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<867, col. b><sup>2</sup>

DISPUTATIO XLVIII.

*De actione.*

Aristoteles. 1. De sex ultimis generibus accidentium perpauca docuit  
5 Aristoteles, tam in Dialectica, quam in *Metaphysica*: sola  
enim eorum numeratione contentus fuit. Immo in 5. *Meta-*  
5R *physicae* cap. 7. ita ea numerat, ut habitum, et situm omittat:  
Commentator. ubi Commentator com. 14. ait: *Tacuit praedicamenta situs et*  
*habitus propter abbreviationem sermonis, vel quia latent.* De  
10 aliis vero quatuor multa sumi possunt ex Aristotele in libris  
*Physicorum*: nam de actione et passione agit in tertio, de tem-  
pore et loco in quarto. Hic vero a nobis tractanda sunt latius  
et abstractius, prout ratio Metaphysica postulat. Et quamvis  
de his praedicamentis generatim tractari soleat, an sint abso-  
lutum quid, vel respectivum, aut mixtum ex utroque, et an  
15 sint res vel modi distincti a reliquis, tamen haec melius ex-  
plicabuntur in singulis horum praedicamentorum, quia ex-  
istimamus nullam esse realem rationem communem his om-  
nibus praedicamentis, et illis solis, de qua possint illae com-  
munes quaestiones tractari: est autem res valde confusa et  
20 operosa de rebus distinctis ut distinctae sunt aliquid commu-  
niter disputare, propter hanc solam extrinsecam denomina-  
tionem qua haec genera dicta sunt sex ultima praedicamenta.  
2. Igitur de actione, quam semper Aristoteles primo  
loco numerat inter haec, multa dicta sunt a nobis in supe-  
rioribus, cum de causa efficiente ageremus. Nam, cum actio  
25

Cur de actione  
ante alia sermo  
sit.

DISPUTATIO XLVIII.

*On action.*

1. Aristotle says very little about the last six genera of accidents, whether  
in the logical works or in *Metaphysics*, for he was content with merely enu-  
merating them. Indeed, in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 7, he omits having and po-  
5R sition when enumerating them. Here the Commentator says in com. 14:  
‘He passes over position and having in silence because of the brevity of the  
discussion or because they escaped his notice’. But concerning the other  
four, more can be gathered from Aristotle in the *Physics*, for he deals with  
action and passion in the third book and with time and place in the fourth  
10R book. But we will here discuss them more broadly and abstractly as the  
metaphysical notion [of them] requires.  
Although usually these [last six] categories are treated generally  
(whether they are something absolute or respective or a mixture of both,  
15R and whether they are things or modes distinct from the rest of the cat-  
egories), these issues will be better explained in each of these categories  
individually. For we think that there is no real common *ratio* for all and  
only these categories about which these common questions can be dis-  
cussed. To dispute something generally about distinct things insofar as  
they are distinct is, moreover, a very confusing and laborious matter, on  
20R account of this only extrinsic denomination by which these mentioned  
genera are the last six categories.  
2. About action, then, which Aristotle always lists in the first place  
among these six categories, we have already said a good deal in earlier  
25R sections when dealing with the efficient cause.<sup>3</sup> For, since action is the

Aristotle.

Commentator.

Why action is  
discussed before  
the others.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in vol. 26 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>DM XVII–XXII are about the efficient cause.

Actio unum entis  
genus.

30 sit causalitas causae efficientis, ut ibi diximus, necessarium  
fuit de actione dicere quidquid ad intelligendam causalitatem  
illius causae fuit necessarium. Sumendum ergo hic est ex  
ibi dictis, actionem esse aliquid in rerum natura, contentum  
in latitudine entis, et ex natura rei distinctum a re quae per  
illam fit; quae cum ibi sint satis probata, hic repetere non  
est necesse, quamquam necessarium saepe erit haec iterum  
atque iterum inculcare. Et ex his etiam supponimus ut cer-  
35 tum, actionem esse quid distinctum a caeteris praedicamen-  
tis, praeterquam a passione, de qua, et de distinctione inter il-  
las dicemus disputatione sequenti; et a quando; de quo est pe-  
culiaris difficultas communis omnibus praedicamentis, quo-  
modo distinguatur ab illis, quam in suum locum reservamus,  
et a relatione, quod infra tractandum est, quia aliqua <868>  
40 declaratione indiget. De caeteris vero res est clara, nam ad  
substantiam, quantitatem, qualitatem, et ubi comparatur ac-  
tio, ut ad terminos suos; et ideo probata distinctione actionis  
a termino, probata est distinctio ab his praedicamentis: cum  
habitu vero et situ nullam habet similitudinem, nedum iden-  
45 titatem: quod si illa considerentur quatenus per actionem  
aliquo modo fieri possunt, erit eadem distinctio actionis ab  
his, quae est ab aliis terminis. His ergo suppositis superest,  
ut distinctius explicemus communem essentiam actionis, et  
causas ac principia eius, ac deinde divisiones eius tradamus,  
50 singula membra declarando, quantum intra limites obiecti  
Metaphysicae continentur.

#### SECTIO 1.

*Utrum actio essentialiter dicat respectum ad principium agendi.*

Quae ratio  
dubium possit  
ingerere.

1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia actio essentialiter videtur dicere  
55 respectum ad agens, sine quo nec intelligi potest, nec a pas-  
sione distingui. In contrarium autem est, quia si relatio con-

<sup>4</sup>*DM XLVIII.10.*

<sup>5</sup>*DM XLVIII.10.8.*

30R causality of an efficient cause, as we said there,<sup>4</sup> it was necessary to say  
about action whatever was necessary for understanding the causality of  
that cause. We should assume here, then, from among the things said  
there, that action is something *in rerum natura*, contained in the breadth  
of being, and *ex natura rei* distinct from the thing that comes about  
through it.<sup>5</sup> Since these claims were sufficiently proven there, it is not  
necessary to go over that here, although it will often be necessary to drive  
them home again and again.

35R And from these we also assume as certain that action is something dis-  
tinct from the other categories, except from passion (we will speak about  
passion and the distinction between passion and action in the following  
disputation), from when (concerning which there is a special difficulty  
common to all the categories—how it is distinguished from them—which  
we reserve for its place), and from relation (which is to be discussed be-  
40R low, since it requires a certain explanation). But the matter is clear with  
respect to the other categories, for action is related to substance, quantity,  
quality, and place as to its termini. For that reason, proving that action  
is distinct from its terminus is to prove that it is distinct from these cate-  
gories. And since having and position have no similarity to action, much  
45R less do they have identity. But if these were considered insofar as they  
can be brought about in some way through action, they will be distinct  
from action in the same way that action is distinct from its other termini.  
Assuming these points, what remains is to explain more distinctly the  
common essence of action, its causes and principles, and finally to discuss  
50R the divisions of action by explaining the individual members insofar as  
they are contained within the boundaries of the object of metaphysics.

#### SECTION 1.

*Whether action essentially expresses a respect to the principle of acting.*

1. The reason for doubting is that an action seems essentially to express  
55R a respect to an agent, without which it is unintelligible and cannot be  
distinguished from passion. But to the contrary, for if relation constitutes

Action is one  
genus of being.

What argument  
could force a  
doubt.

stituit speciale genus praedicamentale, non potest in essentia alterius praedicamenti includi.

