiness.

7. *By what agreement others resolve the mentioned difficulty.*—Secondly, therefore, the principal way of explaining the wickedness of pride in that act is that the Angel through a deliberate desire rested in his natural happiness as if it were sufficient and ultimate. And, consequently, he turned away from the supernatural happiness to which he was held to be turned. St. Thomas explains it in this way and others follow. Nevertheless, an objection similar to the preceding one occurs immediately, since that rest in natural happiness could in two ways include an aversion to the supernatural happiness, namely, either formal (or privative or contrariwise) or only negatively (or precisely). The first way is understood to be through a positive act of dissatisfaction with or aversion to supernatural happiness, namely, that the Angel wished his natural happiness in such a way that he positively disdained supernatural happiness and wished not to have it. The second way, moreover, will be by resting in natural happiness but not ascending to supernatural happiness, through, as it were, thoughtlessness, and not actually desiring it nor referring the natural happiness to it. The former way seems either impossible or difficult to believe, but the latter seems insufficient for introducing a grave sin, at least one of commission and of pride.

8. *Vasquez embraces the former way of explaining.*—Now, P. Vasquez chooses the former way in disp. 235, cap. 1, saying that it is possible, although it is uncertain whether it was that way in fact since this latter question concerns a past contingent fact. Hence, it can neither be shown by reason that it in fact was that way nor is it clear by authority. So far this part seems

mihī videtur res clara. Priorem ergo putat ratione sufficiente probari, quia Angelo pro sua libertate, potest ita placere sua beatitudo naturalis, ut illi formaliter, et expresse displiceat indigere supernaturali, aut illam ex mentis expectare; ergo potest per actum positivum nolitionis, seu displicentiæ ab illa averti. Consequentia est clara, et antecedens probatur, quia ad hujusmodi displicentiam non est necessarium, ut præcedat error, sed sufficit apprehensio alterius supernaturalis beatitudinis sub aliqua ratione mali, utique quatenus morosum, vel difficile apprehenditur indigere novis meritis ad beatitudinem obtinendam, vel non habere sufficientem, et consummatam excellentiam sine extrinseca perfectione.

9. *Impugnatur hic modus primus.*—Sed imprimis, etiam illam displicentiam, ut possibilem admittamus, non potest de facto in ea poni primum peccatum Luciferi, quia non apparet in illa malitia superbiæ, sed potius pusillanimitatis, vel accidiæ. Quod est contra dicta, et contra verba Isaiaë et Ezechielis, quæ infra contra secundum modum dicendi ponderabimus. Assumptum probatur, quia actus in illo modo peccandi intervenire supponuntur, scilicet complacentia de propria beatitudine naturali, et displicentia de indigentia beatitudinis supernaturalis. Isti enim actus in objectis, et in modo tendendi, et in effectibus valde distincti sunt, nec posterior in priori virtute continetur, nam potest optime complacentia illa consistere sine hac displicentia; sunt ergo actus distincti. Et prior non est actus superbiæ, quia est consentaneus objecto <860> suo, et objectum est naturæ Angeli proportionatum. Imo nec malus est per se loquendo, ac præcise spectatus, ut jam probatum. Posterior autem actus, licet sit malus, non est superbia, quia non est appetitus excellentiæ, sed potius est fuga illius. Unde magis ad accidiam, seu pigritiam, vel pusillanimitatem pertinet. Unde, Matth. 25, illi servo, qui unum talentum acceperat, et illud absconderat, dicit Dominus : *Serve male et piger*; quia contentus parvo dono majus lucrum non procuravit. Ad hunc autem modum se habuisset Angelus, si contentus beatitudine naturali ad supernaturalem non aspiraret. Non fuisset ergo superbus, sed piget, aut pusillanimis.

10. *Adversariorum responsio evertitur.*—Dices, pusillanimitatem interdum oriri ex superbia,

a clear matter to me. Then he thinks that the former is sufficiently shown by reason since his natural happiness can be pleasing to the Angel through his freedom in such a way that to lack supernatural happiness or to anticipate it mentally is formally and expressly displeasing to him. Therefore, he can through a positive act of nolition or displeasure turn away from it. The consequence is clear and the antecedent is shown, since it is not necessary for this kind of displeasure that the error precedes, but an apprehension of the other supernatural happiness under some aspect of bad, at least insofar as he is hard to please, is enough. Either it is apprehended that it is difficult to obtain happiness with new merits or to not have sufficient and consummate excellence without extrinsic perfection.

9. *This first way is attacked.*—But, first, in order for us even to admit that dissatisfaction as possible, the first sin of Lucifer cannot in fact be placed in that, since it does not appear in that evil of pride but rather in that of cowardness or sloth. That is against the saying and against the words of Isaiah and Ezekiel, which we will weigh below against the second way of speaking. The assumption is shown, since the acts in that way of sinning are supposed to come between, namely, the pleasure of proper natural happiness and the dissatisfaction of the lack of supernatural happiness. For those acts are very distinct in the objects, in the way tending, and in the effects, nor is the latter virtually contained in the former. For that pleasure can best consist without this dissatisfaction. Therefore, the acts are distinct. And the former is not an act of pride, because it is appropriate to its object and the object is proportionate to the nature of the Angel. Nor indeed is it evil, strictly speaking and considered precisely, as has already been shown. But the latter act, although it is evil is not pride, since it is not a desire for excellence, but rather is a flight from it. Hence, it pertains more to sloth or laziness, or to cowardness. Hence, the Lord says in Matt. 25[:26] to the servant who had received one talent and had buried it ‘wicked and lazy servant!’, because in having been content with a little gift he did not procure greater gain. But the Angel would have held himself to this way, if in having been content with natural happiness he did not aspire to supernatural happiness. Therefore, he would not have been proud, but lazy or cowardly.

