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Quaenam sit in fine proxima ratio finaliter causandi.

1. Sensus praesentis quaestionis ex superiori constat; non enim inquirimus rationem causandi quatenus dicit causationem in actu secundo, sed quatenus dicit actum primum quasi formalem, constituentem causam finalem proxime aptam et sufficientem ad causandum. Sicut enim in causa efficiente distinguimus rem quae causat a proxima ratione causandi, ita in finali videtur necessarium, quia eadem omnino res potest esse et principium efficiens et causa finalis et formalis; oportet ergo ut sub diversis rationibus haec munera exerceat; ergo illa ratio sub qua exercet munus causae finalis, erit quae proxime constituit finalem causam quasi in actu primo.

Resolutio quaestionis.

2. De hac igitur re communis consensus Doctorum omnium esse videtur bonitatem esse proximam rationem sub qua finis movet; atque ita illam esse quae constituit finalem causam, dans (ut ita dicam) virtutem ad causandum. Ita sentit D. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, et latius III cont. Gent., c. 2 et 3, ubi ostendit idem esse operari propter finem, quod operari propter bonum, et I, q. 5, a. 4, probat bonum habere rationem finis; et ibidem, solutione ad 2, de hac causalitate declarat illud Dionysii, c. 4 de Divin. nom., Bonum est diffusivum sui, nimirum, finaliter attractendo et alliciendo voluntatem. Eandem doctrinam habet Alex. Alens., I p., q. 17, memb. 3, et q. 34, memb. 1; sumptaque est ex Aristotele, II Phys., c. 3, tex. 31, ubi dicit finem et bonum

What then the proximate nature of final-causing is in the end.

1. The sense of the present question is clear from what preceded. For we are not inquiring into the nature of causing insofar as it expresses causation in the second act, but insofar as it expresses a first act, as it were, constituting a final cause proximately apt and sufficient for causing. For just as in the efficient cause we distinguish the thing which causes from the proximate nature of causing, so in the final cause it seems necessary, because the very same thing can be both an efficient principle and a final and a formal cause. Therefore, it is necessary that it exercises these functions under different *rationes*. Therefore, that *ratio* under which it exercises the function of final cause will be the one which proximately constitutes a final cause as if in the first act.

Resolution of the question.

2. So then concerning this matter it seems to be a general consensus among all the doctors that goodness is the proximate *ratio* under which the end moves. And so that is what constitutes a final cause, giving (if I may speak in this way) force (*virtutem*) for causing. St. Thomas thinks this in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 and more broadly in SCG III, c. 2 and 3, where he shows that it is the same to act for the sake of an end as to act for the sake of good. And in Ia.5.4 he proves that good has the *ratio* of an end. And in the same place, ad 2, he declares concerning this causality [the statement] from Dionysius, c. 4 of *de Divin. nom.* that good is self-diffusive, namely, by final-attracting and enticing the will. Alexander of Hales holds the same doctrine in p. I, q. 17, memb. 3 and q. 34, memb. 1. And it has been taken up from Aristotle, *Phys.* II, c. 3,

¹Latin text is from <http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d23.htm>. Retrieved Feb. 11, 2008. Spelling errors corrected without note. I checked the text against the 1597 edition (generally the most reliable text) for significant textual variations. Marginal notes are as found in the 1597 edition. Many of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition, D = digital source, and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

esse idem, quod etiam repetit V *Metaph.*, c. 2, et lib. I *Ethic.*,
 c. 7, ait id esse unicuique bonum, cuius gratia caetera operatur;
 idem lib. I *Ethic.* ad Eudemum, sub finem. Ratio autem est
 quia causalitas finis consistit in motione metaphorica voluntatis,
 qua illam ad se allicit; nihil autem ad se allicit voluntatem
 nisi quatenus bonum est; ergo bonitas est ratio movendi voluntatem;
 ergo etiam est ratio seu principium causandi finaliter. Minorem
 suppono ut certam, ex communi consensu theologorum et philosophorum,
 dicentium voluntatem non posse ferri in aliquid nisi sub ratione boni,
 iuxta illud, bonum est quod omnia appetunt.

Malum ut malum possitne causa esse finalis.

3. Sed occurrit statim controversia cum Ockham et aliis nominalibus
 dicentibus posse voluntatem ferri in malum sub ratione mali. Ita
 Ockham, In III, q. 13, dub. 3. Inclinat etiam Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4,
 circa finem, et In II, dist. 43, q. 2. Ex quorum assertione plane
 sequitur malum ut malum posse etiam metaphorice movere voluntatem
 et consequenter habere causalitatem finis, nam si malum potest
 propter se amari, etiam poterunt alia amari propter ipsum, si ad
 illud obtinendum necessaria et utilia sint. Atque ita fiet ut non sit
 bonitas adaequata ratio et virtus finis ad causandum finaliter,
 sed erit entitas vel aliquid huiusmodi, ut Ockham significat.

