

© Sydney Penner 2011

<858, col. b><sup>2</sup>

*Quid sit, vel in quo consistat ratio causandi, seu causalitas causae finalis.*

1. Non inquirimus nunc rationem causandi in actu primo, ut sic dicam, seu id quod in finali causa  
5 est proxima ratio qua potens est ad sic causandum, de hoc enim dicemus sectione sequenti: sed inquirimus causationem ipsam in actu secundo. Quid nimirum sit, et ubi seu in quo subiecto vel  
10 effectu sit: hoc enim, cum in caeteris causis ad explicandum sit difficile, in hac revera est difficillimum, quia non apparet, quae res, vel quis modus realis esse possit haec causalitas: quod si nihil horum est, nec realis causalitas esse poterit.

*Prima sententia expenditur.*

15 2. Quidam ergo ab hac difficultate se facile expediunt, causalitatem hanc nihil aliud <859> esse, nisi quod actio vel effectus fiat propter finem, seu gratia finis. Aristoteles enim non aliter explicuit hanc finis causalitatem, nisi dicendo  
20 *esse id cuius gratia aliquid fit.* Unde Caietanus 2. 2. q. 17. art. 5. optime docet, quod sicut in agente est ratio agendi, quae est in ipso, et effectus, et causalitas, quae est quasi media inter rationem agendi et effectum, ita in fine sunt illa tria, ratio

*What a final cause's ratio of causing or causality is or in what it consists.*

1. We are not now investigating the *ratio* of causing in first act (as I will put it) or investigating that the proximate *ratio* in a final cause is by which it has the power to cause in that way. We will speak about that in the following section.<sup>3</sup> But here we are investigating causation itself in second act: namely, what it is and where or in what subject or effect it is. Although this is difficult to explain in the case of the other causes, it is actually most difficult in the case of final causes. For it is not clear what real thing or mode this causality can be. But if it is neither a real thing nor a real mode, then it cannot be a real causality.

*The first view is considered.*

15R 2. Some thinkers easily resolve this difficulty, saying that this causality is nothing other than that an action or effect comes to be for the sake of or on account of an end. For Aristotle did not explain this causality otherwise than by saying that 'it is that for the sake of which something comes to be'. Hence, Cajetan in *IIaIIæ.17.5* well teaches that just as in the case of an agent there is the *ratio* of acting which is in the agent, the effect, and the causality (which is as it were a means between the *ratio* of acting and the effect), so also in the case of an end there are these three: the *ratio* of final-causing, final-

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>DM XXIII.5.

25 finalizandi, finalizatio, et effectus. Ait vero, finaliza-  
 tionem esse quid innominatum, solumque signifi-  
 cari per haec verba, *esse id cuius gratia*, seu *feri*  
*propter aliud*, neque posse causalitatem hanc ampli-  
 30 etiam ubi sit. Nam si dicatur esse in voluntate, contra  
 hoc est imprimis, quia hoc nec salvari potest  
 in voluntate Dei, neque in naturalibus agentibus,  
 quae etiam operantur propter finem. Et deinde  
 35 inquirendum est in nostra voluntate quid illud sit,  
 nam vel est aliquid antecedens actum elicited ab  
 ipsa voluntate: et hoc non, iuxta veram, et sanam  
 doctrinam, quia in voluntate nihil recipitur ante  
 actum ab ipsa elicited, ut supra satis probatum  
 40 est agendo de concursu primae causae. Omitto  
 habitus supernaturales, qui aliquando infunduntur  
 ante omnem actum, quia illi habent locum  
 potentiae, vel complent illam, et ita non veniunt in  
 praesentem considerationem. Item, quia si quid  
 45 reciperetur in voluntate, deberet habere aliquod  
 principium efficiens extra ipsam, quod nullum est  
 praeter ipsam causam finalem, haec autem ut sic  
 non est activa: alias confunderentur causalitates.  
 Praeterquam quod finis sine reali esse haberet ef-  
 50 ficientiam. Et ideo Aristoteles merito dixit 1. *De*  
*generatione et corruptione* text. 55. *Causa cuius*  
*gratia caetera fiunt, activa non est, et sanitas ipsa*  
*non est activa nisi per translationem*. Nec vero dici  
 potest, illud principium esse intellectum, vel ac-  
 tum eius, quia improbable est intellectum se solo  
 55 posse aliquid imprimere voluntati: et deinde ex-  
 plicari non potest quid illud sit. Et praeterea est  
 id parum consentaneum libertati voluntatis. Aut  
 vero illud quod in voluntate dicitur esse causalitas  
 finis, est ipsemet actus voluntatis: et hoc non,  
 60 quia hic est effectus, causatio autem debet esse  
 aliquo modo distincta ab effectu. Accedit praeterea,

25R causation, and the effect. But, he says, final-causation is  
 something unnamed and is only signified through the words  
 'being that for the sake of which' or 'coming to be for the sake  
 of something else'. Nor can this causality be explained further,  
 and it cannot be understood what else it is or even where it is.

30R For if it is said to be in the will, the fact that this cannot  
 be maintained in the case of the will of God or in the case  
 of natural agents (which also act for the sake of an end)  
 stands, first and foremost, against this claim. And, second,  
 one should ask what final-causality would be in our will. For  
 35R it might be [i] something antecedent to the act elicited from  
 the will itself. But not this, according to sound and true  
 doctrine, since nothing is received in the will before the act  
 elicited from it, as was sufficiently proven above in dealing  
 with the concurrence of the first cause.<sup>4</sup> (I set aside the case  
 40R of supernatural habits, which are sometimes infused prior to  
 all acts, since they have the position of a power or complete it  
 and thus do not enter into the present consideration.) [The  
 first option should be rejected] also because if something were  
 received in the will, it ought to have some efficient principle  
 45R beyond itself. But there is nothing beyond the final cause  
 itself. But the final cause as such is not active; otherwise,  
 the [kinds of] causalities would be confused. In addition,  
 an end without real being would have efficient power. Thus  
 Aristotle rightly said in *De generatio et corruptione* I [324b  
 50R 14-16] that 'the cause for the sake of which other things  
 come to be is not active, and health itself is not active except  
 metaphorically'. But neither can it be said that this active  
 principle is the intellect or one of its acts. For it is improbable  
 55R that the intellect can by itself impress something on the will  
 and, furthermore, it cannot be explained what such a thing  
 [that the intellect impresses on the will] would be. Besides,  
 this would be insufficiently in harmony with the freedom of  
 the will.

