

<312>²

DISPUTATIO XXXII.

De divisione entis creati in substantiam et accidens.

Explicata communi ratione entis creati, sequitur declaranda
eius divisio, ut per eam ad pertractandas, et dignoscendas
5 determinatas rationes entium, quantum ad Metaphysicum 5R
spectat, progrediamur. Solet autem huiusmodi ens prox-
ime dividi in decem praedicamenta, tamen divisio a nobis
proposita aptior visa est ad servandum doctrinae ordinem,
et explicandum rationes omnes communes, et quasi tran-
10 scendentales, quae sub ente considerari possunt. De hac 10R
ergo divisione breviter dicemus, quomodo membra eius op-
ponantur, et sufficienter divisum exhauriant: et quomodo
in illius communi ratione conveniant.

SECTIO 1.

15 *Utrum ens proxime et sufficienter dividatur in substantiam, et
accidens.*

1. Prima ratio dubitandi esse potest, quia substantia non
solum in entibus creatis, sed maxime in increato reperitur:
non ergo recte dividitur ens creatum per rationem substan-
20 tiae, alioquin continebitur aliquid sub membro dividente,

DISPUTATION XXXII.

Concerning the division of created being into substance and accident.

Having explained the common *ratio* of created being, it follows that
the division of common being should be explained in order thereby
to make progress in thoroughly treating and discerning the determi-
nate *rationes* of beings insofar as they pertain to metaphysics. While it
is customary to divide being of this sort proximately into the ten cat-
egories, the division proposed by us seemed more apt for preserving
the order of the doctrine and for explaining all the common and, as it
were, the transcendental *rationes* that can be considered under being.
10R With respect to this division, therefore, we will briefly discuss [i] how
its members are opposed and are exhaustive when sufficiently divided³
and [ii] in what manner they agree in that with the common *ratio* [of
being].⁴

15R SECTION 1.

*Whether being is proximately and sufficiently divided into substance and
accident.*

1. The first reason for doubting can be that substance is found not
only in created beings but especially in uncreated being. Created being,
therefore, is not rightly divided through the *ratio* of substance. Other-
wise, something would be contained under one of the dividing mem-

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 26 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³In Section 1.

⁴In Section 2.

quod non continetur sub diviso: vel saltem modus contra-
 hens seu determinans divisum, universalior erit seu com-
 muniior quam ipsum divisum. Quod si forte dicatur sub-
 stantiam in ea divisione non sumi, ut abstrahit a creata, et
 increata, sed definite pro substantia creata: oritur hinc alia
 25 difficultas, nimirum ens prius fuisse dividendum in substan-
 tiam, et accidens, deinde vero substantiam in creatam, et
 increatam: quandoquidem substantia creata non convenit
 cum increata solum in ratione entis, sed etiam in ratione
 30 substantiae: ergo nullo modo potest praesens divisio enti
 creato attribui.

2. Secundo, sunt aliae divisiones entis aequae <col. b>
 universales, et immediate partientes ipsum ens: ergo nulla
 est ratio ob quam praesens divisio caeteris praeferatur. An-
 35 tecedens patet, nam ens dividi potest in absolutum, et re-
 spectivum, quae divisio adaequata est enti, cum nullum ex-
 cogitari possit ens, quod non sub altero membrorum con-
 tineatur. Unde fit, hanc divisionem esse proximam, et im-
 mediatam ipsius entis, alioquin non possent membra divi-
 40 dentia illud adaequate dividere. Item, dividitur ens creatum
 in actum et potentiam, quae etiam est adaequata, et imme-
 diata divisio. Item, dividi potest ens in completum et in-
 completum, dantur enim quaedam entia integra, et totalia,
 ut sunt substantialia supposita, quae merito completa entia
 45 nominari possunt: alia vero sunt quae sunt partes, aut affec-
 tiones talis entis, quae sub ratione entis incompleti compre-
 henduntur: sub quo membro, non tantum accidentia, sed
 etiam partes substantiae comprehenduntur. Unde constat
 hanc divisionem esse valde diversam a praecedenti. Quod
 50 autem sit adaequata, per se notum est, quia membra imme-
 diatam contradictionem includunt, dividuntque immediate
 ipsam rationem entis, quia illi modi quasi transcendent
 sunt, et proxime determinant, et quasi afficiunt ipsam ra-
 tionem entis. Videtur autem haec partitio aptior ad expli-
 55 candam communitatem, seu analogiam entis, quia solum
 ens completum esse videtur principale membrum, et per
 habitudinem ad illud, reliqua omnia entis rationem partici-
 pant.

bers that is not contained under what was divided, or at least the mode
 contracting or determining what was divided will be more universal or
 more common than what was divided. But if perhaps it is said that
 the substance in that division is not taken as abstracting from created
 and uncreated but rather is taken precisely for created substance, then
 another difficulty arises from here—namely, that being should first be
 divided into substance and accident and substance then be divided into
 created and uncreated—since created substance does not agree with un-
 created substance just in the *ratio* of being but also in the *ratio* of sub-
 stance. Therefore, in no way can the present division be attributed to
 created being.

2. Second, there are other divisions of being that are equally univer-
 sal and that immediately partition being. Therefore, there is no reason
 for preferring the present division. The antecedent is obvious, for being
 can be divided into absolute and respective. This division is adequate
 to being, since no being can be thought of that is not contained in one
 of the members. Hence, the result is that this is a proximate and im-
 mediate division of being. Otherwise, the dividing members could not
 adequately divide it.

Likewise, created being is divided into act and potency. This, too,
 is an adequate and immediate division.

Likewise, being can be divided into complete and incomplete. For
 there are certain entire and whole beings (such as substantial supposita)
 that can rightly be called complete beings, but there are others that are
 parts or affections of such beings that are included under the *ratio* of
 incomplete being. Not only accidents but also the parts of substances
 are included under the latter member. Hence, it is clear that this di-
 vision is far different from the former one. Moreover, that it is also
 adequate is known *per se*, since the members include an immediate con-
 50 tradiction and immediately divide the *ratio* of being. For these modes
 are transcendent, as it were, and they proximately determine and, as it
 were, affect the very *ratio* of being. Moreover, it seems that this par-
 titio is more apt for explaining the community or analogy of being,
 since only complete being seems to be a principal member and all other
 being participate in the *ratio* of being through a relation (*habitudinem*)
 to complete being.

3. Tertio hinc oritur praecipua difficultas, nam videtur
 60 illa divisio plane insufficientis: nam praeter substantiam, et
 accidentia, datur aliquid quod participat rationem entis, et 60R
 non est substantia nec accidens, ut, verbi gratia, modus rei
 non est substantia rei, ut per se notum est, nec etiam est
 accidens, quia non inhaeret, sed per quamdam identitatem
 65 afficit rem cuius est modus. Quod praesertim declaratur in
 dependentia creativa, qua ens creatum producitur, et conser- 65R
 vatur a Deo; illa enim aliquid rei est, et hoc modo sub ente
 continetur, et non est accidens, quia non est in subiecto, nec
 ex subiecto, sed est prior natura omni subiecto, cum sit ex
 70 nihilo, nec etiam est substantia, quia ex natura rei distingui-
 tur a substantia, quae per ipsam producitur. Et confirmatur 70R
 augeturque difficultas ex quibusdam proprietatibus substan-
 tiaae vel entis, quae secundum suas rationes formales non
 censentur esse substantiae, sed proprie- <313> tates sub-
 75 stantiae, et tamen non sunt etiam accidentia, quia in re non
 distinguuntur a substantia, nec realiter, nec modaliter, sed 75R
 tantum formaliter, ex mentis praecisione, quae est rationis
 distinctio. Assumptum declaratur, nam est proprietas sub-
 stantiae esse aptam, ut substet accidentibus, quae tamen pro-
 80 prietas neque addit substantiae ullum accidens, nec declarat
 ipsam rationem substantiae. Simile est de hac proprietate, 80R
 esse principalem virtutem operandi, et similibus. Idemque
 argumentum maiori ratione fieri potest de ipsis proprietati-
 bus entis in communi, quae nec accidentia esse possunt, nec
 85 substantiae, cum utrisque communes sint, et tamen sunt entia,
 alioqui nihil essent: illa ergo duo membra non dividunt 85R
 sufficienter ens.

Quaestionis resolutio.

4. Nihilominus dicendum est illam esse optimam, ac suf-
 ficientem divisionem entis. Quae sententia adeo est com-
 munis, ut tamquam res per se nota ab omnibus recepta sit:
 5 quapropter magis indiget terminorum explicatione, quam 5R
 probatione. Quod ergo in rebus creatis, quaedam sint sub-

3. From here, third, arises an especially strong difficulty, since that
 division [into substance and accident] seems plainly insufficient. For
 beyond substance and accident, there is given something that partici-
 pates in the *ratio* of being but is not a substance or an accident. For
 example, a mode of a thing is not a substance of that thing, as is known
per se and neither is it an accident, since it does not inhere but it affects
 the thing of which it is a mode through a kind of identity. This is es-
 pecially revealed in the creative dependence by which a created being
 is produced and conserved by God. For that dependence is something
 of the thing and in this way is contained under being. But it is not an
 accident, since it is not in a subject nor from a subject. It is prior in
 nature to every subject, since it is *ex nihilo*. Nor is it a substance, since
 it is distinguished *ex natura rei* from the substance, which is produced
 through it.

