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<843, col. b>²

De causa finali in communi.

On the final cause in general.

Consecutionis
inter has
disputationes
ordo.

5 **Q**uamvis finalis causa praecipua quodammodo om-
nium sit, atque etiam prior, obscurior tamen est eius
causandi ratio, et ideo veteribus Philosophis paene
incognita fuit, ob quam ignorationem in alios errores 5R
circa rerum naturalium cognitionem inciderunt, ut
Aristoteles tractat, 2. *Physicae* cap. 8. et 1. *Meta-*
physicae et 1. *De partibus animalibus* in principio.
10 Ob hanc ergo rationem, licet in superioribus defini-
tum sit finem annumerandum esse inter quatuor 10R
causarum genera, ut hoc magis exponamus, et dif-
ficultates dissolvamus, inquirendum imprimis erit
an finis sit causa, deinde quomodo et quid causet,
15 quotuplex etiam sit finis, et quae sit uniuscuiusque
causandi ratio. 15R

Although the final cause is in a certain way the principal one
among all the kinds of causes, and even prior to the others,
the *ratio* of its causing is, nevertheless, more obscure. For
that reason it was almost unknown to the ancient philoso-
phers and because of this ignorance they fell into other errors
regarding the cognition of natural things, as Aristotle dis-
cusses in *Physics* II.8, *Metaphysics* I, and in the beginning
of *On the Parts of Animals*. For this reason, therefore, even
though it was determined above that the end is numbered
among the four genera of causes,³ in order to explain this
more thoroughly and to resolve the difficulties, we should first
inquire whether an end is a cause and then inquire how and
what it causes, how many kinds of ends there are, and what
the *ratio* of causing is for each of them.

The order of
inquiry in
these
disputations.

SECTIO 1.

SECTION 1.

An finis sit vera causa realis.

Whether an end is a true real cause.

Rationes
dubitandi.
Prima.

1. Ratio dubitandi imprimis est, quia de ratione cau-
sae est ut sit principium, ut ex definitione a nobis
superius tradita constat; sed finis non est princip-

1. The first reason for doubting that an end is a true cause is
that it belongs to the *ratio* of a cause to be a principle, as is
clear from the definition we gave above.⁴ But an end is not a

Reasons for
doubting.
First.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³DM XII.3.3.

⁴DM XII.2.4.

ium, nam potius opponitur principio, <844> ut ex
 5 ipso nomine finis constat, et significat Aristoteles 5R
 3. *Metaphysicae* text. 3.

Secunda. 2. Secundo, de ratione causae realis est ut per
 se ac realiter influat in effectum, ut supra in def-
 initione causae positum est; sed finis non influit
 10 esse realiter in effectum: ergo non est causa. Pro- 10R
 batur minor, quia vel finis influit antequam sit, vel
 postquam iam est: non primum, nam quod non
 est, quemnam realem influxum habere potest, cum
 fundamentum totius operationis, et similiter totius
 15 causalitatis sit esse? Neque etiam dici potest secun- 15R
 dum, quia quando finis est, iam tunc cessat actio et
 causalitas agentis: ergo iam non est tunc necessaria
 causalitas finis.

Tertia. 3. Tertio, quia nihil potest esse causa realis sui
 20 ipsius: sed forma, teste Aristotele, est finis genera- 20R
 tionis naturalis, qua ipsa forma fit, ut sanitas est
 finis curationis qua acquiritur: ergo quatenus est
 finis, non potest habere veram rationem causae re-
 alis. Dices, formam esse finem generationis, quae
 25 ab ipsa distinguitur. Sed contra, quia nihil potest 25R
 esse causa realis productionis rei, nisi sit etiam
 causa rei productae, quia non causatur res nisi per
 actionem qua fit: sed forma non potest esse causa

principle; rather, it is opposed to a principle, as is clear from
 the very name ‘end’ and as Aristotle indicates in *Metaphysics*
 III, text. 3 [996b22–24].

2. Second, it belongs to the *ratio* of a real cause *per se* and
 really to have an influence on the effect, as was posited above
 in the definition of cause.⁵ But an end does not really inflow
esse into the effect.⁶ Therefore it is not a cause. The minor
 premise is proven: either the end has an influence before it
 exists or after it already exists. But not the former, for what
 sort of real influence can something that does not exist have,
 given that being is the foundation of all activity and similarly
 of all causality? Nor can the latter be affirmed, since once
 the end exists, the action and causality of the agent cease at
 just that time. Therefore, the causality of the end is no longer
 necessary.

3. Third, [an end cannot be a real cause] because nothing
 can be a real cause of itself. But a form, as Aristotle testifies,
 is the end of the natural generation by which the form itself
 comes to be, as health is the end of the healing by which it
 is acquired. Therefore, insofar as a form is an end, it cannot
 have the true nature of a real cause.

