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CAPUT I.

De nominibus naturae, et liberi arbitrii.

1. Quia libera natura gratiae fundamentum est, et gratia perfectio, et sanitas est naturae, ideo disputatio de gratia cognitionem aliquam talis naturae supponit, propter quod solent gratia, et natura, seu liberum arbitrium, non tantum in disputatione ipsa, sed etiam in titulo totius operis coniungi, sicut Augustinus librum unum de *Natura, et gratia*, et alium de *Gratia, et libero arbitrio* scripsit. Propter hanc ergo causam necessarium est in ingressu huius materiae supponere quid nomine naturae, et liberi arbitrii intelligamus. Nam philosophi in libris de Physico auditu de natura disputant, prout principium est motus, et quietis; in praesenti vero non in ea latitudine sumitur, sed prout dicitur per antonomasiam de intellectuali, seu rationali natura, quae principium est moralium operationum, quibus aeterna beatitudo comparatur, vel amittitur, ad quem finem sola intellectualis natura per gratiam ordinatur. Et ideo dixit Augustinus lib. 1. contra Iulianum cap. 3. solam rationalem naturam esse gratiae

Augustinus.

Augustinus.

CHAPTER I.

On the names 'nature' and 'freewill'.³

1. Since a free nature is the foundation of grace and grace is the perfection and health of nature, a discussion of grace presupposes some cognition of such a nature. This is the reason why grace and nature or freewill⁴ are usually conjoined not just in the same disputation but in the title of the whole work. Augustine, for example, wrote one book [entitled] *On Nature and Grace* and another one *On Grace and Freewill*. For this reason, therefore, it is necessary that in beginning with this material we first establish what we understand by the names 'nature' and 'freewill'. For philosophers discuss nature in books examining [Aristotle's] *Physics* insofar as it is the principle of motion and rest. But at present we are not taking 'nature' so broadly but are taking it as it is said through antonomasia of intellectual or rational nature, which is the principle of the moral activities by which eternal happiness is secured or lost. Intellectual nature alone is ordered to this end through grace. For this reason, Augustine said in *Against Julian* IV, ch. 3, that only rational nature has the capacity for grace. But he is speaking about rational nature insofar as it includes intellectual na-

Augustine.

Augustine.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1620 Lyon edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Coimbra, 1619). For recorded variants, B = 1620 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1620 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 7 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³Merely three years after the first publication of this work, the Spanish Franciscan Jeronimo Tamarit de Tavaría copies the bulk of the present chapter in the identically titled chapter in his *Flores theologiae* (Valencia, 1622), tom. 1, pp. 491–92.

⁴I take '*liberum arbitrii*' as a technical term naming the item under dispute. The equivalent term in contemporary philosophy might be 'freedom of the will', though it has the disadvantage of already suggesting a theory as to which faculty would provide us with this freedom. I will translate '*liberum arbitrii*' with 'freewill' as a single word and reserve 'freedom of the will' for '*libertas voluntatis*' where it is clear that it is the *will's* freedom that is being considered.

20 capacem. Loquitur autem de rationali prout intellectualem 20R
 complectitur, quia tam Angelica, quam humana natura capax
 est divinae gratiae, quia utraque libera est. *Gratiam autem*
 Bernardus. (ut ait Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio) *nec dare potest*
 nisi Deus, *nec capere nisi liberum arbitrium*, id est, natura libe-
 25 ra, illa enim indiget, ut supernaturalem finem assequatur. 25R
 Quia vero humana natura et nobis est magis familiaris, et
 pluribus titulis, ac modis indiget gratia, <col. b> quam An-
 gelica, ideo de rationali natura sermonem semper faciemus,
 doctrina vero facile poterit ad Angelicam cum proportione
 30 applicari: nam ubi ratio diversitatis intervenerit non diffi- 30R
 cile intelligetur, eamque indicare curabimus. Non loquimur
 autem nunc de natura humana prout a supposito distinguitur,
 nec de statu illo plus quam humano, quem in divino Verbo
 per hypostaticam unionem obtinuit: nam prior naturae spec-
 35 ulatio metaphysica est, nihilque ad praesentem causam spec- 35R
 tat, alterius vero mysterii consideratio altior est, quam suo
 loco pro viribus prosecuti sumus. In praesenti ergo natura
 humana quatenus in persona creata capax est gratiae, illaque
 ad bene operandum, et ad suum finem consequendum indi-
 40 get, consideratur.