4. Verumtamen haec sententia antiquata est et ab scholis merito
 reiecta, utpote repugnans cum Aristotelis, Dionysii, Augustini,
 D. Thom. et omnium recte sentientium consensu, ut patet ex
 Aristot., lib. I *Ethic.*, c. 1; Dionys., c. 4 de *Divin. nom.*;
 August., II *Confess.*, c. 6 et 8; D. Thoma, I-II, q. 8, a. 1, et
 reliquis theologis, In II, dist. 43; Henric., *Quodl.* I, q. 17. Vide
 etiam Greg. Nyss., lib. de *Opificio hominis*, c. 20; et Damas., lib. II
 de *Fide*, c. 22. Horum enim omnium axiomata commune est,
 neminem ad malum intendentem operari. Estque id experientia
 evidentissimum. Et ratio est quia esset inordinatissime instituta
 voluntatis facultas si in malum qua malum est ferri posset. Quid
 enim magis inordinatum esse

text. 31, where he says that the end and the good are the same, which
 he also repeats in *Metaph.* V, c. 2, and in *EN* I, c. 7, he says that
 for each [agent] that is the good for the sake of which other things are
 done. And likewise in *EE* I close to the end. Moreover, the reason
 is because the causality of the end consists in a metaphorical motion of
 the will by which the end entices the will to itself. Moreover, nothing
 entices the will to itself except insofar as it is good. Therefore, good-
 ness is the *ratio* for moving the will. Therefore, it is also the *ratio*
 or principle of final-causing. I assume the minor as certain from the
 general consensus of theologians and philosophers, who say that the
 will cannot be brought to something except under the aspect of good,
 given that good is what everyone desires.

Whether bad as bad could ever be a final cause.

3. But a controversy immediately comes up with Ockham and other
 nominalists saying that the will can be brought to something bad under
 the aspect of bad. Ockham [says] this in [*Sent.*] III, q. 13, dub. 3.
 Scotus also inclines this way in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 1, q. 4 and II, dist. 43,
 q. 2. From their assertion it plainly follows that bad as bad can also
 metaphorically move the will and consequently have final causality,
 for if bad can be loved for its own sake, it will also be possible for
 other things to be loved for its sake, if they are necessary and useful
 for obtaining it. And thus it will result that goodness is not the
 adequate *ratio* and force of the end for final-causing, but it will be
 an entity or something of this sort, as Ockham indicates.

4. Nevertheless, this time-honoured view is deservedly rejected by
 the schools, inasmuch as it is repugnant to Aristotle, Dionysius,
 Augustine, St. Thomas, and to the right consensus of all views. This
 is clear from Aristotle, *EN* I, c. 1; Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*,
 c. 4; Augustine, *Conf.* II, c. 6 and 8; St. Thomas, *ST* IaIIæ.8.1; and
 for the remaining theologians in II, dist. 43, and Henry of Ghent in
Quodl. I, q. 17. See also Gregory of Nyssa, *De opificio hominis*, c. 20,
 and [John] Damascene, *De fide* II, c. 22. For it is a common axiom
 for all of them that no one acts by intending bad. And this is entirely
 obvious from experience. And the reason is that the faculty of the
 will would have been set up most inordinately if it could be brought
 to a bad thing insofar as it is bad. For what could be more inordinate
 than to will something

25 potest quam velle malum quia malum est? Voluntas autem
 nihil potest appetitu elicito velle nisi quod sit consentaneum
 alicui naturali inclinationi ipsius voluntatis, quia ex tali incli-
 natione nascitur omnis appetitio elicita, saltem naturalis, quia
 omnis appetitio huiusmodi refertur ad obiectum adaequatum
 et proportionatum voluntati vel aliquam partem eius; natu-
 30 ralis autem inclinatio voluntatis est ad totum illud obiectum;
 si ergo voluntas posset moveri per proprium actum in malum
 ut malum, naturalis etiam inclinatio eius esset ad malum ut
 malum; esset ergo ipsa naturalis inclinatio inordinata. Hoc
 autem omnino repugnat, tum quia ab optimo auctore sapien-
 tissime instituta, tum etiam quia esset sibi ipsi repugnans. Nam
 35 voluntatis finis seu institutio est ut per eam homo quaerat con-
 venientia sibi et fugiat disconvenientia; si ergo accepisset incli-
 nationem ad tendendum in disconveniens quatenus disconveni-
 ens est, formaliter et directe sibi ipsi et suo fini repugnaret, et
 ideo recte dixit Damasc., lib. II, c. 22: Voluntas fertur ad agen-
 dum in illis rebus quae naturae consentaneae sunt. Ut Senec.,
 40 lib. IV de Benefic., c. 17, dixit: Nec quisquam tantum a naturali
 lege descivit et hominem exuit, ut animi causa malus sit.

5. Et confirmatur, nam impossibile est ut intellectus assen-
 sum praebeat falso quatenus falsum est; ergo et quod voluntas
 45 prosequatur malum quatenus malum est. Patet consequentia
 quia, sicut comparatur intellectus ad verum, ita voluntas ad
 bonum; tantaque est ex terminis ipsis repugnantia inter prose-
 cutionem et malum, quanta est inter assensum et falsum. Tum
 50 etiam, quia si intellectus non potest iudicare assentiendo falso,
 ergo non potest iudicare malum ut malum habere unde ametur,
 nam id est evidenter et ex ipsis terminis falsum et repugnans
 omni intellectui. Cuius signum apertum est (ut obiter solvam-
 55 us omnia argumenta quae contra fieri solent), quia nunquam
 iudicamus esse amandum vel prosequendum aliquid quod alias
 malum esse cognoscimus, nisi quia iudicamus commodum vel
 ad delectationem, vel ad vindictam sumendam, vel ad aliam
 similem utilitatem. Ergo nec voluntas potest ferri in malum ut
 60 tale est, seu quod tantum cognoscitur esse malum. Patet con-
 sequentia, quia, ut inferius dicitur, voluntas non potest moveri
 nisi medio iudicio rationis quo sufficienter proponatur aliquid