You will respond that the form is the end of a generation,
 which is distinct from the form.⁷ But against this: for nothing
 can be a real cause of the production of a thing unless it is
 also a cause of the thing that is produced, since a thing is

⁵*DM XII.2.4.*

⁶I will translate ‘*influxus*’ with ‘influence’, ‘*influer*’ with ‘to have an influence’, and transitive uses of the verb with ‘to inflow *X*’.

Forms of the verb ‘*influer*’ and the cognate noun ‘*influxus*’ appear throughout Suárez’s discussion of causation. Given that he defines cause as ‘a principle that *per se* inflows *esse* into another thing’ (*DM XII.2.4*: ‘*Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud*’), this is not surprising. It is, however, not entirely clear what the term means in this context nor how best to translate it. A paradigmatic use of the term would be to say that the Nile flows into (*influit*) the Mediterranean Sea. This might suggest that Suárez’s model of causation is one in which some of the being from the cause flows into or is transferred to the effect. Leibniz, however, famously castigates Suárez for using the term on grounds that it is ‘a most barbarous and obscure expression’ that is ‘metaphorical and more obscure than what it defines’ and, furthermore, only an inept stylist would use the verb transitively as Suárez does (*Philosophical Papers and Letters*, translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd edition [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1969], 126). Suárez himself, immediately after providing the just-quoted definition, says that the ‘inflows’ should not be taken in a strict sense (*DM XII.2.4*). He says it means the same thing as ‘give’ or ‘communicate’; a little later still he says that to say that something inflows being into a second thing is the same as to say that the second thing depends on the first (*DM XII.2.7*). For further discussion, see Eileen O’Neill, ‘*Influxus Physicus*’, in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony*, edited by Steven Nadler (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania University State Press, 1993), 27–55.

⁷Suárez imagines an objector who makes the unpromising suggestion that the form is only the cause of the generation, but not the cause of the form resulting from the generation. Hence, the form does not cause itself.

30 realis sui ipsius: ergo neque generationis qua ipsa
 forma fit. Unde confirmatur, nam causa realis dicit
 relationem realem ad effectum: finis autem non est
 capax huiusmodi relationis, tum quia vel quando
 causat, non habet esse reale, vel quando habet esse
 reale, nec causat, nec distinguitur ab effectu.

30R

35R

Quarta. 35 4. Quarta ac praecipue ratio dubitandi est,
 quia finis considerari potest aut in ratione principii
 moventis, et allicientis agens ad agendum, vel in 40R
 ratione termini ad quem tendit actio: haec enim
 duplex ratio distingui solet a Philosophis in obiecto
 alicuius potentiae, scilicet, obiecti motivi et termina-
 tivi: eademque distinctio locum habet in fine qui est
 obiectum voluntatis. Sed sub neutra ratione potest 45R
 finis habere veram rationem causae. Et imprimis de
 ratione termini videtur manifestum, tum quia ut sic
 potius habet rationem effectus quam causae, et ut
 sic est postremum actionis, non origo eius: denique
 ut sic non influit, sed potius aliarum causarum 50R
 influxus in illum tendit. Deinde neque sub altera ra-
 tione moventis potest habere rationem causae, nam,
 Aristoteles. 50 ut sentit Aristoteles 1. *De generatione et corruptione*
 text. 55. motio finis tantum est metaphorica: non
 est ergo vera et realis: <col. b> ergo non sufficit ad 55R
 causalitatem realem. Et confirmatur primo, quia
 etiam in Deo reperitur haec motio metaphorica fi-
 nis; nam revera Deus propter bonitatem suam, a
 qua eius voluntas metaphorice movetur seu allic-
 itur, communicat se creaturis, et tamen dici non 60R
 potest quod ille finis habet veram causalitatem circa

not caused except through the action by which it comes to
 be. But a form cannot be the real cause of itself and neither,
 therefore, can it be the real cause of the generation by which
 the form itself comes to be.

Hence, it is confirmed, for a real cause expresses a real
 relation to the effect. An end, however, is not capable of this
 sort of relation, because at the time when it causes it does not
 have real being and when it does have real being it neither
 causes nor is distinct from the effect.

4. The fourth and principal reason for doubting is that
 the end can be considered either as a principle moving and
 enticing the agent to act or as a terminus to which the ac-
 tion tends. For philosophers customarily distinguish these
 two *rationes*—namely, the motive object and the terminative
 object—in the case of the object of any power.⁸ And this same
 distinction applies to an end which is the object of the will.
 But under neither *ratio* can an end have the true *ratio* of a
 cause. In the first place, this is obvious when considered
 under the *ratio* of a terminus, both because as such it has
 the *ratio* of an effect rather than of a cause and as such it is
 what comes at the end of an action and not its origin. Finally,
 as such it does not have an influence; rather, the influence of
 other causes tends to it.

Fourth.

Next, the end cannot have the nature of a cause under the
 other *ratio*, that of a moving principle, since, as Aristotle holds
 in *On Generation and Corruption* I, text. 55 [324b14–17], the
 motion of an end is merely metaphorical. Therefore, it is not
 true and real. Therefore, it does not suffice for real causality.
 And this is confirmed, first, because this metaphorical motion
 of an end is found even in God. For God indeed communicates
 himself to creatures for the sake of his goodness, by which
 his will is metaphorically moved or enticed, and yet it cannot
 be said that that end has true causality on God. And it is

Aristotle.

