

<4, col. b><sup>2</sup>

CAPUT II.

*Quae sint necessaria, ut potentia sit libera, et libere operetur?*

In superiori capite solum voces, seu loquendi modos explicavimus, nunc vero aliquid de re ipsa addendum, et fundandum est, ut postea, in gratiae auxiliis explicandis, et cum libertate arbitrii conciliandis solide, et efficaciter procedere possimus.

1. Primum igitur omnium statuimus, de ratione potentiae formaliter liberae esse, ut quatenus talis est, sit potentia activa. Est certa, et communis assertio, quam probare possumus primo ex Scriptura, ubicumque enim libertatem arbitrii declarat, verbis utitur ad propriam potestatem agendi pertinentibus. Ut est illud Eccli. 15. *Ad quod volueris porrigere manum tuam*, et illud, *Qua enim odit, ne feceris*, et illud cap. 31. *Qui potuit facere mala, et non fecit*. Item illud Zachar. 1. *Convertimini ad me*, per quae verba *libertatis nostra admonemur*, ut Concilium Tridentinum dixit; nemo autem seipsum convertit, nisi agendo. Simile est illud Apocal. 3. *Siquis aperuerit mihi iannam, intrabo ad illum*: nam verbum *aperiendi* efficientiam includit. Ac denique 2. Petr. 1. *Satagite, ut per bona opera certam vestram vocationem, et electionem faciatis*. Et similia passim occurrunt. Se-

1. Assertio. De ratione potentiae formaliter liberae, qua talis est ut sit potentia activa.  
Eccli. 15.

Zachar. 1.

Apocal. 3.

2. Petr. 1.

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CHAPTER II.

*What things are necessary for a power to be free and to operate freely?*<sup>3</sup>

In the previous chapter we only explained words or ways of speaking, but now something should be added and established, so that later we can proceed effectively and in a secure manner when we explain the help of grace and reconcile it with freewill.

1. First of all, therefore, we establish that it is of the *ratio* of a formally free power that, insofar as it is such, it is an active power. This is a certain and common assertion that we can prove first from Scripture. For wherever it talks about freewill it uses words that pertain to one's own power of acting. For example: Sir. 15[:17]: 'Stretch out your hand to that which you want'. Sir. 15[:11]: 'Do not do the things that he hates'. Sir. 31[:10]: 'He who could have done evil but did not do it'. Zech. 1[:3]: 'Turn to me', through which words 'we are reminded of our freedom', as the Council of Trent said. For no one converts except by acting. It is similar with Rev. 3[:20]: 'If anyone will open the door for me, I will enter to him'. For the word 'open' implies efficient causality. And finally, 2 Pet. 1[:10]: 'Labour the more that by your good works you may make sure your calling and election'. Similar passages occur throughout.

Second, we prove it by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 5, where,

1st assertion. It belongs to the *ratio* of a formally free power that by being such it is an active power.  
Sir. 15.

Zech. 1.

Rev. 3.

2 Pet. 1.

Council of Trent.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1620 Lyon edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Coimbra, 1619). For recorded variants, B = 1620 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1620 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 7 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>Merely three years after the first publication of this work, the Spanish Franciscan Jeronimo Tamarit de Tavaría closely follows the present chapter in the identically titled chapter in his *Flores theologiae* (Valencia, 1622), tom. 1, pp. 492–95.

Tridentinum. cundo id probamus ex Concilio Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 5. ubi, cum dixisset, homines vocari a Deo per gratiam, ut *eidem gratiae libere assentiendo, et <5> cooperando in ipsum Deum convertantur*, explicat illam liberam cooperationem dicens. 25R  
 25 *Ita ut tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse nihil omnino agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui et illam abiicere potest. Neque tamen sine gratia movere se ad iustitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate posset.* Et ideo in can. 4. damnat dicentes, *liberum arbitrium nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti, aut nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere.* Ergo ex sententia Concilii potentia passiva ad liberum usum non sufficit; est ergo libertas formaliter in potentia activa.

Augustinus. 35 2. Tertio idem probatur Patrum auctoritate, Augustinus 35R lib. 12. de Civitate cap. 6. et 7. ubi agens de causa actus mali, dicit, ad voluntatem ipsam reduci tanquam ad causam efficientem, et deficientem. Idemque docet lib. 1. de Libero arbitrio a cap. 12. et lib. 3. cap. 1. et 2. Additque cap. 3. *illud esse in potestate nostra, quod cum volumus facimus, quapropter nihil tam in nostra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est.* Quod repetit, 40R  
 40 *et confirmat lib. 1. Retractionum cap. 9. et 22. Non dicitur autem aliquid esse in potestate nostra propter potentiam passivam, sed propter activam, quam ipsum nomen potestatis significat. Unde idem Augustinus lib. 1. Retractionum 45R  
 45 cap. 1. recognoscens verba, quae in q. 1. lib. 2. ad Simplicium posuerat. Quamvis sit in cuiusque potestate quid possit, ait ideo illa dixisse, quia non dicimus esse in potestate nostra, nisi quod cum volumus fit, ubi primum, et maximum est ipsum velle.* 50R  
 50 *Sine ullo quippe intervallo temporis praesto est voluntas ipsa, cum volumus.* Unde etiam lib. 83. Quaestionum q. 8. *Moveri (inquit) per se animam sentit, qui sentit in se esse voluntatem: nam si volumus, non alius de nobis vult, et iste motus animae spontaneus est.* Et q. 24. *Nec peccatum, nec recte factum (ait) imputari cuiquam iuste potest, qui nihil fecerit propria voluntate.* 55R  
 55 Et hoc modo ait utrumque esse in libero voluntatis arbitrio. Est ergo voluntas libera per potestatem activam, quam habet supra suos actus. Sic etiam dixit Damascenus lib. 2. de Fide cap. 25. ideo hominem esse liberi arbitrii, quia in sua potes-

Damascenus.

when it has said that human beings are called by God through grace so that ‘by freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace they are turned to God himself’, it explains that free cooperation by saying: ‘in such a way that, while God touches the human heart through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the human being himself does not do nothing at all while receiving that inspiration, inasmuch as he is also able to reject it. Yet he is not able to move himself to a just heart by his own free will without grace.’ For this reason the Council in can. 4 condemns those who say that ‘freewill in no way cooperates by assenting to God who excites it [...] it does nothing whatever and is merely passive’. Therefore, according to the Council a passive power does not suffice for free use. It is, therefore, formally free in an active power.