60R Or [ii] that very act of the will itself is that in the will which  
 is said to be the causality of the end. But this is not right  
 either, since that act is the effect. Causation, however, ought

<sup>4</sup>Passage?

quod in actibus imperatis non poterit explicari quid sit haec causalitas, quia in huiusmodi actibus nihil immediate influit ipse finis: multoque minus explicari poterit in effectibus Dei, et naturalium agentium. <col. b>

3. Haec sententia in eo magnam difficultatem habet, quod rem non declarat, nam per illa verba, *id cuius gratia*, non tam declaratur causalitas finis, quam denominatio quaedam resultans in ipso fine ex eo, quod aliud ad ipsum ordinetur: quae denominatio non potest esse causalitas, tum quia non est aliquid rei in effectu, sed aliquid rationis in causa, seu denominatio extrinseca, quod idem est: quod enim Deus sit id cuius gratia res fit, non est aliquid intrinsecum in rebus, neque in Deo ipso, sed est denominatio extrinseca Dei a rebus ipsis desumpta. Tum etiam quia in illis verbis non significatur finis ut principium, sed potius ut terminus: et ideo non significatur emanatio aliqua vel influxus causae finalis in effectum, quod videtur esse de ratione omnis causalitatis. Et confirmatur primo, quia alias in omni motu respectu sui termini esset propriissima causalitas finis, et in omni actu respectu sui obiecti: consequens est falsum: ergo. Sequela patet, quia terminus est id cuius gratia est motus, et obiectum cuius gratia est actus. Minor vero patet, quia alias causalitas finis non magis conveniret obiecto voluntatis quam aliarum potentiarum: nec magis esset in rationali motione, quam in naturali. Unde confirmatur secundo, quia alias, quamdiu res est gratia alicuius finis, tamdiu actu causaretur a tali fine, ut potentia visiva, quae est propter actum videndi, vel propter obiectum visibile, semper actu causaretur ab illo fine, quia semper durat illa denominatio, quod haec potentia est propter suum actum vel

to be distinct in some way from the effect. Furthermore, there is the danger that it will not be possible to explain what this causality is in the case of commanded acts, since in acts of this kind the end itself gives no influx immediately. And much less will this view be able to explain final causality in the case of God's effects and in the case of natural agents.

3. This view has a great difficulty in it in that it does not reveal the matter. For the causality of the end is not so much revealed through those words 'that for the sake of' as a certain denomination resulting in the end itself from the fact that something else is ordered to it. This denomination cannot be the causality, partly because there is nothing of the thing in the effect but [rather] something of reason in the cause or an extrinsic denomination (which is the same thing). For the fact that God is that for the sake of which something is made is not something intrinsic in things nor in God himself but is an extrinsic denomination of God taken up from the things themselves. Partly also because the end is not signified as a principle in these words but rather as a *terminus*. And therefore no emanation or influx of the final cause into the effect is signified. [But] this seems to belong to the nature of all causality. And it is confirmed first because otherwise there would be a most proper causality of the end in every motion with respect to its *terminus* and in every act with respect to its object. The consequent is false. Therefore. The consequence is clear, because the *terminus* is that for the sake of which the motion is and the object for whose sake the act is. But the minor is clear, since otherwise the causality of the end would not be more fitting to the object of the will than [to the objects] of other powers. Nor would it be more in rational motion than in natural. Whence it is confirmed, secondly, since otherwise a thing would be caused actually by such an end just as long as it is for the sake of some end. For example, a visive power, which is for the sake of the act of seeing or for the sake of the visible object, would always be caused actually by that end, because that denomination (that this power is for the sake of its act or

100 obiectum: quae denominatio manere potest vel ex  
actione praeterita, vel ex naturali propensione po-  
100 tentiae in suum actum vel obiectum. Consequens  
autem est falsum, quia actualis causalitas finis  
non est sine actuali causalitate agentis, ut statim  
dicam, per illam ergo denominationem non satis  
105 declaratur causalitas finis. Praesertim quia omnes  
ponunt hanc causalitatem in motione metaphorica,  
quae non satis declaratur per sola illa verba, nisi  
res amplius exponatur.

*Expenditur secunda sententia.*

4. Secundus modus explicandi hanc causalitatem  
esse potest, illam esse quamdam metaphoricam  
motionem: quod ita in communi sumptum est ex  
5 Aristotele 1. *De generatione et corruptione* c. 7. et  
D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. et aliis locis quae  
statim referam. Tamen in modo explicandi hanc  
motionem est singu- <860> laris haec sententia:  
dicit enim, hanc motionem talem esse, ut ex se  
10 antecedit actum a voluntate elicited: non solum  
natura, sed etiam tempore, quia haec motio natu-  
rali quadam necessitate resultat ex causa finali  
sufficienter proposita: actus autem voluntatis in  
eius manet libertate. Unde licet haec motio re-  
15 spectu ipsius causae finalis sit veluti actus secun-  
dus, tamen respectu voluntatis se habet ut ac-  
tus primus. Quod explicatur et probatur in hunc  
modum, nam hoc ipso quod bonitas finis sufficien-  
ter est cognita et voluntati proposita, excitat illam,  
20 et quantum in se est, trahit eam ad sui amorem,  
voluntas autem, eo quod libera sit, potest sus-  
pendere suum proprium actum, ergo haec motio  
finis est distincta ab ipso actu voluntatis, et ante-  
cedit illum, ergo in hac motione consistit propria  
25 causalitas finis. Antecedens experientia constare

98 manere] manare V.

object) always endures. This denomination can remain either  
from past action or from the natural propensity of the power  
to its act or object. But the consequent is false, since the  
actual causality of the end does not exist without the actual  
causality of the agent, as I will point out shortly. Therefore,  
the causality of the end is not satisfactorily indicated through  
that denomination, especially since everyone considers this  
causality as metaphorical motion, which is not satisfactorily  
indicated through those words alone, unless the matter is  
explained more thoroughly.

*The second view is considered.*

4. The second way of explaining this causality can be that it is  
a kind of metaphorical motion. This is commonly taken from  
Aristotle, *De gen.* I, c. 7, and St. Thomas, Iallæ.1.1, and other  
5R places to which I will refer shortly. Nevertheless, this view  
is unusual in how it explains this motion. For it says that  
this motion is such that from itself it precedes the act elicited  
by the will, not only in nature but also temporally, because  
this natural motion results by a kind of necessity from the  
final cause having been proposed sufficiently. But the act of  
will remains in its freedom. Hence, although this motion with  
respect to the final cause itself is as a second act, with respect  
to the will, nevertheless, it is related as a first act.

