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Quaenam sit in fine proxima ratio finaliter causandi.

1. Sensus praesentis quaestions ex superiori constat; non enim inquirimus rationem causandi quatenus dicit causationem in actu secundo, sed quatenus dicit actum primum quasi formalem, constituentem causam finalem proxime aptam et sufficientem ad causandum. Sicut enim in causa efficiente distinguimus rem quae causat a proxima ratione causandi, ita in finali videtur necessarium, quia eadem omnino res potest esse et principium efficiens et causa finalis et formalis; oportet ergo ut 5 sub diversis rationibus haec munera exerceat; ergo illa ratio sub qua exercet munus causae finalis, erit quae proxime constituit finalem causam quasi in actu primo.

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Resolutio quaestionis.

2. De hac igitur re communis consensus Doctorum omnium esse videtur bonitatem esse proximam rationem sub qua finis movet; atque ita illam esse quae constituit finalem causam, dans (ut ita dicam) virtutem ad causandum. Ita sentit D. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, et latius III cont. Gent., c. 2 et 3, ubi ostendit idem esse operari propter finem, quod operari propter bonum, 15R et I, q. 5, a. 4, probat bonum habere rationem finis; et ibidem, solutione ad 2, de hac causalitate declarat illud Dionysii, c. 4 de Divin. nom., Bonum est diffusivum sui, nimirum, finaliter attrahendo et alliciendo voluntatem. Eamdem doctrinam habet 20R Alex. Alens., I p., q. 17, memb. 3, et q. 34, memb. 1; sumptaque est ex Aristotele, II Phys., c. 3, tex. 31, ubi dicit finem et bonum 25R

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What then the proximate nature of final-causing is in the end.

1. The sense of the present question is clear from what preceded. For we are not inquiring into the nature of causing insofar as it expresses causation in the second act, but insofar as it expresses a first act, as it were, constituting a final cause proximately apt and sufficient for causing. For just as in the efficient cause we distinguish the thing which causes from the proximate nature of causing, so in the final cause it seems necessary, because the very same thing can be both an efficient principle and a final and a formal cause. Therefore, it is necessary that it exercises these functions under different *rationes*. Therefore, that *ratio* under which it exercises the function of final cause will be the one which proximately constitutes a final cause as if in the first act.

Resolution of the question.

2. So then concerning this matter it seems to be a general consensus among all the doctors that goodness is the proximate *ratio* under which the end moves. And so that is what constitutes a final cause, giving (if I may speak in this way) force (*virtutem*) for causing. St. Thomas thinks this in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 and more broadly in SCG III, c. 2 and 3, where he shows that it is the same to act for the sake of an end as to act for the sake of good. And in Ia.5.4 he proves that good has the *ratio* of an end. And in the same place, ad 2, he declares concerning this causality [the statement] from Dionysius, c. 4 of *de Divin. nom.* that good is self-diffusive, namely, by final-attracting and enticing the will. Alexander of Hales holds the same doctrine in p. I, q. 17, memb. 3 and q. 34, memb. 1. And it has been taken up from Aristotle, *Phys.* II, c. 3,

¹Latin text is from <http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d23.htm>. Retrieved Feb. 11, 2008. Spelling errors corrected without note. I checked the text against the 1597 edition (generally the most reliable text) for significant textual variations. Marginal notes are as found in the 1597 edition. Many of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition, D = digital source, and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

esse idem, quod etiam repetit V Metaph., c. 2, et lib. I Ethic., c. 7, ait id esse unicuique bonum, cuius gratia caetera operatur; idem lib. I Ethic. ad Eudemum, sub finem. Ratio autem est quia causalitas finis consistit in motione metaphorica voluntatis, qua illam ad se allicit; nihil autem ad se allicit voluntatem nisi quatenus bonum est; ergo bonitas est ratio movendi voluntatem; ergo etiam est ratio seu principium causandi finaliter. Minorem suppono ut certam, ex communi consensu theologorum et philosophorum, dicentium voluntatem non posse ferri in aliquid nisi sub ratione boni, iuxta illud, bonum est quod omnia appetunt.

Malum ut malum possitne causa esse finalis.

3. Sed occurrit statim controversia cum Ocham et aliis nominalibus dicentibus posse voluntatem ferri in malum sub ratione mali. Ita Ocham, In III, q. 13, dub. 3. Inclinat etiam Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, circa finem, et In II, dist. 43, q. 2. 5 Ex quorum assertione plane sequitur malum ut malum posse etiam metaphorice movere voluntatem et consequenter habere causalitatem finis, nam si malum potest propter se amari, etiam poterunt alia amari propter ipsum, si ad illud obtainendum necessaria et utilia sint. Atque ita fiet ut non sit bonitas adaequata ratio et virtus finis ad causandum finaliter, sed erit entitas vel aliquid huiusmodi, ut Ocham significat.