2. Est autem ulterius advertendum gratiam perficere nat- 40R
 uram, praecipue quatenus humanorum, ac liberorum actuum
 principium est. Unde fit, ut liberum arbitrium, et gratia tam
 sint habitudine, et officio coniuncta, ut non possint disputa-
 45 tione seiungi, ut satis indicavit Augustinus, dicens: *Si non est*
 Augustinus, *Dei gratia, quomodo Christus salvat mundum? Et si non est* 45R
 epistola 47. *liberum arbitrium, quomodo iudicat mundum?* Et lib. 3. Hy-
 pognosticon cap. 11. *Neque gratia sine libero arbitrio facit*
 Bernardus. *hominem habere beatam vitam, nec liberum arbitrium sine gra-*
 50 *tia*, et Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio: *Tolle liberum*
arbitrium, non erit quod salvetur, tolle gratiam, non erit unde 50R
salvetur. Unde praecipua huius materiae difficultas in concilianda gratiae necessitate, ac efficacia cum libertate arbitrii
 posita est, et ignorantia huius concordiae fere omnium erro-
 55 rum, qui in <2> hac materia fuerunt, radix et origo fuit. 55R
 Oportet ergo ante significationem gratiae, quid nomine lib-
 ertatis, et liberi arbitrii significetur praemittere.

ture, since angelic nature as well as human nature has a capacity for divine grace, since each is free.

‘But grace’, as Bernard says in *On Grace and Freewill*, ‘cannot be given except by God and cannot be received except by freewill’, that is, by a free nature. For that is required in order to achieve a supernatural end. But since human nature both is more familiar to us than angelic nature and is in need of grace under more headings and ways, we will always make our discussion about rational nature. But the doctrine could easily be applied analogously to angelic nature. For it is not difficult to realize where the aspect of difference comes up and we will take care to indicate it. Moreover, we are not now talking about human nature as distinguished from the supposit nor more about the state that obtains in the case of the divine Word through the hypostatic union than about the human case. For the former belongs to the metaphysical speculation about nature and in no way pertains to the present subject. The latter is a deeper consideration of a mystery which we pursued in its place according to our strength. At present, then, human nature is considered insofar as it is capable of grace in a created person and as grace is needed in order to act well and in order to attain that person’s end.

2. It should further be noted that grace perfects nature, especially insofar as it is the principle of human and free acts. Hence, the result is that freewill and grace are so joined together in disposition and office that they cannot be separated in discussion, as Augustine indicated well enough in saying: ‘If not for the grace of God, how does Christ save the world? And if not for freewill, how does he judge the world?’ And in *Hypognosticon* III, ch. 11, he says: ‘Grace without freewill does not make a human being have a happy life and neither does freewill without grace’. Bernard says in *On Grace and Freewill*: ‘Remove freewill and what is saved will not be; remove grace and that from which one is saved will not be’. Hence, the primary difficulty in this matter is placed in reconciling the necessity and efficacy of grace with freewill. Ignorance of this concordance was the root and origin of almost all the errors that have been made in this matter. It is necessary, therefore, first to deal with what is signified by the names ‘freedom’ and ‘freewill’ before discussing the signification of ‘grace’.

Augustine,
Letter 47.

Bernard.

Hugo Victorinus.
Triplex libertas,
sed illa, quae est a
necessitate, est
propria libertas
moralis.