This is confirmed—and the difficulty is made more severe—by cer-
 tain properties of substance or being that according to their formal *ra-*
tiones are not thought to be substances but properties of substances and
 yet also are not accidents, since they are not distinguished in reality
 from the substance, neither really nor modally, but only formally ac-
 cording to a precision of the mind (which is a distinction of reason).
 The assumption is shown, for it is a property of substance to be suit-
 able for standing under accidents. But that property neither adds some
 accident to substance nor declares the *ratio* of substance.

It is similar in the case of the property of being the principal power
 of activity, and other similar cases. The same argument can be made
 with more powerful reason with respect to the properties of being in
 general, which cannot be either accidents or substances, since they are
 not common to either kind. Nevertheless, these properties are beings.
 Otherwise, they would be nothing. Therefore, substance and accident
 do not sufficiently divide being.

Resolution of the question.

4. Nevertheless, one should say that this is the best and sufficient divi-
 sion of being. This view is so common that it is received by everyone as
 a thing known *per se*. For this reason, what is needed is more an expla-
 nation of the terms than a proof. That, therefore, among created things
 some are substances and some are accidents is manifest from the contin-

stantiae, quaedam vero accidentia, ex ipsa continua rerum
 mutatione, et alteratione manifestum est, mutatur enim
 aqua, verbi gratia, ex calida in frigidam, et e converso, et
 10 homo nunc sedet, nunc vero ambulat, per quas mutationes
 aliquid rei amitti, vel acquiri necesse est; alioqui non fieret
 mutatio realis: non amittitur autem, nec mutatur substan-
 tia, integra enim manet substantia aquae, vel hominis, sive
 calefiat, sive frigefiat, sedeat, aut ambulet: est ergo accidens,
 15 illud in quo fit mutatio; dantur ergo in entibus quaedam
 quae sunt accidentia. Unde ulterius necessario concluditur,
 aliquod esse ens, quod sit substantia, nam accidens alicuius
 est accidens, nimirum substantiae. Quod si quis dicat etiam
 accidentis posse dari accidens. Respondetur, necessario sis-
 20 tendum esse in aliqua substantia, quia licet unum accidens
 alteri accidat, tamen cum neque in hoc ordine possit in in-
 finitum procedi, neque sibi in aliquo accidente, quod nulli
 subiecto accidat (alioqui iam non esset accidens, sed substan-
 tia), necessario sistendum est in aliquo ente, quod sit sub-
 25 stantia, quodque sit primum, et quasi radicale subiectum, et
 fundamentum accidentium. Quod etiam manifestant prae-
 dictae accidentales mutationes, sub quarum terminis necesse
 est, ut idem sub- <col. b> iectum maneat, quod non potest
 esse nisi substantia, sive sola, ac nuda, sive aliis accidentibus
 30 affecta. Sic igitur satis constat, convenienter dividi ens in
 substantiam, et accidens.

5. Quod vero sufficienter etiam dividatur, eodem fere
 discursu concludi potest; nam vel ens tale est, ut nulli alteri
 accidat, vel est tale, ut alicui accidat, seu ut alicui enti ad-
 35 haereat, illudque afficiat accidentaliter, seu extra essentiam
 eius. Quidquid priori modo se habet, sub ratione substan-
 tiae comprehenditur, quod autem posteriori, sub ratione ac-
 cidentis. Non potest autem inter haec duo membra sic ex-
 plicata medium inveniri, nam immediatam contradictionem
 40 includunt, ut ex ipsis verbis a nobis propositis satis constat.
 Coincidit autem haec ratio cum illa vulgari, quod ens per se,
 et in alio habent inter se immediatam oppositionem, unde
 necesse est alterutrum ex his modis omni enti convenire; ens
 autem per se constituit substantiam, ens vero in alio con-

uous change and alteration of things. For water, for example, is changed
 from hot to cold and the other way around. A human being now sits,
 but now walks. It is necessary that through these changes something of
 the thing is lost or acquired. Otherwise, there would not be any real
 change. But the substance is not lost or changed, for the entire sub-
 stance of the water or of the human being remains, whether becoming
 hot or becoming cold, whether sitting or walking. That with respect
 to which the change happens, then, is an accident. Therefore, certain
 things are given among beings that are accidents. Whence it is further
 necessarily concluded that there is some being that is a substance. For
 an accident is an accident of something, namely, of a substance.

Someone might say that there could also be an accident of an ac-
 cident. I respond that it must necessarily stop in some substance, since,
 although one accident can befall another accident, since it is neither the
 case that this chain can proceed to infinity nor the case that it can stop
 in some accident that does not befall some subject (otherwise this last
 accident would already not be an accident but a substance). Therefore,
 it must necessarily be stopped in some being that is a substance and that
 is first and, as it were, the root subject and foundation of the accidents.

The aforementioned accidental changes also make this obvious. It
 is necessary that the same subject remain under those terms, and that
 subject cannot be anything other than a substance, either a substance
 alone bare of any accidents or a substance affected by other accidents.
 Thus, then, it is sufficiently clear that being is suitably divided into
 substance and accident.

5. Moreover, that being is also sufficiently divided [in this way] can
 be concluded from the same argument. For either being is such that it
 does not befall anything else or it is such that it does befall something,
 either as adhering to some being and affecting it accidentally or as
 beyond its essence. Whatever holds itself in the former way is included
 under the *ratio* of substance, but that which holds itself in the latter way
 under the *ratio* of accident. Nor can one find any intermediate between
 these two members explained in this way, since it would include an
 immediate contradiction, as the very words we used make clear enough.

Moreover, this argument coincides with the common one that be-
 ing *per se* and being in another have an immediate opposition to each
 other, as a result of which it is necessary that for any being one or the
 other of these ways of being apply to it. A being *per se*, moreover,

45 stituit accidens; ergo adaequate dividunt ens. Quid autem
 per hos duos modos per se et *in alio* significetur, non potest
 breviter explicari, sed in sequentibus disputationibus trac-
 tandum est: nunc tantum supponatur, utrumque sumi, ut
 50 includit immediatam negationem alterius, ita ut quidquid
 non est in alio, ad modum accidentis, id est, inhaerendo,
 vel afficiendo extra essentiam rerum, per se esse dicatur, et
 sit substantia, et e converso quidquid per se non est, sed
 alicui adhaeret, sit in alio, et accidens dicatur. Quamquam
 55 ex his duobus modis melius modus per se concipiatur, et ex-
 plicetur a nobis per negationem alterius, quia simplicior est,
 quam modus existendi in alio. Atque hoc nunc sit satis ad
 explicandam sufficientiam huius divisionis, nam exacta dec-
 laratio horum modorum inferius tradenda est, ut dixi. Et
 60 respondendo ad difficultates propositas haec divisio amplius
 declarabitur.

Responsio ad primam dubitandi rationem.

6. Ad primam ergo rationem dubitandi, primo dicendum
 est, in hac divisione, prout a nobis tradita est, membra div-
 identia sumenda esse proportionata diviso. Cum ergo divi-
 5 sum sit ens creatum, utrumque membrum dividens accipi-
 endum est quatenus per modum enti creato accommodatum
 constituitur. Et quidem in accidente hoc nulla indiget decla-
 ratione, quia iuxta sanam et Ca- <314> tholicam doctrinam
 nullum est increatum accidens, quia neque extra Deum est
 10 aliquod ens increatum, neque in Deo est aliquod accidens,
 ut supra ostensum est. De alio vero membro, scilicet, sub-
 stantia, fatemur quidem Deum esse substantiam increatam,
 atque ita posse abstrahi rationem substantiae in communi a
 creata, et increata, tamen in hac divisione non hoc modo
 15 sumitur, sed quatenus constituitur per modum proprium
 substantiae creatae. Qui modus dupliciter explicari potest.
 Primo, ut substantia non tantum dicatur quae per se est,
 sed quae accidentibus substat, vel substare potest: quomodo
 videtur Aristoteles sumpsisse, et descripsisse substantiam in
 20 praedicamentis. Haec vero explicatio supponit imprimis

45R constitutes a substance, but a being in another constitutes an accident.
 They adequately divide being, therefore. But what is signified through
 these two ways ‘per se’ and ‘in another’ cannot be briefly explained
 but must be treated in the following disputations. For now it is only
 assumed that each is taken as immediately including a negation of the
 other, such that whatever is not in another in the way of an accident
 (that is, by inhering or affecting beyond the essence of things) is said
 to be *per se*, and so is a substance. And, conversely, whatever is not *per*
se but adheres to something is in another and is called an accident. Of
 these two ways, however, the way *per se* is conceived and explained by
 us through a negation of the other, since it is simpler than the way of
 existing in another thing. This is enough for now for explaining the
 sufficiency of this division, for an exact statement of these ways of be-
 ing should be discussed below, as I said. And this division will be more
 fully revealed in responding to the proposed difficulties.