25R bad precisely because it is bad? But the will can will nothing by an
 elicited desire except that which is fitting for some natural inclination
 of the will itself, because every elicited appetition—at least every natu-
 ral one—arises from such an inclination. For every appetition of this
 sort is referred to some object that is adequate and proportionate to the
 will or to some part of it. But a natural inclination of the will is to its
 30R whole object. Therefore, if the will could be moved through a proper
 act to something bad insofar as it is bad, the natural inclination would
 also be to something bad insofar as it is bad. Therefore, that natural
 inclination would be inordinate. But this is wholly repugnant, both be-
 cause the will is set up by the best and most wise author and because it
 would be self-contradictory. For the end or institution of the will is so
 35R the human being will through it seek things agreeable to him and flee
 things disagreeable. Therefore, if it received an inclination to tend to
 something disagreeable insofar as it is disagreeable, it would formally
 and directly contradict itself and its end. And therefore [John] Dama-
 scene rightly said in *De fide* II, c. 22: ‘The will is brought to acting for
 those things which are fitting to nature’. As Seneca said in *De benef.* IV,
 40R c. 17: ‘Nor has anyone so fallen from the natural law and cast off his
 humanity as to be bad for his mind’s sake’.

5. And it is confirmed: for it is impossible for the intellect to assent
 to something false insofar as it is false. Therefore, it is also impossible
 45R that the will pursue something bad insofar as it is bad. The consequence
 is clear, because the will is related to the good just as the intellect is to
 the true. And there is just as great a repugnance on the part of the terms
 between pursuit and bad as there is between assent and false. Also be-
 50R cause if the intellect cannot judge by assenting to the false, it therefore
 cannot judge the bad as bad to have what it takes to be loved, for that is
 evidently and from the terms themselves false and repugnant to every
 understanding. It is an obvious sign of this (so that along the way we re-
 solve every argument which is usually made for the opposing position)
 55R that we never judge that something is to be loved or is to be pursued
 that we otherwise cognize as being bad except because we judge it ad-
 vantageous or useful for getting delight or revenge or for something
 else. Therefore, the will cannot be brought to something bad insofar
 as it is such or to something only cognized as bad. The consequence is
 60R clear, because, as I will say further on, the will cannot be moved except
 by means of a judgement of reason by which something is sufficiently

vel appetendum vel appetibile.

6. Atque hinc tandem sumitur ratio quae ad rem de qua
 agimus spectat, quia in malo ut sic quatenus malum est nihil
 65 est quod possit apprehendi aut existimari ut sufficiens ratio ob
 quam voluntas moveatur. Nam vel in malo consideratur malitia, vel entitas quae malitiae subest. Malitia per se ac formaliter
 sumpta nihil habet quo voluntatem allicitat vel attrahat, quia
 ipsa nihil est, ut in superioribus diximus. Entitas autem, quae
 70 malitiae subesse potest, aliquid bonitatis habet; unde si appetitum
 movet, id est ratione bonitatis. Et confirmatur, nam in
 electione mediorum impossibile est voluntatem eligere aliquid
 ut medium ad finem eo quod sit disconveniens, vel impediatur
 ad consecutionem finis, quod esset eligere malum oppositum
 75 bono utili sub ratione mali; ergo in intentione vel amore finis
 impossibile est quod feratur in aliquid ut in finem eo quod per
 se sit disconveniens, quod est velle sub ratione mali oppositi
 bono propter se appetibili. Antecedens videtur per se notum
 ex terminis; qui enim intelligi potest ut aliquis ex intentione
 80 finis eligat quod repugnat fini, quatenus tale est? nam esset
 haec contradictio in ipsa voluntate. Quin potius docent omnes
 qui recte sentiunt, quando unitum est medium utile ad finem
 fieri non posse quin voluntas illud eligat, si vere et efficaciter
 intendit finem; multo ergo impossibilius est ut eligat medium
 85 inutile, qua tale est. Prima vero consequentia probatur, quia
 tantum repugnat malum ut in se malum est, intentioni, sicut
 inutile ut inutile, electioni; nam sicut electio inutilis, ut inu-
 tilis, repugnat intentioni finis, ita intentio mali ut per se mali,
 repugnat naturali et adaequatae propensione voluntatis.

Indifferens ut sic possitne causa esse finalis.

7. Dices haec argumenta satis probare et malum ut malum non
 posse finaliter causare et bonum ut bonum posse, non tamen
 probare solum bonum posse habere huiusmodi causalitatem,
 5 aut bonitatem esse adaequatam rationem finalisandi. Quia

proposed as either something that is to be desired or is desirable.

