

<1><sup>2</sup>

CAPUT I.

*De nominibus naturae, et liberi arbitrii.*

1. Quia libera natura gratiae fundamentum est, et  
gratia perfectio, et sanitas est naturae, ideo dispu-  
5 tatio de gratia cognitionem aliquam talis naturae  
supponit, propter quod solent gratia, et natura, seu  
liberum arbitrium, non tantum in disputatione ipsa,  
sed etiam in titulo totius operis coniungi, sicut Au-  
Augustinus. gustinus librum unum de *Natura, et gratia*, et alium  
10 de *Gratia, et libero arbitrio* scripsit. Propter hanc  
ergo causam necessarium est in ingressu huius ma-  
teriae supponere quid nomine naturae, et liberi arbi-  
trii intelligamus. Nam philosophi in libris de Physico  
15 auditu de natura disputant, prout principium est  
motus, et quietis; in praesenti vero non in ea latitu-  
dine sumitur, sed prout dicitur per antonomasiam  
de intellectuali, seu rationali natura, quae prin-  
cipium est moralium operationum, quibus aeterna  
beatitudo comparatur, vel amittitur, ad quem finem

CHAPTER I.

*On the names 'nature' and 'freewill'.<sup>3</sup>*

1. Since free nature is the foundation of grace and grace is  
the perfection and health of nature, a discussion of grace  
presupposes some knowledge of such a nature. This is the  
reason why grace and nature or freewill<sup>4</sup> are usually con-  
joined not just in the same disputation but in the title of  
the whole work. Augustine, for example, wrote one book  
[entitled] *On Nature and Grace* and another one *On Grace  
and Freewill*. For this reason, therefore, it is necessary that  
in taking up this subject we first set out what we understand  
by the names 'nature' and 'freewill'. For philosophers dis-  
cuss nature in books examining [Aristotle's] *Physics* insofar  
as it is the principle of motion and rest. But at present we  
are not taking 'nature' that broadly but are taking it as it  
is said through antonomasia of intellectual or rational nature,  
which is the principle of the moral operations by which eter-  
nal happiness is secured or lost. Only intellectual nature is  
ordered to this end through grace. For this reason, Augus-

Augustine.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1620 Lyon edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Coimbra, 1619). For recorded variants, B = 1620 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1620 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

My thanks to Shane Duarte, who generously commented on my translation and spared me from a number of errors and infelicities.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 7 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>Merely three years after the first publication of this work, the Spanish Franciscan Jeronimo Tamarit de Tavaría copies the bulk of the present chapter in the identically titled chapter in his *Flores theologiae* (Valencia, 1622), tom. 1, pp. 491–92.

<sup>4</sup>I take '*liberum arbitrii*' as a technical term naming the item under dispute. The equivalent term in contemporary philosophy might be 'freedom of the will', though it has the disadvantage of already suggesting a theory as to which faculty would provide us with this freedom. I will translate '*liberum arbitrii*' with 'freewill' as a single word and reserve 'freedom of the will' for '*libertas voluntatis*' where it is clear that it is the *will's* freedom that is being considered.

20 sola intellectualis natura per gratiam ordinatur. 20R  
 Augustinus. Et ideo dixit Augustinus lib. IV. contra Iulianum  
 cap. 3. solam rationalem naturam esse gratiae ca-  
 pacem. Loquitur autem de rationali prout intellec-  
 tualem complectitur, quia tam Angelica, quam hu-  
 25 mana natura capax est divinae gratiae, quia utraque  
 Bernardus. libera est. *Gratiam autem* (ut ait Bernardus de Gra-  
 tia et libero arbitrio) *nec dare potest nisi Deus, nec*  
*capere nisi liberum arbitrium*, id est, natura libera,  
 illa enim indiget, ut supernaturalem finem asse-  
 30 quatur. Quia vero humana natura et nobis est  
 magis familiaris, et pluribus titulis, ac modis indi-  
 get gratia, <col. b> quam Angelica, ideo de rationali  
 natura sermonem semper faciemus, doctrina vero  
 facile poterit ad Angelicam cum proportione appli-  
 35 cari: nam ubi ratio diversitatis intervenerit non dif-  
 ficile intelligetur, eamque indicare curabimus. Non  
 loquimur autem nunc de natura humana prout a  
 supposito distinguitur, nec de statu illo plus quam  
 humano, quem in divino Verbo per hypostaticam  
 40 unionem obtinuit: nam prior naturae speculatio  
 metaphysica est, nihilque ad praesentem causam  
 spectat, alterius vero mysterii consideratio altior  
 est, quam suo loco pro viribus prosecuti sumus. In  
 praesenti ergo natura humana quatenus in persona  
 45 creata capax est gratiae, illaque ad bene operandum,  
 et ad suum finem consequendum indiget, consider-  
 atur.