*Divisio relationis in extrinsecus, et intrinsecus advenientem expenditur.*

2. Hoc loco tractanda nobis ex professo est opinio Scoti distinguentis relationem, in extrinsecus et intrinsecus advenientem, quam supra in hunc locum remisimus. Illas relationes vocat intrinsecus advenientes quae necessario consurgunt positis fundamento et termino; et ideo vocat intrinsecus advenientes, quia quasi intrinsece pullulant positis fundamento et termino. Et hos respectus dicit esse posse proprias relationes quae constituunt praedicamentum Ad aliquid. Respectus autem extrinsecus advenientes appellat eos, qui non necessario sequuntur ex positione alicuius fundamenti et termini, ut est actio, in qua versamur, nam posito igne et ligno non statim insurgit intrinsece respectus actionis, quia possunt non esse applicata, vel potest esse interiectum obstaculum quod actionem impediatur. Immo etiam positus omnibus requisitis, et ablatis omnibus impedimentis, stat non sequi actionem, ut patet in agente li- <col. b> bero, et in agente etiam naturali posset id accidere de potentia absoluta, secluso solo Dei concursu. Hoc autem non potest accidere in relationibus intrinsecus advenientibus; et ideo merito vocantur illi respectus, extrinsecus advenientes, tum ut a prioribus distinguantur, tum etiam quia si non pullulant intime ex fundamento, necesse est ut illi extrinsecus adveniant. Et de his respectibus ait Scotus, nec pertinere ad praedicamentum ad Aliquid, nec constituere unum aliquod praedicamentum, sed plura: cuius rei nullam reddit rationem, sed solum auctoritatem eorum qui decem praedicamenta distinxerunt. Potest autem reddi, quia priores relationes sicut conveniunt in modo resultandi ex fundamento et termino, ita habent communem quamdam et univocam rationem relationis, et

a special categorical genus, then it cannot be included in the essence of another category.

*The division of relations into extrinsically occurring and intrinsically occurring.*

2. The opinion of Scotus in distinguishing between extrinsically occurring and intrinsically occurring relations—which we earlier left for now<sup>6</sup>—needs to be discussed explicitly here. Those relations are called intrinsically occurring that arise necessarily once the foundation and terminus have been posited. They are called intrinsically occurring because they grow out intrinsically, as it were, once the foundation and terminus have been posited. Scotus says that these respects can be the proper relations that constitute the genus toward something (*ad aliquid*). Moreover, he labels those respects extrinsically occurring that do not necessarily follow from the placing of some foundation and terminus. Action—our object now—is an example, for a respect of action does not intrinsically arise at once from positing fire and wood, since they might not have been put into contact or some obstacle might have been put between them that blocked the action. In fact, even positing all the requisites and removing all impediments, it is still not the case that the action follows. This is clear in the case of free agents, but even in the case of natural agents this could happen by [God’s] absolute power merely by removing God’s concurrence. This cannot, however, happen in the case of intrinsically occurring relations. And for this reason the second kind are rightly called respects that are extrinsically occurring, both as distinguished from the former kind and also because if they do not grow out from within the foundation, they necessarily occur extrinsically to it.

Scotus says about extrinsically occurring respects that they do not belong to the category toward something, nor do they constitute some one category, but multiple ones. He provides no argument for this, but only the authority of those who distinguished ten categories. An argument can be provided, however, since the first kind of relations so converge in the way that they result from the foundation and terminus that they have a certain common and univocal *ratio* of relation—they do not have any

Descriptions of each kind of relation according to Scotus.

Utriusque relationis descriptio secundum Scotum.

<sup>6</sup>*DM XLVII.4.12*. Footnote 11 in Doyle’s translation of this text usefully cites some of the relevant passages from Scotus.

non habent aliud munus nisi referre, et ideo illae consti-  
tuunt speciale praedicamentum relationis. At vero posteri-  
ores relationes, sicut adveniunt extrinsecus, ita variis modis  
35 et ad varia munera conferuntur: ideoque et habent modum  
omnino diversum a prioribus relationibus, et inter eas sunt  
etiam varia genera primo diversa.

3. Hanc sententiam ex professo tractat Scotus in 4. dist.  
13. q. 1. §. *ad huius autem*, et eamdem tetigit dist. 6. q. 10. et  
40 in 3. dist. 11. q. 1. Iuxta quam docet actionem esse quem-  
dam respectum extrinsecus advenientem. Et fundamentum  
eius esse potest, quia actio dicit respectum realem ad agens,  
ut prima ratio dubitandi ostendit, et non dicit relationem  
praedicamentalem, ut probat posterior ratio dubitandi: ergo  
45 dicit respectum alterius rationis, qui optime declaratur illa  
voce *extrinsecus advenientis*, ut supra declaratum est. Nec  
satisfaciet qui dixerit, actionem dicere respectum secundum  
dici, quia actio et passio non tantum distinguuntur secun-  
dum dici aut significari, sed in ipsa ratione formali signifi-  
50 cata; et non distinguuntur nisi in respectu: ergo ille respectus  
non est tantum secundum dici, quia ut supra dictum est, esse  
respectum secundum dici, non est esse respectum, sed sig-  
nificari ad modum respectus: est ergo respectus secundum  
esse. Et confirmatur, nam de intrinseca ratione actionis est  
55 ut sit emanatio et causalitas agentis: unde essentialiter est  
quid medians inter agens et effectum, ab utroque pendens, et  
constituens inter illa veluti oppositionem quamdam, sed hoc  
solum est de ratione respectus secundum esse, ergo. <869>

*Quomodo Scoti sententia ab aliis impugnetur.*

4. Hanc vero Scoti sententiam primum impugnant Thomis-  
tae quoad illam generalem distinctionem relationum in in-  
trinsecus et extrinsecus advenientes, ut videre licet in Her-  
vaeo, *Quodlibet* 7. q. 14. Soncinate 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 39. et  
Soto in *Praedicamentis* cap. de Ad aliquid, et 5. *Physicorum*

Hervaeus.  
Soncinas.

<sup>7</sup>See *DM XLVII*.4.10.

<sup>8</sup>For Suárez on relations according to being said, see *DM XLVII*.3.6–9.

<sup>9</sup>*DM XLVII*.3.8.

function (*munus*) other than to refer<sup>7</sup>—and for this reason they constitute  
a special category of relation. The latter kind of relations, on the other  
hand, just as they occur extrinsically, so they are also conferred in dif-  
ferent ways and for different functions. For this reason they also have a  
45R mode completely different from the first kind of relations and are even  
themselves divided into utterly different genera.

3. Scotus explicitly discusses this view in IV, dist. 13, q. 1, *§ad huius  
autem*, and touches on it in IV, dist. 6, q. 10, and in III, dist. 11, q. 1. Ac-  
40R cording to this he teaches that action is a kind of extrinsically occurring  
respect. The foundation for this view can be that action expresses a real  
respect to the agent (as the first reason for doubting showed) but does not  
express a categorical relation (as the second reason for doubting proved).  
Therefore, it expresses a respect of a different *ratio*, which is best indi-  
45R cated by the term ‘extrinsically occurring’, as was explained above. Nor  
does it satisfy if someone says that action expresses a respect according to  
being said (*secundum dici*),<sup>8</sup> since action and passion are not distinguished  
merely according to being said or being signified, but in the formal *ratio*  
that is signified itself. Nor are they distinguished other than by a respect.  
50R Therefore, that respect is not merely according to being said. For, as we  
said earlier,<sup>9</sup> to be a respect according to being said is not to be a respect;  
rather, it is to be signified in the way a respect is signified. Therefore, [the  
respect that distinguishes an action] is a respect according to being.