2. The same thing is proven, third, by the authority of the Fathers. Augustine in *The City of God* XII, chs. 6 and 7, where he is dealing with the cause of an evil act, says that it is traced back to the will itself as to an efficient and deficient cause. He teaches the same thing in *On Freewill* I, from ch. 12, and III, chs. 1 and 2. He adds in ch. 3 that ‘that is in our power which when we will to do it we do it; wherefore nothing is so much in our power as the willing itself’. He repeats and confirms this in *The Retractions* I, ch. 9 and 22. But something is not said to be in our power on account of a passive power but on account of an active power, which is what the very name ‘power’ signifies. Hence, the same Augustine says in *The Retractions* I, ch. 1, when recollecting the words that he wrote in *To Simplicius, On Different Questions* II, q. 1: ‘Although what he wills is in the power of every person’, he says that he said that ‘because we do not say that something is in our power unless, when we will it, it is done; for this reason, willing itself is first and foremost. For without any interval of time, willing itself is instantly present when we will’. Wherefore he also says in *Eighty-three Questions* q. 8: ‘He thinks that the soul moves through itself who thinks that there is a will in himself. For if we will, it is not another person willing concerning us. That motion of the soul is spontaneous’. And in q. 24 he says: ‘Neither sin nor having done rightly can rightly be imputed to one who does nothing by his own will’. And in this way he says that each is in the free decision (*libero arbitrio*) of the will. The will, therefore, is free through an active power that it has over its own acts. Likewise, also, John

Augustine.

- 60 tate habet eas actiones, quas libere operari dicitur, et ideo *om-* 60R  
*nem deliberationem actionis causa suscipi*, et addit in cap. 26.  
*In nostra potestate sunt ea, quae liberum nobis est facere, vel*  
*non facere*. Et alia, quae prosequitur, per quae omnia docet  
libertatem in nobis esse per activam potestatem. Idem sum-  
65 itur ex Anselmo lib. de <col. b> Conceptu Virginali cap. 6. 65R  
Bernardo lib. de Gratia et libero arbitrio. Et citatur Nyssenus  
lib. 7. Philosophia cap. 1. et 2. habet Nemesius de Natura hom-  
inis cap. 29. 39. et sequentibus.
3. Quarto probatur ex Scholasticis, et imprimis ex 70R  
D. Thoma 1. p. q. 82. art. 4. et q. 83. in co. et ad 2. Item  
1.2. q. 9. art. 1. et 3. quibus locis ait, voluntatem esse poten-  
tiam se, et alias moventem per modum agentis, eandemque  
esse liberum arbitrium, quatenus ad utrumlibet potest seip-  
sam movere. Idem habet q. 22. de Veritate art. 9. in co. et ad 75R  
1. et q. 24. art. 4. in co. et ad 15. in qua solutione declarat  
expressius, liberum arbitrium, ut tale est, esse potentiam  
non passivam, sed operativam. Idem tradit Capreolus in  
2. d. 24. q. 1. art. 1. concl. 5. et Scotus in 2. d. 25. in argumen-  
tis *Ad oppositum*, et in toto discursu quaestionis, Durandus 80R  
d. 24. q. 2. n. 10. 19. et 34. Gregorius eadem d. q. unic. Hen-  
ricus quodlibet 10. q. 9. ubi parum a principio ait, voluntatem  
totam esse moventem, et motam, sed moventem quatenus lib-  
era est, quae libertas, ait, est formaliter in ipsa. Idem habet  
quodlibet 12. q. 17. *Ad hoc* (inquit) *quod aliquid dicatur esse* 85R  
*vere ex libero arbitrio, oportet quod sit ab illo, ut a movente*  
*proximo, et sic voluntas est domina suorum actuum*. Bellarmi-  
nus lib. 3. de Gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 10.
4. Tandem ratione declaratur, quam Scotus supra optime  
attigit: nam potentia libera est quae in manu, et potestate sua 90R  
habet mutari, vel non mutari, nam hoc est esse dominam sui  
actus, vel mutationis, in quo dominio libertas consistit. Haec  
autem potestas non est in potentia passiva, ut passiva est; ergo
- of Damascus said in *On the Faith* II, ch. 25, that a human being has  
freewill because those actions which he is said to perform freely are  
in his power, and for this reason ‘every deliberation is undertaken for  
the sake of action’. He adds in ch. 26: ‘Those things are in our power  
that we are free to do or not to do’. And other things which he pur-  
sues, through all of which he teaches that the freedom in us is through  
an active power. The same point is taken from Anselm, *On the Virgin*  
*Conception*, ch. 6, and Bernard, *On Grace and Freewill*. And Gregory  
of Nyssa, *On Philosophy* VII, chs. 1 and 2, is cited for what Nemesius  
has in *On Human Nature*, chs. 29 and 39 and following.<sup>4</sup>
3. It is proven, fourth, from the scholastics, especially from  
St. Thomas, *ST* Ia.82.4 and 83[.2] co. and ad 2. Also in *ST* IaIIae.9.1  
and 9.3, in which places he says that the will is a power moving itself  
and other things in the way of an agent, and the same is freewill in-  
sofar as it can move itself to either option. He has the same claim in  
*On Truth* q. 22, art. 9, co. and ad 1, and in q. 24, art. 4, co. and ad 15,  
where in the solution he declares more expressly that freewill insofar  
as it is such is a power that is not passive but operative. Capreolus  
teaches the same thing in II, d. 24, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5, as well as Sco-  
tus in II, d. 25, in the arguments ‘*Ad oppositum*’ and throughout the  
entire discussion of the question; Durandus in II, d. 24, q. 2, nn. 10,  
19, and 34; Gregory in the only question of the same distinction; and  
Henry of Ghent in *Quodlibet* 10, q. 9, where near the beginning he  
says that the whole will is mover and moved but that it is a mover  
insofar as it is free, which freedom, he says, is formally in the will. He  
has the same point in *Quodlibet* 12, q. 17: ‘In order that something is  
said to be truly from freewill, it is necessary that it is from the will as  
from a proximate mover and in such a way that the will has dominion  
of its acts’. [See also] Bellarmine, *On Grace and Freewill* III, ch. 10.
4. Finally, it is shown by reason, which Scotus reaches best in  
the in the passage cited above. For a free power that has in its hands  
and in its power to be changed or not to be changed. For that is to  
have dominion over its act or change, in which dominion freedom  
consists. But that power does not exist in a passive power insofar as it

<sup>4</sup>In chapter 39, Nemesius says: ‘puta moveri et non moveri, impetu ire et non ire, dare et non dare, non concupiscere et concupiscere, mentiri et non mentiri, dare et non dare, laetari in his quae oportet, et non laetari, et quaecumque sunt talia, in quibus sunt virtutis et malitiae opera. Haec enim sunt in nostro libero arbitrio.’ Versions of this are often quoted and attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, *On Philosophy* VII, ch. 2. Suárez shows awareness in other places as well, e.g., *DM* 19.2.12, that he recognizes that this is a misattribution.