2. Est autem ulterius advertendum gratiam  
 perficere naturam, praecipue quatenus humano-  
 50 rum, ac liberorum actuum principium est. Unde  
 fit, ut liberum arbitrium, et gratia tam sint habi-  
 tudine, et officio coniuncta, ut non possint dis-  
 putatione seiungi, ut satis indicavit Augustinus,  
 Augustinus, epistola 47. dicens: *Si non est Dei gratia, quomodo Christus*  
 55 *salvat mundum? Et si non est liberum arbitrium,*

20R tine said in *Against Julian* IV, ch. 3, that only rational nature  
 has the capacity for grace. But he is speaking about ratio-  
 nal nature insofar as it includes intellectual nature, since  
 angelic nature as well as human nature has the capacity for  
 divine grace, since each is free.

25R 'But grace', as Bernard says in *On Grace and Freewill*,  
 'cannot be given except by God and cannot be received except  
 by freewill', that is, by a free nature. For a free nature is  
 required in order to achieve a supernatural end. But since  
 human nature both is more familiar to us than angelic na-  
 30R ture and is in need of grace under more headings and ways,  
 we will always make our discussion about rational nature.  
 But the doctrine could easily be applied proportionately to  
 angelic nature. For it will not be difficult to realize where the  
 basis of difference comes up and we will take care to indicate  
 35R it. Moreover, we are not now talking about human nature as  
 distinguished from the supposit nor about that more-than-  
 human state that it obtains in the divine Word through the  
 hypostatic union. For the former consideration of nature is  
 metaphysical and in no way pertains to the present subject,  
 40R whereas the consideration of the latter mystery is loftier and  
 we have pursued it in its proper place to the extent we are  
 able. In the present place, then, we are considering human  
 nature insofar as it is capable of grace in a created person,  
 and insofar as grace is necessary for it to operate well and  
 45R attain its end.

2. It should further be noted that grace perfects nature,  
 especially insofar as it is the principle of human and free  
 acts. Hence, the result is that freewill and grace are so joined  
 together in disposition and function that they cannot be  
 50R separated in discussion, as Augustine indicated well enough  
 in saying: 'If there is not the grace of God, how does Christ  
 save the world? And if there is not freewill, how does he  
 judge the world?' And in *Hypognosticon* III, ch. 11, he says:

Augustine.

Augustine,  
 Letter 47.