4. Verumtamen haec sententia antiquata est et ab scholis merito reiecta, utpote repugnans cum Aristotelis, Dionysii, Augustini, D. Thom. et omnium recte sentientium consensu, 15 ut patet ex Aristot., lib. I Ethic., c. 1; Dionys., c. 4 de Divin. nom.; August., II Confess., c. 6 et 8; D. Thoma, I-II, q. 8, a. 1, et reliquis theologis, In II, dist. 43; Henric., Quodl. I, q. 17. Vide etiam Greg. Nyss., lib. de Opificio hominis, c. 20; et Damas., lib. II de Fide, c. 22. Horum enim omnium axioma commune est, neminem ad malum intendentem operari. 20 Estque id experientia evidentissimum. Et ratio est quia esset inordinatissime instituta voluntatis facultas si in malum qua malum est ferri posset. Quid enim magis inordinatum esse

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tex. 31, where he says that the end and the good are the same, which he also repeats in *Metaph.* V, c. 2, and in *EN* I, c. 7, he says that for each [agent] that is the good for the sake of which other things are done. And likewise in *EE* I close to the end. Moreover, the reason is because the causality of the end consists in a metaphorical motion of the will by which the end entices the will to itself. Moreover, nothing entices the will to itself except insofar as it is good. Therefore, goodness is the *ratio* for moving the will. Therefore, it is also the *ratio* or principle of final-causing. I assume the minor as certain from the general consensus of theologians and philosophers, who say that the will cannot be brought to something except under the aspect of good, given that good is what everyone desires.

Whether bad as bad could ever be a final cause.

3. But a controversy immediately comes up with Ockham and other nominalists saying that the will can be brought to something bad under the aspect of bad. Ockham [says] this in [Sent.] III, q. 13, dub. 3. Scotus also inclines this way in [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 4 and II, dist. 43, q. 2. From their assertion it plainly follows that bad as bad can also metaphorically move the will and consequently have final causality, for if bad can be loved for its own sake, it will also be possible for other things to be loved for its sake, if they are necessary and useful for obtaining it. And thus it will result that goodness is not the adequate *ratio* and force of the end for final-causing, but it will be an entity or something of this sort, as Ockham indicates.

4. Nevertheless, this time-honoured view is deservedly rejected by the schools, inasmuch as it is repugnant to Aristotle, Dionysius, Augustine, St. Thomas, and to the right consensus of all views. This is clear from Aristotle, *EN* I, c. 1; Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 4; Augustine, *Conf.* II, c. 6 and 8; St. Thomas, *ST* IaIIæ.8.1; and for the remaining theologians in II, dist. 43, and Henry of Ghent in *Quodl.* I, q. 17. See also Gregory of Nyssa, *De opificio hominis*, c. 20, and [John] Damascene, *De fide* II, c. 22. For it is a common axiom for all of them that no one acts by intending bad. And this is entirely obvious from experience. And the reason is that the faculty of the will would have been set up most inordinately if it could be brought to a bad thing insofar as it is bad. For what could be more inordinate than to will something

25 potest quam velle malum quia malum est? Voluntas autem nihil potest appetitu elicito velle nisi quod sit consentaneum alicui naturali inclinationi ipsius voluntatis, quia ex tali inclinatione nascitur omnis appetitio elicita, saltem naturalis, quia omnis appetitio huiusmodi refertur ad obiectum adaequatum et proportionatum voluntati vel aliquam partem eius; naturalis autem inclinatio voluntatis est ad totum illud obiectum; 30 si ergo voluntas posset moveri per proprium actum in malum ut malum, naturalis etiam inclinatio eius esset ad malum ut malum; esset ergo ipsa naturalis inclinatio inordinata. Hoc autem omnino repugnat, tum quia ab optimo auctore sapientissime instituta, tum etiam quia esset sibi ipsi repugnans. Nam voluntatis finis seu institutio est ut per eam homo quaerat convenientia sibi et fugiat inconvenientia; si ergo accepisset inclinationem ad tendendum in disconveniens quatenus disconveniens est, formaliter et directe sibi ipsi et suo fini repugnaret, et 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 400 405 410 415 420 425 430 435 440 445 450 455 460 465 470 475 480 485 490 495 500 505 510 515 520 525 530 535 540 545 550 555 560 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600 605 610 615 620 625 630 635 640 645 650 655 660 665 670 675 680 685 690 695 700 705 710 715 720 725 730 735 740 745 750 755 760 765 770 775 780 785 790 795 800 805 810 815 820 825 830 835 840 845 850 855 860 865 870 875 880 885 890 895 900 905 910 915 920 925 930 935 940 945 950 955 960 965 970 975 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bad precisely because it is bad? But the will can will nothing by an elicited desire except that which is fitting for some natural inclination of the will itself, because every elicited appetition—at least every natural one—arises from such an inclination. For every appetition of this sort is referred to some object that is adequate and proportionate to the will or to some part of it. But a natural inclination of the will is to its whole object. Therefore, if the will could be moved through a proper act to something bad insofar as it is bad, the natural inclination would also be to something bad insofar as it is bad. Therefore, that natural inclination would be inordinate. But this is wholly repugnant, both because the will is set up by the best and most wise author and because it would be self-contradictory. For the end or institution of the will is so the human being will through it seek things agreeable to him and flee things disagreeable. Therefore, if it received an inclination to tend to something disagreeable insofar as it is disagreeable, it would formally and directly contradict itself and its end. And therefore [John] Damascene rightly said in *De fide* II, c. 22: ‘The will is brought to acting for those things which are fitting to nature’. As Seneca said in *De benef.* IV, c. 17: ‘Nor has anyone so fallen from the natural law and cast off his humanity as to be bad for his mind’s sake’.