10. *The response of the adversaries is overturned.*—You may say that cowardness sometimes arises from pride,

teste D. Thoma 2, 2, q. 133, art. 1, ad 3, cum Gregorio in Pastoralis, p. 1, cap. 7, dicente : quod *Superbus existeret, qui auctoris imperio obedire recusaret*. Verumtamen Gregorius videtur loqui de superbia late sumpta, prout omnis inobediens potest dici superbus, materiali quadam, seu generali ratione. D. Thomas autem declarat, tunc pusillanimitatem oriri ex superbia, quando aliquis nimis proprio sensui innixus refugit ea facere, ad quæ sufficientiam habet. In præsentia autem non possumus huiusmodi deceptionem, vel nimiam fiduciam in proprio iudicio Angelo attribuere : quia illa supponit magnam ignorantiam, imo errorem in intellectu. Unde Lucifer non creditur fuisse superbus, quia nimis de iudicio suo confidit, sed quia aliquid supra se appetiit. Responderi potest, illam displicentiam de indigentia beatitudinis supernaturalis non fuisse ortam ex apprehensione, quod illa excederet vires naturales, aut ex errore, quod vel vires supernaturales ad illam acquirendam non sufficerent; vel quod non tribuerentur (quod esset ad pusillanimitatem necessarium), sed ortam fuisse ex nimia complacentia in beatitudine naturali, sub ratione perfectionis sufficientis, absque alia intrinsicis adveniente.

11. *Impugnatur secundo*.—Sed contra hoc addimus secundam principalem rationem, quia hic modus superbiæ est Angelo impossibilis sine prævia deceptione, et errore. Sed hæc non præcessit; ergo. Major declaratur, quia illa responsio supponit illam complacentiam de beatitudine naturali, ut est actus distinctus a displicentia beatitudinis supernaturalis, et prior illa naturæ ordine fuisse malum, et superbia, non quia fuerit appetus alterius perfectionis distinctæ a naturali beatitudine, sed <col. b> per apprehensionem ejusdem excellentiæ aliter, quam revera esset, sed illa necessario includit deceptionem, et errorem; ergo. Et confirmatur, quia Lucifer evidenter cognoscebat in prima, et secunda mora se non videre Deum per solam beatitudinem naturalem, quam jam habebat; ergo non potuit apprehendere beatitudinem naturalem, ut sufficientem perfectionem suam, nisi iudicando, vel visionem, Dei esse simpliciter impossibilem, vel se non esse capacem illius, vel non esse excellentiorem perfectionem, magisque satiantem intellectum, quam beatitudinem naturalem.

by witness of St. Thomas who, with Gregory in *Pastoralis*, p. 1, cap. 7, says in [ST] IIaIIæ.133.1 ad 3: ‘He becomes proud who refuses to obey the rule of authority’. Nevertheless, Gregory seems to speak of pride taken more broadly, insofar as everyone who is disobedient can be called proud, by a certain material or general reason. But St. Thomas declares that cowardness then arises from pride when someone who has leaned too much on a particular sense runs away from doing that which for which he has enough. But at present we cannot attribute a deception of this kind or an excessive reliance on a particular judgement to the Angel, since that supposes a great ignorance, indeed error, in the intellect. Hence, Lucifer is not believed to have been proud because he was too confident in his judgement, but because he desired something beyond himself. It can be responded that dissatisfaction with the lack of supernatural happiness did not spring from the apprehension that it exceeded natural strength or from the error that either supernatural strength does not suffice for acquiring it or that strength was not bestowed (which is necessary for cowardness), but it sprung from an excessive pleasure in natural happiness under the aspect of sufficient perfection apart from another arising intrinsically.

11. *The second way is attacked*.—But against this we add the second principal reason, since this mode of pride is impossible for an Angel without deception or error leading the way. But this does not precede. Therefore. The major is declared, since that response supposes that that pleasure of natural happiness, as it is an act distinct from the dissatisfaction with supernatural happiness and prior by that order of nature, was wicked and was pride, not because there was a desire for another perfection distinct from natural happiness, but through an apprehension of the same excellence in a way different than it really was. But that necessarily includes deception and error. Therefore. And it is confirmed, since Lucifer evidently was aware in the first and second pauses that he did not see God through natural happiness alone, which he already has. Therefore, he could not apprehend natural happiness as his sufficient perfection, unless by judging either that vision of God is strictly speaking impossible or that he is not capable of it or that it is not a more excellent perfection and more satisfying to the intellect than natural happiness.

12. *Quid ad prædicta respondeat Vasquez.—Rejicitur responsio.*—Hic vero adhibent aliam responsionem, videlicet ad displicentiam tendendi in beatitudinem supernaturalem, vel ad nimium affectum naturalis beatitudinis, non supponi iudicium, sed solam simplicem apprehensionem illius beatitudinis, ut sufficientis, vel indigentiae alterius beatitudinis, ut disconvenientis, vel contrariae propriae naturali dignitati. In qua apprehensione non est deceptio, nec falsitas, cum iudicium non includat. Verumtamen impossibile est, apprehensionem, quæ non includat iudicium aliquod, posse movere affectum, ut ex tractatu de Anima., disp. 5, quæst. 7, et ex 1, 2, suppono, et in sequentibus attingemus. Ergo vel illa simplex apprehensio voluntatem Angeli ad inordinatum affectum beatitudinis movere non potuit, vel includit iudicium, quod illa beatitudo sibi sufficeret, seu quod indigentia alterius melioris suæ naturali bonitati repugnaret. Imo in Angelo, qui sine discursu iudicat, non potest intelligi talis apprehensio, quæ iudicium non includat, quia est apprehensio non vocis, sed rei, et ita est cognitio rei, quod talis, vel talis sit, et hoc est iudicare. Unde si Angelus apprehendit supernaturalem beatitudinem, vel indigentiam ejus sub ratione mali, per illam cognoscit illud objectum esse sibi disconveniens, et consequenter iudicat esse sibi disconveniens illam beatitudinem appetere. Et sirniliter, si apprehendit talem beatitudinem, ut sibi sine alia sufficientem simpliciter, talem esse iudicat, ac proinde in utroque errat, ac decipitur.