Response to the first reason for doubting.

6. To the first reason for doubting, then, it should first be said that in
 this division as it was taught by us the dividing members should be pro-
 portionately divided. Since, therefore, what is being divided is created
 being, each dividing member should be accepted insofar as it is con-
 5R stituted through a mode accommodated to created being. And indeed
 in the case of accidents this requires no explanation, since according
 to sound and Catholic doctrine there are no uncreated accidents. For
 there is nothing beyond God that is an uncreated being and there is
 10R nothing in God that is an accident, as was shown above.

But with respect to the other member—namely, substance—we do
 confess that God is an uncreated substance and that thus one can ab-
 15R stract the *ratio* of substance in general from created and uncreated sub-
 stance. Nevertheless, substance is not taken in this way in this division
 but rather insofar as it is constituted through the proper mode of a cre-
 ated substance. This mode can be explained in two ways. First, as a
 substance is not only said to be what exists *per se* but as what stands or
 can stand under accidents. Aristotle seems to have taken and described
 substance in this way in the categories. But this explanation assumes in
 20R the first place that every created and creatable substance is apt to stand

omnem substantiam creatam, et creabilem aptam esse sub-
 stare accidentibus, quod alicui fortasse non omnino evidens
 apparebit, mihi autem indubitatum est, ut ex dictis in dis-
 putatione praecedenti de compositionibus entis creati constare
 25 potest. Illa vero descriptio declarat rationem substantiae
 25R creatae per habitudinem ad aliquid extrinsecum, cum
 tamen illius ratio absoluta sit, et intra proprium genus con-
 tineatur.

7. Secundo ergo modo explicari potest, ex eo quod
 30 modus per se essendi, qui essentialiter constituit substan-
 30R tiam creatam imperfectus est, vel quia aliquam composi-
 tionem includit in tali substantia, vel certe quia licet inclu-
 dat negationem inherendi, tamen non dicit ex vi suae prae-
 cisaе, et essentialis rationis actualem modum subsistendi,
 35 quo ultimate ac perfecte videtur substantia compleri ac con-
 35R stitui. Substantia itaque increata est per se ipsa substan-
 tialiter, atque essentialiter subsistens, atque ita ex vi suae
 35R essentiae habet completam rationem substantiae, substan-
 tia vero creata si incompleta sit hoc ipso deficit a perfecta
 40 ratione substantiae, et ex se, vel non subsistit actu nisi in
 40R alio, seu in toto, vel non perfecte subsistit, neque omnino
 absolute, sed in ordine ad componendum aliquod totum,
 ut materia prima. Si vero sit completa substantia, quamvis
 45 subsistat actu, non tamen ex vi suae essentiae formaliter ac
 45R praecise, sed per aliquem modum et actum suae essentiae, et
 ideo substantialis natura creata, ut infra dicam, non est es-
 sentialiter actus subsistens, sed aptitudine. Sic igitur constat
 sub hac divisione prout in praesenti assignatur, non compre-
 hendi substantiam increatam. <col. b>

8. Neque necesse fuit prius dividere ens in substan-
 50 tiam, et accidens, et deinde substantiam in creatam, et in-
 50R creatam: quamvis enim negari non possit, quin talis modus
 dividendi fundamentum habeat in re, et ideo non sit rei-
 ciciendus tamquam includens aliquid falsum, vel in rebus
 55 ipsis repugnans, nihilominus inde non fit, illum dividendi
 modum fuisse ordine naturae praefendum. Quin potius si

under accidents. This will perhaps not appear entirely evident to every-
 one, but I find it indisputable, as can be established from what was said
 in the previous disputation about the compositions of created being.

But this description explains the *ratio* of created substance through
 a disposition to something extrinsic, even though its *ratio* is absolute
 and is contained within a proper genus.

7. The proper mode of a created substance can, then, be explained
 in a second way from the fact that the way of being *per se* which essen-
 tially constitutes a created substance is imperfect, either because some
 composition is included in such a substance or at least because although
 it includes a negation of inhering it nevertheless does not imply accord-
 ing to the force of its own precise and essential *ratio* an actual mode of
 subsisting by which a substance is ultimately and perfectly completed
 and constituted. Consequently, an uncreated substance is the very *per se*
 substantially and essentially subsisting thing, and so by the force of its
 own essence has the complete *ratio* of a substance. But if a created sub-
 stance is incomplete, it by this fact lacks the perfect *ratio* of a substance.
 Of itself it either does not subsist in act except in another or in a whole
 or it does not perfectly subsist and not wholly absolutely but in order
 to compose some whole (as prime matter does). But if it is a complete
 substance, although it subsists in act, it does not do so according to the
 force of its own essence formally and precisely, but through some mode
 and act of its essence. Therefore, a substantial created nature, as I will
 say below, is not an essentially subsisting act but an aptitudinally sub-
 sisting one. In this way, therefore, it is clear that uncreated substance is
 not included under this division as it is assigned at present.

8. Neither was it necessary first to divide being into substance and
 accident and then divide substance into created and uncreated. For, al-
 though it cannot be denied that such a way of dividing has a foundation
 in reality and so should not be rejected as including something false or
 including something repugnant to the things themselves, nevertheless
 it does not follow from that that this was of dividing must be preferred
 according to the order of nature. Rather, if the matter is considered

44 ex] *om. V.*

54 in] *om. A.*

attente res consideretur, non possunt huiusmodi divisiones
quadam serie, et ordine a nobis concipi, et tradi, ita ut non
possint secundum alias rerum convenientias, et differentias
60 aliis etiam modis concipi, et coordinari. Ut (retorquendo
argumentum) licet divideretur ens in substantiam, et acci-
dens, posset substantia non dividi immediate in creatam, et
increatam, sed in spiritualem, et materialem, et deinde sub-
stantia spiritualis dividenda esset in creatam et increatam.
65 Vel aliter, posset dividi substantia in viventem, et inanimem,
et rursus substantia vivens in rationalem seu intellectualem,
et irrationalem, ac deinde intellectualis in simplicem seu
pure intellectualem, et compositam, seu discursivam, ac tan-
dem simplex, et pure intellectualis in creatam, et increatam.
70 Atque his et aliis modis possunt in infinitum hae divisiones
multiplicari, quia convenientiae, et differentiae rerum in-
finitis paene modis possunt a nobis concipi per habitudinem
ad diversas actiones, seu rerum proprietates.

9. Quapropter ad constituendum aliquem divisionis
75 modum ordini doctrinae maxime accommodatum, consid-
eravimus, ut supra notatum est, summam, ac primam entium
distantiam, ac diversitatem, quam invenimus inter ens
creatum et increatum. Quamvis enim ens increatum pos-
sit sub aliis rationibus, praeter communem rationem entis,
80 convenire cum aliquibus entibus creatis, ut in ratione sub-
stantiae, et in aliis iam propositis, et in ratione entis abso-
luti, vel respectivi, et similibus: nihilominus omnibus pen-
satis maior est distinctio, ac diversitas inter ens increatum et
quodlibet creatum, quam inter omnia creata inter se
85 comparata: et ideo merito prius divisimus ens in creatum, et
increatum, quam in substantiam, et accidens. Praesertim,
quia Deus extra omne genus seu extra omne praedicamen-
tum existit, unde licet aliquo modo conveniat in ratione sub-
stantiae, cum aliquibus entibus creatis; non tamen univoce,
90 sed analogice, ut ex superius dictis de ente creato, et incre-
ato sumi facile <315> potest, et ideo ad constituendum sub
ente decem genera summa, seu praedicamenta rerum, oportet

carefully, divisions of this sort cannot be conceived and taught in a cer-
tain series and order in such a way that they cannot also be conceived
and arranged in other ways according to other similarities and differ-
ences between things. So that (turning around the argument) although
being is divided into substance and accident, it might be that substance
is not divided immediately into created and uncreated but into spiri-
tual and material and then spiritual substance should be divided into
created and uncreated. Or, alternatively, substance can be divided into
living and inanimate, and living substance in turn into rational or in-
tellectual and irrational, and then intellectual substance into simple or
purely intellectual and composite or discursively rational, and finally
65R simple or purely intellectual substance into created and uncreated. And
from these and other ways these divisions can be multiplied to infinity,
since we can conceive of the similarities and differences between things
in nearly infinitely many ways through relations to the different actions
or properties of things.

9. Wherefore in order to set up some especially suitable mode of di-
vision in the order of teaching, we considered, as was noted above, the
first and greatest distance and difference of beings, which we find be-
tween created and uncreated being. For although uncreated being could
[be found] under other *rationes* beyond the common *ratio* of being—
since it agrees with some created beings as in the *ratio* of substance, in
the other *rationes* already mentioned, in the *ratio* of absolute being or
of respective being, and in other similar ones—nevertheless, once ev-
erything has been weighed the distinction and difference between un-
created being and any created being is greater than between any created
beings compared to each other. For this reason we rightly first divided
being into created and uncreated rather than first into substance and
accident.