5. And it is confirmed: for it is impossible for the intellect to assent to something false insofar as it is false. Therefore, it is also impossible that the will pursue something bad insofar as it is bad. The consequence is clear, because the will is related to the good just as the intellect is to the true. And there is just as great a repugnance on the part of the terms between pursuit and bad as there is between assent and false. Also because if the intellect cannot judge by assenting to the false, it therefore cannot judge the bad as bad to have what it takes to be loved, for that is evidently and from the terms themselves false and repugnant to every understanding. It is an obvious sign of this (so that along the way we resolve every argument which is usually made for the opposing position) that we never judge that something is to be loved or is to be pursued that we otherwise cognize as being bad except because we judge it advantageous or useful for getting delight or revenge or for something else. Therefore, the will cannot be brought to something bad insofar as it is such or to something only cognized as bad. The consequence is clear, because, as I will say further on, the will cannot be moved except by means of a judgement of reason by which something is sufficiently

vel appetendum vel appetibile.

6. Atque hinc tandem sumitur ratio quae ad rem de qua agimus spectat, quia in malo ut sic quatenus malum est nihil est quod possit apprehendi aut existimari ut sufficiens ratio ob quam voluntas moveatur. Nam vel in malo consideratur malitia, vel entitas quae malitiae subest. Malitia per se ac formaliter sumpta nihil habet quo voluntatem alliciat vel attrahat, quia ipsa nihil est, ut in superioribus diximus. Entitas autem, quae malitiae subesse potest, aliquid bonitatis habet; unde si appetitum movet, id est ratione bonitatis. Et confirmatur, nam in electione mediiorum impossibile est voluntatem eligere aliquid ut medium ad finem eo quod sit disconveniens, vel impedit ad consecutionem finis, quod esset eligere malum oppositione bono utili sub ratione mali; ergo in intentione vel amore finis impossibile est quod feratur in aliquid ut in finem eo quod per se sit disconveniens, quod est velle sub ratione mali oppositi bono propter se appetibili. Antecedens videtur per se notum ex terminis; qui enim intelligi potest ut aliquis ex intentione 70
75R finis eligat quod repugnat fini, quatenus tale est? nam esset haec contradicatio in ipsa voluntate. Quin potius docent omnes qui recte sentiunt, quando unitum est medium utile ad finem fieri non posse quin voluntas illud eligat, si vere et efficaciter intendit finem; multo ergo impossibilius est ut eligat medium inutile, qua tale est. Prima vero consequentia probatur, quia tantum repugnat malum ut in se malum est, intentioni, sicut inutile ut inutile, electioni; nam sicut electio inutilis, ut inutilis, repugnat intentioni finis, ita intentio mali ut per se mali, repugnat naturali et adaequatae propensioni voluntatis.

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Indifferens ut sic possitne causa esse finalis.

7. Dices haec argumenta satis probare et malum ut malum non posse finaliter causare et bonum ut bonum posse, non tamen probare solum bonum posse habere huiusmodi causalitatem, aut bonitatem esse adaequatam rationem finalisandi. Quia

proposed as either something that is to be desired or is desirable.

6. And, finally, from here is taken the argument that regards the thing concerning which we act, because in a bad thing as such insofar as it is bad there is nothing that could be apprehended or estimated as a sufficient reason for the will to move. For in the bad thing one either considers the badness or the entity which lies underneath the badness. Badness taken in itself or formally has nothing by which it entices or attracts the will, because it itself is nothing, as we said earlier. But the entity that lies underneath the badness has some goodness. Hence, if it moves the appetite, it does so by reason of the goodness. And it is confirmed, for in the election of means it is impossible for the will to elect something as a means to the end by reason of it being disagreeable to or impeding the attainment of the end. That would be to elect a bad opposing a useful good under the aspect of bad. Therefore, in intention or love for the end it is impossible that the will is brought to something as to an end by reason of it being in itself disagreeable. That would be to will under the aspect of bad opposing a good desirable for its own sake. The antecedent seems *per se notum* from the terms. For who can make sense of someone choosing something repugnant to an end insofar as it is repugnant in that way as a result of an intention for the end? For this would be a contradiction in the will. Instead, everyone who thinks rightly teaches that when a useful means is united to an end it cannot but happen that the will elects that means if it truly and efficaciously intends the end. Therefore, much more is it impossible for it to elect a useless means insofar as it is useless. But the first consequence is proven because just as much as bad insofar as it is bad in itself is repugnant to intention, so the useless insofar as it is useless is repugnant to election. For just as the election of something useless insofar as it is useless is repugnant to the intention for the end, so the intention for a bad thing insofar as it is bad in itself is repugnant to the natural and adequate propensity of the will.

