

<849, col. b>²

De comparatione causarum inter se.

Duae tantum comparationes faciendae supersunt inter causas ipsas, una in perfectione, altera in causalitate: ex quibus simul etiam constabit quomodo in prioritare comparentur, seu quae
5 illarum prior censenda sit. In his autem comparationibus 5R observandum est, generatim esse intelligendas, conferendo nimirum unum genus causae cum alio: nam speciatim descendere ad singulas causas singulorum generum, res esset infinita, et praeter scientiam.

10 SECTIO I.

Quaenam ex quatuor causis perfectior sit.

1. Possunt hae causae comparari vel in ratione et perfectione entis, vel in ratione causandi, et perfectione quam in illa habent: estque haec posterior comparatio formalis (ut <950> ita dicam) et per se ad praesens pertinens: tamen, quia causalitas consequitur rationem entis, et est proprietas seu attributum eius, ideo maior perfectio in causando consequi solet ex
5 maiori perfectione in essendo: et ideo non possumus ita posteriorem comparationem facere, ut priorem omnino omittamus. 5R

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes: many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³For the moment I have decided to translate ‘*comparatio*’ and its relatives consistently with ‘comparison’ and its relatives; it should be noted, however, that in various places in this disputation one might well prefer ‘relation’, since the point is often one about how one cause relates to another rather than an exercise in comparing and contrasting.

On the comparison of the causes with each other.

Only two comparisons³ remain to be made between the causes themselves: one concerning perfection and one concerning causality. From these it will also be clear at the same time how they compare with respect to priority or which of them should be deemed prior. It should be noted that these comparisons should be understood generically—that is, by comparing one genus of cause with another genus—for if we were to descend particularly to individual causes of individual genera, the matter would be infinite and beyond science.

10R SECTION I.

Which of the four causes is more perfect.

1. These causes can be compared either in the *ratio* and perfection of being or in *ratio* of causing and the perfection they have in that. It is this latter formal (if I may call it that) and *per se* comparison that is relevant at present. Nevertheless, since causality follows the *ratio* of being and is a property or attribute of it, greater perfection in causing usually follows from greater perfection in being. For this reason we cannot make the latter comparison in such a way as to omit the prior comparison entirely. 5R

10 *Comparantur intrinsecae ad extrinsecas.*

2. Primo igitur certum est, comparando materiam et formam
ad efficiens et finem, illas esse causas minus perfectas ex suo
genere tam in esse quam in causalitate. Probatur, quia cum
fit comparatio inter genera, illud est praefendum alteri in
15 quo forma et perfectissima species excedit perfectissimam al-
terius generis, ut colligitur ex doctrina Aristotelis lib. 1. *De*
caelo cap. 11. text. 115. et 116. ubi docet metiri perfectiones
potentiarum ex eo, quod in unaquaque maximum est: sed
supremum efficiens et supremus finis superant quamcumque
20 materiam vel formam, ut per se notum est: ergo. Item in
genere entis materia et forma sunt entia incompleta, et aliquo
modo imperfecta, et hoc intrinsece includunt ex vi suarum
rationum, et in tota sua latitudine, efficiens autem et finis,
minime, sed quo ens fuerit magis completum, actualius, et
25 perfectius, eo per se loquendo aptius erit ad perfectam ra-
tionem efficientis vel finis exercendam. Item materia et forma
in ipso modo causandi imperfectionem includunt, quia non
causant nisi componendo: efficiens autem et finis, quae sunt
causae extrinsecae, per se loquendo nullam involvunt imper-
30 fectionem in causalitate sua.

Comparantur inter se forma et materia.

3. Secundo comparando materiam ad formam dicendum est,
formam praestare materiae tam in ratione entis, quam in ra-
tione causae. Haec assertio praecipue habet locum in materia
et forma substantiali: de quibus satis tractata est supra cum
35 de his causis ageremus, ubi utramque partem ostendimus ex
eo, quod forma plus actualitatis habet quam materia: unde
ipsa est quae complet rei essentiam, et quae est principium
omnium operationum et perfectionum compositi. Ex quo
40 intelligitur, comparisonem hanc in ratione causae debere in-
telligi respectu compositi, nimirum quatenus hae duae sunt

⁴*DM XIII and XV.*

35 tractata] tractatum V.

Intrinsic and extrinsic causes are compared.

2. First, therefore, it is certain that when comparing matter and form
to efficient cause and end, the former causes are less perfect according
to their own genera, in being as much as in causality. It is proven, for
when a comparison is made between genera, that genus should be pre-
ferred in which the form and most perfect species surpasses the most
15 perfect species of the other genus, as is gathered from the teaching of
Aristotle in *De caelo* I, cap. 11, text. 115 and 116, where he says to mea-
sure the perfections of powers according to that which is the greatest
in each one. But the supreme efficient cause and the supreme end sur-
pass any matter or form, as is known *per se*. Therefore. Likewise, in
the genus of being, matter and form are incomplete beings and imper-
fect in some way, and they include this intrinsically from the meaning
of their concepts and in their entire extensions. But efficient cause
and end not at all. But by whatever a being will have become more
complete, more actual and perfect, by that, speaking *per se*, it will be
25 more apt for exercising the perfect *ratio* of an efficient cause or an end.
Likewise, matter and form include imperfection in their very mode of
causing, since they cannot cause except by composing. But efficient
cause and end, which are extrinsic causes, speaking *per se*, involve no
imperfection in their causality.

30R *Formal and material causes are compared with each other.*

3. Secondly, in comparing matter to form it should be said that the
form excels matter in the *ratio* of being just as in the *ratio* of cause.
This assertion is especially on the mark in the case of matter and sub-
stantial form, which we dealt with satisfactorily above when we dis-
cussed these causes,⁴ where we showed both parts from the fact that
form has more actuality than matter, whence it is that which com-
pletes the essence of a thing and which is the principle of every activ-
ity and perfection of a composite. From this it is understood that this
comparison in the *ratio* of cause ought to be understood with respect
40R to the composite, namely, insofar as these two are causes of it. For

causae illius: nam si comparatio fiat inter materiam, <col. b>
 et formam praesertim materialem, ad invicem, sic magis proprie
 videtur causalitas materiae in formam, quam formae in
 45 materiam, quia dependentia talis formae a materia est magis
 a priori, ut a proprio sustentante: dependentia vero materiae 45R
 a forma magis est a posteriori, ut a conditione seu actualitate
 requisita ad connaturalem et debitum statum materiae, ut in
 superioribus dictum est. Neque hoc obstat quominus materia
 50 in genere entis simpliciter sit minus perfecta, licet secundum
 quid in aliqua conditione excedat.

Accidentaline
 forma perfectior
 sit suo subiecto,
 an imperfectior.

4. Quocirca si haec comparatio extendatur ad formam 50R
 accidentalem, et subiectum eius, intelligenda proportionaliter
 est respectu concreti ut formaliter constituti in tali ratione:
 55 sic enim perfectius causatur a forma accidentali, quam a
 subiecto, et sub eadem consideratione forma accidentalis ex-
 cedit subiectum quatenus comparatur ad illam ut actus ad 55R
 potentiam: tamen ille excessus tantum est secundum quid, nam
 absolute in perfectione entis subiectum primum accidentis
 60 est substantia, quae simpliciter perfectior est. Et in ratione
 etiam causandi, subiectum magis est causa accidentis, quam e
 converso, quia subiectum simpliciter sustentat accidens in suo 60R
 esse, accidens vero ut sic solum accidentaliter perficit subiec-
 tum, et ad summum aliquando est conditio vel dispositio nec-
 65 essaria ad sui subiecti conservationem. Atque ex his duabus
 comparationibus colligere licet, absolute loquendo de generi-
 bus causarum, materiam esse in primo et infimo gradu; in 65R
 secundo esse formam, solum ergo superest ut finem et effi-
 ciens inter se comparemus.

Finis et efficiens inter se comparantur.

Finis et efficiens
 in perfectione
 entitativa non
 necessario se
 excedunt.

5. Dico tertio, Si finis et efficiens in perfectione entitativa
 comparentur, neutrum est perfectius alio, sed eiusdem sunt
 perfectionis, quamvis in ratione finis formalis illa perfectio
 5 exprimitur, quam in ratione efficientis. Probat prior pars, 5R
 quia finis et efficiens sumpta in tota latitudine sua, non nec-
 essario distinguuntur in ratione entis, saepe enim in idem
 coincidunt, quod maxime contingit in perfectissimo effi-

if the comparison were made between matter and form—especially
 material—to each other, then it would more properly seem to be the
 causality of matter to form than the causality of form to matter, since
 the dependency of such a form on matter is more a priori, as enduring
 on its own; but the dependency of matter on form is more a posteriori
 as a condition or actuality required for the connatural and appropriate
 (*debitum*) state of matter, as was said in the earlier sections. Nor does
 it stand in the way that matter in the genus of being strictly speaking
 is less perfect, although it excels *secundum quid* in some condition.

4. Wherefore if this comparison is extended to accidental form
 and its subject, they should be understood proportionately with re-
 spect to the concrete object as it is formally constituted in such a *ra-*
tio. For in this way something more perfect is caused by an accidental
 form than by the subject, and under the same consideration an acci-
 dental form excels the subject insofar as it is compared to that as an act
 to power. Nevertheless, that excelling is only *secundum quid*, for ab-
 solutely in the perfection of being the subject of the primary accident
 is the substance, which is more perfect, strictly speaking. And even
 with respect to the *ratio* of causing, the subject is more a cause of the
 accident than conversely, since the subject strictly speaking sustains
 the accident in its being, but the accident as such only accidentally
 perfects the subject and at most is sometimes a condition or disposi-
 tion necessary for the conservation of its subject. It can be gathered
 from these two comparisons that speaking absolutely about the gen-
 era of causes matter is in the first and deepest level and form is in the
 second level. What is left, then, is to compare end and efficient cause
 with each other.

Ends and efficient causes are compared with each other.

5. I say, third, that if end and efficient cause are compared with
 respect to entitative perfection, neither is more perfect than the other.
 Rather, both are the same in perfection, although that perfection is
 expressed more in the *ratio* of end than in the *ratio* of efficient cause.
 The former part is proven by the fact that end and efficient cause taken
 in their whole latitude are not necessarily distinguished in the *ratio* of
 being, but often coincide in the same thing. This happens especially

Whether
 accidental form is
 more perfect
 than its subject or
 less perfect.

End and efficient
 cause do not
 necessarily
 surpass each
 other in
 entitative
 perfection.

10 enti, et in perfectissimo fine: hae namque duae rationes in
 15 una et eadem re coniunguntur, nempe in Deo: ergo com-
 parando has duas causas in suo genere, et in <951> summo
 utriusque, neutra excedit alteram. Et ratio propria esse vide-
 tur, quia utraque harum causarum ex suo genere dicit per-
 fectionem sine imperfectione, et utraque, ut habeat summam
 perfectionem possibilem in suo genere, requirit infinitam per-
 fectionem simpliciter in genere entis, et ideo neutra ex suo
 genere alteram necessario excedit.