This is so especially because God exists beyond every genus or be-
yond every category. Hence, although he in some way fits the *ratio* of
substance along with some created beings, yet not univocally but ana-
logically, so that the things said earlier about created being and uncre-
ated being can easily be accepted. For this reason in order to constitute
the ten highest genera or categories of things under being, it is neces-

81 et in aliis] et aliis A.

tuit prius increatum ens a caeteris secernere, et deinde ens creatum in caetera membra ordinate distinguere.

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Responsio ad rationem secundam.

10. Atque ex his patet responsio ad secundam rationem dubitandi, concedimus enim posse alias divisiones entis creati excogitari, quibus, et immediate; et adaequate dividatur, praeterquam in substantiam, et accidens, hoc enim satis probant exempla ibi adducta, et quoad hoc eadem est ratio de ente creato, quae de ente in communi. Nihilominus tamen haec divisio entis creati in substantiam et accidens caeteris a nobis praelata est, propter easdem causas supra indicatas. Prima est, quia maior est diversitas inter substantiam, et accidens, quam inter quaelibet alia membra, quae sub ente creato excogitentur, quia maiorem oppositionem includunt, et quia maior est analogia entis respectu illorum, ut statim dicitur, quod est signum minoris convenientiae, maiorisque distantiae. Quod etiam ex ipsis exemplis in argumento adductis intelligi potest. Primum erat de divisione in absolutum et respectivum, in qua si ens respectivum sumatur pro respectu transcendentali, vix distingui potest in re ab absoluto, sed ratione tantum, quia nullum est ens creatum adeo absolutum, ut non includat in sua entitate aliquem transcendentalem respectum, ut supra tactum est. Si vero sumatur proprie pro respectu praedicamentali, huiusmodi respectus vel nihil rei addit entibus absolutis vel, si quid addit, multo minus distat a caeteris accidentibus maioremque cum illis convenientiam habet, quam ipsa accidentia inter se.

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11. Aliud exemplum erat de actu, et potentia: quae si sumantur pro ente in actu, et pro ente in potentia, non sunt proprie ac positive diversa entia, sed indicant diversos status eiusdem entis, ut supra declaratum est, et ideo illa divisio in eo sensu non tam deservit ad declarandas diversas naturas entium, quod hic intendimus, quam ad explicandum ipsam communem rationem entis creati, quod de se non habet esse actu, et ideo illa divisio supra est a nobis declarata, simul

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sary first to separate uncreated being from other beings and only then to divide created being into the remaining members in an orderly way.

Response to the second reason.

10. From what has been said the response to the second reason for doubting is clear. For we concede that in addition to the division into substance and accident one can think of other divisions of created being by which it is divided both immediately and adequately. For this was sufficiently established by the examples presented there. And with respect to this there is the same argument concerning created being as there is of being in general. Nevertheless, we prefer this division of created being into substance and accident to the other divisions on account of the same reasons indicated above. The first is that there is a greater difference between substance and accident than between whatever other members you please that can be thought of under created being, since they include a greater opposition and since the analogy of being is greater with respect to them, as I will discuss shortly, which is a sign of less similarity and greater distance. This can also be understood from the examples presented in the argument. The first was about the division of being into absolute and respective being. In this case if respective being is taken for a transcendental respect, it can hardly be distinguished from absolute being in reality but only by reason. For there is no created being so absolute that it does not include in its entity some transcendental respect, as was touched on above. But if it is taken properly for a categorial respect, a respect of this sort either adds nothing real to absolute beings or, if it does add something, it stands much less far from the remaining accidents and has a greater similarity to them than the accidents themselves have to each other.

11. Another example was of act and potency. If they are taken for being in act and for being in potency, they are not properly and positively different beings, but indicate different states of the same being, as was shown above. Therefore, this division taken in this sense does not serve so much to reveal different natures of beings—which is what we are after here—than serve to explicate the common *ratio* itself of created being, which does not of itself have being in act. For this reason we explained this division above at the same time along with the *ratio*

35 cum ipsa ratione entis creati. Si vero actus, et potentia proprie sumantur, pro potentia agendi, vel recipiendi, et actu
 40 utriusque, sic illa membra, nec maxime inter se <col. b> distant, nam saepe potentia, et actus ad idem genus pertinent, nec etiam illa duo membra in eo sensu sumpta adaequate dividunt ens, non enim omne ens est actus, aut potentia in ea proprietate, quamvis si actus late sumatur pro
 45 aliquod ex dictis membris reduci. Tamen non ita declarant propriam, et intrinsecam rationem uniuscuiusque entis, sicut ratio substantiae, et accidentis, nec tantam diversitatem inter entia ipsa constituunt, ut dictum est.

12. Aliud exemplum erat de ente completo, et incompleto: quae duo membra fatemur adaequate, et immediate dividere ens: nihilominus tamen non est ita apta ad praesentem doctrinam, sicut divisio entis in substantiam, et accidens. Quia tam in accidentibus quam in substantiis dari possunt entia completa et incompleta respective, et maior est convenientia inter ens incompletum substantiale cum substantia completa, quam cum quocumque accidente, et e converso maior est diversitas inter quamcumque substantiam et accidentia, quam inter substantiam completam, et incompletam inter se. Accedit altera generalis ratio, quod hae divisiones entis ordinantur ad distinguenda praedicamenta, seu genera rerum, et declarandas eorum essentias, et ad hunc finem longe aptior est divisio entis in substantiam, et accidens, quam in ens completum, et incompletum. Immo vix potest ratio entis completi, et incompleti exacte declarari nisi supposita priori divisione, nam quod in uno genere est incompletum perfectius ens esse potest, quam quod est completum in alio, et quod in uno genere est completum in propria ratione illius generis, est simpliciter incompletum in ratione, seu latitudine entis. Non est ergo necessaria illa divisio, sed in singulis generibus entium commodius explicatur.

of created being.

35R But if act and potency are taken properly for the potency, [i.e., power], of acting or of receiving and for the act of either kind of potency, then those members are not especially distant from each other, for a potency and act often belong to the same genus. Taken in that sense those two members do not even adequately divide being. For not every being is either act or potency in that strict sense. Although if act is taken broadly for any formally constitutive being, whether that is a proper form or a mode or a terminus, and potency is taken for any principle of acting or receiving whatever, then any being whatever can really be reduced to one of the stated members. Nevertheless, in that way they do not reveal the proper and intrinsic *ratio* of every being, as the *ratio* of substance and accident do, nor do they constitute as much difference between the beings themselves, as was said.

12. Another example was of complete being and incomplete being. We grant that these two members adequately and immediately divide being. Nevertheless, it is not as apt for the present teaching as is the division of being into substance and accident. For complete and incomplete beings can be found respectively among accidents as much as among substances, and there is more similarity between incomplete substantial beings and complete substantial beings than with any accident whatever. Conversely, there is a greater difference between any substance and any accident than between a complete substance and an incomplete substance.

Another general reason appears: these divisions of being are ordered towards distinguishing the categories or genera of things and for revealing their essences, and the division of being into substance and accident is much more apt for this end than the division into complete being and incomplete being. Indeed, the *ratio* of complete being and incomplete being can hardly be revealed accurately except by presupposing the former division. For that which is incomplete in one genus can be a more perfect being than that which is complete in another genus, and that which is complete in one genus according to the proper *ratio* of that genus is incomplete without qualification according to the *ratio* or breadth of being. That division, therefore, is not necessary, but it is more agreeably explained in the individual genera of beings.

Primum dubium de modis entium, circa tertiam dubitandi rationem.

13. In tertia difficultate nonnulla brevia dubia insinuantur. Primum est, an modus entis, qui ex natura rei distinguitur
 5 ab illa re cuius est modus, sub hac divisione comprehen- 5R
 datur, et ad quod illius membrum pertineat. Et quidem
 propter argumentum factum existimare quis posset, hos
 modos non contineri <316> sub diviso huius divisionis, et
 10 ideo necessarium non esse, ut aliquod ex membris dividen- 10R
 tibus illis conveniat. Hi enim modi non habent propriam
 entitatem et realitatem, et ideo neque entia dici possunt,
 sed solum modi entium: cum ergo divisum huius divisionis
 sit ens non complectetur hos modos, et ideo nec accidentia
 15 erunt, nec substantiae. Verumtamen hic modus dicendi fal- 15R
 sus est, nam constat, ab Aristotele, et aliis Philosophis multa
 inter accidentia numerari, quae solum sunt modi entium,
 ut figura, ubi, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus suis locis vide-
 20 bimus. Et ratio est quia ens creatum prout absolute distin- 20R
 guitur ab increato complectitur quidquid non est nihil, sed
 aliquam realem essentiam, seu formalitatem habet in rerum
 natura: hoc enim totum complectitur ens creabile, transcen-
 25 dentaliter et in tota sua latitudine sumptum, ergo etiam ens 25R
 creatum ambit omnia, quae non sunt omnino nihil, et ex-
 tra Deum sunt, hi autem modi reales non sunt nihil, sed
 suas reales essentias habent sibi proportionatas: continen-
 tur ergo sub diviso huius divisionis.