Whether indifference as such could ever be a final cause.

7. You may say that these arguments are enough to prove both that bad as bad cannot final-cause and that good as good can, but this does not yet prove that only good can have causality of this sort or that goodness is the adequate nature of final-causing. For between good and bad there

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inter bonum et malum potest dari indifferens vel reipsa, vel saltem praecisione mentis, quatenus ratio entis aut veri praecisa ratione boni considerari potest; ergo haec potest esse ratio sufficiens ad movendum appetitum, et consequenter ad finaliter causandum. Respondeo in re dari quidem posse ens indifferens secundum aliquam rationem boni, non tamen secundum omnem, quia non potest ens non esse bonum, atque ita quando ens sub aliqua ratione indifferens voluntatem movet, non movet illam quatenus indifferens est, sed quatenus aliquam rationem boni habet. Quod si contingat aliquod ens sub omni ratione boni esse indifferens respectu appetentis, id est, ut nec sit honestum, nec turpe, nec iucundum, nec molestum, neque naturae conveniens, neque inconveniens (quod fortasse non potest inveniri), tamen illo posito, tale ens non posset habere causalitatem finalem in voluntate; quia nullam convenientiam aut conformitatem haberet cum illa; voluntas autem cum sit essentialiter appetitus, non inclinatur nisi in conveniens ut tale est; unde cum ratio entis de se sit indifferens ad rationem convenientis et inconveniens appetenti, non est de se sufficiens ad movendum appetitum. Quod si interdum videatur ens aliquod movere voluntatem solum quia non existimatur inconveniens, ideo est quia in omni ente apprehenditur inesse aliquid bonitatis et perfectionis, quae si aliunde non habet convenientiam, hoc ipso ratione suae perfectionis existimatur conveniens.

8. Immo, quia id quod est in se bonum potest esse vel conveniens vel inconveniens homini, ideo non quaecumque bonitas, sed secundum aliquam convenientiam ad appetentem est sufficiens ratio finalisandi. Propter quod dixit Arist., VIII Ethic., c. 5: *Amabile quidem bonum, unicuique autem proprium.* Quod quomodo intelligendum sit, longam et theologicam postulat disputationem, tum propter amorem amicitiae, tum maxime propter amorem Dei super omnia. Nunc breviter tantum notetur bonum proprium non debere intelligi solum illud quod cedit in proprium commodum, sed simpliciter quod per se decet aut est consentaneum naturae appetentis. Quo sensu comprehenditur omnis finis, etiamsi ad perfectissimum amorem amicitiae pertineat.

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can be indifference, either in the thing itself or at least as considered by the mind, insofar as the *ratio* of being or of the true can be considered apart from the *ratio* of good. Therefore, this can be a sufficient reason for moving appetite and consequently for final-causing. I respond that in the thing there can indeed be given being that is indifferent according to some aspect of good but, nevertheless, not according to every [aspect of good]. For being cannot fail to be good. Thus when being moves the will under some aspect of indifference, it does not move the will insofar as it is indifferent but insofar as it has some aspect of good. If it happens that some being is indifferent under every aspect of good in relation to the person desiring, that is, so that it is neither morally good nor wicked, neither pleasant nor annoying, neither agreeable to nature nor disagreeable (which perhaps can never happen), once all that has been posited, such being cannot have final causality in the will. For it would have no agreeability or conformity with the will. The will, moreover, since it is essentially appetite, is not inclined except to the agreeable insofar as it is such. Hence, when the *ratio* of being of itself is indifferent to the one desiring with respect to the aspect of agreeability or disagreeability, it is not of itself sufficient for moving the appetite. If sometimes it seems that some being moves the will only because it is not thought disagreeable, this happens because in every being there is apprehended to be something of goodness and of perfection so that it is deemed agreeable by very reason of its perfection if it does not have disagreeability from some other source.

8. Indeed, since that which is in itself good can be either agreeable or disagreeable to a human being, not just any goodness but only that which has some agreeability to the one desiring is a sufficient *ratio* for final-causing. For this reason Aristotle said in *EN* VIII, c. 5: ‘What is lovable [is] indeed good, but [what is lovable] to each person [is the good] for him’. How this should be understood demands a long and theological disputation, both on account of friendship love and especially on account of love for God beyond all other things. For now I will only briefly note that one’s own good must not be understood to be only that which yields one’s own advantage but strictly speaking that which in itself is right or is fitting to the nature of the person desiring. Every end is included in this sense, even if it belongs to the most perfect friendship love.

