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<p. 316, col. b>

Whether every human wants happiness above all and of necessity (Utrum omnes homines velint de necessitate et summe beatitudinem?)

Does every human want happiness above all and of necessity? It seems not, because, according to Augustine in *de Trinitate* X, c. 1, what is not known cannot be desired. But the ultimate end is not known, because not everyone knows happiness. Therefore, not everyone desires it. The minor is clear in *EN* I and from diverse opinions concerning it.

Utrum omnes homines velint de necessitate et summe beatitudine?
Videtur quod non, quia secundum Augustinum 10. *de Trinitate*,
cap. 1. incognitum non potest appeti. Sed ultimus finis non est no-
tus, quia non omnes sciunt beatitudinem; ergo non omnes appetunt
eam. Minor patet 1. *Ethic.* ex diversa opinione circa eam.

Arg. 1.
Vide D. Thom.
dist. præsentis art.
1. q. 3.

Also, the damned do not desire it. Therefore, not all humans [desire it]. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is shown in two ways. First thus: someone who despairs concerning something, does not desire it or desires it feebly, as Augustine says in *de Trinitate* X. But the damned despair of happiness, because they are obstinate. Therefore, etc. Secondly thus: voluntary desire is not for the impossible. But happiness is apprehended as impossible for them by the damned. Therefore, etc.

Præterea, damnati non appetunt eam; ergo non omnes homines.
Consequentia patet; antecedens probatur dupliciter, primo sic, de
quo desperat aliquis, non appetit illud, vel tenuiter appetit, ut dicit
Augustinus 10. *de Trinitate*; sed damnati desperant de beatitu-

Arg. 2.

Cap. 1.

¹Latin text is from the Wadding edition, v. 21, pp. 316–17. The Wadding edition's scholia and commentary are not included here. Cf. the parallel passage in the *Reportata parisiensis*.

dine, quia sunt obstinati; ergo, etc. Secundo sic: Appetitus voluntarius <317> non est ad impossibile; sed apprehenditur beatitudo a damnatis ut impossibile ab eis; ergo, etc.

To the principal, if everyone of necessity desires happiness, they do not earn merit in desiring it. The consequence is false; therefore, also the antecedent. The consequence is shown [false] by Augustine in *de lib. arb.*, where he says that ‘no merit is earned in that which cannot be avoided’. The falsity of the consequent is shown: we earn merit in willing those things which are for the end. But the volition to the end is the cause of the volitions to those things which are for the end. Therefore, [we earn] even more in willing the end, because ‘that because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater extent’, first from the Posterior and secondly from the Metaphysics.

Ad principale, si omnes de necessitate appetant beatitudinem, non merentur appetendo eam; consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Consequentia probatur per Augustinum *de libero arbitrio*, ubi dicit quod *nullus meretur in eo quod vitare non potest*. Falsitas consequentis probatur, meremur volendo ea quæ sunt ad finem; sed volitio finis est causa volitionis eorum quæ sunt ad finem; ergo magis volendo finem, quia *propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis*, primo posteriorum et secundo Metaphysicæ.

Text. 5.
Text. 4.

Also, that it is not above all, that power does not wish some object above all, which allows some act to itself on account of another object, because distraction to diverse things makes remission in the act. But happiness in the will allows an act to itself, which is use. Therefore, it does not will happiness above all.

Præterea, quod non summe, illa potentia non vult summe objectum aliquod, quæ compatitur secum actum aliquem circa aliud objectum, quia distractio ad diversa facit remissionem in actu; sed beatitudo in voluntate compatitur secum actum, qui est *uti*; ergo non summe vult beatitudinem.

On the contrary, Augustine in *de Trinitate* XIII, c. 8 says that ‘everyone wills to be happy, as truth proclaims’. But if anyone or everyone wills it contingently, this will not be true because then some can not so will. Therefore, all humans will it of necessity.

Contra Augustinus 13. de Trinit. cap. 8. *Beati omnes esse volunt, ut veritas clamat.* Sed si aliquis, vel omnes vellent, contingenter eam, hoc non esset verum, quia tunc aliqui possent non velle; ergo de necessitate volunt eam omnes homines.

Also, Augustine seems to say that it is above all in the same book, c. 5, where he says that everyone wills happiness most ardently. Also, in book 2 of *Physics* and book 7 of *EN*, the Philosopher says: Just as the principle in speculative [reason], so the end in practical [reasoning]'. But the intellect necessarily assents to principles. Therefore, the will to the end.

Præterea, quod summe, videtur dicere Augustinus *ibidem* cap. 5. ubi dicit quod ardentissime beatitudinem omnes volunt. Præterea 2. *Physicorum*, et 7. *Ethicorum* dicit Philosophus: *Sicut principium in speculabilibus, sic finis in practicis*; sed <col. b> intellectus necessario assentit principiis; ergo voluntas fini.

Text. 89.
cap. 12.

Also, Anselm in *de concordia* c. 21 says that the will cannot not will what is most advantageous. But happiness is most advantageous. Therefore, it necessarily wills it. Also, that it is above all, the Philosopher in *EN* I says that they said it well that 'good is that which everyone desires'. And this is happiness. From this it can be argued that therefore that which everyone desires more is more good. But happiness is this sort of good. Therefore, etc.

Præterea, Anselmus *de concordia prædestin. et gratiæ cum libero arbitrio*, cap. 21. dicit quod voluntas non potest non velle summe commodum; sed beatitudo est summo commodum; ergo vult necessario eam. Præterea, quod summe, Philosophus 1. *Ethicorum*, dicit quod bene dixerunt *bonum esse, quod omnia appetunt*, hoc est beatitudo. Ex hoc potest argui, igitur magis bonum illud omnia magis appetunt; sed beatitudo est hujusmodi bonum; ergo, etc.

Cap. 26. Idem de
casu diaboli cap. 4.
Cap. 1.