13. *Quid alii respondeant.*—Denique non desunt, qui nullum reputent inconveniens aliquem errorem in Angelo admittere prævium ad peccatum (ut ex Ægidio in capite sequenti referemus) quando ille error non est de re mere naturali, sed est de supernaturali. Et ita posset in præsentis puncto talis error admitti; <861> quia quod supernaturalis beatitudo sit possibilis creaturæ, non est veritas mentalis et consequenter, quod Angelus sit capax talis beatitudinis, id est, visionis Dei claræ, non est naturale objectum. Potuit ergo Angelus in his errare, et ex tali errore despicere supernaturalem beatitudinem, ab illaque per positivum actum averti.

14. *Impugnatur.*—Sed in hoc distinguendum est

12. *How Vasquez might respond to the foregoing.—The response is rejected.*—But here they invite another response, namely, that in order to tend to dissatisfaction with supernatural happiness or to excessive affection for natural happiness, no judgement is supposed but only a simple apprehension of that happiness as sufficient, or of the need for another happiness as disagreeable, or of the proper contrary to natural dignity. In this apprehension there is no deception or falsity, since it does not include a judgement. Nevertheless, it is impossible that an apprehension which does not include some judgement could move affection, as I suppose from the treatise on *De Anima*, disp. 5, q. 7 and from IaIIæ. And we will touch on this in following sections. Therefore, either that simple apprehension could not move the will of the Angel to an inordinate affection for happiness or it includes the judgement that that happiness is sufficient for him or that need for the other better [happiness] is repugnant to his natural goodness. Indeed, such an apprehension, which does not include a judgement, cannot be understood in an Angel who judges without going through a reasoning process, since the apprehension is not of words but of the thing and thus is a cognition of the thing that it is like this or like that. And that is to judge. Hence, if the Angel apprehends supernatural happiness or the need for it under the aspect of bad, through that he cognizes that that object is disagreeable to himself and consequently he judges it to be disagreeable to himself to desire that happiness. And, similarly, if he apprehends happiness to be such that it is sufficient, strictly speaking, for himself without the addition of other [happiness], he judges it to be such. And therefore he errs either way and is deceived.

13. *How others might respond.*—Finally, those who think that it is not disagreeable to admit some error in the Angel prior to the sin (as we will refer from Ægidius in following chapters) when that error is not about a merely natural thing but about a supernatural thing are not entirely lacking. And thus in the present case such an error can be admitted, since that supernatural happiness is possible for a creature is not a truth of the mind (*veritas mentalis*). Consequently, that the Angel is capable of such happiness, that is, of the clear vision of God, is not a natural object. Therefore, the Angel could err in these and as a result of such an error disdain supernatural happiness and be turned from it through a positive act.

14. *It is attacked.*—But in this matter a distinction

inter involuntarium, et voluntarium errorem. Nam de priori jam supra ostendimus, in mente angelica non potuisse reperiri involuntarium errorem, vel deceptionem ante peccatum, saltem ex ordine divinæ providentiæ : ergo licet de potentia absoluta potuerit Angelus illo modo despiciere supernaturalem beatitudinem ex errore, nihilominus secundum ordinariam non potuit, ac proinde de facto non sic peccavit. Imo quamvis de potentia absoluta sic averteretur a supernaturali beatitudine, in eo non peccaret, quia supponitur error esse involuntarius, et consequenter ignorantiam esse invincibilem, qualis esset, si omni supernaturali revelatione Angelus careret, et ex sufficientibus, vel probabilibus conjecturis crederet, talem beatitudinem ad suam perfectionem non pertinere.

15. *Progreditur impugnatio.*—At vero, si error esset vincibilis, voluntarius etiam esset, et consequenter supponeret peccatum in voluntate, de quo quale esset, dicam commodius in capite sequenti. Nihilominus tamen peccatum circa affectum beatitudinis, occasione illius erroris commissum, non est superbia. Quia in affectu ad beatitudinem naturalem nulla esset superbia; quia solum amaretur, ut vera perfectio naturalis, et ut excellentia proportionata tali naturæ. Nec etiam indisplentia supernaturalis beatitudinis, esset superbia, sed pusillanimitas, vel quædam omissio, ut jam ostensum est. Denique quidquid sit possibile, de facto certe non est verisimile, Luciferum peccasse ex ejusmodi errore, quia in primo instanti habuit revelationem, et fidem supernaturalis beatitudinis, et spem illius in eadem fide, et charitate Dei fundatam : non potuit ergo postea ex errore mentis, formalem displicentiam illius, aut aversionem habere; nisi prius in hæresim circa veritatem talis beatitudinis, et consequenter in ejus desperationem, indiceret : non est autem verisimile, Luciferum in hæresim incidisse, ut infra ostendam : ergo, etc.

16. *Secundus modus explicandi peccatum superbiæ Luciferi impugnatur.*—*Adversario- <col. b>rum responsio.*—*Impugnatur.*—Superest dicendum de alio modo explicandi peccatum superbiæ in ordine ad naturalem beatitudinem, supernaturali neglecta : solum negative, seu præcisive. Quem modum explicandi hoc peccatum

should be made between involuntary and voluntary error. For with regard to the former we already showed above that involuntary error or deception could not be found in the angelic mind before sin, at least according to the order of divine providence. Therefore, although the Angel could with respect to absolute power disdain supernatural happiness in that way as a result of error, nevertheless, he could not according to ordinary [power] and therefore did not in fact sin in that way. Indeed, however much he might with respect to absolute power in that way have been turned from supernatural happiness, he would not have sinned in that, since the error is supposed to be involuntary and consequently the ignorance is invincible. This sort of thing would be if the Angel lacked any supernatural revelation and from sufficient or more probably conjectures believed that such a happiness did not pertain to his perfection.