This is explained and proven in this way: for by the fact  
that the goodness of the end is sufficiently cognized and  
proposed to the will, it excites the will and insofar as the  
end itself is concerned it draws the will to a love for it. But  
the will, as a result of being free, can suspend its proper act.  
Therefore, this motion of the end is distinct from the act of  
the will and precedes it. Therefore, the proper causality of the  
end consists in this motion. The antecedent seems obvious  
from experience and its foundation seems to be placed in  
a certain natural sympathy between the intellect and the  
will, insofar as they are rooted in the same essence of the  
soul. But the first consequence is known *per se*. The second,

videtur, et fundamentum eius videtur esse positum in sympathia quadam naturali, quae est inter intellectum et voluntatem quatenus in eadem animae essentia radican-  
 30 se nota est, secunda autem patet, quia nulla alia ratione videtur intelligi posse haec causalitas, tum quia quod proxime sequitur post hanc motionem in voluntate, est aliquis actus eius, qui, ut supra dicebam, non est causalitas, sed effectus causae  
 35 finalis: tum etiam quia, seclusa hac motione, in reliquis, finis non se habet ut causa, sed potius ut terminus specificans, qui potius participat causalitatem formae, quam habent omnia obiecta, quae specificant actus quarumcumque potentiarum.

40 5. Haec vero sententia imprimis est aliena a mente D. Thomae ubicumque ponit causalitatem finis in hac motione metaphorica, nam q. 22. *De veritate* art. 2. explicans hanc motionem inquit, *Sicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti seu desiderari: ubi  
 45 clare sentit non esse in actu influentiam causae finalis donec voluntas moveatur appetendo seu desiderando. Idem sentit q. 5. De potentia* art. 1. Et ratione probatur, quia est aperta repugnantia  
 50 quod sit finis causans in actu secundo, et quod non sit aliquid actu causatum, sed antequam voluntas eliciat actum, nihil est causatum in ipsa: ergo neque causalitas finis potest esse in actu secundo. Maior patet, tum quia causare et causari  
 55 sunt correlativa, tum etiam quia realis causalitas ad aliquid reale terminari debet, et in sese debet esse aliquid reale, alias esset nihil: si ergo in voluntate <col. b> nulla res nova, vel operatio, aut affectio inest, neque actualis causalitas  
 60 finis in illa esse potest: neque etiam est in intellectu ut per se constat: ergo intelligi non potest talis causalitas finis ante omnem actum voluntatis.

moreover, is obvious, because it seems that this causality cannot be understood by any other *ratio*, both [i] because what proximately follows after this motion in the will is some act of it which, as I said above, is not the causality but an effect of the final cause and [ii] because, setting aside this motion, the end is not related as a cause to the other [acts] but rather as a specifying *terminus* which participates more in the causality of the form, which [causality] all objects have that specify the acts of any power whatever.

35R 5. But this view is, in the first place, alien to the mind of St. Thomas, who everywhere places the causality of the end in this metaphorical motion. For in *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 2, he says when explaining this motion: ‘Just as for the efficient cause to have an influence is for it to act, so for the final cause to have an influence is for it to be sought (*appeti*) or desired (*desiderari*)’. He clearly does not think here that there is an actual giving of influx of the final cause until the will is moved to seeking or desiring. He thinks the same thing in *De potent.*, q. 5, a. 1. And it is proven by reason: there is an obvious repugnance between the claim that the end is causing in the second act and the claim that there is nothing that has actually been caused. But before the will elicited an act, nothing was caused in it. Therefore, neither can there be any causality of the end in the second act. The major is clear, both because to cause and to be caused are correlative and because real causality must be terminated in something real and must itself be something real. Otherwise it is nothing. If, therefore, there is no new thing in the will and no activity or affection in it, there cannot be an actual causality of the end in it. Nor can it be in the intellect, as is clear *per se*. Therefore, such a causality of the end before every act of the will cannot be understood. And it is confirmed,

Et confirmatur primo, quia finis non causat in actu, nisi agens etiam actu efficiat, nam, ut dixit Aristoteles, 3. *Metaphysicae* c. 2. text. 3., *finis, et id cuius gratia, alicuius actionis est finis*: et ideo dixit idem Aristoteles 1. *De generatione et corruptione* c. 7. cessante actione sistere etiam finalem causam, ergo eodem modo prius tempore quam actio agentis inchoetur, non potest esse in actu secundo causalitas causae finalis, sed antequam voluntas eliciat actum, nulla causa efficiens mota a fine aliquid actu agit, et e contrario nihil etiam actu fit propter finem: ergo neque ipse finis aliquid actu causat in voluntate. Ultimo confirmatur declarando rem ipsam, nam antequam voluntas moveatur eliciendo proprium actum, solum est obiectum bonum seu finis repraesentatus per cognitionem seu iudicium intellectus: in voluntate autem nihil est quod antea non esset: ergo in toto illo tempore nulla est excitatio distincta a iudicio: ipsum autem iudicium non est causalitas, sed sufficiens approximatio finis ut causare possit: ergo non potest intelligi causalitas finis in actu posita ante actum voluntatis. Maxime cum neque illa causalitas versari possit circa ipsam potentiam, cum ipsa nondum aliter se habeat, sed immutata maneat, neque circa actum ipsius voluntatis, cum ille nondum sit.

6. Dicit fortasse aliquis, has rationes concludere, hanc causalitatem finis esse aliquid novum in ipsa voluntate, quod sit proprius actus elicited seu consensus liber eius: nihilominus tamen esse posse novum aliquem modum se habendi, vel ut clarius dicamus, esse aliquem simplicem affectum, per quem sit actualiter et vitaliter propensa in finem, ut illum amet, vel intendat. Sed hoc non est constanter dictum in illa sententia, nam talis affectus, quacumque ratione fingatur in voluntate, non potest esse non elicited ab illa, alias non

first, because an end does not actually cause except an agent also actually effect, for, as Aristotle said in *Metaph.* III, c. 2, text. 3: 'the end and that for the sake of which is the end of any action'. And therefore the same Aristotle said in *De gen.* I, c. 7, that when an action cease the final cause also stops. Therefore, in the same way before the time in which the action of an agent is begun, the causality of the final cause cannot exist in second act. But before the will elicits an act, there is no efficient cause moved by an end that actually does something and, conversely, there is also nothing that actually is done for the sake of the end. Therefore, the end itself also does not actually cause something in the will. Lastly, it is confirmed by revealing the thing itself: for before the will is moved to eliciting a proper act, there is only a good object or end represented through the cognition of judgement of the intellect. But there is nothing in the will that was not there before. Therefore, in that whole time there is no excitation distinct from the judgement. But the judgement itself is not a causality but is a sufficient approximation of the end so that it can cause. Therefore, the causality of the end cannot be understood to be in the act posited before an act of the will, especially since that causality also cannot concern the power itself, since it does not yet hold itself otherwise but remains unchanged, nor can it concern the act of the will itself since it does not yet exist.