Bernardus.	60	<p><i>quomodo iudicat mundum?</i> Et lib. 3. Hypognosticon cap. 11. <i>Neque gratia sine libero arbitrio facit hominem habere beatam vitam, nec liberum arbitrium sine gratia</i>, et Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio: <i>Tolle liberum arbitrium, non erit quod salvetur, tolle gratiam, non erit unde salvetur</i>. Unde praecipua huius materiae difficultas in concilianda gratiae necessitate, ac efficacia cum libertate arbitrii posita est, et ignorantia huius concordiae fere omnium errorum, qui in &lt;2&gt; hac materia fuerunt, radix et origo fuit. Oportet ergo ante significationem gratiae, quid nomine libertatis, et liberi arbitrii significetur praemittere.</p>	55R	<p>'Grace without freewill does not make a human being have a happy life and neither does freewill without grace'. Bernard says in <i>On Grace and Freewill</i>: 'Take away freewill and there is nothing to be saved; take away grace and there is nothing by which to be saved'. Hence, the primary difficulty in this matter is situated in reconciling the necessity and efficacy of grace with freewill. Ignorance of this concordance has been the root and origin of almost all the errors that have been made in this matter. It is necessary, therefore, first to deal with what is signified by the names 'freedom' and 'freewill' before discussing the signification of 'grace'.</p>	Bernard.
Hugo Victorinus.	70	<p>3. Et imprimis praemittenda est distinctio triplicis libertatis, quam sic tradit Hugo Victorinus in <i>Summa sententiarum</i> tract. 3. cap. 9. <i>Est namque (ait) triplex libertas, a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria</i>. Nos vero aliter illa membra numeramus, est enim libertas a servitute, a coactione, et a necessitate; ex quibus sola haec tertia est propria libertas moralis ad humanos actus laude, et reprehensione; praemio, aut poena dignos necessaria: unde illa sola simpliciter nomen libertatis meretur; reliquae enim eatenus libertates appellantur, quatenus alicui necessitati opponuntur. Servitus enim quamdam parendi necessitatem inducit, et ideo carentia servitutis libertas appellatur Rom. 8. <i>Liberabitur a servitute corruptionis</i>. Potest autem servitus esse vel peccati, vel poenae: sicque carentia culpa, et remissio poenae dici potest libertas quaedam a peccato, seu peccati servitute, iuxta illud Rom. 6. <i>Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae: nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum in sanctificationem</i>. Et 2. Cor. 3. <i>Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas</i>. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. <i>Bonus (inquit) homo, etiamsi</i></p>	65R	<p>3. In the first place, a distinction needs to be made between three kinds of freedom. Hugh of Saint Victor makes the distinction this way in <i>Summa sententiarum</i> tr. 3, ch. 9: 'For freedom is threefold: from necessity, from sin, and from suffering'. But we number the members differently, for there is freedom from servitude, from coercion, and from necessity. Of these, only the third kind is the proper moral freedom necessary for human acts to deserve praise and reprimand, rewards and punishments. Hence, it alone deserves the name 'freedom' strictly speaking.</p>	Hugh of Saint Victor. Three kinds of freedom, but only freedom from necessity is proper moral freedom.
Rom. 8.	80	<p><i>Liberabitur a servitute corruptionis</i>. Potest autem servitus esse vel peccati, vel poenae: sicque carentia culpa, et remissio poenae dici potest libertas quaedam a peccato, seu peccati servitute, iuxta illud Rom. 6. <i>Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae: nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum in sanctificationem</i>. Et 2. Cor. 3. <i>Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas</i>. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. <i>Bonus (inquit) homo, etiamsi</i></p>	75R	<p>For the others are called freedoms only insofar as they are opposed to some kind of necessity. For servitude brings in a kind of necessity of obeying, and for this reason the absence of servitude is called freedom in Rom. 8[21]: '[the creature itself] shall be freed from the servitude of corruption'. Servitude, moreover, can be to sin or to punishment, and so the absence of guilt and the remission of punishments can be called a kind of freedom from sin or from servitude to sin, as in Rom. 6[20–22]: 'For when you were servants of sin, you were free of justice . . . but now having been freed from sin and having been made servants of God, you have your fruit unto sanctification'. And in 2 Cor. 3[17]: 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom'. Hence, Augustine also said in</p>	Rom. 8.
2. Cor. 3. Augustinus.	90	<p><i>Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas</i>. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. <i>Bonus (inquit) homo, etiamsi</i></p>	80R	<p>2 Cor. 3. Augustine.</p>	2 Cor. 3. Augustine.

86 6] 7 V.

91 3] 2 V.

*serviat, utique homini, liber est, scilicet a peccato; malus autem etiamsi regnet, servus est, nimirum peccati. Et ad eundem modum lib. 14. de Civitate* 90R  
 95 *cap. 15. dixit, primum hominem peccando amisisse libertatem, quam concupivit. Non enim libertatem a necessitate concupierat, nam illam a principio habuit, et ita neque illam amisit, sed libertatem a subiectione appetiit, et hanc amisit, quia et peccati,* 95R  
 100 *et poenae, et miseriae servus factus est, et contraxit concupiscentiae inordinationem, et pugnam fomitis, quae servitus quaedam poenalis est. Atque ad hanc significationem reducitur omnis carentia obligationis, seu debiti, sive a lege, sive a quacumque alia* 100R  
 105 *causa proveniat: sic enim dispensatio, vel exemptio a lege, libertas quaedam censetur; unde etiam privilegium nomine libertatis vocari solet; et cui aliquod debitum remittitur, liberari ab illo dicitur. Si quis autem recte consideret, tota haec libertas supponit* 105R  
 110 *propriam libertatem a necessitate, quia non est capax propriae servitutis, culpa, aut poenae, praeccepti, <col. b> aut obligationis, nisi persona libera in agendo, ideoque sicut propria privatio supponit aptitudinem, ita servitus, et obligatio supponunt* 110R  
 115 *personam aptam ad operandum cum indifferentia, et absque necessitate. Quia vero operationes a necessitate liberae possunt esse sub iure alterius, vel sub aliquo onere, et obligatione, ideo cum libertate a necessitate potest esse in operibus necessitas* 115R  
 120 *servitutis, et obligationis, seu (quod idem est) potest quis per legem, vel servitutem privari libertate illis contraria, et nihilominus retinere propriam operum libertatem.*

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fere quod  
violentum.

