

<10>²

CAPUT III.

Utrum recte describatur potestas libera esse, quae positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum potest agere, et non agere.

5 1. Punctum hoc tractavi in lib. 1. de Auxiliis, quia illius resolu-
tionem, et declarationem, ad intelligendum usum libertatis, et concordiam eius cum gratia censeo esse valde necessariam, et ob eandem causam iterum hic praemittendum esse iudicavi, quia nonnulli moderni, licet descriptionem, seu propositionem illam simpliciter negare non audeant: illam limitant variis modis, prout unicuique, ad proprias sententias in aliis punctis defendendas commodum videtur. Has ergo limitationes hic expendere necesse est, ut postea cum solido fundamento procedere valeamus. Ut autem intelligantur limitationes, sciendum est, verbum illud, *potest*, in descriptione positum, duobus modis accipi solere, scilicet in <col. b> sensu composito, vel diviso, id est, vel ut cum illis omnibus praerequisitis stare simul possit, tam agere, quam non agere; vel ut stantibus illis praerequisitis potentia retineat integram libertatem suam, non tamen possit uti illa ad non agendum, nisi aliquod ex dictis praerequisitis auferatur.

Verbum, potest, in sensu composito et diviso accipitur.

Prima limitatio aliquorum.

20 2. Primus ergo modus interpretandi, vel limitandi illam descriptionem est, ut si verbum, *potest*, accipiatur in sensu

CHAPTER III.

*Whether a power that after all the prerequisites for acting have been posited can both act and not act is rightly described as being free.*³

1. I treated this point in Book I of *De concursu, motione et auxilio Dei*,⁴ since I think its resolution and explanation to be most necessary for understanding the use of freedom and its harmony with grace. For the same reason I deem that we should start with here for a second time here, since some moderns, although they do not dare simply to deny that description or proposition, they restrict it in various ways as seems advantageous to each one in defending his own views in other points. It is necessary, therefore, to evaluate these restrictions here so that afterwards we can proceed from a solid foundation.

But in order to understand these restrictions, one should know that it is usual to take that verb ‘can’ in two ways, namely, in a composed sense and in a divided sense. That is, either such that both acting and not acting are compatible with all those prerequisites, or such that with those prerequisites standing the power retains its complete freedom yet cannot use it for not acting except with the removal of some one of the stated prerequisites.

The verb ‘can’ is taken in a composed sense and a divided sense.

2. The first way of interpreting or restricting that description, then, is to take the verb ‘can’ such that if taken in the composed sense, it should

The first restriction [proposed] by some.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1620 Lyon edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Coimbra, 1619). For recorded variants, B = 1620 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1620 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 7 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³Merely three years after the first publication of this work, the Spanish Franciscan Jeronimo Tamarit de Tavaría summarizes the present chapter in the identically titled chapter in his *Flores theologiae* (Valencia, 1622), tom. 1, pp. 495–96.

⁴The first of Suárez’s *Opuscula*, which can be found in vol 11 of the Vivès edition.

composito, limitanda sit ad praerequisita ex parte causarum secundarum, ut intellectus, obiecti, et phantasiae, et si quid est aliud simile, non tamen extendatur ad praerequisita ex parte Dei: tum quia praeius concursus est necessarius ex parte Dei, et tamen illo posito non potest voluntas agere, et non agere, sed tantum agere: tum etiam quia voluntas, qua Deus vult liberum arbitrium operari, est necessaria, ut arbitrium operetur, et est ex praerequisitis, quia praecedat ipsum actum, et determinationem voluntatis creatae: et posita illa Dei voluntate, non stat voluntatem creatam liberam non operari; ergo necessario ab illa descriptione excipienda sunt praerequisita ex parte primae causae. Ita opinatur Alvarez, disp. 115. Ledesma, art. 10. §. *Sed antequam*, post 7. concl. et alii.

Alvarez.
Ledesma.

Secunda
limitatio.

3. Secundus modus limitandi descriptionem illam est, ut si intelligatur de omnibus praerequisitis, tam ex parte Dei, quam ex parte aliarum causarum, vel conditionum necessariarum, verbum, *potest*, accipiendum sit in sensu diviso, non in composito, respectu utriusque actus agendi, et non agendi, etiam divisim, seu sigillatim sumpti. Ita ut sensus sit, illam potentiam esse liberam, quae positis omnibus requisitis, adhuc in se retinet potestatem non agendi, etiamsi stantibus illis omnibus praerequisitis, cum illis coniungi non possit, ut non agat, sed oporteat aliquod ex illis praerequisitis auferri, ut potentia libera sua potestate non agendi utatur. Et simili modo quando talis potentia non agit, aut non vult, potestatem retinet agendi, et ideo libera est, non potest tamen coniungere actionem, vel volitionem cum solis illis praerequisitis, quae tunc concurrunt, quando non vult, nisi aliquid, quod deerat, addatur, et ordine naturae, seu causalitatis praecedat. Et hunc

be restricted to the prerequisites on the part of secondary causes—such as the intellect, the object, the imagination, and anything else that is similar—and it should not be extended to the prerequisites on the part of God. This is both [i] because a previous concursus on the part of God is necessary, yet once it has been posited the will cannot both act and not act, but can only act, and also [ii] because the willing by which God wills freewill⁵ to operate is necessary for choice (*arbitrium*) to operate and it is one of the prerequisites, since it precedes the act itself and the determination of the created will. Once that willing by God has been posited, it does not remain for the created free will not to operate. It is necessary, therefore, to remove the prerequisites on the part of the first cause from that description. Alvarez thinks this in [*De auxiliis gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus*] disp. 115, and Pedro de Ledesma⁶ in [*De divinae gratiae auxiliis*] art. 10, in the section starting ‘But before ...’ after the 7th conclusion, as well as others.

Alvarez.
Ledesma.

The second
restriction.

3. The second way of restricting that description is so that if it is understood to include all prerequisites or necessary conditions, both on the part of God and on the part of the other causes, the verb ‘can’ should be taken in the divided sense rather than the composed sense, with respect to each act of acting and not acting, which also are taken separately or individually. Thus the sense is that that power is free which, once all the requisites are posited at that point retains in itself the power not to act, even though with all those prerequisites standing the power cannot be conjoined with those prerequisites such that it does not act. Rather, some one of those prerequisites must be removed in order for the free power to use its capacity for not acting. In a similar way when such a power does not act or does not will, it retains the capacity to act, and for that reason it is free, although it cannot conjoin that action or volition with precisely those prerequisites that concur in the case where it does not will, unless something that is absent is added and surpasses the order of nature or of causality.

⁵I take ‘*liberum arbitrii*’ as a technical term naming the item under dispute. The equivalent term in contemporary philosophy might be ‘freedom of the will’, though it has the disadvantage of already suggesting a theory as to which faculty would provide us with this freedom. I will translate ‘*liberum arbitrii*’ with ‘freewill’ as a single word and reserve ‘freedom of the will’ for ‘*libertas voluntatis*’ where it is clear that it is the *will’s* freedom that is being considered. A benefit to using ‘freewill’ is that it is readily read as referring to a faculty rather than an act. A disadvantage, however, is that ‘*arbitrium*’ used by itself cannot be translated as ‘will’ because ‘will’ needs to be reserved for ‘*voluntas*’. I will translate ‘*arbitrium*’ with ‘choice’, even though that obscures the connection between ‘*arbitrium*’ and ‘*liberum arbitrium*’.