14. Aliter ergo dici potest, hos modos entium revo-
 cari ad genera rerum, quarum sunt modi, et cum quibus
 habent realem identitatem, ita ut modus substantiae revo-
 30 cetur ad substantiam, et sit substantia saltem incompleta, 30R
 modus vero accidentis sit accidens, et ad illud genus acci-
 dentis revocetur in quo fuerit ipsum accidens cuius est talis
 modus. Sed neque haec sententia in universum verum ha-
 bet, nam licet interdum ita contingat, quod modus rei par-
 35 ticipet illam rationem substantiae, vel accidentis quae est in 35R
 re cuius est modus: non est autem hoc semper verum, nam
 figura est modus quantitatis, et tamen non participat ra-

The first doubt concerning the modes of being with respect to the third reason for doubting.

13. Several doubts were briefly suggested with the third difficulty. The first is whether a mode of a being that is distinguished *ex natura rei* from the thing of which it is a mode is included under this division and to which of the members it would belong. And certainly someone could think as a result of the argument that was made that these modes are not contained in what is divided by this division, and so it is not necessary that one of the dividing members agree with these modes. For these modes do not have a proper entity and reality. As a result they cannot be called beings but only modes of beings. Since, therefore, what is being divided by this division is being, it does not include these modes. And so they will be neither accidents nor substances.

Nevertheless, this way of speaking is false. For it is clear from Aristotle and many other philosophers that what are only modes of beings—such as figure, where, and others of this kind, about which we will speak in their places—are numbered among accidents. The reason is because created being insofar as it is absolutely distinguished from uncreated being contains anything that is not nothing but has some real essence or formality *in rerum natura*. For this whole contains creatable being taken transcendently and in its whole breadth. Therefore, created being also covers everything that is not nothing and is beyond God. These real modes, moreover, are not nothing but have real essences proportionate to themselves. Therefore, they are included in what this division divides.

14. Alternatively, then, it can be said that these modes of beings are assimilated to those genera of things of which they are modes and with which they have real identity, so that a mode of a substance is assimilated to substance and is at least an incomplete substance while a mode of an accident is an accident and is assimilated to that genus of accident to which the accident of which it is such a mode belongs.

But this view cannot be held in general either, since, although it sometimes happens such that the mode of a thing participates in the *ratio* of substance or of accident that is in the thing of which it is a mode, this is not, nevertheless, always true. For figure is a mode of quantity and yet does not participate in the *ratio* of quantity but in the

tionem quantitatis, sed qualitatis, et similiter ubi est modus
 quantitatis, vel substantiae, et tamen nec est substantia, nec
 40 quantitas, sed peculiare genus, ac praedicamentum consti-
 tuit. Et idem multi censent de relationibus praedicamentalibus, si in ipsa substantia immediate fundentur, non enim
 45 habent proprias entitates realiter distinctas ab aliis, sed ad
 summum sunt quidam modi entium, et tamen novum genus
 accidentis constituunt.

15. Quocirca duo a nobis exponenda sunt, unum est
 quando modus entis sit substantia, quando vero accidens:
 aliud est, quando ille modus, qui est accidens revocetur ad
 45R praedicamentum alterius accidentis, vel no- <col. b> vum
 genus accidentis constituat. Circa primum dicendum est,
 50 in substantiis illum modum substantialem esse, qui ad con-
 stitutionem, et complementum ipsius substantiae pertinet,
 50R e contrario vero illum esse accidentalem modum, qui sup-
 ponit substantiam complete constitutam, et illam afficit sub
 aliqua alia ratione. Exemplis declaratur, nam unio materiae
 55 cum forma substantiali, vel formae cum materia per se or-
 dinatur ad constitutionem substantiae completae, et in in-
 55R trinseca ratione substantiae compositae includitur, et ideo
 talis modus substantialis est, similiter subsistentia est in-
 60 trinsecus terminus substantialis naturae, complens, ac con-
 stituens substantiale suppositum, et ideo est etiam substan-
 tialis modus, idemque dicendum esset de existentia substan-
 tiali, si illa esset modus ex natura rei distinctus ab essentia
 60R actuali naturae substantialis. Ac denique eodem modo di-
 65 cunt Theologi, unionem humanitatis ad Verbum, quamvis
 supernaturalis sit, nihilominus esse substantialem modum,
 quia ad constitutionem unius personae compositae intrin-
 65R sece concurrat. Altera pars declaratur etiam exemplis, nam
 in substantia, verbi gratia, Angelica iam completa in ratione
 70 suppositi per suam subsistentiam datur modus praesentiae
 localis in hoc, vel illo spatio, seu loco; cui praesentiae re-
 70R spondet localis motus Angelo proportionatus, qui etiam
 est modus subiecti in quo est: et tamen neuter est modus

ratio of quality. Likewise, where is a mode of quantity or of substance
 and yet is neither substance nor quantity, but constitutes its own genus
 or category. And many people think the same thing about categorial
 relations, if they are immediately founded in the substance itself.⁵ For
 they do not have proper entity distinct from other things, but at most
 are a kind of mode of beings. And yet they constitute a new genus of
 accident.

15. There are two things, then, that we need to explain. One is
 when a mode of a being is a substance and when it is an accident. The
 other is when a mode that is an accident is assimilated to the category
 of another accident and when it constitutes a new genus of accident.

Concerning the first matter, it should be said that in substances a
 mode is substantial if it pertains to the constitution and completeness of
 that substance. Conversely, it is an accidental mode if it presupposes a
 completely constituted substance and affects that substance under some
 other *ratio*. This is shown by examples: for the union of matter with
 substantial form or of form with matter is ordered *per se* to the con-
 stituting of a complete substance and is included in the intrinsic *ratio*
 of a composite substance. For this reason such a mode is a substantial
 mode. Similarly, subsistence is an intrinsic terminus of substantial na-
 ture, completing and constituting a substantial suppositum, and therefore
 it is also a substantial mode. The same thing should be said about sub-
 stantial existence, if that is a mode distinct *ex natura rei* from the actual
 essence of a substantial nature. Finally, theologians say in the same way
 that the union of humanity with the Word, although it is supernatural,
 is, nevertheless, a substantial mode, since it intrinsically concurs for the
 constituting of one composite person.

The other part is also shown by examples. For in substances—
 angelic substances, for example—already completed in the *ratio* of a
 suppositum through their own subsistence there is given a mode of local
 presence in this or that space or location, to which presence the local
 motion proportionate to an angel answers. The local motion is also a
 mode of the subject in which it is. Yet neither of these modes is a sub-
 stantial mode, nor is anything thought to substantially change in the
 angel through these modes changing. For neither belongs to the consti-

⁵Cf. *DM* 47.7.

75 substantialis, nec illis mutatis censetur aliquid substantiale
 in Angelo mutari, quia neuter pertinet ad constitutionem,
 seu complementum Angelicae substantiae. Idemque ser-
 vata proportione reperitur in substantia corporea, si praesentia
 75R localis non in sola quantitate, sed in ipsamet substan-
 tia intelligatur. Quo etiam modo dicunt Theologi, praesentiam
 80 sacramentalem corporis Christi in Eucharistia, quae
 ad genus localis praesentiae revocatur, esse modum acciden-
 talem illius corporis, quia nullo modo spectat ad substan-
 80R tialem constitutionem, vel complementum eius. Idem est
 de relatione identitatis, quae immediate in substantia fun-
 datur (si supponamus has relationes esse modos) nam talis
 85 relatio nihil confert ad substantiae complementum, aequae
 enim perfecta substantia fuit Adam quando nullum habuit
 hominem similem, seu eiusdem speciei, ac postea quando
 alii producti fuere.