3. Et imprimis praemittenda est distinctio triplicis libertatis, quam sic tradit Hugo Victorinus in *Summa sententiarum* tract. 3. cap. 9. *Est namque* (ait) *triplex libertas, a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria*. Nos vero aliter illa membra numeramus, est enim libertas a servitute, a coactione, et a necessitate; ex quibus sola haec tertia est propria libertas moralis ad humanos actus laude, et reprehensione; praemio, aut poena dignos necessaria: unde illa sola simpliciter nomen libertatis meretur; reliquae enim eatenus libertates appellantur, quatenus alicui necessitati opponuntur. Servitus enim quaedam parendi necessitatem inducit, et ideo carentia servitutis libertas appellatur Rom. 8. *Liberabitur a servitute corruptionis*. Potest autem servitus esse vel peccati, vel poenae: sicque carentia culpa, et remissio poenae dici potest libertas quaedam a peccato, seu peccati servitute, iuxta illud Rom. 6. *Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae: nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum in sanctificationem*. Et 2. Cor. 3. *Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas*. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. *Bonus* (inquit) *homo, etiamsi serviatur, utique homini, liber est*, scilicet a peccato; *malus autem etiamsi regnet, servus est*, nimirum peccati. Et ad eundem modum lib. 14. de Civitate cap. 15. dixit, primum hominem peccando amisisse libertatem, quam concupivit. Non enim libertatem a necessitate concupierat, nam illam a principio habuit, et ita neque illam amisit, sed libertatem a subiectione appetiit, et hanc amisit, quia et peccati, et poenae, et miseriae servus factus est, et contraxit concupiscentiae inordinationem, et pugnam fomitis, quae servitus quaedam poenalis est. Atque ad hanc significationem reducitur omnis carentia obligationis, seu debiti, sive a lege, sive a quacumque alia causa proveniat: sic enim dispensatio, vel exemptio a lege, libertas quaedam censetur; unde etiam privilegium nomine libertatis vocari solet; et cui aliquod debitum remittitur, liberari ab illo dicitur. Si quis autem recte consideret, tota haec libertas supponit propriam libertatem a necessitate, quia non est capax propriae servitutis, culpa,

73 6] 7 V.

76 3] 2 V.

3. In the first place, a distinction needs to be made between three kinds of freedom. Hugh of Saint Victor makes the distinction this way in *Summa sententiarum* tr. 3, ch. 9: ‘For freedom is threefold: from necessity, from sin, and from suffering’. But we number the members differently, for there is freedom from servitude, from coercion, and from necessity. Of these, only the third kind is the proper moral freedom necessary for human acts to deserve praise and reprimand, rewards and punishments. Hence, it alone deserves the name ‘freedom’ strictly speaking.

The others are called freedoms only insofar as they are opposed some kind of necessity. For servitude brings in a kind of necessity of obeying, and for this reason the absence of servitude is called freedom in Rom. 8[21]: ‘[the creature itself] shall be freed from the servitude of corruption’. Servitude, moreover, can be to sin or to punishment, and so the absence of guilt and the remission of punishments can be called a kind of freedom from sin or from servitude to sin, as in Rom. 6[20–22]: ‘For when you were servants of sin, you were free of justice . . . but now having been freed from sin and having been made servants of God, you have your fruit unto sanctification’. And in 2 Cor. 3[17]: ‘where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom’. Hence, Augustine also said in *The City of God* IV, ch. 3: ‘the good man, even if he serves, at least if he serves another man, is free’, namely, from sin; ‘but an evil man is a servant even if he reigns’. And in the same way he says in *The City of God* XIV, ch. 15, that the first man by sinning lost the freedom that he craved. For it was not freedom from necessity that he craved, for he had that from the beginning and so he did not lose it. But he desired freedom from subjection and this he lost, since he was made a servant of sin, punishment, and suffering, and he contracted a disordering of concupiscentia and a battle of lust, which is a kind of penal servitude. Every absence of obligation or of debt—whether it arises from a law or from any other cause—is traced back to this signification. In this way a dispensation or exemption from a law is thought to be a kind of freedom. Hence, a privilege is also usually given the name ‘freedom’, and someone for whom some debt is remitted is said to be freed from that debt.

But if someone were to consider the matter rightly, this entire

Hugh of Saint Victor.
Three kinds of freedom, but only freedom from necessity is proper moral freedom.

Rom. 8.

2 Cor. 3.
Augustine.

95 aut poenae, praecepti, <col. b> aut obligationis, nisi persona libera in agendo, ideoque sicut propria privatio supponit aptitudinem, ita servitus, et obligatio supponunt personam aptam ad operandum cum indifferentia, et absque necessitate. Quia vero operationes a necessitate liberae possunt esse sub iure alterius, vel sub aliquo onere, et obligatione, ideo cum libertate a necessitate potest esse in operibus necessitas servitutis, et obligationis, seu (quod idem est) potest quis per legem, vel servitatem privari libertate illis contraria, et nihilominus retinere propriam operum libertatem. 100R

Coactum idem
fere quod
violentum.