⁶There are at least two other scholastics with the name ‘Ledesma’, but Pedro de Ledesma seems the likeliest one for Suárez to have in mind here.

		etiam modum dicendi approbant dicti auctores: in quolibet autem alio sensu illam descriptionem reiiciunt, quam etiam dicunt non esse ab Aristotele, D. Thoma, Magistro, vel aliquo gravi doctore traditam, sed ab Almaino, et quibusdam Nominalibus inventam. Et ita facile omnia contemnunt, quae de illa descriptione in lib. 1. de Auxiliis diximus.	55R	The mentioned authors also approve this way of speaking, but they reject any other sense of that description, which they also say is not handed down by Aristotle, St. Thomas, the Master, or any other important doctor, but was invented by Jacques Almain and other nominalists. And thus they easily scorn everything that we said about that description in Book I of <i>De concursu, motione et auxilio Dei</i> .		
Prima assertio, vera est definitio libertatis in titulo posita. Victoria.	60	4. Nihilominus iterum dicimus descriptionem illam optimam esse, et a gravissimis Auctoribus traditam vel eisdem, vel aequivalentibus verbis. Imo existimo, ante nuperas controversias circa auxilium efficac gratiae exortas, descriptionem illam fuisse a Doctoribus, et in scholis communiter probatam, ut affirmat Victoria Relectiones de homine veniente ad usum rationis q. 1. propos. 3. ubi etiam ipse illam supponit, licet ad usum liberi arbitrii amplius requirat. Eandem supponit tanquam communem Valentia 2. tom. disp. 8. q. 5. punct. 4. §. 4. ubi ait in hoc consistere essentialiter libertatem actionis. Eandem ponit, ut receptam sententiam Corduba in lib. 1. Quaestionarum q. 55. dub. 9. et 10. et sumitur ex Nemesio lib. de Natura hominis cap. 35. dicente, <i>Esse autem liberum, si eisdem positis causis in nobis esset aliquando appetere, aliquando refugere, etc.</i> Et ex Scoto 2. d. 25. q. unica in fine, et ibi Gabriel n. 3. dub. 3. et 4. et in 1. d. 48. cap. 3. et ibi Ockham et quodlibet 1. q. 16. et Marsilius 2. q. 16. art. 4. et Dionysius Cisterciensis 2. d. 25. art. 2. concl. 2. et art. 3. concl. 4. Henricus quodlibet 1. q. 16. Hervaeus quodlibet 1. q. 1. Soto lib. 1. de Natura et Gratia cap. 16. ubi ponit illam, ut receptam definitionem liberi arbitrii. Et novissime consentit Curielus Controversiae 2. in Epistola 2. D. Petri n. 234. Denique ex Aristotele ac D. Thoma paulo post illam comprobabimus. Ratio autem potissima est, quia per illa verba optime declaratur internum dominium voluntatis in actiones suas, et proxima potestas operandi, et non operandi, vel operandi contrarium, quae vix potest aliis verbis commodius explicari.	60R	4. Nevertheless, we say again that that description is best and was handed down by the most important authors, either in the same words or in equivalent words. In fact, I think that before the appearance of the recent controversies about the efficacious help of grace that description was commonly proved by the doctors and in the schools, as Francisco de Vitoria affirms in <i>Relectiones theologicae</i> XIII ('On that to which one is held who is coming to the use of reason'), q. 1, propos. 3, where he also presupposes, even though it is more required for the use of freewill. Gregory of Valencia supposes the same as the common view in <i>Commentariorum theologorum tomus quatuor</i> II, disp. 8. q. 5, punct. 4, §4, where he says freedom of action consists essentially in this. Antonio de Córdoba takes this as the received view in <i>Quaestionarium theologicum libris quinque distinctum</i> I, q. 55, dub. 9 and 10, and it is taken from Nemesius, <i>On Human Nature</i> , ch. 35, where he says: 'but to be free is, if the same causes are posited in us, sometimes to seek, sometimes to flee ...' It is also taken from Scotus, II, d. 25, the end of the only question; Gabriel, II, d. 25, n. 3, dub. 3 and 4, and I, d. 48, ch. 3; Ockham, I, d. 48, ch. 3, and <i>Quodlibet</i> 1, q. 16; Marsilius of Inghen, II, q. 16, art. 4; Dionysius the Cistercian, ⁷ II, d. 25, art. 2, concl. 2, and art. 3, concl. 4; Henry of Ghent, <i>Quodlibet</i> 1, q. 16; Hervaeus Natalis, <i>Quodlibet</i> 1, q. 1; and Domingo de Soto, <i>On Nature and Grace</i> I, ch. 16, where he assumes it as the received definition of freewill. And very recently Juan Alfonso Curiel agrees in <i>Controversiae in diversa loca Sacrae Scripturae</i> II, in n. 234 of the part on 2 Pet. Finally, we will confirm it a little later from Aristotle and St. Thomas. But by far the chief reason is that the internal control of the will over its actions and the proximate capacity to act and not to act or to act contrarily is best revealed through those words. It can hardly be explained more helpfully through other words.		The first assertion: the definition of freedom posited in the title is true.
Valentia.	65		70R		Vitoria.	
Corduba. Nemesius.	70		75R		Gregory of Valencia. Córdoba.	
Scotus. Gabriel. Ockham. Marsilius. Dionysius. Henricus. Hervaeus. Soto. Curielus.	75		80R		Nemesius.	
	80		85R		Scotus. Gabriel. Ockham. Marsilius. Dionysius. Henry of Ghent. Hervaeus Natalis. Soto. Curiel.	
Pronuntiata liberi arbitrii.	85	5. Assumptum declaratur imprimis per varias definitiones		5. The assumption is confirmed especially through briefly dis-	Accounts of freewill.	

⁷Is there a Cistercian Dionysius or does Suárez mean Denis the Carthusian, i.e., Dionysius Cartusienis?

liberi arbitrii ab aliis traditas breviter discurrendo. Quinque sumi possunt ex Illustrissimo Bellarmino lib. 3. de Gratia et libero arbitro et ipse addit sextam, quae tamen proprie definitiones non sunt, sed quaedam sunt simplices assertiones aliquarum proprietatum liberi arbitrii. Tale enim est, quod liberum arbitrium sit *rationalis voluntas*, vel quod sit *potestas servandi rectitudinem propter ipsam rectitudinem*. Aliae quodammodo involvunt definitum in definitione, ut cum dicitur arbitrium esse *liberum de ratione iudicium*, ut ex Philosophis refert D. Thomas <col. b> 1. 2. q. 17. art. 1. ad 2. cum Magistro in 2. d. 25. in principio, vel esse *habitum animi liberum sui*, vel esse *consensum ob inamissibilem animi libertatem*, vel *liberam potestatem eligendi, aut acceptandi, et respuendi*. Ut enim omittam alios defectus, qui in his locutionibus, si ut propriae definitiones accipiantur, notari possunt; quoties nomen, *liberi*, vel *libertatis*, in definitione ponitur, definitio involvit definitum, et aequae obscura manet, quia cum liberum arbitrium definiendum proponitur, maxime declarari desideratur, quid significet illud, *liberum*, vel quid sit illa libertas, unde liberum denominatur, hoc autem in illis descriptionibus non declaratur, sed reperitur, et ideo dico in illis definitum involvi. E contrario vero cum Magister in 2. d. 24. dicit liberum arbitrium esse *facultatem voluntatis, et rationis, qua bonum, vel malum eligitur*, nec adaequate explicat facultatem illam; quia libertas non solum in electione, sed etiam in aliis actibus voluntatis, nec solum in electione inter bonum, et malum, sed in electione inter plura bona exerceri potest: neque etiam declarat quid sit electionem, aut consensum, vel volitionem esse liberam, quod maxime desideratur. Unde D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. non definiendo, sed asserendo dixit, *liberum arbitrium esse facultatem voluntatis, et rationis*, et quasi tacite complens descriptionem, addidit illam facultatem esse *per quam homo est dominus suorum actuum*. Per hoc insinuans, libertatem potentiae consistere in dominio sui actus. Dominium autem est facultas utendi, et non utendi, seu faciendi, et non faciendi, et ideo moderni aliqui liberum arbitrium dicunt esse

cussing the different definitions of freewill given by others. Five can be taken from the most illustrious Bellarmine, *On Grace and Freewill* III, and he himself adds a sixth, although they are not properly definitions but a kind of simple assertion of some properties of freewill. For it is of this sort [to assert] that freewill is a ‘rational willing’ or that it is a ‘capacity for serving rectitude for the sake of rectitude itself’. Others in a certain way include what is defined in the definition, as when it is said that choice (*arbitrium*) is a ‘free judgement of reason’, as St. Thomas reports some philosophers saying in *ST IaIIae.17.1 ad 2*, along with the Master in II, at the start of d. 25. Or it is said to be a ‘habit of the mind, free of itself’,⁸ or to be a ‘consent of the soul on account of a freedom that cannot be lost’, or a ‘free power to elect or accept and to reject’.