20 6. Posterior vero pars declaratur, nam in fine propria et
 formalis ratio causandi est bonitas et perfectio eius, ut supra
 dictum est: efficiens vero causat per suam formam seu natu-
 ram ut sic: et ideo dicitur causa finalis formaliter exprimere
 perfectionem et bonitatem quam causa efficiens, quod magis
 pertinet ad distinctionem ex conceptibus nostris, quam ex
 ipsa re. Hinc vero proportionaliter intelligitur, in aliis agen-
 tibus et finibus saepe etiam has duas causas esse eiusdem per-
 fectionis, quatenus quodlibet agens aliquo modo propter seip-
 sum operatur, vel quatenus operatur propter finem univocum
 seu sibi similem vel aequalem: aliquando vero causam ef-
 ficientem superare in perfectione finalem, quando finis est
 30 proximus, et non ultimus, saepius vero et connaturaliter finem
 excedere in perfectione causam agentem, nam quando causa
 agens non est summe perfecta, ut optimo modo operetur,
 propter aliquod excellentius bonum operatur.

35 7. Dico quarto. Si finis et efficiens comparentur in
 ratione causandi, in multis etiam habent aequalitatem, in
 aliis vero se mutuo excedunt secundum proprias ac praeci-
 sas rationes formales, simpliciter autem causa finalis cense-
 tur prima ac praecipua in causando. Ut brevius agamus, to-
 tam conclusionem hanc in Deo, qui suprema causa finalis et
 efficiens est, declaremus. Quamquam enim omnia quae in
 Deo sunt, prout in eo sunt, sint aequae perfecta, vel potius
 40 una perfectio, tamen prout a nobis varia attributa secun-
 dum proprias ac praecisas rationes concipiuntur, intelligimus
 unum ex suo genere esse eminentius alio, vel munus aut opus
 unius, munere alterius, quomodo dicunt Theologi misericor-
 diam esse maximam virtutem in Deo. Sic ergo compara-

10R in the case of the most perfect efficient cause and the most perfect
 end. For these two *rationes* are conjoined in one and the same thing,
 namely, God. Therefore, if we compare these two causes in their gen-
 era and in the highest instance of each, neither exceeds the other. The
 proper reason seems to be that each of these causes according to its
 genus expresses perfection without imperfection, and each, insofar as
 15R it has the highest perfection possible in its genus, requires infinite per-
 fection without qualification in its genus. For this reason neither nec-
 essarily exceeds the other in its genus.

6. The latter part is shown: for in an end the proper and formal
ratio of causing is its goodness and perfection, as was shown above.
 But an efficient cause causes through its form or nature as such. And
 for this reason final cause more formally expresses its perfection and
 goodness than efficient cause. This pertains more to a distinction aris-
 ing from our concepts than from the reality itself. From here it should
 be proportionately understood that in other agents and ends these two
 causes are also often of the same perfection, insofar as any agent what-
 ever in some way acts for its own sake or insofar as it acts for the sake
 of a univocal end or an end similar or equal to itself. But sometimes
 an efficient cause surpasses a final cause in perfection, when the end is
 proximate and not ultimate. But more often and more connaturally
 the end exceeds the agent cause in perfection, for when an agent cause
 is not perfect in the highest degree, it acts for the sake of some more
 excellent good in order to act in the best way.

7. I say, fourth, that if end and efficient cause are compared
 with respect to the *ratio* of causing, they also have equality in many
 cases. But in other cases they mutually exceed each other according
 to proper and precise formal *rationes*. Strictly speaking, however, the
 final cause is thought to be first and foremost in causing. In order
 to deal with this matter briefly, I will explain this whole conclusion
 in the case of God, who is the supreme final cause and the supreme
 efficient cause. For although everything that is in God is equally
 perfect insofar as it is in him—or, better, they are one perfection—
 nevertheless, insofar as various attributes are conceived by us accord-
 ing to proper and precise *rationes*, we understand one attribute to be
 more eminent than another according to its genus or the function or
 work of one to be more eminent than the function of another, just as

50 ndo rationem causae efficientis et finalis, inveniuntur aequales
 primo in effectibus, quia non potest causa efficiens perfectis-
 55 sima habere plures vel nobiliores effectus, quam possit finalis
 causa etiam summe perfecta, et e converso: nullus enim ef-
 60 fectus est a Deo ut efficiente, qui non sit propter eum ut ul-
 timum finem, et e contra- <col. b> rio. Immo ulterius addi
 potest in hoc etiam esse aequalitatem, quod sicut omnes effec-
 65 tus omnium causarum efficientium sunt a primo efficienti, ita
 omnes effectus omnium causarum finalium sunt a supremo
 fine: et mutata proportione sicut omnes effectus omnium
 70 causarum finalium sunt in suo genere a primo efficienti, ita
 omnes effectus omnium causarum efficientium sunt in suo
 genere a supremo fine. Tertio est in hoc etiam quaedam ae-
 75 qualitas, quod utraque ex his causis ex suo genere dicit per-
 fectionem simpliciter, unde neutra includit imperfectionem,
 ut limitationem, aut dependentiam, vel aliquid simile, et si-
 cut una est connexa (ut ita dicam) cum altera in causando, ita
 80 etiam vicissim altera cum illa, neutra tamen dici potest pro-
 prie dependens ab altera, sed effectus ipsi sunt dependentes
 necessario ab utraque, seu a Deo sub utraque ratione. Et ita
 patet prima pars assertionis.

Efficiens in quo
excedat finem.

8. Secunda declaratur, quia ratio causae efficientis in hoc
 70 multum videtur excedere, quod influxus eius est maxime pro-
 prius et realis per essentialem dependentiam et emanationem
 effectus ab illa, unde efficiens propriissime dicitur dare esse
 effectui, et Aristoteles illud definivit esse principium *unde*
incipit motus, seu productio vel factio rei. Et hinc etiam
 75 ortum habuit ut effectus, cum sit adaequatum correlativum
 causae, per antonomasiam ab efficiendo nominetur, propter
 quod Stoici solam causam efficientem nomine causae dignam
 censuerunt, ut patet ex Seneca epistola 66. et Laertius in vita
 80 Zenonis. Finis autem excedit primum in hoc, quod est ve-
 luti ultimus terminus in quem omnis actio efficientis dirigi-
 tur, ita ut, si ita fas est loqui, dicere possimus efficiens fini de-
 servire, et Deum ipsum sibi quodammodo ministrare, dum

Seneca.
Laertius.

theologians say that mercy is the greatest virtue in God.⁵ In the same
 way, therefore, if we compare *rationes* of efficient and final cause, they
 will in the first place be found equal in effects, since the most perfect
 efficient cause cannot have more or more noble effects than the final
 cause can that is also perfect to the highest degree, nor the other way
 around. For there is no effect that comes from God as from an effi-
 50R cient cause that is not for the sake of him as for the sake of the ultimate
 end, and the other way around.

Indeed, it can be further be added that there is also equality in
 this, namely, that just as all effects of all efficient causes are from the
 first efficient cause, so also all effects of all final causes are from the
 highest end. And, changing proportionately, just as all effects of all
 55R final causes are in its genus from the first efficient cause, so also all
 effects of all efficient causes are in its genus from the highest end.

Third, there is also a certain equality in that each of these causes
 expresses an unqualified perfection in its genus; hence, neither in-
 60R cludes imperfection, whether limitation, dependence, or something
 like that. And just as one is connected (if I may speak in this way)
 with another in causing, so also in turn the latter with the former (al-
 though neither can properly be called dependent on the other; rather,
 the effects themselves are necessarily dependent on both or dependent
 65R on God under each *ratio*). And so the first part of the assertion is clear.

8. Second, it is shown—since the *ratio* of efficient cause seems
 to surpass greatly in this respect—that its influx is more proper and
 real especially through the effect’s essential dependence on and eman-
 ation from the efficient cause. Hence, an efficient cause is most
 properly said to give being to the effect. Aristotle defines it as the prin-
 ciple ‘whence motion begins’ or whence the production or making of
 a thing begins. And this is where it comes from that effects, since
 75R they are adequate correlatives of causes, are named through antono-
 masia from effecting. This is the reason why the Stoics suppose that
 only efficient causes are worthy of the name ‘cause’, as is clear from
 Seneca, Letter 66, and Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives and Opinions of Emi-
 nent Philosophers*, the life of Zeno in Book VII.

In what way
efficient cause
exceeds end.

Seneca.
Diogenes
Laërtius.

But end exceeds efficient cause first in this, namely, that it is as
 it were the ultimate terminus to which every action of an efficient

⁵Cf. Suárez’s use of the term ‘*munus*’ when discussing transcendental relations, e.g., in *DM* 47.4.

quidquid agit, propter se operatur. Et ob hanc rationem, cum effectus aliquo modo sit propter suam causam (particula enim *propter* generatim potest causalitatem indicare) tamen
 85 per antonomasiam de solo fine dicitur, *esse propter quem res fit*, et hinc etiam Socrates solam causam finalem, causam appellavit apud Platonem in *Phaedone*. Deinde ac praecipue videtur superare finis in hoc, quod ipse est primum initium et principium omnis actionis, quia ipsummet efficiens excitat
 90 et allicit ad efficiendum: quod, quamvis in primo efficiendi inveniatur absque causalitate finis in ipsum efficiens, sed tantum in <952> externam actionem eius, nihilominus secundum eam rationem intelligimus primum motorem, vel (ut ita dicam) primum procuratorem omnis causalitatis esse finem.
 95 Qui propterea appellari solet *Prima, et Causa causarum*, ut notavit Albertus lib. 2. *Physicorum* tract. 2. cap. 5. ubi quosdam alios ordines inter has causas considerat: sed quos explicuimus, videntur esse praecipui.

Plato.

Causa dicitur analogice de quatuor generibus.

9. Sed quaeri tandem hic potest, quod supra huc remisimus, an haec inaequalitas causarum tanta sit, ut analogiam inter eas constituat in ratione causae. Ad quod breviter dicendum est cum communi sententia, rationem causae non esse univocam, sed analogam, primo quidem propter rationem supra tractatam, quod causa accidentium et substantiarum non est univoce causa. Secundo quia ratio causae dicta de Deo, et de materia et forma non potest esse univoca propter eandem rationem, qua nec ratio entis aut cuiusvis alterius praedicati realis communis Deo et creaturis potest esse univoca. Quae duae rationes non solum probant rationem causae in communi, sed etiam rationem causae efficientis (et idem est de fine) non esse univocam, sive ut communis est causae efficienti accidentium et substantiae, sive ut communis est primae causae et secundis, propter essentialem dependentiam secundarum a prima. Quod maxime verum est, si
 115 comparentur in virtute causandi: nam si comparentur in ac-

cause is directed in such a way that—if one may speak in this way—we can say that efficient cause serves end. God himself serves himself in a certain way, while whatever he does, he does for his own sake. And for this reason, although an effect is in some way on account of (*propter*) its cause (for the phrase ‘on account of’ [*propter*] generally can indicate causality), nevertheless, through antonomasia it can be said that it belongs only to an end ‘to be that for the sake of which a thing comes to be’. This is why in Plato’s *Phaedo* Socrates designates only the final cause a cause.

Plato.