6. Perhaps someone will say that these arguments support the conclusion that this causality of the end is something new in the will itself that is a proper elicited act or a free consent to it. Still, nevertheless, there can be a new way of relating [to the end] or, so that we may speak more clearly, there can be some simple affect through which it is actually and vitally inclined to the end so that it loves or intends it. But this is not consistently stated in that view, for such an affect, for whatever reason it is constructed in the will, cannot fail to be elicited by it; otherwise, it could not be a vital motion or affection, but would be some quality in the mode of a habit

potest esse vitalis motio aut affectio, sed erit qualitas aliqua per modum habitus, vel actus primi, quae nulla ratione fingi aut cogitari potest, ut satis probant rationes hactenus factae. Si autem ille motus est elicited a voluntate, ille est quidam actus voluntatis: non ergo datur causalitas finis ante actum voluntatis.

7. Quod si dicatur, illum actum esse imperfectum, et per modum velleitatis, ut vocant, secundam autem sententiam, quam examinamus, esse intelligendam de perfecto actu, et consensu. Contra hoc obstat primo, quod ille actus, qualiscumque sit, est quidam effectus ipsius finis: ergo non est causalitas finis: vel si in illo distingui potest causalitas ab effectu, idem dici poterit de primo actu perfecto et consummato: neque erit necessarium recurrere ad talem actum imperfectum. Obstat secundo, quia causalitas quam finis exercet circa talem actum, in illo habet suum proprium effectum, et ideo illa non est causalitas propria et necessaria ad alium actum consummatum et perfectum, quam inquirimus, sed solum erit occasio et dispositio quaedam ad illum ulteriorem effectum. Tandem obstat, quia vel ille actus simplex est necessarius, aut liber, si est liber: ergo neque semper resultat ex sufficienti propositione finis, ut illa opinio dicebat: neque etiam oportet ut semper antecedit ante effectum consummati actus amoris, vel intentionis finis: non est ergo per se necessarius ad causalitatem finis, neque in illo potest talis causalitas consistere. Si vero ille actus naturaliter fit, et absque libertate, multo minus esse potest per se requisitus ad causalitatem finis circa actum liberum, et perfectum: huiusmodi enim actus vel motus imperfecti insurgunt

or first act, which cannot be imagined or thought of for any reason, as the arguments made so far sufficiently prove. But if that motion is elicited by the will, it is a certain act of the will. Therefore, no causality of the end is given before an act of the will.

7.<sup>5</sup> If it is said that that act is imperfect and in the mode of a velleity, as they say, but according to the view that we are examining it should be understood to be about a perfect act and consent, against this stands, firstly, the fact that that act, whatever it may be, is a certain effect of the end itself. Therefore, it is not the causality of the end. Or if the causality can be distinguished in that from the effect, one will be able to say the same thing about the first perfect and consummate act nor will it be necessary to have recourse to an imperfect act of this sort. Secondly, there stands against this the fact that because the causality which the end exercises concerning such an act has in that [act] its proper effect and therefore it is not the causality proper and necessary to another consummate and perfect act which we seek but will only be a certain occasion and disposition to that more ultimate effect. Finally, there stands against this the fact that either this simple act is necessary or free. If it is free, then it will not always result from a sufficient proposing of the end, as that opinion said. Nor is it necessary that it always precede before the achievement of a consummate act of love or intention for the end. Therefore, it is not *per se* necessary for the causality of the end nor can this kind of causality consist in that. But if that act happens naturally and without freedom, even less can it be *per se* requisite for the causality of the end concerning a free and perfect act. For imperfect acts or motions of this kind arise in us from a conjunction of appetirte or from some superior cause preceding our deliberation. And therefore these acts are only

<sup>5</sup>The paragraph numbering in the 1597 and Vivès editions diverges from here on (the 1597 includes this paragraph as part of num. 6).

in nobis ex coniunctione appetitus, vel ex aliqua superiori causa praeveniente deliberationem nostram, et ideo solum sunt utiles vel necessarii hi actus, supposita aliqua imperfectione nostra, per  
 140 modum dispositionis vel excitationis, non vero quia per se sint ad causalitatem finis requisiti. Unde in angelis, in Christi anima, in B. Virgine, et aliis fuit perfectus modus operandi ex causalitate finis, absque huiusmodi actibus. 130R

*Tertia sententia proponitur, et suadetur.*

8. Est ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalitatem in motione metaphorica. Addit vero, huiusmodi motionem non poni in actu  
 5 secundo, nisi quando voluntas ipsa in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur, in re non esse aliquid distinctum ab ipsomet actu voluntatis. Sed, sicut supra dicebamus, unam et eandem actionem prout fluit ab agente, esse causalitatem eius, ut vero inest materiae, esse etiam  
 10 causalitatem eius circa formam: ita aiunt unam et eandem actionem voluntatis causari a fine, et a voluntate ipsa, et prout est a voluntate, esse causalitatem effectivam, prout vero est  
 15 a fine, esse causalitatem finalem, et priori ratione esse motionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat a potentia ut a proprio principio physico, posteriori autem ratione esse motionem metaphoricam, quia manat ab obiecto alliciente, et trahente  
 20 ad se voluntatem. Haec sententia sumitur ex D. Thoma citatis locis et 1. 2. q. 9. art. 1. ubi ait finem movere metaphorice voluntatem, sentiens in hoc consistere causalitatem eius, quamvis non ita expresse id declaret. Tamen ex lib. 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 75. rat. 5. id clarius sumi 25R

useful or necessary on the assumption of some imperfection on our part through the mode of disposition or excitation, but not because they are *per se* required for the causality of the end. Hence, in angels, in the soul of Christ, and in the Blessed Virgin Mary, and others, there was a perfect way of acting from the causality of the end without acts of this kind.