For even if I disregard the other defects that can be found in these phrases if they are taken as proper definitions, every time the name ‘free’ or ‘freedom’ is placed in the definition, the definition includes what is defined and remains just as obscure. For when freewill is put forward to be defined, one especially desires to be shown what that word ‘free’ signifies or what that freedom is in reference to which it is denominated free. But this is not explained in those descriptions but rather is found in them. For this reason I say that what is being defined is found in the descriptions. But, conversely, when the Master says in II, d. 24, that freewill is the ‘faculty of the will and of reason by which good and bad are elected’, he neither adequately explains that faculty (for freedom can be exercised not only in election but also in other acts of the will and not only in electing between good and bad but also in electing between multiple goods) nor does he reveal what it is for an election, consent, or volition to be free, which is what was especially desired. Hence, St. Thomas said in *ST IaIIae.1.1*, not in defining but in asserting, that ‘freewill is a faculty of the will and of reason’, and as it were silently completing the description, he adds that that faculty is the one ‘through which a human being is in control of his acts’. He suggests through this that a power’s freedom consists in its control over its acts. Control, moreover, is the faculty of using and not using or doing and not doing. For this reason, some moderns say that freewill is the ‘faculty of the will and of reason for either’, that is, for doing and not doing and for doing one thing or another. This indeed was truly said, and it was selected from Aristotle,

St. Thomas.
The Master.

The Master.

St. Thomas.

What control is.

Aristotle.
St. Thomas.

⁸Bernard of Clairvaux, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 1.

Aristoteles. D. Thomas. 125 *facultatem voluntatis, et rationis ad utrumlibet*, id est, agendum, vel non agendum, et agendum unum, vel alterum. Quod quidem vere dictum est, et ex Aristotele desumptum 9. Metaphysicorum cap. 3. alias text. 12. et ex D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 6. art. 2. ad 2. et q. 13. et 1. p. q. 83. ut autem illud sit proprium liberi arbitrii, debet intelligi de potentia proxima, alias non erit illud proprium potentiae formaliter liberae; ergo ad hoc explicandum necessarium est addere particulam in dicta descriptione positam, *positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum*. 130

Ex aequiparatione ad intellectum probatur. 135

6. Utrumque declarare possumus intellectum cum voluntate comparando: nam etiam intellectus habet facultatem agendi, et non agendi, ut credendi, et non credendi, vel etiam dissentiendi, et assentiendi, et nihilominus <12> non est formaliter liber, sicut voluntas: ergo necesse est hoc discrimen in definitione liberi arbitrii explicare, quod sine illis particulis non fit. Supponimus enim, liberum arbitrium non esse plures potentias divisim sumptas, nec collectionem earum, sed unam solam, quae sit domina suorum actuum; esse autem facultatem agendi unum, et oppositum, vel agendi, et non agendi, non unitantum, sed multis potentiis convenit, ut dictum est de intellectu; et suo modo convenit etiam appetitui sensitivo, et multo magis voluntati: ergo per hanc facultatem ad utrumlibet generatim et indistincte sumptam non explicatur proprietas illius unice, ac simplicis potentiae, quae est liberum arbitrium, nec propria ratio, per quam in ratione potentiae formaliter liberae constituitur. Ergo ad hoc explicandum merito additur, esse potentiam, quae habet facultatem agendi, et non agendi positam omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum. Per hanc enim ultimam particulam optime explicatur vis intrinseca liberae potentiae ad eliciendum, vel sustinendum actum sola sua potestate, et non ex defectu alicuius conditionis necessariae ad agendum, vel non agendum. 140

145

150

Sola voluntas potest efficere, et suspendere actum positam omnibus requisitis. 155

7. Unde quia hic modus operandi soli voluntati convenit, ideo illa est formaliter libera, et liberum arbitrium. Intellectus autem non habet hanc facultatem intrinsecam ita indifferentem, ut sese possit determinare ad actum, vel suspendere illum, aut ad oppositum se determinare. Nam si obiecti veritas sit evidens, et sufficienter proponatur, ex necessitate naturali 155R

Metaphysics IX, ch. 3, text. 12, and elsewhere, and from St. Thomas, *ST* IaIIae.6.2 ad 2, IaIIae.13, and Ia.83. But as that is a proprium of freewill, it must be understood of a proximate power. Otherwise that would not be a proprium of a formally free power. Therefore, in order to explain this it is necessary to add the phrase posited in the given description: ‘after all prerequisites for acting have been posited’.

6. We can compare intellect and will with each other in order to reveal each. For intellect also has the capacity to act and not act, to believe and not believe, or to dissent and assent, and yet it is not formally free as the will is. It is necessary, then, to explain this difference in the definition of freewill. That cannot happen without the phrase in question. For we assume that freewill is neither multiple powers taken separately nor a collection of powers, but is one power alone that is the controller of its acts. But to be a capacity to do one thing and to do its opposite or to act and not to act applies not just to one power but to many, as was said about the intellect. It applies in its way even to the sensitive appetite, and much more to the will. Therefore, the property of this unique and simple power that is freewill is not explained through this capacity for either, taken in a general and imprecise way. It is also not a proper *ratio* through which a power is constituted in the *ratio* of a formally free power. In order to explain this [kind of power], therefore, one rightly adds that it is a power that has the capacity to act and not to act after all the prerequisites for acting have been posited. For it is through this last phrase that one best explains the intrinsic force of a free power to elicit or sustain an act through its power alone and not just as the result of the absence of some condition necessary for acting or for not acting.

It is proven from a comparison to the intellect.

7. Hence, since this way of operating applies only to the will, it for that reason is formally free and is freewill. The intellect, however, does not have an intrinsic faculty indifferent in such a way that it can determine itself to act or to suspend that act or to determine itself to an opposite act. For if the truth of the object is evident and it is sufficiently proposed, the intellect gives assent by a natural necessity. But if it is not

The will alone can effect and suspend an act once all the requisites have been posited.

160 praebet assensum; si vero non sit evidens, sed probabilis, vel
credibilis appareat, non potest sese determinare, nisi interce-
dente voluntate (ut in fide Christiana certum est, et idem est
cum proportione in humana). Et tunc nunquam intellectus,
positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere, et non
165 agere, quia unum ex praerequisitis ad agendum est, ut moveatur
a voluntate, et posita tali motione non potest non agere,
illa autem non posita, necessario non agit, non tam ex poten-
tia non agendi, quam ex impotentia agendi. Voluntas autem
positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, sicut potest agere ex
170 interna facultate se determinando, sine motione alterius po-
tentiae, ita ex eadem interna facultate potest non agere, sus-
pendendo suum influxum ex interna vi, et dominio, vel etiam
ex eadem facultate aliud, seu contrarium agendo, si ex parte
obiecti suffi- <col. b> ciens propositio ad utrumque facta sit. 170R
Per illam ergo particulam optime completur descriptio liberi
arbitrii, non excludendo, vel reprobando alias, sed explicando,
de qua potestate agendi intelligi debeant, ut bonae sint, utique
de potestate proxima, quae per se ad utramque partem flecti
possit sine mutatione status, ut sic dicam, per quam scilicet
175R mutationem impotens ad agendum, vel non agendum fiat.

180 8. Secundo hinc dicimus, descriptionem illam in sensu
composito esse intelligendam, sicut ab omnibus auctoribus,
qui illam attigerunt, est intellecta. Et probatur facile, quia
positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum, posse non agere in
180R sensu diviso, id est, retinere potestatem ad non agendum, ab-
lata aliqua conditione ex praerequisitis, non est proprium po-
tentiae liberae, sed cuilibet naturaliter agenti convenit. Nam
sol etiam ita illuminat, cum omnia requisita concurrunt, ut
possit non illuminare, si fenestrae claudantur, et oculus videt
185R obiectum imprimens speciem, et aptus est ad carendum vi-
sione, si auferatur species: et intellectus ipse dum credit a
voluntate motus potens est ad non credendum, si volun-
tas aut non moveat, aut in contrarium actum inclinet: non
enim suam potentiam in actu primo, quam innatam habet ad
190R utrumque actum, amittit, quando ad credendum per volun-
tatem applicatur: ergo positis omnibus requisitis est potentia
non credendi, vel dissentendi in sensu diviso: ergo id non est

evident but only appears probable or credible, the intellect cannot de-
termine itself except by the intercession of will (as is certain in the case
of Christian faith and the same is true with proportion in human cases).
Even in that case the intellect, once all the requisites for acting have been
posited, can never act and not act, since one of the prerequisites for act-
ing is that it be moved by the will. By positing such a motion it cannot
fail to act, but if it is not posited then it necessarily does not act, not so
much from a power for not acting but from an inability to act. But the
will, once all the requisites for acting have been posited, just as it can act
from an internal capacity for determining itself without the motion of
another power, so also from the same internal capacity it can not act,
by suspending its influence with its internal power and control. By the
same capacity, it can also do something else or do a contrary thing, if
on the part of the object there a sufficient proposal of each option was
made. Therefore, through that phrase the description of freewill is best
filled in, not by excluding or rejecting the other ones, but by explaining
of what power of acting it should be understood so that it is good. It
should certainly be understood of a proximate power that through itself
can turn to either option without a change in its state (if I may call it
that), through which change, namely, it is made unable to act or unable
not to act.