End also seems especially to exceed in this, namely, that it itself is the first beginning and principle of every action, since it excites and attracts the efficient cause to effecting. Although in the case of the first efficient cause it is found without any causality of the end in the efficient cause itself but the causality is only found in the cause’s external action, nevertheless according to this argument we understand that the first motor or (if I may speak in this way) first procurator of every causality is an end. For this reason the end is usually called the ‘first cause’ or the ‘cause of causes’, as Albert the Great notes in *Physics* II, tract. 2, cap. 5, where he considers certain other relationships between these causes. But the ones we have explained seem to be especially significant.

9. Finally, one can ask here what we above left for later discussion: whether this inequality of the causes is so great that an analogy between them is set up in the *ratio* of cause. In response to this one should briefly say in accordance with the common view that the *ratio* of cause is not univocal but analogical. This is so, first of all, on account of the reason discussed earlier: the cause of accidents is not univocally a cause with the cause of substances. Second, because the *ratio* of cause is said of God and it cannot be univocal with respect to matter and form for the same reason on account of which the *ratio* of being or of any other predicate that is real and common to both God and creatures cannot be univocal. These two reasons not only prove that the *ratio* of cause in general is not univocal but also that the *ratio* of efficient cause (and likewise in the case of ends) is not univocal, whether as it is common to the efficient cause of accidents and of substance or as it is common to the first cause and secondary causes on account of the essential dependence of secondary causes on the first. This is especially true if they are compared with respect to the power

‘Cause’ is said analogically of the four genera.

tione ipsa, non est tam propria analogia, eo quod et actio ipsa 120R
quid creatum sit, et saepe unamet actio sit ab utraque causa,
quod in superioribus tactum est.

120 10. Praeterea, comparando materiam et formam inter
se, nulla apparet inter eas analogia in ratione causae, tamen 125R
si conferantur cum fine, videtur sane alia ratio analogiae hic
intercedere. Nam efficiens propriissime influunt esse: materia
autem et forma non tam proprie influunt esse, quam compo-
nunt illud per seipsas, et ideo secundum hanc rationem vide-
125 tur nomen causae primo dictum de efficiente: ad materiam 130R
autem vel formam esse translatum per quamdam proportion-
alitatem. Unde licet illae duae causae sint proprie partes es-
senciales, et principia intrinseca rei naturalis, causae vero dic-
tae videntur per dictam analogiam, licet iam secundum com-
130 munem usum simpliciter sit illis tribuendum nomen causae. 135R

11. At vero comparando inter se causam <col. b> effi-
cientem et finalem, mihi quidem videtur, si nominis imposi-
tionem et vim attendamus, primo et maxime dictum esse de
causa efficiente, cuius influxus et notior est, et maxime realis,
135 et propriissime attingens ipsum esse, quod communicat effec- 140R
tui. Quoad rem tamen significatam, iam dictum est proprie
et aliquo modo primario convenire causae finali. Non video
autem quae sit necessitas constituendi propriam analogiam
inter has duas causas modo a nobis propositas, finem scilicet
140 ac efficientem, si per se comparentur, et caeteris paribus 145R
ex parte effectus et secundum totam perfectionem quam un-
aquaeque potest habere in suo ordine, quod est comparare
rationem finis et efficientis prout in Deo sunt. Nam utriusque
convenit proprie et intrinsece ratio causae, et in ea possunt
145 concipi ut habentes aliquam convenientiam veram ac prop- 150R
riam, et non habent inter se dependentiam essentialem in
ea ratione, quamvis habeant connexionem, ut declaravimus:
nulla est ergo ratio analogiae inter ipsas: erit ergo sub ea ra-
tione nomen univocum. Nec enim repugnat nomen alioqui
150 analogum ad plura, univoce aliquibus convenire, ut inferius 155R
dicemus tractando de analogia entis et accidentis. Et haec de
hac comparatione sint satis.

of causing. For if they are compared with respect to the action itself,
there is not so proper an analogy by the fact both that the action itself
is what is created and that often one and the same action comes from
both causes (which was touched on in previous sections).

10. In addition, when comparing matter and form to each other,
no analogy between them appears in the *ratio* of cause; nevertheless,
if they are compared to end, it seems reasonable that another *ratio* of
analogy comes up here. For efficient causes most properly inflow
being. Matter and form, however, do not as properly inflow being
as compose it through themselves. And therefore for this reason it
seems that the name 'cause' is said in the first place of efficient causes.
But the name is carried over to matter and form through a certain
proportionality. Hence, although these two causes are properly es-
sential parts and intrinsic principles of a natural thing, they seem to
be called causes through the mentioned analogy, although now the
name 'cause' is simply attributed to them through common usage.

11. But when comparing efficient cause and final cause to each
other, it indeed seems to me that if we pay attention to the imposition
and meaning of the name, it was said first and foremost of efficient
causes whose influx is both better known and especially real. And
the being that communicates to the effect most properly belongs to
it. Nevertheless, with respect to the signified thing, it was already
said that it properly and in some way primarily applies to final causes.
Moreover, I do not see what the necessity is in constituting a proper
analogy between these two causes in the way proposed by us, namely,
if end and efficient cause are compared *per se* and *ceteris paribus* on the
part of the effect and according to the whole perfection which each
can have in its order, which is to compare the *ratio* of end and of effi-
cient cause as they are in God. For the *ratio* of cause applies properly
and intrinsically to each and they can be conceived in God as having
some true and proper agreement and they do not have an essential
dependence between them in that *ratio* (although they have a connec-
tion, as we showed). There is, therefore, no *ratio* of analogy between
them. There will, therefore, be a univocal name under that *ratio*. For
it is not repugnant for a name to apply analogically to multiple things
but univocally to some, as we will say below when discussing the anal-
ogy of being and accident. And this is enough for this comparison.

SECTIO II.

Utrum causae possint esse sibi invicem causae.

Dubitandi ratio
pro parte
negativa.

1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia causa, ut supra est dictum, est
prior effectu et consequenter effectus posterior causa: ergo
5 non potest id quod est effectus, esse causa suae causae: alio-
qui vel esset simul prius et posterius, vel non omnis causa
esset prior suo effectu. Nec satisfaciet si quis respondeat, non
repugnare idem esse prius et posterius altero natura tantum,
10 et secundum diversas rationes: nam prioritas naturae, quae in
causa requiritur respectu effectus, non est tantum prioritas se-
cundum unam vel alteram considerationem, sed est absoluta
prioritas, quae dici potest praesuppositionis, quatenus, abso-
lute loquendo, in causa debet praesupponi esse, ut causare
15 possit. Unde sic concludi potest: in causa absolute supponi-
tur esse ad esse effectus, nam effectus non habet esse nisi me-
dia causalitate, et ad causalitatem simpliciter supponitur esse
in causa: ergo ad esse effectus simpliciter supponitur esse in
causa: ergo causa simpliciter et omni ratione debet <953>
20 esse prior natura effectu: nam prioritas naturae non videtur
esse aliud quam quaedam prioritas praesuppositionis: ergo
feri non potest ut causa sit effectus suae causae.

Rationes
affirmativae
partis.

2. In contrarium autem est, quia Aristoteles agens de cau-
sis, illud docuit axioma, quod a caeteris Philosophis recep-
25 tum est. Quapropter non tam investigamus an hoc verum sit,
quam quo sensu intelligendum sit: quod praestabimus melius
conferendo singulas causas inter se: nam in generali loquendo
non est necessarium neque possibile omnes causas esse sibi in-
vicem causas, sive secundum diversa genera, sive intra idem
30 genus conferantur. Quia imprimis non omnes causae habent
causam, ut constat de prima causa efficiente et ultimo fine.
Deinde, quamvis aliqua causa, efficiens verbi gratia, habeat
causam, non tamen habet causam a se causatam, neque etiam
35 debet illud axioma universe intelligi, sed indefinite seu non

SECTION II.

Whether causes can be causes of each other in turn.

1. The reason for doubting is that causes, as was said above, are prior
to effects and, consequently, effects are posterior to causes. There-
5 fore, it cannot be that that which is an effect is the cause of its causes.
Otherwise, it would either be both prior and posterior at once or not
every cause would be prior to its effect. Nor will it be satisfactory
if someone responds that it is not repugnant for the same thing to
be prior and posterior to another nature alone and according to dif-
10 ferent *rationes*. For the priority of nature that is required in a cause
with respect to its effect is not merely priority according to one or
another consideration, but is absolute priority, which can be called
priority of presupposition insofar as, absolutely speaking, being must
be presupposed in a cause in order for it to be able to cause. Hence,
15 one can conclude as follows: being is absolutely assumed in a cause
for the being of the effect, for an effect does not have being except by
means of causality, and for causality being is assumed without qual-
ification in the cause. Therefore, for the being of the effect being is
assumed without qualification in the cause. Therefore, a cause must
20 without qualification and according to every *ratio* be a nature prior
to the effect. For the priority of nature does not seem to be anything
other than a certain priority of presupposition. Therefore, it cannot
happen that a cause is the effect of its own cause.

2. But the contrary is the case since Aristotle, when dealing
with the causes, teaches that axiom, which is received by the remain-
25 ing philosophers. For this reason we are not so much investigating
whether this is true as in what sense it should be understood. We
will accomplish this better by comparing individual causes with each
other. For speaking generally it is neither necessary nor possible for
all causes to be causes of each other in turn, whether they are com-
30 pared according to the different genera or within the same genus. In
the first place, after all, not all causes have a cause, as is obvious in
the case of the first efficient cause and the ultimate end. Furthermore,
although some cause—and efficient cause, for example—has a cause, it,
nevertheless, does not have a cause caused by itself nor does it always
35 have a material cause or a formal cause. That axiom, therefore, should

The reason for
doubting on
behalf of the
negative side.

Reasons for the
affirmative side.

35 repugnanter, quia nimirum non repugnat aliquas causas esse
sibi invicem causas, vel certe quod in aliquibus etiam neces-
sarium sit, et ideo videndum superest in quibus non repugnet,
vel necessarium sit.

40R

Sensus quaestionis exponitur.

3. Est autem advertendum duobus modis posse intelligi
causas esse sibi invicem causas: primo formaliter tantum (ut
sic dicam) seu secundum generales rationes causarum: se-
cundo in particulari, et secundum easdem res causantes et
causatas. Prior sensus est facilis et sine difficultate, sed non
est in praesenti praecipue intentus, quia in eo solum asseritur,
efficientem causam verbi gratia posse habere causam materi-
alem: et e converso causam materialem posse habere causam
efficientem, et sic de aliis, quod in omnibus generibus man-
ifestum est, nam et materia est effecta, et multae causae ef-
ficientes sunt res causatae a materia, et quatenus actu causae
sunt, earum causalitas etiam causatur a materia. Neque in
hoc sensu procedit difficultas supra tacta, quia non comparatur
eadem res in ratione causae et causati, sed una res comparatur
ad alteram ut ad effectum suum in quodam genere
causae, ad aliam vero ut ad causam suam in alio genere, quod
genus causae participatur ab effectu alterius, sic autem nul-
lum est inconveniens ut aliqua causa materialis, sit posterior
aliqua causa efficiente a qua fit, et <col. b> prior alia quam
ipsa materialiter causat. Comparari ergo debent causae in in-
dividuo, et in eisdem rebus. Rursus autem inter istasmet res
potest intelligi comparatio vel secundum idem, vel secundum
diversa: secundum idem, ut si una sit causa esse alterius, et
vicissim ab illa causetur quantum ad suum esse, nam cum un-
aqueque causa per suum esse causet, si secundum illud etiam
causatur a suo effectu, tales res, et eadem, et secundum idem
erunt sibi invicem causae. Secundum diversa autem erunt, si
una sit causa alterius secundum esse eius, alia vero sit causa al-
terius solum secundum causalitatem ad aliquam aliam super-
additam perfectionem, quae omnia exemplis clarius patebunt

5R

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not be understood universally, but indefinitely or not repugnantly,
because, namely, it is not repugnant for some causes to be causes of
each other in turn and in some cases it is even necessary. And for this
reason what remains to be seen is in which cases it is not repugnant or
in which cases it is necessary.