90 16. Ratio vero utriusque partis facile reddi potest, nam
 substantia completa, cum sit <317> ens per se unum, et in
 suo genere absolutum, non nisi ex substantia, vel substan-
 tiis constat: quidquid ergo intrinsece concurret ad constitu-
 tionem substantiae, substantiam saltem incompletam esse,
 95 necesse est. Item substantia incompleta nihil aliud est nisi
 vel substantia ista in aliquo esse imperfecto, vel id quod est
 pars, seu complementum substantiae, ergo omnis modus
 qui ita concurret ad constitutionem substantiae est substan-
 tia incompleta, seu modus substantialis, et non est accidens.
 100 Denique de ratione accidentis est, ut supponat subiectum
 suum, ergo modus qui non supponit, sed complet substantiam
 non est accidens. Atque hinc patet ratio alterius partis,
 nam postquam substantia iam est plene in suo genere con-
 stituta, quidquid ei additur sive sit res, sive modus est ac-
 cidens eius, sed modus, qui nullo modo spectat ad comple-
 105 mentum substantiae, ex se supponit illam plene constitutam
 in suo genere: est ergo accidens eius. Maior constat, tum ex
 communi ratione accidentis, tum etiam quia si modus adve-
 niens substantiae non est accidens, sed aliquid substantiale,

tution or completion of the angelic substance. Preserving proportion, the same is found in corporeal substance, if local presence is understood to be not only in quantity but also in the substance itself. In this way theologians also say that the sacramental presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, which is assimilated to the genus of local presence, is an accidental mode of that body, since it in no way belongs to the substantial constitution or completion of that substance. The same is true in the case of the relation of identity, which is immediately founded in the substance (if we suppose that these relations are modes⁶). For such a relation confers nothing to the completion of the substance. For Adam was just as perfect a substance when there were no human beings similar to him or of the same species as afterwards when he had produced other human beings.

16. But a reason can easily be given for each part. For a complete substance, since it is a being that is one *per se* and absolute in its genus, is not except consisting of a substance or substances. Therefore, it is necessary that whatever intrinsically concurs in constituting a substance is at least an incomplete substance. Also, an incomplete substance is nothing other than either that very substance in some imperfect being or that which is a part or complement of the substance. Therefore, every mode that thus concurs for the constitution of the substance is an incomplete substance or a substantial mode and so is not an accident. Finally, it belongs to the *ratio* of accident to presuppose its subject. Therefore, a mode that does not presuppose but rather completes a substance is not an accident.

And from this the reason of the other part is clear. For after a substance is already fully constituted in its genus, whatever is added to it, whether a thing or a mode, is an accident of it. But a mode that in no way belongs to the completion of the substance of itself presupposes the substance to be fully constituted in its genus. Therefore, it is an accident of that substance. The major is clear, both from the common *ratio* of accidents and also because a mode arising in a substance is not an accident but something substantial. Therefore, it further completes the

⁶Suárez in the end rejects that relations are modes in *DM* 47.2.

110 ergo complet amplius, et quasi magis integrat ipsam sub- 105R
stantiam cuius est modus; ergo talis modus non supponit
substantiam plene constitutam, ergo si eam sic constitutam
supponit talis modus non erit substantialis, sed accidentalis.
Tandem, quia nulla alia ratio reddi potest, cur aliqui modi
115 advenientes substantiae sint accidentales, nisi quia non per- 110R
tinent ut modi ad constitutionem, vel complementum eius.

17. Solum habet peculiarem difficultatem, quae in prae-
dicto argumento tangebatur, de dependentia substantiae, et
maxime de illa quae est per modum creationis, nam illa non
120 constituit intrinsece substantiam, neque pertinet ad com- 115R
plementum eius, ergo nullo modo erit substantia etiam in-
completa, cum tamen neque accidens esse possit, propter
rationem ibi tactam, scilicet, quia non est in subiecto. Haec
vero difficultas generalis esse potest de omni actione, seu de-
125 pendentia, quamvis specialem rationem difficultatis habeat, 120R
in illa quae non est ex subiecto, de qua re ex professo di-
cendum erit inferius disputando de actione, et de passione.
Nunc breviter dicitur, nullam dependentiam, seu fieri ut sic
habere rationem accidentis respectu termini ad quem ten-
130 dit, sed esse modum quemdam indirecte, seu reductive perti- 125R
nentem ad praedicamentum sui termini: sub qua considera-
<col. b> tione motus localis reducitur ad praedicamentum
Ubi, alteratio ad qualitatem: et fortassis sub hac ratione
Aristoteles de motu disseruit in postpraedicamentis. Ratio
135 autem huius est, quia de ratione accidentis est, ut supponat 130R
subiectum suum, de ratione autem dependentiae seu fieri
est, ut non supponat terminum suum, nam est via ad illum,
et ideo non potest dependentia respectu termini habere ra-
tionem accidentis. An vero quando talis dependentia est in
140 subiecto et de subiecto, respectu illius habeat rationem acci- 135R
dentis, in dicto loco tractabimus. Recte tamen ex dictis col-
ligitur, illam dependentiam, quae et ad substantiam tendit,
et in subiecto non recipitur, non habere rationem acciden-
tis, sed modi substantialis. Unde consequenter dicendum

substance and, as it were, further integrates the substance of which it is
a mode. Therefore, such a mode does not presuppose a substance that is
fully constituted. Therefore, if it presupposes the substance constituted
in that way, then such a mode will not be substantial but accidental.
Finally, because no other reason can be given why some modes arising
in substances are accidental except that they do not belong as modes for
the constitution or completion of a substance.

17. Only [this view] has a special difficulty, which was touched
on in the argument made earlier, concerning the dependency of sub-
stance, especially concerning the dependency that is through the mode
of creation. For that dependency does not intrinsically constitute the
substance nor does it belong to the substance's completion. Therefore,
in no way will it be an incomplete substance. Yet neither could it be an
accident on account of the argument touched on there, namely, because
it is not in a subject.

But this general difficulty can apply to every action or dependency,
although it has a special *ratio* of difficulty in that which is not from
a subject. This matter must be discussed *ex professo* below when dis-
cussing action and passion.⁷ For now I say briefly that no dependency
or coming to be as such has the *ratio* of an accident with respect to
the terminus to which it tends but rather is a kind of mode indirectly
or reductively belonging to the category of its terminus. Under this
consideration local motion is reduced to the category where and alter-
ation to the category quality. And perhaps Aristotle discussed motion
in the post-predicaments under this characterization. The reason for
this, moreover, is that it belongs to the *ratio* of an accident to presup-
pose its subject, but it belongs to the *ratio* of a dependency or coming
to be not to presuppose its terminus, for it is a way to that terminus.
For this reason a dependency cannot have the *ratio* of an accident with
respect to the terminus. But whether a dependency has the *ratio* of an
accident in the cases where it is in a subject and of a subject is something
we will discuss in the stated place.

Yet it can be rightly gathered from what has been said that that
dependency which both tends to a substance and is not received in a
subject does not have the *ratio* of an accident but is a substantial mode.

⁷See especially *DM* 48.

145 est, non esse de ratione substantialis modi, ut intrinsece, et 140R
 in facto esse constituat substantiam, sed satis esse, ut con-
 stituat illam tamquam via ad illam, seu ut intrinsecum fieri
 eius, et quod non aliter illam afficiat, sic enim omne fieri ut
 sic nihil aliud est quam suus terminus in esse incompleto,
 150 ut calefactio est veluti quidam incompletus calor, et sic de 145R
 reliquis.

18. Ex dictis facile est respondere ad aliam partem,
 quam secundo loco proposuimus, scilicet, quando modus,
 qui est accidens reducat ad aliud genus accidentis, vel
 155 novum genus constituat. Eadem enim fere regula, quam
 de modis substantialibus tradidimus, applicanda hic est. 150R
 Nam interdum accidentalis modus solum est ad comple-
 mentum alterius accidentis, seu ad exercendum effectum
 formalem eius, et tunc modus accidentalis non constituit
 160 novum genus, seu praedicamentum accidentis, sed ad il-
 lud reducitur ad cuius complementum pertinet, nam in eo 155R
 genere quid incompletum est. Quando vero modus acci-
 dentalis non spectat ad complementum, vel constitutionem
 alterius accidentis, sed per sese peculiari modo afficit sub-
 stantias, vel immediate, vel medio aliquo accidente, tunc per
 165 se habet peculiarem rationem accidentis et novum praedica-
 mentum, vel proprium genus alicuius praedicamenti con- 160R
 stituit. Exemplis res declaratur: nam actualis inhaerentia
 quantitatis in substantia modus est ex natura rei distinctus a
 170 quantitate, quandoquidem in Eucharistiae sacramento ab ea
 separatur, qui tamen modus non constituit aliquod genus 165R
 peculiare alicuius praedicamenti, sed ad praedicamentum
 quantitatis reducitur, quia intrinsece pertinet ad
 constitutionem rei quantae, et ad exercendum formalem ef-
 175 fectum quantitatis. Et idem proportionaliter est de inhaer-
 entia qualitatis, quae ad praedicamentum qualitatis reduci- 170R
 tur. Item punctus tamquam incompleta quantitas ad genus
 quantitatis revocatur, quia intrinsece competit ad constitu-
 tionem ipsius quantitatis, cuius est modus, vel terminus,
 180 immo licet forte punctus habeat suam entitatem, nihilomi-
 nus, quia solum ordinatur ad terminandam, vel uniendam
 quantitatem, ad illam revocatur, multo ergo magis modus,

Consequently, it should be said that it does not belong to the *ratio* of a substantial mode to constitute a substance intrinsically and as existing in fact, but it is enough to constitute it as a way to it or as its intrinsic coming to be and what cannot otherwise affect it. For thus every coming to be as such is nothing other than its terminus in incomplete being, as heating is as a certain incomplete heat, and so on for other cases.