8. Second, from this we say that that description should be under-
stood in the composed sense, just as it is understood by all the authors
who touch on it. This is easily proven, because that something is able
not to act in the divided sense once all the prerequisites for acting have
been posited—that is, that it retain the capacity for not acting with the re-
moval of some condition among the prerequisites—is not the proprium
of a free power but applies to anything acting naturally. For the sun
also illuminates in that way with all the requisites concurring, so that it
is able not to illuminate if the windows are closed, and the eye sees an
object that is imprinting a species but is ready to lack that vision if the
species is removed. And the intellect itself that believes as long as it is
moved by the will is able not to believe if the will either does not move
it or inclines it to some contrary. For it does not lose its power in first
act that it has innately for either act when it is applied to believing by
the will. Therefore, once all the requisites have been posited it is still
has the power in the divided sense not to believe or to dissent. That,
then, is not enough for a power to be formally free. Or it must be said

Particula, positis
omnibus
requisitis,
complet
definitionem
liberi arbitrii.

Secunda assertio.
Descriptio
libertatis in sensu
composito est
intelligenda.

The phrase 'once
all the requisites
have been
posited' fills in
the definition of
freewill.

The 2nd
assertion: the
description of
freedom should
be understood in
the composed
sense.

		satis ad potentiam formaliter liberam: vel dicendum est, intellectum esse potentiam formaliter liberam, quod nec verum est, neque a dictis auctoribus admittitur: ergo ut illis verbis formalis libertas voluntatis explicetur, necesse est, ut in sensu composito accipiantur.	195R	that the intellect is a formally free power. But that is not true and is not granted by the mentioned authors. Therefore, in order to explain the formal freedom of the will through those words, it is necessary that they be taken in the composed sense.	
Probatur ex voluntate beata.	200	9. Idem argumentum sumi potest ex ipsamet voluntate: nam in beatitudine non libere, sed necessario beatus amat Deum, quia positus praerequisitis ad illum amorem, non potest non amare in sensu composito, et nihilominus ibi etiam retinet potestatem non amandi in sensu diviso: nam si visio ad illum amorem requisita auferatur, poterit voluntas ab illo amore cessare; sicut in Paulo contigit, si in raptu Deum vidit. Neque refert, quod illa necessitas aliunde proveniat, nimirum ex vi obiecti, et visionis, quia nihilominus sub illa manet potestas ad non amandum in sensu diviso, et in hoc tantum <13> fit aequiparatio. Deinde voluntas in actibus indeliberatis, quales sunt etiam motus gratiae excitantis, ex necessitate, et sine libertate operatur: quia positus praeviis requisitis ad illum actum, non potest actum continere, cum tamen in sensu diviso possit ab illo cessare, ut constat. Quin potius etiam in brutis idem genus indifferentiae inveniretur, possunt enim sponte sua, et moveri, et quiescere, et ad unam partem, et ad oppositum moveri. Propter quod dixit Aristoteles 8. Physicorum text. 40. habere in seipsis moveri, et non moveri, et ideo quando positus omnibus requisitis aliquid appetunt, potestatem retinent ad cessandum ab illo appetitu, et ad contrarium appetendum in sensu diviso, id est, si aliquod ex illis praerequisitis auferatur, vel aliud diversum adhibeatur. Et nihilominus, quia positus praerequisitis ita ad unum determinantur, ut in sensu composito, id est, illis stantibus, nec aliud appetere, nec ab illo appetitu cessare valeant, ideo sine libertate operantur. Unde D. Thomas q. 24. de Veritate art. 2. <i>In brutis (ait) est quaedam similitudo liberi arbitrii, in quantum possunt agere, vel non agere unum, et idem, secundum suum iudicium, [...] sed quia eorum iudicium est determinatum ad unum, per consequens eorum appetitus, et actio ad unum determinatur.</i> Et	200R	9. The same argument can be taken from the will itself. For in the blessed state, the blessed do not love God freely but love him necessarily, since once the prerequisites for that love have been posited, they cannot not love in the composed sense, yet here also they retain the power not to love in the divided sense. For if the vision that is a requisite for that love were removed, the will would be able to cease from that love (as happened in the case of Paul, if he saw God when he was taken up ⁹). Nor is it relevant that that necessity comes from a different source, namely, from the force of the object or of the vision, since, nevertheless, the power not to love remains in the divided sense under that necessity, and it is only about this that a comparison is being made. In addition, the will acts from necessity and without freedom in undeliberated acts of the kind to which the motions of <i>gratia excitans</i> belong. For once all the previous requisites for that act are posited, the will cannot restrain that act, yet it can cease from it in the divided sense, as is clear. In fact, the same kind of indifference can even be found in brute animals. For they can spontaneously both move and rest, and move to one option and to the opposite option. For this reason Aristotle said in <i>Physics</i> VIII, text. 40, that they have it in themselves to move and not to move. And so when all the requisites for desiring something are posited, they retain the power in the divided sense (that is, if one of those prerequisites is removed or another different one is introduced) for ceasing from that desire and for desiring something contrary. Nevertheless, since once the prerequisites have been posited they are determined to one thing in such a way that in the composed sense (that is, with the prerequisites in place) they do not have the power to desire something else or to cease from that desire, they operate without freedom. Hence St. Thomas says in <i>On Truth</i> , q. 24, art. 2: ‘There is a certain semblance of freewill in brute animals, insofar as they can, according to their judgement, do or not do one and the same thing But because their judgement is determined to one thing, their appetite and action are consequently also determined	It is proven with reference to the blessed will.
Evasionis ventilatio.	210		205R		Airing an evasion.
Idem in brutis probatur. Aristoteles.	220		210R		The same is proven in the case of brute animals. Aristotle.
S. Thomas.	230		220R		St. Thomas.

⁹See 1 Cor. 12:1–4.

in solutione ad 2. et 3. dicit esse in brutis quamdam indiffer-
 235 entiam actionum, quia eorum potentia motiva non magis in- 230R
 clinatur ex se ad unum motum, quam ad alium, et idem suo
 modo esse in appetitu eorum, et tamen non esse libertatem,
 quia posita apprehensione, et iudicio phantasiae, ad unum de-
 240 terminantur. Ex quibus verbis colligimus, necessarium esse ad 235R
 libertatem, ut stante eodem iudicio cum talibus praerequisi-
 tis tam actio, quam non actio sit in potestate agentis, nec satis
 esse, quod in eo sit potestas ad agendum, et non agendum, vari-
 ato iudicio: nam hanc etiam potestatem habent bruta: eadem
 autem ratio est de caeteris praerequisitis, ut mox dicam.

240R

Ratio
convincens.