*The third view is proposed and defended.*

8. There is therefore a third view that also constitutes this causality of the end in metaphorical motion. But it adds that a motion of this kind is not place in the second act except when the will is moved in the second act and when it is placed in that way in the thing there is not something distinct from the act itself of the will. But just as we said above that one and the same action insofar as it flows from the agent is its causality but insofar as it is in the matter it is also its causality with respect to the form, so also they say that one and the same action of the will is caused by the end and by the will itself and insofar as it is caused by the will it is effective causality but insofar as it is caused by the end it is final causality. And for the former reason it is real and proper motion, because such an action flows from the power as from a proper physical principle, but for the latter reason it is a metaphorical motion, because it flows from an object enticing and attracting the will to itself. This view is taken from St. Thomas, in the cited places and *ST IaIIæ.9.1*, where he says that the end moves the will metaphorically, thinking its causality to consist of this, although he does not expressly declare it in that way. Still, it can be taken more clearly from *SCG I, c. 75, rat. 5*, for St. Thomas says that ‘the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are desired for its sake’. From these words I gather that the desire itself by which something is desired

2 8] 7 A.

5 ipsa] *om.* V.

potest, ait enim D. Thomas *causalitatem finis in hoc consistere, quod propter illud alia desiderantur*. Ex quibus verbis colligo desiderium ipsum, quo aliquid propter finem desideratur, quatenus  
 30 est a fine, vocari a D. Thoma causalitatem finis. Rursus quod causalitas finis in hac motione metaphorica consistat, communis est loquendi modus apud auctores, ut patet ex Avicenna lib. 6. suae *Metaphysicae* tract. 5. cap. 5. Alberto  
 35 5. *Metaphysicae* tract. 1. cap. 3. et Hervæo *Quodlibeta* 2. q. 1, et clarius q. 8. §. Ad rationes. Soncinas 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 2. Sumitur etiam ex Alensi, 1. p. q. 17. membr. 3. Nullus tamen ita clare et expresse praedictam declaravit sententiam, sicut  
 40 Ocham in 2. q. 3. art. 2. ubi ait, causationem finis esse movere efficiens ad agendum: illud autem *movere*, non esse aliud nisi ipsum finem amari ab agente, vel aliquid propter ipsum. Unde inferius respondens ad quoddam dubium, ait, non esse prius  
 45 tempore causationem finis quam motionem agentis, saltem per amorem, aut volitionem qua vult effectum exsequendum propter finem, vel finem ipsum propter se.

9. Ratione videtur satis probari haec sententia impugnationibus aliarum, et a sufficienti partium enumeratione, quia nihil aliud cogitari potest, quod sit causalitas finis: neque etiam est aliud necessarium ut intelligatur voluntas moveri a fine, et in finem, et ut actus eius habeat dependentiam a fine ut finis est: ergo in eo tantum quod  
 50 haec sententia affirmat, consistit haec causalitas. Confirmatur, ac declaratur a simili, nam actus potentiae cognoscitivae pendet et ab obiecto, et a potentia: unde causalitas tam obiecti quam potentiae nihil aliud est, quam ipsamet actio quatenus  
 60 fluit ab obiecto et a potentia, nam ut est ab obiecto dicitur causalitas eius, ut vero est a potentia, est

for the sake of the end, insofar as it is from the end, is called the causality of the end by St. Thomas. On the other hand, that the causality of the end consists in this metaphorical motion is a common way of speaking among authors, as is clear from Avicenna, *Metaph.* VI, tract. 5, c. 5; Albert [the Great], *Metaph.* V, tract. 1, c. 3; Hervæus [Natalis], *Quodl.* II, q. 1, and more clearly in q. 8, §Ad rationes; and Soncinas, *Metaph.* V, q. 2. It is also taken from [Alexander] of Hales, I p., q. 17, membr. 3. No one, however, declares the stated opinion as clearly and expressly as Ockham, II, q. 3, a. 2, where he says that the causation of the end is to move the efficient cause to acting. But that 'to move' is nothing other than for the end itself to be loved by the agent or something for its sake. Hence, later when responding to a certain doubt, he says that there is no causation of the end earlier in time than there is a motion of the agent, at least through the love or volition by which the agent wills to pursue an effect for the sake of the end or the end for its own sake.

9. This view seems satisfactorily proven against the attacks from the other sides by reason and by a sufficient enumeration of parts. For nothing else can be thought of that is the causality of the end. Nor is anything else needed to understand that the will is moved by the end to the end and to understand that its act has a dependency on the end as an end. Therefore, this causality consists only in that which this view affirms. It is confirmed and established by analogy: for an act of the cognoscitive power depends both on its object and on the power. Hence, the causality of the object as well as of the power is nothing other than the action itself insofar as it flows from the object and from the power. For as it is from the object it is called the object's causality, but as it is from the power it is called the power's causality. In this way,

causalitas illius: sic igitur actio voluntatis simul ac fit, necessario pen- <862> det a voluntate, et a fine: illa ergo eadem actio quatenus est a voluntate est dependentia activa ab illa, quatenus vero est a fine, est dependentia finalis. Est enim quoad hoc diversitas inter finem et obiectum potentiae cognoscentis, nam obiectum potentiae cognoscitivae concurrat efficienter ad actum eius, mediante aliqua forma reali qua coniungitur, vel per suammet entitatem si per illam possit ei uniri: bonum autem voluntati propositum solum finaliter concurrat ad actum eius, quia solum movet metaphorice attrahendo, propositum per cognitionem, etiamsi aliter in re non existat.

*Quarta sententia reiicitur.*

Vide  
Fonsecam  
lib. 5. *Meta-  
physicae*  
q. 13.

10. Sunt vero qui dicant, hanc causalitatem finis non esse actionem voluntatis, ut dependentem a fine, sed e contrario esse ipsummet finem per intellectum obiective propositum, ut influentem in suo genere, seu concurrentem ad actum voluntatis. Quod si inquiras quid sit concursus ille, vel quid addat supra ipsum finem, respondent nihil ei intrinsecum addere, sed connotare actualem dependentiam effectus a tali causa. Sed, licet hic modus dicendi in hoc cum praecedenti conveniat, quod in hac causalitate nullam aliam rem intervenire dicit praeter ipsum finem voluntati obiectum medio intellectu, et actum vel affectum inde resultantem in voluntate, et denominationes inde insurgentes, quibus et finis dicitur causare actum, et actus pendere a fine, nihilominus tamen in eo displicet, quod ipsum finem dicit esse suam causalitatem, seu concursum suum ad actum, quia concursus nunquam significat causam ipsam, sed aliquid quod proxime profluit a causa in suo genere, quo causet effectum, sive illud distinguatur aliquo modo in re ipsa ab effectu, sive tantum ratione, quatenus concipitur

therefore, the action of the will happens at the same time and necessarily depends on the will and on the end. That same action, therefore, insofar as it is from the will is an active dependence on the will but insofar as it is from the end it is a final dependence. For with respect to this there is a difference between the end and the object of a cognoscitive power. The object of a cognoscitive power concurs efficiently for its act, by the mediation of some real form by which it is conjoined or through its own entity if it can be united to it through that. But the good proposed to the will only concurs finally for its act, because it only moves metaphorically by attracting [the will], having been proposed through cognition even if it does not otherwise exist in reality.