It is confirmed: for it belongs to the intrinsic *ratio* of an action to  
be the emanation and causality of an agent. Hence, it essentially is that  
which mediates between the agent and the effect, depending on both and  
constituting a kind of opposition, as it were, between them. But this only  
55R belongs to the *ratio* of a respect according to being. Therefore.

*How Scotus’s view is attacked by others.*

4. But the Thomists attack this view of Scotus’s first with respect to that  
general distinction between intrinsically occurring and extrinsically oc-  
curring relations, as may be seen in Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* 7, q. 14; Sonci-  
45R nas, *Metaphysics* V, q. 39; and Soto in *Categories* in the chapter on [the cat-  
egory] toward something, and in *Physics* V, q. 2, art. 2. The primary rea-

Hervaeus.  
Soncinas.

q. 2. art. 2. Et praecipua ratio impugnationis est, quia si isti respectus extrinsecus advenientes, sunt veri respectus secundum esse, ut Scotus supponere videtur, essentialiter et univoce conveniunt in ratione respectus ad aliud: nam sola differentia in modo originis seu productionis aut resultantiae, quamquam indicet aliquam diversitatem essentialem, non tamen impedit, immo supponit convenientiam aliquam communem et essentialem, quam oportet esse univocam, quia nulla ibi est ratio analogiae: erunt ergo omnes hae relationes eiusdem generis, et consequenter eiusdem praedicamenti: Neque enim reddi potest ratio, cur illae differentiae, cum essentialia sint, non sint verae differentiae, cum ipsae non sint relationes: alioqui etiam posset quis dicere relationem mutuam et non mutuam, et similes distingui praedicamento.

5. In qua impugnatione statim occurrit difficultas, quia simili ratione probabitur, relationes transcendentales non esse veros respectus secundum esse, aut pertinere ad praedicamentum relationis; cum tamen in superioribus ostendimus, non posse negari, hos respectus transcendentales esse veros, et secundum esse. Et quidem, si Scotus per relationes extrinsecus advenientes non intellexisset nisi respectus transcendentales, non esset cum eo multum contendendum de nomine relationis extrinsecus advenientis, etiamsi ab illo merito cavendum sit, ut statim dicam: nam quod ad rem atinet, non possumus negare respectus transcendentales, tum in aliis rebus, ut in discursu praecedentis disputationis, et totius metaphysicae visum est, tum etiam in actione, ut iam ostendam. Neque contra hoc vim habet dicta impugnatione, quia conceptus ipse respectus transcendentalis, transcendentalis est, et omnia entia percurrit, praesertim creata, quod magis indubitatum est de entibus incompletis ac imperfectis:

<sup>10</sup>The horn taken by at least some Thomists.

<sup>11</sup>*DM XLVII.3.11.*

<sup>12</sup>*DM XLVII.*

9 et] *om.* V.

15 ibi est] est ibi V.

son for the objection is that if these extrinsically occurring respects were true respects according to being, as Scotus seems to suppose, they would essentially and univocally fit the *ratio* of a respect to something else. For a difference in the mode of origin or production or resulting only, although it indicates some essential difference, does not, nevertheless, stand in the way [of these extrinsically occurring respects being respects univocally with other respects]. In fact, it presupposes some common and essential agreement that must be univocal since there is no *ratio* of analogy here. All these relations, therefore, will belong to the same genus and, consequently, to the same category. For neither can any reason be given why those differences, since they are essential, would not be true differences, since they are not themselves relations. Otherwise, someone might also say that mutual and non-mutual relations and other similar cases divide into different categories.

5. There is immediately a difficulty with this objection, since an analogous argument would prove that transcendental relations either are not true respects according to being<sup>10</sup> or belong to the category of relation. But, nevertheless, we showed in earlier sections<sup>11</sup> that it cannot be denied that these transcendental respects are true and according to being. Indeed, if Scotus had not understood anything other than transcendental respects by ‘extrinsically occurring relations’, there would not be much need to contend with him over the name ‘extrinsically occurring relations’, even if one should rightly be cautious with him, as I will now say. For as far as the issue is concerned, we cannot deny that there are transcendental respects, both in other things (as was seen during the course of the preceding disputation<sup>12</sup> and in the whole work) and also in action (as is to be shown now). Nor does the aforementioned objection have any force against this, since the concept itself of transcendental respects is transcendental and runs through all beings, especially all created beings, which is more indisputable about incomplete and imperfect beings. Therefore, a more abstract concept—namely, respect in general, as it abstracts from

40 ergo multo magis conceptus abstractior, scilicet, respectus  
in communi, ut abstrahit a transcendentali et praedicamen-  
tali, non potest esse genericus, sed (ut ita dicam) supertrans-  
<col. b> cendentalis. Separantur ergo haec tamquam primo  
diversa, ut constat ex dictis in praedicamento Ad aliquid.

*Qua ratione reiicienda sit dicta opinio Scoti.*

6. At vero, si Scotus per relationem intrinsecus, et extrin-  
secus advenientem aliquid aliud praeter respectum transcen-  
dentalem et praedicamentalem intelligit, non possumus illi  
5 consentire, et tunc argumentatio facta, non est parum effi-  
cax, quia cum relatio extrinsecus adveniens non sit respectus  
transcendens, dicet determinatum modum relationum: cur  
ergo non dicet speciale genus relationis realis, et commune  
univoce, ac per modum naturae determinatae, et contentum  
10 sub genere universaliori. Deinde, non est cur Scotus has rela-  
tiones, quas extrinsecus advenientes vocat, ad sola sex ultima  
praedicamenta limitet. Nam unio ex eius sententia est re-  
latio extrinsecus adveniens, et tamen non est in aliquo sex  
praedicamentorum, sed reducitur ad praedicamentum for-  
mae quae unitur, ut supra ostensum est. Quod si forte di-  
15 cat omnia haec praedicamenta dicere vel includere hunc re-  
spectum, non tamen e converso omnem respectum extrinse-  
cus advenientem pertinere ad sex ultima praedicamenta: Pri-  
mum oportuisset huius rei rationem reddere. Deinde facilius  
20 dicere posset, haec praedicamenta includere respectus tran-  
scendentales, et primo diversos a praedicamentalibus.