10. Ratio denique hanc partem convincit, quia non quae-
 libet potestas agendi, et non agendi ad libertatem sufficit, sed
 illa quae est ex interna potestate, et eminenti virtute, ac do-
 minio (ut in praecedenti capite declaravi:) at vero ita oper-
 245 ari positus omnibus requisitis ad agendum, ut solum possit 245R
 facultas ab operatione cessare in sensu diviso, id est, sublato
 250 aliquo ex requisitis, non est posse cessare ex interna potestate,
 et dominio actionis: ergo non satis est ad libertatem. Minor
 <col. b> probatur, quia tunc non cessatur ex potestate non
 agendi, sed potius ex impotentia agendi, quia nimirum nulla
 255 causa agere valet, nisi positus omnibus requisitis ad agendum. 250R
 Et confirmatur, quia alias postquam voluntas positus omnibus
 praerequisitis velle incepit, non poterit sua sponte ab actuali
 voluntate cessare, stantibus iisdem praerequisitis, sed oport-
 260 tebit aliquod illorum auferri, ut ipsa cesset; hoc autem est, 255R
 et contra experientiam, et contra usum libertatis: ergo. Se-
 quela probatur: nam eadem est ratio de inceptioe actus, et
 de perseverantia in illo: imo aliqui existimant magis neces-
 sariam esse continuationem, quam inceptioem, saltem pro
 brevi morula, quod nec verum est, nec nostra nunc refert:
 265 satis enim est, quod aequalis ratio intercedat. Si ergo voluntas, 260R
 stantibus omnibus praerequisitis ad perseverandum, potest sua
 sponte, et interna vi ab amando cessare, componendo simul il-
 lam cessationem cum illis praerequisitis, eadem profecto, vel
 270 maiori ratione poterit non inchoare amorem, stantibus om- 265R
 nibus praerequisitis, negationem agendi cum eisdem praereq-

Confirmatio.

to one thing.’ And in ad 2 and 3 he says that in brute animals there is
 a certain indifference in their actions, since their motive power is not
 of itself more inclined to one motion than another and the same is true
 in its way with their appetite. And yet they are not free, since they are
 determined to one course once the apprehension and the judgement of
 imagination are posited. From these words we gather that it is necessary
 for freedom that while standing with the same judgement along with
 such prerequisites both the action and non-action are in the power of
 the agent. It is not enough that the power for acting and not acting be
 in it with changed judgements. For brute animals also have this power.
 The argument is the same, moreover, for the other prerequisites, as I will
 say shortly.

10. Finally, reason establishes this part, since not just any power
 for acting and not acting suffices for freedom, but only one that is from
 an internal capacity and eminent power and control (as I showed in the
 previous chapter). On the other hand, to operate in such a way that once
 all the requisites for acting have been posited the faculty can only cease
 from operation in the divided sense—that is, by removing something
 from the requisites—is not to be able to cease from an internal power and
 control over the action. Therefore, it is not enough for freedom. The
 minor is proven: for in that case it would not cease in virtue of a power
 for not acting but in virtue of an inability to act, namely, because no
 cause has the strength to act without all the requisites for acting having
 been posited.

Establishing
reason.

It is confirmed, for otherwise after the will begins to will once all the
 prerequisites have been posited, it could not spontaneously cease from
 the actual willing as long as the same prerequisites stand. It would be
 necessary that something be removed from the prerequisites in order to
 cease from that willing. But this is both contrary to experience and con-
 trary to the use of freedom. Therefore. The consequence is proven: for
 the reasoning is the same about the inception of the act as about persever-
 ing in it. In fact, some people think the continuation is more necessary
 than the inception, at least for brief delays. This is neither true nor rel-
 evant for us at present. For it is enough that there be an equal reason.
 If, therefore, the will once all the prerequisites for persevering have been
 posited can spontaneously and by an internal power cease from loving,
 by bringing together at the same time that cessation with those prereq-
 uisites, then surely there is just as much reason or more that it could not

Confirmation.

uisitis simul componendo, vel si hoc posterius non potest, pro-
fecto nec illud prius potest. Unde ulterius confirmatur a con-
trario, quia si positus illis praerequisitis non relinquitur potes-
tas non agendi in sensu composito, ergo ex potentia sic
275 constituta cum omnibus praerequisitis necessario sequitur actio;
ergo talis actio non est libera, cum ex necessitate sequatur ad
potentiam antecedenter ad omnem usum libertatis ita disposi-
tam, ut cum tali dispositione non possit actionem continere,
et sine illa praeparatione non possit illam elicere. 275R

Ultima 280 11. Tandem confirmatur, quia ex altera sententia sequitur,
confirmatio ex absurdo oppositae sententiae. Capreolus.
Potentia in sensu 285 in solo sensu diviso solum est potentia remota, et potentia
diviso est potentia proxima includit omnia requisita ad actum, ut supra ex Scoto
potentia remota. retulimus. Et probatur clare, quia illa, quae dicitur potestas
290 solum in sensu diviso, non potest immediate reduci ad actum,
sed oportet, ut praecedat aliqua dispositio, aut mutatio, qua
potentia reddatur proxima, acquirendo aliquid necessarium ad
295 actum, vel tollendo impedimentum actus, ut homo carens lu-
mine gloriae dicitur potens ad videndum Deum, non in <14>
sensu composito, sed diviso, id est, ablata illa carentia, et ideo
290R illa potentia est remota: idemque in universum invenietur in
omni actu possibili in sensu tantum diviso. Si ergo voluntas
295 positus omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum, potest non agere
tantum in sensu diviso, non est tunc potentia proxima ad non
agendum, sed tantum potentia remota. Et e contrario quando
295R non habet omnia praerequisita ad agendum, non est poten-
tia proxima ad agendum, sed tantum remota, nunquam ergo
300 est potentia proxima ad agendum, et non agendum, sed ad al-
terum tantum. Minor autem, seu falsitas consequentis pro-
batur, quia hoc modo tollitur in effectu verus usus libertatis:
305R quia potestas remota revera non exercetur, nec reducitur in ac-
tum, nisi in statu proximo constituta, ut potestas, quam habet

273 si] sic B.

285 solo] om. V.

begin to love with all the prerequisites standing, but bringing together
at the same time a negation of acting with the same prerequisites. Or, if
the latter is not possible, then certainly the former is not possible either.
Hence, it is further confirmed *a contrario*. For if with those prerequisites
posited the power not to act does not remain in the composed sense, then
the action necessarily follows from the power set up in that way with all
the prerequisites. Therefore, such an action is not free, since it follows
of necessity on the power in that condition antecedently to any use of
freedom, so that when it is in such a condition the power cannot hold
back the action and without that preparation cannot elicit it.

11. Finally, it is confirmed by the fact that it follows from the other
view that the will never has the proximate power to act and not to act.
But the consequent is contrary to the use of freedom. Therefore. The
consequence is proven: as Capreolus rightly said in II, d. 28, q. 1, art.
3, ad 2 and 3, against the fourth conclusion, that a power in the divided
sense alone is only a remote power and that a proximate power includes
all the requisites for the act, as we reported from Scotus above. It is
clearly proven, for that which is called a power only in the divided sense
cannot be immediately reduced to act, but it is necessary that some con-
dition or change precede by which the power is rendered proximate, by
acquiring something necessary for the act or removing something im-
peding the act. For example, a human being lacking the light of glory is
said to be able to see God, not in the composed sense but in the divided
sense, that is, by the removal of that lack, and for this reason that power
is remote. The same thing is universally found in every act that is pos-
sible only in the divided sense. If, therefore, once all the prerequisites
for acting have been posited the will is able not to act only in the divided
sense, it is not in this case a proximate power for not acting, but only a re-
mote power. Conversely, when it does not have all the prerequisites for
acting, it is not a proximate power for acting but only a remote power.
Therefore, it is never a proximate power for both acting and not acting,
but only for one or the other. But the minor or the falsity of the conse-
quent is proven, for in this way the true use of freedom is removed in the
effect. For a remote power is not really exercised or reduced to act except
when constituted in a proximate state. For example, in order to be black
a power that has white cannot be reduced to act except the whiteness be

The last
confirmation
from the
absurdity of the
opposite view.
Capreolus.

A power in the
divided sense is a
remote power.

album, ut sit nigrum, non reducitur in actum, nisi ablata albedine, et quamdiu illa potentia est sub albedine, non exercet actum alterius potestatis, et sic de aliis; ergo si voluntas nunquam est in potentia proxima ad utrumque actum agendi, et non agendi, vel agendi hoc, aut illud, nunquam exercet potestatem liberam, quia solum eam partem exercet, ad quam proxime est praeparata. Quod maxime urget, rem moraliter considerando: quia non datur usus libertatis, nisi quando operanti imputari potest carentia actionis, et e converso: at vero ad hoc non satis est potentia remota, quae non potest ad proximam reduci per ipsam voluntatem, qualis est illa potestas in sensu diviso: quia positus omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum, quae antecedunt libertatem, non est in potestate hominis cum illis componere carentiam actionis: ergo non potest illi imputari, quod tunc non absteat a tali actione: ergo nec actio ipsa illi potest tribui, tanquam libera, id est, tanquam procedens ex dominio agendi, et non agendi, ut ergo per illam descriptionem vera libertas explicetur, oportet, ut in sensu composito intelligatur.