9. Rursus dicet aliquis: voluntas non semper movetur a fine ad obtainendum aliquid, sed saepe etiam ad vitandum aliquid; sed ad hoc movetur a fine ratione malitiae; ergo non solum bonum, sed etiam malum ut malum potest habere aliquam causalitatem finalem in voluntate. Respondetur quando mobile recedit ab uno termino ut ad alium accedat, terminum a quo non esse finem illius motus, neque excitare mobile (loquimur metaphorice) ut a se recedat, sed finis est terminus ipse ad quem mobile fertur, et si finaliter excitari posset ab illo tantum traheretur et consequenter ratione illius ab alio termino recederet. Sic ergo voluntas proprie a bono tantum movetur ut a fine a quo trahitur ut ad se accedat per amorem, intentionem, etc.; inde vero sequitur recessus a malo, qui non tam est motio in finem quam quid consequens ad tendentiam in finem et quasi quoddam medium ad obtainendum finem. Unde ad illummet actum qui est odium mali, non movet malum nisi in virtute boni, quia non habetur odio malum nisi ratione boni amati, et ita etiam in illo actu dici potest bonitas ratio movens ad odio prosequendum malum oppositum. Nam odisse malum sub ratione mali nihil aliud est quam odisse illud quia privat bono, et ita bonitas est illis ratio principaliter movens, sicut in simili dicemus paulo inferius de electione mediorum.

10. Tandem dicet aliquis: interdum minor bonitas plus movet voluntatem ut amet, quam maior malitia ut recedat, et e converso minor malitia interdum plus movet ad fugam quam magna bonitas ad prosequendum finem; ergo eadem ratione fieri potest ut voluntas recedat a bono quatenus bonum est, seu etiamsi non sit malum, et e converso, ut feratur in malum etiamsi non sit bonum, quia, ut dialectici aiunt, sicut simpliciter ad simpliciter, ita magis ad magis, et e converso. Respondetur: sicut solum bonum potest movere voluntatem, ita etiam solum maius bonum, quantum est de se, magis movere, dummodo sufficienter propositum sit. Quod autem voluntas interdum non sic moveatur, provenit ex libertate ipsius voluntatis. Haec vero non sufficit ut feratur in malum sub ratione mali, tum quia libertas non potest exerceri extra obiectum vol-

45R 9. On the other hand, someone may say: the will is not always moved by the end to obtaining something but often to avoiding something. But it is moved to this by an end under the aspect of badness. Therefore, not only good but also bad insofar as it is bad can have some final causality in the will. For when a moving thing recedes from one *terminus* and approaches another one, the *terminus a quo* is not the end of that motion nor does it excite the moving thing (we are speaking metaphorically) to recede; rather the end is the *terminus* to which the moving thing is brought. And if it can be final-excited by that, it is only attracted and consequently recedes from the other *terminus* by reason of that attraction. Therefore, in the same way the will is properly moved only by something good as by an end by which it is drawn so that it approaches it through love, intention, etc. But retreat from something bad follows as a result. This is not so much motion to an end as something that follows from a tendency to an end and is, as it were, a kind of means to obtaining an end. Hence, as far as that act of hatred for something bad is concerned, the bad does not move [the will] except by virtue of the good. For the bad is not held for hatred except by reason of a loved good. And so in that act there can also be said to be a goodness that is the *ratio* moving to pursuit to hating the opposing bad. For to hate bad under the aspect of bad is nothing other than to hate it because it lacks good. And in that way goodness is in those cases the primarily moving *ratio* is goodness, just as in similar cases about which we say a little below concerning the election of means.

70R 10. Finally, someone may say: sometimes lesser goodness moves the will more to love than some greater badness moves it to withdraw and, the other way around, sometimes a lesser badness moves the will to flee more than a great goodness to pursuing the end. Therefore, for the same reason it can happen that the will withdraws from a good object insofar as it is good or even if it is not bad, and, the other way around, it can happen that the will is brought to a bad object even if it is not good. For, as the logicians say, just as strictly to strictly, so also more to more, and conversely. I respond: just as only something good can move the will, so also only a greater good, insofar as concerns itself, can move more, provided that it has been sufficiently proposed. The fact that the will sometimes is not moved in that way results from the will's own freedom. But this is not enough for it to be brought to bad under the aspect of bad, both because the freedom cannot be exercised

80 untatis, tum etiam quia, hoc ipso quod voluntas feratur in malum ad experiendam suam libertatem, iam non fertur sub ratione mali, sed sub aliqua ratione utilis. Quamquam hoc experimentum libertatis semper supponit in obiecto sufficientem rationem boni vel mali, quae ex parte illius fundare possit 85 huiusmodi usum libertatis. Ad hunc autem usum, si sit tantum quoad exercitium, sufficit ut vel bonitas obiecti, vel actus ipse seu dilectio eius non existimetur necessaria, ut in superioribus traditum est cum de liberis causis ageremus.