7. Ulterius autem inquiri de appellatione ipsa. Cur, scilicet  
vocet hunc respectum extrinsecus advenientem. Nam  
certe ratio supra data, et exemplum de actione non videtur  
25 sufficere: quia relatio propinquitatis inter Petrum et Paulum  
praedicamentalis censetur, et tamen non statim sequitur po-  
sito Petro et Paulo in rerum natura, nam in illis tantum  
est fundamentum quasi remotum, et oportet aliud adiun-  
gere, quod sit proxima ratio fundandi et quasi excitandi re-

40R transcendental and categorical—much more cannot be generic, but (if I  
may speak in this way) is supertranscendental. These are separated, there-  
fore, as utterly diverse, as is clear from what was said about the category  
toward something.<sup>13</sup>

*For what reason the mentioned opinion of Scotus is rejected.*

6. On the other hand, if Scotus means something other than transcen-  
dental and categorical relations through ‘intrinsically occurring’ and ‘extrin-  
sically occurring’ relations, then we cannot agree with him. And then the  
5 argument that was made is not a little effective, since, if an extrinsically  
occurring relation is not a transcendent respect, it expresses a determinate  
mode of relations. Why, then, not call it a special genus of real relations,  
both generally univocal and in the manner of determinate nature, and  
contained under a more universal genus? Next, there is no reason why  
10 Scotus should limit the relations that he calls extrinsically occurring to  
only the last six categories. For according to his view union is an extrin-  
sically occurring relation and yet it is not in any of the last six categories,  
but is reduced to the category of form that is united, as was shown ear-  
lier. But if perhaps he says that all these categories express or include this  
15R respect, but, nevertheless, it is not conversely the case that every extrin-  
sically occurring respect belongs to the last six categories, then, first, a  
reason would need to be given for this thing. Second, it would be easier  
to say that these categories include transcendental respects that are utterly  
diverse from categorical respects.

20R 7. Furthermore, I ask about the appellation itself. Why, namely,  
call this respect ‘extrinsically occurring’? For the argument given above  
and the example about action certainly do not seem to suffice. For a re-  
lation of nearness between Peter and Paul is thought to be a categorical  
relation and yet it does not immediately follow once Peter and Paul have  
25R been posited *in rerum natura*. For there is only a remote, as it were, foun-  
dation in them and something else must be added that is the proximate  
reason of founding and stirring up, as it were, of the relation.<sup>14</sup> This very

<sup>13</sup>See, especially, *DM XLVII.4.16*.

<sup>14</sup>On the reason of founding, see *DM XLVII.7.10–14*.

30 lationem. Hoc autem ipsum invenitur inter rem quae agit,  
 et quae patitur, quia non consurgit respectus inter illas, nisi  
 interveniente aliqua mutatione, et aliquo novo modo in ali- 30R  
 qua illarum: quae mutatio non est ipsa relatio, sed est aliquis  
 modus rei, etiamsi includat respectum transcendentalem, vel  
 35 ad illum consequatur respectus praedicamentalis. At vero si-  
 cut in aliis rebus, posito motu, vel mutatione necessaria, sta-  
 tim consurgit relatio, ita etiam hic posita actione, nec ampli- 35R  
 us est necessa- <870> rium, nisi ut ipsa actio fiat. Quod  
 non satis est, ut ille respectus dicatur extrinsecus adveni-  
 40 ens, nam fere in omnibus relationibus praedicamentalis hoc  
 reperitur. Ut verbi gratia non solum actio, sed etiam ipsa  
 potentia non potest referri ad suum obiectum, nec scientia  
 ad scibile, nisi prius fiat in rerum natura, et cum fit, non fit  
 sine respectu transcendentali.

45 8. Quod ultimo sic declaro, nam vel Scotus loquitur de  
 relatione agentis ad passum vel effectum, vel de respectu ip-  
 siusmet actionis ad principium agendi. Si primum, falsum  
 est, illum respectum includi in actione, nam potius resultat 45R  
 ex actione: falso etiam dicitur extrinsecus adveni-  
 ens, nam  
 50 posito fundamento cum sua proxima ratione fundandi, et ter-  
 mino, necessario surgit illa relatio: quae omnia constant ex  
 dictis de praedicamento ad aliquid. Si vero loquitur de re-  
 spectu ipsiusmet actionis; cui, quaeso, extrinsecus advenit?  
 55 num ipsi actioni? at est intrinsecus et essentialis illi: num  
 subiecto in quo inest actio, quodcumque illud sit? at hoc  
 modo plures relationes praedicamentales dici possunt extrin-  
 secus advenientes, quia subiecto cui tribuuntur, extrinsecus  
 seu accidentaliter adveniunt. Ut relatio scientiae ad scibile  
 60 potest dici extrinsecus advenire respectu subiecti, cui accidit  
 scientia, et maxime si extrinsecus infusa est, nam posita po-  
 tentia et obiecto non est in ea talis relatio: posita autem sci-  
 entia necessario convenit talis relatio. Quod si tandem di-  
 65 catur esse discrimen, quia per actionem qua fit scientia, non  
 fit relatio, sed illa deinde resultat: per actionem autem ut sic  
 non additur nisi respectus, qui ita per se fit, sicut ipsa actio

65 qui] quia V.

thing, moreover, is found between the thing that acts and the thing that  
 is acted on, since a respect does not arise between them except by the in-  
 30R tervention of some change and some new mode in something of them.  
 This change is not the relation itself, but is some mode of the thing, even  
 if it includes a transcendental respect or if a categorical respect follows  
 on it. On the other hand, just as in other things by positing a necessary  
 35R motion or change, a relation immediately arises, so also here once the  
 action has been posited nothing more is necessary other than that the ac-  
 tion itself come about. This is not enough for that respect to be called  
 extrinsically occurring, for this is found in nearly all categorical relations.  
 For example, not just action but also the power itself cannot be referred  
 40R to its object nor knowledge to the knowable unless it first comes about *in*  
*rerum natura*. And when it comes about, it does not come about without  
 a transcendental respect.

8. I explain this, lastly, as follows: for either Scotus is speaking about  
 a relation of the agent to the patient or effect or he is speaking about  
 a respect of the very action to the principle of acting. If the first, it is  
 45R false that that respect is included in action, for it rather results from the  
 action. It would also be false to call it extrinsically occurring, for that re-  
 lation arises necessarily once the foundation has been posited along with  
 the proximate reason of founding and the terminus. All of this is clear  
 from what was said about the category towards something. But if he is  
 50R speaking about a respect of the very action, to what, I ask, is it extrin-  
 sically occurring? Surely not to the action itself? On the contrary, it is  
 intrinsic and essential to the action. To the subject in which the action  
 exists, whatever that is? But in this way many categorical relations could  
 be called extrinsically occurring, since they occur extrinsically or acciden-  
 55R tally to the subject to which they are attributed. For example, the relation  
 of knowledge to the knowable can be called extrinsically occurring with  
 respect to the subject on which the knowledge falls. This is especially  
 so if it is extrinsically infused, for such a relation is not in the subject  
 [merely] by positing the power and the object. But once knowledge has  
 60R been posited, such a relation necessarily comes along.

Finally, if it is said that the difference is that the relation is not made  
 through the action by which the knowledge is made, but it results thence;

per se fit: et in universum id convenire relationi extrinsecus adveniendi, ut sola ipsa per se fiat: Si hoc (inquam) dicatur, id commune est relationibus transcendentalibus, quamquam non sit necessarium in omnibus: de qua re in superioribus dictum est. Et similiter non potest illud esse verum in omnibus sex ultimis praedicamentis, ut ex eorum tractatione constabit. Et specialiter in actione gratis id dicitur, quia sicut scientia non est solus respectus, sed qualitas includens respectum transcendentalem ad obiectum, ita actio non est solus respectus, sed est quidam modus includens respectum intrinsece et essentialiter: quod si ex scientia ut includente respectum transcendentalem, deinde resultat alius praedicamentalis, idem dici poterit de actione: nulla est < col. b > ergo specialis ratio ob quam talis respectus vere dicatur extrinsecus adveniendi.