oportet, ut sit in potentia activa, quatenus activa est. Minor  
 95 probatur, quia non est in potestate ac dominio patientis, ut  
 tale est, quod patiatur necne: hoc enim pendet ab agente, quia  
 100 patiens ideo patitur, quia agens in illud agit. Actio enim in-  
 fert passionem, et ordine naturae, vel rationis illam praecedit,  
 et ideo talis est passio, qualis est actio, et non e converso, lo-  
 105 quendo causaliter, et a priori. Ergo actio non est in potestate  
 patientis, ut patiens est, id est, in dominio eius, sed agentis;  
 quia prius non est in potestate posterioris, sicut praeceptum  
 non est in potestate subditi, sed superioris; ergo etiam passio  
 non est in potestate patientis, ut tale est, sed in <6> potestate  
 110 agentis, quia posita actione necessario sequitur passio, et ideo  
 eatenus tantum potest passio esse, aut denominari libera, in  
 quantum actio fuerit libera; ergo utrumque est in potestate,  
 et dominio agentis; ergo libertas solum est in potentia activa,  
 et sub ea ratione sit potentia passiva, non est tamen libera,  
 115 nisi quatenus potestatem habet eliciendi, et non eliciendi ac-  
 tum suum, et in tantum receptio eius potest esse libera ipsi  
 voluntati, in quantum illum efficere est illi liberum: si enim  
 ab alio agente reciperet actum, ipsa nihil efficiente, ex parte  
 sua necessario illum reciperet: quod si esset in potestate al-  
 120 terius agentis non immittere in voluntatem talem actum, al-  
 teri agenti esset liber ille effectus, non ipsi voluntati. In po-  
 tentia ergo passiva, ut passiva est, non est libertas.

Obiectio.

5. Dices. Passum interdum determinat actionem agen-  
 tis, vel ad illam confert, vel illam impedit; ergo eadem ratione  
 120 potest ex parte potentiae passivae provenire, ut agens illam  
 immutet, vel non immutet; ergo etiam poterit libertas esse in  
 potentia passiva, ut passiva est. Antecedens patet in causa su-  
 125 periori, et universali necessario agente, determinatur enim ad  
 hanc, vel illam actionem ex parte passi, ut patet in sole ex-  
 siccante lutum, et liquefaciente ceram. Item in causis particu-  
 laribus actio est maior, vel minor iuxta dispositionem passi,  
 et interdum omnino impeditur propter resistantiam eius. Ac  
 130R denique in moralibus, et supernaturalibus quando Deus in-

is passive. Therefore, it must be the case that it is in an active power  
 insofar as it is active. The minor premise is proven: for it is not in  
 the power or dominion of a patient insofar as it is such that it either  
 undergo something or not. For that depends on the agent, since the  
 patient undergoes something because the agent acts on it. For action  
 implies passion, and according to the order of nature or of reason ac-  
 tion precedes passion. For this reason passion is such as action is and  
 not the other way around, speaking causally and *a priori*. Therefore,  
 action is not in the power of a patient insofar as it is a patient. That is,  
 it is not in the patient's dominion but in the agent's. For the former  
 is not in the power of the latter, just as a precept is not in the power  
 of the subject but in the power of the superior. Therefore, passion is  
 also not in the power of the patient insofar as it is such but is in the  
 power of the agent, since once the action is posited the passion follows  
 necessarily. And for this reason a passion can only be or be denomi-  
 nated free to the same extent that the action was free. Therefore, each  
 is in the agent's power and dominion. Therefore, freedom is only in  
 an active power insofar as it is active. Wherefore, although the will  
 is receptive if its act and under that *ratio* is a passive power, it is not,  
 nevertheless, free except insofar as it has the power of eliciting or not  
 eliciting its act. And the reception of the act can be free for the will  
 only insofar as it is free to effect the act. For if it were to receive the act  
 from another agent and itself effecting nothing, it would for its part  
 necessarily receive the act. But if it were in the power of another agent  
 not to introduce such an act to the will, that effect would be free for  
 the other agent but not for the will itself. Freedom, therefore, is not  
 in a passive power insofar as it is passive.

5. You will say that the one undergoing sometimes determines  
 the action of the agent, either by coming together with it or by im-  
 peding it. For the same reason, therefore, that the agent changes the  
 patient or does not change the patient can come to be from the side of  
 the passive power. Therefore, there can also be freedom in a passive  
 power insofar as it is passive. The antecedent is clear in the case of a  
 superior and universal cause that acts necessarily, for it is determined  
 to this or that action from the side of the one undergoing the action,  
 as is clear in the case of the sun drying out mud and liquefying wax.  
 Similarly, in the case of particular causes the action is greater or lesser  
 according to the disposition of the thing undergoing the action, and

Objection.

130 fundit habitum voluntati, ipsa voluntas mere passive se ha-  
bet, et nihilominus receptio est illi libera, quia ex eius pendet  
dispositione.

Responsio.

135 6. Respondeo negando secundam consequentiam, quia  
passum ut tale est, si sit omnino idem non potest determinare  
actionem agentis, nec magis iuvare, vel impedire actionem  
140 unius agentis, quam alterius: si vero sit diversum, seu diverso  
modo dispositum, tunc determinatio, resistentia, vel similis  
effectus erit omnino necessarius, aut si participet aliquam in-  
differentiam, necessario pendeat aliquo modo ex potentia ac-  
145 tiva libera. Declaratur: nam si agens sit naturale, et potens  
ad plures effectus efficiendos propter universalem virtutem,  
non potest circa idem passum eodem modo dispositum ad  
certum effectum determinari, nisi passum illius tantum sit ca-  
150 pax. Nam si passum sit de se <col. b> indifferens ad plures,  
non est, cur ab illo determinetur tale agens ad unam actionem  
potius, quam ad aliam, ut recte notavit Scotus supra §*Con-*  
*tra conclusionem*. Si autem passum sit capax unius tantum  
155 effectus, tunc determinabit quidem actionem agentis, deter-  
minatio autem erit omnino naturalis, seu necessaria, ut per  
se constat. Et eodem modo si passum sit diverso modo dis-  
positum determinat quidem actionem talis agentis, necessi-  
tate tamen naturali, ut patet in illo exemplo de sole liquefa-  
160 ciente ceram, vel exsiccante lutum, utrumque enim facit nec-  
essitate naturali. Et ratio est, quia ex parte recipientis, ut  
sic, non provenit determinatio actionis, nisi propter incapaci-  
tatem naturalem, vel limitationem capacitatis ab aliqua dis-  
165 positione proveniente, et ideo si limitatio illa, vel dispositio  
naturalis sit, etiam determinatio est necessaria, nec potest  
ex parte passi esse libera. Idemque est de resistentia, vel im-  
pedimento, aut carentia illius proveniente ex naturali dispo-  
sitione recipientis: intercedit enim eadem ratio. At vero si  
agens sit liberum, tunc potest determinare suam actionem,  
et consequenter etiam passionem circa idem passum de se in-  
differens, et capax plurium actionum. Et tunc quidem deter-  
minatio libera est, provenit autem ab eminentia potentiae  
activae, et dominio, quod habet in suam actionem, nec potest