15. *The attack continues.*—But, on the other hand, if the error were vincible, it would also be voluntary, and consequently, it would place the sin in the will. About what condition that is, I will speak more fully in the following chapter. Yet still a sin concerning the affection for happiness, by occasion of that error having been committed, is not pride. For there would be no pride in the affection for natural happiness, since it was only loved as a true natural perfection and as an excellence proportionate to such a nature. Nor would the non-dissatisfaction with supernatural happiness be pride, but cowardness or a certain omission, as was shown already. Finally, whatever may be possible, it is certainly not in fact verisimilitudinous that Lucifer sinned as a result of an error of that sort, since in the first instance he had revelation and faith in supernatural happiness, as well as hope for it founded in that very faith and in the charity of God. Therefore, he could not afterwards have by an error of the mind have a formal dissatisfaction in or aversion to it, except he earlier have indicated heresy concerning the truth of such happiness and consequently his desperation. But it is not verisimilitudinous that Lucifer fell into heresy, as should be shown below. Therefore, etc.

16. *The second way of explaining Lucifer's sin of pride is attacked.*—*The response of the adversaries.*—*It is attacked.*—What is left to be discussed is the other way of explaining the sin of pride in the order to natural happiness, neglecting supernatural happiness: only negatively or precisely. The Thomists Hervæus, Cajetan, and Ferrariensis and all the moderns generally preder

præferunt communiter Thomistæ, Hervæus, Cajetanus, Ferrara, et alli ex modernis: et consentiunt Ægidius et Bassolis. Contra hoc autem statim occurrit objectio: quia sequitur primum peccatum Luciferi fuisse omissionis, et consequenter non peccasse appetendo, sed potius non volendo: consequens est falsum: ergo. Sequela patet, quia volendo naturalem beatitudinem Lucifer non peccavit: sed præter hanc voluntatem solum habuit negationem affectus, vel relationis ad supernaturalem beatitudinem, ratione cujus peccasse dicitur: ergo tantum peccavit, omittendo. Falsitas autem consequentis probatur; tum quia repugnat verbis de Lucifero relatis, Isaïæ 12: *In cælum conscendam, super astra Dei exaltabo solium meum*, etc. Unde, Ezechielis 28, dicitur: *In multitudine negotiationis tuæ, repleta sunt interiora tua iniquitate*. Quæ verba gravissimum peccatum commissionis indicant. Tum etiam, quia sequitur, peccatum Angeli non fuisse superbiam, quia superbia non est peccatum omissionis, sed commissionis. Propter quod consequens illud est contra communem sententiam theologorum. Respondent Ferrara et alii, et insinuat etiam D. Thomas 2, dist. 5, quæst. 1, a. 3, ad 4, in illo peccato fuisse aliquam omissionem ejus circumstantiæ, quæ actu amandi beatitudinem naturalem adjungi debuisset, scilicet, ordinationis illius amoris in Deum finem supernaturalem. Nihilominus tamen peccatum non fuisse omissionis, sed commissionis, quia fuit per actum positivum sine debita circumstantia, sicut orare sine intentione non est tantum peccatum omissionis, sed commissionis.

17. Hæc vero responsio non satisfacit, quia supponit quamdam obligationem affirmativi præcepti obligantis pro secundo instanti ad tunc referendum omnia naturalia in finem supernaturalem, quia si tunc non ut geret talis obligatio, omittere illam, vel operari cum carentia talis relationis, nullum esset peccatum. At vero hæc obligatio pro illomet instanti, non fuit ex sola rei natura; quia præceptum affirmativum non obligat pro semper; et illud præceptum utique amandi Deum, ut objectum supernaturalis beatitudinis, jam fuerat impletum in primo instanti. Unde satis erat in secundo illam relationem non retractare, nec <862> aliquid illi contrarium agere. Nec etiam fuit illa obligatio ex peculiari præcepto positivo divino, quia de illo non con-

this way of explaining this sin. Ægidius and [John de] Bassolis are in agreement. But an objection against this view occurs at once, for it follows that the first sin of Lucifer was an omission and, consequently, he did not sin by desiring but rather by not willing. The consequent is false. Therefore. The consequence is clear, since Lucifer did not sin by willing natural happiness. But beyond this willing he only had the negation of an affect or of a relation to supernatural happiness by reason of which he is said to have sinned. Therefore, he only sinned by omitting something. But the falsity of the consequent is proven, first, because it conflicts with the words concerning Lucifer related in Isaiah [14:13]: ‘I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God ...’ Hence, it is said in Ezekiel 28[:16]: ‘In the multitude of your business your interior was filled with your iniquity’. These words indicate a most serious sin of commission. Also, furthermore, since it follows that the sin of the Angel was not pride, because pride is not a sin of omission but of commission. As a result, that consequent is contrary to the common view of the theologians. Ferrariensis and others respond—and even St. Thomas suggests it in II, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4—that there was in that sin some omission of its circumstance which ought to have been joined to the act of loving natural happiness: namely, of the ordering of that love to the supernatural end in God. Still, despite that, the sin was not of omission but of commission, because it was through a positive act without the obligatory circumstances, just as praying without intention is not only a sin of omission but of commission.

17. But this response is not satisfactory because it assumes a certain obligation of an obligating affirmative precept before the second instant to then refer all natural things to the supernatural end. For if there was not something then to bear such an obligation, then to omit it or to act while lacking such a relation would not be a sin. But, on the other hand, this obligation before that instant did not exist solely as a result of the nature of the thing, since an affirmative precept does not obligate forever. And, certainly, that precept to love God as the object of supernatural happiness had already been satisfied in the first instant. Hence, it was enough in that second instant not to retract that relation and not to do something contrary to it. Nor was that obligation a result of a special positive divine precept, since it is not consistent with that. But to

stat. Ad hoc vero dici potest, præceptum ipsum charitatis infusæ ex natura rei obligare pro instanti viæ : et Angelos obligasse in secundo instanti et pro illo, quia illud erat ultimum viæ, et unicum plenæ deliberationis angelicæ, cum qua debuerunt Deum amare in via, ut ad patriam possent pervenire. Unde probabilissimum est, habuisse Angelos omnes hanc obligationem pro illo secundo instanti.