*Secunda sententia negans includi respectum in actione reiicitur.*

Hervaeus.  
Javellus.

9. Est ergo secunda sententia dicens, actionem non includere essentialiter respectum alium ad agens, praeter extrinsecam denominationem, sumptam ab ipsamet forma, vel effectu facto. Ita tenet Hervaeus supra, et *Quodlibet* 1. q. 9. et Javellus 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 23. qui dicunt actionem calefaciendi, verbi gratia, nihil aliud esse quam calorem productum ab igne, a quo ignis agens denominatur: quae denominatio non consistit in respectu, sed in quadam veluti informatione extrinseca, ad quam potest deinde consequi respectus. Fundamentum huius sententiae est, quia hoc sufficit ut agens constituatur actu agens: ergo sufficit etiam ad rationem actionis: ergo quidquid aliud fingitur est superfluum, et vix potest intelligi: non est ergo admittendum.

10. Sed haec sententia vel falsa est, vel non satis declarat proprium respectum actionis. Si enim intelligat, actionem in re nullam rem vel modum realem dicere, distinctum ex natura rei a forma facta, sed esse ipsammet formam ut dominantem extrinsece causam agentem, improbata sufficienter est haec sententia in superioribus, dum ostendimus

9 in] id A.

65R through the action, moreover, nothing is added except a respect, which comes about *per se* in the same way as the action itself comes about *per se*; and it generally fits with an extrinsically occurring relation so that it alone comes about *per se*—if all this (I say) is said—then it is common to transcendental relations, although it is not necessary to all of them (I spoke about this matter in earlier sections).

70R Likewise, that cannot be true for all of the last six categories, as will be obvious from the discussion of them. It especially cannot be true in the case of action for the sake of which this was said, since just as knowledge is not a respect alone but a quality including a transcendental respect to the object, so also action is not a respect alone but is a kind of mode that intrinsically and essentially includes a respect. If another category results from the fact that knowledge includes a transcendental respect, the same can be said about action. There is no special reason, therefore, on account of which such a respect is truly called extrinsically occurring.

*The second view, which denies that a respect is included in action, is rejected.*

9. There is, then, a second view that says that action does not essentially include another respect to the agent in addition to the extrinsic denomination taken from the very form or effect that was brought about. Hervaeus holds this view in the passage cited above and in *Quodlibet* I, q. 9, as does Javellus in *Metaphysics* V, q. 23. They say that the action of heating, for example, is nothing other than the heat produced by the fire, by which heat the fire is denominated an agent. This denomination does not consist in a respect but in a kind of extrinsic informing, as it were, on which a respect can then follow. The foundation for this view is that this is enough for the agent to be established as an acting agent. Therefore, it is also enough for the *ratio* of action. Therefore, whatever else might be imagined is superfluous and is barely intelligible. It should not, therefore, be admitted.

10R 10. But this view is either false or it does not explain the proper respect of an action. For if it is understood that action does not in reality express any thing or mode that is distinct *ex natura rei* from the produced form but is the very form itself as extrinsically denominated an acting cause, this view was sufficiently disproven in previous sections, as long as we show that action must be some middle thing between the agent

Hervaeus.  
Javellus.

actionem debere esse aliquid medium inter agens et effectum, et ex natura rei distinctum ab utroque. Iuxta praedictam autem sententiam nullum est tale medium, quia ipsemet effectus dicitur denominare extrinsece causam agentem, et ut sic vocari actionem, sicut superficies rei continentis denominat extrinsece rem contentam, et ut sic dicitur locus. Non potest autem haec sententia rationem reddere, cur forma facta extrinsece denominet causam facientem, quia sola existentia utriusque rei, scilicet, quae facta dicitur, et quae dicitur faciens, non sufficit ad illam denominationem, quia possent illae duae res existere in rerum natura, ita ut neutra aliam faceret, sed utraque facta esset a Deo vel alia causa: tunc ergo ex illarum duarum rerum existentia non sumeretur talis denominatio: ergo aliquid aliud in rebus ipsis intercedere necesse est, quia illa denominatio ex rebus ipsis oritur. Quod si dicatur, ut necessario dici debet, hoc solum intercedere, quod una procedat ab alia, interrogo quid sit hoc procedere: nam aliquid est in rebus ipsis existens, <871> et non potest non esse distinctum ex natura rei a re quae est efficiens, et a re quae est effectus, quandoquidem possent illae duae res existere sine processione unius ab alia: ergo illa denominatio non sumitur ab ipsa re quae est effectus, sed ab hoc procedere seu producere, quidquid illud sit.

11. Et confirmatur ac declaratur hoc, quia sicut ad genericam denominationem agentis necessaria est processio absolute, ita ad determinatam denominationem determinatus modus processionis, etiamsi alias eadem res sit facta ab eadem re: ergo signum est denominationem non sumi ex co-existentia harum rerum, sed ex illa processione quae mediat inter eas. Assumptum declaratur exemplo, nam, si Petrus efficiat Paulum naturali modo, vere dicitur genitor et pater eius: si autem illum produxisset divina virtute, verbi gratia, per actum voluntatis, quamvis esset effector eius, non tamen genitor, neque pater: ergo actio non potest esse res ipsa facta ut denominans, sed aliquid aliud quod inter ipsam, et rem efficientem intercedat; siquidem existente eadem re facta, effectio, et denominatio inde sumpta diversa est.

12. Quod si illa sententia per formam factam non in-

and the effect and distinct *ex natura rei* from both. But according to the just-mentioned view, there is no such middle thing, since the effect itself is said to extrinsically denominate the acting cause and as such is called action, just as the surface of a containing thing extrinsically denominates the contained thing and as such is called a place. Nor can this view provide a reason why the produced form extrinsically denominates the producing cause, since the mere existence of both things—namely, the thing that is said to be produced and the thing that is said to be producing—is not enough for that denomination. For those two things could exist *in rerum natura* in such a way that neither produces the other, but both are produced by God or some other cause. In that case, then, such a denomination is not taken from the existence of those two things. It is necessary, therefore, that something else in the things themselves intercede, since that denomination arises from the things themselves. But if it is said—as must necessarily be said—that the only thing that intercedes is the fact that one thing proceeds from another, I ask what this proceeding is. For it is something existing in the things themselves and it cannot be distinct *ex natura rei* from either the thing that is the efficient cause or from the thing that is the effect—seeing that these two things can exist without the procession of one from the other—therefore, that denomination is not taken from the very thing that is the effect but it proceeds or produces from this, whatever that is.

11. This is confirmed and explained: just as an absolute procession is necessary for the generic denomination of an agent, so a determinate mode of procession is necessary or a determinate denomination, even if elsewhere the same thing is produced by the same thing. This is evidence, therefore, that a denomination is not taken from the co-existence of these things but from that procession that mediates between them. The assumption is explained by an example, for, if Peter effects Paul in a natural way, he is truly called his parent and father. But if Paul had been produced by divine power—through an act of will, for example—although he would be his effector, he would still not be his parent or father. Therefore, an action cannot be the produced thing itself as denominating, but it must be something else that intervenes between the produced thing and the effecting thing. Even supposing that the same produced thing exists, the effecting (*effectio*) and the denomination taken from it are different.