The sense of the question is explained.

3. It should, moreover, be noticed that there are two ways to
understand the claim that causes can be causes of each other in turn:
first, formally alone (if I may speak in this way) or according to the
general *rationes* of causes, or, second, in particular and according to
the same things causing and caused. In the former sense, the matter is
simple and without difficulty, but it is not what is primarily intended
at present, since understood in that way the claim only asserts that
efficient causes, for example, can have material causes and that, con-
versely, material causes can have efficient causes, and so on for the
other causes. This is obvious for all the genera. For it is the case both
that matter is an effect and that many efficient causes are things caused
by matter, and, insofar, as they are actually caused, their causality is
also caused by matter. Nor do the difficulties mentioned earlier apply
when the claim is taken in this sense, since it is not the very same thing
that is compared in the *ratio* of cause and of the caused, but one thing
is compared to a second thing as to its effect in a certain genus of cause
but to another thing as to its cause in another genus, which genus of
cause is participated in by the effect of another. In this way there is
no disagreeability in some material cause being posterior to some ef-
ficient cause by which it comes to be and being prior to another that
materially causes it. The causes should, therefore, be compared indi-
vidually and with respect to the things themselves.

In turn, the comparison between the things themselves can be un-
derstood *secundum idem* or *secundum diversa*. *Secundum idem*: if one
thing is the cause of the being of another thing and in turn is caused
with respect to its own being by the second thing. For when each
cause causes through its own being, if with respect to that it is also
caused by its effect, such things will both be the same and will be mu-
tual causes of each other *secundum idem*. But they will be causes of
each other *secundum diversa* if one thing is the cause of the other with

ex sequentibus.

Quomodo materia et forma sint sibi invicem causae.

35 4. Dico ergo primo. Materia et forma sunt sibi invicem
causae, et aliquo modo secundum idem, non tamen omnino.
Haec assertio primo declaratur in materia prima, et substan-
tialibus formis materialibus, de quibus certum est causari a 40R
materia, et quoad esse suum, quia ex ea fiunt, et in ea sus-
tentantur, et quoad suam causalitatem, quia earum informa-
tio eodem modo pendet a materia. E converso vero etiam
40 forma est causa materiae in suo genere, quia illam informat et
actuatur, et quia sine illa informatione non potest materia 45R
naturaliter esse. In quo est considerandum duo contineri in hac
causalitate formae circa materiam: unum est, quod forma per-
ficit materiam ipsam informando illam, aliud est, quod media
45 hac informatione materia suum esse retinet. Quantum ad pri-
mum forma et materia sunt sibi invicem causae, non tamen 50R
secundum idem, quia illa perfectio quam forma formaliter
praebet materiae, distinctum quid est ab ipso esse materiae,
50 quia non est aliud ab ipsa forma seu informatione eius, unde
sub hac ratione forma non tam est causa materiae absolute, et
simpliciter, quam materiae informatae. Atque ita materia est 55R
causa formae simpliciter et secundum esse eius, forma vero
est causa materiae solum quatenus formata est, et secundum
55 hanc rationem dicimus non esse secundum idem sibi invicem
causas materiam et formam.

60 5. At vero secundum aliud quod habet materia per for-
mam, possunt dici invicem causari et causare secundum idem,
nam materia per suum esse causat formam, et in eodem dici
60 potest causari ab illa, quatenus illud habere non
potest sine illa, nam hoc est signum dependentiae et causal-
itatis alicuius. Tamen, si vera sunt quae de his causis supra 65R
diximus, in hoc quasi circulo non est omnino eadem pro-
prietas et similitudo, nam materia per suum esse directe et

respect to its being, but the second thing is the cause of the other only
according to the causality with respect to some other superadded per-
fection. All this will be made clearer by the examples in the following
35R paragraphs.

In what way matter and form are causes of each other in turn.

4. Therefore, I say first: matter and form are causes in turn of each
other, and *secundum idem* in a certain way though not entirely. This
assertion is first shown in the case of prime matter and with material
40R substantial forms, concerning which it is certain that they are caused
by matter, both with respect to their being (for they come to be from
it and are sustained in it) and with respect to their causality (for their
information depends in the same way on matter). But, conversely,
form is also the cause of matter in its genus, since it informs and ac-
tually matter and since matter cannot naturally exist without that
45R information. In this two things should be considered to be contained
in this causality of the form with respect to matter. One is that form
perfects matter itself by informing it. The second is that matter pre-
serves its own being by means of this information. With respect to
50R the first, form and matter are causes of each other in turn, yet not
secundum idem, since that perfection which form formally presents to
matter is something distinct from the being itself of matter. For it
is nothing other than the form itself or its information. Hence, un-
der this aspect, form is not so much the cause of matter absolutely and
without qualification as the cause of informed matter. And in this way
55R matter is the cause of form without qualification and with respect to
its being, but form is the cause of matter only insofar as it is formed.
For this reason we say that it is not *secundum idem* that matter and
form are causes of each other in turn.

60 5. But with respect to the other thing that matter has through
form, they can be said in to be caused and to cause *secundum idem*,
for matter through its own being causes form and in the same respect
can be said to be caused by form, insofar as the former cannot be had
without the latter. For this is a sign of dependency and something's
65R causality. Nevertheless, if what said above about these causes is true,
it is not entirely the same property and similitude in this, as it were,
circle. For matter through its own being directly and *per se* causes the

65 per se causat ipsum esse formae, ita ut in nulla ratione de-
beat aut possit intelligi esse formae ut quid praesuppositum
ad influxum materiae, sed ut causatum per illum. At vero 70R
e converso, esse materiae simpliciter concipiendum est ut
praesuppositum ad esse talis formae, quia est principium ip-
sius influxus materialis, sine quo non fit talis forma: adeo ut
70 eius naturalis effectio, si secundum propriam rationem con-
cipiatur, non possit ita praescindi, quin praesupponat mate- 75R
riam, quia essentialiter est eductio de potentia materiae. Igi-
tur esse materiae solum est a forma pendens ut a conditione
75 et actualitate superaddita, sine qua naturaliter esse non potest,
quae a multis dicitur (ut supra notavi) dependentia a posteri-
ori et non a priori. Ob hanc ergo causam dixi, quod licet 80R
haec mutua causalitas sit aliquo modo secundum idem, non
tamen omnino, quia nimirum directe et immediate est secun-
80 dum diversa, consequenter vero terminatur aliquo modo ad
idem, quatenus ipsummet esse materiae pendet aliquo modo
a forma. 85R

very being of the form in such a way that the being of a form should
not, indeed, cannot, under any *ratio* be understood as something pre-
supposed for the influx of matter, but as something caused through
matter. Conversely, however, the being of matter is without qualifi-
cation conceived as presupposed for the being of such a form, since
it is the principle of that material influx without which such a form
could not come to be; so much so that its natural effecting, if it is con-
ceived according to its proper *ratio*, cannot be divided in this way, lest
it presuppose matter since it essentially is the eduction of a potency
of matter. Therefore, the being of matter only depends on form as
on a superadded condition and actuality without which it cannot nat-
urally be. By many this is called (as we noted above) an a posteriori
dependency and not an a priori dependency. Therefore, for this rea-
son we said that although this mutual causality is *secundum idem* in
a certain way though not entirely. For, namely, directly and *per se* it
is *secundum diversa*, but it is consequently terminated in some way in
the same respect insofar as the very same being of matter depends in
some way on form. 85R

6. And according to these points the conclusion with respect to
matter and subsisting substantial forms is easily explained. For those
forms are not caused by matter according to its own being but only
according to information. There is, moreover, a cause of matter in the
same way in which there is of other substantial forms and so that diffi-
culty about mutual causality is in some way less applicable. Likewise,
that mutual causality comes up in an analogous way between subjects
and accidents. For a subject is a material cause of an accident and most
properly causes both the coming to be and the being of the accident,
since it sustains it. But an accident is not properly a cause of the sub-
ject with respect to its being. It is, nevertheless, a cause in some way,
actualizing and perfecting the subject. This is more to be a formal
cause of the being that it confers on the subject than to be a formal
cause of the subject itself. But sometimes this causality redounds in
some way to the subject itself, when, namely, there is such a connec-
tion between the subject and accident that it cannot naturally remain
a subject without such an accident or disposition. In that case one can
in some way say that there is such a mutual causality according to the
same subject. Nevertheless, that is not so much a proper causality and
a priori dependency as a kind of necessary condition according to the

The assertion is
explained with
respect to prime
matter and
rational souls.

Explicatur
assertio in
materia prima et
rationali anima.

6. Et iuxta haec facile explicatur conclusio in materia, et
forma substantiali subsistente, illa enim forma non causatur
a materia secundum suum esse, sed tantum secundum in-
formationem: est autem causa materiae eodem modo quo
aliae formae substantiales, et ita minor quodammodo est in 90R
illa mutua causalitate difficultas. Inter subiectum item et ac-
cidens proportionali modo intervenit illa mutua causalitas,
90 nam subiectum est causa materialis accidentis, et propriissime
causat fieri et esse illius, quia sustentat illud: accidens vero
non est proprie causa subiecti secundum esse illius, est tamen 95R
causa aliquo modo actuans et perficiens illud, quod potius est
esse causam formalem illius esse quod confert subiecto, quam
ipsius subiecti. Interdum vero haec causalitas redundat aliquo
95 modo in ipsummet subiectum, quando videlicet talis est con-
nexio inter subiectum et accidens ut naturaliter manere non
100R
possit subiectum sine tali accidente seu dispositione: et tunc
aliquo modo dici potest talis causalitas mutua secundum idem
100 esse <col. b> subiecti: verumtamen illa non tam est causal-
itas proprie et dependentia a priori, quam conditio quaedam
105R
necessaria secundum naturalem ordinem, ut saepe dictum est.

Quomodo finis et efficiens sint sibi invicem causae.