6. And, finally, from here is taken the argument that regards the
 thing concerning which we act, because in a bad thing as such insofar
 65R as it is bad there is nothing that could be apprehended or estimated as
 a sufficient reason for the will to move. For in the bad thing one either
 considers the badness or the entity which lies underneath the badness.
 Badness taken in itself or formally has nothing by which it entices or
 attracts the will, because it itself is nothing, as we said earlier. But the
 entity that lies underneath the badness has some goodness. Hence, if
 70R it moves the appetite, it does so by reason of the goodness. And it is
 confirmed, for in the election of means it is impossible for the will to
 elect something as a means to the end by reason of it being disagreeable
 to or impeding the attainment of the end. That would be to elect a bad
 75R opposing a useful good under the aspect of bad. Therefore, in intention
 or love for the end it is impossible that the will is brought to something
 as to an end by reason of it being in itself disagreeable. That would be to
 will under the aspect of bad opposing a good desirable for its own sake.
 The antecedent seems *per se notum* from the terms. For who can make
 sense of someone choosing something repugnant to an end insofar as
 it is repugnant in that way as a result of an intention for the end? For
 this would be a contradiction in the will. Instead, everyone who thinks
 rightly teaches that when a useful means is united to an end it cannot
 but happen that the will elects that means if it truly and efficaciously
 85R intends the end. Therefore, much more is it impossible for it to elect a
 useless means insofar as it is useless. But the first consequence is proven
 because just as much as bad insofar as it is bad in itself is repugnant to
 intention, so the useless insofar as it is useless is repugnant to election.
 For just as the election of something useless insofar as it is useless is
 90R repugnant to the intention for the end, so the intention for a bad thing
 insofar as it is bad in itself is repugnant to the natural and adequate
 propensity of the will.

Whether indifference as such could ever be a final cause.

7. You may say that these arguments are enough to prove both that bad
 as bad cannot final-cause and that good as good can, but this does not
 yet prove that only good can have causality of this sort or that goodness
 5R is the adequate nature of final-causing. For between good and bad there

inter bonum et malum potest dari indifferens vel reipsa, vel saltem praecisione mentis, quatenus ratio entis aut veri praecisa ratione boni considerari potest; ergo haec potest esse ratio sufficiens ad movendum appetitum, et consequenter ad finaliter causandum. Respondeo in re dari quidem posse ens indifferens secundum aliquam rationem boni, non tamen secundum omnem, quia non potest ens non esse bonum, atque ita quando ens sub aliqua ratione indifferens voluntatem movet, non movet illam quatenus indifferens est, sed quatenus aliquam rationem boni habet. Quod si contingat aliquod ens sub omni ratione boni esse indifferens respectu appetentis, id est, ut nec sit honestum, nec turpe, nec iucundum, nec molestum, neque naturae conveniens, neque disconveniens (quod fortasse non potest inveniri), tamen illo posito, tale ens non posset habere causalitatem finalem in voluntate; quia nullam convenientiam aut conformitatem haberet cum illa; voluntas autem cum sit essentialiter appetitus, non inclinatur nisi in conveniens ut tale est; unde cum ratio entis de se sit indifferens ad rationem convenientis et disconvenientis appetenti, non est de se sufficiens ad movendum appetitum. Quod si interdum videatur ens aliquod movere voluntatem solum quia non existimatur disconveniens, ideo est quia in omni ente apprehenditur inesse aliquid bonitatis et perfectionis, quae si aliunde non habet disconvenientiam, hoc ipso ratione suae perfectionis existimatur conveniens.

8. Immo, quia id quod est in se bonum potest esse vel conveniens vel disconveniens homini, ideo non quaecumque bonitas, sed secundum aliquam convenientiam ad appetentem est sufficiens ratio finalis. Propter quod dixit Arist., VIII Ethic., c. 5: Amabile quidem bonum, unicuique autem proprium. Quod quomodo intelligendum sit, longam et theologiam postulat disputationem, tum propter amorem amicitiae, tum maxime propter amorem Dei super omnia. Nunc breviter tantum notetur bonum proprium non debere intelligi solum illud quod cedit in proprium commodum, sed simpliciter quod per se decet aut est consentaneum naturae appetentis. Quo sensu comprehenditur omnis finis, etiamsi ad perfectissimum amorem amicitiae pertineat.

can be indifference, either in the thing itself or at least as considered by the mind, insofar as the *ratio* of being or of the true can be considered apart from the *ratio* of good. Therefore, this can be a sufficient reason for moving appetite and consequently for final-causing. I respond that in the thing there can indeed be given being that is indifferent according to some aspect of good but, nevertheless, not according to every [aspect of good]. For being cannot fail to be good. Thus when being moves the will under some aspect of indifference, it does not move the will insofar as it is indifferent but insofar as it has some aspect of good. If it happens that some being is indifferent under every aspect of good in relation to the person desiring, that is, so that it is neither morally good nor wicked, neither pleasant nor annoying, neither agreeable to nature nor disagreeable (which perhaps can never happen), once all that has been posited, such being cannot have final causality in the will. For it would have no agreeability or conformity with the will. The will, moreover, since it is essentially appetite, is not inclined except to the agreeable insofar as it is such. Hence, when the *ratio* of being of itself is indifferent to the one desiring with respect to the aspect of agreeability or disagreeability, it is not of itself sufficient for moving the appetite. If sometimes it seems that some being moves the will only because it is not thought disagreeable, this happens because in every being there is apprehended to be something of goodness and of perfection so that it is deemed agreeable by very reason of its perfection if it does not have disagreeability from some other source.

8. Indeed, since that which is in itself good can be either agreeable or disagreeable to a human being, not just any goodness but only that which has some agreeability to the one desiring is a sufficient *ratio* for final-causing. For this reason Aristotle said in *EN VIII*, c. 5: ‘What is lovable [is] indeed good, but [what is lovable] to each person [is the good] for him’. How this should be understood demands a long and theological disputation, both on account of friendship love and especially on account of love for God beyond all other things. For now I will only briefly note that one’s own good must not be understood to be only that which yields one’s own advantage but strictly speaking that which in itself is right or is fitting to the nature of the person desiring. Every end is included in this sense, even if it belongs to the most perfect friendship love.