12. But if that view does not understand the produced form to be

60 telligat rem ipsam, quae est terminus effectio-  
 65 nis, quasi materialiter sumptam, sed modum aliquem existentem in ipsa re  
 facta, et extrinsece denominantem ipsum agens, qui modus  
 etiam potest inter effectus agentis numerari, quia ab illo  
 etiam procedit immediate et per se ipsum, quamvis non tam  
 70 procedat ut effectus, quam ut via ad effectum: si hoc (in-  
 quam) sensu loquitur illa sententia, dicit quidem quippiam  
 verum, ut ex superioribus constat, et magis explicabitur in  
 sect. 3. ubi agemus de subiecto actionis: tamen et non satis  
 rem declarat, et praeterea miscet dictam quaestionem de  
 75 subiecto actionis, quae ad praesens non refert. Et praeterea  
 sine causa negat actionem dicere respectum ad causam agen-  
 tem, tum quia illam denominationem non aliunde sumitur nisi  
 ex tali respectu: cur enim calefactio quae in hoc ligno fit,  
 denominat hunc ignem agentem, et non alium, nisi quia ad  
 80 ipsum, quod est emanare ab hoc, ita intrinsece dicit respec-  
 tum, ut non possit aliter concipi, sed ostensum est, id quod  
 denominat causam actu agentem ut sic, non esse rem ipsam  
 factam ut absolute existentem, sed aliquid medium, quod  
 non potest esse nisi emanatio <col. b> ipsa: ergo necessario  
 includitur in illa respectus ad rem agentem.

*Tertia sententia.*

Commentator. D. Thomas. Capreolus. Soncinas.  
 5 13. Tertia sententia est actionem dicere absolutum cum  
 respectu. Haec sumitur ex Commentatore 3. *Physicorum*  
 com. 9. et ex D. Thoma ibidem: eamque sequuntur Capre-  
 10 olus in 2. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 1. et 3. et Soncinas 5. *Metaphysicae*  
 q. 38. Verumtamen haec sententia in duobus displicet.  
 Primo, quia putant auctores eius relationem illam quam dicit  
 actio, esse eam, quae resultat in agente ad passum, vel ad ef-  
 fectum, quod est impossibile, quia actio secundum integram  
 15 rationem suam est prior natura, quam illa relatio. Nam ef-  
 fectu iam producto, ordine naturae consurgit dicta relatio:  
 effectus autem est per actionem: ergo actio ut actio non  
 potest intrinsece constitui illa relatione. Et confirmatur,

72 tali] *om.* V.

60R the very thing that is the terminus of the effecting, taken, as it were, ma-  
 65R terially, but understands it to be some mode that exists in the produced  
 thing itself and that extrinsically denominates the agent, which mode can  
 also be listed among the effects of the agent (since it also immediately and  
 70R *per se* proceeds from the agent, although it does not so much proceed as  
 an effect but as a path to the effect), if that view, I say, is stated in this  
 sense, then it does in fact express some truth. This is clear from what was  
 75R said in previous sections and will be further explained in sect. 3 where we  
 deal with action's subject. Nevertheless, it does not explain the matter in  
 a satisfactory way. Furthermore, it mixes in the just-mentioned question  
 about action's subject, which is not relevant at present. And, further-  
 80R more, it without reason denies that action expresses a respect to the act-  
 ing cause, both because that denomination is not taken from somewhere  
 other than from such a respect (for why does the heating that occurs in  
 this piece of wood denominate this fire an agent and not another fire, if  
 not because it expresses a respect to this fire and not to another fire?) and  
 also because this very thing—that is, to emanate from this—intrinsically  
 expresses a respect so that it cannot be conceived otherwise. But it was  
 shown that what denominates a cause an acting agent as such is not the  
 produced thing as existing absolutely but some middle thing. That mid-  
 dle things cannot be anything other than the emanation itself. Therefore,  
 it necessarily includes a respect to the acting thing.

*The third view.*

5R 13. The third view is that action expresses an absolute with a respect. This  
 is taken from the Commentator, *Physics* III, com. 9, and from Aquinas in  
 the same place. It is also followed by Capreolus, II, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 1 and  
 3, and by Soncinas, *Metaphysics* V, q. 38. Even so, this view is displeasing  
 in two ways.

10R First, because its authors think that that relation which the action  
 expresses is the relation that results in the agent towards the patient or to  
 the effect. But this is impossible, since the action according to its complete  
*ratio* is a prior in nature to that relation. For the aforementioned relation  
 arises in the order of nature once the effect has been produced. But the  
 effect comes to be through the action. Therefore, the action as action  
 cannot intrinsically constitute that relation. It is confirmed: for even if

Commentator.  
 St. Thomas.  
 Capreolus.  
 Soncinas.

15 nam quamvis in causa agente nulla resultaret realis relatio  
 praedicamentalis, sicut in Deo creante contingit, nihilominus  
 maneret integra ratio actionis realis, quia esset vera causa  
 agens, sicut et verus effectus ab illa manans: unde causa agens  
 ut sic prior natura est, et independens ab illa relatione: ergo  
 20 talis relatio in causa resultans non est intrinseca, et essentialis  
 actioni. Secundo displicet illa opinio, quia existimat respec-  
 tum quem includit actio, esse relationem praedicamentalem,  
 cum tamen non possit res unius praedicamenti per aliud es-  
 sentialiter constitui, alias nec praedicamenta essent imper-  
 25 mixta, nec actio esset res per se una, sed aggregatum plurium.  
 Sed aiunt, actionem non dicere per se primo et (ut ita dicam)  
 in recto absolutum et respectum, quia alias non esset unum  
 quid, sed directe et per se, aiunt significare absolutum quid,  
 verbi gratia, motum ipsum qui fit in passo, connotare autem  
 30 relationem inde resultantem in agente. Verumtamen argu-  
 menta facta, ostendunt hoc verum esse non posse, tum quia  
 actio ut actio supponitur ad illam relationem. Tum etiam  
 quia hic inquirimus intrinsecum constitutum actionis: non  
 potest autem fieri ut res unius praedicamenti constituatur  
 per solam connotationem rei alterius praedicamenti: nam  
 35 res connotata extrinseca est, connotatio autem non est ali-  
 quid rei, sed est denominatio sumpta ex modo concipiendi aut  
 denominandi nostro. Quod si nomine connotationis intelli-  
 gatur habitudo aliqua realis ipsiusmet motus ad relationem,  
 quae resultat in agente, iam haec non erit connotata, sed per  
 40 se primo et directe inclusa in actione, et <872> non erit  
 habitudo ad relationem, quae quasi per accidens resultat, sed  
 ad principium ipsum efficiendi, quod per se respicit actio.

14. Alio ergo modo intelligenda est sententia Commen-  
 45 tatoris, ut vera sit, nimirum, actionem in re quidem esse  
 modum quemdam realem et absolutum, intrinsece tamen et  
 essentialiter includentem respectum ad principium agens a  
 quo manat, et praecise sub hoc respectu habere rationem ac-  
 tionis. Ut vero haec sententia exactius intelligatur, per partes  
 declaranda, et probanda est.

17 verus effectus ab illa manans: unde causa agens ] *om.* V.