sometimes is wholly impeded on account of its resistance. And, fi-  
nally, in moral and supernatural cases, when God infuses a habit of  
the will, the will itself holds itself merely passively and yet the recep-  
tion is free for it, since it depends on the will's disposition.

6. I respond by denying the second consequence. For the un-  
dergoing thing insofar as it is such, if it is entirely the same cannot  
determine the action of the agent, nor assist or impede the action of  
one agent more than that of another agent. But if it is different or dis-  
posed in a different way, then the determination, resistance, or other  
similar effect will be entirely necessary, or, if it participates in some  
indifference, it will necessarily depend in some way on a free active  
power.

It is shown: for if the agent is natural and has the power for effect-  
ing different effects on account of some universal strength, it cannot  
be determined with respect to the same undergoing thing disposed in  
the same way to a certain effect except the undergoing thing have the  
capacity for only that. For if the undergoing thing of itself is indiffer-  
ent to multiple effects, there is no reason why such an agent is deter-  
mined by it to one action rather than another one, as Scotus rightly  
noted in the previously cited text, §'Contra conclusionem'. But if the  
undergoing thing has the capacity for only one effect, then it will in-  
deed determine the action of the agent, but the determination will be  
wholly natural or necessary, as is obvious *per se*. In the same way,  
if the undergoing thing is disposed in different ways it indeed deter-  
mines that action of such an agent, but by natural necessity, as is clear  
in those examples of the sun liquefying the wax or drying the mud, for  
the sun brings about each by natural necessity. The reason is that on  
the part of the receiving thing as such, the determination of the action  
does not happen except on account of a natural incapacity or a limita-  
tion of capacity arising from some disposition. And for this reason, if  
that limitation or disposition is natural, then also the determination  
is necessary and it cannot be free on the part of the undergoing thing.  
And the same is true about resistance or impediment or a lack arising  
in it from a natural disposition of the receiving thing. For the same  
reason applies.

On the other hand, if the agent is free, then it can determine its  
own action and consequently also the passion with respect to one and  
the same undergoing thing that is of itself indifferent and has the ca-

Response.

aliunde provenire. Interdum etiam passio aliqua, seu receptio potest pendere ex dispositione libera passi, et tunc licet receptio proxime non possit esse libera ipsi recipienti, quia ab illo non fit, remote potest denominari libera, quatenus ab eius libera dispositione pendet: illa autem libertas in eo posita est, quod effectio talis dispositionis est libera, et ita semper manat ex potentia activa, in qua residet, et hoc modo receptio primae gratiae sanctificantis potest dici homini libera remote, in quantum efficere contritionem est homini liberum, et in naturalibus potest dici esse homini liberum calefieri a sole, in quantum libere potest ad solem accedere, vel ab illo recedere. Propria ergo libertas semper est in potentia activa, ut activa est.

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2. Assertio.  
Indifferentia  
dominativa  
potentiae activae  
ut activa est, ad  
formalem  
libertatem  
alicuius facultatis  
requiritur.

7. Secundo dicimus, et sequitur ex dictis, ad formalem libertatem alicuius facultatis requiri indifferentiam per eminentiam quamdam dominativam potentiae activae, ut activa est, tum ad varias actiones, tum ad exercendas, vel non exercendas illas, aut simpliciter, aut in tali, vel tali determinata specie. Ut hanc assertionem declarem, suppono, sermonem esse de libertate creata, quae primario consistit in ordine ad proprios internos actus eiusdem facultatis, scilicet, voluntatis, et illis mediantibus extenditur ad alias externas actiones; quod secus est in libertate divina, quae immediate in actionibus, seu effectibus extrinsecis exercetur, nam in Deo ad intra nulla effectio, vel receptio, seu additio libera esse potest, ut nunc suppono tanquam certum. Cum proportione tamen potest assertio ad libertatem divinam applicari, ut facile consideranti patebit. Deinde suppono vulgarem distinctionem duplicis libertatis quoad exercitium, et specificationem, quarum prior consistit in potestate habendi, et non habendi, posterior in potestate habendi hunc, vel illum actum. Et illius facultatis conditio quatenus illorum plurimum actuum, seu statuum capax est, indifferentia vocatur. Dico

capacity for multiple actions. And then the determination is indeed free, but it arises from the eminence of the active power and the dominion that it has over its action. Nor can it arise from elsewhere.

Sometimes also some passion or reception can depend on a free disposition of the undergoing thing. In that case, although the reception cannot be proximately free for the receiving thing, since it does not come to be by the receiving thing, it can be denominated remotely free insofar as it depends on the receiving thing's free disposition. But that freedom is posited in the fact that the effecting of such a disposition is free and in such a way that it always remains a result of the active power in which it resides. In this way the reception of the first sanctifying grace can be said to be remotely free for the human being, insofar as effecting contrition is free for the human. And in natural things, a human being can be said to be free to be warmed by the sun insofar as he is free to approach the sun or to withdraw from it. Proper freedom, then, is always in an active power insofar as it is active.

7. Second, we say—and it follows from what has already been said—that for the formal freedom of some faculty is required a certain dominative indifference of an active power insofar as it is active, both for different actions and for exercising or not exercising those actions, either strictly speaking or in determinate species of this or that sort. In order to show this assertion, I assume that the discussion is about created freedom, which primarily consists in relation to the proper internal acts of one faculty, namely, of the will, and by means of those is extended to other external actions. Matters are different in the case of divine freedom, which is immediately exercised in extrinsic actions or effects. For in the case of God there can be no free effecting, reception, or addition within him (something we now presuppose as certain). Nevertheless, with proportion the assertion can be applied to divine freedom, as will easily become clear in considering the case. Finally, I presuppose the common distinction between two kinds of freedom—with respect to exercise and with respect to specification—of which the former consists in the power of having and not having and the latter consists in the power of having either this act or that act.<sup>5</sup> And the condition of that faculty insofar as it has the capacity for multiple of those acts or states is called indifference. I say, then,

2nd assertion.  
Dominative  
indifference of  
the active power  
insofar as it is  
active is required  
for the formal  
freedom of some  
faculty.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. *DM* 19.4.9.

ergo hanc indifferentiam, ut sit verae libertatis, debere con-  
 200 venire tali facultati per se, et ut potentia activa est.