Tertia assertio subterfugia praecludens. 325
 12. Dico tertio, descriptionem intelligendam esse de omnibus praerequisitis sive ex parte Dei, sive ex parte aliarum causarum, et nisi ita intelligatur, non satis definiri libertatem, ut in actum liberum in ipso usu prodire possit. Haec assertio solum ponitur propter priorem partem: nam de altera non est controversia. Est autem iuxta mentem antiquorum doctorum, qui descriptionem illam tradiderunt, vel ut certam supposuerunt; quia nec Dei concursus, aut voluntatem ab illa excipiunt, sed putant, vel non pertinere ad illa praerequisita, vel si aliquo modo pertinet, cum illa, et aliis, ut antecedunt, posse componi tam agere, quam non agere divisim sumpta, ut videre licet in Corduba supra, et aliis, quos ipse refert, et propterea dicere etiam solet non posse eundem effectum esse simul evitabilem in ordine ad causam secundam, et evitabilem in ordine ad primam, ut sentit Caietanus 1. p. q. 21. art. 4. et Waldensis lib. 1. Doctrinale fidei cap. 28. Occam in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Gregorius q. 22. art. 3. Gabriel art. 2. Et propterea cum tota controversia versetur circa concursus, vel motionem divinam, in illa sola limitare generalem

removed. As long as that power is under whiteness, it cannot exercise the act of the other capacity. And so on for the other cases. Therefore, if the will is never in proximate power to both the act of doing and the act of not doing, or to doing this or that, it never exercises a free power, since it only exercises that part to which it was proximately prepared. This is especially convincing if the matter is considered morally. For no use of freedom is given unless when a lack of action can be imputed to the agent and conversely. But a remote power that cannot be reduced to a proximate power through the will itself (that power in the divided sense is of this sort) is not sufficient for this. For once all the prerequisites for acting that precede freedom have been posited, it is not in the power of a human being to bring those together with the lack of an action. Therefore, it cannot be imputed to him that in that case he did not abstain from such an action. Therefore, the action itself also cannot be attributed to him as free, that is, as proceeding from a control over acting and not acting. It is necessary, then, to understand that description in the composed sense in order for true freedom to be explained through it.

12. I say, third: that description should be understood to be about all the prerequisites, whether on the part of God or on the part of other causes. Unless understood in that way, it is not sufficient for defining freedom, so that in the case of a free act it can proceed from a use of that freedom. This assertion is only made on account of the first part, for the other part is not controversial. It is, moreover, according to the mind of the venerable doctors who handed down that description or assumed it as certain, since they do not remove either the will or the concursus of God from it. Rather, they either think that those do not belong to those prerequisites or, if they do belong in some way, both acting and not acting taken individually can be brought together with the concursus and the other prerequisites. This may be seen in Córdoba, cited above, and in others to whom he refers. For this reason it is also customary to say that the same effect cannot be avoidable in relation to the secondary cause and at the same time be avoidable in relation to the first cause. Cajetan thinks this in [ST] Ia.21.4, and Thomas Netter of Walden in *Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei ecclesiae catholicae* I, ch. 28, Ockham in I, d. 38, q. 1, Gregory in q. 22, art. 3, and Gabriel in art. 2. For this reason, since the entire controversy turns around the divine concursus or motion, to limit

3rd assertion, precluding a subterfuge.

Córdoba.

Cajetan.
 Netter of Walden.
 Ockham.
 Gregory.
 Gabriel.

345 assertionem, videtur esse quaedam petitio principii, vel aperta destructio, ac negatio illius axiomatis. Ratione idem ostenditur, quia omnia, quae generaliter diximus de praerequisitis ad agendum, aequae procedunt de omnibus, et singulis praerequisitis, sive ex parte Dei, sive ex parte aliarum rerum, vel causarum necessaria sint, et sive dicantur esse aliquid requisitum in ipsa voluntate, sive in intellectu, sive in alia quacumque re, quae ipsam voluntatem moveat ad agendum, et sive talis motio dicatur esse propria causa, efficiens volitionem, sive sit necessaria conditio, sine qua non stet fieri talem actum, et, illa posita, non stet non fieri, dummodo sermo semper sit de solis, et propriis praerequisitis, id est, ita requisitis, ut omnino praecedant aliquo modo causalitate, et ordine naturae in causalitate fundato usum liberum voluntatis: nam de concomitantibus, quae involvunt liberum usum, non loquimur, ut capite sequenti declarabimus. Assumptum ergo sic declaratum probatur specialiter de illo requisito ex parte Dei, quod a generali descriptione excipitur, et vocatur motio Dei. Nam si illa motio est unum ex praerequisitis, et simpliciter necessaria, ut voluntas operetur, et illa posita non manet in voluntate potestas ad non operandum, nisi in sensu diviso: ergo, illo praerequisito posito, non est voluntas in potentia proxima ad non operandum, sed tantum in remota, quia oportet prius illam motionem auferri ab illo, qui illam posuit: nam ipsa voluntas non potest illam auferre, quia sicut non fuit facta ab illa, ita neque ab illa pendet, nisi ut a subiecto recipiente, in cuius potestate non est duratio passionis, sicut nec inceptio eius, ut cap. 2 probatum est: ergo illa potentia in sensu diviso non est potestas ad liberum usum sufficiens, quia liber usus non est nisi a potestate proxima, ut etiam probavi. <15> Ergo in voluntate sic mota non manet libertas non agendi, et consequenter neque ipsum operari liberum est. Et eadem ratione quamdiu illa motio non datur voluntati, solum est in potentia remota, et ex parte receptiva ad agendum, quia oportet, ut prius recipiat illam motionem, quae non est in potestate eius activa, sed receptiva tantum: ergo tunc non est

376 motio] ratio B.

the general assertion to that alone seems to be a kind of begging of the question, or a manifest destruction or negation of that axiom. The same is shown by reason, since everything that we said generally about the prerequisites for acting apply equally to each and every prerequisite—whether on the part of God or on the part of other things or causes that are necessary, and whether they are said to be something requisite in the will itself or in the intellect or in any other thing whatsoever that moves the will to acting, or whether such a motion is said to be a proper cause effecting a volition or is a necessary condition without which such an act would not be in a position to come to be and with it having been posited the act would not be in a position not to come to be—as long as the discussion is always about the proper prerequisites alone, that is, requisites of such a kind that in some way in causality and in the order of nature founded in causality they wholly precede the free use of the will. For we are not talking about the concomitants that involve free use, as we will explain in the following chapter.

The assumption, therefore, is in that way proven specifically with respect to the requisite on the part of God that is taken out of the general description and is called the motion of God. For if that motion is one of the prerequisites and necessary without qualification for the will to operate and if once it is posited the power not to operate does not remain in the will except in the divided sense, then, once that prerequisite has been posited, the will is not in proximate potency for not acting but only in remote potency, since it is necessary that that motion first be removed by him who posited it. For the will itself cannot remove it, since just as it was not made by the will, so also it does not depend on the will except as on a receiving subject. The duration of a passion is not in the power of the receiving subject just as the passion's inception is not in its power, as was shown in ch. 2. Therefore, that power in the divided sense is not a sufficient power for free use, since there is no free use except by a proximate power, as I also proved. Therefore, the freedom not to act does not remain in a will moved in that way, and, consequently, neither is the acting itself free. For the same reason, as long as that motion is not given to the will, the will's potency for acting is only remote and on the receptive side. For it must first receive that motion, which is not in its active power but only in its receptive power. Therefore, in that case

The proof of the assumption.