105 4. Coactum idem fere est quod violentum, utrumque enim est contra internum appetitum patientis, vel operantis, sed violentum generalius dicitur de quocumque motu contrario appetitui, sive elicito, sive innato: coactum vero proprie dicitur, quando appetitui elicito, et vitali repugnat, licet interdum soleant voces illae confundi. Duo ergo ad coactum requiruntur, scilicet, ut ex necessitate fiat, vel sustineatur, et quod sit contra internum affectum; et ita coactio est quaedam necessitas, et aliquid ultra illam addit. Utrumque ex Aristotele 3. Ethicorum cap. 1. colligitur, dicente, *violentum esse, quod est ab extrinseco, passo non conferente vim*, id est, resistente aliquo modo, ut omnes exponunt ex eodem Aristotele 2. Ethicorum ad Eudemum cap. 8. quia si passum non resistat, motio non erit violenta, etiamsi ab extrinseco proveniat. Coactum ergo, ut tale est, non potest esse ab intrinseco, alioqui non esset contra propriam inclinationem, si autem est ab extrinseco, eo ipso necessarium est, quia libertas a necessitate non est in patiendo, sed in agendo, ut infra probabo: ob hanc ergo causam et coactum includit necessarium, et quod non est a coactione liberum, ut tale est, non potest esse a necessitate immune. Propter alias vero conditiones non convertitur coactum cum necessario, multa enim necessaria sunt, quae contra internum appetitum non sunt, imo ex illo saepe nascuntur. Et ob eandem rationem libertas necessitatem excludens universalior est libertate soli coactioni opposita: nam omnis libertas a necessitate est etiam a coactione exempta, 110R 115R 120R 125R

Aristoteles.

freedom presupposes a proper freedom from necessity. For nothing has the capacity for proper servitude, guilt, punishment, command, or obligation except a person who is free in acting. For this reason, just as a proper privation presupposes an aptitude, so also servitude and obligation presuppose a person apt for acting with indifference and without necessity. But since activities free from necessity can be under the right of another or under some burden and obligation, therefore the necessity of servitude and of obligation can exist in works along with freedom from necessity. Or, what comes to the same thing, someone can be deprived through law or servitude of freedom from their contraries, and yet retain the proper freedom of works.

4. What is coerced is almost the same thing as what is violent, for each goes against the internal appetite of the patient or of the one acting. But violence is more generally said of any motion contrary to appetite, whether elicited or innate, while coercion is properly said when it is contrary to an elicited and vital appetite, although sometimes these words are confused. Two things, therefore, are required for a coerced action: that it be contrary to an internal affect and that the coercion be a kind of necessity and add something beyond that affect. Both are gathered from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 1, where he says: ‘the violent is from something extrinsic that was suffered without conferring force’, that is, without resisting in some way, as everyone explains it in accordance with what the same Aristotle says in *Eudemian Ethics* II, ch. 8. For if what is suffered is not resisted, the motion will not be violent even if it arises from something extrinsic. The coerced, therefore, in order to be such cannot be from something intrinsic. Otherwise, it would not be contrary to one’s own inclination. But if it is from something extrinsic, it is by that fact necessary. For freedom from necessity is not found in undergoing but in acting, as I will prove below. For this reason, therefore, the coerced includes necessity, and what is not free of coercion, insofar as it is such, cannot be exempt from necessity. But on account of other conditions the coerced is not interchangeable with the necessary. For there are many things that are necessary that are not contrary to internal appetite. In fact, necessary things often arise from internal appetite. For the same reason freedom that excludes necessity is more universal than freedom that is only opposed to coercion. For every freedom from necessity is

The coerced
almost the same
as the violent.

Aristotle.

130 non vero e contrario, ut per se notum est; dilectio enim Dei 130R
in patria a coactione libera est, non tamen a necessitate.