7. Dico secundo. Finis et efficiens sunt sibi invicem causae, non tantum secundum diversa, sed etiam secundum idem. Haec assertio quoad primam partem est Aristotelis 5. *Metaphysicae* cap. 2. et lib. 2. *Physicorum* cap. 3. Ubi non adhibet exempla huius mutuae causalitatis, nisi inter finem et efficiens. Communiter autem exponitur secundum diversa, scilicet, finem esse causam efficientis quoad causalitatem eius, efficiens vero esse causam finis quoad esse illius. Ita fere D. Thomas super Aristotelem et Alensis in *Metaphysicae* et Albertus 2. *Physicorum* tract. 2. cap. 6. sed non existimo esse omnino excludendum, quin aliquo modo hae duae causae sint sibi invicem causae etiam secundum idem, ut ex his quae dicemus, constabit. Nunc declaratur facile sententia communis, quoad id, quod affirmat. Nam finis quem agens habet in agendo non est causa esse illius, nam supponit in illo esse, ut possit et agere et metaphorice moveri a fine ad agendum, si capax sit talis motionis. Quod autem finis sit causa efficientis quoad causalitatem patet, quia excitat et movet efficientem causam ad agendum. Quod vero e contrario finis sit effectus agentis secundum suum esse, patet, quia eadem forma quae movet agens ad agendum, est terminus actionis eius. Ratio denique a priori est, quia finis, ut causet, non requirit actualem existentiam, sed tantum esse in apprehensione: et ideo priusquam in re sit, potest movere in suo genere agens ad agendum, et rursus potest ab eo existentiam recipere per veram efficientiam.

Aliquot obiecta
contra
resolutionem de
efficiente et fine.

8. Sed obiicitur primo contra utramque partem. Primo quia finis non confert efficienti ullo modo ut sit id, unde primum motus proficiscitur, sed a se id habet, vel ab aliis causis prioribus, ergo finis non est causa efficientis quoad causalitatem. Secundo, nam alias sequitur Deum quatenus efficiens est, causari a fine, quod dici nullo modo potest. Tertio e contrario videtur, finem non solum esse causam efficientis quoad

natural order, as has often been said.

In what way ends and efficient causes are causes of each other in turn.

7. Second, I say: end and efficient cause are causes of each other in turn not only *secundum diversa* but also *secundum idem*. This assertion with respect to the first part comes from Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, cap. 2, and *Physics* II, cap. 3, where he does not bring up examples of this mutual causality except between end and efficient cause. It is often, however, explained, *secundum diversa*: namely, that end is the cause of the efficient cause with respect to its causality but the efficient cause is the cause of the end with respect to its being. This is more or less the claim made by St. Thomas regarding Aristotle and by Alexander of Hales in *Metaphysics* and by Albert the Great in *Physics* II, tract. 2, cap. 6. But I do not think that it should be entirely excluded that these two causes are in some way causes of each other in turn even *secundum idem*, as will be clear from what we will say.

For now the common view is easily shown, with respect to that which it affirms. For the end which an agent has when acting is not the cause of the agent's being for it presupposes being in the agent so that the agent can act and be moved to acting by the end, if it is capable of such motion. That the end is the cause of the efficient cause with respect to causality is clear, since the end excites and moves the efficient cause to acting. But, the other way around, that the end is the effect of the agent according to its being is clear, since the same form that moves the agent to acting is the terminus of the agent's action. Finally, the reason is a priori, since an end does not require actual existence in order to cause, but only requires being in apprehension. And for this reason it can in its genus move the agent to acting before it exists in reality and, in turn, can receive existence from the agent through true efficiency.

8. But there is, first, an objection against each part. First: since an end does not confer anything to the efficient cause so that it is that from which the first motion proceeds, but has that from itself or from other prior causes, therefore, the end is not the cause of the efficient cause with respect to causality. Second: for otherwise it follows that God insofar as he is an efficient cause is caused by an end, which can in no way be said. Third: the other way around it seems that an

Some objections
against the
resolution
concerning
efficient causes
and ends.

35 causalitatem, sed etiam quoad esse, ut patet in exemplo Aris-
totelis: nam laborare vel <955> ambulare est causa effectiva
sanitatis, causatur autem a sanitate in genere finis: causatur
autem non tantum quoad causalitatem, sed etiam quoad esse:
nam ipsummet esse deambulationis, seu fieri (quod in ea idem 40R
40 est) est propter sanitatem. Quarto falsum etiam videtur finem
esse ab efficienti quoad suum esse, nam finis operantis est ip-
summet agens, quod non potest esse a seipso effective.

9. Propter primam objectionem quidam in universum
negant finem esse causam efficientis quoad causalitatem: immo
45 in omnibus causis negant esse sibi invicem causas quoad
causalitatem, quia nec materia habet a forma ut sustineat
formam, nec forma a materia, ut informet. Sed vereor ne 50R
sit aequivocatio in his terminis, nam loqui possumus vel de
causalitate in actu primo, vel in actu secundo. Cum ergo
50 dicitur, unam causam esse causam alterius quoad eius causal-
itatem, proprie ac per se est sermo de causalitate in actu se-
cundo: argumenta autem procedunt de actu primo. Sic enim 55R
verum est materiam non habere a forma sustentare, id est
vim illam, quam habet ad sustentandam formam, et e con-
trario formam non habere a materia vim quam habet ad in-
formandum. Quamquam hoc posterius non sit in universum 60R
verum, sed in anima tantum rationali, nam aliae formae si-
cut habent suum esse dependenter a materia, ita et omnem
suam vim et substantialem aptitudinem, ut per se satis con-
stat. Unde si etiam e contrario dicatur materia habere suum
60 esse a forma, fatendum est ab illa etiam habere vim susten-
tandi formam, nos autem non ita loquimur, quia non cense-
mus proprie loquendo, habere materiam proprie suum pec-
65 ualiare esse a forma, sed habere illud dependenter a forma
ut a posteriori conditione, ut saepe declaratum est. At vero
quoad actuale causalitatem falsum est materiam et formam
non esse sibi invicem causas, nam et materia est in suo genere 70R
70 causa actualis informationis formae, quia non potest forma
informare nisi materia causante materialiter ipsamet infor-
mationem formae, et e converso materia similiter non potest

end cannot be the cause of an efficient cause with respect to causality
alone but also with respect to being, as is clear in the example from
Aristotle. For working or walking is the effective cause of health; it
is, moreover, caused by health in the genus of ends. But it is not only
caused with respect to causality but also with respect to being. For
the being itself of walking about or the becoming (which is the same
in this case) is for the sake of health. Fourth: it also seems to be false
that an end is from an efficient cause with respect to its being, for the
end of the one acting is the agent itself, which cannot be effectively
45R from itself.

9. On account of the first objection some people deny in gen-
eral that ends are causes of efficient causes with respect to causality.
Indeed, in the case of all causes they deny that they cause each other
in turn with respect to causality, since matter does not have anything
from form in order to sustain form nor does form have anything from
matter in order to inform. But I am afraid that there may be equiv-
ocation in these terms, for we can speak either about causality in the
first act or in the second act. When, therefore, it is said that one cause
is the cause of another with respect to its causality, the discussion is
properly and *per se* about causality in the second act. The arguments,
however, only apply concerning causality in the first act. For thus it
is true that matter does not have from form so that it can sustain—
that is, that power that it has for sustaining a form—and, conversely,
form does not have from matter the power that it has for informing.
Though this latter part is not universally true but only in the case of
rational souls. For just as other forms have their being dependently
on matter, so also they have all their power and substantial aptitude,
as is sufficiently obvious *per se*. Hence, if it is also said the other way
around that matter has its being from form, it should be acknowl-
65R edged that it also has its power for sustaining form from form. But we
do not speak in this way, since we do not think that, properly speak-
ing, matter properly has its own peculiar being from form; rather, it
has that dependently from form as from a posterior condition, as has
often been shown. But with respect to actual causality, it is false that
matter and form are not causes of each other in turn, for even matter
is in its genus an actual cause of the information of the form, since
form cannot inform except by the matter materially causing the in-
formation itself of the form. And, conversely, matter likewise cannot

actualiter sustinere formam, nisi eadem forma causante in suo genere ipsamet sustentationem materiae, quidquid illa sit. Unde reipsa spectata haec mutua causalitas in causando non est aliud nisi mutuus concursus utriusque causae ad suas proprias causalitates. <col. b>

75 10. Sic igitur facile constat quomodo finis sit causa efficientis causae quoad causalitatem eius, quidquid sit de virtute causandi, de quo inferius dicam. Est ergo finis causa alliciens virtutem agentis ut causet, et consequenter in suo genere influens in actualem causalitatem eius. Ex quo ulterius colligo etiam efficientem causam posse dici in suo genere causam finis quoad actualem causalitatem. Quamvis enim virtus causandi finis prout antecedit in intentione non sit ab ipso efficiente, tamen actualis causalitas finis non potest esse sine efficientia agentis, ut supra demonstratum est, et ideo sicut causa efficiens constituitur in actu secundo, concurrente fine propter quem causat, et ob hanc rationem dicitur causari a fine quoad causalitatem suam, ita e converso causa finalis non constituitur in actu secundo nisi concurrente causa efficiente in suo genere ad causalitatem eius, ergo habent in hoc mutuam inter se causalitatem in suis generibus, sicut materia et forma inter se. Et quoad hanc partem verum imprimis habet, quod in conclusione dixi, finem et efficiens esse sibi mutuo causas non tantum secundum diversa, sed etiam secundum idem.

Secundo. 95 11. Ad secundum responderi potest primo, non oportere conclusionem positam univ[er]se intelligi de omni fine et de omni efficiente. Quod enim in principio notavimus propositionem Aristotelis non esse universalem de omnibus causis, potest ad praesentem etiam conclusionem applicari, quia, ut statim dicemus, non omne efficiens dat esse illi fini propter quem operatur, et simili modo non omne agens movetur a fine ad operandum per propriam finis causalitatem. Secundo vero dicitur, loquendo de Deo ut de efficiente non quoad vim efficiendi, nec quoad internam voluntatem causandi, sed quoad actualem et transeuntem causalitatem suam, verum esse, hanc causalitatem, qua denominatur Deus actu efficiens,

75R actually sustain form except by the same form causing in its genus the sustaining work itself of matter, whatever that is. Hence, in the cases looked at this mutual causality in causing is nothing other than a mutual concursus of each cause to their proper causalities.

80R 10. In this way, therefore, it is readily clear in what way an end is the cause of an efficient cause with respect to its causality, whatever the case may be concerning its power of causing, concerning which I will speak below. An end, therefore, is a cause attracting the power of the agent so that it causes and consequently in its own genus gives influence into its actual causality. From this I gather further that an efficient cause can also be called in its genus the cause of an end with respect to actual causality. For although the power of causing of the end insofar as it precedes in intention is not from the efficient cause, nevertheless, the actual causality of an end cannot be without the efficiency of the agent, as was demonstrated above. And for this reason just as an efficient cause is constituted in second act by the concurring end for the sake of which it causes (and for this reason is said to be caused by the end with respect to its causality), so also, conversely, the final cause is not constituted in second act except by the efficient cause concurring in its genus for its causality. In this they have, then, a mutual causality between each other in their genera, just as matter and form have between each other. And with respect to this part what was said in the conclusion is especially held true: end and efficient cause are causes for each other in turn not only *secundum diversa* but also *secundum idem*.