11. Unde, licet bonum quantum est ex se efficacius sit 90 in suo genere ad finaliter causandum, quia tamen actu causare non potest nisi voluntas ipsa se moveri sinat, seu cooperetur in suo genere motioni eius, quod pro sua libertate potest non facere, ideo ex hoc capite accidere potest ut minus bonum actu causet finaliter, praetermisso maiori bono. Quod tamen facere 95 non posset si nullam haberet bonitatem, quia iam tunc omnino deesset ratio causandi, sine qua non sufficit libertas voluntatis ut moveatur, quamvis, ut non moveatur, sufficiat (ut dixi) carentia vel negatio boni necessarii, etiamsi malum non sit. Secus vero erit si usus libertatis non tantum sit quoad exercitium, sed 100 etiam quoad specificationem per actum contrarium odii, aut similem, nam tunc necesse est ut aliqua ratio mali in obiecto appareat, nam odium proprie sumptum solum circa rationem mali versati potest.

12. Dico secundo: non tantum verum bonum quod in re 105 sit aut esse possit, sed etiam bonum apprens seu tantum existimat, potest esse sufficiens ut finalem suam causalitatem exerceat. Ita docet D. Thomas, I-II, q. 8, a. 1. Constatque satis experientia, nam saepe movetur homo ad inquirendum aliqua quae apparent bona, vel delectabilia, quae revera talia non sunt. 110 Quod etiam in electione mediorum est manifestum; eligimus enim saepe quod existimamus esse utile ad finem, quod postea experimur esse inutile, vel etiam impediens. Ratio autem est quia causa finalis non causat nisi cognita, ut infra dicemus; quantum autem spectat ad cognitionem, perinde se habet res 115 quae existimatur bona ac si in re ipsa bona esset, quia idem iudicium de illa fertur et aequa verum existimatur, ac denique eodem modo repraesentatur seu proponitur voluntati.

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beyond the object of the will and also because by the fact that the will is brought to something bad in order to experience its freedom does not mean that it is brought under the aspect of bad but rather under some aspect of utility. Although this experiment of freedom always assumes in the object a sufficient aspect of good or bad which for its part can be founded in this kind of use of freedom. But with respect to this use, if it is only with respect to exercise, it is enough that either the goodness of the object or the act itself or its love is not deemed necessary, as was related earlier when we dealt with free causes.

11. Hence, although a good as far as it is concerned is more efficacious in its genus for final-causing, nevertheless, because it cannot actually cause unless the will permits itself to be moved or cooperates in its genus with its motion (which it can fail to do thanks to its freedom), therefore from this head it can happen that a lesser good actually final-causes, passing over a greater good. Yet that could not be done if it has no goodness, because now in this case it would wholly lack a reason for causing, without which the freedom of the will is not enough for it to be moved, although, in order not to be moved, a lack or negation of the necessary good is sufficient (as I said), even if it is not bad. But it will be otherwise if the use of freedom is not only with respect to exercise but also with respect to specification through an act contrary to hatred or something similar, for then it is necessary that some aspect of bad appear in the object. For hatred properly taken can only be directed to an aspect of bad.

12. I say secondly: not only the true good which really is or can be, but also apparent good or good only estimated to be can be sufficient for the end to exercise its causality. St. Thomas teaches this in *ST* IaIIæ.8.1. And it is sufficiently clear from experience, for a human being is often moved to seeking things that appear good or delightful but which really are not good or delightful. This is also obvious in the election of means. For we often elect something that we think is useful for an end but which we afterwards find to be useless or even an impediment. The reason, moreover, is that the final cause does not cause except cognized, as we will say below. But as far as cognition is concerned, there is no difference between a thing that is thought to be good and a thing that is good in reality, since the same judgement is brought concerning it and it is thought equally true in either case and, finally, it is represented or proposed to the will in the same way.

120 13. Illud tamen videri solet difficile in hac conlcusione, cum causalitas finalis vera et realis sit, quomodo ratio tantum conficta aut existimata possit ad hanc causalitatem sufficere. Nam realis causalitas non potest oriri nisi a principio reali; illa autem bonitas tantum apprensens nihil reale est, sed fictum potius; ergo nec potest realiter causare. Immo talis bonitas, cum non sit in rebus, sed in ratione tantum, non videtur esse 125 posse sufficiens ad movendam metaphorice voluntatem, nam voluntas non fertur nisi in res ipsas quatenus bona sunt.

130 14. Respondetur primo hanc causalitatem finalem ita esse realem ut fiat morali quodam et intellectuali modo per naturalem sympathiam quae est inter voluntatem et intellectum, et 135 ideo ad illam non requiri aliud esse reale in causa nisi illud quod sufficit ad motionem inter has potentias per naturalem concessionem earum, et quia ad illud sufficit esse reale, ut representatum in intellectu, etiamsi in re verum non sit, ideo etiam ad causalitatem finalem sufficere potest apprensens bonitas, licet 140 vera non sit. Et hoc fere est quod D. Thomas citato loco ait, appetitum elicitum sequi formam apprehensam et ideo ad eius motionem sufficere bonitatem apprehensam seu existimatam, etiamsi vera non sit.