18. *Progreditur impugnatio.*—*Ad exemplum in fine num. 14.*—Verumtamen illa posita, impugnatur directe illa responsio, quia illud præceptum obligabat quidem ad habendum actum supernaturalis dilectionis Dei ex fide, et cum fiducia supernaturali obtinendi supernaturalem beatitudinem, non tamen obligabat ad hunc actum, ut ad circumstantiam dilectionis naturalis, sed per se, ut erat quidam actus debitus Deo, et necessarius ad salutem; ergo inde inferri non potest, actum illum dilectionis beatitudinis naturalis fuisse malum commissive, etiamsi habuerit concomitans omissionis peccatum. Et ideo non est simile exemplum orationis adductum : quia attentio ex natura rei est intrinseca circumstantia orationis; imo per se non est præcepta, sed tantum ex suppositione, quod quis orare debeat, aut velit; et ideo qui sine attentione orat, peccat committendo, quia orat modo indebito contra ipsum orationis præceptum. At vero relatio amoris naturalis beatitudinis in supernaturalem, non est ex natura rei circumstantia necessaria ad bonitatem naturalis dilectionis, nec in eo casu erat necessaria talis relatio ex vi præcepti, de tali dilectione naturali, sed aliunde oriebatur ex præcepto generali charitatis Dei : quod respectu actus naturalis erat illi extrinsecum, et quasi accidentaliter, et contingenter conjunctum pro eodem instanti : ergo ommissio talis præcepti non est circumstantia alterius actus naturalis, neque illum reddit moraliter malum. Et declaratur, nam si Angelus in illo instanti non haberet actum naturalis dilectionis suæ beatitudinis, amando Deum ex charitate, suæ obligationi satisfaceret, nihilque peccaret, etiamsi dilectionem sui naturalem actu non referret in Deum, quia illam actu non exerceret : ergo signum est, illam obligationem supernaturalis amoris non fuisse de illo, ut de circumstantia amoris naturalis, sed per se, ut de quodam actu bono. Ergo quamvis in omissione illius peccetur, inde non sequitur, <col. b> amorem

this can be responded that the very precept of infused charity obligates by the nature of the thing for the instant of the way. And the Angels were obligated in the second instant both for that, since it was the end of the way, and each one by full angelic deliberation, since by that they owed it to love God on the way so that they could come to the homeland. Hence, it is most probably that all the Angels had this obligation for that second instant.

18. *The attack advances.*—*To the example at the end of n. 14.*—Nevertheless, that having been posited, that response is directly attacked, because that precept indeed was obligating that one have an act of supernatural love to God by faith and with trust in a supernatural obtaining of supernatural happiness, yet it was not obligating to this act as to the circumstance of natural love but *per se* so that it was indeed an act owed to God and necessary for salvation. Therefore, it cannot from that be inferred that that act of love for natural happiness was a bad commissive act, even if it had a concomitant sin of omission. And for that reason the example of prayer that was raised is not similar, since attention is an intrinsic circumstance of prayer by the nature of the thing. Indeed, *per se* it is not commanded but only by supposition that anyone ought or wishes to pray. And therefore he who prays without attention sins by committing, since he prays in a way that he ought not against the very precept to pray. But, on the other hand, a relation of natural love for happiness in the supernatural is not a necessary circumstance by the nature of the thing for the goodness of natural love nor was such a relation necessary in that case by force of a precept concerning such natural love, but it arose elsewhere from a general precept of charity for God which with respect to the natural act was extrinsic to it and, as it were, accidentally and contingently conjoined [to it] for the same instant. Therefore, the omission of such a precept is not a circumstance of another natural act nor does it render it morally bad. And it is shown, for if the Angel had not had in that instant an act of natural love for his happiness, by loving God from charity, he would have satisfied his obligation. Therefore, this is a sign that that obligation to supernatural love was not about that as about a circumstance of natural love but *per se* as about a certain good act. Therefore, although he sinned in the omission of that, it does not from that follow that the natural love exercised at that time and good with respect to the object and other circumstances becomes evil as a result [of the omission].

naturalem tunc exercitum, et ex objecto, et aliis circumstantiis bonum, inde fieri malum. Et confirmatur tandem, quia qui omittit amorem Dei eo tempore pro quo tenebatur illum exercere, non propterea peccat in omni actu, quem pro illo tempore exercet, per se loquendo, et ex vi talis concomitantiae solius, ut ex 1, 2, suppono; ergo ita erit in præsentia.

19. *Respondent ulterius adversarii.—Impugnatur primo.*—Responderi potest illam delectationem naturalis beatitudinis fuisse causam omittendi dilectionem supernaturalem, et ex hac parte fuisse peccaminosam commissive. Hoc declarat Ferrara, quia Angelus ex sui amore naturali applicuit intellectum, ut suum decorem intensius consideraret, ex qua intensa consideratione orta est etiam intensio in proprio amore naturali, et ex hac secuta est inconsideratio beatitudinis supernaturalis, et consequenter omissio relationis, et ordinationis sui ad beatitudinem supernaturalem. Sed licet hoc totum concedatur, semper concluditur, in toto illo negotio solam omissionis malitiam inventam fuisse : nam actus, qui de se non est malus, licet ut causa omissionis malæ denominetur peccatum, et quasi materialiter dici possit commissio; nihilominus formaliter, et in ratione peccati, tantum est peccatum omissionis, quia in toto illo negotio unica tantum est malitia omissionis. Item licet in illo actu, ut causa omissionis reperiretur distincta malitia, nunquam illa esse posset malitia superbiæ, quia malitia, quæ inest actui solum, ut est causa alicujus eventus, non transcendit speciem malitiæ in ipso effectu inventæ, sive malitia causæ sit distincta, sive non : sed illa dilectio naturalis beatitudinis non fuit causa superbiæ, sed alterius peccati; ergo ex illa causalitate non potuit malitiam superbiæ contrahere.