4. Coactum idem fere est quod violentum, 125  
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*The City of God* IV, ch. 3: ‘the good man, even if he serves, at least if he serves another man, is free’, namely, from sin; ‘but an evil man is a servant even if he reigns’, namely, of sin. And in the same way he says in *The City of God* XIV, ch. 15, that the first man by sinning lost the freedom that he craved. For it was not freedom from necessity that he had craved, for he had that from the beginning and he had not lost it. But he desired freedom from subjection and this he lost, since he was made a servant of sin, punishment, and suffering, and he contracted a disordering of concupiscence and a battle of lust, which is a kind of penal servitude. Every absence of obligation or of debt—whether it arises from a law or from any other cause—is traced back to this signification. For thus a dispensation or exemption from a law is thought to be a kind of freedom. Hence, a privilege is also usually given the name ‘freedom’, and someone for whom some debt is remitted is said to be freed from that debt.

But if someone were to consider the matter rightly, this entire freedom presupposes a proper freedom from necessity. For only a person who is free in acting has the capacity for proper servitude, guilt, punishment, command, or obligation. For this reason, just as a proper privation presupposes an aptitude, so also servitude and obligation presuppose a person apt for operating with indifference and without necessity. But since operations free from necessity can be under the right of another or under some burden and obligation, therefore the necessity of servitude and of obligation can exist in works along with freedom from necessity. Or, what comes to the same thing, someone can be deprived through law or servitude of the freedom that is contrary to them, and yet retain the proper freedom of works.

4. What is coerced is almost the same thing as what is subject to the violent, for each goes against the internal appetite of the patient or of the one operating. But violent is said more generally of any motion contrary to appetite, whether elicited or innate, whereas [a motion] is properly called coerced when it is in conflict with an elicited and vi-

The coerced  
almost the  
same as the  
violent.

130 soleant voces illae confundi. Duo ergo ad coac- 125R  
 tum requiruntur, scilicet, ut ex necessitate fiat, vel  
 sustineatur, et quod sit contra internum affectum;  
 Aristoteles. et ita coactio est quaedam necessitas, et aliquid ul-  
 135 *ab extrinseco, passo non conferente vim*, id est, re- 130R  
 sistente aliquo modo, ut omnes exponunt ex eodem  
 Aristotele 2. Ethicorum ad Eudemum cap. 8. quia  
 140 si passum non resistat, motio non erit violenta, eti- 135R  
 amsi ab extrinseco proveniat. Coactum ergo, ut tale  
 est, non potest esse ab intrinseco, alioqui non es-  
 set contra propriam inclinationem, si autem est ab  
 extrinseco, eo ipso necessarium est, quia libertas  
 145 a necessitate non est in patiando, sed in agendo, 140R  
 ut infra probabo: ob hanc ergo causam et coactum  
 includit necessarium, et quod non est a coactione  
 liberum, ut tale est, non potest esse a necessitate  
 150 immune. Propter alias vero conditiones non conver- 145R  
 titur coactum cum necessario, multa enim neces-  
 saria sunt, quae contra internum appetitum non  
 sunt, imo ex illo saepe nascuntur. Et ob eandem rati-  
 onem libertas necessitatem excludens universalior  
 est libertate soli coactioni opposita: nam omnis lib-  
 155 ertas a necessitate est etiam a coactione exempta, 150R  
 non vero e contrario, ut per se notum est; dilectio  
 enim Dei in patria a coactione libera est, non tamen  
 a necessitate.

5. Libertas ergo a sola coactione tantum requirit  
 160 carentiam violentiae, ita ut motio, quae sic libera dic- 155R  
 itur, contra internum appetitum <3> non sit, sive  
 ex necessitate fiat, sive non. Talis autem motio, si  
 sit voluntatis, dicenda est potius voluntaria, quam  
 libera. Hae namque duae proprietates in actibus  
 voluntatis distinctae sunt, et ideo nominibus etiam 160R