15R no real categorical relation were to result in the acting cause (as happens  
 in the case of creating [the effect]), the complete *ratio* of a real action  
 would still remain, because there would be a true acting cause just as also  
 a true effect flowing from it. Hence, the acting cause as such is prior in  
 nature and is independent from that relation. Therefore, such a relation  
 resulting in the cause is not intrinsic and essential to the action.

20R Second, that opinion is displeasing, because it takes the respect that  
 action includes to be a categorical relation, but, nevertheless, a thing in  
 one category cannot be constituted through another. Otherwise, the cat-  
 egories would not be unmixed nor would action be a thing that is *per se*  
 one but it would be an aggregate of multiple things. But, they say, an  
 25R action does not express an absolute and a respect *per se* primarily and (if  
 I may say it in this way) directly, because otherwise it would not be one  
 unified thing. Rather, they say that it directly and *per se* signifies an abso-  
 lute thing (for example, the motion that comes about in the patient), but  
 connotes the relation resulting therefrom in the agent. Nevertheless, the  
 30R arguments that were made show that this cannot be true, both because an  
 action as action is presupposed for that relation and also because we are  
 here inquiring into an intrinsic constituent of action. But it cannot be the  
 case that a thing in one category is constituted through a mere connota-  
 tion of a thing in another category. For the thing connotated is extrinsic;  
 35R the connotation, moreover, is not something in reality, but is a denom-  
 ination taken from our way of conceiving or denominating. But if one  
 understands by the name ‘connotation’ some real habitude that the mo-  
 tion itself has to the relation that results in the agent, this will already not  
 be connoted but be *per se* primarily and directly included in the action.  
 40R And the habitude will not be to the relation, which results *per accidens*,  
 as it were, but to the very principle of effecting, which the action *per se*  
 respects.

14. Therefore, the view of the Commentator should be understood  
 45R in another way so that it is true: namely, that action is indeed in reality  
 a real and absolute mode but a mode that intrinsically and essentially in-  
 cludes a respect to the acting principle from which it flows and that this  
 mode has the *ratio* of an action precisely under this respect. But in or-  
 der to understand this view more precisely, it needs to be explained and  
 proven part by part.



et per conceptus praecisos illis correspondentes non signifi-  
 cari modum illum, qui est dependentia sub eodem respectu,  
 ut statim declarabo: et hoc satis est ad illam causalem locu-  
 tionem, quae saepe non indicat veram causam, sed rationem,  
 40 ad quam sufficit distinctio per inadaequatos conceptus; quo-  
 modo dicimus Deum esse volentem, quia est intelligens. Et  
 ideo in conclusione non dixi actionem formaliter esse depen-  
 dentiam, ne id etiam intelligeretur de formalitate ut praecise  
 concepta, sed dixi in re actionem non esse aliud a dependen-  
 45 tia, quod certissimum mihi est ex rationibus factis.

*Assertio secunda.*

Actio respicit  
 essentialiter  
 agens.

17. Dico secundo. Actio ut actio dicit intrinsece et essen-  
 tialiter respectum transcendentalem ad agens, seu ad prin-  
 cipium agendi. Hanc conclusionem probat sufficienter ratio  
 5 dubitandi in principio posita. Cui non obstat ratio in op-  
 positum facta, quia procedit tantum de relationibus praedica-  
 mentalibus ut sic. Eadem probant omnia quae circa alias  
 sententias dicta sunt. Item, cum actio ut actio dicat egres-  
 sum, vel processionem ab agente, concipi non potest sine  
 10 respectu ad agens: ergo signum est intrinsece dicere respec-  
 tum ad agens. Praeterea actio ut actio denominat agens actu  
 tale, denominatione reali orta ex ipsis rebus, et non propter  
 realem unionem ad ipsum agens, ut infra ostendemus, quia  
 15 alias non esset illa denominatio extrinseca, sed intrinseca:  
 ergo saltem propter habitudinem realem actionis ad agens.  
 Denique, infra ostendemus actionem habere realem et essen-  
 tialem dependentiam a principio agente, et non per aliam de-  
 pendentiam a se distinctam: alias procederetur in infinitum,  
 ut saepe dictum est: ergo per seipsam intrinsece: sed non  
 20 potest tam intrinseca dependentia consistere sine reali habi-  
 tudine actionis ad agens: ergo includitur hic respectus tran-  
 scendentalis in essentiali respectu actionis, ut sic. <873>

*Tertia assertio.*

35R Next, I admit that that mode which is a dependence under the same  
 respect is not signified through these two words, ‘dependence’ and ‘ac-  
 tion’, and through the concepts precisely corresponding to these words,  
 as I will explain now. And this is enough for that causal locution, which  
 often does not indicate a true cause but a *ratio* for which a distinction  
 40R through inadequate concepts is sufficient, just as we say that God is a  
 willing being because he is an understanding being. Therefore, in con-  
 clusion I do not say that action is dependence formally, lest that also be  
 understood about formality as conceived precisely, but I say that action is  
 in reality nothing other than a dependence, which seems entirely certain  
 45R to me from the arguments that were made.

*The second assertion.*

17. Second, I say: Action as action intrinsically and essentially expresses  
 a transcendental respect to the agent or to the principle of action. The ar-  
 5R gument for doubting given in the beginning sufficiently proves this con-  
 clusion. The argument given for the opposing position is no threat, since  
 it only proceeds for categorical relations as such. Everything else that was  
 said about the other views shows the same thing. Likewise, since action  
 as action expresses an egress or procession from the agent, it cannot be  
 conceived except as a respect to the agent. This is a sign, therefore, that  
 10R it intrinsically expresses a respect to the agent. Furthermore, action as  
 action denominates the agent as acting as such by a real denomination  
 arising from the things themselves and not on account of a real union  
 with the agent itself, as we will show below. For otherwise that denom-  
 15R ination would not be extrinsic but intrinsic. Therefore, [the denomina-  
 tion arises] in any event on account of a real habitude of the action to  
 the agent. Finally, we will show below that action has a real and essential  
 dependence on the acting principle and not through another dependence  
 distinct from itself. Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress, as has  
 often been said. Therefore, [the action has a real and essential dependence  
 20R on the the acting principle] intrinsically through itself. But such an in-  
 trinsic dependence cannot exist without a real habitude of the action to  
 the agent. Therefore, there is included here a transcendental respect in an  
 essential respect of action as such.

Action essentially  
 respects the  
 agent.

*The third assertion.*

Respectu  
imbibito in  
actione non  
refertur agens.