18. From what has been said it is easy to respond to the other part that we proposed in the second place, namely, when a mode that is an accident is reduced to some other genus of accident or when it constitutes a new genus. For almost the same rule that we related concerning substantial modes should be applied here. For sometimes an accidental mode only is for the completion of another accident or for exercising its formal effect. In such cases an accidental mode does not constitute a new genus or category of accidents but is reduced to that to whose completion it belongs. For it is something incomplete in that genus.

But when an accidental mode does not belong to the completion or constitution of another accident but *per se* affects substances in some special way, either immediately or by means of some accident, then it has *per se* the special *ratio* of an accident and constitutes either a new category or its own genus in some category.

The matter is shown by examples: for the actual inherence of quantity in a substance is a mode that is distinct *ex natura rei* from quantity, seeing that it is separated from quantity in the Eucharist. Yet the inherence does not constitute some special genus of some category but is reduced to the category of quantity, since it belongs intrinsically to the constitution of a quantified thing and pertains to the exercising of the formal effect of quantity. The same is true proportionately of the inherence of a quality, which is reduced to the category of quality. Likewise, a point as an incomplete quantity is assimilated to the genus of quantity, since it intrinsically belongs to the constitution of that very quantity of which it is a mode or terminus. Indeed, although perhaps a point has its own entity, nevertheless, since it is ordered only to terminating or uniting quantity, it is assimilated to quantity. Much more, therefore, is a mode that is the complement of some accident assimilated to it, and neither will it constitute its own genus of accident *per se*.

qui est complementum alicuius accidentis ad illud revocatur, neque constituet per se suum genus accidentis.

185 19. At vero figura, quamvis sit modus quantitatis, non 175R
revocatur ad praedicamentum quantitatis, sed genus quod-
dam qualitatis constituit, et ubi similiter est alius modus
quantitatis, qui non reducitur ad quantitatem, sed novum
praedicamentum constituit. Cuius rei causa non potest esse
190 alia, nisi quia tales modi non conferunt per se ad effectum 180R
formalem quantitatis, neque ad integritatem, vel constitu-
tionem eius, sed novum, et specialem modum afficiendi
habent, idem ergo est in omnibus similibus. Ratio item gen-
eralis fere tacta est, nam quoad priorem partem eadem est
195 ratio proportionalis in accidentibus, quae est in substantia, 185R
nam sicut id quod componit, aut integrat substantiam est in-
completa substantia, sive sit pars, sive modus eius, ita quod
complet, vel integrat aliquod accidens est quid incompletum
in eo genere accidentis, sive sit pars, sive modus eius. Quoad
200 posteriorem autem partem ratio est quia, si modus est acci- 190R
dentalis et non est pars, vel complementum accidentis in suo
esse, necesse est ut habeat proprium modum afficiendi ac-
cidentaliter qui proprium genus accidentis constituet, quia
in suo ordine est completum accidens, neque est aliquod
205 genus accidentis ad quod revocetur, tamquam quid incom- 195R
pletum in eo ordine. Atque haec doctrina notanda est ad dis-
tinguenda praedicamenta accidentium, et eorum rationem,
seu sufficientiam tradendam: de qua posterius disputabimus
et si quid difficultatis circa hanc doctrinam occurrerit, ibi
210 melius expeditur.

*Quae distinctio necessario intercedat inter substantiam et acci-
dens.*

20. In confirmatione illius tertii argumenti indicatur ali-
iud dubium, nimirum, quanta <col. b> distinctio neces-
5 saria sit inter accidens, et substantiam. Quidam enim existi-
mant requiri disiunctionem realem propriam, et rigorosam, 5R
qualis est inter res mutuo separabiles. Ita significavit Sonci-
nas 7. *Metaphysicae* q. 36. et alii, ut videbimus tractando

19. Figure, on the other hand, although it is a mode of quantity, is not assimilated to the category of quantity, but constitutes a certain genus of quality. Similarly, where is another mode of quantity that is not reduced to quantity but constitutes a new category. The cause of this cannot be anything other than that such modes do not *per se* add either to the formal effect of quantity or to its integrity or constitution, but they have a special mode of affecting. The same, therefore, is true in all similar cases.

The general reason was also already more or less presented, for with respect to the former part there is the same proportional argument in the case of accidents that there is in the case of substance. For just as that which composes or integrates a substance is an incomplete substance, whether as a part or a mode of it, so also that which completes or integrates some accident is something incomplete in that genus of accident, whether it is a part or a mode of the accident. With respect to the latter part, moreover, the reason is that if a mode is accidental and is not a part or complement of an accident in its being, it is necessary that it have its own mode of accidentally affecting, which constitutes its own genus of accident. For the accident is complete in its order, nor is there any genus of accident to which it is assimilated as something incomplete in that order.

This doctrine should be observed in order to distinguish the categories of accidents and in order to relate their *ratio* and sufficiency. We will discuss this later. If some difficulty concerning this doctrine will come up, it will be better resolved there.

What distinction necessarily exists between substance and accident.

20. In the confirmation of that third argument, another doubt is indicated, namely, how much of a distinction is necessary between an accident and a substance. For some think that a proper and rigorous real disjunction is required of the sort that there is between mutually separable things. Soncinas indicates this in question 36 and others of *Metaphysics* 7, as we will see when treating the categories of accidents,

10 praedicamenta accidentium, praesertim relationis. Sed hoc
 constat, evidentiusque constabit ex dicendis inferius de sin- 10R
 gulis Praedicamentorum, seu rerum generibus. Et ratio bre-
 viter nunc est, quia ad rationem accidentis sufficit, quod sit
 15 modus ex natura rei distinctus a substantia, afficiens illam
 omnino extra genus substantiae, ut est ubi, verbi gratia, et si
 quid est aliud simile.

21. Alii e contrario sentiunt de ratione accidentis non 15R
 esse, quod distinguatur a substantia ex natura rei, id est vel
 realiter, vel modaliter, sed satis esse quod distinguatur ra-
 20 tione formali praecisa per intellectum, cum fundamento in
 re, qualis est in exemplis in praedicta confirmatione adduc-
 tis. Sic enim in materia prima distinguimus potentiam 20R
 recipiendi a substantia materiae, quia ratio potentiae diversam
 rationem formalem denotat, quamvis contingat a parte rei
 25 non distingui ab entitate in qua est. Item, interdum substan-
 tia est virtus proxima ad agendum, vel virtute naturali (ut
 est probabilis opinio) vel saltem virtute obedienciali, quae 25R
 virtus non est a parte rei distincta ab ipsa substantia, et
 tamen est formaliter accidens ad qualitatem pertinens, nam
 30 potentia species est qualitatis, virtus autem agendi nihil est
 aliud, quam potentia quaedam. Item, relatio identitatis sub-
 stantialis specificae est formaliter accidens, et tamen non est 30R
 aliquid a parte rei distinctum a substantia. Denique est ur-
 gens argumentum quia, ut duo Praedicamenta accidentium
 35 distinguantur, non est necessario a parte rei distinctio inter
 ipsa, sed sufficit distinctio rationis formalis per intellectum,
 ut constat in actione, et passione, et inferius latius dicitur: 35R
 ergo ad distinguendum accidens a substantia similis distinc-
 tio sufficit, est enim aequalis ratio, cum non sit necessaria
 40 maior distinctio, quam Praedicamentalis.

22. Alii putant necessariam esse in re aliquam distinc- 40R
 tionem, saltem modalem. Primo, quia ratio accidentis realis
 non constituitur mente nostra, sed in re esse debet, alioqui
 non esset ens reale, sed rationis; Ubi vero non est distinc-
 45 tio in re ipsa, non po- <319> test vera ratio accidentis in re

especially [the category] of relation. But this is not universally true,
 as is clear from what was said in the last point and as will be more ob-
 vious from what will be said below about the individual categories or
 genera of things. For now the reason in brief is that it is sufficient for
 the *ratio* of accident that it is a mode that is *ex natura rei* distinct from
 a substance, affecting it wholly outside the genus of substance, as is the
 case, for example, with where and if one thing is similar to another.

21. In the other direction, others think that it is not of the *ratio*
 of accidents to be distinguished *ex natura rei*—that is, either really or
 modally—from a substance, but think that it is enough to be distin-
 guished by formal *ratio* prescinded through the intellect with a foun-
 dation in reality. This is the kind found in the examples brought up
 in the aforementioned confirmation. For in this way in the case of
 prime matter we distinguish the power of receiving from the substance
 of the matter, since the *ratio* of power denotes a different formal *ratio*,
 although it is the case that on the part of the thing the power is not
 distinguished from the entity in which it is. Likewise, sometimes a sub-
 stance is a proximate power for acting, either by a natural power (this is
 the probable opinion) or at least by an obediencial power. This power
 is not distinct on the part of the thing from the substance itself, and yet
 it is formally an accident belonging to quality. For power is a species of
 quality, but a power for acting is nothing other than a kind of power.
 Likewise, a relation of specific substantial identity is formally an acci-
 dent, and yet on the part of the thing is not something distinct from
 the substance. Finally, there is the compelling argument that since in
 order to distinguish two categories of accident it is not necessary that
 there be a distinction on the part of the thing between them but that
 a distinction of a formal *ratio* through the intellect is sufficient (as is
 clear in the case of action and passion, as will be discussed more thor-
 oughly later), therefore a similar distinction suffices for distinguishing
 an accident from a substance. For there is equal reason, since a greater
 distinction than a categorial one is not necessary.