145 15. Addi vero ulterius potest aliud esse loqui de bonitate, aliud de re bona, nam voluntatem interdum movet res quae vere bona non est; quo sensu procedit conclusio posita, scilicet, quod interdum bonum tantum apprensens finaliter causet. Nihilominus tamen dici potest voluntatem nunquam moveri nisi a vera bonitate; nunquam enim movetur nisi vel a delectatione, vel ab honestate, vel a commodo naturae, quae omnes 150 verae bonitates sunt (omitto appetitum boni in communi, in quo non est deceptio). Unde in propria ratione formalis quae movet nunquam etiam est deceptio, sed haec intervenit in applicatione huius rationis formalis ad hanc vel illam rem, et hac ratione movet quidem res quae appetit bona; ratio autem movens non est apprensens vera bonitas, quamvis tali rei

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13. That, nevertheless, usually seems difficult in this conclusion: if final causality is true and real, how can an aspect that is only imagined or thought to be suffice for this causality? For real causality cannot arise except from a real principle. But that merely apparent goodness is nothing real, but rather a fiction. Therefore, it cannot really cause. Indeed, such a goodness, since it is not in things but in reason alone, does not seem able to be sufficient for moving the will metaphorically. For the will is not brought to things except insofar as they are good.

14. I respond, first, that this final causality is real in such a way that it comes about in a kind of moral or intellectual way through the natural sympathy that there is between the will and intellect. And for this reason no real being in the cause is required for it except that which suffices for the motion between these powers through their natural harmony. And because for that it is enough to have being represented as real in the intellect even if this is not true in reality, for that reason apparent goodness can also suffice for final causality, even if it is not true. And St. Thomas says almost this in the cited place: elicited desire follows apprehended form and therefore apprehended or deemed goodness is sufficient for its motion even if the apprehension is not true.

15. But one can further add that it is one thing to speak about goodness but another to speak about a good thing. For a thing that is not truly good sometimes moves the will, in which sense the posited conclusion—namely, that sometimes a merely apparent good final-causes—proceeds. Nevertheless, it can still be said that the will is never moved except by true goodness. For it is never moved except by delight, or honesty,³ or by an advantage to nature, all of which are true goodnesses (I pass over the appetite for good in general, in which there is no deception). Hence, there is never deception in the proper formal *ratio* which moves; deception comes up in the application of this formal *ratio* to this or that thing. And for this reason a thing which [merely] appears good does indeed move. But the moving *ratio* is not apparent but true goodness, although it is falsely attributed to such a thing. So,

³ Suárez uses the traditional threefold division of good into *honestum*, *delectabile*, and *utile*—see n. 16. Translation of these terms is liable to lead to unhappy results. For example, one might be tempted to translate *honestum* with ‘moral good’ or ‘virtuous good’, but those English expressions really do not cover a wide enough range of cases. I will here translate the terms with the archaic expressions ‘honesty’ or ‘honest good’, ‘delight’ or ‘delightful good’ (‘pleasure’ would be another option), and ‘useful good’. Suárez discusses this division in more detail in *DM* X.

falso attribuatur. Ut verbi gratia, si quis amat furtum ut ex illo eleemosynam faciat, movetur quidem a bono existimato, tamen a vera bonitate et honestate, scilicet, ab honestate misericordiae quam in tali actu esse existimat. Et idem est cum homo quaerit aliquod obiectum quod putat esse delectabile, in re tamen delectabile non est, nam ille veram quaerit delectationem et ab ea tantum movetur, errat tamen illam applicando rei in qua vere non est. In hoc ergo sensu dici potest rationem causandi finaliter semper esse veram aliquam bonitatem, quamvis non semper sit verum aliquod bonum, quia non semper apprehenditur talis bonitas aut iudicatur de re in qua vere existat.

165 16. Dico tertio: solum illud bonum quod in se seu per se bonum est, est sufficiens ad causalitatem finalem exercendam. Declaratur, nam bonum, ut supra tractavimus, tantum est aut honestum, aut delectabile, aut utile; ex quibus duo priora sunt in se ac per se bona, tertium vero solum per habitudinem ad illa, quae omnia ibidem explicata sunt. Igitur duo priora bona sufficiunt ad causalitatem finalem exercendam, quod facile probari potest. Nam causalitas finis in duobus consistit, vel in alterutro eorum, scilicet, quod voluntatem moveat ut finem propter se et alia propter ipsum diligit aut exsequatur; utrumque autem horum praestare potest utrumque ex illis bonis. Nam bonum honestum propter se est maxime expetibile tamquam per se decens, vel per sese naturae conveniens; immo haec est ipsa ratio boni honesti, ut dicto loco notavimus cum D. Thoma, I, q. 6, a. 6. De bono autem delectabili ait idem D. Thomas, I-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, ex Aristot., X Ethic., c. 2, stultum esse quaerere propter quid appetatur, nam ipsa delectatio per se habet unde appetibilis sit. Haec ergo duo bona sufficiencia sunt ad causandum primam motionem in finem propter seipsum.