5. Libertas ergo a sola coactione tantum requirit car-
entiam violentiae, ita ut motio, quae sic libera dicitur, con-
tra internum appetitum <3> non sit, sive ex necessitate fiat, 135R
135 sive non. Talis autem motio, si sit voluntatis, dicenda est
potius voluntaria, quam libera. Hae namque duae propri-
etates in actibus voluntatis distinctae sunt, et ideo nominibus
etiam sunt distinguendae, ne verborum ambiguitas disputa-
tionem reddat incertam. Potest ergo esse actus hominis vol- 140R
140 untarius, ac subinde a coactione liber, qui tamen simpliciter
liber a necessitate non sit, ut in amore, quo Deus se amat,
et quo Spiritum Sanctum producit, et quo beati diligunt
Deum, et in actibus indeliberatis voluntatis, et in affectibus
appetitus sentientis videre licet. Ratioque satis constat ex 145R
145 dictis; his adiunctis, quae de ratione voluntarii Aristoteles et
D. Thomas tradiderunt. Voluntarium enim dicitur, quod est
ab interno principio cum cognitione, quae ratio tota potest in
actu reperiri, quamvis ex necessitate fiat, quia sola necessitas
non excludit cognitionem, nec conformitatem cum appetitu 150R
150 innato, vel elicito. Unde etiam ortum habuit communis illa
Theologorum doctrina, voluntati in actibus elicitis non posse
vim, aut coactionem inferri, etiamsi necessitatem pati pos-
sit. Nam coactio excludit voluntarium, illi enim directe op-
ponitur, non potest autem actus esse a voluntate, et non esse 155R
155 voluntarius, quia non potest non esse a principio intrinseco
cum cognitione, nec potest simul esse voluntarius, et coactus,
quia haec duo opponuntur, et immediatam contradictionem
involvunt; necessitas autem non involvit illam oppositionem
cum voluntario, quia necessitas ipsa potest esse voluntaria, 160R
160 seu interno appetitui conformis, ut dictum est.

6. Duo autem in hoc sunt, quoad modum loquendi, ad-
vertenda, quoniam ad intelligendas sententias Patrum erunt
necessaria. Unum est coactionem duplicem esse, unam sim-
pliciter, quae absolutam, et inevitabilem necessitatem con- 165R

132 5] 6 B.
161 6] 5 B.

also exempt from coercion, but not the other way around, as is known
per se. For the love for God in the homeland is free from coercion, yet
not free from necessity.

5. Therefore, freedom from coercion only requires the absence
of violence in such a way that a motion that is called free in this way
is not contrary to internal appetite, whether or not it happens by ne-
cessity. But such a motion, assuming it is of the will, should be called
voluntary rather than free. For these are two distinct properties in
acts of the will and so they should also be distinguished by names, lest
an ambiguity in words render the discussion uncertain. It is possible,
therefore, for an act of a human being to be voluntary and thereby
be free from coercion that, nevertheless, is strictly speaking not free
of necessity. One can see this in the love by which God loves him-
self and by which he produces the Holy Spirit and in the love with
which the blessed love God, as well as in undeliberated acts of the
will and in the affects of an appetite of someone who is sensing. The
reason is sufficiently clear from what has been said, along with these
additional points made by Aristotle and St. Thomas about the *ratio* of
the voluntary. For something is called voluntary that comes from an
internal principle together with cognition. That whole *ratio* can be
found in an act even though it comes to be by necessity, since neces-
sity alone excludes neither cognition nor conformity to an innate or
elicited appetite. Here, also, is the source for that common doctrine
of the theologians that force or coercion cannot be inflicted on the
will in the case of elicited acts even if it can suffer necessity. For co-
ercion excludes the voluntary, since they are directly opposed, but an
act cannot be from the will and not be voluntary, since it cannot fail
to be from an intrinsic principle together with cognition. Nor can it
simultaneously be voluntary and coerced, since these two are opposed
and involve an immediate contradiction. Necessity, however, does not
involve that opposition to the voluntary, since necessity itself can be
voluntary or conform to an internal appetite, as was said.

6. But two things should be noticed in this regarding the way
of speaking, since they will be necessary for understanding the views
of the Fathers. One is that coercion is of two kinds. One is coer-
cion *simpliciter*, which is an absolute and inevitable necessity inflicted

Aristoteles 5.
Ethicorum
cap. 1.
D. Thomas 1.2.
q. 6. art. 1.

Duo advertenda
quoad modum
loquendi
necessaria ad
intelligendos
Patres.
Primum.

Aristotle, *EN* V,
ch. 1.
St. Thomas, *ST*
IIaIIae.6.1.

Two things
necessary for
understanding
the Fathers with
respect to the
way of speaking.
First.

165 tra internum affectum infert: alia secundum quid, qualis est,
 quae per poenas, vel timores fit, quae non absolutam necessi-
 tatem, sed secundum quid, scilicet, ad vitandum tale incom-
 modum, inducit. Prior ergo coactio est, quae omnino repug-
 nat actui elicito voluntatis, quia eo ipso quod est elicitus, iam 170R
 170 non est coactus, posterior autem coactio esse potest cum ab-
 soluta voluntate, imo et cum libertate, cum absolutam nec-
 cessitatem non inducat, et ideo licet interdum coactio, aut
 violentia vocetur, ut patet ex Augustino lib. 1. contra Gau-
 Augustinus. <col. b> dentium cap. 25. et epistola 48. simpliciter, et ab- 175R
 175 solute coactio non est, sed alicuius mali prohibitio, ut dixit
 idem Augustinus lib. 2. contra litteras Petilianus cap. 83.