380 in potestate libera non agendi, sed in necessitate, et impotentia
agendi. Ergo ut salvetur libertas, etiam respectu divinae mo-
tionis praevia requisitae, necessarium est, ut illa etiam posita
cum aliis praerequisitis, maneat potentia in sensu composito
ad agendum, et non agendum. 380R

A simili confirmatio. 385 13. Confirmatur, et explicatur a simili de potentia, verbi
gratia, scribendi, quae est in manu; illa enim de se est etiam
potentia non scribendi, et nihilominus libera non est, quia nec
potest scribere sine actione voluntatis, nec posita motione vol-
untatis, potest in sensu composito non scribere, licet in sensu 385R
390 diviso, et remote possit, utique si voluntas motionem auferat:
ergo simili modo si voluntas non potest velle nisi mota a Deo,
et posita motione non potest cum illa componere carentiam
volitionis, licet in sensu diviso, id est, ablata motione, possit
non velle, non magis est potentia libera, quam potentia motiva, 390R
395 quae est in manu. Simile est de intellectu quoad poten-
tiam assentiendi, et dissentendi per fidem: nam in hoc non
est formaliter liber, quia nec assentit nisi motus a voluntate,
neque si ab illa moveatur, potest non assentire in sensu com-
posito, sed in diviso: quae divisio (ut sic dicam) non est in 395R
400 eius activa potestate. Ergo si ita comparatur voluntas homi-
nis ad motionem Dei praeviam, ut sine illa non possit velle, et
illa posita non possit non velle nisi in sensu diviso, qui non est
in eius potestate activa, profecto non est magis libera voluntas,
quam intellectus, quia non potest ipsa active tollere motionem 400R
405 Dei, sicut non potest eam parere. Quid enim interest, quod
una motio sit a voluntate creata, et alia ab increata? profecto
haec magis officit libertati; quia motio voluntatis increata effi-
caciior est, et intimior, magisque per se influens in effectum.

Adversantium responsio. 410 14. Respondent constituendo discrimen, quia voluntas
creata, licet sit mota a Deo, retinet intrinsicam potestatem
non eliciendi talem actum, si velit, quod non habet intellec-
tus, nec alia potentia naturaliter agens. Sed hoc <col. b>
Impugnatur. 410R
415 non potest satisfacere. Primo, quia illa potestas intrinseca
ad non eliciendum actum, quae dicitur manere in voluntate
moti a Deo, vel est ad non eliciendum actum in sensu com-
posito, id est, sustinendo actum non obstante motione, et illa

it is not in a free potency for not acting, but in necessity and with the
inability to act. Therefore, in order to save freedom even with respect
to the previous requisite of divine motion, it is necessary (since it is also
posited along with the other prerequisites) that the power for acting and
not acting remain in the composed sense.

13. It is confirmed and explained by analogy to, for example, the
power of writing that is in the hand. For it of itself is also the power
not to write and yet is not free. For it can neither write without an
action of the will nor can it in the composed sense not write when the
motion of the will is posited, although remotely and in the divided sense
it can as long (certainly if the will removes the motion). Therefore, in
a similar way if the will cannot will except when moved by God and
with that motion posited cannot compose an absence of volition with
that motion (although in the divided sense, that is, with that motion
removed, it could not will), it is no more a free power than the moving
power that is in the hand. It is similar with the intellect with respect to
the power of assenting or dissenting through faith. For it is not formally
free in this, since it can neither assent except when moved by the will
nor can it in the composed sense fail to assent when it is moved by the
will, but only in the divided sense, which division (if I may speak in this
way) is not in its active power. Therefore, if the will of a human being
is related to the prior motion of God in this way, that it cannot will
without that motion and once that motion is posited it cannot not will
except in the divided sense (which is not in its active power), then surely
the will is no more free than the intellect. For it cannot itself actively
remove the motion of God just as it cannot give rise to it. For what
difference does it make that one motion is created by the will and the
other is not created by it? Surely the latter blocks freedom more, since
the motion not created by the will is more efficacious, deeper, and has
more of a *per se* influx into the effect.

14. They respond by setting up a distinction, since the created will
although it is moved by God retains the intrinsic power not to elicit
such an act if it wills, a power that the intellect and another naturally
acting powers do not have. But this cannot be satisfactory. First, because
that intrinsic power for not eliciting an act that is said to remain in the
will moved by God is a power for not eliciting the act either [i] in the
composed sense, that is, by holding back the act without hindering the
motion and existing simultaneously with it—and the distinction is best

A confirmation
by analogy.

The adversaries'
response.

It is rejected.

simul stante: et in hoc sensu optimum est discrimen, tamen
 per illum datur nobis, quod intendimus. Vel illa potentia est
 tantum in sensu diviso, et sic eadem profecto est in poten- 415R
 tia motiva, et in intellectu, quia si motio voluntatis cesset, ex
 420 intrinseca natura talium potentiarum est, ut actum non eli-
 ciant, quia natura sua ita subordinantur voluntati quoad tales
 actus, ut si ab illa non applicentur, illos non eliciant, multo 420R
 autem magis dicitur pendere voluntas hominis ab actuali ap-
 425 plicatione, et praemotione Dei: ergo sub illa motione non
 magis habet potentiam intrinsecam non volendi, quam intel-
 lectus, vel manus sub motione voluntatis. Unde fit, ut sicut
 non posita motione voluntatis non solum potest intellectus 425R
 non assentiri, vel manus non moveri, sed etiam necessario non
 430 assentit, nec movetur, ita iuxta illam sententiam non posita
 motione Dei, voluntas necessario non vult: ergo non vere dic-
 itur in sensu diviso, id est, ablata motione, posse non oper-
 ari, si velit, sed dicendum est ablata motione necessario non 430R
 operari. Nam sicut non potest componi carentia operationis
 cum motione, ita non potest componi operatio cum carentia
 435 cum motione. Declaratur a simili, nam ablata cognitione non
 recte dicitur voluntas posse ab intrinseco carere volitione, si
 velit, sed dicendum potius est, non posse velle, et necessario 435R
 non velle: sed non minus necessaria est (iuxta illam senten-
 440 tiam) ad volendum motio Dei, quam motio intellectus: ergo
 in illo sensu diviso, id est, si motio Dei desit, non habet vol-
 untas potestatem non operandi, si velit, sed est in potentia
 necessario non volendi: quae (ut supra dicebam) est quaedam 440R
 impotentia volendi. Quapropter illa particula, *si velit*, nullo
 445 modo potest ibi locum habere, quia ablata motione Dei, non
 potest homo velle; ergo cum dicitur, *si velit*, ponitur condi-
 tio impossibilis. Aut enim illud, *si velit*, intelligitur de vol-
 untate directe per actum positivum volendi suspendere alium 445R
 actum, et hoc dici non potest, quia neque id est necessarium
 450 ad non agendum libere, ut est probabile, nec illud est possibile
 in illo sensu diviso, id est, ablata motione Dei; vel intelligitur
 de voluntate indirecta, et tunc supponi debet proxima poten-
 tia volendi, quae non est sine motione <16> Dei, quia adhuc 450R
 voluntas est ex parte in potentia tantum receptiva: ergo tunc

Elucidatur
 similitudine.

in this sense, but then we are given everything that we intended—or [ii]
 that power exists in the divided sense only—and in that way it is surely
 the same in the moving power [of the hand] and in the intellect. For if
 the motion of the will ceases, it is in accordance with the intrinsic nature
 of such powers that they do not elicit the act, since by their nature they
 are subordinated to the will with respect to such acts in such a way that
 they do not elicit an act if they are not directed [to it] by the will. But
 much more is the will of a human being said to depend on the actual
 application and premotion of God. Therefore, the will no more has an
 intrinsic power not to will under that motion than the intellect or hand
 [has such an intrinsic power] under the motion of the will.

The result is that just as in the case where the motion of the will is
 not posited the intellect not only can not assent and the hand not move
 but also necessarily does not assent and not move, so also according to
 that view when the motion of God is not posited the will necessarily
 does not will. Therefore, it is not rightly said that in the divided sense,
 that is, with the motion removed, it can not operate if it wished. Rather,
 it should be said that with the motion removed it necessarily does not
 operate. For just as the absence of operation cannot be composed with
 the motion, so also operation cannot be composed with the absence of
 motion.

It is explained by analogy, for with the removal of cognition the
 will is not rightly said to be able intrinsically to lose volition if it wills.
 It should be said, rather, that it is unable to will and necessarily does not
 will. But (according to that view) the motion of God is no less necessary
 for willing than the motion of the intellect is. Therefore, in that divided
 sense—that is, if the motion of God is missing—the will does not have
 the power not to act if it wills, but it is in its power necessarily not to
 will, which (as I said earlier) is a kind of inability to will.