8. Probatum primo de indifferentia quoad exercitium,  
 quia imprimis ad illam necessaria est potentia activa. Hoc  
 enim probant omnia adducta in praecedenti assertione, et per 210R  
 se evidens est, quia nisi supponatur vis agendi in tali facul-  
 205 tate, semper carebit actione, quia actio esse non potest, nisi ab  
 habente vim agendi, eritque illa carentia non per modum pri-  
 vationis, sed per modum simplicis negationis, sicut potest esse  
 in qualibet re inepta ad agendum. Deinde probatur de poten- 215R  
 tia ad non agendum, quia, si potentia careat actione ex aliqua  
 210 impotentia agendi, tunc non est libertas in carentia actionis,  
 sed necessitas; quia impotentia aequivalet impossibilitati, et  
 impossibilitas agendi aequivalet necessitati non agendi: ergo  
 ut carentia actionis libera esse possit, supponit in ipsa facul- 220R  
 tate talem potentiam agendi, quae vi sua possit non agere, non  
 215 ex impotentia, sed ex eminentia virtutis, quam recte vocarunt  
 Theologi dominium actus. Carere enim actione ex impoten-  
 tia, non est dominium, cum de ratione dominii sit potestas  
 utendi, et non utendi, ergo ut potentia vere sit domina sui ac- 225R  
 tus quoad exercitium eius, oportet, ut non ex impotentia, sed  
 220 ex interna, et eminenti potestate actionem possit suspendere.  
 Et ob hanc causam non potest talis indifferentia inveniri im-  
 mediate in potentia passiva, ut passiva est, respectu passionis:  
 quia <col. b> licet possit interdum pati, et interdum non 230R  
 pati, in utroque pendet ab agente. Unde si adsit agens, nec-  
 225 sario patitur, vel absolute, si agens sit naturale, vel ex sup-  
 positione actionis, si agens sit liberum, et velit. Si vero agens  
 absit, vel cohibeat actionem, tum etiam necessario non pati-  
 235R tur, et ex quadam impotentia, quia ut passiva est, non potest  
 se ad actum reducere.

9. Probatum deinde assertio de indifferentia quoad spec-  
 230 ificationem, ex dictis etiam in assertione praecedenti, quia  
 libertas est proprie, et immediate conditio potentiae activae, 240R  
 ut activa est, ergo si talis indifferentia sit respectu plurium  
 actuum, necesse est, ut in tali facultate sit vis effectrix om-  
 235 nium illorum actuum: nam si tali virtute careat, ad aliquem

that this indifference, in order to be of a true freedom, must apply to  
 such a faculty *per se* and insofar as it is an active power.

8. It is proven, first, concerning indifference with respect to exer-  
 cise, since an active power is especially necessary for that. For all those  
 things mentioned in the previous assertion prove this, and it is *per se*  
 evident. For unless a power for acting is presupposed in such a faculty,  
 it will always lack the action, since an action cannot be except from  
 something having the power to act. And that lack will not be in the  
 mode of a privation, but in the mode of a simple negation, just as can  
 be in any thing whatever that is entirely unsuitable for acting. Next, it  
 is proven concerning a power for not acting, since, if a power lacks an  
 action as a result of an inability to act, then there is no freedom in the  
 lack of the action, but necessity. For inability is equivalent to impos-  
 sibility and the impossibility of acting is equivalent to the necessity of  
 not acting. Therefore, so that order for the lack of an action can be  
 free, there is presupposed in the faculty itself such a power of acting  
 which by its own strength can not act, not as a result of inability, but  
 as a result of an eminence of strength, which the theologians rightly  
 call dominion over acts. For to lack an action as a result of inability  
 is not dominion, since the *ratio* of dominion is the power to use and  
 to not use. Therefore, in order for a power to truly have dominion  
 over its can suspend the action, not from an inability, but from an in-  
 ternal and eminent power. And for this reason such an indifference  
 cannot be found immediately in a passive power insofar as it is passive  
 with respect to passion. For although it can sometimes undergo and  
 sometimes not undergo something, in each case this depends on an  
 agent. Hence, if the agent is present, the patient necessarily undergoes  
 the action, either absolutely if the agent is natural or by supposition  
 of the action if the agent is free and wills it. But if the agent is absent  
 or refrains from the action, then also the patient necessarily does not  
 undergo the action and this is the result of a certain inability, since as  
 it is passive it cannot reduce itself to act.

9. Next, the assertion is proven concerning indifference with res-  
 pect to specification, also from what was said in the previous asser-  
 tion. For freedom is a proper and immediate condition of an active  
 power insofar as it is active. Therefore, if there is such an indifference  
 with respect to multiple acts, it is necessary that there be in such a  
 faculty an originating power of all those acts. For if it lacked such a





275 sed tantum partialem, seu inchoatam, erit in potentia pas-  
 siva ad recipiendum complementum potestatis activae, ergo  
 ex ea parte, qua est in potentia receptiva talis complementi  
 virtutis activae, non est libera, quia non habet illud comple- 285R  
 mentum in sua potestate activa, sed in receptiva; ergo etiam  
 non est proxime libera ad ipsum effectum, seu actum secun-  
 280 dum, donec in sua virtute agendi compleatur. Unde est at-  
 tente considerandum, quod licet potentia libera, etiam sup-  
 posita integra libertate possit (ut dixi) esse passiva, respectu 290R  
 actus secundi volendi, aut nolendi, quia haec potentialitas  
 potest supponere in eadem facultate integram vim activam,  
 285 nihilominus non potest esse integre libera, si sit in sola po-  
 tentia passiva ad totam, vel aliquam partem virtutis activae  
 suorum actuum, quia sine integra virtute activa nondum habet  
 295R actum in manu sua. Ideoque optime D. Thomas dicta  
 q. 24. de Veritate art. 4. dixit, liberum arbitrium in eo con-  
 sistere, quod *non excedit vim potentiae*. Nam secundum hoc  
 300R aliquid fieri dicitur, quod est in potestate facientis, quod de  
 potestate operativa, seu activa in solutione ad ultimum ex-  
 plicuit.