9. Rursus dicit aliquis: voluntas non semper movetur
 45 a fine ad obtinendum aliquid, sed saepe etiam ad vitandum
 aliquid; sed ad hoc movetur a fine ratione malitiae; ergo non
 solum bonum, sed etiam malum ut malum potest habere ali-
 quam causalitatem finalem in voluntate. Respondetur quando
 50 a quo non esse finem illius motus, neque excitare mobile (lo-
 quimur metaphorice) ut a se recedat, sed finis est terminus ipse
 ad quem mobile fertur, et si finaliter excitari posset ab illo tan-
 tum traheretur et consequenter ratione illius ab alio termino
 recederet. Sic ergo voluntas proprie a bono tantum movetur ut
 55 a fine a quo trahitur ut ad se accedat per amorem, intentionem,
 etc.; inde vero sequitur recessus a malo, qui non tam est mo-
 tio in finem quam quid consequens ad tendentiam in finem et
 quasi quoddam medium ad obtinendum finem. Unde ad il-
 lummet actum qui est odium mali, non movet malum nisi in
 60 virtute boni, quia non habetur odio malum nisi ratione boni
 amati, et ita etiam in illo actu dici potest bonitas ratio movens
 ad odio prosequendum malum oppositum. Nam odisse malum
 sub ratione mali nihil aliud est quam odisse illud quia privat
 bono, et ita bonitas est illis ratio principaliter movens, sicut in
 65 simili dicemus paulo inferius de electione mediorum.

10. Tandem dicit aliquis: interdum minor bonitas plus
 movet voluntatem ut amet, quam maior malitia ut recedat, et
 e converso minor malitia interdum plus movet ad fugam quam
 magna bonitas ad prosequendum finem; ergo eadem ratione
 70 fieri potest ut voluntas recedat a bono quatenus bonum est, seu
 etiamsi non sit malum, et e converso, ut feratur in malum eti-
 amsi non sit bonum, quia, ut dialectici aiunt, sicut simpliciter
 ad simpliciter, ita magis ad magis, et e converso. Responde-
 tur: sicut solum bonum potest movere voluntatem, ita etiam
 75 solum maius bonum, quantum est de se, magis movere, dum-
 modo sufficienter propositum sit. Quod autem voluntas in-
 terdum non sic moveatur, provenit ex libertate ipsius volun-
 tatis. Haec vero non sufficit ut feratur in malum sub ratione
 mali, tum quia libertas non potest exerceri extra obiectum vol-

9. On the other hand, someone may say: the will is not always
 moved by the end to obtaining something but often to avoiding some-
 45R thing. But it is moved to this by an end under the aspect of badness.
 Therefore, not only good but also bad insofar as it is bad can have some
 final causality in the will. For when a moving thing recedes from one
terminus and approaches another one, the *terminus a quo* is not the
 end of that motion not does it excite the moving thing (we are speak-
 50R ing metaphorically) to recede; rather the end is the *terminus* to which
 the moving thing is brought. And if it can be final-excited by that, it
 is only attracted and consequently recedes from the other *terminus* by
 reason of that attraction. Therefore, in the same way the will is prop-
 55R erly moved only by something good as by an end by which it is drawn
 so that it approaches it through love, intention, etc. But retreat from
 something bad follows as a result. This is not so much motion to an end
 as something that follows from a tendency to an end and is, as it were,
 a kind of means to obtaining an end. Hence, as far as that act of hatred
 for something bad is concerned, the bad does not move [the will] ex-
 60R cept by virtue of the good. For the bad is not held for hatred except by
 reason of a loved good. And so in that act there can also be said to be a
 goodness that is the *ratio* moving to pursuit to hating the opposing bad.
 For to hate bad under the aspect of bad is nothing other than to hate
 it because it lacks good. And in that way goodness is in those cases the
 65R primarily moving *ratio* is goodness, just as in similar cases about which
 we say a little below concerning the election of means.

10. Finally, someone may say: sometimes lesser goodness moves
 the will more to love than some greater badness moves it to withdraw
 and, the other way around, sometimes a lesser badness moves the will to
 70R flee more than a great goodness to pursuing the end. Therefore, for the
 same reason it can happen that the will withdraws from a good object
 insofar as it is good or even if it is not bad, and, the other way around,
 it can happen that the will is brought to a bad object even if it is not
 good. For, as the logicians say, just as strictly to strictly, so also more
 to more, and conversely. I respond: just as only something good can
 75R move the will, so also only a greater good, insofar as concerns itself,
 can move more, provided that it has been sufficiently proposed. The
 fact that the will sometimes is not moved in that way results from the
 will's own freedom. But this is not enough for it to be brought to bad
 80R under the aspect of bad, both because the freedom cannot be exercised

80 untatis, tum etiam quia, hoc ipso quod voluntas feratur in
malum ad experiendam suam libertatem, iam non fertur sub
ratione mali, sed sub aliqua ratione utilis. Quamquam hoc
experimentum libertatis semper supponit in obiecto sufficien-
tem rationem boni vel mali, quae ex parte illius fundare possit
85 huiusmodi usum libertatis. Ad hunc autem usum, si sit tantum
quoad exercitium, sufficit ut vel bonitas obiecti, vel actus ipse
seu dilectio eius non existimetur necessaria, ut in superioribus
traditum est cum de liberis causis ageremus.