17. Ex hac autem motione nascitur altera, quae est ad media propter finem; nam illud idem bonum quod propter se amatur movet ad amandum alia propter ipsum, si necessaria vel utilia sint ad bonum propter se amatum obtinendum. Utrumque ergo ex his bonis per se sufficiens est ratione suea bonitatis ad causalitatem finalem exercendam quoad utramque

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for example, if someone loves theft in order to give alms with what is stolen, he is indeed moved by something thought good. Nevertheless, he is moved by true goodness or honesty, namely, by the honest goodness of mercy which he thinks there is in such an act. And it is the same in the case of a human being who seeks some object that he thinks is delightful but which in reality is not delightful. For he seeks true delight and is only moved by that, yet he errs in attributing it to something in which it really is not. In this sense, therefore, one can say that the *ratio* of final-causing is always some true goodness, although there is not always some true good thing. For such goodness is not always apprehended in or judged to be in a thing in which it truly exists.

16. I say thirdly: only that good which in or of itself is good is sufficient for exercising final causality. It is shown: for good, as we discussed earlier, is either honest good, delightful good, or useful good. Of these, the former two are good in and of themselves, but the third is only good through a relation to those two. All this is explained in the same place. Therefore, the former two goods suffice for exercising final causality, which can easily be shown. For the causality of the end consists in two things or in one of them, namely, that it moves the will so that the end is loved or attained for its own sake or other things for its sake. But either of these can play the part according to these goods. For an honest good is especially desirable for its own sake as being right in itself or as agreeable in itself to nature. Indeed, this is the very nature of honest good, as we noted in the cited place with St. Thomas, *ST* Ia.6.6. Moreover, St. Thomas says the same thing about delightful good in *ST* IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1 in accordance with Aristotle, *EN* X, c. 2: it is foolish to ask why it is desired, for delight itself has of itself that which makes it desirable. Therefore, these two goods are sufficient for causing a first motion to the end for its own sake.

17. Moreover, from this motion there arises another, which is the one to the means for the sake of the end. For that same good which is loved for its own sake moves one to loving other things for its sake, if they are necessary or useful for obtaining the good that is loved for its own sake. Therefore, either of these goods is in itself sufficient by reason of its goodness for exercising final causality with respect to either

190 eius partem. In quo munere sese habent mutuo sicut excedens
et excessum, nam bonum delectabile et quoad nos plus movere
solet et ad se trahere appetitum, et delectatio quodammodo
est ultima perfectio operationis propter se amabilis; at vero
bonum honestum, quo maius est et per se nobilis, eo de se
195 et natura sua potentius est ad hanc causalitatem exercendam et
nobiliores etiam effectus potest in hoc genere causare. Quin
potius, si naturae institutionem spectemus, solum honestum
bonum habere debet propriam rationem finis, nam delectatio
ex intentione naturae non est propter se, sed propter operationem
200 cui adiungitur, et ideo propter illam amari debet, de
quo alias latius.

18. De bono autem utili, cum non sit per se bonum, satis
manifestum apparet non esse sufficiens ad causalitatem finalem
205 exercendam, quia bonum utile ut sic non est per se amabile;
ergo non est sufficiens ad primam motionem finis exercendam.
Rursus quatenus utile est, non est id propter quod aliud amat-
atur, nam potius ipsum amatur propter aliud; ergo neque se-
210 cundam motionem seu causalitatem finis exercere potest. Quin
potius sub ea ratione est effectus finis, quia est id quod alterius
gratia fit vel amatur; ergo bonum utile ut sic non potest causalitatem
finalem exercere. Sola ergo bonitas honesta, sive moralis
sive naturalis, et bonitas delectabilis, potest esse propria ratio
215 causandi finaliter. Hic vero occurrebat statim difficultas de
mediis, an possint causalitatem finalem exercere, quam melius
tractabimus sectione sequenti.

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part of it. In service of this they are mutually related as exceeding and exceeded, for delightful good both usually moves us more and draws desire to itself more and delight in a certain way is the ultimate perfection of activity that is lovable for its own sake. But, on the other hand, honest good, by the fact that it is greater and in itself more noble, of itself and by its nature is more powerful for exercising this causality and can also cause more noble effects in this genus. But rather, if we regarded the institution of nature, only honest good ought to have the proper *ratio* of an end, for delight is not for its own sake by the intention of nature but is added to it for the sake of activity. And for this reason delightful good ought to be loved for the sake of honest good, concerning which more is to be said elsewhere.

18. But concerning useful good, since it is not good in itself, it appears obvious enough that it is not sufficient for exercising final causality, since useful good as such is not lovable for its own sake. Therefore, it is not sufficient for exercising the first motion of an end. On the other hand, insofar as it is useful, it is not that for the sake of which something else is loved, for it is itself rather loved for the sake of something else. Therefore, it cannot exercise according to the motion or causality of the end. But it is rather an effect of the end under that aspect, because it is that which is done or loved for the sake of another thing. Therefore, useful good as such cannot exercise final causality. Therefore, only honest good, either moral or natural, and delightful good can be a proper *ratio* for final-causing. But here a difficulty about means immediately comes up: whether they can exercise final causality. We will better discuss this in the following section.