25 18. Dico tertio. Per hunc respectum actionis ad agens, prae-  
cise sumptum, non refertur ipsum agens ad aliud, sed potius  
ipsa actio respicit agens a quo egreditur. Haec conclusio  
partim probata est argumentis factis contra Capreolum et  
alios citatos in tertia sententia. Et praeterea potest breviter  
suaderi, quia ipsum agens potius est terminus huius respec-  
tus, nam ipsum respicit actio, quatenus talem respectum in-  
cludit. Ut vero amplius declaretur advertendum est, duobus  
modis intelligi posse, agens ut agens referri ad aliud, seu ad  
terminum vel effectum suum: primo, respectu transcenden-  
tali, quatenus causa est in actu: secundo, relatione praedica-  
mentali inde resultante. De hac posteriori relatione est evi-  
dens conclusio posita, et eam maxime probant argumenta  
facta. De transcendentali vero respectu est ulterius animad-  
vertendum, posse concipi talem respectum ipsius agentis ad  
actionem suam, nam haec vere ac realiter ab ipso egreditur,  
et potest aliquo modo computari inter effectus eius: tamen  
hoc modo revera nullus est novus respectus transcendentalis  
in ipso agente ad suam actionem, praeter eum (si quis est)  
qui in ipsamet potentia agendi essentialiter imbibitur: quia  
inter ipsam potentiam et actionem eius non interponitur ali-  
qua alia res vel realis modus, in cuius intrinseca ratione talis  
respectus includatur. Non ergo est in agente novus aliquis re-  
spectus transcendentalis ad suam actionem, sed actio potius  
refertur ad ipsum, et inde denominatur agens in actu.

50 19. Alio vero modo intelligi potest agens ut agens referri  
transcendentaliter ad suum effectum: neque enim potest in-  
telligi agens nisi aliquid agat, ut sequenti sectione latius dice-  
mus. Nihilominus tamen, si proprie loquamur, potius di-  
cendum est agens denominari, ac si referretur transcenden-  
tali in terminum, quam referri in illum, quia nihil refer-  
tur nisi per respectum quem in se habet: agens vero ut agens  
non habet in se illum respectum, sed denominatur ab ac-  
tione, quae illum respectum habet. Unde in hoc ipso est  
ulterius considerandum, actionem non respicere agens sine  
respectu ad terminum, ut sequenti sectione ostendetur; ni-  
hilominus tamen abstractione praecisiva posse nos unum re-  
spectum praescindere ab alio: sicut nunc in ipsa- <col. b>

25R 18. Third, I say: the agent itself is not referred to something else through  
this respect of the action to the agent, taken precisely; rather, the action  
itself respects the agent from which it egressed. This conclusion is proven  
in part from the arguments made against Capreolus and the others cited  
for the third view. Furthermore, it can be proved in brief, for the agent  
is rather the *terminus* of this respect, for the action respects it insofar as it  
includes such a respect.

30R  
35R  
40R  
45R  
But in order to better explain this, it should be noted the claim that  
the agent as agent is referred to something else, to its terminus or its ef-  
fect, can be understood in two ways. First, with a transcendental respect  
insofar as the cause is in act; second, with a categorical relation resulting  
from that. With respect to this latter relation, the posited conclusion is  
obvious. The arguments that were made first and foremost prove that.  
With respect to a transcendental respect, it should further be noted that  
such a respect of the agent itself to its action can be conceived, for the  
action truly and really egresses from the agent and can in some way be  
reckoned between its effects. Nevertheless, in this way there really is no  
new transcendental respect in the agent itself to its action, beyond the one  
(if there is one) that is essentially taken in by the very power of acting. For  
no other real thing or mode in the intrinsic *ratio* of which such a respect  
is included is inserted between the power itself and its action. There is,  
therefore, no new transcendental respect in the agent towards its action;  
rather, the action is referred to and as a result the agent is denominated in  
act.

50R  
55R  
60R  
19. But there is another way of understanding that an agent as agent  
is transcendentaliter referred to its effect. For an agent cannot be under-  
stood except as something that acts, as we will explain more thoroughly  
in the following section. Nevertheless, if we are speaking properly, it  
should be said that the agent is denominated as if it were referred tran-  
scendentaliter to the terminum, rather than that the agent is referred to the  
terminum. For nothing is referred except through a respect that it has in  
itself. But an agent as agent does not have that respect in itself, but is de-  
nominated from the action that has that respect. Hence, in this matter it  
should further be considered that action does not respect the agent with-  
out a respect to the terminum, as will be shown in the following section.  
Nevertheless, one respect cannot be prescinded with precise abstraction  
from another as we now prescind them in the explication itself. And for

The agent is not  
referred by a  
respect taken in  
by the action.

met explicatione illos praescindimus: et ideo considerate dixi in assertione, per hunc respectum praecise sumptum, quem actio habet ad agens, non referre illud, sed quasi informare vel denominare: quamquam actio secundum totum quod includit, dici possit referre, et quasi ordinare agens ad effectum, quamvis, ut dixi, illud sit magis denominare ut relatam, quam referre. Maxime in actione transeunte, ut sectione tertia declarabimus, ex qua magis constabit qualis sit hic respectus actionis ad agens.

*Quarta assertio.*

20. Ultimo dicitur, et colligitur ex dictis, actionem ut actio est recte dici posse ultimum actum potentiae activae, et exercitium eius, dummodo non intelligatur de actu intrinseco et informante, sed absolute de actu dimanante a potentia, sive illam informet, sive non. Eo enim modo quo potentia activa dicitur potentia, quamvis potius sit quidam actus, actio ab illa manans potest dici actus eius, non ut subiecti, sed ut principii a quo est; hic enim est essentialis respectus actionis ut sic. Unde ex ipso respectu, quem dixi habere actionem ad suum principium, sequitur, comparari ad illud ut actum ab eo egredientem. Item, quia actio est id quod proxime egreditur a potentia activa, recte dicitur exercitium eius, et eodem sensu dicitur veluti extrinseca quaedam actuatio eius. Item, actio est ipsa causalitas causae efficientis, per quam constituitur actu causans: causalitas autem constituit causam in actu: ergo sub ea ratione potest dici actus eius, saltem extrinsecus. Neque huic obstat, quod supra diximus, actionem in re non esse aliud quam dependentiam effectus a causa: quia ipsamet dependentia essentialiter respicit suum principium, et ratione huius respectus dicitur esse exercitium et actualitas quaedam extrinseca ipsius potentiae activae.

65R this reason I carefully said in the assertion that this respect, taken precisely, which the action has to the agent does not refer the agent but, as it were, informs or denominates it. Action according to the entirety that it includes, however, can be said to refer and, as it were, order the agent to its effect, although, as I said, that is more to denominate as related than to refer. This is especially true of transeunt actions, as we will explain in sect. 3, which will make it clearer what this respect of the action to the agent is like.

*The fourth assertion.*

20. Lastly, I say—and it can be gathered from what was said—that an action as action can rightly be called the ultimate act of an active power and its exercise, as long as this is not understood of an intrinsic and informing act but strictly of an act flowing from the power, whether it informs the power or not. For in the way in which an active power is called a power, although it rather is a kind of act, the action flowing from the power can be called an act of the power, not as of a subject but as of a principle by which it exists. For this is the essential respect of the action as such. Hence, it follows from that respect that, I said, an action has to its principle that it is related to that principle as an act egressing from it. Likewise, since action is that which proximately egresses from the active power, it is rightly called the power's exercise and in the same sense is said to be a kind of extrinsic actuation of it. Also, action is the causality itself of an efficient cause though which the cause is constituted as actually causing. Moreover, the causality constitutes the cause in act. Therefore, under this *ratio* the action can be called its act, at least extrinsically. Nor does what we said above—namely, that action is in reality nothing other than the dependency of the effect on the cause—pose an obstacle to this. For the dependency itself essentially respects its principle and is by reason of this respect said to be a kind of extrinsic exercise and actuality of the active power itself.

Action is the ultimate act of an active power.

Actio est ultimus actus potentiae activae.