Secundum quod
 est observandum.

7. Aliud animadvertendum est, interdum voluntarium
 actum ita esse necessarium simpliciter, ut ipsa necessitas ab 180R
 180 intrinseco sit, ac subinde conformis sit inclinationi, et perfec-
 tioni naturali ipsius voluntatis, et tunc actus licet sit necessar-
 ius ita est voluntarius, ut nullo modo dici possit violentus, vel
 coactus, quia nullo modo repugnat interno appetitui, neque
 elicito, quia actus, ut supponitur, voluntarius est, nec innato, 185R
 185 quia ipsa necessitas non est etiam voluntati, eiusve innatae in-
 clinationi contraria, ut supponitur. Et hoc modo amor Dei in
 beatis est necessarius sine ullo genere coactionis, aut violent-
 tiae, et affectus appetitus sentientis possunt in eodem ordine
 poni propter eandem rationem. Aliquando vero actus volun- 190R
 190 tarius potest esse necessarius tantum ab extrinseco efficiente,
 seu quasi impellente, et tunc licet actus sit voluntarius, et ideo
 non possit dici absolute coactus, nihilominus cum necessitas
 ipsa non sit conformis naturali conditioni, et inclinationi vol- 195R
 195 untatis, eo quod sit tantum ab extrinseco, actus sic necessarius
 interdum solet aliquo modo violentus dici, saltem secundum
 quid, quia est contra modum connaturalem, et contra quem-
 dam innatum appetitum. Et hoc modo necessitas immissa
 voluntati in actibus de se liberis vocari solet a Patribus coac- 200R
 tio quaedam, et e converso actus simpliciter liber vocari so-
 let spontaneus, et voluntarius, utique perfecte, et extrinsecam

190 seu] sed B.

against an internal affection. The other is coercion *secundum quid*, which is the kind that comes from punishments and fears. They do not introduce an absolute necessity but only a necessity with respect to something (*secundum quid*), namely, necessary in order to avoid such a disadvantage. The former, therefore, is the coercion that is entirely repugnant to an elicited act of the will, since the very fact that it is elicited makes it not coerced. But the latter kind of coercion is compatible with an absolute willing, in fact, even with freedom, since it does not introduce an absolute necessity. For this reason, although it is sometimes called coercion or violence, as is clear from Augustine, *Against Gaudentius* I, ch. 25, and Letter 48, it is not, strictly speaking and absolutely, coercion. Rather, it is a prohibition of [doing] some evil, as Augustine also said in *Against the Letters of Petilianus* II, ch. 83.

Augustine.

7. The other thing that should be noted is that sometimes a voluntary act is necessary *simpliciter* in such a way that the necessity itself is from the intrinsic [principle] and so it is conformed to the inclination and to the natural perfection of the will itself. In this case the act, although it is necessary, is voluntary in such a way that it is no way can be called violent or coerced, since it is in no way repugnant to an internal appetite. It is not repugnant either to an elicited appetite because the act, as it is being imagined, is voluntary, or to an innate appetite because the necessity itself is also not contrary to the will or to its innate inclination as it is being imagined. In this way the love for God in the blessed is necessary without any kind of coercion or violence. The affected appetites of someone sensing can also be placed in the same order for the same reason.

The second point
 that should be
 observed.

But sometimes a voluntary act can be necessary only from an extrinsic [principle] effecting or, as it were, impelling [the will to act]. In this case, although the act is voluntary and for that reason cannot be called absolutely coerced, nevertheless, since the necessity itself is not conformed to the natural condition and inclination of the will as a result of the fact that the necessity is only from an extrinsic [principle], an act necessary in this way is sometimes customarily called violent in some way, at least *secundum quid*. For it is contrary to a connatural mode and contrary to a certain innate appetite. And in this way the necessity put into the will in the case of acts that are free of themselves

200 necessitatem interno appetitui, seu inclinationi voluntatis repugnantem excludens.

Liberum a necessitate dici solet et de facultate operandi absque necessitate, et de ipsa actione. Augustinus.