22. Others think that some distinction *in re* is necessary, at least a
 modal one. First, because the *ratio* of a real accident is not constituted
 by our mind but must be *in re*. Otherwise, it would not be a real being
 but a being of reason. But where there is not a distinction *in re*, it
 cannot consist in the true *ratio* of an accident *in re*. Therefore, for

ipsa consistere: ergo ad veram rationem accidentis oportet, 45R
quod a parte rei sit aliqua realis distinctio inter illud et sub-
stantiam. Minor probatur, quia alias nulla ratio afferri pos-
set, ob quam attributa Dei, aut actus voluntatis, vel intellec-
50 tus eius, non sint vera, et realia accidentia, quia si identitas
non obstat, nihil est quod obstat, nam etiam ibi est distinc- 50R
tio rationis formalis fundata in re, et completa per intellec-
tum. Secundo, quia si in re nulla est distinctio, nihil est,
quod in re accidat alicui, nam idem non potest accidere sibi
55 ipsi, cum nihil possit cogitari magis essenziale, quam idem
sibi: ergo sine distinctione in re non potest concipi vera ratio 55R
accidentis realis, nam de ratione accidentis est, ut accidat
alicui. Vel potest aliter formari ratio, quia de ratione acci-
dentis est aliqua realis inhaerentia actualis, vel aptitudinalis,
60 sed eiusdem ad seipsum non potest esse vera, et realis in-
haerentia, sed omnimoda identitas secundum rem: ergo sine 60R
distinctione aliqua in re non potest vera ratio accidentis in-
telligi. Tertio declaratur aliter, quia quando mens concipit
diversis modis, seu conceptibus eandem substantiam, nul-
65 lum format conceptum distinctum, et adaequatum essentiae
talis substantiae: ergo quilibet ex illis conceptibus est in- 65R
adaequatus substantiae secundum rationem substantialem,
et essentialem eius: ergo ratio formalis concepta in substan-
tia, ut sola ratione distincta ab illa, nunquam habet veram
70 rationem accidentis. Primum antecedens patet, quia, si sub-
stantia quaelibet concipiatur distincte, et adaequate, ut in se 70R
est, solum uno conceptu concipietur, et secundum unam ra-
tionem formalem illi adaequatam, et essentialem, quia nulla
ratio formalis potest esse magis essentialis, quam illa, quae
75 est adaequata entitati rei, et ab illa in re ipsa non distingui-
tur: ergo nulla forma vel modus potest habere in re veram 75R
rationem accidentis, nisi vel realiter, vel modaliter ex natura
rei a substantia distinguatur. Atque hoc modo intelligi vide-
tur quod D. Thomas ait in 1. dist. 33. q. 1. art. 3. ad 4. ea
80 quae sunt in genere substantiae et accidentis, non esse in re
idem, ut latius docet 4. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 14. 80R

66 quilibet] qualibet A.

79 3] 4 V.

a true *ratio* of an accident it is necessary that there be on the part of the thing some real distinction between the accident and the substance. The minor is proven: for no other reason could be given on account of which the attributes of God or the acts of his will or intellect would not be true and real accidents. For if identity does not stand in the way, there is nothing that stands in the way. For in the case of the attributes there is also the distinction of a formal *ratio* founded *in re* and completed through the intellect.

Second, because if there is no distinction *in re*, there is nothing that befalls (*accidat*) something *in re*, since the same thing cannot befall itself. For nothing could be thought more essential than the very same thing to itself. Therefore, a true *ratio* of a real accident cannot be conceived without a distinction *in re*. For it is of the *ratio* of an accident to befall something. Another argument can be formed: for some real actual or aptitudinal inherence belongs to the *ratio* of accident, but something cannot have true and real inherence in itself. Something can only have identity in every way with itself according to the thing. Therefore, a true *ratio* of accident cannot be understood without some distinction *in re*.

Third, it is shown in another way: for when the mind conceives different modes or concepts of the same substance, it does not form any distinct and adequate concept of the essence of such a substance. Therefore, any one of those concepts is inadequate to the substance according to its substantial and essential *ratio*. Therefore, the formal *ratio* conceived in a substance, insofar as it is distinct from the substance only by reason, never has the true *ratio* of an accident. The first antecedent is clear, since, if any substance whatever is conceived distinctly and adequately as it is in itself, it will be conceived by one concept alone and according to one formal *ratio* adequate and essential to the substance. For no formal *ratio* can be given that is more essential than that which is adequate to the entity of a thing, and it is not distinguished *in re* from that. Therefore, no form or mode can have the true *ratio* of an accident *in re* except it is distinguished *ex natura rei*—either really or modally—from the substance. And what St. Thomas say in I, dist. 33, q. 1, art. 3, ad 4—that those things that are in the genera of substance and accident are not the same *in re*, which he teaches more thoroughly in *Summa*

23. Alii denique distinctione utendum putant. Aliud
 est enim loqui de accidente reali, et physico, aliud vero de ac-
 cidente Logico, seu praedicamentali. Accidens priori modo
 85 dicitur, quod in re vere inest, et accidentali- <col. b> ter ad- 85R
 venit, et hoc sine dubio requirit distinctionem aliquam ex
 natura rei, ut argumenta proxime facta convincunt. Pos-
 teriori autem modo dicitur accidens, id quod secundum
 modum praedicationis, et conceptionis nostrae accidental-
 90 iter, ac contingenter dicitur, secundum specialem aliquam 90R
 rationem, quae ad constituendam aliquam ordinationem
 praedicamentalem sufficiat, et huiusmodi accidens non sem-
 per requirit actualem distinctionem in re iuxta hanc senten-
 tiam. Quam existimo necessario esse probandam, propter
 95 argumentum factum, quod ad distinctionem praedicamen- 95R
 torum, non semper est necessaria distinctio in re. Quod
 etiam verum esse de aliquibus generibus accidentium ad sub-
 stantiam comparatis, praesertim, Relatione, et Quando, ex
 discursu praedicamentorum constabit. Deinde negari non
 100 potest, quin aliquae denominationes Praedicamentorum ac- 100R
 cidentium a rebus, quae sunt substantiae, desumantur, ut
 esse vestitum, deauratum, et aliae similes. Praeterea, Meta-
 physice abstrahendo, ac praescindendo, aliqua sunt extra es-
 sentiam rei, quae a parte rei non sunt actu distincta: ergo
 105 pari ratione poterunt aliqua praedicari accidentaliter, secun- 105R
 dum praedicamentalem distinctionem, etiamsi in re non
 sint distincta a substantia. Et ita facile possunt argumenta
 pro aliis sentiis adducta dissolvi, quamquam non omnia
 110 exempla, quae in eis sumuntur, vera sint. Quae omnia ex 110R
 discursu praedicamentorum accidentium evidentius, et clar-
 ius intelliguntur. Nunc vero ut comparemus substantiam et
 accidens, praecipue agimus de accidente vero, et physico, ac
 reali, alias non poterit commode fieri comparatio.

contra gentiles 4.14—seems to be understood in this way.

23. Finally, others think a distinction should be used. For it is one thing to speak of real and physical accidents, but another to speak about logical or categorial accidents. Something is called an accident in the first way when it is truly in a thing and comes accidentally to the thing. This without doubt requires some distinction *ex natura rei*, as the arguments just made clearly prove.

But something is called an accident in the latter way when it is said to be accidental and contingent according to a mode of predication and conception according to some special *ratio* which suffices for constituting some categorial ordering. Accidents of this latter sort do not always require an actual distinction *in re* according to this view. I think this view must necessarily be proven on account of the argument made that a distinction *in re* is not always necessary for a distinction between categories. This is also true about other genera of accidents compared to substance, especially about relation and when. This will be clear from the discussion of the categories.

Furthermore, it cannot be denied that some denominations of accidental categories are taken from things that are substances, as is the case with clothed, gilded, and other similar denominations. Furthermore, abstracting and prescinding from metaphysics, there are things outside the essence of a thing that on the part of the thing are not actually distinct. Therefore, by equal reason they could be predicated accidentally of something according to a categorial distinction, even if they are not distinct *in re* from substance. In this way the arguments given for the other views can easily be resolved, although not all the examples that were assumed in them are true. All this will be understood more evidently and clearly from the discussion of the categories of accidents. But now in order to compare substance and accident, we will deal primarily with true, physical, and real accidents. Otherwise, the comparison could not be made helpfully.