tal appetite, although sometimes those terms are confused.  
 Two things, therefore, are required for coerced motion: that  
 it comes to be or be endured of necessity, and that it be  
 contrary to an internal affect. And thus coercion is a kind  
 of necessity and adds something to it. Both are gathered  
 from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 1, where he says:  
 ‘the violent is from something extrinsic, without the patient  
 contributing force’, that is, without resisting in some way,  
 as everyone explains it in accordance with what the same  
 Aristotle says in *Eudemian Ethics* II, ch. 8. For if what is  
 suffered is not resisted, the motion will not be violent even  
 if it arises from something extrinsic. The coerced, therefore,  
 insofar as it is such cannot be from something intrinsic. Oth-  
 erwise, it would not be contrary to one’s own inclination. But  
 if it is from something extrinsic, it is by that fact necessary.  
 For freedom from necessity is not found in undergoing but  
 in acting, as I will prove below. For this reason, therefore,  
 the coerced includes necessity, and what is not free of coer-  
 cion, insofar as it is such, cannot be exempt from necessity.  
 But on account of other conditions the coerced is not inter-  
 changeable with the necessary. For there are many things  
 that are necessary that are not contrary to internal appetite.  
 In fact, necessary things often arise from internal appetite.  
 For the same reason freedom that excludes necessity is more  
 universal than freedom that is opposed to coercion alone.  
 For every freedom from necessity is also exempt from coer-  
 cion, but not the other way around, as is known *per se*. For  
 the love for God in the afterlife is free from coercion, yet not  
 free from necessity.

5. Therefore, freedom from coercion alone only requires  
 the absence of violence in such a way that a motion that is  
 called free in this way is not contrary to internal appetite,  
 whether or not it happens by necessity. But such a motion,  
 assuming it is of the will, should be called voluntary rather  
 than free. For these two properties in acts of the will are  
 distinct and so they should also be distinguished by names,

Aristotle.

165 sunt distinguendae, ne verborum ambiguitas dispu-  
 tationem reddat incertam. Potest ergo esse actus  
 hominis voluntarius, ac subinde a coactione liber,  
 qui tamen simpliciter liber a necessitate non sit,  
 ut in amore, quo Deus se amat, et quo Spiritum  
 170 Sanctum producit, et quo beati diligunt Deum, et in  
 actibus indeliberatis voluntatis, et in affectibus ap-  
 petitus sentientis videre licet. Ratioque satis constat  
 ex dictis; his adiunctis, quae de ratione voluntarii  
 Aristoteles et D. Thomas tradiderunt. Voluntarium  
 175 enim dicitur, quod est ab interno principio cum  
 cognitione, quae ratio tota potest in actu reperiri,  
 quamvis ex necessitate fiat, quia sola necessitas non  
 excludit cognitionem, nec conformitatem cum ap-  
 180 petitu innato, vel elicito. Unde etiam ortum habuit  
 communis illa Theologorum doctrina, voluntati in  
 actibus elicitis non posse vim, aut coactionem in-  
 ferri, etiamsi necessitatem pati possit. Nam coactio  
 excludit voluntarium, illi enim directe opponitur,  
 non potest autem actus esse a voluntate, et non  
 185 esse voluntarius, quia non potest non esse a prin-  
 cipio intrinseco cum cognitione, nec potest simul  
 esse voluntarius, et coactus, quia haec duo oppo-  
 nuntur, et immediatam contradictionem involvunt;  
 necessitas autem non involvit illam oppositionem  
 190 cum voluntario, quia necessitas ipsa potest esse vol-  
 untaria, seu interno appetitui conformis, ut dictum  
 est.

6. Duo autem in hoc sunt, quoad modum lo-  
 quendi, advertenda, quoniam ad intelligendas sen-  
 195 tentias Patrum erunt necessaria. Unum est coac-  
 tionem duplicem esse, unam simpliciter, quae ab-  
 solutam, et inevitabilem necessitatem contra inter-  
 num affectum infert: alia secundum quid, qualis  
 est, quae per poenas, vel timores fit, quae non ab-  
 200 solutam necessitatem, sed secundum quid, scilicet,

lest an ambiguity in words render the discussion uncertain. It is possible, therefore, for an act of a human being to be voluntary and thereby free from coercion that, nevertheless, is strictly speaking not free of necessity. One can see this in the love by which God loves himself and by which he produces the Holy Spirit and in the love with which the blessed love God, as well as in undeliberated acts of the will and in the affects of an appetite of someone who is sensing. The reason is sufficiently clear from what has been said, along with these additional points made by Aristotle and St. Thomas about the *ratio* of the voluntary. For something is called voluntary that comes from an internal principle together with cognition. That whole *ratio* can be found in an act even though it comes to be by necessity, since necessity alone excludes neither cognition nor conformity to an innate or elicited appetite. Here, also, is the source for that doctrine common among the theologians that force or coercion cannot be inflicted on the will in the case of elicited acts even if it can suffer necessity. For coercion excludes the voluntary, since it is directly opposed to that, but an act cannot be from the will and not be voluntary, since it cannot fail to be from an intrinsic principle together with cognition. Nor can it simultaneously be voluntary and coerced, since these two are opposed and involve an immediate contradiction. Necessity, however, does not involve that opposition to the voluntary, since necessity itself can be voluntary or conform to an internal appetite, as was said.