Therefore, that phrase ‘if it wills’ can in no way have a place here,
 since with the motion of God removed, the human being cannot will.
 Therefore, to say ‘if it wills’ is to posit an impossible condition. For
 either [i] ‘if it wills’ is understood as the will directly through a positive
 act of willing suspending another act—and this cannot be said, because
 it is not the case that it is necessary for freely not acting, as is probable,
 nor is that possible in that divided sense, that is, with the motion of
 God removed—or [ii] it is understood about the will indirectly and then
 one must assume a proximate power for willing. Such a power does not

It is elucidated by
 similarity.

455 non habet locum conditio, *si velit*, quia non voluntarie, sed
necessario caret voluntatis actu, quia a Deo non movetur.

455R
15. Est igitur eadem ratio de quolibet requisito ex parte
Dei, quae est de aliis causis. Nam si tale est requisitum ex
parte Dei, ut cum illo non sit potentia non agendi nisi in
460 sensu diviso, revera non est potentia suspendendi volitionem
per intrinsecum dominium in illam, sed per quamdam im- 460R
potentiam, quia si auferatur illud requisitum, sine illo non
potest velle, sicut non potest operari sine concursu Dei. Et
similiter potentia illa in sensu diviso, etiamsi sit respectu prae-
465 motionis necessariae ex parte Dei, est tantum potentia re-
mota, quia debet prius auferri motio Dei, ut talis potentia 465R
reducatur in actum non volendi, et auferre illam motionem
non est in potestate ipsius voluntatis, quia ad illam solum pas-
sive se habet. Unde etiam hic habet locum illa ratio, quod
470 nec possit imputari homini carentia volitionis, quando non re-
cipit motionem Dei, quia ante motionem non est in potentia 470R
proxima, et non habet in sua potestate motionem, per quam
in proxima potentia constituatur, sed solum est ad illam in
potentia passiva, et ita non potest illi imputari, quod illam
475 non habeat, et post motionem non potest voluntati moraliter
tribui, quod actum non suspendat, vel quod suum influxum 475R
non contineat, quia posita motione non potest, et illa motio
ponitur sine influxu eius. Ergo ad veram libertatem salvandam
sensus compositus universaliter, et sine exceptione necessarius
480 est respectu omnium, quae proprie sunt praerequisita ad agen-
dum, sive ex parte causarum secundarum, sive ipsius Dei. 480R

Opposito
fundamento fit
satis.

485 16. Ad fundamentum contrariae sententiae, negamus pri-
orem partem de concursu praevio, sufficit enim simultaneus,
qui ut in re ipsa datus non est ex praerequisitis ad volendum,
sed est concomitans, et cum illo involvitur usus libertatis. Ut 485R
vero est tantum in actu primo, est ex praerequisitis: verumtam-
en cum illo in eo statu posito, seu oblato ex parte Dei, potest
simul componi carentia actus, ad quem supponitur concursus
in actu primo oblatus. Et eodem modo dicendum est ad al-

exist without the motion of God, since thus far the will is in part only a
receptive power. Therefore, then, the condition ‘if it wills’ has no place.
For the act of will is absent not voluntarily but necessarily, since it is not
moved by God.

15. There is, therefore, the same argument concerning any requisite
on the part of God that there is concerning any other cause. For if the
requisite on the part of God is such that when it is present there is no
power for not acting except in a divided sense, then there really is no
power for suspending volition through an intrinsic dominion in it but
only through a kind of impotency. For if that requisite is removed the
will cannot will without it, just as it cannot operate without the concu-
sus of God. Likewise, that power in the divided sense, even if it is with
respect to a necessary premotion on the part of God, is only a remote
power, because the motion of God must first be removed so that such a
power is reduced into the act of not willing, and to remove that motion
is not in the power of the will itself since it is related to that only in a
passive way.

Hence, here also is a place for that argument that the absence of a
volition cannot be imputed to a human being when it did not receive the
motion of God. For before the motion it is not in proximate potency
and it does not have in its power the motion through which it is placed
in proximate potency but is only in passive potency to that motion. And
thus what it does not have cannot be imputed to it. After the motion, it
cannot be morally attributed to the will that it does not suspend the act
or that it does not contain its influx, since once the motion is posited it
cannot [suspend the act] and that motion is posited without its influx.

Therefore, in order to save true freedom the composed sense is uni-
versally and without exception necessary with respect to everything that
is properly a prerequisite for acting, whether on the part of secondary
causes or on the part of God.

16. In response to the foundation of the contrary view, we deny
the former part concerning the previous concursus. For it is enough
that there is a simultaneous [concursum], which as it is given in the thing
itself is not from the prerequisites for willing but is a concomitant. With
that the use of freedom is involved. But insofar as it is only in first act, it
is among the prerequisites. Nevertheless, when in that state it is posited
or offered on the part of God, it can at the same time be composed with
the absence of the act for which the offered concursus in the first act is

The foundation
of the opposing
view is satisfied.

490 teram partem de voluntate Dei. Concedimus enim aliquam 490R
 voluntatem Dei esse praeiviam ad volitionem hominis, et ni-
 hilominus dicimus cum illa posse simul componi, tam non
 agere, quam age- <col. b> re, quia non oportet, ut sit volun-
 tas absoluta, quod talis actus fiat, et in rerum natura ponatur,
 Soto. 495 ut recte dixit Soto 1. de Natura et gratia cap. 16. sed sufficit 495R
 voluntas includens aliquam conditionem, nimirum voluntas
 concurrendi cum libero arbitrio hominis ad hunc, vel illum ac-
 tum, si ipse cooperari velit, quod semper relinquitur in manu,
 et potestate eius. Unde merito graves Theologi dixerunt, licet
 500 voluntas Dei ex aeternitate antecedit, nihilominus volitionem 500R
 eius, ut determinatur ad volendum concurrere cum voluntate
 creata ad talem actum, non esse voluntatem praecedentem sed
 concomitantem. Haec autem concomitantia videtur consis-
 505 tere in obiecto illius voluntatis divinae, qua vult concurrere 505R
 cum humana, quia per illam volitionem non vult actum vol-
 untatis humanae simpliciter, et absolute, sed ut coefficiendum
 ab eadem voluntate humana et quasi sub conditione, si volun-
 tas ipsa humana velit cooperari, et ideo talis voluntas Dei nihil
 510 operatur per se sola, neque prius, quam voluntas creata, simul 510R
 efficiat, et ita facile intelligitur, quomodo illae duae voluntates
 simul coniungantur ad eandem actionem, nam voluntas divi-
 na ex aeternitate est quasi praeparata, et habet applicatam po-
 tentiam suam ad coagendum cum voluntate humana. Unde
 515 quando in tempore voluntas humana pro libertate sua coniun- 515R
 gitur divinae, simul efficiunt.

presupposed.

The same thing should be said about the other part concerning the will of God. For we concede that a certain willing of God is prior to the human being's volition, and yet we say that at the same time not to act and to act can be composed with that willing, since it is not necessary that it be an absolute willing that such an act happen and be placed *in rerum natura*, as Soto rightly says in *De natura et gratia* I, ch. 16. Rather, a willing that includes some condition—namely, a willing concurring with the freewill of a human being to this or that act if he himself wills to cooperate, which always remains in his hand and in his power—is sufficient. For this reason the weighty theologians rightly said that although the will of God precede from eternity, nevertheless, its volition as it is determined to willing to concur with a created will to such an act is not a preceding willing but a concomitant one. But this concomitance seems to consist in the object of that divine will, by which it wills to concur with a human being. For it does not will the act of the human will without qualification and absolutely through that volition, but wills it as coeffecting with the human will and, as it were, under the condition 'if the human will itself wills to cooperate'. For this reason such a willing by God cannot perform anything through itself alone nor before the created will simultaneously brings about the effect. And thus it is easily understood how those two wills are simultaneously conjoined to the same action. For the divine will is prepared, as it were, from eternity and has its power for co-acting with the human will applied. Hence, when in the temporal order the human will through its freedom is conjoined to the divine will, they bring about the effect at once.

496 includens aliquam conditionem, nimirum voluntas] *om.* V.

504 qua] quia B.