11. Unde, licet bonum quantum est ex se efficacius sit
90 in suo genere ad finaliter causandum, quia tamen actu causare
non potest nisi voluntas ipsa se moveri sinat, seu cooperetur
in suo genere motioni eius, quod pro sua libertate potest non
facere, ideo ex hoc capite accidere potest ut minus bonum actu
causet finaliter, praetermisso maiori bono. Quod tamen facere
95 non posset si nullam haberet bonitatem, quia iam tunc omnino
deesset ratio causandi, sine qua non sufficit libertas voluntatis
ut moveatur, quamvis, ut non moveatur, sufficiat (ut dixi) car-
entia vel negatio boni necessarii, etiamsi malum non sit. Secus
vero erit si usus libertatis non tantum sit quoad exercitium, sed
100 etiam quoad specificationem per actum contrarium odii, aut
similem, nam tunc necesse est ut aliqua ratio mali in obiecto
appareat, nam odium proprie sumptum solum circa rationem
mali versati potest.

12. Dico secundo: non tantum verum bonum quod in re
105 sit aut esse possit, sed etiam bonum apparens seu tantum ex-
istimatum, potest esse sufficiens ut finalem suam causalitatem
exerceat. Ita docet D. Thomas, I-II, q. 8, a. 1. Constatque satis
experientia, nam saepe movetur homo ad inquirendum aliqua
quae apparent bona, vel delectabilia, quae revera talia non sunt.
110 Quod etiam in electione mediolorum est manifestum; eligimus
enim saepe quod existimamus esse utile ad finem, quod postea
experimur esse inutile, vel etiam impediens. Ratio autem est
quia causa finalis non causat nisi cognita, ut infra dicemus;
quantum autem spectat ad cognitionem, perinde se habet res
115 quae existimatur bona ac si in re ipsa bona esset, quia idem iu-
diciu[m] de illa fertur et aequè verum existimatur, ac denique
eodem modo repraesentatur seu proponitur voluntati.

beyond the object of the will and also because by the fact that the will is
brought to something bad in order to experience its freedom does not
mean that it is brought under the aspect of bad but rather under some
aspect of utility. Although this experiment of freedom always assumes
85R in the object a sufficient aspect of good or bad which for its part can be
founded in this kind of use of freedom. But with respect to this use, if
it is only with respect to exercise, it is enough that either the goodness
of the object or the act itself or its love is not deemed necessary, as was
related earlier when we dealt with free causes.

11. Hence, although a good as far as it is concerned is more ef-
ficacious in its genus for final-causing, nevertheless, because it cannot
actually cause unless the will permits itself to be moved or cooperates
in its genus with its motion (which it can fail to do thanks to its free-
dom), therefore from this head it can happen that a lesser good actually
95R final-causes, passing over a greater good. Yet that could not be done if it
has no goodness, because now in this case it would wholly lack a reason
for causing, without which the freedom of the will is not enough for it
to be moved, although, in order not to be moved, a lack or negation of
the necessary good is sufficient (as I said), even if it is not bad. But it will
be otherwise if the use of freedom is not only with respect to exercise
100R but also with respect to specification through an act contrary to hatred
or something similar, for then it is necessary that some aspect of bad
appear in the object. For hatred properly taken can only be directed to
an aspect of bad.

12. I say secondly: not only the true good which really is or can
be, but also apparent good or good only estimated to be can be suffi-
cient for the end to exercise its causality. St. Thomas teaches this in
ST IaIIæ.8.1. And it is sufficiently clear from experience, for a human
being is often moved to seeking things that appear good or delightful
but which really are not good or delightful. This is also obvious in
the election of means. For we often elect something that we think is
useful for an end but which we afterwards find to be useless or even
an impediment. The reason, moreover, is that the final cause does not
cause except cognized, as we will say below. But as far as cognition is
concerned, there is no difference between a thing that is thought to be
good and a thing that is good in reality, since the same judgement is
brought concerning it and it is thought equally true in either case and,
finally, it is represented or proposed to the will in the same way.

13. Illud tamen videri solet difficile in hac conclusione, cum causalitas finalis vera et realis sit, quomodo ratio tantum
 120 conficta aut existimata possit ad hanc causalitatem sufficere. 120R
 Nam realis causalitas non potest oriri nisi a principio reali; illa autem bonitas tantum apparens nihil reale est, sed fictum potius; ergo nec potest realiter causare. Immo talis bonitas, cum non sit in rebus, sed in ratione tantum, non videtur esse
 125 posse sufficiens ad movendam metaphorice voluntatem, nam voluntas non fertur nisi in res ipsas quatenus bonae sunt. 125R

14. Respondetur primo hanc causalitatem finalem ita esse realem ut fiat morali quodam et intellectuali modo per naturalem sympathiam quae est inter voluntatem et intellectum, et ideo ad illam non requiri aliud esse reale in causa nisi illud quod
 130 sufficit ad motionem inter has potentias per naturalem consensionem earum, et quia ad illud sufficit esse reale, ut repraesentatum in intellectu, etiamsi in re verum non sit, ideo etiam ad causalitatem finalem sufficere potest apparens bonitas, licet
 135 vera non sit. Et hoc fere est quod D. Thomas citato loco ait, 135R
 appetitum elicited sequi formam apprehensam et ideo ad eius motionem sufficere bonitatem apprehensam seu existimatam, etiamsi vera non sit.