205 8. Liberum ergo in praesenti vocatur, quod a necessitate liberum est: dici autem solet et de facultate operandi absque necessitate, et de ipsa actione. Priori modo denominatur arbitrium liberum, quod dicitur esse *facultas voluntatis, et rationis*, utique ad operandum cum indifferentia, et dominio actionis, ita ut in manu eius sit velle, aut nolle exercere, vel sustinere actionem. De quo dixit Augustinus lib. 2. de Peccatorum meritis et remissione cap. 18. *Esse voluntatis arbitrium, quod huc, atque illuc liberum flectitur, atque in eis naturalibus bonis est, quibus homo bene, et male uti potest.* Atque in hoc sensu de fide certum est, hominem esse hoc modo natura sua liberum, seu habere aliam quam facultatem a necessitate liberam in operibus suis, non solum naturalibus, sed etiam supernaturalibus, ut aperte definit Concilium Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 5. et can. 5. et 9. et Scripturis, et rationibus probat late Augustinus lib. de Gratia et libero arbitrio, et latius moderni de hac materia scribes, et nos brevius in lib. 1. de Auxilio a principio. Praecipue vero videri possunt eruditae disputationes Cardinalis Bellarmini in tota controversia de Gratia et libero arbitrio cum Praefatione.

Concilium Tridentinum.

Bellarmini.

Unde liber actus denominetur.

220 9. Hinc etiam actus, qui ab hac facultate libera procedit, liber denominatur: oportet autem, ut ab illa, ut indifferens est, procedat. Non enim defuerunt aliqui moderni Catholici, qui negaverint ad libertatem actus esse necessariam indifferentiam, seu carentiam necessitatis, sed satis esse carentiam coactionis: sed haec sententia reprobata est inter assertiones Michaelis Baii assert. 39. et 41. et in lib. 3. ex professo refutabitur. Ut ergo actus sit vere liber, non satis est, quod sit voluntarius, seu non coactus, sed etiam ut non sit necessarius simpliciter, ac proinde, ut procedat a potentia libera, ut indifferentiam, et libertatem retineat, ut in ipso usu, et exercitio libera, et integra potestate sua sinatur operari, ita ut

216 9] 6 V.

228 39] 30 V.

is customarily called a kind of coercion by the Fathers. Conversely, an act that is free *simpliciter* is usually called spontaneous and voluntary, certainly perfectly, and excluding the extrinsic necessity repugnant to the internal appetite or inclination of the will.

205R 8. Therefore, at present that is called free which is free from necessity. Moreover, it is customarily said both of a faculty operating apart from necessity and of the action itself. In the former way freewill is denominated, which is said to be *a faculty of the will and of reason*, at least when operating with indifference and with dominion over the action so that it is in one's hands either to will or to will not to exercise or to sustain the action. In *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins* II, ch. 18, Augustine said about this: 'It is the determination of the will, which is freely turned to this or to that, and has its place among those natural goods which a human being can use well or badly'. In this sense it is certain in the faith that human beings by their nature are in this way free or have some faculty free from necessity in their works, not only in their natural works but also their supernatural works. The Council of Trent clearly settles this in the Sixth Session (ch. 5 and canons 5 and 9). Augustine proves it thoroughly from Scripture and by reasons in *On Grace and Freewill*, and the moderns even more thoroughly when writing about this subject. We dealt with it more briefly in the beginning of Book I of *De auxilio*. But the erudite *Disputations* of Cardinal Bellarmine may especially be seen regarding the whole controversy about grace and freewill along with the preface.

Free from necessity is customarily said both of a faculty acting apart from necessity and of the action itself. Augustine.

Council of Trent.

Bellarmino.

Whence a free act is denominated.

225R 9. From here the act which proceeds from this free faculty is also denominated free, but it must proceed from that faculty as it is indifferent. For modern Catholics are not lacking who deny that indifference or the absence of necessity is necessary for a free act, but say that the absence of coercion is enough. But this view was among Michael Baius's condemned assertions (assertions 39 and 41) and will be refuted *ex professo* in Book III. Therefore, in order for an act to be truly free, it is not enough that it is voluntary or not coerced, but it must also not be necessary *simpliciter*. And in the same way as it proceeds from a free power as indifferent and retains freedom so that in the use and exercise itself the power is allowed to act by its whole power so that it remains in its hand to choose between contraries or