6. But two things should be noticed in this regarding the way of speaking, since they will be necessary for understanding the views of the Fathers. One is that coercion is of two kinds. One is coercion *simpliciter*, which imposes an absolute and inevitable necessity against an internal affection. The other is coercion *secundum quid*, which is the kind that comes from punishments and fears. They do not introduce an absolute necessity but only a qualified necessity

Aristotle, *EN*  
 V, ch. 1.  
 St. Thomas,  
*ST IaIIae.6.1.*

Two things  
 necessary for  
 understanding  
 the Fathers  
 with respect to  
 the way of  
 speaking.  
 First.

ad vitandum tale incommodum, inducit. Prior ergo  
 coactio est, quae omnino repugnat actui elicito vol-  
 untatis, quia eo ipso quod est elicitus, iam non  
 est coactus, posterior autem coactio esse potest  
 205 cum absoluta voluntate, imo et cum libertate, cum 200R  
 absolutam necessitatem non inducat, et ideo licet  
 interdum coactio, aut violentia vocetur, ut patet  
 Augustinus. ex Augustino lib. 1. contra Gau- <col. b> den-  
 210 tium cap. 25. et epistola 48. simpliciter, et abso- 205R  
 lute coactio non est, sed alicuius mali prohibitio, ut  
 dixit idem Augustinus lib. 2. contra litteras Petilianus  
 cap. 83.

7. Aliud animadvertendum est, interdum volun-  
 tarium actum ita esse necessarium simpliciter, ut  
 ipsa necessitas ab intrinseco sit, ac subinde con- 210R  
 formis sit inclinationi, et perfectioni naturali ipsius  
 voluntatis, et tunc actus licet sit necessarius ita  
 est voluntarius, ut nullo modo dici possit violentus,  
 vel coactus, quia nullo modo repugnat interno  
 220 appetitui, neque elicito, quia actus, ut supponitur, 215R  
 voluntarius est, nec innato, quia ipsa necessitas  
 non est etiam voluntati, eiusve innatae inclinationi  
 contraria, ut supponitur. Et hoc modo amor Dei  
 225 in beatis est necessarius sine ullo genere coactio- 220R  
 nis, aut violentiae, et affectus appetitus sentientis  
 possunt in eodem ordine poni propter eandem rationem.  
 Aliquando vero actus voluntarius potest  
 esse necessarius tantum ab extrinseco efficiente,  
 seu quasi impellente, et tunc licet actus sit vol-  
 230 untarius, et ideo non possit dici absolute coactus, 225R  
 nihilominus cum necessitas ipsa non sit conformis  
 naturali conditioni, et inclinationi voluntatis, eo  
 quod sit tantum ab extrinseco, actus sic necessarius  
 235 interdum solet aliquo modo violentus dici, saltem 230R  
 secundum quid, quia est contra modum connatu-  
 ralem, et contra quemdam innatum appetitum. Et

(*secundum quid*), namely, in order to avoid some disadvantage. The former, therefore, is the coercion that is entirely repugnant to an elicited act of the will, since the very fact that it is elicited makes it not coerced. But the latter kind of coercion is compatible with an absolute willing, in fact, even with freedom, since it does not introduce an absolute necessity. For this reason, although it is sometimes called coercion or violence, as is clear from Augustine, *Against Gaudentius* I, ch. 25, and Letter 48, it is not, strictly speaking and absolutely, coercion. Rather, it is a prohibition of [doing] some evil, as Augustine also said in *Against the Letters of Petilianus* II, ch. 83.

Augustine.

7. The other thing that should be noted is that sometimes a voluntary act is necessary *simpliciter* in such a way that the necessity itself is from something intrinsic and so it is conformed to the inclination and to the natural perfection of the will itself. In this case the act, although it is necessary, is voluntary in such a way that it can in no way be called coerced or violent, since it is in no way repugnant to an internal appetite. It is not repugnant either to an elicited appetite because the act, as it is being imagined, is voluntary, or to an innate appetite because the necessity itself is also not contrary to the will or to its innate inclination as it is being imagined. In this way the love for God in the blessed is necessary without any kind of coercion or violence. The affected appetites of someone sensing can also be placed in the same order for the same reason.

The second point that should be observed.