D. Thomas.

Obiectio. 11. Dices, ad libertatem necessarium non esse, ut sola  
 295 voluntas per se habeat integram vim activam sui actus etiam  
 proximam: nam multi putant obiectum, vel notitiam eius  
 concurrere active ad actus liberos voluntatis, et homo est sim- 305R  
 pliciter liber ad videndum, licet non habeat speciem, vel lu-  
 men. Item ad actus supernaturales libera est voluntas, licet  
 300 integram vim eliciendi illos sola per se non habeat. Respon-  
 deo ad primam partem, probabilius esse solam voluntatem  
 esse principium proximum sui actus, et in hoc distingui ab 310R  
 intellectu, ut aperte sensit D. Thomas in loco proxime alle-  
 gato de Veritate ad 9. Verumtamen licet contraria sententia  
 305 supponatur, nihil obstat, quia, <col. b> iuxta illam  
 consequenter dicendum erit voluntatem solam per se spec-  
 tatam, et nondum coniunctam notitiae obiecti non habere 315R  
 completam, sed inchoatam libertatem, quod sine inconveni-  
 enti dici potest, quia in eo statu nihil potest eligere; com-

Responsum.

D. Thomas.

291 potestate ] potentia V.

or nilling such an object but only has a partial and inchoate power, then it will be up to the passive power to receive the complement of the active power. Therefore, as a result of the part that is in the power that receives such a complement of active power, the faculty is not free, since it does not have that complement in its own active power but in the receptive power. Therefore, it is also not proximately free with respect to that effect or second act as long as it is completed in its power of acting. Hence, one should attentively consider that, even if a free power—with a complete freedom also having been presupposed—could (as I said, be passive with respect to the second act of willing or nilling, since this potentiality can presuppose a complete active power in the same faculty, it cannot, nevertheless, be completely free if it is in the passive power alone for all or some part of the active power for its acts, without which complete active power it would not yet have the act in its hands. And for this reason St. Thomas well said in the aforementioned *On Truth* q. 24, art. 4, that freewill consists in the fact that ‘it does not exceed the strength of the power’. For according to this something is said to be done that is in the power of the one acting, which was explained concerning an operative or active power in the solution to the last objection.

St. Thomas.

11. You will say that it is not necessary for freedom that the will alone have *per se* the complete active and proximate ability for its act. For many think that the object or knowledge of it actively concurs to produce the free acts of the will, and that a human being is without qualification free to see even though he does not have the species or light. Likewise, the will is free to perform supernatural acts, even though it does not alone and *per se* have the complete ability to elicit them.

Objection.

I respond to the first part that it is more probably that the will alone is the proximate principle of its acts, and in this is distinguished from the intellect, as St. Thomas clearly thinks in *On Truth* q. 24, art. 4, ad 9. Nevertheless, even if the contrary view were granted, it would pose no problem, since, according to it one should consequently say that the will alone regarded *per se* and without yet a conjunction with knowledge of the object does not have complete freedom but only the beginning of freedom. This can be said without

Response.

St. Thomas.

310 parata autem notitia obiecti habere completam libertatem,  
 quia iam habet completam vim agendi, et non agendi volun-  
 320 tarie, et per illam qualemcumque coniunctionem voluntatis  
 cum notitia, seu obiecto cognito, censetur completa virtus  
 eius activa in actu primo proxime requisito ad volendum, vel  
 315 nolendum. Ad secundam partem dicitur hominem posse esse  
 simpliciter liberum ad volendum, vel desiderandum videre,  
 quando non habet integram facultatem videndi, quia sine  
 325 hac potest habere integram potestatem volendi, aut concu-  
 piscendi. At vero ad videndum non habere proximam liber-  
 330 tatem, quia oportet, ut in potestate sua habeat acquirere com-  
 plementum virtutis videndi, et necessarium est, ut inde suam  
 liberam actionem inchoet illam speciem procurando, et ita  
 335 remote dicitur habere libertatem ad videndum, quatenus vim  
 habet se movendi ad comparandum quidquid ad integram fac-  
 ultatem videndi illi deest.

12. Ad tertiam partem dicimus, doctrinam absolute in-  
 telligi de libertate naturali voluntatis secundum se spectatae  
 335R in ordine ad actus ex natura rei sibi proportionatos; cum pro-  
 portione tamen applicandam esse ad actus supernaturales, ut  
 340 postea videbimus, et nunc breviter explicatur. Nam voluntas  
 sola per se sumpta non est proxime, et simpliciter libera ad ac-  
 345 tus supernaturales, sed de se habet tantum quamdam inchoat-  
 ionem libertatis ad tales actus, in quantum habet aliquam vim  
 activam innatam; vel naturalem, vel obedientialem, ad illos  
 335 efficiendos, et est capax complementi illius virtutis: quamdiu  
 vero illud complementum non habet actu illa potentia remota  
 est, et similiter libertas ad eosdem actus remota est, et incom-  
 345R pleta. Et ideo D. Thomas in dicto art. de Veritate ad 9. dixit  
 liberum arbitrium in ordine ad actum charitatis, dicere po-  
 340 tentiam cum habitu infuso utique, vel aliquo alio principio,  
 quod suppleat [vim] eius. Quomocumque ergo voluntas  
 supponatur habere integram vim agendi actum, sive per se  
 350R sola, sive per aliquid iam illi additum, vel sufficienter coniunc-  
 tum, esse poterit plene, et sufficienter libera: quamdiu vero  
 345 est in potentia tantum receptiva alicuius virtutis proximae ac-

disagreeability because in that state it cannot elect anything. But once there is knowledge of the object, it has complete freedom, since now it has the complete ability voluntarily to act and to not act. And through that sort of conjunction of the will with knowledge or with the cognized object, its active power is thought to be completed in the first act as proximately required in order to will or to nill.

With respect to the second part, it is said that a human being can be free without qualification to will or to desire to see even while it does not have the complete faculty of seeing, since without this it can still have the complete power of willing or desiring. On the other hand, it does not have proximate freedom to see, since for that it is necessary that it be in its power to acquire the complete power for seeing. It is also necessary that from there its free action begin by procuring that species and that in that way it is said remotely to have the freedom for seeing, insofar as it has the ability to move itself to provide whatever is missing for a complete faculty of seeing.