20. Adde denique, non posse dici, illam dilectionem fuisse causam talis omissionis, quia quando cum uno actu simul potest esse alius, quamvis unus fiat, et alter omittatur, non potest ille actus dici causa hujus omissionis : quia nec per illum est volita directe (ut supponitur), nec indirecte, aut virtute, quia talis actus non est incompossibilis alteri, ut etiam supponitur. Sed in præsentia consideratio, et dilectio beatitudinis naturalis, per non excludit considerationem supernaturalis beatitudinis, et ordinationem ad il-

And, finally, it is confirmed, for he who omits love for God in that time during which he is supposed to exercise it does not for this reason sin in every act which he exercises during that time, speaking *per se* and according to the force of such a concomitant alone, as I suppose from IaIIæ. Therefore, that will be the case in the present matter.

19. *The adversaries respond further.—It is attacked first.*—It can be responded that that delight in natural happiness was the cause for omitting love for supernatural happiness and from this part it was a sinful commissive [act]. Ferrariensis shows this: for the Angel applied his intellect by a natural love of himself so that he considered his own beauty more intensely, from which intense consideration the aim at his own by natural love also arose. And from this followed the lack of consideration for supernatural happiness and consequently the omission of the relation and of the ordering of himself to supernatural happiness. But although all of this be conceded, it is always concluded that in that whole business only the badness of omission was found. For an act which is not of itself bad, although as a cause of a bad omission it is denominated a sin and, as it were, can be called a commission materially, nevertheless formally and with regard to the nature of sin, it is only a sin of omission because in that whole business there is only a single badness of omission. Likewise, although in that act as a cause of omission a distinct badness is found, it can never be the badness of pride. For the badness which belongs to an act only as it is a cause of some event does not exceed the species of badness in the discovered effect itself. Either the badness of the cause is distinct or it is not. But that love of natural happiness was not a cause of pride but of a further sin. Therefore, he could not have committed the badness of pride by that causality.

20. Finally, I add that it cannot be said that that love was the cause for such an omission, since when one act can be simultaneous with another, then although one happens and the other is omitted the former act cannot be called the cause for this omission. For it was not willed through the former act directly (as is assumed) nor directly or virtually, since such an act is not impossible with the other, as is also assumed. But in the present case, consideration of and love for natural happiness does not *per [se]* exclude consideration of supernatural happiness and ordering to it. For in the

lam : nam in primo instanti hæc omnia simul Angelus habuit, et boni Angeli etiam in secundo instanti utrum- <863> que actum habuerunt; ergo dilectio naturalis beatitudinis in malis non fuit causa oblivionis (ut sic dicam) supernaturalis beatitudinis, nec omissionis ordinis ad ipsam. Nec illud, quod de intentione actus addit Ferrara, verisimilitudinem habet, quia longe verisimilius est Angelos omnes in primo instanti dilexisse summo conatu unicuique possibili seipsos, suamque beatitudinem naturalem : ac subinde non potuisse in secundo instanti illam dilectionem, vel considerationem magis intendere. Nec illa intensio, etiamsi daretur, talis fuisset, quæ considerationem supernaturalem, vel dilectionem charitatis impediret, quia sunt diversi ordinis, ut supra, in libro quarto, dictum est. Unde simpliciter non videtur verisimile, Luciferum in secundo instanti mentem a consideratione rerum supernaturalium omnino avertisse, ut in superioribus capitibus tactum est, et in sequentibus etiam dicitur.

21. *Ultima evasio adversariorum.—Impugnatur primo.*—Ultima vero evasio est, Luciferum excessisse in dilectione suæ naturalis beatitudinis in modo diligendi, quia illam amavit super omnia : et per talem amorem virtualiter contempsit beatitudinem supernaturalem, et ideo non solum peccasse omittendo relationem ad supernaturalem beatitudinem, sed etiam inordinate diligendo naturalem beatitudinem ultra mensuram, et ultra propriam dignitatem, et excellentiam ejus; atque ita in illamet dilectione peccatum commissionis, ac superbiam inventum esse. Sed hoc eisdem fere modis jam tactis impugnari efficaciter potest. Nam imprimis etiamsi totum illud concedatur, non apparet in Lucifero illa propria superbia, quæ illi in Scriptura tribuitur per appetitum excellentiæ nondum obtentæ, et obtinentæ. Nam perfectionem, et beatitudinem naturalem jam habebat Lucifer, et nihilominus dixit in corde suo : *In cælum conscendam, exaltabo solium meum, sedebo, similis ero*, etc. Quæ omnia verba sunt appetentis excellentiam nondum habitam : non ergo fuit ejus superbia de sola beatitudine naturali, quam jam habebat. Confirmatur ex Hieronymo Ezech. 20 : *Perdidisti (ait) sapientiam in decore tuo, ut dum plus vis esse, quam conditus es, et magis sapere, quam a Deo acceperas, etiam in [sic: id] perderes, quod*

first instant the Angel has all these at the same time and the good Angels also had both of these acts in the second instant. Therefore, love for natural happiness in the bad [Angels] was not the cause for being oblivious (if I may say it this way) of supernatural happiness nor for the omission of ordering to it. Nor does what Ferrariensis adds about the intention of the act have verisimilitude, since it is more verisimilar that each of the Angels in the first instant loved himself and his natural happiness with the greatest impulse possible to each one and thereupon they could not have intended that love or consideration more in the second instant. Nor could that aim, even if it were granted, have been the sort of thing which would have impeded supernatural consideration or charitable love, because they are of different orders, as was said above in book four. Hence, strictly speaking, it does not seem verisimilar that Lucifer in the second instant turned his mind entirely away from consideration of supernatural things, as was touched on in previous chapters and will also be discussed in following chapters.