105R 11. To the second objection one can respond, first, that the posited conclusion must not be understood universally of every end and every efficient cause. For what we noted at the outset—that Aristotle's proposition is not universally true of all causes—can also be applied to the present conclusion. For, as we will say at once, not every efficient cause gives being to the end for the sake of which it acted. In a similar way not every agent is moved by an end to acting through the proper causality of an end. But, second, it is said, it is true when speaking about God as an efficient end, not with respect to the power of effecting nor with respect to the internal will for causing but with respect to his actual and transeunt causality, that the causality by which God is denominated an efficient cause in act is caused by God

Secund.

causari ab ipso Deo ut fine, nam haec causalitas Dei non est aliud quam actio eius transiens ab ipso, et in creatura recepta, quae vere etiam causatur ab ipsomet Deo ut a fine, ut in superioribus visum est. Atque ita etiam in Deo verum est non constitui actu agentem nisi concurrente seipso ut fine ad suam causalitatem activam, et e converso non constitui actu finem nisi concurrente seipso active ad suam causalitatem finalem.

Tertio.

12. Ad tertium concedendum est id totum <956> quod intendit, nam aliqua est causa efficiens quae totum suum esse habet a fine in genere causae finalis quem et propter quem causat. Quod non solum Aristotelis exemplo, sed etiam aliis ostendi potest, nam finis intellectus verbi gratia, est intelligere: immo in universum potentia vel agens creatum, dicitur esse propter operationem: ergo in genere finis intellectus causatur ab intelligere, non solum quoad causalitatem, sed etiam quoad esse, nam propter intellectionem fit, et est. Et hinc etiam intelligitur interdum finem esse causam agentis, non solum quoad actualem causalitatem in actu secundo, sed etiam quoad virtutem causandi in actu primo, ut verbi gratia sanitas est causa finalis rhabarbari, non tantum ut actu expellentis, vel applicati ad expellendam choleram, sed etiam quoad ipsam virtutem innatam quam habet ad illum effectum, nam propter hunc finem illam recepit ab auctore naturae ut sanitatem causaret. Et hoc secundum a fortiori colligitur ex primo, ut supra in simili dicebam, nam, si ipsum esse rei quae est causa efficiens, causatur finaliter a suomet effectu, multo magis virtus effectiva ad causandum, quae consequitur ad ipsum esse, poterit ab eodem fine causari. Atque in hoc etiam verificatur quod in conclusione diximus, finem et efficiens posse esse sibi invicem causas secundum idem, nam et finis in suo genere causat efficiens quoad esse eius, et efficiens in suo causat finem quoad suum esse reale. Et ratio est eadem quae supra tacta est, quia finis ut causet, non supponitur esse secundum esse reale, et ideo, si supponatur apprehensus in causa efficiente aliam efficientem causam ipsiusmet finis,

himself as by an end. For this causality of God is nothing other than the action transiting from him and received in a creature, which indeed is also caused by God himself as by an end, as was seen in earlier sections.⁶ And in this way it is also true in the case of God that he is not constituted an agent in act except by himself concurring as an end with his active causality. Conversely, he is not constituted an end in act except by himself concurring actively with his final causality.

12. To the third objection one should concede everything that is intended, for there is something that is an efficient cause and has its whole being from an end in the genus of final cause which and for the sake of which it causes. Aristotle's example is not the only one; others can also be pointed out. The end of intellect, for example, is to understand. Indeed, created powers or agents are generally said to be for the sake of activity. Intellect, therefore, in the genus of ends is caused by understanding, not only with respect to causality but also with respect to being, for it comes to be and is for the sake of understanding.

Third.

And from this one also understands that sometimes an end is the cause of an agent not only with respect to actual causality in second act but also with respect to the power of causing in first act, as, for example, health is the final cause of rhabarb⁷ not only as actually expelling or as applied in order to expel jaundice but also with respect to the innate power that it has for that effect. For it receives this power from the author of nature for the sake of this end so that it would cause health. And this second point is gathered a fortiori from the first, as I was saying in similar cases above, for, if the being itself of a thing that is an efficient cause is final-caused by its own effect, much more can the effective power for causing that follows from the being itself be caused by that same end.

And in this is also verified what we said in the conclusion: that end and efficient cause can be causes of each other *secundum idem*. For the end in its genus causes the efficient cause with respect to its being and the efficient cause in its genus causes the end with respect to its real being. And the reason is the same as the one mentioned above: for in order for an end to cause it is not assumed to be according to real being and so, if it is assumed apprehended in the efficient cause [and

⁶*DM* XXIII.9.

⁷Rhubarb was prescribed for purging bile.

potest finaliter illam movere, vel cum illa finaliter concurrere
ad dandum esse illi rei, a qua postea idemmet finis secundum
realem existentiam procedit, et sic domus in mente artificis,
145 est causa finalis fabricandi serram verbi gratia, a qua serra do-
mus ipsa postea efficienter fit. 150R

13. Quapropter, cum graves auctores dicunt, finem et ef-
ficiens esse sibi mutuo causas secundum diversa, exponendi
sunt, quod explicuerint id quod magis per se convenit his
150 causis ac formaliter ut actu causantibus, non vero quod ex-
cluserint omnem alium modum mutuae causalitatis, qui in-
ter has causas haberi potest. Itaque specialiter attribuitur fini,
quod sit causa agentis quoad actualem causalitatem seu ac-
tionem, quia hoc est semper ac per se necessarium, eo quod
155 omnis actio <col. b> est aliquo modo propter finem: quod
vero sit causa ipsius esse agentis, non est ita per se aut neces-
sarium, quamvis saepe ita contingat. Et quamvis agens etiam
concurrat ad causalitatem finis, ut declaravimus, tamen hoc
magis attribuitur fini, quia ipse est primus in movendo et in-
160 fluendo ad causalitatem agentis, ut supra etiam declaratum
est. E converso autem efficiens dicitur causare finem secun-
dum esse eius, quia hoc per se ac semper illi convenit, quia
non potest operari propter finem nisi aliquo modo efficiat ip-
sum finem. 165R

14. Hoc autem (ut ad quartam obiectionem iam respon-
deamus) intelligendum est de fine cuius, vel etiam de fine quo
170 seu formali, qui est adeptio finis obiectivi. Nam finis cui, non
fit ab efficiente, ut recte probat illa quarta obiectio: nec etiam
finis obiectivus fit, sed obtinetur: finis autem cuius, est ter-
minus intrinsecus ad quem tendit et terminatur actio agentis,
et ideo per se, et secundum suum esse est effectus agentis. Et
175 similiter quando bonum amatur seu desideratur, non ut fiat,
sed ut possideatur, ipsa consecutio vel possessio finis fit ab
ipso agente, quia tota intentio, et applicatio mediorum ad il-
lam tendit, et tunc in illa serie, illa est quidam finis, cuius
180R gratia et propter quem fit operatio.

there is] another efficient cause of the end itself, the end can final-
move the former efficient cause or final-concur with it to give being
to that thing from which afterwards the same end proceeds according
to real existence. In this way the house in the mind of the builder is
the final cause, for example, of a saw, by which saw the house itself
afterwards efficiently comes to be.

13. For this reason, when weighty authors say that ends and ef-
ficient causes are mutual causes of each other *secundum diversa*, they
should be explained to have expounded that which more *per se* applies
to these causes and more formally as they are actually causing but
not to have excluded every other mode of mutual causality that can
be had between these causes. And so it is especially attributed to ends
that they are causes of agents with respect to actual causality of action,
since this is always and *per se* necessary by the fact that every action
is in some way for the sake of an end. But that they are causes of the
agents' being is not *per se* and necessary in the same way, although it
often happens that way. And, although agents also concur with the
causality of ends, as we showed, nevertheless, this is attributed more
to ends, since ends are first in moving and influencing to the causal-
ity of agents, as was also shown above. Conversely, however, efficient
causes are said to cause ends according to their being, since this always
and *per se* applies to them. For they cannot act for the sake of ends
except by in some way effecting the ends themselves.

14. This, moreover, in order now to respond to the fourth objec-
tion, should be understood as of *fines cuius* or also as of *fines quo* or
formal ends, which are the attainments of objective ends.⁸ For a *finis*
cui does not come to be from the efficient cause, as the fourth objec-
tion rightly shows. Nor does the objective end come to be; rather, it
is obtained. A *finis cuius*, however, is the intrinsic terminus to which
the action of an agent tends and in which it is terminated. And so it
is *per se* and according to its being an effect of the agent. Similarly,
when a good is loved or desired not so that it come to be but so that it
be possessed, that attainment or possession of the end comes to be by
the agent itself, since the entire intention and application of the means
tends to that. And then in that series that for the sake of which and

⁸On the distinction between *finis cuius* and *finis cui*, see *DM* XXIII.2.2–8.

Quomodo materia et finis sint sibi invicem causae.

15. Tertio dicendum est, finem et materiam posse mutuo sibi
 invicem esse causas. Probat, quia Aristoteles ait formam
 et finem coincidere in idem numero: est autem forma non
 5 tantum finis generationis, sed etiam ipsius materiae, quia ma- 5R
 teria natura sua est propter formam tamquam propter finem,
 et simul etiam est propter compositum, quia haec duo non re-
 pugnant, sed subordinata sunt. Est ergo materia effectus for-
 mae et compositi in genere causae finalis: sed eadem materia
 10 est causa materialis formae et compositi: ergo est reciproca- 10R
 tio inter has duas causas in ratione causae et causati. Quod
 quidem generale est ex parte materiae, non vero ex parte fi-
 nis, sed tunc solum, quando talis est finis ut materia constet
 vel ab illa pendeat: omnis enim materia ordinatur ad aliquam
 15 formam vel compositum ut ad finem, et ideo in quacumque 15R
 materia respectu talis intercedit semper dicta causalitas mu-
 tua: non autem omnis finis constat materia aut pendet ab illa,
 ut per se notum est, et ideo ex parte eius non potest esse uni-
 versalis illa <957> reciprocatio. Atque ita explicata hac as-
 20 sertione nulla manet in ea difficultas, et fundamentum eius 20R
 est idem quod supra tactum est, quia finis ut causet, non sup-
 ponit praeesistere realiter, et ideo potest esse causa suae ma-
 teriae, licet ab illa realiter causetur in suo genere.

Mutua causalitas inter formam, et finem excluditur.

25 16. Dico quarto. Forma et finis, proprie ac per se loquendo, 25R
 nunquam possunt esse sibi invicem causae. Loquor de forma
 ut exercet genus causae formalis, et ideo dixi *proprie et per se*
loquendo: nam interdum contingit unam formam, quae est
 effectus alterius in genere causae finalis, esse causam eiusdem
 30 formae quae est finis, tamen nunquam est causa formalis eius,
 sed aut efficiens, aut materialis. Ut lumen gloriae est effectus

2 15] 14 A.

25 16] 15 A.

on account of which the activity comes to be is indeed the end.

In what way matter and end are causes of each other in turn.