12. With respect to the third part, we say that the doctrine absolutely is understood concerning natural freedom of the will according to itself considered in relation to acts proportionate *ex natura rei* to the will, but it should be applied with proportion to supernatural acts, as we will see later and is briefly explained now. For the will alone taken in itself is not free proximately and without qualification to perform supernatural acts. Of itself it only has a kind of beginning of freedom for such acts insofar as it has some innate active ability, either natural or obediential, for effecting those acts and insofar as it has the capacity for a complement of that power. But as long as it does not have that complement in act, that power is remote, and the freedom for those same acts is likewise remote and incomplete. For this reason St. Thomas in ad 9 from the mentioned article from *On Truth* said that freewill in relation to an act of charity expresses a power together with an infused habit or at any rate some other principle that supplies its ability. Therefore, in whatever way the will is supposed to have a complete ability to perform its act, whether through itself alone or through something else already added to it or sufficiently conjoined with it, it will be fully and sufficiently free. But as long as it is a power only receptive to some proximate active power that is necessary for

D. Thomas.

St. Thomas.

341 vim] vicem B V.

Idem. 350  
 Bellarminus. Driedo. Ruardus. 360R  
 4. Assertio. 355  
 Libertas remota, et proxima requirit indifferentiam potentiae activae. 360  
 Scotus. 365  
 370  
 375  
 380

tivae, ac necessariae ad ac- <9> tum eliciendum, nondum habet absolute, et simpliciter liberam, et proximam facultatem. Unde D. Thomas 1. p. q. 83. art. 2. ad 2. dixit liberum arbitrium nominari facultatem, quia debet esse potestas expedita ad agendum: quomodo autem erit expedita, si non sit integra, vel integrata, ut ita dicam? Et hanc assertionem confirmant, quae adducit Bellarminus lib. 6. de Gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 15. assert. 1. 2. et 3. et Driedo in Concordia cap. 3. et Ruardus art. 7. quos allegat.

13. Ad maiorem intelligentiam praecedentium conclusionum dico quarto, libertatem in actu primo esse posse remotam, et proximam, et utramque requirere indifferentiam potentiae activae, servata proportione: nam remota libertas requirit indifferentiam potestatis activae in facultate formaliter libera secundum se, et nude spectata; proxima autem libertas in actu primo requirit indifferentiam activam in facultate ipsa agendi expedita, et proposita cum omnibus requisitis ad agendum. Divisio haec ex generali doctrina potentiae activae nota est, eamque attingit Scotus in 4. d. 49. q. 6. sub §. *Dico ergo ex doctrina Aristotele 9. Metaphysicorum cap. 12.* ubi ait, eum, qui habet solam potentiam operativam, et non habet alia requisita ad operationem, solum secundum quid, et quantum est ex parte sui, esse potentem ad operandum. Sicut dicitur potens ad videndum qui habet visum, etiamsi lumine careat. Simpliciter vero dicitur potens, qui ita est dispositus ad operandum, ut sine immutatione ulla, vel in se, vel in passo, vel in obiecto, vel in aliquo alio potest actionem emittere. Priorem itaque statum vocamus potestatis remotae, posteriorem autem potestatis proximae. Hi ergo duo status locum habent in potestate libera, ut per se notum est, et ipsi libertati recte accommodantur; nam qui dormit, libertatem habet in actu primo, remote tamen, quia multa immutatione indiget, ut libertate utatur: qui vero vigilat, et actu considerat volendum sit necne, dum nihil eligit, liber est tantum in actu primo, sed proxime, quia immediate, sine interventu alicuius actionis, aut mutationis potest velle, vel nolle.

370 qui ] quia B.

eliciting the act, it does not yet the absolutely and without qualification free proximate faculty. Hence, St. Thomas in *ST* Ia.83.2 ad 2 said that freewill is named a faculty because it must be a power having been readied to act. But how will it have been readied if it is not complete or has not been completed (if I may speak in that way)? This assertion is confirmed by what Bellarmine brings up in *On Grace and Freewill* VI, ch. 15, assertions 1–3, and by those cited by John Driedo in *On the Harmony of Freewill and Predestination*, ch. 3, and by Ruard Tapper in [*Explicatio articulorum*], art. 7.

13. In order to reach a better understanding of the preceding conclusion, I say, fourth, that freedom in the first act can be remote and proximate, and that each requires the active power's indifference, *mutatis mutandis*. For remote freedom requires indifference of the active power in a faculty formally free in itself and taken apart from anything else, but proximate freedom in the first act requires indifference of the active power in the faculty readied for acting and proposed with all the things required for acting. This division is known from the general doctrine about active powers and Scotus touches on it in IV, d. 49, q. 6, under the section that starts 'I say, therefore, according to the doctrine of Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 12 . . .' He says there that he who has only an operative power and does not have the other things required for operation is only with qualification and with respect to its own contribution a power for operating, just as one who has sight is said to have the power to see even if there is no light. Strictly speaking, however, he is said to have power who is in such a condition for acting that he without any change either in him, the patient, the object, or in any other thing can produce the action. We accordingly call the former state one of having a remote power, but the latter one of having a proximate power. These two states are applicable in the case of a free power, as is known *per se*, and are rightly accommodated to it. For he who sleeps has freedom in the first act, but only remotely, since he needs much change in order to use that freedom. But he who is awake and actually considering what he should will or not will, as long as he elects nothing, is free only in the first act but proximately, since he can will or nill immediately without the intervention of any action or change.

St. Thomas.

Bellarmine.  
John Driedo.  
Ruard Tapper.4th assertion:  
remote and  
proximate  
freedom require  
the active power's  
indifference.

Scotus.

14. Atque hinc facile patet prior pars assertionis, nimirum in utroque statu requiri immunitatem a necessitate actionis in ea potentia, quae est formaliter libera, seu indifferens <col. b> 390R  
 385 <col. b> rentiam potentiae activae tali statui accommodatam. Quod quidem in statu remoto per se notum est: nam ideo qui dormit, vel non considerat, liber nihilominus est, quia voluntatem retinet, quae de se est facultas potens operari sine 395R  
 390 necessitate. Si enim talem potentiam, vel illam proprietatem eius amitteret, iam nullo modo dici posset liber. Imo interdum non videtur esse satis solam potentiam retinere, nam puer ante usum rationis, vel amens non dicitur habere libertatem, etiamsi potentiam de se liberam habeat, quia est 400R  
 395 intrinsece impotens, et indispositus ad multa praevia, et necessaria ad usum libertatis. Dicitur tamen potest habere naturam de se liberam, vel habere libertatem in actu primo remotissimo. Qui autem est intrinsece aptus ad usum libertatis non tantum 405R  
 400 ex parte voluntatis, sed etiam ex parte aliarum potentiarum, et intrinseca dispositione organorum, licet actu sit impeditus, verbi gratia, per somnum, minus remotam facultatem habet utendi libertate, et ideo communi usu liber vocatur, quia et facultatem habet de se indifferentem ad agendum, et non 410R  
 410 agendum, et intrinsece impeditus non est ad usum illius, licet quoad caetera requisita adhuc illa libertas remota sit.