21. *The last evasion of the adversaries.—It is attacked, first.*—But the last evasion is that Lucifer was excessive in love for his natural happiness in the mode of loving, because he loved it beyond everything else. And through such a love he virtually scorned supernatural happiness and therefore not only sinned by omitting the relation to supernatural happiness but also by inordinately loving natural happiness beyond measure and beyond its proper worth and excellence. And thus a sin of commission and of pride was found in that very love. But this can be attacked effectively in nearly the same ways already mentioned. For in the first place even if the whole matter were conceded, that proper pride would not appear in Lucifer which is attributed to him in Scripture through his desire for excellence not yet obtained and to be obtained. For Lucifer already had perfection and natural happiness and yet still said in his heart: ‘I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne . . . I will sit . . . I will be like . . .’ [Isaiah 14:13–14]. All these words are of a desire for an excellence not yet had. Therefore, his pride was not only about a natural happiness which he already had. It is confirmed from Jerome’s [*Commentary*] on Ezekiel [28:17]: ‘You destroyed your wisdom because of your beauty so that as long as you have more power than was placed in you and understand more than you received from God, you also destroyed that which you had’. Anselm delivers the same point with

habeas. Idem tradit multis verbis Anselmus, libr. de Casu diab., capite 4. Nam ad explicandum, quomodo peccaverit Angelus, interrogat : Quæro quid voluit? et respondet non peccasse volendo, quia habebat. *Debebat enim* (ait) *vere velle, quod a Deo acceperat, nec <col. b> hoc volendo peccavit*. Unde concludit : *Voluit ergo aliquid quod non habebat, nec tunc velle debeat*. Et adducit exemplum de Eva, quæ quidem non peccavit male amando quæ habebat, sed concupiscendo quæ non habebat. Postea vero subdit : *Peccavit volendo aliquod commodum, quod non habebat, nec tunc velle debuit, quod tamen ad augmentum beatitudinis illi esse poterat*. Ubi aperte docet, objectum illius superbiæ fuisse aliquod bonum distinctum a beatitudine naturali, quam jam acceperat, et peccatum illud in actu desiderii, seu concupiscentiæ, non in actu complacentiæ de bono jam habito propositum fuisse. Quod etiam expresse tradit Gregorius, lib. 13, Moral., cap. 4, alias 7, et Hieronymus, vel potius Beda, Job 40, circa illa verba; *An extrahere poteris Leviathan*, et Isidorus, lib. 1, de Sum. Bon., capit. 15.

22. *Impugnatur secundo.—Quo pacto amor sui in Angelo dici possit super omnia.—*Deinde contra evasionem illam applicari possunt facile aliquæ ex rationibus factis. Nam si Lucifer amavit suam beatitudinem naturalem super omnia, hoc intelligi potest, vel formaliter, ac expresse ponendo in objecto illam comparisonem, vel virtualiter in modo diligendi. Primum dici non potest quia talis modus diligendi se plusquam Deum, et beatitudinem naturalem plusquam supernaturalem per expressam comparisonem, adeo est inordinatus, et contrarius naturali rationi, ut non videatur possibilis, nisi vel in persona omnino ignorante Deum, et supernaturalem beatitudinem, vel in voluntate jam valde depravata, qualis nunc est voluntas dæmonis. Ergo incredibile est Luciferum sapientissimum, et rectissime antea institutum, a tali amore initium iniquitatis suæ accepisse. Amor autem creaturæ, qui saltem implicite super omnia imputatur, duplici tantum signo dignoscitur. Unum est, si propter amorem creaturæ divina præcepta gravia non servantur : aliud est, si creatura sub aliqua ratione propria Dei ametur, colatur, aut æstimetur. Nam ex sola intensione talis amor non fit super omnia, ut sæpe dixi, et ex materia de Charitate, et de Pœnitentia est manifestum; nec aliud signum

many words in *De casu diab.*, c. 4. For in order to explain in what way the Angel sinned, he asks: I ask what he willed. And he responds that he did not sin by willing because he had. He says: 'For he truly ought to will that which he had received from God nor did he sin by willing this'. Hence, he concludes: 'Therefore, he willed something which he did not have nor ought to will to have at that point'. And he adduces the example of Eve who indeed did not sin by badly loving what she had but by lusting for what she did not have. But afterwards he supplies: He sinned by willing some advantage which he did not have nor ought to have willed at that point, which, nevertheless, could have served to augment happiness for him'. He plainly teaches here that the object of that pride was some good distinct from the natural happiness which he had already received and that the sin under discussion was in the act of desire or lust and not in the act of taking pleasure in good already possessed. Gregory also expressly relates this in *Moral.* XIII, c. 4 and subsequently in c. 7, as well as Jerome, or rather Bede, concerning the words 'can you pull in the Leviathan' from Job [41:1], and Isidore in *De Sum. Bon.* I, c. 15.

22. *It is attacked, secondly.—According to what the love of himself in the Angel can be called beyond everything.—*Next, others of the arguments made can easily be applied against that evasion. For if Lucifer loved his natural happiness beyond everything, this can be understood either formally and expressly by placing that comparison in the object or virtually in the manner of loving. The first cannot be said because such a way of loving himself more than God and natural happiness more than supernatural happiness through an explicit comparison is to that extent inordinate and contrary to natural reason, so that it does not seem possible except in a person wholly ignorant of God and supernatural happiness or in a will already greatly depraved like the will of a demon now. Therefore, it is unbelievable that Lucifer the most wise and most rightly established before admitted the beginning of his iniquity through such a love. But the love of a creature which is imputed as at least implicitly beyond everything is discerned by only two signs. One is if important divine precepts are not observed on account of the love for a creature. The other is if the creature is loved, cherished, or esteemed under some aspect proper to God. For from the aim alone of such a love it does not become beyond everything, as I have often said. And it is manifest from the material in both *De Charitate* and *De Pœnitentia*. Nor has any other sign of