⁸Francisco Toletus makes the distinction between a motive object and terminative object when talking about the object of the intellect. The motive object is that which imprints the species on the intellect even though it is not what is cognized by the intellect. This Toletus takes to be the sensible phantasm, which moves one's intellect to understanding. The terminative object is that which is cognized by the intellect. This he takes to be the nature included in the phantasm and represented by the species. See his *Commentaria in tres libros Aristotelis De anima* (Cologne, 1594), 131v. Cf. Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), vol. 2, 283. The distinction seems to come up more often when discussing the intellect, but another place where Suárez refers to it when discussing the will is *DFH* 1.1.5.

60 Deum. Et confirmatur secundo, quia si finis sub
 hac ratione tantum habet rationem causae: ergo
 saltem respectu agentium naturalium non potest
 finis esse causa realis, quia non potest illa movere 65R
 seu allicere ad sui amorem.

Quinta. 5. Atque hinc oritur quinta difficultas, quia
 65 hinc evertitur totum fundamentum, ob quod a
 Philosophis introductum est hoc genus causae,
 nimirum quia agentia naturalia non operantur casu
 aut fortuito, sed in determinatos fines suis action- 70R
 ibus tendunt. Ex hoc enim fundamento seu indi-
 70 cio solum colligitur, habere res naturales definitos
 terminos suarum propensionum et inclinationum
 naturalium: id enim satis est ut non casu, sed per
 se operentur determinatos effectus, etiamsi nullum 75R
 aliud genus causalitatis intercedat. Sicut dicunt
 75 Theologi aeternum Patrem per se ac definite tendere
 (ut sic loquar) per generationem in talem terminum,
 nempe in hunc Filium, non ex causalitate finis, sed
 ex determinatione naturae. Et in naturalibus lapis 80R
 naturali inclinatione definite tendit in locum infer-
 80 num, etiamsi locus ille nullum genus causalitatis
 habeat circa illum motum, sed solum rationem ter-
 mini, ad quem lapis habet naturalem propensionem.
 Idemque dici potest de operante per appetitum elici- 85R
 tum sive ex necessitate, sive libere, quod nimirum
 85 moveatur motu elicitio in obiectum sibi propositum,
 quia talis motus consentaneus est inclinationi nat-
 urali ipsius potentiae in tale obiectum, absque alia
 causalitate illius obiecti in talem actum: ergo nul- 90R
 lum est sufficiens fundamentum ut fini tribuamus
 90 veram rationem causae.

Sexta. 6. Sexta et ultima difficultas sit, quia non potest
 satis explicari quid, vel circa quid finis causet. Aut
 enim causat aliquid in ipsum agens: et hoc non

confirmed, second, because if an end has the *ratio* of a cause
 under this notion alone, then—at least with respect to natural
 agents⁹—the end cannot be a real cause, because it cannot
 move or entice [such agents] to love it.

5. And from here a fifth difficulty arises, since from the
 foregoing the whole foundation on account of which this genus
 of cause was introduced by the philosophers is overthrown—
 namely, because natural agents do not act by chance or
 fortuitously, but rather tend to determinate ends with their
 actions. For from this foundation or evidence one can only
 gather that natural things have defined termini by their nat-
 ural inclinations and propensities. For this is sufficient so
 that they act *per se* to determinate effects and not by chance,
 even if no other genus of causality is involved. Just as the
 theologians say that the eternal Father *per se* and in a de-
 fined way tends (as I will say it) through generation to such
 a terminus, namely, to this Son, not by the causality of an
 end but by the determination of nature.¹⁰ And among natural
 [things], a stone tends in a defined way to a lower place by
 a natural inclination, even though that place has no genus
 of causality with respect to the stone's motion but only the
ratio of a terminus to which the stone has a natural propen-
 sity. And the same can be said about one acting through an
 elicited appetite, whether from necessity or freely. In such
 a case the appetite is moved with an elicited motion to an
 object proposed to it, because such a motion is appropriate
 to that power's natural inclination to such an object, without
 there being any other causality of that object on such an act.
 Therefore, there is no sufficient foundation for attributing the
 true *ratio* of a cause to an end.

Fifth.

6. Let the sixth and final difficulty be that one cannot
 satisfactorily explain what or with respect to what an end
 causes. For either [i] the end causes something in the agent

Sixth.

⁹Suárez uses the term 'natural agents' for agents that lack intellect and will. See *DM XXIII*.10.

¹⁰'Generation' refers here to the relation of generation between the Father and the Son in the Trinity, a relation commonly thought to be a non-causal relation. See *ST Ia*.33.1 and Suárez, *De Deo Uno et Trino* tract. III, lib. 2, cap. 2, par. 8.