Cardo concordiae 405  
 gratiae, et libero  
 arbitrio.

15. Altera pars de libertate proxima in actu primo, et quasi immediato est difficilior, est tamen verissima, et valde necessaria, et fortasse est quasi cardo totius concordiae gratiae cum libero arbitrio, et ideo diligenter probanda est. Primo 415R  
 410 ergo probatur, quia illa etiam est potestas vere libera; ergo in illo etiam statu retinere debet indifferentiam activam in operando, quia haec est de intrinseca ratione libertatis, ut ostensum est. Secundo, quia alias nunquam potentia libera in actu primo remoto esset proxime libera ad agendum, vel 420R  
 415 non agendum, quod est contra omnem rationem potentiae activae, et plane contra usum libertatis. Explicatur sequela, quia potentia per se, ac formaliter libera in re non utitur, nec valet uti sua libertate et indifferentia, nisi proxime disposita 425R

399 intrinseca] extrinseca V.

14. From here the former part of the assertion—namely, that immunity from the necessity of the action in the power that is formally free is required for either state or that indifference in the active power accommodated to such a state is required—is readily clear. This indeed is known *per se* in the case of the remote state. For because of this he who sleeps or does not consider is nevertheless free, since he retains his will, which of itself is a faculty with the power to operate without necessity. For if will lacked such a power or lacked that property of it, it could in no way be called free. In fact, sometimes it does not seem enough only to retain the power, for a boy before the use of reason or someone demented is not said to have freedom, even if he has a power that is of itself free. For he is intrinsically unable and lacking the required condition for many things that are also necessary for the use of freedom. Nevertheless, he can be said to have a nature of itself free or have freedom in the first act in a very remote way. But he who is intrinsically apt for the use of freedom not only on the part of the will but also on the part of the other powers and of the intrinsic condition of the organs, even though he is actually impeded, for example, through sleep, has a less remote faculty for using freedom. For that reason he is by common use called free, since he both has the faculty of itself indifferent between acting and not acting and is not intrinsically impeded from using that faculty, although that freedom is remote so far with respect to the remaining things that are required.

15. The other part concerning proximate freedom in the first and, as it were, immediate act is more difficult. It is, however, most true and very necessary, and it may be, as it were, the crux of the whole harmony of grace with freewill. For this reason it should be proven with care.

The crux of the  
 harmony of grace  
 and freewill.

First, therefore, it is proven by the fact that it also is a power that is truly free. Therefore, in that state also it must retain an active indifference in acting, since this belongs to the intrinsic *ratio* of freedom, as was shown.

Second, because otherwise no power remotely free in the first act would be proximately free to act or to not act, which is contrary to every *ratio* of active power and plainly contrary to the use of freedom. The consequence is explained: for a power that is *per se* and formally

ex parte sua, et ex parte intellectus, et obiecti, et ex omni  
 alia parte necessaria ad opus; ergo si postquam est proxime  
 420 disposita, iam non manet cum plena indifferentia, profecto  
 nunquam in re ipsa libere operatur, nec utitur innata liber-  
 tate. Tertio probatur, quia libertas formalis, et quasi essen- 430R  
 tialis voluntatis duplicem potestatem inadaequatam, seu rati-  
 one distinctam includit circa idem obiectum, eodem modo  
 425 hic, <10> et nunc propositum, una est potestas volendi, alia  
 est potestas non volendi, seu nolendi illud. Si ergo volun-  
 tas iam expedita, et proxime disposita ad operandum circa 435R  
 tale obiectum, non est indifferens ad utramque partem illius  
 potestatis, sicut erat per se praecise, ac remote, et nude spec-  
 430 tata; ergo ad unam partem illarum manebit proxime, et sim-  
 pliciter potens, ad alteram vero non nisi remote, ac subinde  
 proxime impotens; ergo de facto voluntas tunc non oper- 440R  
 atur tanquam domina utriusque potestatis, sed perinde se ha-  
 bet, ac si alteram tantum potestatem haberet, ac proinde non  
 435 libere operatur. Ut declaremus, et probemus consequentiam,  
 constituamus, et consideremus voluntatem dicto modo prox-  
 ime dispositam, ac praeparatam, seu applicatam ad primum 445R  
 usum libertatis suae, prius natura quam libertate utatur. Aut  
 ergo etiam tunc retinet indifferentiam ad utramque partem,  
 440 et hoc est, quod intendimus; aut alteram tantum potestatem  
 exercere potest, verbi gratia, volendi, et tunc profecto se-  
 quitur, ut sit hic, et nunc simpliciter, et proxime impotens 450R  
 ad nolendum, quia ut posset nolle, deberet aliter praeparari,  
 seu disponi, quod iam non est in potestate illius, nec antea  
 445 fuit, quia nondum usa fuerat libertate sua, ut supponitur:  
 ergo illa libertas remota nunquam ad usum liberum appli- 455R  
 catur. Atque hic discursus, et assertio ex capite sequenti am-  
 plius confirmabitur.

free *in re* does not use and is not strong enough to use its freedom and indifference except if it is proximately disposed for its part and on the part of the intellect and the object and every other part necessary for the work. Therefore, if after it is proximately disposed it does not still remain with full indifference, then surely it never operates freely *in re* and does not use its innate freedom.

It is proven, third, by the fact that the formal and, as it were, essential freedom of the will includes two powers that are inadequate or distinct by reason, two powers concerning the same object proposed in the same way here and now. One is the power for willing the object and the other is the power for not willing or nilling the object. If the will, then, is already prepared and proximately disposed for acting with respect to such an object, it is not indifferent to each part of that power, as it was taken in itself, remotely, and separately. For one part of those, therefore, it will continue to have the power proximately and without qualification. But for the other part it will not except remotely and, consequently, proximately unable. Therefore, in fact the will does not then operate as having dominion over either power, but it holds itself just as if it has only one or the other of those powers and thereby does not operate freely. In order to show and prove the consequence, we set up and consider the will in the stated way as proximately disposed and prepared or applied to the first use of its freedom, but prior in nature to using the freedom. Either it then also retains an indifference to each part (and this is what we intend), or it can exercise only one or the other power, for example, the power to will. In the latter case it surely follows that here and now it is strictly speaking and proximately unable to nill, since in order to be able to nill it has to be prepared or disposed differently. But that is no longer in its power, nor was it before, since it had not yet used its freedom, as was assumed. Therefore, that remote freedom is never applied to the use of freedom. And this discussion and assertion will be more thoroughly confirmed by the following chapter.