But sometimes a voluntary act can be necessary only from an extrinsic [principle] effecting or, as it were, impelling [the will to act]. In this case, although the act is voluntary and for that reason cannot be called absolutely coerced, nevertheless, since the necessity itself is not conformed to the natural condition and inclination of the will as a result of the fact that the necessity is only from an extrinsic [principle], an act necessary in this way is sometimes wont to be called violent in some way, at least *secundum quid*. For it is con-

hoc modo necessitas immissa voluntati in actibus de se liberis vocari solet a Patribus coactio quaedam, et e converso actus simpliciter liber vocari solet spontaneus, et voluntarius, utique perfecte, et extrinsecam necessitatem interno appetitui, seu inclinationi voluntatis repugnantem excludens.

Liberum a necessitate dici solet et de facultate operandi absque necessitate, et de ipsa actione. Augustinus.

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8. Liberum ergo in praesenti vocatur, quod a necessitate liberum est: dici autem solet et de facultate operandi absque necessitate, et de ipsa actione. Priori modo denominatur arbitrium liberum, quod dicitur esse *facultas voluntatis, et rationis*, utique ad operandum cum indifferentia, et dominio actionis, ita ut in manu eius sit velle, aut nolle exercere, vel sustinere actionem. De quo dixit Augustinus lib. 2. de Peccatorum meritis et remissione cap. 18. *Esse voluntatis arbitrium, quod huc, atque illuc liberum flectitur, atque in eis naturalibus bonis est, quibus homo bene, et male uti potest.* Atque in hoc sensu de fide certum est, hominem esse hoc modo natura sua liberum, seu habere aliquam facultatem a necessitate liberam in operibus suis, non solum naturalibus, sed etiam supernaturalibus, ut aperte definit Concilium Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 5. et can. 5. et 9. et Scripturis, et rationibus probat late Augustinus lib. de Gratia et libero arbitrio, et latius moderni de hac materia scribentes, et nos brevius in lib. 1. de Auxilio a principio. Praecipue vero videri possunt eruditae disputationes Cardinalis Bellarmini in tota controversia de Gratia et libero arbitrio cum Praefatione.

Concilium Tridentinum.

Bellarmini.

Unde liber actus denominetur.

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9. Hinc etiam actus, qui ab hac facultate libera procedit, liber denominatur: oportet autem, ut ab illa, ut indifferens est, procedat. Non enim defuerunt aliqui moderni Catholici, qui negaverint ad

trary to a connatural mode and contrary to a certain innate appetite. And in this way the necessity put into the will in the case of acts that are free of themselves is customarily called a kind of coercion by the Fathers. Conversely, an act that is free *simpliciter* is usually called spontaneous and voluntary, at any rate perfectly so, and excluding the extrinsic necessity repugnant to the internal appetite or inclination of the will.

8. Therefore, at present that is called free which is free from necessity. Moreover, it is customarily said both of the faculty operating apart from necessity and of the action itself. In the former way freewill is denominated, which is said to be *a faculty of the will and of reason*, at least when operating with indifference and with dominion over the action so that it is in one's hands either to will or not to will to exercise or to undergo the action. In *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins II*, ch. 18, Augustine said about this: 'It is the decision of the will, which is freely turned to this or to that, and has its place among those natural goods which a human being can use well or badly'. In this sense it is certain in the faith that human beings by their nature are free in this way or have some faculty free from necessity in their works, not only in their natural works but also their supernatural works. The Council of Trent clearly settles this in the Sixth Session (ch. 5 and canons 5 and 9). Augustine proves it thoroughly from Scripture and by arguments in *On Grace and Freewill*, and the moderns even more thoroughly when writing about this subject. We dealt with it more briefly in the beginning of Book I of *De auxilio*. But the erudite *Disputations* of Cardinal Bellarmine may especially be consulted in the whole controversy about grace and freewill along with the preface.

Free from necessity is customarily said both of a faculty acting without necessity and of the action itself. Augustine.

Council of Trent.

Bellarmino.

Whence a free act is denominated.