95 potest universe dici, quia licet in agentibus creatis
 95 voluntariis possit aliquo modo defendi, non tamen
 in agentibus naturalibus, nec in Deo, qui est agens
 voluntarium increatum. Vel causat aliquid in ipso
 effectu, et hoc habet in universum difficultatem
 supra tactam in tertio argumento; et praeterea ha-100R
 100 bet specialem difficul- <845> tatem in agentibus
 voluntariis creatis, quia tota causalitas finis, qualis-
 cumque illa sit, videtur versari circa voluntates tal-
 ium agentium: circa effectus autem eorum non
 nisi remote, et per accidens, ideoque effectus non 105R
 105 habebunt propriam causam finalem.

Quaestionis resolutio.

Aristoteles. 5 7. Nihilominus statuenda est conclusio certa, finem
 esse veram, propriam, ac realem causam. Hoc est
 receptum dogma, et quasi primum principium in
 Philosophia, et Theologia. Illud docuit Aristoteles
 2. *Metaphysicae* cap. 3. et lib. 11. cap. 1. et 5R
 Plato. 2. *Physicae* cap. 3 et sequentibus et ante illum
 docuerat Plato in *Phaedone*, ubi in eadem sen-
 tentiam refert Socratem: immo ille solum finem
 vult esse causam, forte per antonomasiam, id est,
 10 primam et praecipuam: de quo dicemus infra in 10R
 10 et de causa, nam finis esse dicitur *propter quem*
 15 *aliquid fit, vel est*: in hunc enim modum Aristoteles 15R
 15 finem ubique describit: constat autem, particulam
 illam *propter* causalitatem significare: unaquaeque
 enim res propter causam suam dicitur habere esse:

itself—and this position cannot be universally affirmed, since, although it can in some way be defended for created voluntary agents, it cannot, nevertheless, be defended in the case of natural agents or in the case of God, who is an uncreated voluntary agent—or [ii] the end causes something in the effect itself—and this position has the general difficulty touched on in the third argument above.¹¹ In addition, it has a special difficulty in the case of created voluntary agents, since the whole causality of the end, of whatever kind it is, seems to be concerned with the wills of such agents and not with their effects except remotely and *per accidens*. And so the effects will not have a final cause proper to them.

The resolution of the question.

7. Nevertheless, the settled conclusion that an end is a true, proper, and real cause should be established. This is the received teaching and, as it were, a first principle in philosophy and theology. Aristotle taught it in *Metaphysics* II.3 [995a18–20] and XI.1 [1059a37–9] and in *Physics* II, Chapter 3 and following. And before him Plato had taught it in the *Phaedo* [97C], where he ascribes the same view to Socrates. Indeed, he wants only the end to be a cause, perhaps speaking antonomastically, meaning that the final cause is the first and preeminent cause. We will discuss this below when comparing the causes.¹²

The reason for this, moreover, can first be taken from the common way of speaking about the end and about the cause. For the end is said to be that ‘on account of which something comes to be or is’.¹³ For Aristotle everywhere describes the end in this way. Moreover, it is obvious that the phrase ‘on account of’ signifies causality, for each thing is said to have

Aristotle.

Plato.

¹¹*DM XXIII.1.3.*

¹²*DM XXVII.1.8.*

¹³I usually prefer translating ‘*propter*’ with ‘for the sake of’ in contexts where a relation to an end is meant, but the point being made here is best brought out precisely by using a translation with a wider range of meanings, e.g., ‘on account of’, in order to highlight that the Latin term has a similarly wide range.

ergo signum est finem habere rationem causae.
 Praeterea, causa efficiens nisi temere agat, alicuius
 20 gratia agere debet: ergo et ipse effectus causae effici- 20R
 entis ut per se ab illa fieri possit, intrinsece postulat
 ut alicuius gratia fiat: ergo talis effectus sicut per
 se pendet ab efficiente ut a quo fit, ita in suo genere
 per se pendet ab aliquo cuius gratia fit: ille autem
 25 est finis: ergo per se pendet a fine: ergo e contrario 25R
 finis est vera causa eius rei quae propter finem fit.

8. Sed in hac re non tam oportet rationes multi- 30R
 plicare, quam rem exponere, ut difficultates solvan-
 tur, et finis causalitas, quae obscura est, declaretur:
 30 huc enim tendunt difficultates in principio positae,
 non ut res certa in dubium revocetur. Ut autem hoc
 distinctius fiat, distinguamus tria agentia propter 35R
 finem. Primum et supremum est intellectuale agens
 increatum, quod est solus Deus. In secundo ac
 35 medio ordine sunt agentia intellectualia creata: in-
 ter quae nobis notiores sunt homines, et ideo de
 illis semper loquemur, quamvis eadem ratio sit de 40R
 intelligentiis creatis. In tertio et infimo ordine sunt
 agentia naturalia, seu intellectu carentia, quamvis
 40 inter ea nonnulla sit differentia eorum, quae sen-
 sum et appetitum habent, et reliquorum, <col. b>
 quam etiam suo loco indicabimus. Causalitas ergo 45R
 finis licet suo modo locum habeat in actionibus ho-
 rum omnium agentium, tamen in creatis agentibus
 45 intellectualibus nobis notior est, et maiorem quam-
 dam proprietatem, et specialem modum habet; et
 ideo in illis peculiariter declarabimus hanc causal- 50R
 itatem finis, et expediemus difficultates circa eam

being on account of its cause.¹⁴ This, then, is a sign that the end has the *ratio* of a cause.