235 in manu eius sit inter contraria, vel contradictoria eligere, vel
 operari, aut non operari. Quia ut actus sit liber, necessarium
 est, ut procedat a facultate libera, ut libera est; non procedet 240R
 autem a potentia libera, ut talis est, nisi expeditam habeat
 suam facultatem quoad utramque partem, utique operandi,
 et non operandi. Quid enim proderit ad libertatem talis ac-
 240 tus, quod potentia innatam habeat indifferentiam, si in ipso
 usu impediatur? Quapropter supposita distinctione data de 245R
 duplici necessitate, altera ab intrinseco per naturalem deter-
 minationem potentiae ad unum; alia ab extrinseco per impul-
 sum alicuius extrinseci agentis: prior repugnat non solum ac-
 245 tui, sed etiam facultati liberi arbitrii, et ideo fieri non potest,
 ut potentia libera tali necessitati subdita sit respectu eiusdem 250R
 obiecti, quia contradictionem involvit, ut per se notum est.
 Posterior autem necessitas non repugnat facultati liberae, ut
 nunc suppono, ut paulo post probabo, repugnat autem ac-
 250 tui libero, quia, ut talis sit, oportet, ut procedat a potentia,
 ut libera, vel quoad specificationem, vel saltem quoad exerci- 255R
 tium, iuxta modum, quo actus liber fuerit, quia non habet,
 quod sit liber, nisi per denominationem a suo proximo prin-
 255 cipio. At vero si actus procedat <col. b> a potentia neces-
 sitatem patiente, sive per intrinsecam necessitatem potentiae
 determinatae ad unum, sive per extrinsecam necessitatem im- 260R
 missam potentiae de se liberae, iam impeditur, et tollitur lib-
 260ertas actus; ita ut liber dici non possit, nec laude, vel vituperio
 dignus, quia non procedit a potentia, ut libera est, nam ipsa
 non valet necessitatem illam auferre, vel praevenire, et ideo
 265 non potest illi imputari, quod tali modo, et non alio operetur. 265R
 Quam doctrinam satis clare docuit Concilium Tridentinum
 loco citato, et necessaria omnino est ad salvanda omnia, quae
 de humanis actionibus, earumque libertate Scriptura docet.
 265 Ideoque censeo in hoc puncto non esse dissensionem inter
 Catholicos, licet in modo explicandi, et defendendi hanc lib- 270R
 ertatem possit esse aliqua diversitas.

Quae necessitas
 repugnet actui
 liberi arbitrii
 eiusque facultati:
 quaeve non.

Tridentinum.

contradictories, either to act or not to act. For in order for an act to
 be free it is necessary that it proceed from a free faculty insofar as it is
 free. But an act will not proceed from a free power insofar as it is such
 unless it has its faculty unencumbered with respect to either part, at
 least with respect to acting and to not acting. For of what advantage
 to the freedom of such an act is a power that has an innate indifference
 if that indifference is impeded in that use?

Therefore, having assumed the distinction given between two
 kinds of necessity—one from an intrinsic [principle] through a nat-
 ural determination of the power to one object, the other from an
 extrinsic [principle] through the impulse of some extrinsic agent—the
 former is repugnant not only to the act but also to the faculty of
 freewill. Therefore, it cannot happen that a power subjected to such
 necessity is free with respect to the same object, since that involves a
 contradiction, as is known *per se*. But the latter necessity is not repug-
 nant to a free faculty, as I assume for now and as I will prove a little
 later, but it is repugnant to free acts. For in order for an act to be
 free, it is necessary that it proceed from a power insofar as it is free,
 either with respect to specification or at least with respect to exercise,
 according to the mode by which the act will be free. For an act does
 not have what it takes to be free except through denomination from
 its proximate principle. On the other hand, if the act proceeds from
 a power suffering necessity, either through the intrinsic necessity of
 a power determined to one object or through an extrinsic necessity
 imposed on a power free of itself, the freedom of the act is already
 prevented or removed. Thus the act cannot be called free and does
 not merit praise or blame. For it does not proceed from a power in-
 sofar as it is free, since it does not prevail to remove or forestall that
 necessity. And for this reason it cannot be held responsible for acting
 in such a way and not in another way. This doctrine is taught clearly
 enough by the Council of Trent in the cited place. Furthermore, it
 is entirely necessary for the salvation of all, which Scripture teaches
 about human actions and their freedom. Therefore, I think that there
 is no dissension about this point among Catholics, although there can
 be some diversity in the way this freedom is explained and defended.

Which necessity
 is repugnant to
 an act of freewill
 and its faculty
 and which one is
 not.

Council of Trent.