15. Third, it should be said that end and matter can be mutual causes
 of each other in turn. It is proven, for Aristotle says that form and end
 coincide as one in number. But form is not only the end of generation
 but also of matter itself, since matter by its nature is for the sake of
 form as for the sake of an end. It is at the same time also for the sake
 of the composite, since these two are not repugnant but subordinated.
 Matter is, then, an effect of the form and of the composite in the genus
 of final causes. But the same matter is the material cause of the form
 and of the composite. There is, therefore, a reciprocation between
 these two causes under the *ratio* of cause and caused. This indeed is
 generally true on the part of matter but not on the part of ends, but
 only then when the end is such that the matter stands on or depends
 on it. For all matter is ordered to some form or composite as to an
 end and for this reason with any matter whatever with respect to such
 the mentioned mutual causality is always involved. But not every end
 stands on matter or depends on it, as is known *per se*, and so that
 reciprocation cannot be universal on its part. Explained in this way,
 no difficulty remains in this assertion and its foundation is the same
 as what was mentioned above, since in order for an end to cause it
 need not be assumed to preexist in reality. And so it can be a cause of
 its matter, although it be caused to be in reality by that matter in its
 genus.

Mutual causality between form and end is ruled out.

16. Fourth, I say: form and end, speaking properly and *per se*, can
 never be causes of each other in turn. . . .

visionis beatificae in genere causae finalis, et est etiam causa eius, non formalis, sed efficiens: et intellectus etiam est effectus eiusdem visionis in genere finis, quia propter illam fit, et
 35 est causa eius, et materialis, et efficiens, formalis autem esse non potest. Et ratio conclusionis est, nam vel consideratur forma ut est finis generationis, vel ut ordinatur in aliam formam seu operationem ut in finem. Priori modo forma et finis
 40 incidunt in idem numero, et ideo non potest illa forma esse causa formalis illius finis, quia non potest esse causa formalis sui ipsius: quod secus est in causalitate finali, nam eadem forma ut antecedens in intentione est causa sui ipsius in executione secundum causalitatem finalem, quae non requirit
 45 praexistentiam in re. At vero in genere formalis causae non potest forma causare seipsam, sed compositum, quia causalitas eius consistit in compositione et unione ad materiam.

17. Ut autem conclusio quoad hanc partem omni careat difficultate, intelligenda est de forma comparata ad proprium effectum suum, ut est compositum: quod dico, quia si comparatur ad ipsammet unionem vel actualem informationem,
 50 revera in genere finis est effectus eius, nam forma est ut informet, et propter hunc finem fit, et tamen ipsamet informatio est a forma in genere causae formalis, tamen non tam proprie est effectus eius, quam causalitas eius: si tamen ipsa etiam unio vel informatio, effectus formae vocetur in genere causae
 55 formalis, quoad talem effectum limitanda est posita conclusio propter <col. b> specialem connexionem quam habet cum ipsa forma ut exercet rationem formae. Nam sicut efficiens est propter operationem, et ideo inter illa est mutua causalitas, nam operatio est causa finalis potentiae activae, et
 60 potentia est causa efficiens operationis; ita forma est propter informationem, et in suo genere est causa eius. At vero comparando formam prout est finis generationis, ad eandem propriam formam ut informantem, non potest intercedere dicta mutua causalitas, quia est una et eadem prorsus forma.
 65

18. Si autem formas duas comparemus, quarum una ad alteram ut ad finem ordinatur, etiam non potest illa mutua

17.

18.

47 17] 16 A.

66 18] 17 A.

causalitas intercedere, quia una forma non potest esse causa
 70 formalis alterius, quatenus etiam forma est: si enim contin-
 gat unam formam alia accidentali informari, necesse est ut ea
 quae informatur, exerceat sub ea ratione causalitatem mate-
 rialem, non formalem. Scio nonnullos ita loqui, ut dicant
 75 actus immanentes dependere ab anima vel a potentia vitali in
 genere causae formalis, cum tamen ipsimet actus immanentes
 sint causae formales accidentales: et similiter dici solet pas-
 siones, vel potentias animae pendere ab illa in genere causae
 formalis, cum tamen illam informent. Sed hae locutiones
 sunt impropriae, nam neque actus neque potentiae pendeat
 a forma nisi aut materialiter aut effective: quia vero illa effici-
 80 entia est valde intrinseca, aut per resultantiam naturalem, dici
 solet secundarius effectus formae, tamen proprie et in rigore
 non pertinet ad effectum formalem.

*Excluditur mutua causalitas inter efficientem causam respectu
 materialis et formalis.*

19. Dico quinto. Causa efficiens non potest habere mu-
 tuam causalitatem cum materia vel forma, sed solum cum
 5 finali causa, ut iam explicuimus. Sensus conclusionis est,
 quod si aliqua causa vere ac proprie efficiat aliquam formam,
 non potest ab illa causari in genere causae formalis, et e con-
 verso, si aliqua forma formaliter constituit aliquam rem, non
 potest ab illa effective fieri. Et quoad has duas partes nulla
 10 est difficultas in conclusione posita. Et ratio est, primo quia
 causa efficiens supponitur absolute existens ad efficiendum:
 ergo non potest formaliter constitui per formam quam ef-
 ficat. Patet consequentia, quia si illa res in suo esse per formam
 constituenda est, iam forma supponitur constituta, quia iam
 15 supponitur habens esse: <958> ergo non potest formaliter
 constitui per formam a se factam. Secundo, quia forma est
 principium agendi: ergo forma quae est terminus actionis,
 non potest esse causa formalis ipsiusmet agentis: hac enim ra-
 tione Aristoteles dixit 2. *Physicorum* cap. 7. text. 70. formam
 20 quae fit non coincidere in idem numero cum efficiente, sed

3 19] 18 A.

*Mutual causality between efficient causes and material and formal causes
 is ruled out.*

19. Fifth, I say: an efficient cause cannot have mutual causality with
 matter or form, but only with a final causes, as we will explain now.

5R ...

in idem specie. Ex his autem rationibus facile colligitur, conclusionem intelligendam esse de causalitate formali quantum ad proprium esse ipsius causae efficientis: nam, si loquamur de causalitate formali quantum ad aliquod aliud esse superadditum ipsi efficienti, saepe accidere potest ut forma facta a
 25 causa efficiente suam causam informet, ut amor informat voluntatem a qua fit, non vero informat illam quoad dandum ei illud esse, per quod ab ipsa causatur: unde nec informat illam ut efficiens est, sed ut subiectum et causa materialis esse
 30 potest.

20. Simili modo intelligenda est conclusio comparando efficientem causam ad materialem. Nam si res aliqua efficit aliquam materiam, non potest ab illa materialiter causari, et e converso, si una res materialiter causat aliam, non potest
 35 ab illa effective fieri. Et quidem, si sermo est tantum de materia prima, est res evidentissima, quia materia prima non potest fieri nisi per creationem, et ideo causa eius est remotissima ab omni dependentia a materia: ergo impossibile est ut quidquid ex tali materia causatur, sit causa efficiens materiae,
 40 non modo eiusdem numero, verum neque ullius omnino. Tamen extendendo conclusionem (ut revera intelligenda est) ad omnem causam materialem seu subiectivam, ratio generalis est, quia causa efficiens supponitur simpliciter et absolute existens ad agendum, et ideo si indiget aliqua causa, vel
 45 causalitate materiali ut sit, talis causa supponitur ante omnem efficientiam eius, ac proinde non potest talis res esse causa efficiens suae materiae. Et confirmatur, nam causa materialis est intrinseca si comparetur ad compositum, vel est intime coniuncta, si comparetur ad formam: ergo sive res quae dicitur causa efficiens, sit compositum, sive forma, non potest
 50 efficere materiam vel subiectum a quo pendet. Patet consequentia, quia intrinseca rei constitutio vel unio est simpliciter prior quam efficientia eius: item etiam quia intrinseca constitutio non potest esse effective ab ipsamet re quae constituitur; nec intrinseca unio materialis <col. b> potest esse effective
 55 ab ipsa forma quae unitur: alias etiam ipsaeductio formae

20.

- Dispositio ultima
non est effective a
forma. 60
- 65
- Expulsio unius
formae an causa
materialis
introductionis
alterius. 70
- 75
- 80
- Fenestrae apertio
an habeat
causalitatem
respectu ingressus
lucis. 85
- 90
- posset esse effective ab eadem forma quae educitur.
21. Solent autem contra hanc partem nonnullae instantiae afferri. Una est de forma et dispositione ultima; sed de hac multa dicta sunt disp. 13. de causa materiali; ubi probabilius esse ostendimus, dispositionem ultimam, quae vere praeparat materiam, non esse effective a forma: quae vero est effective a forma, non esse praeparantem materiam, nec participare causalitatem materialem, sed esse dispositionem ornantem, et quasi foventem, et conferentem unionem formae cum materia.
22. Altera instantia est de introductione unius formae, et expulsionem alterius, nam haec expulsio est quasi causa materialis illius. Sed haec magis pertinet ad mutuam causalitatem inter materiam et formam quam ad praesens, nam forma introducta non expellit alteram effective, sed formaliter, ut supra visum est: si autem sit sermo de forma active introducente aliam, respectu illius expulsio formae nullam habet causalitatem, sed tantum est effectus secundarius illius actionis. Adde etiam, expulsionem formae improprie dici causam materialem introductionis alterius formae, nam potius est remotio cuiusdam impedimenti non tam antecedens, quam subsequens, vel concomitans, vel si aliquis est ordo vel prioritas, est magis secundum considerationem nostram, quam secundum veram causalitatem.
23. Alia instantia esse solet de apertione fenestrae, et introductione lucis, quae magis videtur vulgaris, quam Philosophica, nam apertio fenestrae est remotio cuiusdam impedimenti simpliciter antecedens ordine naturae, quia nullo modo est effectus introductionis lucis. Quod si fingamus fenestram aperiri ab externo vento impellente et introeunte, sic apertio quidem est effective ab aere impellente: tamen ille aer ut impellens et efficiens, nullo modo est effectus ipsius apertionis in genere causae materialis, quia aer impellens non efficit illum motum fenestrae ut introductus iam in locum eius, sed ut contingens, et imprimens illi impetum, quod facit prius tem-

58 21] 20 A.

67 22] 21 A.

81 23] 22 A.

pore vel instanti, quam in locum fenestras introduca- <959>
 tur, et quam fenestra ipsa a loco suo moveatur, et ita respectu
 illius efficientiae nulla est causalitas materialis in effectu eius.
 95 Quod si consideretur aer ut iam occupans locum fenestras
 quae aperitur, sic non est causa effectiva apertionis, sed for-
 malis, per formalem nimirum impossibilitatem illorum
 duorum corporum in eodem spatio. Et secundum hanc rati-
 onem si est mutua causalitas inter apertionem fenestras, et
 100 introductionem aeris, pertinet ad materialem et formalem,
 non ad efficientem: et idem iudicium de illa est, quod de
 introductione unius formae, et expulsionem alterius. Atque
 ita in universum verum est, causam efficientem non habere
 mutuam causalitatem cum suo effectu nisi in genere finis:
 105 neque Aristoteles unquam aliam docuit. Statim vero occurrit
 hic Theologis difficultas de ultima dispositione ad gratiam,
 quam illis remittimus: existimamus autem iuxta haec prin-
 cipia verum iudicium de illa ferendum esse.