*The fourth view is rejected.*

10. But there are some who say that this causality of the end is not an action of the will as dependent on the end. Rather, they say, it is the end itself objectively proposed through the intellect, as giving influx in its genus or concurring with the act of the will. But if you ask what this concursus is or what it adds beyond the end itself, they answer that it adds nothing intrinsic to it but connotes an actual dependence of the effect on a cause of this kind. But, although this way of speaking in this matter can agree with the preceding [way] in saying that nothing else comes up in this causality beyond the end itself placed before (*obiectum*) the will by means of the intellect and the act or affect thereby resulting in the will and the denominations thereby arising by which both the end is said to cause the act and the act is said to depend on the end, it displeases, nevertheless, in that it says that the end itself is its causality or concursus with the act, because the concursus never signifies the cause itself but something that proximately flows forth from the cause in its genus by which it causes the effect. The former thing is distinguished in some way in reality itself from the effect or it is distinguished at least in reason, insofar as it is conceived as that by which (*quo*) and that which (*quod*). We spoke about this matter above when

See Fonseca,  
*Metaph. V*,  
q. 13.

25 ut quo et quod. De qua re diximus supra trac-  
tando de causalitate causae efficientis, est autem 25R  
eadem proportionalis ratio **de finali**. Immo in hac  
est quodammodo maior ratio, quia finis interdum  
causat non existens actu, sed tantum obiective in  
intellectu.

30 11. Sed aiunt etiam non esse necessarium ut  
concursum finalis causae realiter existat, quando  
ipsa actu causat, sed satis esse si existat obiective. 30R  
Hoc tamen non recte dicitur, quia esse obiective  
tantum est cognosci: at vero ut causa finalis actu  
35 causet, non est necesse concursum eius actu cogi-  
tari aut cognosci, sed sufficit cogitare de bonitate  
talis causae: et e converso quamvis ille concursus 35R  
sit in esse obiectivo per formalem ac expressam  
cogitationem de illo, et de eius convenientia, id  
40 satis non est ut effectus ponatur in voluntate, ut  
per se constat, quia stante tota illa cogitatione  
potest voluntas non moveri. Igitur licet causa fi-  
nalis secundum suum esse aut bonitatem suam 40R  
sit tantum obiective in intellectu, tamen ut actu  
causet, oportet ut actualis concursus eius in re  
45 ipsa ponatur, quia hic concursus in re non est ali-  
ud a dependentia effectus a sua causa, ut autem  
causa actu causet, oportet ut effectus in re ipsa  
actu causetur, ergo et quod dependeat realiter a  
50 causa, ergo et quod concursus actualis, seu, quod  
idem est, dependentia actualis in re ipsa existat, et  
non tantum in intellectu, immo hoc posterius est 50R  
impertinens. Quia vero haec dependentia huius  
effectus causae finalis ab illa solum consistit in  
55 intrinseca quadam habitudine ad talem causam,  
quae habitudo in re ipsa existere potest, et termi-  
nari ad causam ut existentem tantum obiective  
in intellectu, inde est, quod possit causa finalis  
60 actu causare existens tantum obiective, non possit  
autem causare actu, nisi causalitas eius existat re-  
aliter, per habitudinem ad ipsam causam obiective

dealing with the causality of the efficient cause. There is here  
the same proportional *ratio*. Indeed, there is in a certain way a  
greater *ratio* here, because the end sometimes causes without  
actually existing but only existing objectively in the intellect.

11. But they also say that it is not necessary that the  
concursum of the final cause really exist when it actually  
causes, but that it is enough if it exist objectively. Yet this is  
not said rightly, because to be objectively is only to be cognized.  
But for a final cause actually to cause it is not necessary  
that its concursum actually be thought of or cognized; it is  
enough to think about the goodness of such a cause and,  
35R conversely, although that concursum is in objective being  
through the formal and express cogitation about it and about  
its agreeability, that is not enough for the effect to be placed  
in the will. This is clear in itself, since the will can fail to be  
moved with the standing of that whole cogitation. Therefore,  
40R although the final cause according to its being or its goodness  
is only objectively in the intellect, in order for it actually to  
cause, nevertheless, its actual concursum must be placed  
in the thing itself, because this concursum in the thing is  
nothing other than the dependency of the effect on its cause.  
45R But in order for a cause actually to cause, the effect must  
actually be caused in the thing itself. Therefore, it must  
also depend in reality on the cause. Therefore, an actual  
concursum or, what is the same thing, an actual dependence  
in the thing itself must exist, and not only in the intellect  
50R (indeed, whether it exists in the intellect is irrelevant). But  
because this dependence of this effect of the final cause by  
that only consists in a certain intrinsic relation to such a  
cause, which relation can exist in the thing itself and can  
be terminated in the cause as existing only objectively in the  
55R intellect, it follows that a final cause can actually cause even  
though existing only objectively, but it cannot cause actually  
except its causality exist in reality through a relation to the  
objectively existing cause.

existentem.

*Tertia sententia eligitur, et resolvitur quaestio.*

12. Unde ex impugnatione huius ultimae sententiae magis explicata et confirmata manet tertia, quae sine dubio vera est, et optime satisfacit quoad  
 5 hunc effectum quem finis habet intra voluntatem creatam, et quoad causalitatem eius. Neque contra illam quidquam obstat obiectio supra facta, quod  
 10 actus voluntatis potius est effectus quam causalitas finis. Nam imprimis in ipsomet actu voluntatis possumus distinguere actionem ab actu, et actum  
 15 dicemus esse effectum, actionem vero quatenus in suo genere est a fine, esse causalitatem eius, sicut proportionaliter dicendum est de causalitate efectiva. Deinde etiamsi in illo actu non distinguantur  
 20 ex natura rei illae duae rationes, sed fingatur esse pura actio, nihilominus non repugnat ut eadem res quae est effectus causae, in eo genere in quo est effectus sit etiam causalitas, quando ille effectus est ipsamet actio, suffi- <863> citque distinctio  
 25 rationis ut distinguantur per modum causalitatis vel per modum effectus, sicut in causalitate activa manifeste constat.