Furthermore, the efficient cause, unless it is to act blindly, must act for the sake of something. Therefore, the effect itself of the efficient cause, so that it can come to be *per se* by that cause, also intrinsically requires that it come to be for the sake of something. Such an effect, therefore, depends *per se* in its own genus on something for whose sake it comes to be, just as it depends *per se* on the efficient cause as that by which it comes to be. But that something is an end. Therefore, it depends *per se* on an end. Therefore, conversely, an end is a true cause of that thing which comes to be for its sake.

8. But in this matter it is not so much necessary to multiply reasons [for thinking that an end is a true cause] as to explain the matter so that the difficulties are resolved and the causality of the end, which is obscure, is revealed. For the difficulties set out in the beginning¹⁵ aim at this, not at calling a settled matter back into doubt.

Now, so that this may be done more clearly, let us distinguish three kinds of agents that act for the sake of an end. First and highest is the uncreated intellectual agent, which is God alone. In the second and middle rank are created intellectual agents. Human beings are better known to us of those in the second rank and so we will always speak of them, although the same nature belongs to created intelligences.¹⁶ In the third and lowest rank are natural agents or those lacking intellect, although among these there is some difference between those which have sense and appetite and the remaining ones, which we will also point out in the proper place.

Therefore, the causality of the end, although it has a place in its own way in the actions of all these agents, is, nevertheless, better known to us in created intellectual agents and it has more of a certain quality and special mode in

¹⁴This sentence would sound less plausible if translated as follows: 'Moreover, it is obvious that the phrase 'for the sake of' signifies causality, for each thing is said to have being for the sake of its cause.'

¹⁵*DM XXIII*.1.1–6.

¹⁶That is, angels.

insurgentes: postea vero de aliis agentibus dicemus.
 50 Igitur quod in agentibus creatis per intellectum et
 voluntatem intercedat causalitas finis, sufficiens
 argumentum sumitur ex humanis actionibus. Con- 55R
 stat enim nobis experientia, intendere nos cum hu-
 mano modo, id est libero et rationali, operamur,
 55 certum aliquem finem, in quem actiones nostras di-
 rigimus, et propter quem media eligimus: movemur
 ergo a fine, tum ad dilectionem seu intentionem sui, 60R
 tum ad eligenda et exsequenda media propter il-
 lum: haec autem motio aliquid est in rerum natura,
 60 non est enim aliquid imaginarium vel fictum per
 intellectum, et aliquod genus causalitatis est, quan-
 doquidem est origo operationum realium: est ergo 65R
 finis vera et realis causa. Et hinc etiam obiter con-
 stat hanc causalitatem maxime habere locum in
 65 agentibus intellectualibus, quia illa maxime pos-
 sunt cognoscere finem et media, et ordinem unius
 ad alterum, et propriam uniuscuiusque rationem. 70R

Rationes dubitandi solvuntur.

9. Argumenta in principio facta partim postulant
 difficultates proprias pertinentes ad Deum, et ad in-
 fima agentia naturalia, partim inculcant ea, quae de
 hac causa tractari possunt, haec autem sunt illa om-
 5 nia quae de caeteris causis tractantur, ut insinuavit 5R
 Caietanus 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. et 2. 2. q. 17. art. 5. scilicet,
 quae res possint finaliter causare, per quid
 seu quae sit illis ratio causandi, vel tamquam prin-
 cipalis ratio vel tamquam proxima. Item quae sit
 10 necessaria conditio, quis effectus: in quo denique 10R
 consistat eius causalitas, quod hic est omnium ob-

them. For this reason, we will explain this causality of the
 end especially in their case and resolve the difficulties that
 arise concerning this causality. But afterwards we will talk
 about the other agents.¹⁷

A sufficient argument for the claim that the causality of
 the end has a place in created agents through intellect and
 will is taken from human actions. For it is clear from our
 experience that, when we act in a human way, that is, freely
 and rationally, we intend some definite end towards which we
 direct our actions and for the sake of which we select means.
 Therefore, we are moved by the end, both towards a love or
 intention for it and towards electing and executing means for
 the sake of it. This motion, moreover, is something in reality,
 for it is not something imaginary or invented by the intellect.
 And it is some genus of causality, since it is a source of real
 operations. The end, therefore, is a true and real cause.

It is, by the way, also clear from this reasoning that this
 kind of causality is most at home in intellectual agents, since
 they in particular can cognize an end and means, the relation
 of one to the other, and the proper nature of each.

The reasons for doubting are answered.