Quomodo inter causas eiusdem generis esse possit causalitas reciproca.

In eodem genere
 causae simpliciter
 nullae sunt sui
 mutuo causae.

24. Ultimo dicendum est intra idem genus causae non posse
 5 duas res esse sibi invicem causas simpliciter et secundum
 idem: secundum quid autem, et secundum diversas rationes
 veluti specificas intra idem genus causae non renugnare. Prior
 pars est sententia Aristotelis citatis locis, quam absolute etiam
 docent omnes eius interpretes; et potest inductione probari,
 nam res quae aliam efficit, non potest ab ea vicissim fieri, et
 sic de caeteris. Ratio autem in singulis potest propria reddi,
 10 nam materia vel non habet materialem causam, ut materia
 prima, vel si habet, ut materia secunda, non potest eadem res,
 quam ipsa componit aut recipit esse materia eius. Quia mate-
 15 ria comparatur ut pars, vel potentia receptiva ad suum effec-
 tum, et ad illum supponitur: si vero ipsa habet causam mate-
 rialem, ad illam comparatur ut totum ad partem, et genera-
 tionis seu existendi ordine illam supponit: et ideo non potest
 esse talis circulus inter causas materiales. Nec vero inter for-

In what way there can be reciprocal causality between causes of the same genus.

Intra causam
 materialem
 probatur.

Intra formalem.

24. Lastly, it should be said that two things cannot be causes of each
 5R other in turn without qualification and *secundum idem* within the
 same genus of cause. . . .

No things are
 without
 qualification
 mutual causes of
 each other in the
 same genus of
 cause.

Intra finalem. 20 males, quia forma non habet causam formalem, ut supra dice-
bamus. In causa etiam finali est res manifesta, quia causa fi-
nalis ut sic non habet causam finalem: quod si illam habet
quatenus induit aliquam rationem medii, non potest in eam-
dem rem, quae est medium ad illam, ut in finem <col. b>
ordinari: alioqui in eodem ordine intentionis esset prior et
Intra efficientem. 25 posterior, quod repugnat. In efficientibus est etiam manifesta
ratio, quia res quae efficit aliam, supponitur esse, et conse-
quenter facta, si effectione indigeat: et ideo impossibile est ut
a suo effectu effective fiat. Quod semper intelligendum est
(quod in finibus etiam est observandum) loquendo de actuali
30 causalitate mutua, quae simul sit: nam loquendo tantum de
potentia causandi, et divisim, non repugnat ut res, quae nunc
est finis alterius, cesset ab illa causalitate, et postea ordinetur
ad alteram ut in finem ex libertate agentis. Et similiter non
repugnaret ut res quae nunc efficit aliam, fieret ab illa, si ordo
35 causandi a principio fuisset mutatus, et res quae nunc fit ab
una causa, non fieret ab illa, sed ab alia, nam tunc sine in-
convenienti posset illa efficere eandem rem a qua nunc facta
est, ut supra tractavi. Nunc autem non divisim, sed coniunc-
tim loquimur, et sic impossibile est ut res fiat ab effectu quem
40 facit.

25. Alia ratio generalis hic tradi solet, quia alias idem
esset causa sui ipsius, nam quod est causa causae, est causa
causali: quod axioma tenet in causis eiusdem generis, ut
omnes dicunt, et specialiter adnotavit Scotus in 4. dist. 49. q. 2. et
45 in *Theorematis* 22. conclus. universali. Non immerito
autem interrogare potest aliquis, quare illa consecutio teneat
in causis eiusdem generis, non autem diversorum. Deinde
dubitare quis potest, quia non sequitur quod aliquid sit causa
sui per se, sed tantum per accidens, sicut avus est causa nepo-
50 tis, quod non videtur magnum inconueniens. Ad priorem
partem respondeo rationem esse, quia in diversis generibus,
hoc ipso quod mutatur causandi modus, mutatur etiam ra-
tio essendi quae in causa supponitur ad effectum. Et conse-
quenter id quod est causa suae causae, non est causa eius se-

25.

55 cundum id quod habet a sua causa, sed secundum aliud, ut
 quamvis finis sit causa sui efficientis, non est causa eius se-
 cundum esse existentiae exercitum quod ab illo habet, sed ut
 apprehensum. At vero si in eodem genere duo se mutuo ef-
 60 ficerent, et secundum eundem ordinem unum supponeretur
 ad aliud, et e converso, quod repugnat; et unum causaret ali-
 iud secundum illudmet esse quod ab illo habet, et e converso,
 et ideo virtute causaret seipsum. Unde ad alteram partem re-
 spondetur illam causam dici per accidens, quia non immedi-
 ate influit in effec- <960> tum mediatum: tamen est causa
 65 per se sui immediati effectus; in quo virtute continetur alius
 effectus, et per se ab illo manat: et ideo perinde repugnat aliq-
 uid hoc modo esse causam sui, ac si per se et immediate se
 efficeret.

Leviore
 obiectiones
 contra praedicta
 solvuntur.

70 26. Aliae obiectiones leviores fieri solent contra hanc
 conclusionem, quia in omnibus generibus causarum videtur
 pati calumniam: in efficiente, quia duae manus si sint calidae,
 et simul se contingant, se mutuo fovent et conservant: si vero
 sint frigidae, confricatione se mutuo calefaciunt. In dispo-
 75 sitionibus, quae ad materialem causam pertinent, calor vere
 disponit ad raritatem, et raritas ad calorem. In finibus poten-
 tia est gratia operationis, et operatio propter potentiam. In
 formalibus denique, quamvis physice non inveniatur illa vi-
 cissitudo, reperitur tamen metaphysice, dum una differentia
 contrahit aliam, et vicissim potest contrahi ab illa, nam mor-
 80 tale contrahit rationale, vel intellectuale late sumptum, ut si
 homo dicatur vivens, intellectuale, mortale: et e contrario ra-
 tionale contrahit mortale.

26.

Manus invicem se
 fricantes qualiter
 se mutuo
 calefaciant.

85 27. Respondetur tamen ad primam, duas manus, si aequae
 sint calidae, non se conservare mutuo agendo, sed fortius re-
 sistendo contrario, aut expugnando illud. Si vero sint frigi-
 dae, non per se, se calefacere, sed per accidens medio motu:
 et tunc una non agit in aliam, quatenus calorem recipit media
 confricatione alterius, sed vi movendi ac tangendi, quam ha-
 bet: et hoc modo non est inconveniens duas res mutuo agere
 90 in seipsas, si per se agant per proprias virtutes, et non per

27.

69 26] 25 A.

83 27] 26 A.

id quod ad invicem recipiant, ut stomachus calefacit vinum calore formali et innato, et vinum calefacit stomachum calore virtuali quem ex se habet: et hoc modo non repugnat duo mutuo in se efficere, id tamen non est secundum proprium esse per quod causant: et ita formaliter loquendo, non fit causa ab effectu suo, quod repugnare dicimus.

Duae formae
sibi mutuae
dispositiones.

95 28. Ad secundam instantiam respondetur imprimis, causam dispositivam proprie non esse causam materialem, sed secundum quid, et reductive: unde illa non tam est mutua causalitas materialis, quam mutua quaedam concordia vel proportio inter duas formas in eodem subiecto existentes: in qua nulla est <col. b> repugnantia. Deinde dicitur, has dispositiones semper esse aliquo modo diversarum rationum, ut in exemplo posito de calore et raritate, calor videtur esse non tantum dispositio, sed etiam aliquo modo efficiens, et tunc raritas non tam est dispositio praeparans, quam consequens, quae non habet propriam rationem causae. Et similia multa diximus de his causis supra disp. 13. sect. 3.

28.

Duo partiales
fines sibi invicem
sunt finales
causae.

110 29. Denique de hac dispositionum connexionem intelligi potest posterior pars conclusionis. Sed praecipue posita est propter instantiam tertiam, ad quam concedimus secundum diversas rationes finium non repugnare ut duo sint sibi invicem fines, ut argumentum probat, tamen illud est tantum secundum quid, nam illi sunt quasi fines partiales, ex quibus unus integer coalescit, qui totus cadit sub unam adaequatam intentionem: tamen ad illam qualemcumque mutuum habitudinem necesse est ut illi fines in suo genere sint aliquo modo diversarum rationum. Ad quartum respondetur, hic nos agere de causis propriis et realibus: differentiae autem non sunt huiusmodi, sed tantum secundum rationem; et adhuc illo modo differentiae non se mutuo contrahunt per se, sed ad summum quatenus in uno communi genere coniunguntur.

10R

29.

Satisfit rationi dubitandi positae in principio.

A reason for doubting mentioned at the beginning is addressed.

97 28] 27 A.

109 29] 28 A.

1 *positae*] *posita* V.

30. Ultimo ex dictis manet expedita ratio dubitandi in principio posita. Nam si quis attente consideret quae diximus, nunquam duae causae ita mutuo comparantur, ut una simpliciter supponat aliam in existendo, et e converso, etiam ordine naturae: nam finis ut est causa agentis, non necessario supponitur existens: ut vero est effectus, supponit causam efficientem ut existentem: forma item supponit materiam, non tamen materia simpliciter supponit formam, sed eam tantum requirit ut concomitantem seu consequentem ordine naturae. Atque ita facile vitatur circulus prioris et posterioris in existendo, etiam secundum naturae ordinem. In causando vero secundum diversa genera causarum nullum habet incommodum, quia vel una causalitas talis est ut non supponat existentiam, ut contingit in fine, vel, si existentiam requirit, non sunt sibi mutuo causae secundum esse simpliciter: et ita, si in una causa supponitur esse, secundum illud non est proprie effectus alterius, sed secundum aliquid quod illi adiungitur: sicut in forma respectu materiae, et in accidentibus respectu subiecti declaravimus: et ita vitantur facile omnia in- <col. b> comoda in hac mutua causarum connexione et causalitate. Atque hactenus de causis entis, et de prima principali huius operis parte dicta sint.

30. Lastly, it remains to resolve from what has been said the reason for doubting posited in the beginning.⁹ For if someone attentively considers what we have said, no two causes are mutually compared in such a way that one without qualification assumes another in existing, and conversely, even by the order of nature. For an end, in order to be a cause of the agent, is not assumed necessarily existing. But in order to be an effect it assumes the efficient cause as existing. Likewise, form assumes matter, but matter does not without qualification assume form but only requires it as something concomitant or consequent in the order of nature. And in this way the circle of prior and posterior causes in existing is easily avoided, even according to the order of nature. But in causing according to different genera of causes there is no disagreeability, since either one causality is such that it does not assume existence (as happens in the case of ends) or, if existence is required, they are not mutual causes of each other with respect to being without qualification. And so, if being is assumed in the case of one cause, it is not properly the effect of another with respect to that being, but with respect to something that is conjoined to it; just as we showed in the case of form with respect to matter and in the case of accidents with respect to a subject. And so every disagreeability in this mutual connection and causality of causes is easily avoided.

And here ends the discussion about the causes of being and the first principal part of this work.

⁹*DM XXVII.2.1.*