13. Difficilius videri alicui potest quod eadem omnino res, seu realis modus sine ulla distinctione in re sit causalitas finis et efficientis, cum  
 25 tamen istae causae diversarum rationum sint. Sed si considerentur superius dicta de causalitatibus aliarum causarum, cessabit admiratio. Nam etiam eadem unio diversis respectibus est causalitas materiae et formae, licet illae causae diversarum rationum sint: immo eadem mutatio ut est actio, est  
 30 causalitas agentis, ut vero est passio, est causalitas materiae, quamvis actio et passio re non distinguantur, et similiter eadem actio diversis respectibus est causalitas primae causae et secundae. Et ratio est, quia una et eadem actio per  
 35

*The third view is chosen and a question is resolved.*

12. Hence, as a result of the attack from this last view, the third view remains better explained and confirmed. It is without doubt true and most satisfactory with respect to this effect which the end has in created will and with respect to  
 5R the end's causality. Nor does the objection made above that the act of the will is more the effect rather than the causality of the end pose any obstacle to it. For, in the first place, we can distinguish in that very act of the will the action from the act. And we will say that the act is the effect but the action,  
 10R insofar as in its genus it is from the end, is its causality, just as should proportionately be said about effective causality. Next, even if these two *rationes* were not distinguished in reality in that act, but it was imagined to be a pure action, still, there is no repugnance in the same thing which is an effect of the cause in that genus in which it is an effect also being a causality, when that effect is the action itself. And a distinction of reason is sufficient in order to distinguish through the mode of causality or through the mode of effect, just as is manifestly obvious in the case of active causality.

13. It can seem more difficult to someone that entirely the same thing or real mode without any distinction in reality is the causality of the end and of the efficient cause, since these causes are nevertheless of different natures. But the surprise will cease if the things stated above about the causalities of other causes are considered. For there is the same union of different respects with the causality of matter and of form, although these are causes of different natures. Indeed, the same change as it is an action is the causality of the agent but as it is a passion is the causality of matter, even though the action and passion are not distinguished in reality. And likewise the same action in different respects is the causality of the first cause and of a second cause. The reason is that one and the same action in itself can be immediately caused

seipsam potest immediate causari a multis causis, 35R  
 ab unaquaque in suo genere: atque ita mediante  
 illa causatur effectus ab eisdem causis, ideoque  
 40 per comparationem ad unamquamque earum est  
 causalitas uniuscuiusque, et e contrario est pro-  
 pria dependentia talis effectus a tali causa.

14. Altera difficultas explicanda manet, quia 40R  
 licet haec ratio explicandi causalitatem finalem  
 45 satisfaciat quoad actus elicitos a voluntate creata,  
 non tamen satisfacit quoad actiones imperatas,  
 et effectus exteriores seu transeuntes (ut interim  
 omittamus voluntatem divinam, et actiones natu- 45R  
 ralium agentium, de quibus infra dicturi sumus)  
 50 videtur ergo, superiorem sententiam et doctrinam  
 non posse applicari ad praedictas actiones, et ef-  
 fectus, quia causa finalis non movet metaphorice  
 potentias subiectas voluntati, sed solum ipsam 50R  
 voluntatem, quae postea non finaliter sed effective  
 55 movet aut applicat inferiores potentias ad actiones  
 earum: ergo finis ut sic nullam propriam causalitatem  
 habet in has actiones, vel illa non consistit  
 in tali motione metaphorica.

15. In hac re imprimis statuendum est effec- 60  
 tus exteriores, qui per has actiones producuntur, 55R  
 in tantum esse posse effectus causae finalis, in  
 quantum actiones per quas fiunt, causantur aliquo  
 modo in suo genere a causa finali, et ab ea pendent,  
 quia, ut supra cum Aristotele dicebamus, causa  
 65 finalis non causat actu, nisi quando agens agit 60R  
 aliquid propter finem. Unde sicut effectus factus  
 ab agente, si ab eo non pendet in <col. b> conser-  
 vari, sed tantum in fieri, cessante actione iam non  
 causatur, sed causatus est, ita idem effectus prout  
 70 est causatus a fine propter quem factus est, 65R  
 cessante omnino actione agentis propter finem, iam  
 non causatur a fine, sed causatus est, et manet or-  
 dinatus in finem, vel per intrinsecam habitudinem

by multiple causes by each in its genus. And so by means  
 of that the effect is caused by the same causes and for that  
 reason it is the causality of each of them through relation to  
 each of them. And, conversely, there is a proper dependence  
 of such an effect on such a cause.

14. There is another difficulty that remains to be ex-  
 plained, since, although this way of explaining final causality  
 satisfies with respect to the acts elicited by a created will, it  
 does not, nevertheless, satisfy with respect to commanded  
 actions and external or transeunt effects (as for the time being  
 we pass by the divine will and the actions of natural agents,  
 about which we will speak below). Therefore, it seems that the  
 above view and doctrine cannot be applied to the mentioned  
 actions and effects, because a final cause cannot metaphor-  
 ically move the powers subject to the will but only the will  
 itself. Afterwards the will moves or applies the lower powers to  
 their actions but does so effectively not finally. Therefore, the  
 end as such either has no proper causality in these actions or  
 it does not consist in metaphorical motion of this kind.

15. In this matter it should, in the first place, be estab-  
 lished that the external effects which are produced through  
 these actions can only be effects of the final cause to the  
 extent that the actions through which they come about are  
 causes in some way in its genus by a final cause and to the  
 extent that they depend on it. Because, as we said above with  
 Aristotle, a final cause does not actually cause except when  
 the agent does something for the sake of the end. Hence,  
 just as an effect that has been made by an agent—if it does  
 not depend on the agent in being conserved but only in be-  
 ing made—is not presently caused but was caused since the  
 action has already ceased, so also the same effect as it was  
 caused by the end for the sake of which it was made is not  
 presently caused by the end but was caused since the action  
 of the agent for the sake of the end has already wholly ceased.