9. The arguments made in the beginning¹⁸ in part pose dif-
 ficulties that pertain particularly to God and to the lowest
 natural agents and in part they emphasize those difficulties
 which can be discussed concerning this cause. These, how-
 ever, are all ones which are discussed with regard to the other
 causes, as Cajetan suggests in Ia.5.4 and IIaIIae.17.5: namely,
 which things can final-cause,¹⁹ and through what, or, what
 their nature of causing is, either as principal nature or as
 proximate. Also, what the necessary condition is and what
 the effect is. Finally, in what its causality consists, which [in
 the case of final causes] is the most obscure question of all.

¹⁷On starting with the human case as the better known case, cf. Aristotle, *The History of Animals* I.6.

¹⁸*DM XXIII*. 1. 1–6.

¹⁹I use this graceless locution instead of the potentially confusing ‘finally cause’ or the rather lengthy ‘cause in the manner of a final cause’.

scurissimum. Ne igitur omnia haec involvamus, et confundamus, in sectionibus sequentibus distincte tractanda erunt: ergo exacta argumentorum solutio usque ad finem disputationis erit expectanda. Nunc perfunctorie per singula discurremus.

Prima.
Finis vere principium.

10. Ad primum negamus minorem, scilicet, finem non esse principium, nam eo modo <846> quo est primum quid, habet rationem principii: est autem finis primus in intentione, quamvis sit ultimus in executione. Aristoteles autem in dicto loco 3. *Metaphysicae* non opponit finem omni principio, sed principio motus, per quod causam efficientem intelligit, quam distinguit a finali.

11. Ad secundum negatur minor scilicet, finem non influere realiter: ad probationem autem communis responsio est, finem influere quando non est in re, sed tantum in apprehensione seu cognitione. Sed distinctione opus est, tam ex parte finis, quam ex parte effectus seu actionis, quam finis causat. Nam, ut sectione sequenti dicam, finis alius est cuius gratia fit actio, alius vero cui finis acquiritur: item alius est finis formalis ut visio Dei, et alius obiectivus, ut Deus ipse: item finis causare potest desiderium sui, vel etiam potest causare quietem, vel delectationem, quae omnia mox declarabimus. Finis ergo cui, non causat nisi quando existit: dicitur enim finis cui ipsummet agens, quatenus propter se vel in suum commodum operatur, quod non potest facere nisi existat. Item finis obiectivus potest etiam supponi existens, quando finaliter causat, ut Deus, propter quem videndum ad bene operandum movemur. Rursus finis formalis, seu consecutio finis intenti non causat delectationem

Accordingly, lest we become overwhelmed and confuse all of them, they should be discussed separately in the sections that follow. A full solution to these arguments, therefore, should be expected only at the end of the disputation. At present, we will run perfunctorily through each one.

10. In reply to the first argument, we deny the minor premise, namely, that the end is not a principle. For in the way in which it is something first, it has the character of a principle. The end, moreover, is first in intention, although it is last in execution. Furthermore, in the place cited from *Metaphysics* III [996b22–24], Aristotle does not contrast the end with every principle but only with a principle of motion, by which he means an efficient cause which he distinguishes from a final cause.

First.
The end truly is a principle.

11. In reply to the second argument, I deny the minor premise, namely, that the end does not really have an influence. Now, a common response to the proof [for the minor premise] is that the end has an influence even when it does not exist in reality but only in apprehension or cognition. But a distinction is needed here, both on the part of the end and on the part of the effect or action caused by the end. For, as I will say in the following section, one end is that for the sake of which the action is done but another is that for which the end is acquired.²⁰ Also, a formal end (for example, the vision of God) is one thing and an objective end (for example, God himself) is another. Also, an end can cause desire for itself, or it can even cause rest or delight, all of which we will soon explain.

A *finis cui*, therefore, does not cause except when it exists. For the agent itself is called the *finis cui*, since it acts for its own sake or for its own advantage.²¹ and it cannot do this without existing.

Likewise, the objective end can also be assumed to exist when it final-causes (for example, God, for the sake of seeing

²⁰In the terminology that he explains in the following section (*DM XXIII.2.2–8*), the former is a *finis cuius* and the latter is a *finis cui*. If I act in order to get food for myself, then the food is the *finis cuius* and I am the *finis cui*.

²¹Note the assumption here that agents always have themselves as the *finis cui*.