15. Addi vero ulterius potest aliud esse loqui de bonitate, aliud de re bona, nam voluntatem interdum movet res quae vere bona non est; quo sensu procedit conclusio posita, scilicet, quod interdum bonum tantum apparens finaliter causet. Nihilominus tamen dici potest voluntatem nunquam moveri nisi a vera bonitate; nunquam enim movetur nisi vel a delectatione, vel ab honestate, vel a commodo naturae, quae omnes verae bonitates sunt (omitto appetitum boni in communi, in quo non est deceptio). Unde in propria ratione formalis quae movet nunquam etiam est deceptio, sed haec intervenit in applicatione huius rationis formalis ad hanc vel illam rem, et
 140 hac ratione movet quidem res quae apparet bona; ratio autem movens non est apparens sed vera bonitas, quamvis tali rei
 145 145R
 150 150R

13. That, nevertheless, usually seems difficult in this conclusion: if final causality is true and real, how can an aspect that is only imagined or thought to be suffice for this causality? For real causality cannot arise except from a real principle. But that merely apparent goodness is nothing real, but rather a fiction. Therefore, it cannot really cause. Indeed, such a goodness, since it is not in things but in reason alone, does not seem able to be sufficient for moving the will metaphorically. For the will is not brought to things except insofar as they are good.

14. I respond, first, that this final causality is real in such a way that it comes about in a kind of moral or intellectual way through the natural sympathy that there is between the will and intellect. And for this reason no real being in the cause is required for it except that which suffices for the motion between these powers through their natural harmony. And because for that it is enough to have being represented as real in the intellect even if this is not true in reality, for that reason apparent goodness can also suffice for final causality, even if it is not true. And St. Thomas says almost this in the cited place: elicited desire follows apprehended form and therefore apprehended or deemed goodness is sufficient for its motion even if the apprehension is not true.

15. But one can further add that it is one thing to speak about goodness but another to speak about a good thing. For a thing that is not truly good sometimes moves the will, in which sense the posited conclusion—namely, that sometimes a merely apparent good final-causes—proceeds. Nevertheless, it can still be said that the will is never moved except by true goodness. For it is never moved except by delight, or honesty,³ or by an advantage to nature, all of which are true goodnesses (I pass over the appetite for good in general, in which there is no deception). Hence, there is never deception in the proper formal *ratio* which moves; deception comes up in the application of this formal *ratio* to this or that thing. And for this reason a thing which [merely] appears good does indeed move. But the moving *ratio* is not apparent but true goodness, although it is falsely attributed to such a thing. So,

³Suárez uses the traditional threefold division of good into *honestum*, *delectabile*, and *utile*—see n. 16. Translation of these terms is liable to lead to unhappy results. For example, one might be tempted to translate *honestum* with ‘moral good’ or ‘virtuous good’, but those English expressions really do not cover a wide enough range of cases. I will here translate the terms with the archaic expressions ‘honesty’ or ‘honest good’, ‘delight’ or ‘delightful good’ (‘pleasure’ would be another option), and ‘useful good’. Suárez discusses this division in more detail in *DM* X.

falso attribuat. Ut verbi gratia, si quis amat furtum ut ex illo eleemosynam faciat, movetur quidem a bono existimato, tamen a vera bonitate et honestate, scilicet, ab honestate misericordiae quam in tali actu esse existimat. Et idem est cum
 155 homo quaerit aliquod obiectum quod putat esse delectabile, in re tamen delectabile non est, nam ille veram quaerit delectationem et ab ea tantum movetur, errat tamen illam applicando rei in qua vere non est. In hoc ergo sensu dici potest
 160 rationem causandi finaliter semper esse veram aliquam bonitatem, quamvis non semper sit verum aliquod bonum, quia non semper apprehenditur talis bonitas aut iudicatur de re in qua vere existat.

16. Dico tertio: solum illud bonum quod in se seu per se bonum est, est sufficiens ad causalitatem finalem exercendam. Declaratur, nam bonum, ut supra tractavimus, tantum est aut honestum, aut delectabile, aut utile; ex quibus duo priora sunt in se ac per se bona, tertium vero solum per habitudinem ad illa, quae omnia ibidem explicata sunt. Igitur duo priora bona sufficiunt ad causalitatem finalem exercendam, quod facile probari potest. Nam causalitas finis in duobus consistit, vel in alterutro eorum, scilicet, quod voluntatem moveat ut finem propter se et alia propter ipsum diligat aut exsequatur; utrumque autem horum praestare potest utrumque ex illis bonis. Nam bonum honestum propter se est maxime expetibile tamquam per se decens, vel per sese naturae conveniens; immo haec est ipsa ratio boni honesti, ut dicto loco notavimus cum
 165 D. Thoma, I, q. 6, a. 6. De bono autem delectabili ait idem D. Thomas, I-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, ex Aristot., X Ethic., c. 2, stultum esse quaerere propter quid appetatur, nam ipsa delectatio per se habet unde appetibilis sit. Haec ergo duo bona sufficientia sunt ad causandum primam motionem in finem propter seipsum.