75 seu propensionem, vel per extrinsecam denomina-  
 tionem seu relationem ab actione praeterita. 70R

16. Relinquitur ergo tota difficultas circa ac-  
 tiones imperatas, nam eo modo quo illae causatae  
 fuerint a fine, erunt causalitates eiusdem finis re-  
 spectu effectuum seu terminorum, nam per illas 75R  
 80 pendebunt huiusmodi effectus a causa finali, et  
 solum ratione illarum dicentur fieri propter talem  
 finem. De ipsis ergo actionibus imperatis dici  
 potest, quamvis physice et secundum entitatem  
 actio externa sit distincta ab interiori actu volun- 80R  
 85 tatis, tamen in ratione actionis, et in ordine ad  
 causalitatem finis habere rationem unius, et ab  
 eadem causalitate seu metaphorica motione oriri,  
 quia finem, verbi gratia, metaphorice movere ad  
 volendum scribere, et ad scriptionem ipsam, non 85R  
 90 sunt duo, sed unum et idem, quia illa duo ita sunt  
 connexa, ut separari non possint, loquor enim  
 de volitione quae est per modum usus, et prox-  
 ime imperat actionem externam scribendi. Unde  
 ulterius dici potest, causalitatem finalem, quam 90R  
 95 diximus esse in actu interiori, et cum ipsa actione  
 elicita identificari, esse simul causalitatem ipsius  
 actus interioris et exterioris, qui cum illo neces-  
 sario coniungitur, quamvis diverso modo, nam re-  
 spectu interioris se habet proxime et intrinsece, 95R  
 100 respectu vero exterioris, magis extrinsece et re-  
 mote. Neque propter hanc rationem dicetur finis  
 causa per accidens externa actionis, cum omnino  
 necessario ac per se sequatur ex causalitate eius,  
 et ipse ita moveat voluntatem, ut simul, et per 100R  
 105 modum unius moveat ad executionem actionis  
 imperandae a voluntate. Neque etiam obstat quod  
 huiusmodi causalitas nihil addat actioni exteriori  
 nisi denominationem extrinsecam, quia talis actio  
 non dicitur effectus finis solum quia illa denomi- 105R

It remains ordered to the end either through an intrinsic re-  
 lation or inclination or through an extrinsic denomination or  
 relation from the past action.

16. There remains, then the whole difficulty about com-  
 manded actions, for in that way in which these were caused  
 by the end, they will be causalities of the ends themselves  
 with respect to their effects or *termini*. For effects of this kind  
 depend through those on the final cause; it is only by reason  
 of them that they are said to have been made for the sake of  
 such an end. Therefore, one can say about these commanded  
 actions that, although a an external action is distinct from  
 an interior act of will physically and according to its entity,  
 it, nevertheless, has the *ratio* of one in the nature of action  
 and in relation to the causality of the end and it arises from  
 the same causality or metaphorical motion. For the end, for  
 example, that metaphorically moves to willing to write and  
 the end that metaphorically moves to the written work itself  
 are not two but are one and the same, because those two  
 are connected in such a way that they cannot be separated.  
 For I am speaking about the volition which is in the mode of  
 use and which proximately commands the external action of  
 writing. Hence, one can further say that the final causality  
 that we said is in an internal act and that is identified with  
 the elicited action itself is at the same time the causality of  
 the internal act and of the external act. It is conjoined with  
 that necessity, although in a different way, for with respect  
 to the internal act it holds itself proximately and intrinsically,  
 but with respect to the external act more extrinsically and  
 remotely. Nor is the end for this reason called the cause *per*  
*accidens* of the external action, since the action follows wholly  
 necessarily and *per se* from the end's causality and the end  
 moves the will in such a way that it simultaneously and in  
 the mode of one moves towards the execution of he action  
 to be commanded by the will. And the fact that causality of  
 this kind adds nothing except an extrinsic denomination is  
 no objection, since such an action is not called an effect of  
 the end only because that extrinsic denomination is by the

110 natio extrinseca est a fine, sed quia ipsamet actio  
 prout hic et nunc fit, revera procedit ex motione  
 finis in suo genere, etiamsi possit illa actio exte-  
 rior physice et entitative sumpta, fieri absque illa  
 motione metaphorica et propria causalitate finis, 110R  
 115 quia solum mediante actione interna a tali causa  
 <864> procedit. Eo vel maxime, quod haec causal-  
 itas quodammodo est moralis, et quasi artificiosa  
 et intellectualis, et ideo non est in omnibus ae-  
 quiparanda cum causalitate efficientis, quae est 115R  
 120 magis physica et realis. Atque ita simul responsum  
 est difficultati tactae in fine sectionis praecedentis,  
 et in hunc locum remissae.

17. Ultimo addi potest, ipsam actionem im-  
 peratam eo modo quo hic et nunc a tali agente 120R  
 125 progreditur, esse et effectum causae finalis per  
 modum actionis, et causalitatem eius respectu rei  
 factae propter illum finem per eandem actionem,  
 nam illa mediante pendet ille effectus a tali fine,  
 et nihil aliud est esse causalitatem, quam esse 125R  
 130 quasi viam qua pendet effectus a causa in tali  
 genere causae. In hac autem dependentia non  
 est considerandus effectus quasi materialiter ut  
 est talis res, sic enim non semper requirit illam  
 dependentiam per talem causalitatem, ut per se 130R  
 135 necessarium ad suum esse, sed considerandus  
 est formaliter, quatenus est effectus hic et nunc  
 tali modo factus, quo modo necessario includit or-  
 dinem ad talem actionem, et ad modum agendi  
 talis causae. Atque ita haec responsio fere coinci- 135R  
 140 dit cum praecedente, et utramque melius expli-  
 cabimus inferius, declarando causalitatem finalem  
 in effectibus Dei.

end. [It is also called an effect of the end] because the action  
 itself, as it happens here and now, really proceeds from the  
 motion of the end in its genus, even if that external action,  
 taken physically and entitatively can be made apart from that  
 metaphorical motion and proper causality of the end because  
 it proceeds from such a cause only by means of an internal  
 action, especially in view of the fact that this causality is in  
 a certain way moral and, as it were, skillful (*artificiosa*) and  
 intellectual. For this reason it should not be made equal in  
 everything to an efficient cause which is more physical and  
 real. And in this way there is at the same time a response to  
 the difficulty touched on at the end of the preceding section  
 and returned to in this place.

17. Lastly, one can add that the commanded action itself,  
 in the way in which it comes forth here and now from such an  
 agent, is both the effect of the final cause through the mode  
 of action and its causality with respect to the thing made for  
 the sake of that end through the same action. For by means  
 of that this end depends on an end of that kind. And to be  
 causality is nothing other than to be, as it were, the way by  
 which an effect depends on a cause in that kind of genus  
 of cause. But in this dependency the effect should not be  
 considered materially, as it were, as it is such a thing. For it  
 does not always require that dependency in this way through  
 such a causality as *per se* necessary for its being. Rather, it  
 should be considered formally insofar as it is an effect that  
 was produced here and now in such a way. In this way it  
 necessarily includes a relation to such an action and to the  
 way of acting of such a cause. And in this way this response  
 almost coincides with the preceding one. And we will better  
 explain both of them below when declaring the final causality  
 in the effects of God.