45 seu fruitionem sui nisi quando existit, quia delecta-
 tio non est nisi de bono possesso: quod si sit de spe
 eius, tunc ipsa spes habet rationem imperfectae con-
 secutionis. In his ergo omnibus non procedit illud
 argumentum, quia existente fine obiectivo vel fine 50R
 50 cui (qui claritatis gratia posset subiectivus appellari),
 non cessat inquisitio, nec causalitas finis, nisi ad-
 sit etiam consecutio finis, et hac obtenta, quamvis
 cesset motus in finem per modum desiderii, non
 tamen per modum quietis et delectationis. Solum 55R
 55 ergo de fine formali, seu consecutione finis verum
 est per se loquendo quod causat sui desiderium
 quando non est in re, et de illo recte responsum
 est, sufficere quod sit in apprehensione et iudicio
 intellectus, eo quod eius motio intentionalis sit, et 60R
 60 (ut ita dicam) animalis, per sympathiam et conso-
 nantiam potentiarum animae, intellectus scilicet et
 voluntatis.

whom we are moved to act well). In turn, the formal end, or the attainment of the intended end, does not cause delight or enjoyment of it except when it exists, since there is no delight except when the good is possessed. If there is delight from hope for the intended good, then the hope itself has the character of an imperfect attainment. Therefore, the argument [for the minor premise] does not go through in any of these cases, since objective end or *finis cui* (which can be called the subjective [end] for the sake of clarity) existing does not cease the seeking [of the agent for the end] nor the causality of the end. This only ceases when the attainment of the end also arrives and, even once this is obtained, motion to the end in the way of rest and delight does not cease, although motion in the way of desire does then cease. Therefore, strictly speaking it is true only of the formal end or of the attainment of the end that it causes desire for itself when not existing in reality. And concerning this case, it was rightly responded that [for an end to cause desire] it is sufficient that it exist in the intellect's apprehension and judgement. This is because its motion is intentional and (as I will put it) animal, [coming about] through the sympathy and concordance of the powers of the soul, namely, the intellect and will.

Quid sit id
 quod finis
 causat.

12. Tertium argumentum postulat quid causet
 finis, et specialiter attingit difficultatem quomodo
 65 forma sit finis generationis naturalis, quod spec-
 tat ad difficultatem de naturalibus agen- <col. b>
 tibus infra tractandam: et ideo breviter nunc dicitur,
 finem causare desiderium sui, seu alium similem
 affectum erga seipsum, et ita non causare immedi-
 70 ate seipsum, sed aliquid distinctum a se. Et hinc
 etiam constat ad confirmationem, ex hac parte non
 repugnare relationem causae in fine esse realem:
 est enim sufficiens distinctio inter ipsam et talem ef-
 fectum, et quando ipse finis non sit in re distinctus
 75 ab effectu eius, dicemus inferius sect. 3. 80R

12. The third argument asks what an end causes and touches especially on the difficulty about how a form is the end of natural generation. This has to do with the difficulty about natural agents to be discussed below and so for now I will say briefly that the end causes desire for itself or another similar affection for itself. Thus, it does not immediately cause itself, but rather something distinct from itself. Hence, in response to the confirming argument [at the end of n. 3], it is obvious that as far as this goes it is not repugnant that the end's relation of being a cause be a real relation, since there is a sufficient distinction between the end and such an effect [for a real relation between them to be possible]. As for cases where the end itself is not distinct in reality from its effect, we will discuss them later in sect. 3.

What it is that
 the end
 causes.

13. An vero ex alio capite repugnet illam rela-

13. But whether it is repugnant from another source—

Soncinas. 80 tionem esse realem, nimirum, ex eo quod finis ipse non habet esse reale dum causat, res est dubia et controversa. Soncinas 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 3. et 85R
 Javellus. 80 Iavellus q. 6. aiunt, illud esse obiectivum, quod finis habet in intellectu, sufficere ut realiter referatur ad effectum: sed id difficile creditu est, nam illud esse obiectivum in ipso fine nihil rei ponit, sed solum denominationem extrinsecam ab actu qui realiter est 90R
 85 in intellectu: ille autem actus non refertur realiter ad effectum causae finalis, quia non concurrat per se ad illum, ut infra dicam. Melius ergo respondent, qui negant ad omnem causalitatem realem sequi relationem realem in causa: non est enim necesse ex 95R
 90 vi causalitatis, si aliae conditiones non concurrant, ut patet in causalitate Dei effectiva. Unde addo, etiamsi finis existat dum causat, non referri realiter ad suum effectum, quia in suo modo causandi est superioris cuiusdam rationis, quia ipse nullo modo ordinatur ad effectum, sed effectus ad ipsum. Quare 95
 95 etiamsi ex parte effectus admittatur hic relatio realis, quod est probabile, maxime quando effectus non tantum per extrinsecam denominationem, sed per intrinsecam habitudinem ordinatur in finem, iuxta 105R
 100 ea quae inferius declarabimus: nihilominus illa relatio censenda est non mutua. Effectus enim referri potest ad finem, quatenus ab eo pendet: unde, sicut ad hanc dependentiam satis est, quod finis praeexistat in mente, ita etiam sufficet ad realem 110R
 105 habitudinem transcendentalem, licet praedicamentalis forte non sit nisi ad finem actu existentem: tamen quia finis causat ut omnino immotus, et non ordinatus ad suum effectum, ideo non oportet ut ex parte eius relatio sit realis. Sicut enim Aristoteles dixit scientiam referri realiter ad scibile, non e 115R
 110

namely, from the end itself not having real being when causing—that that relation be real is a matter of doubt and controversy. Soncinas, *Metaphysics* V, q. 3, and Javellus, *Metaphysics* V, q. 6, say that the objective being which an end has in the intellect is enough for it really to be referred to the effect. But that is difficult to believe. For that objective being implies nothing real in the end itself, but merely an extrinsic denomination from an act which is really in the intellect. That act, moreover, is not really referred to the effect of the final cause, since it does not concur *per se* with it, as I will say below.