libertatem actus esse necessariam indifferentiam, seu carentiam necessitatis, sed satis esse carentiam coactionis: sed haec sententia reprobata est inter assertiones Michaelis Baii assert. 39. et 41. et  
 275 in lib. 3. ex professo refutabitur. Ut ergo actus sit vere liber, non satis est, quod sit voluntarius, seu non coactus, sed etiam ut non sit necessarius simpliciter, ac proinde, ut procedat a potentia libera, ut indifferentiam, et libertatem retineat, ut  
 280 in ipso usu, et exercitio libera, et integra potestate sua sinatur operari, ita ut in manu eius sit inter contraria, vel contradictoria eligere, vel operari, aut non operari. Quia ut actus sit liber, necessarium est, ut procedat a facultate libera, ut libera est; non  
 285 procedet autem a potentia libera, ut talis est, nisi expeditam habeat suam facultatem quoad utramque partem, utique operandi, et non operandi. Quid enim proderit ad libertatem talis actus, quod potentia innatam habeat indifferentiam, si in ipso usu  
 290 impediatur? Quapropter supposita distinctione data de duplici necessitate, altera ab intrinseco per naturalem determinationem potentiae ad unum; alia ab extrinseco per impulsum alicuius extrinseci agentis: prior repugnat non solum actui, sed etiam facultati liberi arbitrii, et ideo fieri non potest, ut potentia libera tali necessitati subdita sit respectu eiusdem obiecti, quia contradictionem involvit, ut per se notum est. Posterior autem necessitas non repugnat facultati liberae, ut nunc suppono, ut paulo post probabo, repugnat autem actui libero, quia, ut talis sit, oportet, ut procedat a potentia, ut libera, vel quoad specificationem, vel saltem quoad exercitium, iuxta modum, quo actus liber fuerit, quia non habet, quod sit liber, nisi per denominationem a suo proximo principio. At vero si actus procedat <col. b> a potentia necessitatem patiente, sive per intrinse-

of necessity is necessary for freedom of action, but say that the absence of coercion is enough. But this view was among Michael Baius's condemned assertions (assertions 39 and 41) and will be refuted *ex professo* in Book III. Therefore, in order for an act to be truly free, it is not enough that it is voluntary or not coerced, but it must also not be strictly necessary, and, accordingly, it must proceed from a free power that retains its indifference and freedom and that in its very use and exercise it be allowed to operate with its free and undiminished power, so that it is in its hands to choose between contraries or contradictories, either to act or not to act. For in order for an act to be free it is necessary that it proceed from a free faculty insofar as it is free. But an act will not proceed from a free power insofar as it is such unless it has its faculty unencumbered with respect to either part, at least with respect to acting and to not acting. For of what advantage to the freedom of such an act is a power that has an innate indifference if that indifference is impeded in that use?

Therefore, assuming the distinction given between two kinds of necessity—one from an intrinsic [principle] through a natural determination of the power to one object, the other from an extrinsic [principle] through the impulse of some extrinsic agent—the former is repugnant not only to the act but also to the faculty of freewill. Therefore, it cannot happen that a power subjected to such necessity is free with respect to the same object, since that involves a contradiction, as is known *per se*. But the latter necessity is not repugnant to a free faculty, as I assume for now and as I will prove a little later, but it is repugnant to free acts. For in order for an act to be free, it is necessary that it proceed from a power insofar as it is free, either with respect to specification or at least with respect to exercise, according to the mode by which the act will be free. For an act does not have what it takes to be free except through denomination from its proximate principle. On the other hand, if the act proceeds

Which necessity is repugnant to an act of freewill and its faculty and which one is not.

Quae necessitas repugnet actui liberi arbitrii eiusque facultati: quaeve non.

310 cam necessitatem potentiae determinatae ad unum,  
 sive per extrinsecam necessitatem immissam poten- 305R  
 tiae de se liberae, iam impeditur, et tollitur libertas  
 actus; ita ut liber dici non possit, nec laude, vel vitu-  
 perio dignus, quia non procedit a potentia, ut libera  
 est, nam ipsa non valet necessitatem illam auferre,  
 vel praevenire, et ideo non potest illi imputari, quod 310R  
 tali modo, et non alio operetur. Quam doctrinam  
 Tridentinum. 315 satis clare docuit Concilium Tridentinum loco citato,  
 et necessaria omnino est ad salvanda omnia, quae  
 de humanis actionibus, earumque libertate Scrip-  
 tura docet. Ideoque censeo in hoc puncto non esse 315R  
 320 dissensionem inter Catholicos, licet in modo expli-  
 candi, et defendendi hanc libertatem possit esse  
 aliqua diversitas.

from a power suffering necessity, either through the intrinsic  
 necessity of a power determined to one object or through  
 an extrinsic necessity imposed on a power free of itself, the  
 freedom of the act is already prevented or removed. Thus  
 the act cannot be called free and does not merit praise or  
 blame. For it does not proceed from a power insofar as it  
 is free, since it does not prevail to remove or forestall that  
 necessity. And for this reason it cannot be held responsible  
 for acting in that way and not in another way. This doctrine  
 is taught clearly enough by the Council of Trent in the cited  
 place. Furthermore, it is entirely necessary to preserve all  
 the things that Scripture teaches about human actions and  
 their freedom. Therefore, I think that there is no dissension  
 about this point among Catholics, although there can be  
 some diversity in the way this freedom is explained and  
 defended.

Council of  
Trent.