17. Ex hac autem motione nascitur altera, quae est ad media propter finem; nam illud idem bonum quod propter se amatur movet ad amandum alia propter ipsum, si necessaria vel utilia sint ad bonum propter se amatum obtinendum. Utrumque ergo ex his bonis per se sufficiens est ratione suae bonitatis ad causalitatem finalem exercendam quoad utramque

for example, if someone loves theft in order to give alms with what is stolen, he is indeed moved by something thought good. Nevertheless, he is moved by true goodness or honesty, namely, by the honest goodness of mercy which he thinks there is in such an act. And it is the same in the case of a human being who seeks some object that he thinks is delightful but which in reality is not delightful. For he seeks true delight and is only moved by that, yet he errs in attributing it to something in which it really is not. In this sense, therefore, one can say that the *ratio* of final-causing is always some true goodness, although there is not always some true good thing. For such goodness is not always apprehended in or judged to be in a thing in which it truly exists.

16. I say thirdly: only that good which in or of itself is good is sufficient for exercising final causality. It is shown: for good, as we discussed earlier, is either honest good, delightful good, or useful good. Of these, the former two are good in and of themselves, but the third is only good through a relation to those two. All this is explained in the same place. Therefore, the former two goods suffice for exercising final causality, which can easily be shown. For the causality of the end consists in two things or in one of them, namely, that it moves the will so that the end is loved or attained for its own sake or other things for its sake. But either of these can play the part according to these goods. For an honest good is especially desirable for its own sake as being right in itself or as agreeable in itself to nature. Indeed, this is the very nature of honest good, as we noted in the cited place with St. Thomas, *ST* Ia.6.6. Moreover, St. Thomas says the same thing about delightful good in *ST* IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1 in accordance with Aristotle, *EN* X, c. 2: it is foolish to ask why it is desired, for delight itself has of itself that which makes it desirable. Therefore, these two goods are sufficient for causing a first motion to the end for its own sake.

17. Moreover, from this motion there arises another, which is the one to the means for the sake of the end. For that same good which is loved for its own sake moves one to loving other things for its sake, if they are necessary or useful for obtaining the good that is loved for its own sake. Therefore, either of these goods is in itself sufficient by reason of its goodness for exercising final causality with respect to either

190 eius partem. In quo munere sese habent mutuo sicut excedens
 et excessum, nam bonum delectabile et quoad nos plus movere
 solet et ad se trahere appetitum, et delectatio quodammodo
 est ultima perfectio operationis propter se amabilis; at vero
 195 et natura sua potentius est ad hanc causalitatem exercendam et
 nobiliores etiam effectus potest in hoc genere causare. Quin
 potius, si naturae institutionem spectemus, solum honestum
 bonum habere debet propriam rationem finis, nam delectatio
 200 ex intentione naturae non est propter se, sed propter opera-
 tionem cui adiungitur, et ideo propter illam amari debet, de
 quo alias latius.

18. De bono autem utili, cum non sit per se bonum, satis
 manifestum apparet non esse sufficiens ad causalitatem finalem
 exercendam, quia bonum utile ut sic non est per se amabile; 200R
 205 ergo non est sufficiens ad primam motionem finis exercendam.
 Rursus quatenus utile est, non est id propter quod aliud ama-
 tur, nam potius ipsum amatur propter aliud; ergo neque se-
 cundam motionem seu causalitatem finis exercere potest. Quin
 210 potius sub ea ratione est effectus finis, quia est id quod alterius
 gratia fit vel amatur; ergo bonum utile ut sic non potest causali-
 tatem finalem exercere. Sola ergo bonitas honesta, sive moralis
 sive naturalis, et bonitas delectabilis, potest esse propria ratio
 205R causandi finaliter. Hic vero occurrebat statim difficultas de
 210R mediis, an possint causalitatem finalem exercere, quam melius
 215 tractabimus sectione sequenti.

part of it. In service of this they are mutually related as exceeding and
 exceeded, for delightful good both usually moves us more and draws de-
 sire to itself more and delight in a certain way is the ultimate perfection
 of activity that is lovable for its own sake. But, on the other hand, hon-
 190R est good, by the fact that it is greater and in itself more noble, of itself
 and by its nature is more powerful for exercising this causality and can
 also cause more noble effects in this genus. But rather, if we regarded
 the institution of nature, only honest good ought to have the proper
ratio of an end, for delight is not for its own sake by the intention of
 195R nature but is added to it for the sake of activity. And for this reason de-
 lightful good ought to be loved for the sake of honest good, concerning
 which more is to be said elsewhere.

18. But concerning useful good, since it is not good in itself, it ap-
 pears obvious enough that it is not sufficient for exercising final causal-
 ity, since useful good as such is not lovable for its own sake. Therefore,
 it is not sufficient for exercising the first motion of an end. On the
 other hand, insofar as it is useful, it is not that for the sake of which
 something else is loved, for it is itself rather loved for the sake of some-
 thing else. Therefore, it cannot exercise according to the motion or
 causality of the en. But it is rather an effect of the end under that as-
 pect, because it is that which is done or loved for the sake of another
 thing. Therefore, useful good as such cannot exercise final causality.
 Therefore, only honest good, either moral or natural, and delightful
 good can be a proper *ratio* for final-causing. But here a difficulty about
 means immediately comes up: whether they can exercise final causality.
 We will better discuss this in the following section.