Therefore, those who deny that a real relation in the cause follows every real causality provide the better answer. For this is not necessary on the basis of causality, if other conditions do not concur, as is clear in the case of God's effective causality.²²

Hence, I add that, even if an end exists while it causes, it is not really referred to its effect, because it is in its own mode of causing of a kind of higher nature, since it is in no way ordered to the effect but the effect to it. For this reason, even if this real relation is admitted on the side of the effect—which is probable, especially when the effect is ordered to the end not only through an extrinsic denomination but through an intrinsic habitude,²³ as I will explain later—that relation, nevertheless, should be considered non-mutual. For an effect can be referred to an end insofar as the effect depends on the end. Hence, just as for this dependence it is enough that the end pre-exist in the mind, so also it is enough for a real transcendental habitude to obtain (although perhaps there is no categorical relation except to an actually existing end).²⁴ Nevertheless, because the end causes as something that is entirely unchanged and not ordered to its effect, therefore it is not necessary that the relation be real from its side. For just as Aristotle said that knowledge is really referred to

Javellus.

²²Suárez alludes here to the doctrine that God is not related to creatures with a real relation even though he is the efficient cause of creatures.

²³The Latin '*habitudō*' is often just another term for 'relation', but since Suárez tends to use it when he has in mind transcendental relations rather than categorical relations (see *DM* XLVII.3–4), I shall mirror the Latin word choice with the English cognate 'habitude'.

²⁴The view in the background here says that categorical relations require actually existing termini, while transcendental relations do not. For more on Suárez's account of relations, see *DM* XLVII.

contrario, ita nos dicere possumus de appetitione et appetibili: est enim eadem ratio; et similiter est eadem de appetibili et de fine. <847>

Cur motio finis
metaphorica 115
dicatur.

14. In quarto argumento multa tanguntur pertinentia ad Deum, et ad agentia naturalia: nunc illis omissis, concedimus causalitatem convenire fini ut habet rationem principii, et consequenter ut habet rationem moventis. Eius autem motio dicitur 125R
metaphorica, non quia non sit realis, sed quia non
120 fit per influxum effectivum, nec per motionem physicam, sed per motionem intentionalem et animalem: et ideo nihil obstat, quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas. 130R

15. Ad quintum, quidquid sit de agentibus naturalibus, de quibus postea, respondetur, modum operandi intellectualium creaturarum non posse intelligi sine causalitate finis, quia revera alliciuntur et moventur a fine ad operandum: et quamvis ipsa 135R
130 habeant naturalem propensionem ad obiecta seu fines, ad quos per proprios vitales actus moventur, tamen illa naturalis propensio non potest operari in suo genere, id est effective, nisi sufficienter applicato fine, et in suo genere concausante: et ita 140R
135 determinatio operationis, seu destinatio in certum scopum, quae cernitur in agentibus intellectualibus, manifeste procedit non ex sola inclinatione naturali, sed ex causalitate finis. Ad sextum, quantum hic locus patitur, satis explicatum est, quid, vel circa quid 145R
140 finis causet: integram vero huius rei tractationem trademus inferius.

120R

130R

140R

145R

the knowable, but not the other way around,²⁵ so we can say concerning desire and the desirable. For it is the same argument, and likewise it is the same for the desirable and for the end.

14. In the fourth argument many points pertaining to God and to natural agents are touched on. Setting those cases aside for now, we concede that causality is appropriate to an end insofar as it falls under the *ratio* of a principle and, consequently, insofar as it falls under the *ratio* of a mover. Its motion, however, is called metaphorical, not because it is not real, but because it does not happen through an effective influence²⁶ nor through physical motion but through intentional and animal motion.²⁷ And therefore nothing stands in the way of an end's causality being true and proper causality.

15. In reply to the fifth argument—whatever the case may be concerning natural agents, about which I will respond later—intellectual creatures' mode of operating cannot be understood without the causality of the end, because they are in reality enticed and moved to operating by the end. And, although intellectual creatures have a natural propensity to the objects or ends to which they are moved through their own vital acts, that natural propensity, nevertheless, cannot operate in its own genus, i.e., effectively, except by an end having been applied and co-causing in its own genus. And thus the determination of the operation or the resolution to a definite aim that is seen in intellectual agents obviously proceeds not from a natural inclination alone but from the causality of an end.

In reply to the sixth argument, as much as this place allows, it has been already been sufficiently explained what or with respect to what an end causes. But we will provide a complete discussion of this matter below.

Why the
motion of the
end is called
metaphorical.

²⁵*Categories* c. 7, 7b22–34.

²⁶That is, through the kind of influence that efficient causes have.

²⁷Note the significant homeoteleutonic omission in the Vivès edition in this sentence.