talis amoris hactenus excogitatum est, nec, ut arbitror, inveniri potest. In præsentem autem amor sui in Lucifero non potest reputari super omnia posteriori modo : quia non amavit suam naturalem beatitudinem sub aliqua falsa apprehensione fictæ excellentiæ, excedentis capacitatem naturæ, aut mensuram suæ perfectionis, ut sæpe dic- <864> tum est, ac probatum, quia talis modus amandi non poterat esse sine magna mentis cæcitate, quæ peccatum primum non antecessit; ergo solum dici potest amor ille super omnia, quatenus est causa alterius ordinati affectus, qui habuerit pro objecto bonum aliud præter beatitudinem naturalem, fueritque propria superbia, non tantum per arrogantiam sui, inordinatam complacentiam, sed maxime per concupiscentiam alterius improportionatæ excellentiæ, et tunc in hoc affectu erit primum peccatum Angeli : nam prior amor complacentiæ sui solum denominative participat malitiam peccati, cuius est aliquo modo causa, ut in superioribus declaravi.

23. *Obiectio pro prima sententia.*—Contra resolutionem vero positam, et pro priori sententia objici possunt nonnulla testimonia Augustini; in quibus aperte dicit, Angelum peccasse, eo quod ad se conversus, sua naturali perfectione delectatus, et quasi inebriatus Deum contempsit, et ad ejus laudem conversus non est. Ita loquitur, lib. 4, Genes. ad litt., cap. 24 et 32, et lib. 11, c. 13 et 23, et lib. 11, c. 13 : *Sua*, inquit, *privata potestate elatus*, libro autem 12, cap. 1, ait, *sua potestate delectati*. Unde, lib. 14, cap. 13, generatim dicit, tunc aliquem inchoare superbiam, cum sibi nimis placet. Unde Ambrosius, dicta Epistol. 33, de Diabolo, ait, cecidisse, *quoniam sua potestate, et dignitate, quam a Deo acceperat, sibi placuit*.

24. *Responsio pro nostra sententia.*—Respondemus Patres, in his locis et similibus, non excludere a peccato Luciferi appetitum ulterioris excellentiæ, quam aliis locis solum dicunt Luciferum peccasse ex contemplatione, et amore suæ pulchritudinis, quod verissimum est; et indicatur in illis verbis Ezechielis : *Elevatum est cor tuum in decore tuo*. Nihilominus tamen elatio illa distinctus actus, et amor fuit ab inordinate affectu alterius excellentiæ. Nec oportet, ut in ipso amore et delectatione sui præcesserit inordinatio, quia

such a love been thought of so far, nor, as I think, can one be found. But in the present case, the love of self in Lucifer cannot be regarded beyond everything in the latter way, since he did not love his natural happiness under some false apprehension of an imagined excellence exceeding the capacity of his nature or the measure of his perfection, as was discussed and proved. For such a way of loving could not have been without a great blindness of mind, which did not precede the first sin. Therefore, that love can only be called beyond everything insofar as it is a cause of another ordinate [inordinate?] affect which he had for another good object besides natural happiness and which was proper pride, not only through his arrogance [and] inordinate pleasure, but especially through lust for another disproportionate excellence. And the first sin of the Angel, then, will be in this affect. For the former love of his pleasure only denominatively imparts the badness of sin, of which is in some way a cause, as I showed in previous [sections].

23. *An objection for the first view.*—But against the posited resolution and for the former view some *testimonia* of Aristotle can be brought up in which he plainly says that the Angel sinned by the fact that he turned to himself, taking delight in his natural perfection and, as it were, scorning God like a someone drunk, and not turned to his praise. Thus it is said in *Genes. ad litt.* IV, c. 24 and 32, and XI, c. 13 and 23, and XI, c. 13: ‘he was exalted by his personal power’. But in XII, c. 1, he says ‘by the power of delight’. Hence, in XIV, c. 13, he generally says that some pride begins then when he takes excessive pleasure in himself. Hence, Ambrosius in the designated letter 33, ‘On the devil’, says that he fell ‘because his power and honour which he had received from God were pleasing to him’.

24. *The response for our view.*—We respond that the Fathers in these places and other similar ones do not exclude a desire for another excellence from the sin of Lucifer, when in the other places they only say that Lucifer sinned as a result of contemplation and love for his beauty, which is most true. And it is indicated in these words from Ezekiel: ‘your heart was lifted up to your beauty’. Still, nevertheless, that exaltation was a distinct act and the love was from an inordinate affect for another excellence. Nor is it necessary that something inordinate have preceded in that love of and

illa delectatio sui non fuit per se causa subsequens superbiam, sed fuit aliqualis occasio non data (ut sic dicam) sed accepta ab ipso Angelo male utente sua libertate, et bono affectu, occasionem superbiam ex naturali perfectione sui, ejusque cognitione, et amore, sumendo. Ac proinde illa complacentia sui non est mala, nisi propter adjunctum superbiam affectum. Unde Augustinus, lib. 3, de Liber. Arbit., capite ultimo, ait : *Qui placet sibi ad perverse imitandum Deum, ut potestate sua frui velit, tanto fit minor, quanto <col. b> se cupit esse majorem.* Et hanc dicit diaboli superbiam fuisse.

delight in himself, since that delight in himself was not a *per se* cause of the pride that immediately followed. But it was some kind of occasion not given (if I may say it in that way) but accepted by the Angel himself by badly using his freedom and good affect and in taking up the occasion of pride resulting from his natural perfection and the cognition of and love for it. And hence that taking pleasure in himself is not bad except on account of the adjoined affect of pride. Hence, Augustine in *De lib. arb.* III, last chapter, says: 'He for whom it was pleasing to himself to perversely imitate God as he wished to enjoy by his own power became less to the extent that he desired himself to be greater'. And he says that this was the pride of the devil.